All right, thanks everyone for joining. We're going to get started here. This next session is going to be a treat. I've been looking forward to this. I want to welcome to the stage President and Chief Operating Officer of Cameco, Grant Isaac. Got a lot to talk about in terms of the nuclear ecosystem, especially on the heels of Secretary Wright's comments. I think there's a lot of optimism, anticipation, maybe, maybe capital to talk about in terms of the implications for the sector. But maybe just big picture, I wanted to start, Grant, with 2025 was clearly eventful for both Cameco as well as the overall nuclear industry. So what would you say stood out as some of the most needle-moving events, whether at the macro and policy level, and then also clearly the company-specific milestones? You know, what are you most proud of from last year? Yeah, it's a great place to start. Thank you. And thanks to everybody for giving us some time today. 2025 was a big year in the nuclear industry, and it was just actually a continuation of several big years. And I would just summarize it by actually echoing some of Brian's lines in the past. Nuclear went from being part of, well, first of all, being in the wilderness post-Fukushima. Then it became part of the climate security solution. And then Russia invaded Ukraine, and people realized it actually is a key part of the energy security solution. And then it fully emerged as part of a national security solution as well. So it's that triumvirate of security issues that nuclear is just incredibly well placed with its attributes: 24-hour baseload, carbon-free, resilient, robust power, and then just found its way into discussions over and over again. One of the notable things in 2025 was the announcement that it is time to start building in the United States. We announced a deal with the U.S. government to invest $80 billion into kickstarting new builds of AP1000 reactors, an incredible technology, the world-leading gigawatt-scale technology that other nations are pursuing. And it was time to start building in the United States. So that announcement was big. On the fuel side, it's absolutely linked to the optimism around where nuclear power is going. And another notable thing about 2025 is the world is waking up to the fact that markets actually work. After years of unacceptably low prices across fabrication, enrichment, conversion, and uranium, there was a lack of investment in the nuclear fuel cycle. And that lack of investment has meant that fuel is short. And the only way to solve that is higher prices. We're looking at a really neat situation where our business model allows us to participate in reactor new builds, build our own demand for every reactor that then becomes core for 80 to 100 years for Westinghouse and Cameco. We're delivering on that plan, and we're just excited about where it's at. So this is a January conference. Everyone's trying to look out to 2026 and what the outlook could be. I know you haven't given any guidance, but following on the heels of some of the 2025 momentum, where do you see kind of the best opportunity sets for Cameco here in the coming year in the broader industry? Yeah, when I look ahead, and I'm going to kind of start downstream at the reactor side, and then I want to work back up from the fuel cycle or to the fuel cycle. I think 2026 is going to be a big year because I think we are going to see FID on some AP1000s. Maybe not in the United States because we're still pretty nascent in this $80 billion program. But I think we are going to see FID in Poland and Bulgaria, two nations that have chosen the AP1000. Poland wants to build six of them. The first three have been site-selected. Bulgaria wants to build two. They are very quickly moving through the front-end engineering and design process as they accelerate towards FID. I think that's a pretty strong signal for that next wave of U.S. gigawatt-scale technology. We have a partnership now with the Koreans. They're no longer a collaborator or no longer a competitor. They're now a collaborator. I expect them to continue to advance their new build projects, which benefits Westinghouse quite significantly. As that rolls out, I think 2026 is going to start to see higher levels of contracting across the fuel cycle. I think those are pretty strong signals when you see new builds happening that it really is time to get serious about long-term uranium contracting, and that is an absolutely essential piece. We keep reminding utilities around the world that are interested in nuclear or have nuclear that fuel is one of the long lead items they need to be spending time on. Yes, it's your reactor pressure vessel, it's your coolant pumps, yes, it's your steam generator, but your fuel and your fuel components and contracting for them are also a long lead item. We expect 2026 to see stronger demand for that reason and are prepared for it. In fact, as you have noted in some of your research, 2025 ended quite strong, including a leaked negotiation we were having with the Indians. And I think it woke up the market a little bit that there is big sovereign demand back in the uranium market. And that has always been a leading indicator of a really robust contracting cycle about to begin, so 2026 is feeling very constructive. There's a lot of different pieces to the Cameco business model. Let's dive a bit deeper into some of the segments, starting with uranium, as you alluded to, a strong year in 2025. So Cameco, one of the largest uranium producers in the world by volume. There has been a lot of focus, maybe I would even characterize it as investor pushback at times as to, you know, pricing not maybe reflecting the reality of what you've called out for a number of years. It seems like now, between the supply-demand dynamics that are only getting tighter. So maybe level set us as to where you think supply-demand dynamics are headed here. And then also that question of why utilities aren't as active as it suggests they should be. The supply-demand dynamics, as we look out, are actually in a situation right now where we would conclude that the demand forecast that most have out there, like the World Nuclear Association's fuel market report or UxC or TradeTech, two of the price reporters in the business. We believe they're actually understating demand when they build up their profile because really that demand story is typically only built on the current reactor base. Then you add to it some reactors that are restarting: Duane Arnold, Crane Clean Energy Center, Diablo Canyon life extension. You add that in there, subsequent license renewals for other reactors. Then there's new build, but only of reactors that are under FID. So actually the demand case doesn't include the $80 billion project we just talked about. It doesn't include Bulgaria and Poland yet because they're not at FID. It doesn't include Ontario's plan to build 14 GW-scale reactors because none of those are at FID yet, and by the way, the demand story doesn't yet anticipate nuclear being used for generative AI, so we see that our sector trades quite closely with where the data centers are at. That is all upside to the demand story. That's actually not currently baked into the demand story for nuclear, so it astonishes me a little bit how we trade off when the data story trades off a little bit because that's not even built into the forward demand story of nuclear yet. And then on the supply side, we see a dynamic where we tend to overstate the supply that's going to come to the market because our industry tends to be really bad at disentangling on the uranium side a preliminary economic assessment on a potentially uranium resource from a technical report on a material operating property. And they treat the two as equivalent. And so they see a preliminary economic assessment that says production's going to start in four years from now, and it's going to be, you know, 20 million -25 million pounds of production. And there's no license, there's no permit, there's no infrastructure, you know, there's no workforce, there's no contractors. And so when we back out our experience of how long it actually takes to bring in supply, we actually see the gap is bigger. And that gap, in relative terms, of the amount of material that utilities have not yet bought to run the known reactor base has never been bigger. And that feels like a really exciting time to be an incumbent producer in uranium. But we're a disciplined producer. We still have 30% of our production shut in or curtailed because we are waiting for the fuel buying community to get serious about the prices required to create that next wave of supply. We never reward our investors by front-running demand with supply. In fact, we create the maximum reward for our owners when we're at or slightly late the market. Because when we're at or slightly late the market with our production, that's when fuel buyers trip over each other to buy material. That's when demand starts to hit replacement rate and beyond. That's when you start to discover strong pricing that we can lock into multi-year contracts. We're still in supply discipline because we see a very, very robust contracting cycle coming. I guess in terms of numbers, you mentioned the replacement rate. Contracting for 2025, based on the latest numbers, I think was like 80 million pounds, a little less than 60% of replacement rate, which does seem unsustainable. Is there that much secondary supply or inventory out there? It just seems like something will come to a head. So can you kind of speak to those dynamics and then what you are expecting for the contract environment going forward? We've always used as a rule of thumb in our industry. If you want to kind of assess the health, and I'm talking about the uranium segment in particular, if you want to assess the health of where the uranium segment is at, you simply look and you say, collectively, are utilities entering new forward contracts that are replacing the material they're burning on old contracts? And if they are, that's called replacement rate. If they're above, they're not just at replacement rate, but they're also building inventory by definition. And if they're below, they're chewing through secondary supply and inventory. Utilities have not been at replacement rate collectively since 2012. So the world has chewed through that historic shock absorber. Those who have been around the story for a long time will often say, "But Grant, it's never about primary production in uranium because there's all that secondary supply." There was all that secondary supply. But the situation has been since 2012, utilities largely went on a buyer strike and they stopped contracting at replacement rate. But the gap needs to be filled with something. And that something has been a continual drawdown of government inventories, utility inventories, and secondary supplies such that we're at a moment where the mobile inventory position in the uranium segment has never been lower. And we're not even at replacement rate. We're at an $86 long-term price of uranium in U.S. dollars. And we're not even at replacement rate. We've been at an $86 long-term price before, but never on the front end of a contracting cycle. We've been after there's been a big supply disruption or a demand shock, and we have a lot of above replacement rate contracting in the market. But we've never been at 86 on the front end of a cycle before. This is setting up really nicely. Replacement rate has to be achieved. We have to go beyond replacement rate to start building inventories again. That's a very constructive setup for an incumbent uranium producer. The $86 a pound, I think that's a 17-year high, even at those low replacement rates. What I know you're not in the business of forecasting uranium prices. I am. I'm just not in the business of saying it publicly. I'm advertising, I suppose. But you do set floors and ceilings, and you have a contract mechanism that you have articulated and telegraphed to kind of give a sense to, I think, both the market as well as buyers where Cameco's head at in terms of where pricing is ultimately headed to. So can you kind of give us a sense of where those recent discussions are around floors and ceilings and where you see pricing ultimately headed? Yeah. I'm going to back up a little bit. When we think about the term market, it's important to understand we exclusively sell into the term market. We do not sell any spot material at all. In fact, as a strategy, we are overcontracted. We deliberately sell more than we can produce so that we have demand to deploy in the spot market to buy at our discretion because, quite frankly, some idiot is always going to try to sell into the spot market. And that can be deleterious to forward negotiations. W e always want to be in a position to pick up that material to the advantage of our owners. So when you think about the term market, it's important to understand there's two ends of the spectrum. The first are base escalated type contracts. And the way those work, Brian, is if you came to me and said, "Look, I'm looking for 100,000 pounds of uranium 2028 to 2035, but it's got to be base escalated," we basically would turn to today's long-term price of $86. And that's kind of the starting point of our negotiation. And then we fight over how it escalates. We fight how it escalates to first deliveries from today, and we fight over how it escalates through those deliveries. And I'll be arguing for things like mining cost indicators and regulatory cost indicators. And you'll be saying, "No, I just CPI, and I want you to discount CPI because others are willing to do that." So we'll fight over the escalation. We historically do not like base escalated prices at this point in the cycle. Escalation is nice, and $86 is nice, but we think the market's going higher. So what we have a preference for is market-related contracts. And the way those work, same 100,000 pounds 2028-2035, Brian comes to me. And now we're not trying to price it today. We're just trying to agree the pricing indicator at time of delivery out in the future. And he might say to me, "I want it to be the spot price because we're normally in contango." Or he might say, "Sometimes we're in backwardation, so I want it to be the term price." I never want to take same-day spot exposure, so I might want a rolling average of the spot price, or I might want a blend of the spot and term price at time of delivery. But that's what we're fighting over. And then at some point, he's likely going to go, "Oh, but I want a ceiling." And I'll say, "Okay, well, if you want a ceiling, I want a floor." And now we're fighting over the collars around a market-related contract. So priced out into the future, but subject to collars that escalate. This is our preference today. This is where we want to be. 70% of the contracting in the market in 2025 was market-related. Only 30% was base escalated. Of that 70%, it's really important to understand that price reporters do not account for that 70% at all. Price reporting, that $86 is only based upon base escalated pricing. So what the market is missing right now is 70% of the information that is basically suggesting uranium is already at three-digit pricing. And what I mean there is we sign contracts today, market-related. We've had market-related contracts with floors, escalated floors in the mid-70s. We've had ceilings as high as $150 escalated. The midpoint between those floors and the ceilings are already $100 uranium, $115 uranium. So there are utilities out there willing to sign market-related contracts. They're running a value-at-risk analysis between the floors and the ceilings, and the midpoint is already three-digit uranium. But the market only prices the long-term on the 30% that are base escalated. So what we have to do as Cameco is, even though we have a preference for market-related, we have to occasionally agree to a small portion of a contract that's base escalated just so we can say to the price reporters, "It's not $86 today. We can get $88, and then the next turn we can get $90," so we have to deliberately walk up that long-term price because the market is ignoring 70% of the information out there, and when I look at the 70% of the information, it's already telling me we're at three-digit uranium, which is an exciting place to be. So nuclear demand inflecting higher, inventories dwindling, prices already starting to creep higher. So what is the trigger or triggers for the utilities to actually step in and realize that and start to price more aggressively here? Does it need a supply shock, or what kind of event path do you anticipate? We're in a market where sometimes people confuse the complacency of utilities. You know, the fact that we're not at replacement rate and haven't been for Fukushima, you know, they'll say things like fuel buyers are asleep at the switch or they don't know what they're doing. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our typical fuel buyer is a master's or PhD-trained nuclear scientist. These are some of the smartest people you'll ever have the pleasure of spending time with. You just have to, like in any industry, follow the incentives. Fuel buyers do not have an incentive to try to call the bottom of the uranium price. They have this wonderful averaging effect, first of all. Like, there is no fuel buyer, with the exception of maybe the Ukraine right now because of their security of supply contract. They're not getting all of their uranium this year under one delivery. They have multiple contracts. So they pay an average price of uranium, and it reflects contracts signed many years ago, contracts that are in midlife and brand new contracts. But they pay an average price. They're not paying today's price, right? They pay an average price. But then the interesting thing is they take their uranium, they put it into a bespoke fuel bundle, and then they capitalize it for the time the fuel bundle is in the reactor. So they get these two amazing averaging effects. They average down today, and they average over time, which means they're kind of insulated from price spikes, which means they don't really worry about them in the way that others do. So if the price has been low and it stays low, they don't do anything. When the price starts to go up, well, then they start to contract. That's their incentive structure. And then security of supply kicks in. So they don't spend all their time going, "Oh boy, you know, if I contract today, I can save $2 a pound." They're not rewarded that way. They're just rewarded for security of supply. That means generally our industry needs to be shocked into action. It doesn't sort of march up rationally to a production economic pricing. It usually requires a supply event, like the flooding of the Cigar Lake event in 2006, 2007. Cigar Lake development project flooded. The market panicked. Fuel buyers all went through the door at the same time. Uranium went to $136 a pound, $200 in today's terms, then came off as Kazakh production was incented and came up, or in 2010 there was a demand event. Chinese stepped into the term market for the first time in the summer of 2010 and bought 152 million pounds of uranium in one month, and the rest of the fuel buyers felt like they were going to get left out on future supply, so they all tried to go through the door at the same time, but generally, our market needs to be shocked into action. I don't know where that shock is coming from. It could be the failed promises of restarts of mines. It could be when greenfield projects don't go as well as people think they're going to go, could be a demand shock. I talked about the leaking of the Indian contract that we were negotiating. That's a lot of demand that people didn't realize was in the market. I'm not exactly sure what the next shock is going to be. But because this market doesn't have the inventory position it used to have, this market has never been more vulnerable to a shock than it is today. That historic shock absorber, government inventories like DOE inventories, or the Megatons to Megawatts project, for those old enough to remember that in the industry, 400 million pounds of uranium material flowing into the commercial market under the HEU agreement, gone. None of that exists today. So this market will hit a shock. And when it hits a shock, it has no shock absorbers anymore. And that sounds like a pretty constructive thing for an incumbent producer. I want to spend some time on the Westinghouse business. You know, a key theme of this event seems to be we're short power. We need it. We need baseload power. So, you know, Westinghouse, new nuclear builds. You mentioned at the start the $80 billion partnership between the U.S. government, Cameco, Brookfield, and Westinghouse. Maybe just for starters, contextualize for people how this partnership came to fruition, sort of what does it signal here in the next 12 months and then maybe for the next, you know, probably decade plus for Cameco and Westinghouse's business. Yeah. I think the genesis, or if we think about the origin story for this deal, it really was born out of a little bit of frustration. You know, we were dealing with a U.S. administration that was going, Bulgaria's building gigawatt-scale reactors, Poland's building gigawatt-scale reactors, the U.K., hell, the province of Ontario is building 14 GW-scale reactors. How can all of these much, much smaller economies find the launch conditions to build gigawatt-scale reactors, and we can't launch in the United States? Like, what's going on here, and so it's a matter of, well, you know, the U.S. system was set up to be a race for the bronze medal. It wasn't set up to be a race for the gold medal. The order book for units five, six, and beyond was actually quite big, but nobody wanted to be one and two following Vogtle. Nobody wanted to be three and four. There was nobody wanting the gold and nobody wanting the silver, and so the U.S. government took the position that maybe it's the role of government to prime the pump here, to stimulate the supply chain, to reduce what are often cited as the main risks that are keeping utilities from making this decision, standing up the supply chain for the first time, engaging a constructor and letting them go down the learning curve and making sure they're delivering good unit costs, bringing in the skilled labor and training it up so that it's ready to be deployed. The U.S. government just looked at it and said, "Well, maybe that's our role to play here," and besides, we need the electrons anyway, so it sounds like a good project to be engaged in. As we look ahead, you know, one of the main themes is the Executive Order from May 23rd that spoke to large nuclear power plants, said 10 need to be under construction by 2030. In order to achieve that, you need to separate ordering long lead items for gigawatt-scale reactors from, you know, figuring out the sites they're going to be built at and figuring out the model they're going to be built under. So the first project is, what does the order for long lead items look like? The kit for 8 to 10 nuclear reactors, you know, how are we going to finance that? How are we going to put that package together? That is a Westinghouse conversation. The next project is trying to figure out, well, where are they going to be located and what is the model they're going to be built under? And I think if there's four or five two-packs, there's going to be four or five different models of how they're built under. There might be a build, own, and operate by the U.S. government to meet national security needs, electrons for Generative AI for national security, for example. On the other end of the spectrum, we might simply take advantage of the utilities that already produce nuclear power, that already have a construction and operating license, that are already NRC regulated and are ready to go, but just need a financing package in place. And in between, there might be some build, own, transfer models where you have government taking the lead, but then transferring to a consortium of utilities or transferring to long-term PPA with a group of hyperscalers, all to solve this problem of 24-hour baseload electrons. I think there's going to be a number of different innovative, creative models around how we're going to deploy and where they're going to be. And that's just going to take time. We're peripheral to that conversation. We're not really involved in it. And then, of course, it's going to be financed by foreign and direct investment pledged to the United States from Japan and Korea. And so there's a third work stream, which is to pitch to the investment committees that were set up as part of those mechanisms to secure the funding for long lead items and then the new build. So 2026 should be a really interesting year because if we're going to hit that executive order of 10 under construction by 2030, long lead items will have to be ordered in 2026. We're going to have to identify sites and start moving sometime in 2026 as well in order to hit that objective. Maybe digging into that a little bit. So we've only built two new reactors in this country in the past two decades. We're trying to get shovel in the ground on 10 in the next five years. This $80 billion obviously goes a long way in enabling that. But I guess how much of this is already on the board? Is this all just fresh new builds that are needing to come to fruition starting now? Or, you know, is this construction restarts like VC Summer? This is Fermi in Michigan. Like, maybe give us a contextualization of the volume opportunity and maybe what's sort of on the board already. Yeah. At the moment, the project of $80 billion minimum spend for 8 to 10 reactors, and of course, that's a range because that's dependent on how fast you come down the Next-of-a-kind to Nth-of-a-kind cost curve. If the DOE is right and it's the fifth unit that hits end of a kind, then we can build 10 reactors for $80 billion. If it takes a bit longer, it's probably going to be eight reactors. That's a contained project. It has nothing to do with VC Summer. It has nothing to do with the Fermi project. Those are all in addition. So you can start to do the math and say, well, are we actually potentially talking about 10 reactors plus VC Summer? That's another two. Plus Fermi, that's another. Are we talking about 16 reactors in the United States plus two in Bulgaria plus six in Poland? It goes parabolic really quickly when you start looking at the order book. So those are in addition to this project. And those are playing for the LPO funding, now called the Energy Dominance Financing Department, former LPO. That's hard. It's going to be hard for me to change over on that one. They have $250 billion already appropriated for nuclear new build, for energy new build, but will allocate it to nuclear. So there is another pot of money that exists for those types of projects. They are distinct from this. That's helpful context. Maybe moving on to international. You already talked about Poland and Bulgaria, but I know, Grant, you have a soft spot for Canada as well. Can you kind of speak to the opportunity for large reactors, AP1000 technology in Canada? Yeah. Obviously, Canada is our home. We know the country very well. The CANDU reactors have served Canada extraordinarily well for a very long time, and as Cameco, we're fully integrated in CANDU reactors. We provide fuel to Bruce Power. That's what we sell, a fabricated fuel bundle. We sell all the calandria tubes. We sell reactor components to all the CANDU reactors. We are fully integrated, but Canada has a choice to make, and it's a pretty stark choice. If it wants to build gigawatt-scale reactors and wants to begin to deploy them right now, it has to go with the AP1000 because there is no Generation three CANDU reactor. There isn't one designed. Now, Canada might be tempted to say, well, we're going to build Generation one 1970 Darlington CANDU reactors, and they've just refurbished all of those reactors and refurbished them very successfully. So that could be a good strategy for Canada and would be a good strategy for Cameco. It would build out that part of our business. But then it's not an export strategy because no markets in the world want to build a Gen 1 reactor. In fact, most markets that are looking to build new nuclear have regulations that would prevent them from building a Gen 1 reactor because when Fukushima happened, everybody upgraded their regulatory and safety standards. So if you're going to have an export program, it has to be a Gen 3 reactor or a Gen 3+ reactor like an AP1000. And that doesn't exist today. There is no Gen 3 heavy water CANDU reactor. So if Canada wanted to wait to develop one, it would probably take 10 years to design it. It would probably take 10 years to build the first one. So you're 20 years out from new nuclear, or they could start to deploy an AP1000 today. Because as Eric Chassard, the President and CEO of Bruce Power, would say, being one of the only CEOs who's actually built nuclear reactors in the world, he would say that there are five main risks that you have to manage when you make the decision to build nuclear. The first is design technology risk. The second is fuel risk. Do we actually have a commercial fuel supply for the type of reactor that we're looking to build? Number three is first-time licensing risk. Takes a long time to get a brand new design licensed. Number four is regulatory risk, distinct from licensing. Like, once you have a technology and you have fuel and you have a license, you still have to locate it somewhere. So you have first-time regulatory risk to place it as a product. And then you just have good old-fashioned big product risk and big project risk. And the AP1000 is the only reactor that Canada could choose that takes four or five risks off the table on day one. So we're optimistic that Canada will remain a very powerful nuclear country, that Canada will make the right technology decision. And quite frankly, they've already chosen light water reactor technology. The Darlington SMR project is a GE BWRX-300. That's not a Canadian technology. That's not a pressurized heavy water reactor. It's a light water boiling water reactor. So Canada's already made the pivot into light water reactor technology anyway. They've crossed that Rubicon, so to speak. Maybe in the last few minutes we have here, I mean, we talked a lot about the demand side. Clearly, there is a lot of focus on power demand and nuclear being a part of that equation. How about on the supply side? Can we build, or can Cameco, Westinghouse, your supply chain build multiple AP1000s a year? Sort of what is that situation? Yeah. Right now, our estimate is that we could launch four reactors a year. So if it takes five years to build a reactor, 60 months, by the fifth year, we could have 20 in flight and then just kind of keep rolling them over. We'd have to capitalize more of the supply chain to go beyond that. But that works with today's order book, with today's plans, with where folks want to go. That is enough to get going because it is just absolutely critically important that we do the SS S's, and we do them right this time in nuclear. First one is standardize. Right? The U.S. built out 104 reactors through the 1960s and 1970s, 55 different models across 104 reactors. We cannot do that again. So by standardize, I simply mean it's Vogtle 4 over and over again, right down to the color of the paint in the bathroom. Nothing changes. It's got to be Vogtle 4 over and over again. By sequence, I mean, we have to understand that, you know, we don't start a golf tournament by everybody teeing off on the first hole at the same time. W e have to sequence these things such that the big civil project starts on the first two-pack, and then it moves to the next one as the construction team has stood up. And then as the construction team moves on, the nuclear island gets assembled. And then as it moves on, the turbine island comes in. We've got to learn the lessons of the United Arab Emirates, the Barakah plant. We've got to learn the lessons of what the Koreans do when they build or the Chinese. We've got to learn the lessons of the major component replacement in Ontario. So we have to standardize. We have to sequence. And then we have to make a commitment to simplifying. And I don't mean the design. I don't mean going back and changing the reactor. I mean, we've got to do a way better job of passing the learnings on from program to program to program. The U.S. was kind of built out in small islands. We ended up with 55 different models because there wasn't a lot of crosstalk between utilities about what was working and what wasn't working. We have to do better on that. We standardize, we sequence, we simplify. This is a deliverable program. That's great. We are right up on time. We covered a lot of ground. We could ask you a lot more questions, Grant, but this has been great. And I want to thank Grant for joining us and everyone in the audience. We'll wrap it here. Great. Thank you. Thank you.