Welcome, and thank you for joining Delivery Hero's Q2 2021 trading update. Throughout today's recorded call, all participants will be in a listen-only mode. After a short introduction by the management, there will be a question-and-answer session. If you would like to ask a question, you may press star followed by one on your touchtone telephone. Please press the star key followed by zero for operator assistance. I would now like to turn the conference over to Daniel Fard-Yazdani. Please go ahead. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for joining this call today. We trust that you have all received the release and the slide deck on our second quarter trading update that we published this morning and that we have also sent out by email. These documents are, of course, also available on our IR website. As always, Niklas and Emmanuel will summarize the most important aspects of today's release in the next 20, maybe 30 minutes. After that, we are looking forward to answering any questions you might have. Before I hand the call over, let me quickly mention that this is my last trading update call and almost my last day here, as I will be leaving Delivery Hero. I would like to thank you all very much for the trust and support in the past, and I hope to see you again somewhere else. I am happy to be handing over the IR lead to Christoph Bast, to whom many of you have already spoken, so I'm happy to know that you will be in very good hands. With that, and without further ado, let me pass the word to Niklas. Hey there, everyone, and hope you're doing well. Excited to share our second quarter with you. We'll do it fast to give space for Q&A shortly then. First, let's reiterate our vision, which is to always deliver an amazing experience to our customers. We do this with traditional food delivery, but of course, also in the significantly growing quick commerce space. We are today a true delivery super app. We deliver whatever you want. You already know the premises that we have laid out in the first or in the past, and that haven't changed. That is then also summarized on chart 3, and I think we can move forward here. Before going into Q2, let me recap that we continue to present numbers on a pro forma basis as we have done already at our Q1 trading update in April. This means that we exclude Delivery Hero Korea for the full year and include Woowa for the entire year. Let's now look at some of the main developments since our last trading update on chart 6 here. I already mentioned the tremendous growth we have achieved again this quarter, and this despite very limited COVID impact. Quite importantly, we have scaled up our OD in South Korea quite substantially with the launch of Baemin1 in June. I'll give you more detailed update on this later. We have continued to press forward with the expansion of our Dmart offering. We added another 85 or 84 stores in Q2, and we have or had 687 active stores at the end of June, which is now far above 700. In Germany, we had a proper launch of our business there with foodpanda two days ago. We, of course, remain very excited to build our service out here. Already in late May, we have adjusted our footprint by selling our Balkan operations in Glovo or to Glovo for a total consideration of EUR 170 million. Specifically, the sale comprises of our operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. We think Glovo is well-placed to continue investing into improved customer experience, long-term sustainable operation, and further build out the businesses locally. Given our stake here in Glovo, we are indirectly going to benefit from the upside that we think Glovo will generate post this transaction. Finally, moving away from direct financials, we have also kept the momentum up in the ESG part of our business. We have initiated a sustainable packaging project with an objective to reduce plastic waste as well as carbon emission. We are going to provide local restaurants with eco-friendly packaging solutions at a comparative cost. In a first step until end of the year, we aim to deploy 10 million units of sustainable packaging in eight selected countries. After this, we want to expand the program to additional markets and thereby reinforce our commitment to sustainability. With that, I'll hand over to Emmanuel for the financials of the second quarter. Emmanuel. Well, thanks, Niklas. Good afternoon also from my side. As Niklas has already mentioned, the second quarter has been another tremendously successful quarter for us. We record 730 million orders, which correspond to an increase of 79% year-on-year and over 10% quarter-on-quarter. The GMV or gross merchandise value advanced by almost the same pace, with a 74% to reach EUR 8.4 billion. Finally, total segment revenue in the quarter up by EUR 1.5 billion, which compared to EUR 8 billion in the same quarter last year, and therefore an increase of 105% in reporting currency and even 115% year-on-year in custom currency. I already mentioned most of the second quarter numbers for the group, but let me add a bit of details on chart 8. We reach an own delivery share of 50%, compared to 46% on a pro forma basis a year ago. The modest increase stems from the fact that due to the inclusion of Woowa in the numbers, they historically lower OD share. That result in a lower growth on the group level. This should re-accelerate with the rollout of the OD in South Korea, but we will cover this separately in a moment. The Woowa group of the offshore continued healthy growth in H1, with orders increasing by 66% year-on-year, and the GMV by almost the same magnitude at 68%. Revenues rising up at 76% compared to the same period last year. We will publish our full set of numbers in H1 report in two weeks from now. On preliminary basis, the H1 2021 Adjusted EBITDA to GMV, the margin stood at -2.1%, which shows a very positive development from -3.6% in H1 last year, means 2020. Now turning to chart number 9, our largest segment, Asia. Please remember that the sizable group operations are included in this segment. Despite the fact that the Korean business is growing a little bit less than some other of the countries in Asia, we have again achieved significant growth in the region. The orders are up by 71% year-on-year. The GMV is up by 68%, and the segment revenue are 84% higher than in Q2 2020 on reported currency, and even higher on constant currency. Overall, a significantly higher growth by the ones reported by peers in the region, which means that we are gaining market share. We will give you an update on the rollout of the OD business in Korea in a moment on the next slide. Now let's move to MENA. Now looking quickly at MENA on the chart number 10. As you remember this segment, order numbers going down by 6% in the second quarter of last year due to the COVID-related curfews and restrictions. In that sense, the segment had an easy comp this quarter. In addition to it having returned to its normal growth trajectory already before, we're now showing very decent growth numbers. The orders were 122% above the prior year number at EUR 148 million. The GMV on a reporting basis increased by 97%. Adjusting for FX effects, however, the increase was almost the same level as the order at 124%. Also the segment revenue came in strong with an increase of 117% on reporting basis, and even 142% adjusted on FX effects. Now going to Europe. The orders continue to grow quite significantly with a 63% year-on-year. We've seen a slight deceleration as restrictions fell away. July's growth was still very healthy with 50% year-on-year. The growth of GMV and segment revenue was even higher at 71% and 96% respectively, with a little less in constant currency. Now let's move to Americas, and I will keep my comments very brief on slide 12, which summarize the developments in Latin America. We're very happy to see the strong growth that we have seen in the recent quarters continue. The orders went up by 77% year-on-year. GMV increased by 86%, and segment revenue growth was again above 100% at 110%. The OD share in Latin or in Americas already high in the region and continue to climb further to 86%. Finally, on the next slide 13, you will find the numbers of the Integrated Verticals segments. As we continue to roll out our new Dmarts, our growth continues to be extremely strong. We recorded 21 million orders this quarter, making us the leader in the segment. We achieved growth of 249% year-on-year. GMV and the segment revenues increased by similar magnitudes with 254% and 237%. Already today, the segment contributes to 15% of the total segment revenue. While, of course, revenues are much higher in this segment due to the different revenue recognition compared to the platform business, we think that this is still a remarkable achievement. We also generate about an equal amount of orders in our third-party stores, but those are not part of the Integrated Verticals segment, as you know. On the contribution margin on the next slide, we are also publishing an update here with the contribution margin chart. As we know that this is of high interest to you. On this chart, you will find the figures of the margin before voucher cost. All segments continue to be in positive territory on that basis. What is again important to mention is that the margins on this chart does not include the non-commission revenue or the NCR that we are generating. In H1 2021, for example, we reach 1.6% of GMV, which is already slightly up compared to the 12 months in 2020 when this figure stood at 1.4%. Now let's look at the developments on a post-voucher cost basis on chart 15. As you can see, all regions apart from Asia have a positive contribution margin, and even though with a slight decline compared to the prior quarter. Important to notice for Asia is that the line, of course, shows the entire segment. Keep in mind that we are investing significantly in Japan. At the moment, excluding this, the margin in Asia will improve by around 1 percentage point. For Asia, the slight decline in the margin is almost due to some rider shortage we have experienced in some countries in the region, which had a corresponding effect on cost. The shortage was mainly due to a restriction of curfews linked to the pandemic. In terms of voucher users, they went up slightly compared to the total segment revenue. The ratio stood at 12.3% in H1 2021. We still stick to our guidance, that for the full year, we expect to come out with a number below the 2020 level when the ratio stood at 11.8%. Now on chart 16, we present an overview of where we stand regarding our cash position. Having ended 2020 with operating cash of EUR 2.7 billion, we were at EUR 1.7 billion at the end of June 2021. While we have raised EUR 1.2 billion of cash right at the beginning of the year, we also had a sizable outflow of cash due to M&A activities, and most notably, the cash component for the acquisition of Woowa. Apart from this, we of course, had a cash outflow due to operative results, as well as a lesser degree due to CapEx and other items mentioned on the charts. On the next chart, we are sometimes asked about the portfolio of minority investments we hold. We have therefore decided to give you an update on this one. As you can see, the total market value of our portfolio is EUR 2.3 billion. The largest position is our stake in Glovo, with 35%, followed by Deliveroo and Rappi with 21%. The next three positions are Deliveroo, Jets, and Zomato. In addition to the learnings that we have made from holding these investments, we have also generated very attractive returns in double digits and sometimes even in triple-digit percentages. With that, let me hand back to Niklas for a more detailed view of Korea and the development of the delivery business. Niklas? Thanks, Emmanuel. Let's then start with the development of the important Korean market first. On the chart here, you will find an overview of some major developments since June when Woowa launched Baemin1, which is the name for our main OD offering, our own delivery offering. We launched this to close any customer service gap in the country. As you remember, the only reason for Coupang to have gained traction last year was that they offered a faster delivery compared to the experience customers were making at Woowa or also at Yogiyo, for that sake. With the launch of Baemin1 in June, the gap is now closed, and we are now rolling out our product in Seoul and elsewhere. On the back of this, the share of OD already doubled on a nationwide level to 8%, and it reached 29% in Seoul, where we first launched Baemin1. Again, we moved to 29% in that city. This was achieved because the team did a fantastic job of signing restaurants very quickly for this offering. We already have 66,000 restaurants live in June. I told you we would go in very aggressively, and this is what aggressive looks like. It goes without saying that the sales team is doing a fantastic job adding an insane amount of new restaurants every day. We said before that we will, of course, invest in signing restaurants first by using a promotional period, but the ultimate pricing is set to be the market standard or a market standard with a 12% commission fee, plus 3% payment fee and a KRW 6,000 delivery fee. The average food value is currently around KRW 21,000. I think this is very healthy levels. Again, please keep in mind that we have a very strong brand equity, superior choice, and customer service in Korea. By now adding the fast delivery option, we further strengthen our position in Korea. I would add, at this point in time, we deliver also faster than our competitors in the market. This chart shows you some more details on data points I have already mentioned. You can see the very fast ramp-up of the restaurants that have signed up to the OD offering on the left-hand side and the corresponding increase of the share of own delivery. As mentioned, we already reached 29% in Seoul. What is probably most interesting to you is the recent development of the active user share according here to App Annie in South Korea. You can see on the right-hand side that while Coupang has been able to increase the share last year, in recent weeks, their share has declined sequentially while that of Woowa has further increased. You should rest assured we are very determined to push ahead hard in Korea to defend our very strong position already. Let me now give you a few more comments on our Dmarts business on chart, or here on the slide, as it is also understandably getting a lot of attention by the market. We continue to see very good traction for our offering across the countries we operate in. What you can see on the left hand on the chart is now the orders are developing on our Dmarts that have been active since June 2020 or before. As you can see, they are scaling up their orders quite rapidly, and after 12 months, around half of these stores have 400 or more orders per day. It shows that we are very good in determining where to open a Dmart and to make use of the existing customer base to choose the right location. Just for reference, any competitor going without this traffic would have to spend billions to achieve what we achieved with very limited marketing cost there. Anyway, we are often asked how our assumptions regarding the basket size of Dmarts compared to the traditional food delivery business is trending, and we are giving an update on this on the right-hand side of the chart. We have compared the average basket size of the Dmarts in the countries we are active in today with the average basket size of the food delivery business. We have built a weighted average across these countries. As you can see here, in June this year, the ratio on average food value stood at 1.17, which means that the average basket size in our Dmart business is 17% higher than that of the food business. Six months ago, the Dmart basket size was only 10% higher. In that sense, you can see that the product is well-received by our customer, and they are increasing order more via the Dmarts. In terms of profitability and in the context of current competitive environment, which is fueled by significant capital flowing into the sector, we think it would be unwise to optimize for profits at this point in time when many competitors are only caring about growth. We are therefore reinvesting efficiency gains into the business in order to increase our footprint rapidly. We want to achieve faster delivery times, acquire more customers, and be very competitive when it comes to pricing. If this means that we will have to prolong the time it takes to get to break even per store, we are more than happy to accept this. If we make economics tough for us with our scale and efficiency, it's going to be incredibly hard for our competitors. In general, we are convinced that many competitors will realize that it is a little bit harder than they think to get this business model profitable. What you need is scale, experience in operating a logistic-driven business model, and on top of that, the combination with the food business to leverage the same customer base and the same fleet in order to drive efficiencies much faster than you could if you only had one part of the business. In that sense, we are very happy to be patient and wait to see the current hype around quick commerce settling down a bit. We are certain that we will emerge as one of the winners in this sector, if not the winner. Finally, as you have probably already seen in our release this morning, we have decided to adjust our guidance. Given the strong growth we have already recorded in the first half of the year, we are reflecting this in our increased growth outlook. For GMV, we have so far exceeded or increased the previous range from EUR 31 billion-EUR 34 billion, and we have now narrowed it and increased it to EUR 33 billion-EUR 35 billion. Similarly, our expectation for total segment revenues are now higher as well. We expect this number for the full year to come in between EUR 6.4 billion and EUR 6.7 billion. Up until now, our outlook has stated a range of between EUR 6.1 billion and EUR 6.6 billion. We are also adapting our EBITDA guidance, which so far has been a range of -1.5% to 2% of GMV. We are now expecting a margin of around 2% for this year. I think that's it from our side. Very much looking forward to your questions. Operator. Ladies and gentlemen, at this time, we will begin the question-and-answer session. The first question is from the line of Joseph Barnet-Lamb with Credit Suisse. Your question please. Excellent. Thank you. Afternoon, team. Two questions for me, given the first one sort of has multiple parts. Firstly, you've moved profit guidance to the low end of previous guidance, but left the EUR 550 million of investment in new geographies unchanged, and I guess that implies about EUR 100 million reduction in core profitability versus where people were before. Your full-year profit guidance and 1H profit delivered implies no meaningful margin improvement in 2H. All of this together seems to tell us that you're going to invest more in existing geographies in 2H. Is that a fair read? If it is that investment largely Baemin 1 and your fight back in Korea, as discussed in the presentation? If so, will that peak in 2H 2021, or will the further investment in Korea continue to ramp in FY 2022? The second question is on Deliveroo, and apologies if it comes across as sort of provocative. You announced a 5% stake in Deliveroo. Niklas, on Twitter, you explained it was a financial investment. Do you see this as a regular course of business for Delivery Hero? i.e., could we see more just financial sort of investments or speculation in other businesses? Finally, are you saying there's no strategic angle at all to your position in Deliveroo? Thank you. Thank you. Maybe you want to start on the EBITDA side and I'll cover a little bit around Korea. Well, first, maybe repeat, compared to the previous year, we improved our group EBITDA, right? Adjust the EBITDA massively, moving from the minus 3.6% pro forma to now minus 2.1% primarily as you saw. We had a good momentum in H1 in terms of growth. The additional EBITDA investment supply in our new guidance would be deployed mostly in other areas. We currently see very good opportunities in a handful of countries where we want to extend our market leadership. Again, I should add that this EBITDA in H1 was negative by minus 2.1% on GMV, underlying the profitability is increasing, and we were trailing well within the negative EBITDA guidance that we gave, between - 1.5% and - 2.0%. However, we feel that in a few markets, where we would like to invest harder. We are already gaining market share, but this should hopefully help further. That's the reasoning behind this further investment, but maybe, Niklas, you want to add something on Korea. Yeah. Maybe first a little bit add on that, and we also reserve some money to respond if someone of our competitors is scaling up. We never want to be in a position where someone can bully us. If competitors like to beat us, spending won't help. They have to find other ways to have a chance to overtake us. Spending will not do, and we don't want to be bullied. I would probably also in general speak about EBITDA and a little bit remark there. All global players could easily be profitable. Take Delivery as an example. We plan to be circa 2% negative EBITDA on GMV. We could improve 2% by increasing commission or by just 2%, or add 2% delivery fee on orders. It's a very marginal fee there, of course. We could also add service fees like some other players do, or we could increase logistic efficiency with, let's say, 15%-20% to get there too. We could cut 2% of vouchers, or we could increase baskets with 10%, or actually requires less than 10% basket increase in order for us to improve EBITDA from -2 to zero. We can do a combination of those. There are so many levers for us to get to that profitability. It's just that we have absolutely no rush. We see this as a very long race, and we are committed to win. We want to have the flexibility. As said, we're clearly trading below 2%. Yes, there are a couple of markets where we like to travel down a little bit, but we also like to making sure that we have the reserves to fight anyone who likes to bully us on spending. That should not be a way to beat us. That's why we also want to have a little bit of flexibility there. In terms of Korea, I cannot respond on which markets where we see a possibility to spend up or where we see a good opportunity to further gain market share. I think we gain market share in every market that I'm aware of, with maybe exceptional one, but where we did a little bit of a mistake on social media. I speak of Thailand here, but I think that's very temporarily, and hopefully, we can also resolve that. I think apart from that, we are gaining market share in every single place. This extra potential investments will further improve that position. You asked also Korea, Peak as I don't comment on specific markets. I think in general, we are making big investments to moving from marketplace to OD. We think it's a very healthy move. It's good for our customers, it's also good for our restaurants, it's good for our riders, but it's also very good for us. I think we have more margins to be made. We're actually moving to more market standard gross profit rates as we do so. For that reason, as things start to play out of moving from temporary promotional pricing to normal pricing, there will also be significant uptick in terms of gross profitability there, which is hard to spend down. As I said, I don't want any particular markets, but I think people should be fairly confident when we speak about Korea. Apologies here because it's a lot of question, a very critical question, good questions. I'd like to respond to them carefully. You asked about Deliveroo, no strategic intention. I guess that might be true, but I would also say that we always have some logic when we make these kind of investments. There is some logic or strategic rationale for any investment. This could be relationship for future partnership. This could be to gain knowledge. This could be acquisition plans. This could be preempting others. This could be cooperation agreements or something else. There are all sorts of different reasons why we would see an investment in a company, mostly private companies. In this case, it's a public company. Many of these bets are long-term considerations. We can not always share what the specific rationale is for an investment. We have consistently done investments in companies like Zomato, Glovo, Rappi, Just Eat Takeaway, and others. In most, the strategic rationale has played out the way we planned. Additionally, for us to make a deal, we also have to see that it makes good financial sense. I think we have consistently done that, too. To give you a couple of examples here, we invested below EUR 2 billion valuation in Zomato two years ago. It's now valued above EUR 11 billion. We invested at around EUR 300 million valuation in Glovo three years ago, and that is worth significantly more now. We invested on below $500 million valuation in Rappi three and a half years ago, and I think it's publicly known that that is approximately a $5 billion business today. We also made a 55% return in Just Eat Takeaway in just a few months when we sold some and locked in some gain from the increase we had from EUR 25 share to, I think, around, let's say, EUR 75 via Careem. That was two years ago. We used that cash to invest in other opportunities, which turned out to be a very good decision, too. If something doesn't make sense anymore or we lose the strategic rationale, then we are happy to get out and capture our gain or loss, if that would ever happen. So far, we have made multiple returns in some cases, and even more than multiple returns. I think we are pretty happy here. We have a good view on this business model and how they work. Today, thanks to some of these investments, we have a portfolio of EUR 2.3 billion of pretty strategic holdings. Some will play out the strategic rationale, and in some, maybe not. I'm pretty hopeful that in several of them, the strategic rationale will play out, and in many cases, already happened. When it comes to Deliveroo, I can't share any strategic rationale, but I can share that I like Will and his team. I think they've done a great job. When we started buying into the stock, it was at GBP 2.3 per share. The multiple on GMV was below 0.5x, and we thought this was highly undervalued based on the company we know, because we know it's a good company, and we didn't see a reason why a company that's growing 100%, having good economics, barely losing money. Good economics, why that would be valued at such a discount. We also saw this as financially pretty attractive. It needs to be both financially attractive and there's always some other aspect to it. Thanks for listening for a very long answer. Yeah. Not at all. Sorry for the long question. Thank you, Niklas. You're welcome. The next question is from the line of Miriam Adisa with Morgan Stanley. Your question, please. Great. Good afternoon, everyone. Thanks for taking my questions. First one, just a follow-up on your statement about these EBITDA investments and the fact you'll be investing harder. Is this you preempting an increase in competition in these markets, or have you already started to see an increase in competitive intensity? Also on the contribution margin. It contracted a little bit quarter-on-quarter. Was that driven entirely by the driver shortages in all regions, or were there any other factors that contributed to that? Should we expect that to continue in the second half, or is this increased investment coming through marketing rather than driver costs or vouchering? Finally, if you could just give a bit more color on the acquisition you made today in terms of financial impact, and then also just linked to that, if you could just share your latest thoughts on the dark store versus the third-party model for grocery and if you're starting to favor one versus the other. Thanks. Okay. Several questions here. Maybe I cover first the competition point. Maybe Emmanuel do the contribution margin. I'll do the GPO, yeah. I go for the rest. No. When we look to the food segment, I would say competition is probably less than what it has been. I think competition is less than what it was in Q1. It's less than it was last year. It's less probably than it was before that as well. I think we have seen a gradual trend and probably even more so in this quarter. We see both in Korea as well as Asia, as well as against Uber Eats. I think all players, the competition has been less intense. We have not seen that yet. I think we have seen more competition on the Dmart side. There's definitely more capital coming in there. We might not have seen it in our markets yet, but we are very ready and aware. If someone comes, we will scale up faster, and we will move even harder on economic spend. So far, we haven't seen anyone entering our place there. As I said, we see good investment opportunities. We see good returns in places, in a few countries as well. We think that we can have a good return in some of them. Therefore we think it makes sense to add this flexibility and possibly go a little bit harder in a few places to further strengthen our market position. So far so good. contribution margin, Emmanuel. Yeah, sure. Miriam, the reasons for the slight decline are different for each segment. Let's start maybe with Latam and the GPO. Our GPO after vouchers in Latam remain unchanged. In MENA, the GPO declined a bit due to our structural changes, especially in KSA, with the so-called Saudization of the rider fleet. Consequently, we had an increase of our CPO. We had to include more and more local riders, if you wish, and that's had an impact on our CPO in general, the shift of this rider fleet that we have in the KSA. In Europe, we are increasing our OD share in Greece is moving mainly from marketplace model to a hybrid one or more to OD, and the GPO there in this country is still not positive. In Asia, finally, the reduction was mainly due to our seasonal riders shortage, and mainly in Taiwan. Consequently, from the pandemic and also some related restrictions due to the pandemic. Different kind of reasons for the segment. I would say going forward, the stabilization is something that we will probably see also in Q3 as we had to rebuild the fleets. Tanya asked about acquisition, and you're referring, of course, to Marketyo in Turkey, which is an online grocery platform, and a very good one. This is a very strategic investment for us, or investment acquisition. It helps us scaling our third-party grocery offering to make sure that we also have a leading grocery offering, not only a food service and a Dmart service, but also here. Yes, I think this is a very good one, and as I said, we believe in the Turkish market, and we have some competition there, and we will make sure that we step up if need be in this market. I think this is a fantastic acquisition. It is in the mid million amount, so we shouldn't exaggerate the impact on cash or anything. It's fairly small in that sense, but we get a very good multiple because we also see that we can do this together. There is a small earn-out for the founding team, so we know that they are also very excited to build something much, much bigger in Turkey with us. Overall, a great also development in Turkey over the last couple of months. We really turned a corner here. I wasn't particularly happy a few months ago. Now I start to see it's happening, and I'm a strong believer in our position there to further gain market share in our Dmart business, but also winning market share in our food business. When it comes to dark store or our Dmarts versus third party, and we like both. I love to be a great partner to some of the best local stores as well as global partners such as Carrefour and so on. I like both. I also like the Dmart side where we can make things much faster and even further cut down on cost and price versus what it costs in local stores which is not optimized for delivery. I think you need both. We want to have both. They both serve completely different purposes, so they complement each other very, very well here. I'm bullish about both, but yeah. Great. Thank you. I should add that it's not an easy business to drive efficiency on and drive economics. I know it's very easy on an Excel sheet, and many players will show how they can make economics on an Excel sheet. I tell you, it's not as easy as people think, and that's why we see players losing more money than they have GMV. Basically, it will be cheaper to just give people food and on top of that give them money, because that's the way it is. When you have more burn than GMV, then you basically give things for free with an extra bonus. We do not do that, and that's why you see that our burn for this Dmart space per order is very low. That shows again that the importance and the strength of our platform and our user base cross-selling there, I think we stand very, very strong in others. As they scale up, we will see how tough it is, and they will realize that we have a suite support. Great. Thank you very much. The next question is from the line of Rob Joyce with Goldman Sachs. Your question please. Hi. Thanks very much. Hi, Niklas. Hi, Emmanuel. Hey, Rob. Daniel, all the very best for the future. I've got three, couple of them on Korea. The first one is, thanks for giving us that second quarter Woowa number. Wondering if you could give us the GMV growth for the first quarter for comparison, are you seeing an acceleration in the growth rate in the third quarter as you have launched Baemin One? Second one in terms of the operating model there. You mentioned the promotional period. When does that roll off? How long does the promotional period of pricing generally last for restaurants? Do you think, on a normalized pricing that, I think you hinted at it, that first-party delivery will be more unit profitable than the existing marketplace there in Korea? The other one is just on Japan. Can you give us an update on your progress in Japan? How are you feeling about that market, and should we expect investments to accelerate in 2022 versus 2021 levels, in Japan? Thank you. Thanks. Do you want to start, Emmanuel? I don't have the right number, the correct number right now on top of my head. What I can tell you is that we had a slightly less higher growth in Q2 compared to Q1 in Woowa. I don't have the final numbers here on top of my head for Q1. As I said, there was a tiny reduction in terms of growth in Q2 compared to Q1. This I know for sure. I will look and then come back to you then. Here, of course, there is also some COVID. I know we had a big lockdown in January. January was of course incredibly good in terms of growth. That affects the whole quarter as well. I can answer if you want. Yeah. No, let's leave it. Okay. Let's take the other sort of operating model. Yes, we do that. The underlying economics of delivery is at least as good. We don't see that Korea would be different from any other market. We are pretty optimistic that it will be a market standard, a gross profit that we can achieve there. We are, I would say, a little bit below market standard when it comes to the marketplace. In that sense, I know your assumption is probably right. In terms of promotional period. We have signed up restaurants where we said that there will be three months and then we'll discuss. I don't think they will do three months, especially since they are in COVID period still. It's not the right timing. We want to be helpful to the restaurant. Right now we don't see that as the plan. We will have to see. In general, I wouldn't expect that the margin in this year, it will only start moving in the next year, I would say, because we also sign up a lot of restaurants throughout the year. We should start to see gradual improvement from beginning of next year. Japan progress. Very good. It's the fastest growth that we had in any market that we launched. Yes, we are very hopeful. It's still a long way to go. We still have to work hard, but I think we have gotten the right setup for having a good service offering. We still have some work to do there, but the more we start having the right setup and the right product offering, the better returns we have. If we have better returns on our investment, it also means that we can start investing more in that market as we see increasingly better returns. You can probably expect that there will be a little bit more invested there as well versus what we've done in the past. Thanks, Niklas. Sorry. Okay. I was just going to say, anything on the third quarter, how that started in Korea post the rollout of Baemin? It started really well. It started really well. You can imagine we now offer a superior service on all aspects. Of course we also do a little bit promotion to advertise the new service. We did some very nice updates in our app. We are very happy. Yeah, we are very happy with how it started and how it's continued. Thank you very much. Thanks. The next question comes from the line of Silvia Cuneo with Deutsche Bank. Your question please. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. My first question is about future growth prospects. With the last quarter being the 10th in a row with growth of around 100%, you have constantly outperformed your short midterm guidance of growth above 40%. Looking beyond 2021, can you tell us about how you expect the food delivery market to evolve? Whether high double digit, if not triple digit growth can still be sustained? Perhaps you could share an update on the online penetration of ordering broadly in your main markets, that would be helpful. The second question is about Dmarts. Thanks for sharing the number you added in the quarter. Is the incremental 80 on a quarter-on-quarter basis sort of the rule of thumb we can follow when thinking about the next two quarters of 2021? Also related to that, can you please give us a sense of what markets you consider well-covered with Dmarts compared to which ones are still under-penetrated? Finally, about the launch of foodpanda in Germany, can you please share any feedback from the ground? For example, when signing up restaurants that perhaps you used to partner with three years ago or so, how differently are you pricing and how are you pitching your return? Also finally, if you can share any sort of early feedback from users, are you attracting unique users or perhaps users that already have one of the competing apps? Thank you. Okay. Thank you. On the growth prospects. Yes, we have quite massively exceeded our long-term outlooks that we've given our midterm and short-term for that sake as well. We generally like to be conservative on things we cannot forecast. We don't want to be wrong. I think in general, things we cannot foresee, we tend to maybe be a tap conservative. That also is the case now, and when I'm going to speak about the future growth, because of course we have a tremendous growth. The cohorts are improving everywhere. The new customers who get on the platform are more frequent than the past customers, and the longer they've been on the platform, the more they order. I think there's nothing that tells me that that would change, but I hope that we'll continue to improve there. I would also say that in most markets, we only really just started acquiring users. There are still so many users to be acquired. In some cases, it might be less than, it could be 5% or 10% of the population have tried our service. We are still very early in the stage of growing. For that reason, I think that we can grow in very fast pace, and we will not grow in triple-digit forever. We have done it now for a couple of years, increase from a mid-double-digit to triple-digit as I said. That can of course not continue forever, then we soon be the world's largest company. Maybe we'll be one day, but it will not be in the next few years. Therefore, I think we start getting down to a little bit more normalized growth. We should expect that from there, it's just the rule of scale. You have the size that we cannot increase year-on-year either. I would rather say that we'll continue to grow very fast, but you should expect that scale is rather gradually moving that down. It also means that it's gradually moving down, which means I'm pretty optimistic when you look at the 10-year horizon, that will be a very large company. When it comes to Dmart, I'm not 100% sure I understood that question, so maybe we can repeat the Dmart question there. For sure. What I meant was, given that even in the Q2, you added about 80 extra Dmarts on a quarter-on-quarter basis. Yeah. Is that a good rule of thumb to think about the additions over the next two quarters? Got it. Yes. We didn't see the need to increase number of stores faster than what the business actually can comprehend while still have good economics. Because we need a certain number of orders per store in order to have some economics and make the math work out. Therefore, we increase probably stores a little bit slower because, yeah, we are already the clear service, have the best service offering in the markets we operated. Yeah, we probably balance that a little bit more to having higher efficiency and more demand per store. That's a little bit the last couple of quarters. I think as competition is heating up further, I think we were going to increase the pace in H2, not because we have seen anyone entering our market, but we just increase because we are very bullish about the industry. We think that it's going to continue to grow very fast in Q3, Q4, and we might front-load to open even more stores to have an even more comprehensive offering just in case. Can a little bit in which markets and so on. Of course, we start in the Middle East and then expand out to rest of the world. I think Asia and Latin America has been a little bit more focused on Europe. In Europe, we have rolled out, but at significantly less scale. We think that the model works in every market, but also our business is small in Europe. We have less synergies with our overall business because we have less density of order, less users per capita and so on. Therefore, we prioritize some other regions. We think that the business model can work in every place, at least if you get scale and size. Yeah. Hopefully that answers the third question. Then on foodpanda pricing, and I think that was in relation to restaurant, if I remember right. Yeah, we see that problem on average, we are generally increasing a little bit over time. We're also implementing certain commission caps and so on to making sure that we don't go below a certain level where we don't make economics or good economics. I think we have very healthy commission levels to drive good profitability in all markets, and I would say it's over time probably increased a little bit versus decreased. As a little bit the question of users, that the customers require are most likely new users. There might be some lasting customers going to two platforms and so on, but I think the majority of users actually stick to one platform. That's what we've seen in the past, and that's probably true now, and most of acquisition is coming from new users rather than customers who have ordered food before with another platform. Thank you. Okay. Thank you. We are a little bit short on time, so maybe max 2 questions from now. Yeah. Ladies and gentlemen, in the interest of time, please limit yourself to two questions. The next question is from the line of Giles Thorne with Jefferies. Your question, please. I will actually beat and raise that and just ask 1 question on Dmart. I recall comments, and I can't remember whether it was on a results call or a sell-side breakfast, but I'm recalling comments a year ago that the Dmart model wouldn't work particularly well in a place like Stockholm for reasons related to population density and income disparity and the usual types of things. Now a year later, not only are Dmarts doing very well in Stockholm, but they're also now going to Stockholm suburbs like Bromma and then to cities like Lund. Forgive me, Niklas, I had to Google Lund, and it seems to be a fairly small city. That feels like a substantive change in, I don't know, conditions for having a viable Dmart, which in turn signals that this could be a lot bigger than what we're all anticipating if tier 2 and tier 3 cities can support the model. I'd be interested on your comments on that, and that was it. Thank you. Hey, thanks. You obviously know this space very well with the Dmart. I admire your work there. Yeah, I would say that we are happy with the coverage and the focus that it's taken. You're probably right that the comment that we made before is probably true, but we realized that the market in general is bigger than we thought. That makes even a country like Stockholm or Sweden suitable for this, and as you've seen probably, we have something like 20 stores in Stockholm, I think, or in Sweden, and we're into 50 or so in the Nordics. You're right, we have gone a little bit downstream. We also learned a lot on how we can make this economical even in smaller cities. Again, I like to point out that this is a very tough business model. I think with our size and scale and brand recognition and logistic efficiency and so on, I think we can do it, but it's not going to work for everyone. Especially when there are several players in one market, I think it's going to be very, very tough. We obviously aim to always be number one, and we'll do what it takes to be number one. I hope it's going to work out for us at least. Great. Thank you. Hey, thanks. The next question is off the line of Andrew Ross with Barclays. Your question please. Great. Thanks for squeezing me in, and hope all is well, everyone. I've got two both on Korea, so hopefully quick. First one is on the restaurants joining Baemin 1. Can you talk a bit about any kind of order uplift they're seeing as they move to the new offering? I guess ultimately, how many restaurants you think might migrate to the Baemin 1 model? The second question is, can you talk a bit about the cost per drop on the delivery, I guess both now and in a steady state in Korean won terms, so that we can have a better go at computing where that gross margin as a percent of GMV may end in a steady state? Thanks. Yeah. We do see a fair number of restaurants who move into having both Baemin and Baemin 1. We keep making sure the orders on the Baemin is remaining. Additionally, we have managed to get them on Baemin 1 and drive orders there. There's also a number of restaurants that we never had that we can now add. There is a significant expansion in choice thanks to this offering. I think that is also helping us a lot here. I think, I don't want to say any particular number here, but we have a little bit of both. In terms of cost per drop, we don't generally disclose, but I think our hope is, of course, that we can cover our cost per drop with the delivery fee. I mentioned a little bit delivery fee before. There are some other costs associated to food delivery as well, such as payment, et cetera. Of course, it depends also a little bit if we keep on or if we do one drop or if we start doing multiple drops. It depends a little bit on our efficiency of our logistic operation and so on. I think we've proven that we can make economics even in the most hard markets. I think that's as much as I can say. I hope that's enough. Yeah, that's great. Thanks a lot. Very helpful. Thanks a lot. The next question is from the line of Sarah Simon with Berenberg. Your question please. Hey, Sarah. Yes. Hi. Sorry, I've got two questions. First one was just any update on your thoughts about subscription model, like Deliveroo Plus, they were talking about that yesterday and your thoughts on that as it relates to your markets. The second one was for Emmanuel. If we look at your guidance, there is quite a significant step up in the take rate implied in the second half. Now, obviously there's an ongoing shift to own delivery, and there's also the fact that by far the fastest growing part is Integrated Verticals, where the GMV and the revenue are kind of not a million miles away. Is there anything else we should be thinking about or is there anything else driving that step up that we should know about? Thanks. Yes. On the subscription model, we have been trying to get subscription to work for a long time, and we failed for a number of years to get it to work and get it economical. That's why we never scaled something. After many trials, I think we have something that works really well. We are scaling that. Of course, as we scale it, initially there might be a little bit cost associated to that as well, because we want people to try it out and realize all the benefits. I think that is happening. The trick is, of course, to making sure that you don't have worse economics when you have a subscribing customer. I think many players do the mistake that they get the same economics per user, but not per order. Of course, if you scale that user and that user goes from 5 orders a month to 20 orders a month, then that's terrible to not improve your economics on that user. Therefore, for us, it's always been very important that we can get the same economics per order, even if that customer is scaling that from 5 to 20 orders a month or so. I think we found a way, and I think we can further improve it by making sure that there are special promotion, that restaurants can give those super promotion and so on. There is a little bit of, as we work on the offering and making sure that we get more restaurants participating, there is also slight support from our end, which also has a little bit impact on our gross profit in the last quarter. Maybe we can have a slight negative impact in the next couple of quarters so to scale it up. Overall, the subscription model, I think we are very happy as it's set up at this point in time. Maybe Emmanuel. On the take rate, I think this is a mixed effect. There's nothing specific popping out in my mind. That will be the improvement that we see also in the past where signing new restaurants or new vendors joining the platform, we will then sign them always like higher conditions than in the past. As you know, we are putting a lot of efforts on the NCR, the non-commission revenue. We're also looking for improving the pricing with the dynamic pricing. There's a lot of levers that we are working on continuously, and that should drive this improvement over time. Nothing particular to mention here in terms of very special impact that we are expecting. Perfect. Thanks. The next question is from the line of Andrew Porteous with HSBC. Your question, please. Yeah. Hi, gents. A couple from me. I guess thinking about the opportunity in grocery, clearly Dmart rolling out very quickly. There's a lot of competition in that segment. I'm thinking, conceptually, do you think about grocery as being a must-have from a success perspective, in order to support your restaurant business long term? Do you think it's quite a separate opportunity and it's incremental to the core restaurant business that you have? Secondly, a question around the vouchering in Q2. Clearly, we saw a step up. I know you're flagging that coming off in the second half, but wondering what drove that step up. Are you seeing more competition? Are we seeing a bit higher churn or is there anything you're seeing on customer acquisition cost, perhaps, going back to more normal levels that's really driven that increase in vouchering? Maybe I start with the first one, and then you decide, Emmanuel, if you want to take the next one. Sure. Groceries must have. No, I don't think it's a must have. I think it fits with our strategy of being a delivery super app. I think it does help through cross-pollination type of thing and getting frequency and loyalty and subscription programs, et cetera. I think possibly the worst combination is to be defocused on both areas a little bit half-ass. I think you will see some players be wanting to play in that space, but they don't really. I think that's probably the worst of two. Either you are very focused on just food, that's probably fine, or you cover groceries and other things, but then you also have to completely change your systems. It's not just add and then like another restaurant, and I think that is what some, I think, players and platforms and maybe also investors believe. It is a very different setup if you want to do this successfully. If you don't do it properly, then you're probably better off not doing it at all. Emmanuel, do you want to cover the second one? Yeah, sure. During the first half of the year, we had several initiatives, where the vouchering were used to support our business. I'm thinking here, for example, of the platform migration rebranding in Latin America. Also we've done some customer push, acquisition push in APAC, with also very selective countries in Europe as well, to support also the launch of the Dmart, the new Dmarts. All these components will explain the development that we've seen in H1. I mentioned, I think that we are confident that we can reduce the level of the vouchering, to roughly 11%. As usually this vouchering content are getting less efficient over time. At the same time, and I think it's very important to reiterate this, we constantly evaluate where we get the best returns, and there might be some temporary deviations, as we move into new verticals or even new areas, new cities and so on and so forth. Of course, Emmanuel then say 11%, we generally think in GMV, and I think that's more around 3%. Revenue. I've said it before, and I'll say it again. The efficiency of vouchers over time is also declining. It has a strong value when you're ramping something up and when you get to a certain size. I don't say that it doesn't work afterwards. It works really well for getting a customer to order again, but you then get more and more reorders from existing customers rather than acquisitions of new customer. That makes the return much, much lower. Therefore, the efficiency as a whole is also then declining over time. They start having other channels and other marketing activities that are more effectful than actually on the voucher side. I think if there is a new offering, great, get people to try it out, or if you're early in the market, great, get people to try out, but over time it gets less and less effective. That's why you see usually the voucher share will decline as% of GMV and potentially other marketing channels will increase a little bit. Overall, I think we've seen a healthy kind of marketing, including vouchers, and all in, it's probably long-term more like 3%, maybe even less if I see some of the other players and peers. Of course, that is when we have full scale, that it goes below 3% as a total, and that is marketing and vouchers all combined. Right now, there is both marketing and vouchers, making that percentage a little bit higher in many places. Perfect. Thank you, guys. Thanks. Niklas, Emmanuel, do we have time for more, or do you need to drop? Maybe we can do 1 more, or two if it's short. Operator, we can take the next question. Yep. The next question is from Clément Genelot with Bryan Garnier. Your question, please. Yes, hi. I would got two questions from my side. The first one is on South Korea. To what extent do you think the ongoing boycott of Koreans against the Coupang Eats helps you to stabilize your market share versus the Coupang? My second question is on Dmart. Investors are worried about European, and also U.S. quick commerce players are putting some pressure on your Dmart stores. Do you see any of the dark store players in your geographies apart from Europe? I only have in mind Marketyo and Mother Key and Jokr, all at some markets. Yeah. Yeah, Coupang is always having a little bit of a tough time with boycotts and certain incidents, and I think in general, they've taken a little bit hit on the reputation also when it comes to food. I think for us, we have been very lucky, building a very strong brand, and I think we had a little bit last year, some negative news, also partially connecting to transactions and approvals and so on. You have seen that completely shifting. If you look at the general perception of our brand, Baemin, in Korea, it's exceptionally good, and it's been exceptionally positive also because they are acting with 100% focus on every instance of the ecosystem. That means they care a lot for riders, they care a lot for restaurants. You can see that, and people know that, and they feel it, that there is a caring. As you know, the CEO and founder of Baemin, I think he also donated EUR 100 million from his own pocket to riders and to restaurants. Incredibly generous there. He keeps on doing a lot of charity work and he's an incredible person that is extremely liked and supported. They have built an incredible reputation and a loved brand, and we have seen that positive impact to us over the last quarter or two. Of course, Coupang have had a little bit of the opposite with all sorts of issues. I'm sure they'll come back. It's a good company. I have no doubt it's a very serious competitor we take incredibly serious, and we'll do whatever it takes to making sure that we remain the clear leader in this space. I think that's the market share of Baemin hasn't been touched for years. Even last year, it didn't really impact their market share and the cohorts and so on. It's been good. Coming to Dmart, we haven't really seen any quick commerce player really in our market. There might be a few stores here and there with someone. There might be some market. Of course, Germany now there is strong quick commerce players or dark stores players. Out of Germany, we just started and as I said, we still take this opportunity careful. We mainly launched Germany to making sure that we learn and we can build a product where we sit, because otherwise we cannot build the best global service without being in Germany. That's why we do it more for ourselves. Then we build the best service, and then we'll see where that takes us. We're also a little bit careful in our investments there. Not so much, to answer you straight. Thanks a lot. Thanks. The next question is from the line of Jürgen Kolb with Kepler Cheuvreux. Your question, please. Thanks very much. Hi, guys. Two quick ones on Dmart. Thanks very much for the slide on page 21, where you provide additional details on the Dmarts. Just one question on the left-hand side of this slide. It looks like the average orders per day of the average Dmarts that you depicted there, just leveling off at around 400+, obviously. Is that kind of a sweet spot? That's a good number to deal with? Would you say that's just, they're taking a breather and with more scale, they can do much better than the 400+ orders per day on an average Dmart business? Does that maybe is the limit for the size of the Dmart and the business that you have? That's the first one. The second one, I forgot when you did that, but you provide us at some stage with a calculation on the Dmart business, on the quick commerce business, with an average commission rate, like 22%, and some pickup costs and delivery costs or what have you. Given that you've increased your size and the number of Dmarts and obviously, you've become bigger here. Of this scenario calculation, where would you say you've gained superior scale effects so that the profit contribution is getting higher? Where's the driver predominantly that makes the economics of the Dmarts even better than what you already told us? Thanks. Perfect. Yeah. On the 400 is a good level to be, but it's not enough. We need a little bit more per store to make them achieve the profit contribution that we plan on. However, when we come to 400, it starts to be okay. The reason why it kind of capping out there is that we're building more stores when we start reaching higher levels. Then, of course, there's an average of maybe some having 300 and some having 700. Therefore, we then make sure that we start building more stores and that, of course, takes down the average. It's a little bit us making sure that we build more coverage around that store, shortening delivery distances, which also reduce the cost. If you have one store within a couple of kilometers of delivery, it's very hard to make the economics as well. You need a lot of orders per store in a very small delivery area. We accept delivering a little bit longer until we reach kind of a sweet spot on orders. I think long term this will increase, but it will be always kept down a little bit with the new openings. On the calculations that we've shown before. One of the leverages exactly how many orders to get the store because you have store managers and you have pickers, and if you don't utilize them well in a store, then it's expensive. The same is when you have CapEx costs and inventory costs and so on. Of course, the less turnaround you have on your store, more wastage you would have and so on. I think the number of order per store is very important to get right. Of course, there are some other things, making sure that the purchasing power, I don't think we have that yet, and we also not optimize it for it as much as yet because we still have a little bit size to do before we can really go to the CPG companies and others and getting it right. In some product categories, we will also have to build white label solutions. That is not the priority right now. There are still some levers there that will take some years to get right. I think in terms of efficiency, logistics, picking, procurement, I think we're doing really well with the size that we have at this point in time, but more levers to come. I'd like to add maybe one comment on the previous question because I forgot, of course, that we do have a serious competitor in Turkey. There is a overlap there. They started, I think, four or five years before us. I think we have gained probably, let's say we are maybe at 35 or so. Maybe we have reached 40% market share, but let's assume that we're still 35%-40% market share there against that player in Turkey. We obviously only operated for a little bit more than eight years. I would expect that we will at some point, fairly soon, hopefully reach that 50% market share. I think we have good development there. Of course there is one market with strong competition. Very good. Thanks very much, guys. Thank you very much. If that was the last question or at least the last we will have time for today, I'd like to thank everyone for listening in and for your support. Also for the full team for your incredible job. I think this was one of our best quarters we have had for several years, both on the top line as well as bottom line, as well as market shares, as well as expansion. All of that, I think a huge thanks to all your work. We are building a service that customers love, a service that has helped restaurants stay afloat during COVID and created hundreds of thousands of job opportunities to riders that value the flexibility that we can offer. I'd like to thank everyone for your tremendous job and also thanks to all the investors who are supporting us. Thanks everyone, and hope you have a great rest of the week. All the best. Bye. Ladies and gentlemen, the conference is now concluded and you may disconnect your telephone. Thank you for joining and have a pleasant day. Goodbye.