Good afternoon and welcome to the ECB Press Conference with President Lagarde and Vice President de Guindos. My name is Wolfgang Proissl. We have participants online. When they take the floor, I ask them to unmute and to put on their cameras. With that, I hand over to President Lagarde. Please. Thank you very much, Wolfgang, and good afternoon, good morning to those online. The Vice President and I welcome you to our press conference. The Governing Council today decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate, the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance, is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The disinflation process is well on track. Inflation has continued to develop, as staff expected, with both headline and core inflation declining in March. Services inflation has also eased markedly over recent months. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. Wage growth is moderating, and profits are partially buffering the impact of still elevated wage growth on inflation. The euro area economy has been building up some resilience against global shocks, but the outlook for growth has deteriorated owing to rising trade tensions. Increased uncertainty is likely to reduce confidence among households and firms, and the adverse and volatile market response to the trade tensions is likely to have a tightening impact on financing conditions. These factors may further weigh on the economic outlook for the euro area. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of exceptional uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path. The decisions taken today are set out in a press release available on our website. I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing, and we'll then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions. The economic outlook is clouded by exceptional uncertainty. Euro area exporters face new barriers to trade, although their scope remains unclear. Disruptions to international commerce, financial market tensions, and geopolitical uncertainty are weighing on business investment. As consumers become more cautious about the future, they may hold back spending as well. At the same time, the euro area economy has been building up some resilience against the global shocks. The economy is likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing has shown signs of stabilization. Unemployment fell to 6.1% in February, its lowest level since the launch of the euro. A strong labor market, higher real incomes, and the impact of our monetary policy should underpin spending. The important policy initiatives that have been launched at the national and EU levels to increase defense spending and infrastructure investment can be expected to bolster manufacturing, which is also reflected in recent surveys. In the present geopolitical environment, it is even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, competitive, and resilient. The European Commission's Competitiveness Compass provides a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This includes completing the Savings and Investment Union, following a clear and ambitious timetable, which should help savers benefit from more opportunities to invest and improve firms' access to finance, especially risk capital. It is also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of the digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU's economic governance framework and prioritize essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investments. Annual inflation edged down to 2.2% in March. Energy prices fell by 1% after a slight rise in February, while food price inflation rose to 2.9% in March, from 2.7% in February. Goods inflation was stable at 0.6%. Services inflation fell again in March to 3.5%, and it now stands half a percentage point below the rate recorded at the end of last year. Most indicators of underlying inflation are pointing to a sustained return of inflation to our 2% medium-term target. Domestic inflation has declined since the end of 2024. Wages are gradually moderating. In the last quarter of 2024, annual growth in compensation per employee stood at 4.1%, down from 4.5% in the previous quarter. Rising productivity also meant that unit labor costs grew more slowly. The ECB's wage tracker and information from our contacts with companies point to a decline in wage growth in 2025, as also indicated in the March staff projections. Unit profit fell at an annual rate of 1.1% at the end of last year, contributing to lower domestic inflation. Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around 2%, which supports the sustainable return of inflation to our target. Let's look at the risk now. Downside risks to economic growth have increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties will likely lower euro area growth by dampening exports, and it may drag down investment and consumption. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions, increased risk aversion, and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remain a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, the increase in defense and infrastructure spending would add to growth. Increasing global trade disruptions are adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and a rerouting of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defense and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly could drive up food prices by more than expected. Looking at the financial and monetary conditions now, risk-free interest rates have declined in response to the escalating trade tensions. Equity prices have fallen amid high volatility, and corporate bond spreads have widened around the globe. The euro has strengthened over recent weeks as investor sentiment has proven more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies. The latest official statistics on corporate borrowing, which predated these market tensions, continue to indicate that our interest rate cuts had made it less expensive for firms to borrow. The average interest rate on new loans to firms declined to 4.1% in February from 4.3% in January. Firms' cost of issuing market-based debt declined to 3.5% in February, but there has been some upward pressure more recently. Moreover, growth in lending to firms picked up again in February to 2.2%, while debt securities issuance by firms grew at an unchanged rate of 3.2%. At the same time, credit standards for business loans tightened slightly again in the first quarter of 2025, as reported in our latest bank lending survey for the euro area. As in the previous quarter, this was mainly because banks are becoming more concerned about the economic risks faced by their customers. Demand for loans to firms decreased slightly in the first quarter after a modest recovery in previous quarters. The average rate on new mortgages at 3.3% in February increased on the back of earlier rises in longer-term market rates. Mortgage lending continued to strengthen in February, albeit at a still subdued annual rate of 1.5%, as banks eased their credit standards and demand for loans to households continued to increase strongly. In conclusion, the Governing Council decided today to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate, the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance, is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of exceptional uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path. In any case, we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission. We are now ready to take your questions. Thank you very much. Today, the first question goes to Annette Weisbach of CNBC. Annette, please. President Lagarde, thank you for taking my question. The first one would be on the rate cut. 25 basis points, has that been backed by everybody, and has there been a discussion about potentially cutting by 50? I would like to know your assessment about the re-inflationary or disinflationary effect of tariffs, because there the jury seems to be still out, but you seem to rather err on the side of that it has disinflationary effects. If I'm reading through your statement, perhaps you could tell me if I'm right. Thank you so much for your two questions. I can confirm to you that the decision to cut rates by 25 basis points was a unanimous decision. Options were debated, but there was no one to argue in favor of a 50 basis points cut, for instance. 25 basis points was definitely the rate cut on which all in the room agreed. Looking at today, I will happily address the issue of why we actually cut rate, because I think it's a twofold rationale. Looking at today and the tariffs debate that is going on, as well as the tariff impact that is actually happening, we know that it's a negative demand shock. We can anticipate that it will have some impact on growth, but the net impact on inflation will only become clearer over the course of time. There are diverging views as to the short-term and the longer-term impact of the various developments of circumstances, because let's be clear, we have a lot of uncertainty still today, and there will be many decisions and many implementations that will take place over the course of the next few weeks and months that will be decisive to err in one direction or the other. But I think the net impact of inflation will become clear over that period, clearer, I shouldn't say clear, clearer over the course of time. Thank you. Thank you. The next question goes to Jana Randow of Bloomberg. Thank you very much. In your policy statement, also in your remarks now, you no longer characterize the policy stance on the restrictive-neutral-accommodative spectrum. And I would be quite interested in why you decided to do that and what kind of conclusions we ought to draw from that? And following on, I would like to know whether the direction of travel, as you often have said, is still clear on policy ahead? And then I want to pick up on what you told Annette just now about the options were debated. Would you care to elaborate a little more on what kind of options were debated? Your first question, I think, is very relevant because we did remove from the monetary policy statement a sentence that referred to the restrictiveness and, in particular, as lately qualified the meaningfully restrictiveness or not. While that assessment of the restrictiveness was meaningful or made sense to the extent that we were very far away from destination, it is meaningless at this point in time. Meaningless because assessing restrictiveness relies heavily on the comparison between the policy rates and the neutral rate. I think I had the opportunity in front of this esteemed group to give you my views, and I think the views that are shared by many of us on the Governing Council concerning the neutral rate. Our view, my view certainly, is that the neutral rate, apart from the measurements issues associated with it, is a concept that works for a shock-free world. is how it is described. Anybody in this room who thinks that we are in a shock-free world, would I suggest, maybe raise their hands or have their head examined. Either way, we are not in a shock-free world. That is for sure. That assessment of the restrictiveness is not operative anymore. What we need to do is to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance that will actually take us to our destination. I will not comment on the direction of travel. I will comment on the destination that, as you know, is our 2% target in a sustained manner. I think given the cloud of uncertainty that we have, the multiple decisions that are expected or lack of it in the next few weeks and months, our stance will have to be determined by two key attributes. The first one is readiness. We must be attentive to all the developments and, in particular, the development of those new shocks and be able to make the appropriate determination. That is the first one. The second one is agility. Given the speed at which we see development, the impact they have, the spillovers that we can analyze, it is not going to be a question of rushing to a particular stance, but it will be a question of agility in the face of what we are seeing. That will require a cohesive approach that will be based more than ever on the analysis of data. When I have said repeatedly, we need to be data- dependent and we need to decide meeting- by- meetings, and we do not have a predetermined path. I know this has been annoying for some because there is nothing like having a bit more certainty, anticipating where it is going. More than ever now, we need to be data- dependent and we need to rely on safe, reliable data. We are going to be particularly attentive to all that at the moment. We will decide meeting- by- meeting. What is certain is destination. We are determined to take whatever measures will be appropriate and to use whatever instruments will be appropriate to arrive at that destination. You asked me about the debate. We always debate. We debate on all sides of the decision that we ultimately arrive at. In total candor with you, there were a number of governors who, a few weeks ago, would have argued in favor of a skip. Uncertainty, hollow of fog around our navigation, it calls for a skip. We will decide when we have more data, the projection exercise that is built with the Central Bank and the National Central Banks together. That was on one side of the debate, if you will. There were some to say, well, it might warrant a 50, but at the end of the day, this is not what I'm arguing for. When I say debated, there was not any single argument in favor of arriving at 50 basis points. It was a very strong 25 rally of everybody. We debate. We, hypothetically, tried to figure out what it would have been if or what it would imply if. I can tell you that it was, I mean, I'm sure that you will all do your homework to find out who said what and all the rest of it. I can assure you that it was a unanimous rally about 25 basis points. Thank you. Thank you. Next question, Balazs Koranyi of Reuters. Balazs, please. Good afternoon, President Lagarde. First question is about the outlook. A couple of weeks ago in Parliament, you presented some numbers on the possible impact of a trade war. I wonder if you have an update for us, whether there was such an update made in the Governing Council. Quite a lot has changed. I'm especially interested in what you make of the tariffs and also sharply lower energy prices, significant appreciation of the euro. These all change quite a bit for you. Second question is about your relationship with the Federal Reserve. I'm asking this because just moments before the decision itself, of course, the U.S. President came out and criticized the Fed, which raises questions about Fed independence and whether the Fed can remain independent. The question for you is, do you think there is a risk that central banks around the world start to lose independence in this current environment? You have a really important relationship with the Fed, with the swaps. Sorry, yeah, the swaps. Are you confident that the swaps remain in place, they're safe, that you can rely on it? Are you making any sort of contingency plans in case the Fed changes policy on those? That's a lot of questions. Your first one had to do with whether or not I quantify the current situation relative to previous assessment of the situation. I will say that I will characterize it as follows. We are in the presence of a negative demand shock, no question about that. This is not in and of itself, because we can anticipate, and let me be clear on that. When I say we are in the presence of a negative demand shock, some of the tariffs are already in place. From an approximately 3% average tariff, we are now in the presence of a 13%, I am not giving you the decimal, but roughly it went from 3% to 13% in terms of custom duties on average, on goods, on goods, not goods and services. That is what we face now. We also have the prospect, a prospect of something that could be far more impactful, number one. Number two, there is a series of potential responses on the part of the Commission. We know one or two or three of them, depending on the tactic that is adopted. I think the most obvious one, which has been commented and actually put on the table, is the zero- for- zero tariff offer that has been made. That is number one. Number two, there will likely be, and that really falls in the category of our risk assessment, some redirection, rerouting of goods that will be supplied by markets that are subject to much higher tariffs, even as we speak now, and possibly other destinations from which those goods could be rerouted to Europe. Third, there are other policies that are also in play and being discussed, including in particular in Germany. Fiscal policies that would see significant investments, significant fiscal impulse that would be given. You have a combination of either policies, threats of policies, of different categories that will obviously have an impact on the situation. Added to it, and you alluded to it, and we actually refer to it in the risk statement, there is the appreciation of the euro, which we mentioned specifically in the monetary policy statement, and there has been a significant decline of the price of commodities and particularly price of energy. You have to combine all that, anticipate that there will be development, which will lead me to not actually give you a specific quantification of the impact. Suffice to say that there will be a negative impact on growth, possibly, possibly. As I said, the impact on inflation is, and the net impact on inflation is less than clear at this point in time. There is so much ongoing that some of which will probably settle a bit by our June meeting. Given that the 90 days will only elapse around the 9th of July and then the 14th of July, huh, Bastille Day, we will know more on that front. On the fiscal front, clearly the incoming of new governments in various countries, including in Germany, will also take us to more clarification on exactly where the situation will evolve. We will, you know, as I said earlier, there is no better time to be data- dependent. There is no better time to rely on very strong and solid analysis by all our staff. I'm glad that June is going to be a combined exercise of the ECB and the National Central Banks who will be confronting their respective viewpoints and analysis to arrive at something that will be really consolidated around our three key analytical underpinnings, which are inflation outlook, underlying inflation, and transmission. You asked me about the Fed. Let me just say very squarely that I have a lot of respect for my esteemed colleague and friend, Jay Powell. We have a steady, solid relationship amongst central bankers. I think that that relationship is decisive in order to have a solid financial infrastructure on which to make sure that there is financial stability. We have demonstrated in the past that we could actually operate on that basis of consultation and understanding of the financial risk. We will continue doing so in an undeterred and unchanged manner, I'm sure. Thank you. The next question goes to Tonia Mastrobouni of La Repubblica in Italy. Tonia, please. Thank you very much. Ms. President, do you think that canceling the tariffs might be enough to restore the trust in the U.S. now? We have seen this mistrust in the dollar, in the treasuries and so on. Do you not think that the environment is getting worse and this is also destroying the faith in the U.S.? I am speaking about the attack to the law firms, to judges, to universities. The certainty of law is vanishing in America. Do you think that this is also impacting on the trust in America? My second question is, the U.S. administration seems to have also the ambition to push a lot the stablecoins. How dangerous might this be for the euro if we imagine, for example, big, big, big companies like Amazon, Facebook, and so on, issuing, launching these stablecoins, of course, backed by the dollar? Thank you very much. Thank you so much for your two questions. You know, there is a nice African saying which goes, 'You never swim twice in the same water.' I think for economic players, investors, consumers, employers, employees, all categories, confidence, predictability, and a reasonable level of certainty are important factors for them to make decisions. I will concentrate on the European Central Bank. In the mandate that we have of procuring and maintaining price stability, we will certainly make sure that we respect those principles: predictability, confidence, all based on access to the data, the right data, the safe data, and in as much transparency as is possible with all of you. I think this has been recognized by many investors, and this is a clear answer to your question. On the issue of stablecoins, you know that we have regulation in place. It's called MiCAR. It is effective. It's currently under review and consultation for possible improvements. I'm delighted that this is the case because we are facing a constant evolution of those digital payments, of those cross-border payments, of those stablecoins, which I would put in a very separate category from the cryptos, crypto assets, or however you want to call them. The stablecoins are a different animal. Clearly, having a good, solid regulation that constitutes the framework within which they can operate, I think, is paramount and has been understood by the European Union, by the Commission, by various authorities in charge of those matters, and will be reviewed in order to make sure that it procures a safe harbor for those initiatives. Let me take the opportunity of this to acknowledge that for the first time in our monetary policy statement, we refer to the digital euro. That should be a clear signal that not only do we stand ready and do the hard work that is incumbent upon us, but it also acknowledges the fact that other European authorities are hopefully going to accelerate the pace at which we can deliver. Thank you. Next question goes to Olaf Storbeck of the Financial Times. Olaf, please. Thanks for taking my questions. I have one question on the restrictiveness or the kind of lack of description of the restrictiveness in the policy statement. Have you discussed, and maybe can you share your views on your wider views on this, how much it takes for the ECB to switch into a stimulative stand over the coming months, given all the headwinds and clouds over growth, and how willing would you be to do so if necessary? My second question is on financial stability and in particular your views on the independence of large central banks. How key is it for financial stability that large central banks like the ECB and the Fed are and remain politically independent? Thanks. Thank you for your two questions. We did not discuss the matter of stimulation. We did not discuss the matter of stimulation. We certainly rallied around the statement that is in the monetary policy overall statement that we will take the appropriate monetary policy stance and decisions in order to make sure that we deliver on our commitment to reach target, 2% medium-term sustainable. Obviously, the degree of appropriateness will be measured and exercised through these two principles: readiness, agility in the face of the uncertainty, and the multiple decision points that are external factors and which for some of them constitutes new shocks that are facing the European economy. On your latter point concerning the independence, you know that within the euro area and within Europe, it is particularly important. It's actually one of the criteria that are used in the convergence assessment that applicant new members have to go through. If a new member who applies to join the euro area does not evidence the independence of central bank, both in its legislative foundation and in its operations, that's an obstacle to joining the euro area. For us here, independence of central banks is fundamental. The next question to Jean-Philippe Lacour of Agence France-Presse, AFP. Jean-Philippe, please. Thank you for asking. Bonjour, Madame la Présidente. I'll switch to English, of course. I just want to recall history on these trade tensions in 2019. Your predecessor, Mario Draghi, stood here and said there are major downside risks in the face of U.S.-China trade tensions at this time. In September, ECB responded with a stimulus package. My question is, given the broader conflict that we are facing, is it now just maybe a question of a matter of time before ECB will take further actions in response to these tensions? You told us about readiness and agility, so we are maybe curious. You doubt it? The second more broadly question: since 2022, in February, the ECB has repeatedly condemned the Russia aggressive and unjustify, unjustified war against Ukraine and y ou did it today in your statement. How would you characterize this war, trade war, now that has been launched by Trump against economic partners? Because you talk about tensions, but we journalists, we call spade a spade. It's a trade war. How do you characterize this kind of other war? Thank you. On your first point, we will determine our monetary policy stance on the basis of what is appropriate in order to reach our target. We will do that demonstrating effectiveness and agility. Analyzing the nature of the shock, the kind of responses that it requires, and doing so in a prompt manner. The downside risks are clearly stated. If you look at the paragraph, now you do not have it because it is not yet on the web page, but I read it for you earlier on. The downside risks are clearly identified in relation to growth. Will those risks materialize? When do they materialize? Will be a factor of how decisions are made, which decisions are made, what trade measures will be taken, what countermeasures will be adopted, whether there is an escalation as a result. As I addressed in earlier questions, what kind of rerouting will we be seeing? What measures will be taken to prevent this massive rerouting if necessary? What national and European fiscal decisions will be made over what course, what period of time? You know, when you inject EUR 800 billion in the economy or near EUR 1 trillion, it's not a small feast. It's a serious impulse, and it has serious effects, certainly on growth and to be seen on inflation. This will be for later and latter analysis when we have more information and more data on these particular matters. You know, I'm not going to characterize what's happening at the moment. I think that the commentators, the top-notch economists who specialize in trade matters all agree that it will have downside consequences. The consequences will differ depending on which part of the world you stand. That really justifies the fact that monetary policy decisions are not going to be the same the world over. Thank you. Next question for Stefan Reccius of Handelsblatt. Stefan, please. Good afternoon and thank you for the [floor]. Hi. My first question is on uncertainty. You used various degrees of uncertainty in your wording last time and this time as well. Would you say that we are now past peak uncertainty now that terrorists play out in the open, or is it too early to tell? My second question, if I may, is on the exchange rate, which I am aware you are usually hesitant to comment on, but still the movements are so big, you are even mentioning it repeatedly. How would you characterize the recent movements in the exchange rate? Do you expect a stronger euro to last, or is it just a temporary episode? Thanks. Thank you. Thank you for your two questions. I cannot tell you whether we are at peak of uncertainty. I cannot. There is a negotiation which is ongoing. Players around the tables have stated their position. Proposals have been made, at least on one side. All of that could change. There is a degree of unpredictability which adds to the uncertainty. You know, if you add to that the incredulity that we have had, certainly in the first phase where it was difficult to assess and understand because it was such a break from previous sort of conventional wisdom as to how trade relationships are organized, as was discussed by the WTO yesterday, I do not know whether we are at peak. What I know for a fact is that the European Central Bank and the euro system in our monetary policy decisions, we have to stand ready for the unpredictable, which is why I think it makes a lot of sense to be ready, to be agile, to work on reliable data, and to operate on a meeting-by-meeting basis. We meet about every six weeks. Think about the number of changes which have taken place in the last six weeks. There could be more changes in the next six weeks. That is in the nature of our job to stay focused on our mandate, to analyze what is coming at us, and to draw conclusions in order to make the appropriate monetary policy decision that will take us to target. That is what we will do. We are not going to move away from that. You asked me another question on the exchange rate. Okay. We are not targeting any particular exchange rate. You know my answer. I've made it, I've given the same answer a thousand times here. We do mention, and we do refer, I think it's in the risk assessment in the second paragraph where we say, excuse me, increasing global trade disruptions are adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation, falling global energy prices, that's one, and an appreciation of the euro could put downward pressure on inflation. We do mention it because of the occurrence, the magnitude, and we try to account for it in the assessment that we make of our monetary policy decision. This is what happens. I think I've answered your two questions. Thank you. Next question goes to Andrés Stumpf of Expansión in Spain. Andres, please. Thank you. Two questions for me. Does your inflation analysis contemplate euro rate retaliating at any point, or you do not speculate about these things? I mention this because I am especially worried because digital services could be targeted. I know you are always very attentive to the service element on inflation. My second question, it seems the ECB will be diverging again from the Fed. What are the main differences here and there and at both sides of the trade war that could allow you to keep lower interest rates and not, Mr. Powell? Thank you. Thank you very much. You know, we have a methodology to take into account developments. The level of scrutiny is high, whether it is completely legislated or so certain in its outcome that we can actually take it into our exercise and the analysis that we do. When we are not too sure, we constantly do some scenario analysis to assess and estimate what the impact would be of such or such other decisions. That exercise will be intense in the next few weeks and will, you know, give rise to some very serious results at our June projection meeting. As I said, thanks to the, you know, consolidated exercise between NCBs and ECBs. Currently, if you ask me about the countermeasures, they are not included in the sort of baseline that we have. Obviously, we look at the entire trade balance. We look at goods, we look at services. This is pretty obvious to anyone. We cannot look only at goods or only at services. I do pay attention to services, but I look at goods as well. The two are intrinsically the outcome of the economy and the trade movements that we have with other parts of the world. I look at both. You know, I think each central bank in the world does its job in good conscience on the basis of its mandate and on the basis of the currency that it is in charge of and the territory in which it has competence. That leads us to look at the euro area, not in isolated form, because we are open to the rest of the world and more open than many other economies, including the United States for that matter. We look at that. We are focused on the euro and we are focused on our price stability mandate. The other central banks in the world have different mandates. They have dual mandates for some of them. Clearly, their economic macroeconomic situation is different. They will be on the receiving end of a different nature of shocks from the shocks that we will be receiving. That leads us necessarily to drawing different conclusions. You know, it is a different situation. Thank you. That brings us to the end of our press conference today. Thank you very much. Oh, wait, because I wanted to mention something that nobody asked me about. I want to—sorry, Wolfgang, but I—no, I want to call your attention to one particular segment of our monetary policy statement that you will see, which we have debated and which actually is a clear message from us, central bank, to the other European institutions. This is the paragraph which sometimes is considered as sort of business as usual, or of course they do refer to this and this and that. This time around, we do specifically mention, with a special timetable associated with it and the swift implementation that we expect of—there are three categories of structural efforts on the part of Europe. One is the Competitiveness Compass, which is a derivative of the Draghi report. Number two is the Investment and Saving Union, which I've repeatedly called the Capital Market Union. And number three is the digital euro. I think we've taken the view that this is a moment for Europe to not only be solid on its monetary policy and not just for us to deliver on price stability, but for the Europeans altogether and the European institutions to actually focus on what opportunities there are, what changes need to take place, and at which accelerated pace this should happen. That is a strong message from us to colleagues, friends, and other decision-makers in Europe. Thank you very much. We see each other again if you want on the 5th of June. Oh, happy Easter to all of you. Exactly. Thank you. Bye-bye.