Good afternoon and welcome to our press conference with President Lagarde and Vice President Luis de Guindos. My name is Wolfgang Proissl. As always, we have participants via video. If you ask questions, please unmute and put on your camera. With that, I hand over to President Lagarde, please. Thank you very much. Good afternoon to all of you. The Vice President and I welcome you to our press conference. The Governing Council today decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate, the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance, is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The disinflation process is well on track. Inflation has continued to develop broadly, as staff expected, and the latest projections closely align with the previous inflation outlook. Staff now see headline inflation averaging 2.3% in 2025, 1.9% in 2026, and 2% in 2027. The upward revision in headline inflation for 2025 reflects stronger energy price dynamics. For inflation excluding energy and food, staff project an average of 2.2% in 2025, 2% in 2026, and 1.9% in 2027. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. Domestic inflation remains high, mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. Wage growth is moderating as expected, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation. Our monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive, as our interest rate cuts are making new borrowing less expensive for firms and households, and loan growth is picking up. At the same time, a headwind to the easing of financing conditions comes from past interest rate hikes still transmitting to the stock of credit, and lending remains subdued overall. The economy faces continued challenges, and staff have again marked down their growth projections to 0.9% for 2025, 1.2% for 2026, and 1.3% for 2027. The downward revisions for 2025 and 2026 reflect lower exports and ongoing weakness in investment, in part originating from high trade policy uncertainty as well as broader policy uncertainty. Rising real incomes and the gradually fading effects of our past rate hikes remain the key drivers underpinning the expected pickup in demand over time. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of rising uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path. The decisions taken today are set out in a press release available on our website. I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing, and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions. Looking at the economic activity, the euro area economy likely grew modestly in the fourth quarter of 2024. The first two months of 2025 saw a continuation of many of last year's patterns. Manufacturing is still a drag on growth, even if survey indicators are improving. High uncertainty, both at home and abroad, is holding back investment, and competitiveness challenges are weighing on exports. At the same time, services are resilient. Moreover, rising household incomes and the robust labor market are supporting a gradual pickup in consumption, although consumers' confidence is still fragile and saving rates are still high. The unemployment rate stayed at its historical low of 6.2% in January, and employment is estimated to have grown by 0.1% in the last quarter of 2024. However, demand for labor has moderated, and recent survey data suggest that employment growth was subdued in the first two months of 2025. Uncertainty has increased and is likely to weigh on investment and export by more than previously expected. Growth should be supported by higher incomes and lower borrowing costs. According to the staff projections, export should also be supported by rising global demand so long as trade tensions do not escalate further. Fiscal and structural policies should make the economy more productive, competitive, and resilient. The European Commission's Competitiveness Compass provides a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposal should be swiftly adopted. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU's economic governance framework and prioritize essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment. Looking now at inflation. Annual inflation stood at 2.4% in February, after 2.5% in January and 2.4% in December, according to Eurostat's flash estimate. Energy price inflation slowed to 0.2% following a strong increase to 1.9% in January, from 0.1% in December. By contrast, food price inflation rose to 2.7% from 2.3% in January and 2.6% in December. Goods inflation ticked up to 0.6%, while services inflation eased to 3.7% from 3.9% in January and 4% in December. Most indicators of underlying inflation are pointing to a sustained return of inflation to our 2% medium-term target. Domestic inflation, which closely tracks services inflation, declined in January, but it remains high, as wages and some services prices are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. At the same time, recent wage negotiations point to a continued moderation in labor cost pressures. The assumption of higher energy price inflation led staff to revise up the headline inflation projection for 2025. At the same time, staff expect core inflation to continue slowing as labor cost pressures ease further and the past monetary policy tightening continues to weigh on prices. Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around 2%. All of these factors will support the sustainable return of inflation to our target. The risks to economic growth remain tilted to the downside. An escalation in trade tensions would lower euro area growth by dampening exports and weakening the global economy. Ongoing uncertainty about global trade policies could drag investment down. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, remain a major source of uncertainty as well. Growth could be lower if the lagged effect of monetary policy tightening lasts longer than expected. At the same time, growth could be higher if easier financing conditions and falling inflation allow domestic consumption and investment to rebound faster. An increase in defense, in infrastructure spending, could also add to growth. Increasing friction in global trade is adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. A general escalation in trade tensions could see the euro depreciate and import costs rise, which would put upward pressure on inflation. At the same time, lower demand for euro area exports as a result of higher tariffs and a rerouting of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity would put downward pressure on inflation. Geopolitical tensions create two-sided inflation risks as regards energy markets, consumer confidence, and business investment. Extreme weather events and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly could drive up food prices by more than expected. Inflation could turn out higher if wages or profits increase by more than expected. A boost in defense and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation through its effect on aggregate demand. Inflation might surprise on the downside if monetary policy dampens demand by more than expected. Let's look at the financial and monetary conditions now. Market interest rates in the euro area decreased after our January meeting, but have risen over recent days in response to a revised outlook for fiscal policy. Our interest rate cuts are gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow, and loan growth is picking up. At the same time, a headwind to the easing of financing conditions comes from past interest rate hikes still transmitting to the stock of credit, and lending remains overall subdued. The average interest rate on new loans to firms declined to 4.2% in January from 4.4% in December. By contrast, firms' cost of issuing market-based debt rose to 3.7%, 0.2 percentage points above its December level. Over the same period, the average interest rates on new mortgages declined to 3.3% from 3.4%. Growth in bank lending to firms rose to 2% in January, up from 1.7% in December on the back of a moderate monthly flow of new loans. Growth in debt securities issued by firms rose to 3.4% in annual terms. Mortgage lending continued to rise gradually but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.3%. In conclusion, the Governing Council today decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate, rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance, is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamic of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of rising uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path. In any case, we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission. We are now ready to take your questions. Thank you. The first question today goes to Alex Weber of Bloomberg. Alex, please. Let me grab some water. Thank you. Good afternoon. My first question is on the way forward. You say that your monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive. Does this mean you could slow the pace of rate cuts now and perhaps pause in April? Did you discuss such a scenario at your meeting today? My second question, perhaps related to that, is on fiscal policy. There is a pretty drastic shift underway with plans for much higher defense spending and, in Germany's case, also infrastructure. There has been a significant market reaction as well. Could you elaborate how the Governing Council expects this to change the economic outlook and monetary policy? Thank you very much for your two questions. On your first question, you very well noted that we have changed the wording of the fourth paragraph of our monetary policy statement. Let me try to explain what it means, because it is not just an innocuous little change. It's a change that has a certain meaning. What we had previously was that we would keep our restrictive monetary policy as long as it was necessary, etc. That was very much a static assessment of what was needed. We are now moving by having our monetary policy becoming meaningfully less restrictive to a more evolutionary approach. In other words, we take account of the journey that we have traveled, 150 basis points since we started cutting. We acknowledge the fact that, as a result, it is becoming meaningfully less restrictive. We add to that in the same paragraph the two forces that we are seeing operating on our financing conditions. The first one, if you will, is the... I used a comparison a few weeks ago when we were at the G20 in South Africa, and I used a comparison of the Cape of Good Hope, where you have warm water from the Indian Ocean and the cold water from the Atlantic. This is really where the position is at the moment, where we have the impact of the current monetary policy decisions that we take and have been taking, which is to cut rates. At the same time, we still have the cold water of the Atlantic, meaning the remaining effects of decisions that we have taken over the course of time. That is really where we are at the moment, and that has led us to acknowledge the fact that our measures, that our monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive. You asked me the second question, which has to do with most recent development. I have to say that we have not been spared recent developments in the last few hours and days. The one that you're referring to is the announcement by the European Commission, on the one hand, of this EUR 800 billion comprising the EUR 150 billion borrowing facility and the EUR 650 billion space within which member states can borrow for defense purposes, on the one hand. On the other hand, the announcement by the German authorities of a twofold program, in a way, one which is the big infrastructure financing of EUR 500 billion over a period of 10 years, and a special measure that relates to defense expenditure that would be decided in the years to come. Two observations. One is this is work in progress, and we have to be attentive, vigilant. We have to understand how this is going to work, what the timing will be, what the financing will be, so that we can then draw the conclusions and appreciate how much it will contribute to growth and what impact it would have eventually on inflation. That part of the work we have not yet, of course, determined the conclusion. One thing that around the table of the Governing Council was clear is that on both accounts, that would be supportive to European growth at large and would be a boost to the European economy. Now, everything is going to be a factor of the details. Where will the purchases take place? What will the timing be? What will the financing be? All of those are obviously political decisions that are not within the remit of the Central Bank. We are very attentive to what will come out of today's meeting in Brussels and further development on the German political scene to appreciate the economic consequences. Thank you. Next question goes to Annette Weisbach of CNBC. Annette, please. Thank you. Madame Lagarde, I have another question on the meaningfully less restrictive monetary policy stance. Perhaps you can explain that to us. Lending is still down. What makes you think, the ECB think that the monetary policy stance is actually less restrictive? It seems that companies are still holding back to actually borrow and invest. My second question would be on, yeah, the pause, which is likely or not in April, given the uncertainties. Would you rather wait for more wage data coming in as domestic inflation seems to be stubbornly high? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you so much for your question. Our assessment based on the bank lending survey, based on the numbers that we receive, based on the corporate survey that we hold, and comparing the current situation with the last few quarters, and this month versus last month as well, indicate that lending is actually increasing. The lending to corporate is up by 2%. The lending to households in terms of mortgages is up by 1.3%. Now, this is not yet bringing us to the sort of strong, solid, robust levels of borrowing by economic actors, but it is definitely on the way up. You have two phenomena. You have interest rates that we see going down, both for corporate and households, not phenomenally yet. We hope that that process will continue. We are seeing at the same time the volume of lending going up as well. That is on those two accounts, which is one of the elements that we use to determine whether or not and how much we are or are not still restrictive. We are not really sort of passing judgment, because I think that particular point is not necessarily the most relevant. What we acknowledge is that it is becoming less, meaningfully less restrictive. As I said, we take into account all the work that has been done, and we assess the process that we are in. You asked me a second question. For the potential April pause and wage data. Oh, okay. You know what? That gives me a chance to explain to you where we are. I think there is a particular sentence in the monetary policy statement which refers to the particularly high uncertainty under which we operate. Because clearly, we have three phenomena that we have debated over the course of this Governing Council. One, the disinflation is on track. That's point number one. Point number two, the monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive. Point number three, we have huge uncertainty. Some people have used the adjective phenomenal uncertainty, and we debated as to whether it was high, high and rising. Suffice to say that it is all over. We have risks all over, uncertainty all over. Under those circumstances, our determination is obviously to reach destination. We will do so without pre-committing to any particular path. You have seen that sentence in our monetary policy statement in the past. I think it is even more relevant at the moment, given the level of uncertainty that we have. We are not pre-committing to a path. You might have some governors who will say that, you know, I believe that it is their individual views. I can assure you that the collective view around the table is that we do not pre-commit to a path. We will be, as ever, and probably more so, data-dependent. If the data indicates to us that in order to reach destination, the appropriate monetary policy should be to cut, we shall do so. If, on the other hand, the data indicates that it is not the case, then we shall not cut, and we will pause. That is really where we are, not pre-committing, being data-dependent as ever, and deciding on a meeting-by-meeting basis. I know some will find it frustrating, but I'm terribly sorry. In the circumstances we're facing at the moment, anything more would not be very responsible. From one day to the other, the situation changes dramatically. Our projection, the measure of underlying inflation, the price of energy, you just name it, risks are all over the place. Thank you. Francesco Canepa of Reuters for the next question. Francesco, please. Good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon, Mr. Panetta. You said in the past that the direction of travel was clear, and the only question was about the pace and timing. There was also a mention in the past about inflation reaching target over the course of this year. Now, those are gone. You did not repeat those today. I just wanted to ask you, how broad was the consensus behind today's rate cut? The second question is about something else, about Russian assets. There seems to be growing political appetite in Europe for seizing those assets. Obviously, that would set a legal precedent. I wanted to ask you, how do you think that would affect the status of the euro as a reserve currency? Thank you. Thank you for your two questions. It gives me a chance to tell you how the decision was made. It was made as a result of substantive discussion all around the table on the state of the economy, on our projections, on the risks that we are facing. The decision was a consensus. No one opposed that decision. You might have different sources of information. Could be. I was sitting in the room, you see, mind you. No one opposed the decision. One governor, specifically Governor Holzmann, for whom I have great respect, abstained. Okay? There was no opposition. There was one abstention. You have the gist of the decision. Look, on the Russian assets, I think we have made our position quite clear in the sense that those frozen assets, as you know, are being used in order to guarantee EUR 50 billion loans granted under the ERA by the various members of the G7. This process is underway. There are political debates that are vastly broadcasted around the fact that we should maybe move from freezing to seizing. This is not for the European Central Bank to debate. I would certainly submit that the international law basis on which any decision is made will matter as far as other investors are concerned. It is, I'm sure, an element that will be taken into account by those whose job it is to make those ultimate decisions. Next question goes to Johanna Treeck of POLITICO. Johanna, please. Good afternoon. Thank you very much. Good afternoon. I would like to go back to your previous assertion that there might be a question about the speed of travel, but the direction is clear. From today's perspective, is the direction of travel still clear? There's only one direction. My second question is on the recent market reaction. Borrowing costs have gone up in response to the fiscal news. Do you have any concerns about a return of sovereign debt tensions in the eurozone? Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I think I have tried to explain in the previous answer to the question that the situation that we face at the moment is predicated by this disinflationary process that is on track and confirms broadly the estimates that staff has made over the course of time, and without much error, by the way, most recently. Second, that our monetary policy is meaningfully less restrictive. We have covered 150 basis points of ground. Three, and that's probably the most important in relation to the question that you've pointed at me, the landscape that we have at the moment is clouded with uncertainty. Okay? More than ever before, it will require that we be vigilant. All governors, all the national central banks, all the economies that are scrutinizing the developments and the work that is conducted in each of the national central banks, as well as at the ECB, each of them will continue to scrutinize, and we will all have to be extremely vigilant. We will have to be agile to respond to the data. As I said, if the data indicates that the most appropriate monetary policy stance is a cut, it will be a cut. If, on the other hand, the data indicates that the most appropriate decision is not to cut, then it will be a pause. I think I have been as clear as I could be on that one. You asked me a second question, which had to do with the markets. We look at all market developments, and we are very attentive to what's happening, and we try to understand the reaction function of markets. Clearly, there has been a lot of reaction in the last, particularly in the last 12 hours, 24 hours, including yesterday. We are not going to be changing a policy stance as a result of a market determination of the last 24 hours. Equally, when we look at the spread, there has been very limited spread variation despite the massive change in the yields. I think that that gives us an answer concerning the solidity of transmission and the solidity of the sovereigns around Europe. Thank you. Next question goes to Olaf Storbeck of the Financial Times. Olaf, please. Thanks. Following up on the last question, your answer is that the direction of travel is not clear anymore. Would that be the kind of short version of your elaborate answer? That would be my first question. My second question is, you pointed to the potential increase in infrastructure and defense spending, which could both add to growth and to inflation. Did you have any discussion in the Governing Council which of the two things are potentially the more relevant one looking forward? Do you have any views yourself on that, given what we know so far, what governments are planning to do? Thanks. Now, on your second question, I know you all want to move faster than light, and certainly faster than our brain power collectively can determine. As I said, those announcement dates from yesterday. Honestly, in 24 hours, our staff, despite the great work that they do and despite the agility that they demonstrate, particularly those times, are not in a position to identify how much it will contribute to growth and to the European GDP, nor are they in a position to identify how it will impact inflation. Intuitively, all of us around the table, the governors, believe that if all that works, and that's a big if, because it needs to be decided, it needs to go through the parliamentary channels, it needs to then be implemented, by the way. If all that works, it will boost growth. More to come. Frankly, I think that we need to be attentive to the coming days, weeks, and then try to anticipate the economic consequences that it would have and how it would be distributed as well. On your first point, the reason I'm giving you, I gave Mrs. Treeck quite an elaborate answer, I'm sorry for that, is because the situation is not as sort of straightforward, black and white, we go here, we go there. No, it's not what we're facing at the moment. As I said repeatedly, we are not pre-committing to any particular rate path. Okay? We will be data-dependent more than ever, and we will decide meeting by meeting. One thing is really clear for me, because you asked me my view, is that we have to reach our destination. Let me just mention one thing, because some of you might be attentive to when we reach that target of 2%. If you look at the projection of staff that you will see, it is very early in 2026, not late in 2025. That is so because of energy prices. Staff has considered that on the basis of the cutoff date that they have, which was quite a few days ago, it was legitimate on the basis of future prices, both on oil and gas, it was legitimate to probably increase by 0.2% the inflation projection. If you look at energy prices today, whether it is oil or gas, the impact would be seriously different. That gives us the dimension of uncertainty that we have and the many risks that we have to look at. It is energy prices, it is trade policy, it is potential retaliation, it is massive investment programs. It's a lot of variables that we have to be attentive to, that we have to be vigilant about. There are certain things that are solid and stable and actually fall in line with the projection and anticipation of staff. If you look, for instance, at wages, if you look at the labor markets, that is really moving in line with what we had expected. The same goes for services. There are some stable elements. You remember those of you who were here last time and the monetary policy meeting we had before, I said I'm particularly attentive to the price of services. I'm particularly attentive to the domestic underlying inflation. I'm particularly attentive to wages in all their dimensions. That is heading in the direction that we had anticipated, which is comforting the work that we've been doing. The next question. I know it doesn't make a headline, but hey. Now, [Olivier Kazolek], of the French television channel BFM Business. P lease. Good afternoon. You've said in the past that monetary and fiscal policy must work hand in hand concerning defense spending. Do you think this investment should be accompanied by accommodative financial conditions? Second question, related to uncertainty and risk, especially geopolitical ones, do you consider that we are in a whatever-it-takes moment, as said by Mr. Merz a few days ago? Thank you. Thank you very much for your question. Your two questions. On the first one, as I said, it's work in progress, but if the proposal by the Commission for massive borrowing programs and exemption under the escape clause and the two proposals identified by future Chancellor Merz, if all that was to work, it would certainly have a fiscal impact, which itself would have an impact on demand. We will have to take that into account and factor that in. I don't see that as related to our monetary policy, because our monetary policy, as you know, provided under the mandate that we have under Article 127 of the treaty, is price stability. We're going to really adhere strictly to our mandate of price stability. We are attentive to transmission. We are attentive to underlying inflation. We are attentive to the inflation outlook. All of that is informed by a large amount of data. If your question is intended like, would you not participate in a financing effort, this is not the purpose of the ECB. Okay? There is a European Investment Bank. There are multiple institutions whose actual purpose it is. Our purpose, our mandate, is price stability. On your second questions. Whatever it takes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Geopolitical risks on the one hand, determination by policymakers on the other hand. It is really something that is in their hands and because it will contribute to boosting the European economy, because hopefully it will be a source of innovation. Typically, investment in defense is a source of innovation. Therefore, it will improve productivity. We are very attentive to that, and we are hoping that it will have those impacts on the European economy. Is it a whatever-it-takes moment for the German economy? It is not for me to say. It's for the political leaders to appropriate that expression. Thank you. And now, Isabella [audio distortion], Isabella, please. Thank you for the opportunity. President Lagarde, I have two questions. The first is on quantitative tightening. The ECB has been carrying out QT for quite some time. If I can use your metaphor, it is a bit of cold water, I think, in the flows. We had TLTROs repayment stopping and then the holdings, their investments of APP and PEPP. QT has been continuing during the interest rate cut cycle, and it is taking place now together with a kind of a market tightening, the sharp rise of long-term yields of government bonds. Is the Governing Council taking into consideration or quantifying the impact of this QT on its monetary policy and this meaningfully restrictive monetary policy? My second question is on digital euro, because the Trump administration decided to stop the Federal Reserve's project on central bank digital currency. It looks like the Fed might be on hold on digital dollar for about four years. It looks like kind of a golden opportunity for the ECB and the plans of the digital euro. What is the position of the ECB on these issues, I mean, with these changes also from the United States, and how can the ECB push forward with the creation of a digital euro? Thank you. Thank you very much for your two very different and both important questions. You are perfectly correct in that we have stopped reinvesting quite a while ago now under the APP. We've stopped reinvesting gradually over the course of time under the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, and all TLTRO reimbursements have now been refunded. This is a process which has taken place very smoothly, which has been absorbed by markets in a very innocuous way over the course of time. We do not regard that as a component of our monetary policy primarily. It's operating on the back burner, if you will. It has been telegraphed very early on. We have anticipated, communicated to markets so that it happens in a very, very smooth and gradual manner, which is what we are seeing. The main monetary policy instrument that we have used recently and that will be the driving force is interest rate, not QT or otherwise such financing program. I know that we have to calculate everything. We do calculate. We do try to work with counterfactual. You well know that my dear colleague, Piero Cipollone, has tried to assess exactly how much it contributes or not. This is something that he has had calculated. It is not our key instrument, and it is really not perceived as having a significant impact. On your second point, I tend to share your views. Nature does not like vacuum. We started working on the digital euro way back, actually when I started my term five and a half years ago. I am not claiming parentality on the digital euro because my colleague Benoît Cœuré had already committed a speech on this matter before I arrived. I certainly carried on with that project. Subsequently, Fabio Panetta on the board and then Piero Cipollone, who has replaced Fabio, have taken the lead together with a very, very good team, which is focused on accelerating the pace and hopefully campaigning enough with all the stakeholders, meaning European Parliament, meaning European Council, meaning European Commission, so that we can eventually not put to bed, but put to reality this digital euro. The deadline for us is going to be October of 2025, and we are getting ready for that deadline. We will not be able to move unless the other parties, the stakeholders, as I call them, Commission, Council, and Parliament, actually complete the legislative process without which we will not be able to move. I think it is critically important. It seems to the agnostic or the skeptics, it seems to be more relevant and more of an imperative now than ever before, both on the wholesale and on the retail level, both. [audio distortion]. Thank you. Could you guide us a bit more around today's discussion and the consensus and frictions? Do you see more diversity of views regarding the current economic outlook or regarding the medium-term outlook? Second question, after what we have seen these last weeks, do you still believe that negotiations are preferable in relation to tariff and commercial war, or has Europe to show some strength? Thank you. My personal basic view. Your personal view. My personal view is that you have to negotiate from a position of strength. One thing leads to the other. That is the hope that I can formulate because we know that tariffs, and particularly if there is retaliation, are not good at all and are net negative on pretty much all accounts. That is my personal view. Although I think around the table of the Governing Council, we all agreed that it was net negative when it happens, and it is even negative before it happens because the uncertainty that is generated and the undermined confidence that results from just the threat of those tariff increases and potential retaliations are putting a brake on investment, on consumption decisions, on employment, hiring, and all the rest of it. What can I tell you about the discussions? We had quite extensive, intense, lively discussions, but I don't think that we can draw a line between the short term and the medium term because obviously what is the developments that we are seeing at the moment because of how they will transform the outlook, because of the impact that it will have on our societies as well as our economies, both in terms of growth and in terms of inflation and in terms of employment and in terms of transformation of Europe. Those are significant changes, essential changes that we are witnessing and for which we have to account to help making the best and the most appropriate monetary policy decisions. Everyone was very engaged, as you can imagine. That concludes our press conference today. Thank you very much for following us. Our next press conference is on April 17. Until then, all the best. Thank you.