B eing immodest, I've been in the role for 11 years now, and I do have a background in governance. I have a background in law and in finance with postgraduate [crosstalk]. [I'm so excited to be in the R&D] Global Value Fund as well. There's nothing like walking the talk. I think I complement Jonathan and the other board members in my understanding of LICs, particularly how they report performance, the way they market themselves. Yeah, that's probably it. It's a pretty easy LIC to be on, because Miles and Emma do, and the service providers, such an incredible job. Like Jonathan said, we've never seen a hiccup over the years, but we're still watching vigilantly, trying to trip them up, but not yet. Thank you, Chris. You could just see the proxies on that one, o kay. Again, Chris looking good for re-election. I'm not sure if you got more votes than me, but if we can compare notes afterwards. If there are no further questions, I'll formally put this resolution to the meeting and move to resolution four. Resolution four is the additional 10% placement capacity, placement facility, which is a special resolution. We need 75% of the votes. We traditionally seek this authority every year, although we haven't ever used it in the past, but it's just there in case something might happen, which gives the company an opportunity to do something quickly for the benefit of all shareholders. Are there any questions or comments on this resolution? Yes, sir. [crosstalk]. Yes. Under the governance regulations, you can only place 15% of your shares in a year without the approval of shareholders. That does not need any resolution. That is just something which you get every year as a listed company. This gives us an extra 10%. To take an extreme example, if Emma and Miles came across a financial institution to invest in on very attractive terms, in other words, probably would need to be a premium to NTA, and we wanted to take advantage of that quickly without going through the process of having to call a shareholders meeting 28 days, etc., this extra 10% would allow us to place the extra shares with them. That answers your question? [crosstalk] Thank you. Yes, sir. [crosstalk]. Yeah. I mean, if you look back through the history of GVF, I think you'll find that very consistent with the philosophy of Miles and Emma and of the directors, we haven't issued shares at a discount to NTA. Thanks to Miles, we pioneered a DRP which enabled shareholders to participate, but without diluting existing shareholders, issuing at a discount to rebound market if we're trading below NTA. There's clearly no intention to issue shares at a discount to NTA. Okay, a re there any other questions or comments? Sandra, a nything online from anybody there? If we could please see the proxies for that. Okay. You can see the proxies for that show that 75% in favor, 6% against, 18% open. That's likely to be carried. The final resolution, which is resolution five, is to ratify the issue of 12,617,970 fully paid ordinary shares pursuant to Listing Rule 7.4. This came out of the placement which was done earlier this year at NTA, effectively. That is just to ratify the issue of those shares. It is explained in the explanatory memorandum. Does anybody have any questions on this ratification of the ordinary shares? Yes, sir. [crosstalk] No, it was not. No. Yeah, we did the SPP, and then there was a placement as part of that. T hese shares need to be ratified, I believe because they are issued to Taylor Collison, who participated in it. What does the explanatory memorandum say? The wholesale shares. Yeah, the wholesale shares. They just have to be issued to the market. We actually w ere the lead manager on it. Taylor Collison provided the delivery versus payment, but the shares had to be registered on the exchange. Yeah. [crosstalk]. So it effectively reinstates some of the 15% capacity which we used previously. Okay, a re there any other questions on that resolution? Okay, a ny? [crosstalk]. That's a good point. We do try in the explanatory memorandum to keep it as simple as possible, but every notice of AGM has to go to the ASX. From my experience, and Sandra [crosstalk] experience it different, it can be very prescriptive in requiring you to set out a lot of detail, etc., which often obfuscates the message that you're trying to get across. That' s just the ASX. We'll take that on board, and then next year we'll try to make it simpler for you guys to understand. Maybe we should just stop asking. We haven't used it for a very long time. Yeah, true. Yeah, we haven't used it. Yes. N o, we'll get it. [crosstalk]. [crosstalk]. Yeah. I mean, we've had it, but to my knowledge, we've never actually used it. Yeah, exactly. Maybe next year's general meeting might be even shorter, because we may well not have that resolution if we do not need it. Okay, a ny other questions or comments on it? Yes. [crosstalk] I think that the limit on an SPP, which is a share purchase plan, that is a separate one. That is AUD 30,000 per shareholder. 15% itself does not limit the amount which any particular shareholder can subscribe for. Jonathan, just add, I think I'm right here. The SPP, because it's available to all shareholders, doesn't actually count in the 15%. The company can issue shares to new shareholders, which potentially could be disadvantageous, which is why everyone should be paying attention to us and asking us what we're doing. The 10% that we're allowed to do, and now we're asking for another 15%. The SPP, because it goes to all shareholders, also doesn't require a vote because everyone gets to participate. As we said, I mean, there's sort of things we can and can't say in the legal documentation. As Jonathan said, we've run the fund for 15 years. We've never issued shares at a discount. 11. 11 years. 15. 15. [Jumping out of my head]. If you blink, it'll be 15 years. [crosstalk] [crosstalk] It's really just, it's getting less relevant as we get up to the 300 mark. It's a nice-to-have that we've asked for each year whenever you [crosstalk]. Okay. Yes, sir. That's fine. [crosstalk]. It's just cost. [crosstalk]. [crosstalk] yah. It's just cost, y eah. The regulator has made it much more expensive to do a retail offering, y eah. To do a one for four, you have to do a prospectus. A TMD, and it's hugely hundreds, y eah. We have a [crosstalk]. For us, maybe not for [crosstalk]. [crosstalk] Yeah, you've got economies of scale. What do you think? To me, it's the fairest way to do it. Unfortunately, and we should all write the ASIC, e ffectively, what any sane person and everyone in the room believes is, you should be able to do a placement of a listed company and any person should be able to participate. [crosstalk] that's why you've got to do the prospectus, to allow every person to participate. The crazy thing is, so the wholesale investor can participate at say at a discount hypothetically, and then sell to the retail person immediately. The retail person gets jibbed. The terrible thing is, ASIC, they're using the shield thing to try to make it harder for people to be wholesale again, which is, they should be going the other way. If it's listed like New Zealand, then anyone can participate in it. We wouldn't get caught up. We would not have to do SPPs. Effectively, you could do an entitlement issue. Everyone could do it. The directors could just say, "Hello, we are going to do an entitlement issue. We will give it to all of you on a pro rata basis, but we are going to do it via a placement. We do not need a prospectus. We do not have to spend. S orry, Linda. That is our lawyer. We do not have to pay the lawyers. [crosstalk] value. [crosstalk] value. Yeah. In a formal role, [that was where his money was spent, though]. Yeah. It's a shame. It's disappointing. Sorry. Yeah, we've been on that bandwagon for a while. Yeah. Right to your local MP. Yep. Okay. Any other questions or comments on that? Okay, I will formally put that resolution to the meeting, and I now declare the poll open. Steve [Hodkin] will conduct the poll and collect the voting cards. If you just want to hand them in. I mean, to come back to your point on capital raising, my sort of DNA of working as a lawyer in the late 1980s was, the fairest thing for all shareholders is a pro rata renounceable rights issue, b ecause then if you've got discount, premium, whatever it is, everybody has the chance to benefit fairly. The costs and the complexities is what drives us not doing it. Okay, a ny more? [crosstalk]. Yeah, [crosstalk]. Okay, a ll the cards are in? [crosstalk] around the room. [crosstalk]. Yeah, d emocracy. In action. Exactly. Live. [crosstalk]. You guys can leave [crosstalk]. That's right. Yeah, I think it's all been going on. I'm about to declare the poll closed. Is that all done? All done, all dealt? Okay, I'll declare the poll closed, and the results will be available later today on the website and released to the ASX. I formally declare the meeting closed, and I'm delighted to hand over to Miles and Emma for their presentation. Good morning, everybody. Gosh, thank you so much for being such a great turnout. It's awesome. Today's session is going to be a bit educational. We're going to talk a little bit about GVF, give you an update there. We 'll do the macro update with Miles. We want to talk about two tectonic changes that we see happening in financial markets that we think people should be aware of. It's pretty educational as opposed to anything else. That is the agenda. I'm going to start off with the GVF update. For those that are new, allow me to spend just a few minutes on what we do and what we have done over the last 11 years. The first thing that GVF looks for when making an investment is a discount. Trading at a discount is when the company is worth less than the assets that that company owns. Here in Australia, there are about 100 or such companies that have this ability to trade at a discount. Globally, there are thousands, and it is about a market cap of around $600 million. That is the space that we like to play in and invest in. The underlying assets can be anything from equities to bonds to credits to hedge funds, aircraft leasing, as you guys would have seen, music royalties, everything that you can imagine. GVF invests into these things with two things in mind. One, there has to be a discount and a catalyst to unlock that discount. Two, we want to diversify the underlying portfolio as much as possible, the benefit of which is obviously risk reduction. In the 11 years that we've been going, I'm happy to say that we have done well with our strategy. We haven't had a single down year since we launched 11 years ago. Only eight other products in the Lonsec universe can claim the same. We are very proud of that. We have annualized at returns of 11% per annum. I would say that we've outperformed across the board. That is a very big stateent and maybe not humble enough., but let me qualify that statement. When we compare ourselves, it's hard to compare GVF to anything because it is such a diversified portfolio. Of course, we have the discount capture, which gives us that alpha. I am going to compare us to global equities, even though we actually only run with about a 30% exposure to equities. Equities has probably been one of the best asset classes over the last 11 years. Here up on the screen, you can see what Australian shares, the U.S. and global shares have done. Australia has run at 10% per annum over the last 11 years. Global shares have given us 13% per annum over the last 11 years. The U.S., the S&P 500, has given us 17% per annum over the last 11 years, which is magnificent, thanks in part to the Magnificent Seven, the FAANG, and all the technology stocks that came before. Equally important to the returns that we received is the risk that you took. The most common measurement of risk is volatility. If I show you the volatility of those three indices there up on the screen, you can see that the highest volatility came from Australia. The U.S. had 12% volatility, and global shares was 11%. What I like to do, rather than focus on the volatility, I like to just look at the ratio of your returns over the volatility, which is called a Sharpe ratio. Another way to think about that number is the quality of returns. The higher the number is, the higher that Sharpe ratio is, the higher your quality of returns. You can see very easily, the U.S. shares had the highest quality of returns at 122. Global shares, we have 103, noting that a number above one is really good. Australia, it kind of lagged in terms of the quality of returns that you received. You took a lot of risk for the returns that you ended up getting. How did GVF do? Let's go back to that statement I made earlier. The Global Value Fund annualised at that 11% per annum, but we did so at a much lower volatility, which actually ended up giving us the highest quality of returns. I wanted to take it further, and I looked at a number of other asset classes, including credit. I looked at all the very favourite names that a lot of our shareholders shout out at their investor groups. I looked at property, because what's a presentation without property? Mesa Heads happens to be the best-performing area over the last 11 years. I looked at two funds that a lot of our investors hold and speak very highly of. If we then sort those all in the order of the quality of returns, hopefully you can see there that the Global Value Fund really does come out tops, just pipping the U.S. and some of the other investments. I'm going to hand over to you, Miles, to talk us through the big picture. Thanks, Emma. You can all hear me okay? I've got this terrible tendency to speak a bit softly, so I'll do my best. If you can't hear me at the back, please say so. Don't just nod along. I always get a bit overwhelmed when Emma puts these slides up. She says, "We're going to do a roadshow, Miles. You stare at a blue MoreScreen all day looking at charts and squiggles on the screen. Go tell them what's happening in the big picture." I will do my best. I obviously don't have a crystal ball, and I'm very sceptical of anyone out there that does have or pretends that they have a crystal ball. I think sort of zooming out to the big picture today, the thing that's really important to understand is it's quite unusual and we're really lucky in a way. We are currently living through one of the biggest investment booms in all of history. It's remarkable. This year, America's big technology firms are going to spend roughly $400 billion developing artificial intelligence models and AI infrastructure. That's really the thin end of the wedge. Next year, that's going to increase to $1 trillion. Over the next three years, there's earmarked $3 trillion of spending developing AI, building the infrastructure to go with that. Just to try and get your head around the scale of that capital expenditure, that amount of money, that's equal to twice Australia's annual GDP. Twice GDP of Australia going into developing AI models just over the next three years. Of course, America is ahead of the pack. America is leading the charge in AI, but they're not the only game in town. China is spending a huge amount of money on AI, as are lots of other countries around the world. This is an incredible gusher going on at the moment, a vast amount of capital being spent on this whole AI idea, which I think sitting in Australia, you maybe do not quite appreciate the scale of what's going on. For a lot of us, and I put everyone out in this camp, like, "What is AI?" I'm still not entirely sure. I'm trying to use it. For me, the biggest use case is helping with kids' homework, which I do not know if that's more about the kids. It's a worry when [our elders] speak, but a nyway. For the boosters out there, like the people that are really enthused about AI, what they're chasing is this thing called AGI, Artificial General Intelligence, which is this idea that artificial intelligent models that can do tasks, thinking tasks, cognitive tasks better than us as humans can. The boosters think we're a couple of years away from reaching that point. Maybe they're too optimistic. I think the key thing to understand in terms of this sort of once-in-a-generation investment boom that's going on is there's a huge prize there. Whoever gets to AGI first is going to walk away with an incredibly valuable business. You think about the value of size, scale, network effects in technology companies, and you think about the dominance of Google Search or Facebook and social media, and how those things are just complete cash cows. That's what's going on with AI at the moment. There's an arms race. No one wants to come second, a nd there's this incredible amount of capital being spent. It's really quite extraordinary. Now, that's all interesting. That's sort of one of the big things that are going on in the big picture. What does that mean for financial markets, the squiggles that Emma sees me look at all day on the screen? Like six months ago, the big issue that was preoccupying financial markets was Donald Trump. H e returned to the White House. The tariffs he'd announced were much more aggressive than people were anticipating a nd along with a raft of kind of, shall we say, unorthodox economic policies, most professional forecasters were saying the U.S. economy is going to take a bit of a hit. Now, that's not a political statement. The U.S. is a free country. If they want to go in a direction, they can of course. From a purely economic point of view, a lot of the policies Trump was putting out were economically harmful. Professional forecasters were saying the U.S. is going to hit a growth slowdown. Growth in 2025 is going to slow down this year and next year. You probably remember, especially around April, there was a lot of headlines saying the U.S. might actually go into a recession. Fast forward to today, and that has not happened at all. For the first half of this year, the U.S. economy grew at 1.6%. It is a little bit slower than the sort of 2% we expected before Trump came in, but still well ahead of most other rich world countries. What has happened? What has happened is really this once-in-a-generation AI boom. Trump's policies have certainly slowed things down in America, but they've been completely overshadowed by this huge gusher of capital flowing into the economy that's really just been accelerating as the year's gone on. I think really the interesting thing to appreciate about that is we all know, if we're following financial markets at the moment, we're sort of very well aware there's a small handful of these really exciting mega-cap tech stocks that are dragging global financial markets higher. They're exciting and scary at the same time. As well as just dragging financial markets higher, I think the thing that perhaps is underappreciated is they're underpinning all the growth in the economic system through this amount of capital that's being spent. We can actually see that in the hard data now. If you look at that U.S. growth number for the first half of this year, GDP growth at 1.6%, not bad. If you take out of that the one-time effect, that's basically a big stimulus effect of the capital expenditure that's going on by these tech firms in the U.S., the U.S. economy did not grow at all in the first six months of this year. I find that fascinating. You sort of juxtapose where we all are today. Financial markets are incredibly bullish. People are talking about valuations being very frothy. You compare that to where we might have been if for the first half of this year, we had been living in a world where the U.S. economy was flirting with recession. I think we would be in a very different place. I think one of the key takeaways when you're thinking about what's going on in the big picture now, is to understand that these tech stocks, they're not just carrying markets. They're increasingly carrying the economy. That asks an obvious question, which we've all seen in the papers. Again, I don't have the crystal ball, but we'll just discuss it because it needs to be discussed. Are we into a bubble? Has all the hype around AI gotten ahead of the fundamentals? This chart here, it shows the proportion of the S&P 500 that's made up of tech stocks and comm stocks. That's the red line. You can see back in the dot-com boom, 40% of the S&P was made up by tech stocks. The blue line shows the percent of earnings. I think the dot-com boom is quite instructive in the sense that you can see market was placing a huge aluation on tech stocks, but they were not earning actually a lot of money. One of the things I see commentators talking about a lot today is that we are back to that peak now. 40% of the S&P 500 index is now made up of a very small handful of tech stocks, an incredible amount of concentration. Unlike back in the dot-com boom, they are actually generating some money. F or a lot of people, this is a strong argument that we are heading back into bubble territory. I do not have a crystal ball. I am very skeptical of people that sort of promote that they do. A s always, especially I guess, with our philosophy, I am always of the belief that the risks are balanced up and down, so I'm going to present a more kind of balanced approach. I think the thing to remember is that even though we see all this hype about AI, even though we've seen these tech stocks have this incredible run recently, even though markets are really concentrated, none of that on its own means there's a bubble happening about to pop tomorrow. It's worrying. We should pay attention to it, but i t's a complete truism to say, the only time you can really identify a bubble is after it's burst. This chart here shows the NASDAQ index. This is a framework that again, you'll have seen the press talk about a lot and a lot of commentators. It's not a bad framework to look at. This shows the dot-com boom back in the late 1990s. This is the NASDAQ index. It shows the index of the large technology stocks in the U.S., not the S&P, the broad-based index, but it just hones in on tech stocks. It has a decent amount of similarities to what is going on today. You had a new technology, revolutionary technology. You think about how ubiquitous the internet is today. We use it for everything. Back then, this was brand new. There was a vast amount of capital being spent at the same time, particularly from the communication stocks. Just like back then, we had a lot of commentators saying, "This is getting crazy. This is a bubble. There is a crash coming around." They said that all through the late 1990s. At the end, they were obviously right. Along that journey, you know the NASDAQ doubled, then it doubled again and then just to rub it in, it more than doubled one last time. It was a very volatile journey. You had loTs of big drawdowns along the way, but each time until the very end, it went on to make new highs. I think the message I'd like to convey, and what I see a lot of people struggling with today is really FOMO. We're all excited about these tech stocks. They've had an incredibly good run. I'll call it FOWO, fear of being wiped out, the 82% drawdown on the other side. As I said, I don't have a crystal ball. I'm not qualified to make a statement where we are on this. I hear people saying we're in the mid-1990s, meaning they think there's a long way to run. I hear people saying we're at the end of the 1990s, meaning the crash is just around the corner. I guess the three principles we've been speaking to our shareholders about and we'll leave with you, the first is, it seems reasonable that there will be an over-exuberance phase at some point. Personally, I don't think we're quite there yet. There's so much excitement going on. With that, there's almost certainly going to be some big losers at the end. I don't think you can spend $3 trillion that quickly and expect everyone to make a return on their money. Despite that, and this is something I feel very strongly about in terms of my investing philosophy, I think we have to remain really humble. Nobody calls the market. Nobody times the market. If you got into the NASDAQ boom and out of the NASDAQ boom, good luck for you. That was luck, not skill. I do not think investors in the large part should be in the game of trying to time when markets are turning. You should hopefully have a plan for the longer term, and then you are sticking to that regardless of what markets do through time. The old adage, I think is old for a reason, which is, it is about time in the market, not timing the market. The last one, and this is probably the most nuanced point, but hopefully, potentially the most helpful. It is something that we are going to talk about as we get into the educational piece today. Oh, I have gone too far. I need to go backwards. This is something, Emma, I have been saying for a while. We've been writing about it in our letters and our monthlies, and we've certainly been talking about it at presentations like this. The main risk I see for investors today is that markets have become incredibly concentrated. These technology stocks have done incredibly well, and they've done really well at a time when markets have been shrinking. We'll talk about that point later. They've done incredibly well. In doing so, they've distorted indices. You can see here, 40% of the S&P 500 is now in tech stocks, which is really, 35% of the index is in about eight or nine names. It's an incredibly concentrated proposition. The problem with that is back in the 1990s, you didn't have a lot of ETF investing. ETF investing wasn't a thing. Whereas today, almost half the market is passive investing, and a lot of people invest into ETFs and indices by default, without really considering what's been going on under the hood. I'll say clearly, I think it's honest and fair and true to say, investing in something like the S&P 500 today is much higher risk, much higher reward, but much higher risk than it was five years ago. There's nowhere near the kind of diversification you had five years ago. You think about one of the big premises of index investing, is you're supposed to be buying a highly diversified, low-risk basket of financial opportunities. Today, you have this vast concentration going on. Now, if you're 21, that might actually be a really good thing for you. You've got your whole life to compound savings ahead of you. If the tech excitement about these AI stocks turns in a bust, you can save and compound for another 40 years and it might work. That's great, you should be taking higher risks when you're young. The punchline, and this is the thing we've been saying for a long time, if you're at a later stage in your life, if you're 71, personally, I can't see how it's appropriate you're putting such a large bet into a group of high-risk, high-reward stocks. The key point I really think people need to take away is that if you want to invest in these technology stocks, you need to calibrate that investment based on your own risk tolerance. Don't take as default the large allocation that index providers give to you today. Making indices, the ETF business is an incredibly lucrative business game, and they're not the ones that are going to put their hands up and say, "Actually, today the index is not really suitable for some investors." The index has changed enormously. The risks of investing in the index have changed enormously over the last few years. I think I don't think enough people really realize that when they're just ticking the box to invest into a passive fund [crosstalk]. [crosstalk] bigger globally and in the U.S., but we will come to that in our education piece. Okay, guys, we are going to move on now to this part of the presentation where we're just talking about something that we think investors should be aware of. It is something that kind of crept up on me, to be honest. Hence the sort of focus. It's these two tectonic changes taking place. First, the exponential growth of the passive industry, which we're all well aware of, and then the incredible growth of private markets and the subsequent disappearance of public markets. I think what I want to do is just kind of quickly show you guys where we've come to with that. The first thing to say is, I want to talk a little bit about the passive industry and just remind everybody where it all started. The passive industry started with the efficient market hypothesis. The efficient market hypothesis was a theory in 1960 that basically said everything that you could want to know about an asset is in the price. The way financial markets have always worked is that there are teams of hardworking analysts crunching data, examining company accounts. There are economists building spreadsheets, bright young economists building spreadsheets, building models. All these people all around the world value the assets, whether it's General Electric being valued for the last 100 years or indeed the Australian dollar in international markets. The efficient market hypothesis says everything you could want to know about General Electric is in the price when you turn up to buy it. In 1975, Vanguard introduced the first mutual fund designed to simply track the S&P 500. He took the efficient market hypothesis one step further, and he said, "If all these people are doing all this work, why should we bother? Let's just piggyback off everybody else's work for free and launch an index tracker that we've all come to love and know." When he was the only guy doing it in 1975, it was brilliant, absolutely brilliant. In hindsight, active fund managers never stood a chance. They were bearing all of the costs. To prove that, the S&P launched a scorecard, which was called the S&P's Indices Versus Active scorecard. They do this for the entire globe. I've chosen the U.S. because it's almost 70% of global financial markets and Australia, because it's obviously relevant to us. What you can see here, the light blue shows you the active fund managers who have underperformed the S&P 500. The dark blue shows you the very small proportion of active fund managers who have done better than the S&P 500. Same story in Australia, the summary of which for the passive industry is, "Why bother with these active fund managers? They're no good. They're expensive. Just buy passive." Of course, that has resulted two or three years ago globally, passive investing became bigger than active funds management. This year in the U.S., it has become passive has gone bigger than active funds management. That' s all very well. The question that I've been asking is, "Okay, what next? Where do we go? Is it 90% passive? 99% passive? What's next? Miles." Yeah, what's next, Miles? Come on. The hospital pass. Thanks, Emma. I mean, I'll translate Emma's South African speech into Australian [crosstalk] quickly. I guess what she's saying, and I guess I kind of want to repeat it, is active doesn't have a chance. Under the model that Bogle pioneered, it was a very clever kind of mousetrap when it first came out. Active bears all the costs. Passive investing is a wonderful invention. It keeps costs down, keeps active managers on their toes, but it is a free rider. Passive investing works because it piggybacks off everyone else in the market already doing the work. T h ere's kind of an existential problem with passive investing, which is, if you're the only passive investor in the town and everyone else is the numpty paying all the costs to keep markets efficient, then you're a really clever investor. That works, but there's a point where it does not work. What if you get to a point where 100% of the money in the market is passive? Who is doing all the work? There has to be an equilibrium point. At some point on the journey, markets, by definition, will start becoming inefficient. My personal view is, when you get to that point, active managers will start outperforming again. In terms of what Emma was saying, what comes next? I think this is really fascinating. I find, particularly with our retail [shell]s, it's not really apparent what's been going on. There have been these two seismic forces going on in finance for the last 20 years. The first has been the incredible rise of passive investing. The other, perhaps not quite as well documented, is the incredible growth of the private equity industry. To sort of start by framing the big picture, when I started in markets 25 years ago, the only place you could raise large amounts of capital to fund the business, your BHP, you need hundreds of millions of dollars for a mine, your Woolworths, you need working capital, the only place you could get those kind of ticket sizes was from public equity markets. You would list on the ASX or the New York Stock Exchange because it gave you access to the deepest pools of capital, the most sophisticated investors. You fast forward to today, that's entirely not the case at all. You have these huge amounts of private equity out there that is increasingly replacing public equity capital. This first chart here again, I find kind of amazing. This shows the number of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange over the last 30 years. You can see it's basically halved. Over the same period of time, the number of private companies in the U.S. has gone from 2,000 to 11,000, so a five-fold increase. The reasons for this shift, they're not that hard to understand, regulation, litigation, endless public scrutiny. Joe Aston doesn't write clever little articles about private companies. Of course, the fact that if you bring in innovation to the public markets, the passive industry is going to copy it relentlessly. All of that has meant that there is a much bigger preference for companies to stay private if they can, and use private capital if it is available. What you see in a part of this chart here is there are really two tails. One is interesting public market companies getting taken private. The other part, which I think is a bit more insidious, is you are not getting the same level of new companies coming on. If you are an entrepreneur today with your clever new idea, you have a much stronger preference to go and get your startup money from a venture capital fund. If it works, you raise money next from the private equity industry. You do not come to the ASX as much anymore to get growth capital. If it continues to work, your business will bounce around inside the private equity industry until frankly, private equity is bored of it, until it is ex-growth. This sounds a little dystopian, but there is a certain element of truth to it. Today, a lot of the time, these companies come to public markets when private equity is done with them. They are not as exciting as they were. Private market is basically looking for selling ground. Some of the most exciting businesses certainly never make it to the light of day. There are some tremendously exciting businesses say, buried on the Macquarie balance sheet that will never make it to the light of day. The second chart here, I think hopefully reinforces the theme. Again, I found these kind of data fascinating when I was doing the work. This shows big companies. This is companies that generate more than $100 million a year in revenue. These are not mom-and-dad corner shops. The proportion of such companies that are owned by private and public owners. Y ou can see in the U.S. today, less than 15% of companies of any real size are listed on a public stock exchange. In Australia, it' s worse. In Australia, it is less than 10% of companies of any real size that are listed on a public stock exchange. Why does this matter? Why do Emma and I think there is a link between the big seismic forces of public passive investing and the growth of private equity? Passive investing really rests on two key principles. The one is that Efficient Market Hypothesis that Emma was talking about before, the idea that everything's in the market before you can turn up. The second, and it's a bit more nuanced, but it's really important to understand how passive investing works. One of the key premises of passive investing is that you want to own the market return, because the market return is the best return you can hope to achieve over time after accounting for risk. Now, the market return is a bit of a wonky academic concept, but what it means in practice is you want to own a cross-section of the economy as a whole, weighting your investment by its current market size. If Commonwealth Bank is 12% of the Australian economy, you put 12% of your money in Commonwealth Bank. If BHP is 9% of the Australian economy, you put 9% of your money into BHP and so on. The way that passive industry providers make funds that track markets is they create passive funds, an ETF that tracks a market index like the ASX 200 or the S&P 500. The problem of course, is that the indices that passive investing are increasingly becoming irrelevant. That pie chart there I think really makes a mockery of one of the key points of passive investing. You are not today buying a diversified cross-section of the economy as a whole. In the U.S., as we've been saying before, now this is Emma's slide, as we're saying before, seven technology stocks now make up 35% of the S&P 500 index. There shouldn't be any financial advisor worthy sold,saying that putting more than 1/3 of your money into one high-risk, high-reward bet is appropriate for all people at all points in their life cycle. Here in Australia, there's a similar problem we've known about for a very long time. Half of the ASX index is made up of a few mining stocks and our banking stocks. It's hardly a widely diversified cross-section of exciting stocks. As Emma highlighted earlier, the ASX, sadly for the last year has exhibited a lot of risk for not a lot of return. Emma's going to talk next about why we don't think these themes are going to turn around anytime soon. I think one of the problems I think passive is increasingly going to face, is how to stay relevant against this. Of course, one of the big frustrations we feel, and I know people like Geoff and the other directors feel, is that increasingly, a lot of these opportunities are coming out of the hands of retail investors. These opportunities are no longer available as they used to be. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, just to reiterate what Miles was saying there, I've just got a few more slides that I thought I'd show you. Oh gosh, sorry guys, that was a bit quick. This shows you the scale of the issue. There on the left-hand side, there are just shy of 9,000 companies listed globally represented by the MSCI ACWI. On the right-hand side, there is over 200,000 private companies. The scale here, obviously the public market is still huge. I think in my opinion, a lot of that is legacy. You think about a General Electric listed 100 years ago, you've got a huge legacy there. What I'm really looking at is, on the right-hand side, the private looks to me as though it's going to grow, it's coming off a really low base. You can see it, you can potentially see it growing from there. Okay, so that's all very depressing. I'm going to just do a little bit more. Y eah, we'll cheer you up at the end. Don't worry. The other thing to kind of add to this is the fact that the private markets, they're in the blue, have actually done so much better than public markets over the five-year, 10-year, 15, 20-year time horizons. You can see there the private markets have really done quite a lot better, really. The only exception is that three-year period, where the Magnificent Seven, these amazing tech stocks, have just been extraordinary. That is where the public markets have done better than private. The question I'm asking myself though is, would the Magnificent Seven go public today? I mean, all of those companies listed more than 20 years ago when this theme hadn't really taken off. My argument is, I don't think they would. If you look at the current set of high-growth technology companies, OpenAI, SpaceX, TikTok, Stripe, Databricks, all of those companies are private. Those five companies alone are worth more than the entire ASX 200 combined. All of that growth and all of that opportunity has happened outside of the public arena. Now, Miles is going to give us some good news. I'll try. I mean, I think it's sort of staggering. 25 years ago, you say, is it feasible you could have a private company with a half-a-trillion-dollar valuation that could stay private forever or certainly could stay private for a lot longer? I mean, it would have been inconceivable. Today, it's almost regular news. SpaceX, all of the value of these companies, I guess is Emma's point, is that it's all been created outside of the public arena. Facebook, Google, NVIDIA, would they have come public today or would they be like, these are essentially the next crop of Facebook and FAANG, and all the exciting things that are out there? Where am I on my little thing here? Oh, here we are. Oh, yeah, but here it is. No, that's too far. Yeah. Look, how does this all relate to GVF? I guess one, as Emma said, this is an educational piece. We think these are important big-picture themes that are going on. Unfortunately, retail investors are getting less and less opportunities than they'd like to. 20 years ago, you could have participated in the Facebook IPO. Today, OpenAI is worth $500 trillion, unless you're an endowment fund or know the right people you've never had a look in. In terms of GVF itself though, I mean, these are parts of the market that we know and understand really well. Unlike a passive fund, we're not constrained to following an index. We really have our philosophy of finding cheap, exciting assets all around the world at a discount. We're very agnostic as to whether we buy them in the public sphere or the private sphere. We have always had a large allocation to private assets in our portfolio. This is not us joining, come lately. For the 11 years we've been running GVF [crosstalk], s he just,works me too. I just get there]. What year are we on now? 12. Okay, keep going, keep going. Yeah, 20%-30% of the GVF portfolio has always been in private equity or private debt. Look, just little aside, we've covered some big-picture themes really quickly. What's been going on in private equity? This big shift of capital out of public markets into private markets has also been happening in the debt world. Large amounts of what used to be publicly traded debt bonds is now ending up in private credit, a theme I'm sure a lot of you would have seen out there. We've been investing in private equity, private debt for 11 years and in my previous firm for 10 years before that. We think they're great avenues out there. For us, that gives us more opportunity set than the listed world to find opportunities. Importantly, the diversification helps us lower our overall risk profile. As an interesting aside, if you own GVF shares today, you actually own OpenAI, SpaceX, and ByteDance at a discount. At a discount. That's, I guess, the key point. One of the differentiators for us obviously is, when we invest into these private assets, we're not investing into a private equity fund. That's the normal way to invest into these sorts of assets like TikTok or ByteDance. You invest into a fund, you're locked up for 10, 15 years, you can't get out. We find more sort of lateral ways to invest into these things, generally through listed investment companies around the world. As always with us, that hopefully provides us the opportunity to buy them, not just an exciting company, but at a discount and with a catalyst. Today, we do have exposure to those three really exciting businesses. What I like as well, Miles, I mean, this is the feedback we've had by being on the road. We're not pitching private equity. We're not private equity managers. We're just saying, look, this is something that's happening. I think what's comforting from my point of view as a GVF shareholder, is the fact that we do have the ability to truly diversify the underlying. If there's opportunities in the private markets, we'll go there. If there's opportunities in the public markets, we'll go there. I think that's what's been really comforting. Yeah. As a last little pitch for LICs in general, I think the LIC structure is actually one of the few structures out there that suits private equity really well. It is a great medium for retail investors actually to invest into private equity assets. You cannot put a private equity asset into an ETF. They would be illiquid assets underneath. An LIC or a closed-end fund is actually a tremendous vehicle for giving shareholders access to private assets and this kind of thing. We often get asked what two LICs, or what LICs are there? Of what we know, there is WAM, which is kind of a private sort of alternatives portfolio. We know that Pengana also has a private equity fund. We do not vouch for them. I have not looked at their numbers, but at least you do have those access points. That is it, folks. Questions, questions. [crosstalk] today. Interesting. I mean, I think it would depend very much on the de-equitization of public markets, s o basically, how much of public markets shifts into the private world. I'd say 50% is probably stretching the boat a little bit. We try and stay very diversified to lower risk. C ertainly, if increasing amounts of opportunities move from public into private, then we will probably gravitate more to that world. Yeah, that's a good question. Miles, what do you think would be the catalyst for the interest to come back into public markets? Yeah. I think it's a real shame. I can get on my soapbox about it. I mean, I think there's a trade-off between excessive regulation and allowing people to have access to things. One of the unfortunate things I think about what's been going on is, the reason people don't want to go into public vehicles, entrepreneurs and managers, is they're just really unwilling to run. There's endless amounts of regulation. Every year, the GVF board gets another missive from another regulator saying we've got to do more and more. It's not like they're saying you can do less and less. I guess the reason the regulator does that is to protect retail. I completely understand and value that. At the same time, if you throw so much protection on, you're also shutting out the industry. You can certainly fast forward with these two themes another 20 years, where you have a market where really public markets are just passive investment playground and e verything that's kind of exciting happens out of the public markets. I think that'd be a real shame. I think, I mean, I think that the answer would be public markets need to pull their socks up and realize they have to compete with private markets and make running public companies a lot easier for people, a lot less costly. Oh, sorry. Yeah. Hey, Patricia. [crosstalk] Yeah. I mean, Trump is a complete wildcard, isn't he? It's really tough. I think Marcos was really wrong-footed when he first came into office. There was a presumption that a lot of his campaign talk was rhetoric. When he came into office, he would manage the economy in a more sensible way, in a more kind of conventional way. He's certainly not done that. He's surprised everyone. He came out in April with some incredibly aggressive tariff positions. He was sort of forced to row back by markets selling off. There are two sides to the Trump kind of perspective. One is that he is pro-deregulation, so making life easier for everyone, low tax, and pro-business. All of those things are typically good for markets and businesses in the short term. You can make a decent argument that stores up problems for the future after he has left office. That was certainly my view a year ago. I thought it is probably actually very good for markets, not in a moral way, but I am not making a political statement. I am just going to say this is not moral kind of comments, but from a business finance point of way. He has lost a little bit of that credibility this year, but I feel like he is gaining it back again. Certainly, the U.S. economy and the U.S. market, it's so vibrant. There's so much opportunity compared to the rest of the world. It now makes up 70% of the global investable world. You look at, I often see people say, "Look, the U.S. is a basket case. Where else would you invest in the world?" The analogy that often gets ruled out is the U.S. is the least dirty shirt in the laundry. Would you go to Europe? I mean, there so many problems. France has had five prime ministers in the last six months. Would you go to the U.K.? I mean, it breaks my heart, but the U.K. is really swimming backwards at the moment. No, I mean, it's still by far the biggest part of capital markets. We have to have investments there. We wouldn't find enough opportunities. There is still a lot of exciting things going on. I cannot pretend that it is how it is going to end, but we are riding the dragon, so to speak, like everyone. Sorry, mate. Yeah. [crosstalk] I'll say a few words. Maybe some of the directors might want to chip in as well. One thing, I do not know if the [frankling creditors] are wasting assets. I appreciate they are an asset you cannot use. [crosstalk] Oh, I see what you mean. That is what you mean. Okay, fine. They are not going away, I guess. [crosstalk] Yeah, t rue. I guess one of the challenges with running GVF is we have 4,000 investors. It is a really broad [shirt]. We 've got different levels of kind of desires and what people want. I guess the most consistent message we get is that people want a lot of visibility about the dividend, preference for it to be fully franked, and confidence that it's going to be there in years where we have a really tough year. Me as a portfolio manager, I genuinely don't have an axe to grind either way. If investors said, "Pay everything," if we had a 20% year and investors said, "Pay everything out," I would have got no problem with paying a 20% dividend. It's just the next year, if we have a 2% year, people are going to get a 2% dividend. As a sort of finance purist, I'm relaxed about that. I think in terms of running a LIC successfully, and I think Emma's done a really good job in sort of keeping us at NTA and making sure that we, touch wood, have not had a discount problem over the years. I think that idea in Australia of having like a progressive dividend where you've got a lot of confidence the dividend's going to be there next year, come what may, really helps with investors. On the franking, we typically are a bit short on franking because we cannot store it up like we can with the dividend. I do not know about the point about franking doubling, but i t had not gotten very skinny, right? We were getting close to the point of not being able to frank the next dividend. No? June, here you go. [crosstalk]. [crosstalk] the end of the year. We would prefer to have a bit more than that. Obviously, when we did the accounts, we had a really good year. We had a kind of flurry of franking credits come in, and that has taken us to that AUD 0.09 level equivalent, which means that we can essentially fully frank the next two and a half years. Two and a half years. Which for us feels much more comfortable. I am not speaking for me, it feels more comfortable [crosstalk] on that. It' s always been feedback that we want a fully franked dividend consistent with [crosstalk]. Soon to be that it is going to be there. If I can just add a comment, it is a very good question. It is one that we do grapple with as a board. I do not think you might think we just need to go through on the nod. It's a balancing act between paying a consistent stream of fully franked dividends, and as Miles said, maybe lifting the dividend, lowering it again. We rely on feedback from Emma and Miles, who are close to the shareholders generally, on what they would prefer. Our understanding as independent board of directors, is that is what the majority of shareholders would prefer. I guess for us, that's corroborated by how we're trading versus NTA. I'm involved with other LICs. We've been trading at material discount. That has been a problem. One of the things that I think Emma and Miles have done very well in terms of shareholder management is getting Global Value Fund, which is, relatively speaking, a pretty small LIC compared to others, to trade at NTA. That is in significant part, I think because of the steady dividend stream we've had. You're right. It's a very nuanced point that I do not see talked about in the market a lot, but you are right. I guess, for us, what is the profit reserve? Not the franking increment. Currently, we have four years of profit reserve, so we can pay four years of the current $0.066 of dividend, but only two and a half years of the franking. I guess, [crosstalk]. [crosstalk] Yes. Oh, that is a good point. Is that including the dividend going? Oh, the $0.09? [crosstalk]? [crosstalk] tomorrow. Yeah. Does that come out of the $0.09? [crosstalk] it is in the monthly. I have written it in the monthly. It is p[crosstalk], but I cannot remember off the top of my head. I can come back to you. Yeah. Just the last thing, I thought it was a good question too. The last thing to note, GVF is obviously a much more mature company now than it was 10 years ago. Where things sit, Miles and Emma both said they feel comfortable around the two and a half year type of franking credit balance. As a board, if we saw that creeping up to three years, four years, I think you'd see pressure to release more franking credit. It's again, just backing up what Jonathan's saying. It's getting the balance. We're not going to let it go crazy for years ahead. One good way to address that might be to say a special dividend. A s a portfolio manager, I'm very conscious of not delivering what we set out to investor. We've always said people should hopefully have in their mind we're going to do 8%-10% a year. We've done more like 11. If the yield was suddenly getting more than 11% a year, there's a risk that we can't fund the dividend. A good way to get around that might be to do a special. We did one last year, two years ago.. [crosstalk] [crosstalk]. Becoming teenagers. [crosstalk]. Yeah. No, you're right. I'm just sort of intellectually curious. I guess, an issue with the placement would be, if we did a placement, it would shrink the number of franking per shareholder. It would shrink the amount of franking that we had on the balance sheet. You pay the special dividend, so your franking goes down, and then you issue more shares. You have the same amount of franking over more shares, so o ability to cover the dividend would get squeezed. Again, that might not bother you. I mean, I'm curious. Would it bother you if one year the dividend was X and the next year the dividend was Y, or you'd love it? Yeah. [crosstalk] Yeah. No, you're right. Yeah, I do. There's a really bit, I mean, I guess the count, which is certainly, and I'm not biased, I'm just feeding up the majority of you. The majority of you would be, I think perhaps for less sophisticated investors, there's a lot of comfort about knowing that the next two or three years, the dividend checks under. Yeah. I don't think it's less sophisticated. I just think people like to have the consistency of what's going to hit their account on a six-monthly basis. The bottom line is, when we have in the past not fully franked a dividend, it has hurt. People have complained. They do not like it. They want it fully franked. I think, no, it is not a different thing. [crosstalk] Yeah. The whole reason we have that franking balance is because we do not make franking from our investments. We only make it by paying corporation tax because we are an international investor. I think the feedback that I have always had is when we did, and somewhere around here, we partially franked our dividend, people did not like that. They really want a fully franked dividend, and they want the consistency because for them, a lot of our investors, and 90% of our investors take the dividend, it is their salary in retirement. Yeah, that is kind of where we have ended up. Yes. [crosstalk] Thanks for mentioning it. Thank you for the feedback. [crosstalk] I mean, we do to a degree. We're constantly polling planners, advisors, and direct retail as well. I guess we could throw out a poll. As Jonathan said, I think one of the biggest feedback points is probably how the shares are trading. We could potentially put out a poll. I mean, I don't have an issue with it. Maybe that's something we should do. I'd be happy. I mean, to be frank, t he feedback we've received over the years is overwhelmingly in the camp of consistency. Yeah, let's check it in. If that would be helpful to you guys, I'm more than happy to. It's one email. You click a button, yes or no or whatever. There are some options. We'll see what comes back. If the board agrees. Okay, great. It's just my email. [crosstalk] Yeah, perfect. Perfect, g ood point. Thank you. I appreciate that. No, you go. You go, honey. I just got one at the back. [crosstalk] Yeah. [crosstalk]. We would need to make it very clear. [crosstalk] t he answer should be honest. Sure. No, no, thank you. Good point. At the back. [crosstalk] Yeah. No, I mean, that's a fair way to think about it. I guess part of that would be the franking forms part of the dividend. I guess the way we have always thought about it or I have thought about it, is it's the top line that matters to the end investor. As Emma said, we went through a period where we had to partially frank the dividend. What the board decided to do at that time was to increase the size of the dividend. Yeah. I think the franking, especially for people at that phase where they're not paying tax in their [super], the franking effectively forms part of the dividend itself. Just to further explain that, when an ETF makes 10% returns, you get the 10% returns, and you then declare that to the ATO. When a company makes 10% returns, we give you 7% returns, and we give you a 3% franking. Now, the franking is just as important because of course, we've made the same 10% that the ETF provider has made. Your point is absolutely right. I mean, ultimately, you should just be looking at what the total dividend that you receive is grossed up. Exactly. [crosstalk] m entioned earlier loo king at investments [crosstalk]. Yep, o r U.S. dollar-based invest ments, yeah. [crosstalk] I mean, yeah. I'm at the coalface staring at the squiggles on the screen all day, reading lots of stuff. I guess on the decline of the U.S. dollar, there's always these sort of two arguments. One, is it losing its status as a reserve currency? The common counterargument is that least 30 shirt argument that comes back out. What are the alternatives? The euro, I mean, it's got a lot of problems of its own. Sterling is becoming increasingly irrelevant. You've got these new kind of ideas like Bitcoin and gold, which are really fascinating, but they're sort of tiny in the scheme of things. Y ou have the yuan, which is certainly gaining more and more prominence. For all the concerns the U.S. had in the yuan, you've got a controlled economy where you can never really be entirely sure what's going on. O ver the last year or so, you've seen the value of the U.S. dollar fall. That's a function of a lot of what Trump's policies are. In terms of its use as a reserve currency, I don't think it's depreciated. If anything, it's probably maintained its share of the global currency mix, maybe even increased it slightly. That's just sort of a comment. The decline of the U.S. dollar is this fascinating kind of economic topic. I'm an economist. I read about it. I think it's really interesting. I wouldn't want to make a bet on which way the U.S. dollar was going. In fact, to get sort of into the weeds, whether the U.S. dollar is declining as a reserve currency is independent of whether it might go up and down in value. I think that's sort of an interesting thing to differentiate the two points. You could have the U.S. dollar becoming less and less relevant, but still going up in value or vice versa. In terms of what we do, sorry, that's a really wonky answer to your question, I firmly have the view that we have a real skill set, which is going around the world finding assets at a dollar that we buy at AUD 0.08 and getting that out. That's really the only thing that we know how to do. I think my own view, sort of criticism of other people, my own view is that it's always dangerous when you start shifting what you think you're good at. We're not good at currency trading. Currency market turns over $5 trillion a day. I've never met anyone that can trade currencies consistently and successfully. No, we do not hedge the GVF portfolio. We essentially let the currency mix match the global investable universe, which is a fancy way of saying we do not hedge it. There are a couple of exceptions. One big one is obviously the Aussie dollar. Australia is not yet 30% of the global economy. As a GVF investor and running the GVF investment portfolio, the lowest risk investment we can hold is the Australian dollar. It goes up and down, does not matter. We are not going to make or lose any money. It is the lowest risk we can hold. We have a much bigger inclination to hold more Aussie dollars than we might otherwise. Especially when we are in more exotic currencies, we will often hedge them back into Australian dollar terms. That is sort of the philosophy. I do not have a black and white answer for you. We do not hedge as a principle. We break that principle when it comes to the Australian dollar, which is a non-risk position for us to take. [crosstalk] session that we have, r ight? If you take these two pie charts, you know that this is the asset that we have held through time. This is the currency we have held through time. Those two things together have probably given media investors about 6% per annum, which ties in well with what the volatility has been, just shy of 8% per annum. The way we then had much better returns, is we [crosstalk]. As Miles said, that is the part that we are good at and that we think we are good at. That is where we focus our time. We do not focus our time trying to get the currency [crosstalk]. Making a view on [crosstalk]. [crosstalk] better than that huge currency market. Does that help? [crosstalk]. [crosstalk] [crosstalk] Yeah, sure. It's a fascinating topic, the U.S. dollar. [crosstalk]. [crosstalk]. Not in the [crosstalk]. Never in the fund, y eah. The back. Yeah. [crosstalk] s orry, at the back. Yeah, go ahead. [crosstalk] Yeah. I guess our main skill set is finding LICs around the world. We're a LIC ourselves at a discount and unlocking the value. Closed-end funds, they're often called. It is a huge market. I kind of guess we have all of the above. I've been doing this for 20 years now. We employ some very bright people, mathematicians. We've got some very sophisticated systems. E mma said that. We're doing lots of screening. We've invested in lots of positions many times over. We're watching situations we think are interesting. That's kind of the systematized part. The other part is in a way like old-fashioned stock picking. There are four of us in a way, that we have a very heavy kind of portfolio management team for the amount of money we run. If you're a big institution like a Schroders or an AMP, you might have one PM running a couple of billion dollars. We have four PMs running a couple of hundred million dollars. That kind of heavy management team lets us turn over lots of stones. We're constantly looking at things. I think one of the things we do really well, which is very unexciting, is we'll do a lot of work on a closed-end fund in the U.S. and we'll decide it's not an investment. We save all that work. We're meticulously saving all that work. A year later, we might come back and the price has changed or there's been a development. We have a big library of kind of these prospects all over the world that we're constantly updating. We like referrals too. Anyone has a hot tip, we're happy to look. [crosstalk] It's a great question, y eah. Private equity assets are typically independently valued. One of the great advantages of public market is it's completely transparent. I'm not quite sure where you're going with the slides, but it's completely transparent. We know what the price of BHP is because we can log on to CommSec and see what somebody else paid for it a minute ago. That's how you price it. For a private equity asset, there are very sophisticated investment techniques. The same techniques that fundamental equity analysts would use. They often look at public markets to get comparisons and metrics. It is essentially a big body of work that is essentially, someone does a big spreadsheet and comes up with a number. There is obviously a lot of risk in that. When we invest into private assets, I think the thing that we take away is we'll do our work. We'll build a big spreadsheet and we'll come up with a number. We're very humble about that number. If our number comes up and says, "This asset's worth $1.43," the first thing I say to the guys is, "It's definitely not worth $1.43. It's worth somewhere between $1.20 and $1.60." No one really knows. As long as we're buying it at $0.95, then I still feel pretty comfortable about it. If we're going to pay AUD 1.30 for it, no, I'm not that excited about it. Yeah, it's generally private valuers coming up with numbers, a bit like someone values your house. This presentation is actually on the ASX. This slide, I don't know what number it is, but this slide gives you a really good source of how we've compared private and public in this chart. We've really gone at pains to make sure it's comparative, but it's difficult. [crosstalk] Hey. Yeah. That's kind of like the million-dollar question at the moment. There's a vast amount of capital going into AI development. As I said earlier on, I don't think everyone that's chasing that is going to come away with a prize. We don't have a lot of exposure to it naturally in what we do. We have a very diversified portfolio. I made the point that we do own a little bit of OpenAI, TikTok, and SpaceX. I guess TikTok and SpaceX are not so much AI bets. I guess my view generally is that things really balance each way. I mean, one of the things you talk about markets, everyone's worried about markets crashing. Where are we? I would say that's entirely possible. There's also an entirely possible risk that we have a huge melt-up in markets. If you have a look at what happened at the NASDAQ, for years, everyone was saying it's wildly overvalued. At the end there, when you had that over-exuberant phase, it shot up. The directors were chatting earlier about the 1987 crash, and how everyone was really bearish at the start of 1987. The market went up 60% before it fell down 50%. I guess, one of the key things that we stick to is we don't believe we have a crystal ball. Personally, I don't think anyone has a crystal ball. We own that. We don't have a crystal ball. What we can do is find assets that are below value and unlock the value. If those assets fall in value, then we've bought them at a discount. That provides a margin of safety. Maybe we lose money, but hopefully we lose less money than the market's lost. We don't try and stray out of our kind of comfort zone. Quite frankly, I mean, if you want access to that sort of space, GVF is your steady, eddy plodder sort of investment. Whereas access to those really exciting AI companies and the infrastructure and the energy stories around that, you can get in other ways, I'd say. W hat about lunch? We're not going anywhere, s o please. We'll be here. [crosstalk] lunch. Thanks, everyone.