Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by. I am Sugio, Chorus Call operator. Welcome and thank you for joining Delivery Hero's Conference Call. Throughout today's presentation, a recorded call, all participants will be in a listen-only mode. After a short introduction by the management, there will be a question and answer session. If you would like to ask a question, you may press star followed by one on your touch-tone telephone. Please press the star key followed by zero for operator assistance. I would now like to turn the conference over to Daniel Fard-Yazdani. Please go ahead. Good afternoon, everyone, thank you for joining this call today. I assume that you have all received the slide deck that we have sent out. If not, you can find it on the IR section of the website. Before I hand over the call to Niklas and Emmanuel, let me just quickly summarize the purpose of the call today. We have said when closing the transaction with Woowa Brothers two weeks ago, we wanted to give an update on its size and the performance as soon as possible, as we know that you have all been waiting for this additional information since long. Given that we weren't really able to get access to the information before the closing, it was quite a challenge to put everything together in this short timeframe, and we have worked hard together with our colleagues from Woowa on this. I'm saying this to set expectations regarding our ability to answer questions in depth at this point in time. Also very importantly, as you have seen in the invite, while we are also aware that you are very much interested in the path forward from here and basically the guidance on 2021, this is nothing we can provide today. We will need more time to combine the budget of Woowa with that of Delivery Hero. As such, we will be giving guidance at a later point in April. Please keep this in mind also for the Q&A session at the end of the call and to also flag this now already, it would be great if you could limit your questions to two per person so that we can cover as many participants as possible. Now, without further ado, let me hand the call over to you, Niklas. Hey there, everyone. Hope you are all doing well. I can't tell you how happy I am to finally have closed this transaction. We have spent significant time together the last few weeks, and I'm super excited about the plans we're working on, not only in Korea but for the whole region. Together, we will pursue our common goals. As you can see on page two, Bongjin and his team share a vision which is very similar to the one that Delivery Hero has pursued for the last 10 years. We are both putting the customer at the center of what we do, and we are both aiming to provide an amazing experience with the logistics part of the business becoming a more and more relevant component of this. As you can see from today's presentation, Bongjin and his team have built an amazing company and business in the last 11 years, and we are excited about the prospect of working together going forward. You are all aware of the long time it has taken us to get there. On slide three, we have done a small recap on the transaction and its unfolding of the last 15 months, from signing of the deal to closing of transaction earlier this month. We would have liked to receive the regulatory approval much sooner for many reasons. One of those reason is that it kept us from making operational decisions together with the Woowa management for all of 2020 and the start of this year. This created an opportunity for competitors to use our restricted capacity and budget to execute and gain more traction than what we would normally have allowed. Now that the situation has been clarified, you can be sure that we are eager to respond adequately in the marketplace and make full use of the strong brand and product offering that Woowa has built in the past. We will contribute all we can from our side and our experience to enhance the customer experience further and share our competitive advantage wherever needed. Let me also touch upon where we stand regarding the divestiture of Yogiyo. The process has kicked off formally, and we have initiated all necessary steps to ensure an optimal outcome for Yogiyo, all the Korean colleagues that have built a tremendous business in the past, but of course also for Delivery Hero and its shareholders. You know that we have at least six months time to find an adequate buyer. We have received healthy interest from various sides already. Given the nature of the process, I can't give you much more details today. We will update you as soon as possible on this. Let's now turn to slide four and an overview of the development of both Delivery Hero and Woowa over the last eight quarters and our combined size. Together, on a pro forma basis, we received 648 million orders in the last quarter of 2020. This is unparalleled to any global peer outside China. As you can see, there was an acceleration in growth during 2020, and in particular for the last quarter in Korea. Growth came from around 55% at the end of 2019 to circa 80% in Q4, and this partially driven by COVID. We would expect this to normalize as we reach the one-year mark for COVID. In Asia, this started in February 2020, but the impact was never as material as in Europe and North America. Before Emmanuel is going to give you an overview of the growth and further financial profile of Woowa, let me give you a short introduction on the company on slide six. The company was founded in 2010. It has more than 1,000 employees in the headquarter and a bit less than 2,000, including the affiliates. While South Korea is its home market and currently their by far largest operation, they have also started a business in Vietnam in 2019 and launched in Japan at the very end of last year. Similarly important, again, quite comparable to Delivery Hero. While the initial footprint was in the pure food delivery business, Woowa is also seeing tremendous potential that the grocery business is offering. They have therefore started in 2019 with their so-called B-Marts, which basically follow the same logic and concept as our Dmarts. Again, Emmanuel will cover this later in a bit more detail. Last but not least, and very importantly, we have not only looked to combine a business with ours, but also happy to welcome a great management team to Delivery Hero. We have, as you know, always had a great respect for successful founders, and this is very true for Bongjin and his team. Bongjin will become part of the newly initiated Global Advisory Board, together with Emmanuel and myself. He will also be the chairman and executive director of the joint venture we are forming, and which will manage not only the Woowa, but also our Asian operations. Sean Oh will be the co-CEO in the JV, responsible for overseeing the Woowa business. Furthermore, you have Bum-jun Kim as the CEO of Woowa Korea, Jaeha Song as the CTO of Woowa Brothers Korea, and Giwan Yin as the head of overseas business, which consists of Vietnam and Japan. To conclude with the overview of Woowa Group, let's move to slide seven. It summarizes the order GMV revenue and EBITDA numbers for 2020 and the development that has been made last year. As you can see, group orders grew with more than 300 million orders to 729 million. This was far above any expectation. Part of this over-performance was driven by slight tailwind from COVID-induced restrictions. I believe a good but more normal year would have added more like 250 million orders and ended the year on around 650 million orders. Regarding EBITDA, it is important to call out that these are Woowa's numbers and therefore not yet necessarily in line with Adjusted EBITDA definition we are using at Delivery Hero. When adding these numbers pro forma to those of Delivery Hero, there will have to be adjustments, and we will be able to speak more to that when we give guidance in April. Last year, Woowa managed to deliver EUR 14 million of EBITDA, despite material investments into B-Mart and Vietnam. Those investments will be scaled further in 2021, in addition to Japan. Korea food vertical generated EUR 156 million of EBITDA. With these remarks, let me now hand over to Emmanuel before we'll answer your questions to the degree possible. Thank you very much. Thank you, Niklas, and good afternoon, everyone, also from my side. Just as Niklas, I'm very excited about the closing of the transaction, which took more than a year to complete. I'm happy also to provide you with a more detailed review of Woowa business. On chart number nine, you see the overview of Woowa's food delivery business in Korea. Although all the performance was very strong and in 2020, orders and GMV grew by 67% and 71%, respectively, year on year. In December alone, we had over 40 million orders, monthly orders, compared to a year earlier. This is several times more orders than all other market participants did combined. The business also took a big step forward in terms of profitability. The EBITDA increased by almost 400% to EUR 156 million, while the revenues increased by 77%. As you can imagine, we are very happy about Woowa's performance in 2020. Despite some new competitors entering the market, they may continue to show significant growth and a sustainable, strong market share. As we work closer together, we hope to leverage some of our Delivery Hero capabilities, and especially in regards to logistics. We have proven to offer the fastest and also the most efficient delivery set up in all our markets, and Korea will not be an exception. Today, Woowa shares of own delivery orders stand at around 3% nationwide, while Seoul is around 11%. Although it is too early to give specific guidance on this topic at this point, you can be sure that the introduction of our industry-leading logistics capabilities in Korea is very high on our agenda. We're extremely excited to bring this to the Korean market and to build the best value proposition. Now let's move to slide number 10. You know that we don't usually like to share that with our users, and also the frequency, because we don't want to educate our competitors. Today, we are making an exception, as we have had several investors asking about the aggressive entrance of Coupang Eats. What you see on this slide is the development of our monthly active users on Baemin, as well as the average monthly orders frequency throughout 2019 and 2020 in Seoul. In essence, this confirms our strong belief that our customers are very loyal to our service and that we are not very impacted by large discounts offered by competitors. Now let's move more over to the overseas business on slide number 11. Woowa is present in Vietnam and Japan. Let me start now with Vietnam first. Baemin Vietnam was started only in May 2019, and while we are currently only active in the two larger cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Baemin is already the number two player in the country. We are very happy to add Vietnam to our footprint. The country checks all the right boxes for us. It has a population of more than 96 million people, a very high mobile penetration rate, and a very attractive population density of more than 300 people per square kilometers. Vietnam just fits perfectly to our existing footprint in Asia, and we are excited to be there, and expect to build a strong business here over the next few years. Now let me say a few words about Japan. Baemin launched in Tokyo in December 2020 under the brand FOODNEKO. As you know, foodpanda also launched in Japan a few months earlier, although not in Tokyo. We continue to be very optimistic about the opportunity in Japan and look forward to further strengthening our business there with the addition of FOODNEKO. Because I know that the question will come up later, it's fair to assume that we won't pursue a dual brand strategy in Japan going forward. We will provide you an update on this at a later point when we can. When it comes to the financials, given the late entry into Japan, the vast majority of these numbers refer to Vietnam. GMV grew several hundred percent to reach EUR 66 million in 2020, and revenue EUR 16 million. We are still at a very early stage in this business, and it's fair to assume that we will accelerate the investment during 2021. Now let's move more on the B-Mart and Woowa Other Business on slide 12. On this slide, we provide an overview of Woowa B-Mart business as well as Other Vertical, including restaurant supplies, robotics, and the kitchen business. Woowa started properly promoting the business in the fourth quarter of 2019 after doing a soft launch earlier that year. This business is still quite young, and at the end of 2020, Woowa had a total of 32 B-Mart in Korea, with most of them in Seoul. While the overall concept is in line with our strategy around Dmart, the profile is slightly different. They currently carry around 10,000 products, that we also call SKUs, and they have a maximum delivery radius of 5 km and focus on delivery in less than 30 minutes. Our Dmarts in comparison carry around 3,000 SKUs for smaller radius of circa 2.5 km. In 2020, the B-Marts generates 10 million orders and more than EUR 100 million in revenues. As operations are still focused on getting scale, gross margin are still negative. Consequently, EBITDA for B-Mart and Other Business were negative by EUR 84 million in 2020. It won't surprise you when I say that we are super excited about this B-Mart fitting our strategy very well. While I can't be more specific about our future plan at this point of time, we can be sure that B-Marts will be a big focus for us in South Korea. Before we go into Q&A, let me also briefly touch upon two further topics around the transaction with Woowa. First of all, let me give you an update on our goodwill impairment. You will probably remember that we flagged this in early February, that we may have to do a goodwill impairment upon closing of the Woowa transaction. We put the size of the potential impairment at up to EUR 1.4 billion, depending on the final share price of Delivery Hero on the day of the closing. Now with this event now behind us, we can actually narrow this down further. Today, we think that the size of the potential impairment will be most likely below EUR 500 million, so significantly lower than the amount we initially expected. Second, we want to provide you a quick update on the long-term incentive declaration in Asia going forward. We are super excited to have them on board to further improve our business in the region. As part of the transaction, it was agreed that an amount of up to EUR 120 million will be paid out over a period of four years, depending on certain GMV and EBITDA targets being achieved. When taking your question now, please let me remind you again about the fact that we can't give you proper 2021 guidance today. We are still in the process of integrating Woowa's budget into ours. We plan to provide you with an update of our group guidance in April, at the latest with the release of our annual report at the end of April. While we are in the middle of the onboarding exercise after the closing two weeks ago, we wanted to give you this update on this size and performance as soon as possible. Some KPIs, such as our EBITDA, will require further investigation to be fully comparable with a Delivery Hero definition. We thought that sharing this insight early as possible would already give you a better understanding of the size of our new partners. We are really looking forward to this, as we are very optimistic that 2021 will be another successful year for our company, for Delivery Hero. For now, Niklas and I are happy to be available for any question you might have, and I thank you for tuning in. Ladies and gentlemen, at this time, we will begin the question and answer session. Anyone who wishes to ask a question may press star followed by one on their touchtone telephone. If you wish to remove yourself from the question queue, you may press star followed by two. If you're using speaker equipment today, please lift the handset before making your selection. Anyone who has a question may press star followed by one, at this time. In the interest of time, please limit yourselves to two questions only. The first question comes on the line from Joe Barnet-Lamb from Credit Suisse. Your question, please. Excellent. Daniel, Niklas, Emmanuel, thank you very much for taking my questions. I think you said two questions, and I certainly don't want to abuse that. Just two from me. Firstly, when you announced the acquisition of Woowa, you stated a view that the Korean aggregated GMV in 2030 could reach EUR 30 billion. With such monumental growth in the market in 2020, do you still stand by that estimate, or do you believe that it could be larger? Secondly, can you talk a bit about the evolution of both monetization strategy and commission rates for Woowa, both through FY 2020 and also how you see them beyond that as well? Thank you. Hey, thanks, Joe. Maybe I can cover that. Yes, you're right. One and a half year ago or so, we announced that we think that it could be a GMV of EUR 30 billion. I think on every estimate we have done over the last 10 years, they have always been very bullish, but in the end turn out to be far lower than what the reality says. Clearly here as well, I don't know, we don't give any guidance, but I think the market is very large and our momentum has been tremendous over the last 14, 15 months. I think we can have good hopes to beat any expectations that were set in the past, and maybe we can beat all expectation that we also set in the future. To your second question around commission strategy. We don't focus on the commission now. We want to deliver an amazing service where everyone is willing to pay for and everyone's happy to pay for. We have so many other areas to work on than on pricing. However, we now move in more stronger on logistics and having a premium service of logistics also means that we'll have a more of a low cost offer as well as some more high quality service offer. That high quality service offer of logistics, we have shown in many other markets where we can deliver very fast and we can do it at good economics. We have seen that our Gross Profit on GMV is being clearly positive now in almost every market and for sure the regions. We expect that that Gross Profit for the world, we're going to set somewhere around 11%. I think we've guided to in the past 11% or 12%. That's a choice by us, not the other way around. I don't see this being very different in Korea, that if you deliver a high quality service and we work really hard on efficiencies and on every aspect of logistics and using our tools and tech setup, then we should be able to reach that level also in Korea. Now, of course, I believe that the logistics will be a larger part of Korea long term. That will then change the balance a little bit on the commission. We are not going to change any pricing. We are rather going to launch new services, high quality service of logistics, with normal take rate, what you can expect from a high quality service. Tremendous. Thank you very much. Maybe I should also add that as you know, when you launch a high quality service and you push that very hard, that also means that it takes you 12, 18 months where you do not set the pricing where you expect the efficiency to land or where you have your efficiencies as of today, but you set it where you think you will drive it to in the next 12 or 18 months. That means we are going to push this hard. It will be negative economics in the beginning until we have worked on the efficiencies, and we accept to be negative economics for that time. We know that whatever price we have, we will be able to drive it towards our Gross Profit target, rather in 12, 18 months. That means significant investments as we launch this and push this in the beginning. Very clear. Thank you, Niklas. Thanks. The next question is from the line of Miriam Adisa from Morgan Stanley. Your question, please. Yeah, everyone, thanks for the call. My first question is just on growth for last year. How much do you think the growth was affected by COVID? Perhaps if you could share some color on what you saw in terms of AOVs throughout the year. Can you also just remind us on what the situation was in Korea last year in terms of lockdown, and then also what you think drove the acceleration in Q4 that you mentioned? My second question, just on Coupang, what have you seen from them in terms of competitive intensity in the last couple of months? Are there any things that you see them doing differently, perhaps around delivery? Are there any areas that you think they might be stronger in? Any color you could share there would be helpful. Thank you. Sure. Hey there, Miriam. On the first topic, the growth COVID and impact. I mentioned earlier that on the order size, I think we were on 415 million, if I don't remember wrong, in 2019. We achieved in the end for 2020, we achieved 729 million. I think a good year, a more normal year without COVID, we would have probably landed somewhere around 650 million. That would have been a 260 million increase. That's roughly the increase that we would have expected in this market of a yearly increase. Now, this was some tailwind. It was of course not the same tailwind as we have seen in Northern Europe and I think also our peers in U.S. have seen where we basically double our numbers. That was not the case in Korea. Partially that is also because they've had less COVID. They have been much more prudent. They started already in February to avoid meetings. Face masks, they've been used to from several other incidents in the past. Therefore, they were very on high alert. There were not necessarily strong lockdowns. It was more society driving it there. There were then also later on some restrictions on how many people can be in office, and there were some restrictions on some restaurants, but they were significantly less than what we've seen in many other places of the world. Therefore, there was also never this same effect in Korea as we have seen in many other places. In the last quarter, especially in December, there came some restrictions around meetings, I think, of five people. I think that further drove our growth in December. I'm definitely not an expert in all the restrictions that have been in Korea. I encourage everyone to maybe look online, see if there's something I've been missing, or if I'm portraying in one or another way, not 100% correct. I'm not 100% expert myself. When it comes to Coupang, I think they have a good logistics service, and that's been their key. I don't think it's remarkable in any way. It's decent. No means better than what we do in Taiwan or better than we do in many other markets. I would rather say it's slower than what we do in many of our Asian markets. They have been faster in logistics in Korea, and they've been pushing logistics more than what Woowa has done. That has given them a little bit of an edge on the service side. On many other aspects of the service, I think Woowa has done really well, and I think on those, Woowa has probably been stronger. It's a very likable brand. It's a very nice and a cool app. They're very good on the branding side. They have, of course, a restaurant coverage that's phenomenal. I think if you take that delivery time aside, then I would argue that Woowa has a very, very strong product. Now we're going to combine it with our logistics experience and making sure that we can also deliver things faster. I see no reason why we wouldn't. Thank you. It will take a little bit of time. This is hard to do overnight. Just to set the expectations there. Great. Thanks. The next question is from Andrew Porteous from HSBC. Your question, please. Yeah. Hi, team. Two from me as well, please. Can you just talk about the opportunity in logistics in Korea, given the market structure? Does long-term penetration, given you're coming from a sort of marketplace starting point, does that look lower than, say, some of your other Asian markets, maybe more like Europe or Korea? Longer term, where do you think Korea sits within that sort of 5%-8% GMV margin target you've talked about? I think there is a lot of opportunity in delivery in Korea. What you see though today is that a lot of delivery is already professionally made. It's not necessarily the same as it may be in Europe, that every restaurant has their own delivery crew. Therefore, a lot of non-scale, non-efficiencies, non-professional delivery experience. Korea has a lot of third-party logistic companies like Barogo, where it was a big shareholder. They do deliver for a wide range of restaurants, hundreds or thousands of restaurants, and therefore have a lot of scale, very efficient logistic systems, very cost-effective. They have not yet optimized it for service, but rather for efficiency. That's where it differs to how we normally do, that we optimize for service, and then we make sure that the efficiencies is also there. That's why it's a little bit different in Korea. It also means that we compete with something that is very cost-effective. Then we are also going to leverage those third-party provider. We have a great relationship with them, and work closely with them to make sure they'll have order tracking, having them push service level, I don't know, better service level with their existing teams and so on. I think we can also scale logistic through those third-party providers, and achieve the same thing as we would have built it ourselves, but potentially under similar cost or sorry. Yeah, under similar cost. When it comes to the 5%-8% EBITDA to GMV long term, I see no structured reason why Korea would be any different than any other market. If we operate logistic as efficient as we can do in every other market, then we should reach a gross profit margin of, let's say, 11% of GMV. From there, I think Woowa has already proven that they're incredibly efficient on the overhead. They're incredibly efficient in the marketing. They already have operations and scale. I have no worries that also the EBITDA or the cost below Gross Profit is going to be no higher than any other market. Therefore, we should also expect that we would long term, as we roll out more logistic, reach that 5%-8% target. It will take time. I don't know. First, we need to build a great service, have customers loving it, and then work very hard on efficiencies and yeah, driving it there. Of course. Thanks for that. Thanks, Andrew. The next question is from the line of Sridhar Mahamkali from UBS. Your question, please. Yes. Hi, everyone. Thanks for taking my questions. A couple of them, please. Firstly, you talked about EBITDA comparability. Were you able to call out any elements that might be hampering that comparability back to Delivery Hero, EBITDA currently, please? That's the first one. Secondly, are you able to give us an idea of the business model? I know Woowa and Baemin has a different business model in terms of commissions and flat fee. Is there any sense you can give us in terms of revenue composition? In the same sort of context, can you talk about value-added tools? Logistics is one of those. I think you've also talked in the past about other ways of boosting the take rates, including search-based commissions, et cetera, that you probably are using at Yogiyo's. If you could just talk a little bit more about that broadly, that'll be super helpful. Thank you. Yeah. Emmanuel will cover the EBITDA comparability that could arise. In terms of the business models, it's correct. They work on a flat fee, call it, or a listing fee. A restaurant can buy several listings. We don't think it's the best system. We don't think it's the right system. Woowa doesn't think so either. They have respected that restaurant, at least some restaurants tends to be better. For us, it doesn't really matter so much. How you charge doesn't really matter. If they think it's better, that's also fine, we're happy to live with that. In the end, the market is setting the rate. The more value you create, the more slots restaurants want to buy, therefore the effective take rate will also be kind of adjusted or be a good outcome there. Additional to this, there's still a lot of ad services that we can provide, a lot of extra benefits that can be provided to restaurants that adds a lot of value to them. There are more opportunities to make sure that we are appropriately priced. In general, it's today very low priced. We have no target right now to change that for the Baemin business. However, we believe in logistics, and we believe in scaling logistics. We have done it in every market, and we believe Korea is no exception. We believe this is a better service, and therefore, we are going to invest significant amount of money there and significant resources there. This is rather on a commission basis that you work here. It will be similar price as we price a high-quality service in any other market. That also means that over time, as logistics becomes more important, the similarities to other regions' pricing mechanism will also be more and more similar. I don't see any constraints in the current business model, really. Emmanuel, do you want to comment on the EBITDA potential? Niklas, just a quick one. Yeah. In terms of the take rates for logistics, are they similar to what you see in rest of the markets in the 25%-30% range? I think Coupang and Yogiyo, for that sake as well, are charging a good take rate. They generally charge something around 12%-13% plus KRW 6,000 for logistics, that's around four and a half something EUR per order plus. I think that the take rate that is in the market from logistic players such as Coupang and Yogiyo is a take rate that makes a lot of sense for restaurants, for high quality service, but also a take rate that we definitely can reach our target Gross Profit at, in, let's say 12-18 months hopefully or at least getting close to that level in the 12-18 months. I see no reason why we wouldn't. Let me cover the comparability or difficulties of the EBITDA. Part of the integration that we're doing right now is to make indeed things comparable. This is an exercise that we've done also during prospectus. We need the time to completely analyze the EBITDA, the P&L of Woowa and to make it comparable with ours. Here I'm thinking, for example, of positions like employee benefits that which we pull differently according to IFRS and to local GAAP. On this, I can't give you a precise answer today, but that's one of the key focus that we are doing right now to make it super clear and comparable so that when we go back to the guidance, we can make it equally and have pro forma numbers that are making things comparable. Right now the EBITDA is not completely comparable. That's why we don't talk about Adjusted EBITDA today, but the EBITDA of Woowa, and we come back end of April with comparable metrics. Thank you. The next question is from the line of Andrew P. Steen from BNP Paribas. Your question, please. Hello. One of them has already been asked, but I'll change it to another one. The first one, could you just give us an idea on the relative scale of Coupang? It obviously was pretty small, but it's grown pretty significantly. The second, obviously a big differentiator for themselves versus you guys is much broader offer. I appreciate obviously the Dmart or the B-Mart is a growing part of the business, but could we see a significant amount of extra investment in that in order to be a comparable offer for the consumer? Thank you very much. Thanks. We don't have any comparable numbers. We have our internal estimates, but we don't share publicly. We think that if you look at Woowa and the market share has probably been in the range of 75%-80%, but it's stayed at 75%-80% throughout the year despite massive investment. The share of Woowa has been fairly flat. Of course, it's hard to be at that level, 75%-80% market share when there are several players in the market investing significant amount of money. One would expect that there would be a slight reduction in market share over time. In absolute terms, we definitely think that we'll be gaining market share and gaining leadership also going forward. I think also what you see in the slide, even if someone comes in and makes a massive promotion, a big discount, investing significant amount of money, hundreds of millions of EUR, it still didn't impact the business at all. You see it on customers have keep going up. Frequency has done tremendously well in Seoul, where they have focused all their efforts. Therefore, it doesn't really impact us. Of course, it takes a little bit of the long-term future market. I don't think that in any market it's possible, sustainable to maintain a market share of that size in such a market. In the long term, I think we should expect in every market that there will be a number two and a number three, and we are used to that, and we have been thriving in that. It doesn't really impact us that much. Of course we are very competitive people, and we want to offer the best service, and we'll do whatever it takes to making sure that we have the best service. I think in that regard, you asked about a broader offering. Yeah, we try to set our offering such that it makes a lot of sense in terms of consumer branding, top of mind. The broader you get, the more you risk losing that. I think that's the main reason why you see that we have been winning against competitors like Grab. We have been winning against competitors like Uber. We have been winning against all of these multi-verticals. They try to do food delivery and they try to do ride-hailing, and in the end, consumers don't have them top of mind when it comes to food delivery. That's why I think we have a massive advantage against Grab or Uber Eats. Yeah, as I said, we have seen that in every single market across the globe. I think that's a little bit the same when you go too broad also in your offering, that you want to go a little bit broader because you want to be delivering more stuff, but you don't want to go so broad that you lose your core and that top of mind. I think therefore, I think we have the right set, or at least we are developing towards the right broadness of our service. I definitely see that there is a big advantage for us that we still have that focus. Okay. Thank you very much for your answers. Thanks very much for the presentation as well. Very useful. Thank you. Thanks. The next question comes from the line from Andrew Ross from Barclays. Your question, please. Lovely. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. Mine is to follow up on how the orders of the Woowa are actually delivered. You said that the share of pure 1P is 3%, how does the other 97% break down between orders that are delivered by drivers employed by restaurants and orders delivered by drivers who are employed by third parties? Can you share any KPIs or differences in customer experience between when an order is delivered by one of these third-party networks and when it's delivered by either your 1P network or by Coupang's 1P network? I'm kind of trying to understand, as you roll out 1P, are you doing that to add additional restaurants on Woowa today, or are you doing it to replace preexisting model that restaurants have been using for delivery up until this point? Thanks. Thanks. I don't have a reliable number that I would dare to give in terms of what is the proportion of restaurant using a third-party logistic company, but it's substantial. It's very substantial. The difference then, if you look at restaurant delivering itself and a professional logistic company and us, when you look at the restaurant delivering itself, some can be incredibly good. They can deliver in 10 minutes, 15 minutes consistently amazing service, another restaurant can be one hour. That's a little bit problem that the service level and for many restaurants could also be a service level during peak and the weekends might be different than other times of the day. When you look at a professional company, you often do stacking, and when you do stacking, there is also a big variation in delivery times, and it generally takes more time. Often it could be 30, 45 minutes versus when we deliver is often under 20 minutes. It is a clear customer service experience or significant barrier when we deliver. Of course, we don't stack as much, which also means that it is a little bit more costly than if you stack. That means that for customers who really value quality and fast delivery, it's perfect. They have our service. If people value price and don't care for time, well, there is a lot of restaurants as well as third-party companies. It can take a little bit longer time, and it will be free delivery or very low delivery fee, but it can still be efficient. I think there is also a good mix there. We definitely have too little of our own delivery, which is more the 20 minutes. It's not so much adding new restaurants. We have a good restaurant inventory of 225,000 restaurants. We don't add delivery necessarily for covering more restaurants. There might be a few that we want to add, but the biggest reason for adding your own delivery fleet is the service level. That will also mean that some restaurants will move over to our delivery because it's better customer service, and therefore you can expect more orders. That's helpful. Thank you. The next question comes from the line from Sarah Simon from Berenberg. Your question, please. Yes. Hi. I've got two very simple questions. First one was, can you tell us how many Dmarts you've got in Korea through your own business at the moment? The second one was, in terms of your own delivery through Yogiyo, what proportion of orders have been own delivery, let's say in Q4? Thanks. Yogiyo has around 10 Dmarts right now, or YoMarts I should say. It's less than what Woowa has with its 34 or something. Yeah. It's also not been a strong focus of ours to expand on that business given that we are in the process of selling, therefore not a focus on other areas. When it comes to Yogiyo in OD, also here we are being a little bit cautious. We have not pushed it as much as one would have or what they have done in many other markets. It has been a little bit less of our focus. We are big believers in logistics, but I think the market in general is a little bit two-sided. Some like it, some not. Since we are knowing that we are not the long-term owner of it, we probably add a little bit less of our own beliefs into how we have been operating. Okay, thanks. The next question now comes from the line of Ioannis Pontikis. Your question, please. Hello everyone. Thanks for taking my questions. A couple for me, please. Could you please give us a bit more color around the strong profitability improvement at the EBITDA level in 2020 for food delivery Korea? I know you probably don't have very good visibility yet, any color would be really helpful. Maybe linked to this, you mentioned that own delivery now stands at about 3% of total orders. I think 11% in Seoul. Especially given that Coupang is better at the moment in delivering South Korea. As a follow-up maybe to a previous question, what is the target here longer term, more than 50%, for instance? Could you give us a sense of profitability between marketplace and own delivery orders at the moment, please? As a second question, this is about the long-term incentive plan in connection with the transaction. Could you provide more details on the GMV and EBITDA targets that are tied to this four-year EUR 120 million plan, please? Thanks. Maybe Emmanuel can comment more on it, but in general, the profitability has been driven through scale. A significant increase in scale, and we haven't improved prices or anything, or has been very marginal changes in prices, the take rate. It's really just a scale impact. 2019 also was a year with significant promotion campaigns, both by Yogiyo but also by Coupang. I think both parties realized that that was not an efficient way of growing the business. Therefore, a little bit less of this promotional activity. Those are two reasons for the increased profitability in food delivery in Korea. I cannot say where we will end up on the logistics side, and how long it will take. Actually, I will say that I think it will be above 50%. It's just a question of what time it will be there. That I don't dare to say now, how quickly we get to that 50%. Long term, it can also be higher than that. Above 50%, I think I would dare to say. The timing is unknown. Profitability on OD is negative. It will also remain negative for a good amount of time as we're scaling this up. We will also do promotional activities on OD to making sure that people really learn this experience, because we are behind. Normally, we wouldn't do that, but as we're operating on such a low percentage, we really need to make sure that customer understand that they can get the fastest and the best delivery on Baemin. That we have a superior product to other players in the market. In order to do that, we need to catch up, and there will also be some investments there. Emmanuel. No. Unfortunately, we can't give too much detail on that one. That's obviously confidential information. We can't give too much detail. I just wanted to confirm what Niklas said about the rate of EBITDA. This is indeed a scale-up impact in our reduction of marketing, as Niklas said, and also what we are kind of display on slide 10 of this presentation today. The increase of our active users and the frequency. With the scale and with the increase of frequency, this is a positive impact on the EBITDA, and that's underlying the growth that we've seen there. Okay. Perfect. Thanks. Super. I think, looking into the queue, that's been the last question we had. If you have more questions during the day and the next couple of days, we are happy to take questions. You know where to find us. Now I'll give it up for last remarks to Niklas and Emmanuel. Not so much from my side. Just thank you for all your support. Super excited about pushing Korea now very hard. Pushing logistics, making sure that we have the best service. It will cost some money to get there. We obviously had a very good 2020, and we keep on having a good 2021, but there will be significant investment to catch up on logistics side. We're also a big believer, as I said, in B-Mart. That is also in very early stage of development and investment. We will make sure that we keep pushing that. Now, same goes for Vietnam and Japan. Two very good markets. We are also here in very early stage, just about to ramp up. We believe a lot in these opportunities. If you take a market like Vietnam, it has the size and population of Thailand and Malaysia and Taiwan and many other markets combined. It's a big portion of our APAC business combined is Vietnam. Therefore, we should expect that these are big opportunities that also require big investments. As you start seeing in our APAC business, we have gone through significant investment, and now we see the gross profitability going up. As we build scale, you can clearly see the path towards profitability in these markets. Some are earlier than others, but we're big believers, and I think it has also paved out in the past, and it will be so also for Vietnam, but it will take some time. With that, thanks for your support. Emmanuel, something from you? Yeah. Just wanted to tell that it was a long journey to get to this stage, but it was a very nice journey and a lot of effort internally. Thank you for your support and your patience because it was a long journey and I appreciate the fact that sometimes you wanted to have more information. That's why we came out today, to give you insights and to share with you as much of information as possible, and looking forward to having you again, at the end of April for the latest. Thank you so much. Ladies and gentlemen, the conference is now concluded and you may disconnect your telephones. Thank you for joining and have a pleasant day. Goodbye.