Good afternoon and Welcome To Our Press Conference with President Lagarde and Vice President de Guindos. My name is Wolfgang Proissl. We have journalists participating online, so when I give them the floor, please turn on your camera and your microphone. With that, I hand over to President Lagarde, please. Thank you very much, Wolfgang, and good afternoon to all of you present, and good day to all those who are online from somewhere in the world. The Vice President and I welcome you to our press conference. The Governing Council today decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate, the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance, is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Inflation is currently at around our 2% medium-term target. In the baseline of the new Eurosystem staff projections, headline inflation is set to average 2% in 2025, 1.6% in 2026, and 2% in 2027. The downward revisions, compared with the March projections by 0.3 percentage points for both 2025 and 2026, mainly reflect lower assumptions for energy prices and a stronger euro. Staff expect inflation, excluding energy and food, to average 2.4% in 2025 and 1.9% in both 2026 and 2027, broadly unchanged since March. Staff see real GDP growth averaging 0.9% in 2025, 1.1% in 2026, and 1.3% in 2027. The unrevised growth projection for 2025 reflects a stronger-than-expected first quarter, combined with weaker prospects for the remainder of the year. While the uncertainty surrounding trade policies is expected to weigh on business investment and exports, especially in the short term, rising government investment in defense and infrastructure will increasingly support growth over the medium term. Higher real incomes and a robust labor market will allow households to spend more. Together with more favorable financing conditions, this should make the economy more resilient to global shocks. In the context of high uncertainty, staff also assessed some of the mechanisms by which different trade policies could affect growth and inflation, and some alternative illustrative scenarios. These scenarios will be published with the staff projections on our website. Under this scenario analysis, a further escalation of trade tensions over the coming months would result in growth and inflation being below the baseline projections. By contrast, if trade tensions were resolved with a benign outcome, growth and, to a lesser extent, inflation would be higher in the baseline projections. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. Wage growth is still elevated but continues to moderate visibly, and profits are partially buffering its impact on inflation. The concerns that increased uncertainty and a volatile market response to the trade tension in April would have a tightening impact on financing conditions have eased. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of exceptional uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. Our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We agree we are not pre-committing to a particular rate path. The decisions taken today are set out in a press release that is available on our website. I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing, and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions. The economy grew by 0.3% in the first quarter of 2025, according to Eurostat's flash estimate. Unemployment at 6.2% in April is at its lowest level since the launch of the euro, and employment grew by 0.3% in the first quarter of the year, according to the flash estimate. In line with the staff projections, survey data point overall to some weaker prospects in the near term. While manufacturing has strengthened, partly because trade has been brought forward in anticipation of higher tariffs, the more domestically oriented services sector is slowing. Higher tariffs and a stronger euro are expected to make it harder for firms to export. High uncertainty is expected to weigh on investment, but at the same time, several factors are keeping the economy resilient and should support growth over the medium term: a strong labor market, rising real incomes, robust private sector balance sheets, and easier financing conditions, in part because of our past interest rate cuts, should all help consumers and firms withstand the fallout from a volatile global environment. Recently announced measures to step up defense and infrastructure investment should also bolster growth. In the present geopolitical environment, it is even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, more competitive, and more resilient. The European Commission's Competitiveness Compass provides a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This includes completing the Savings and Investment Union, following a clear and ambitious timetable. It is also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of a digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU's economic governance framework, while prioritizing essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment. Looking at inflation, annual inflation declined to 1.9% in May, from 2.2% in April, according to Eurostat's flash estimates. Energy price inflation remained at minus 3.6%. Food price inflation rose to 3.3%, from 3% the month before. Goods inflation was unchanged at 0.6%, while services inflation dropped to 3.2%, from 4% in April. Services inflation had jumped in April mainly because prices for travel services around the Easter holidays went up by more than expected. Most indicators of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will stabilize sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. Labour costs are gradually moderating, as indicated by incoming data on negotiated wages and available country data on compensation per employee. The ECB's wage tracker points to a further easing of negotiated wage growth in 2025, while the staff projections see wage growth falling to below 3% in 2026 and 2027. While lower energy prices and a stronger euro are putting downward pressure on inflation in the near term, inflation is expected to return to target in 2027. Short-term consumer inflation expectations edged up in April, likely reflecting news about trade tensions. Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around 2%, which supports the stabilisation of inflation around our target. Turning now to our risk assessment, risks to economic growth remain tilted to the downside. A further escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties could lower euro area growth by dampening exports and dragging down investment and consumption. A deterioration in financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions and greater risk aversion, and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, remain a major source of uncertainty. By contrast, if trade and geopolitical tensions were resolved swiftly, this could lift sentiment and spur activity. A further increase in defense and infrastructure spending, together with productivity-enhancing reforms, would also add to growth. The outlook for euro area inflation is more uncertain than usual. As a result of the volatile global trade policy environment, falling energy prices and a stronger euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced if higher tariffs led to lower demand for euro area exports and to countries with overcapacity rerouting their exports to the euro area. Trade tensions could lead to greater volatility and risk aversion in financial markets, which would weigh on domestic demand and would thereby also lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices and adding to capacity constraints in the domestic economy. A boost in defense and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly could drive up food prices by more than expected. Let's look at the financial and monetary conditions. Risk-free interest rates have remained broadly unchanged since our last meeting. Equity prices have risen, and corporate bond spreads have narrowed in response to more positive news about global trade policies and the improvement in global risk sentiment. Our past interest rate cuts continue to make corporate borrowing less expensive. The average interest rate on new loans to firms declined to 3.8%, from 3.9% in March. The cost of issuing market-based debt was unchanged at 3.7%. Bank lending to firms continued to strengthen gradually, growing by an annual rate of 2.6% in April, after 2.4% in March, while corporate bond issuance was subdued. The average interest rate on new mortgages stayed at 3.3% in April, while growth in mortgage lending increased to 1.9%. In line with our monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council thoroughly assessed the links between monetary policy and financial stability. While euro area banks remain resilient, broader financial stability risks remain elevated, in particular owing to highly uncertain and volatile global trade policies. Macroprudential policy remains the first line of defense against the build-up of financial vulnerabilities, enhancing resilience and preserving macroprudential space. In conclusion, the Governing Council today decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate, the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance, is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of exceptional uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. Our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path. In any case, we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation stabilizes sustainably at our medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission. We are now ready to take your questions. The first question goes to Mark Sorensen of Bloomberg. Mark, please. Yes, thanks a lot for taking the questions. The first one is on rates. Has anyone today advocated either pausing rate cuts or cutting by a bigger 50 basis points? Would you say that after today's rate cut to 2%, a pause at the next meeting in July would make sense, also to wait for new projections in September? The other one is not on the future of rates, but on your own future. WEF founder Klaus Schwab had said that you discussed leaving the ECB before the end of your term to lead the World Economic Forum. I know the ECB stated your determination to stay, but without an outright denial of these talks. Have these talks taken place or not? Have you contemplated leaving the ECB early? Thank you. Thank you for your two questions. I'll start with the first one, which is really the order of business and the main topic today. We cut interest rates by 25 basis points. With today's cut at the current level of interest rates, we believe that we are in a good position to navigate the uncertain conditions that will be coming up. We are well positioned to navigate those circumstances. I can also tell you that it was an almost unanimous decision. There was one Governing Council member who did not support the decision. Other than that, it was virtually unanimous. I would call it either very broad consensus or virtually unanimous support for the decision to cut by 25 basis points. Obviously, we analysed the situation in the light of the three criteria that you know well, because they are repeated several times in the monetary policy statement and have not varied for a number of meetings now. Under those three criteria, really, the situation points towards inflation settling at our 2% targets. We can come back to the path, but this is what we are seeing, and that is what has predicated the cut that we made today. Now, you asked me about my future, which is far less important than the future of the economy and the future of our monetary policy, rest assured. I can very firmly tell you that I have always been, and I'm fully determined to deliver on my mission, and I'm determined to complete my term. I regret to tell you that you're not about to see the back of me. Next question goes to Annette Weisbach of CNBC. Annette, please . Hi, President Lagarde. I have a question. When I read through the communiqué today, I have the feeling that you're quite confident on the economy, despite all the uncertainties. Is that a right assessment? At the same time, you're also quite confident that inflation is under control. Does that bring me to the right conclusion that we're almost done when it comes to rate cutting? A question on your thinking about the boost from the fiscal space, because clearly it will take time until we'll see that materializing on the economy and also probably on inflation. Just to also understand, why are you so confident that this is actually supporting the economy also in the shorter term, despite all the uncertainties? Thank you. Thank you so much for your question. We have hardly revised our growth numbers. The only year where we have slightly revised is 2026, and by 0.1%. We have confirmed our projected growth rate as per our projection of last March at 0.9% for 2025. That was certainly reinforced by the number we had for Q1. I mentioned the 0.3 Q1 number, which was, as you know, revised from an initial 0.4. I would not exclude that there be further revision of that number on the upside. This is attributable to multiple factors. It is improved consumption, it is improved investment, but more importantly, it is the build-up of inventory or anticipated purchases and therefore sales in fear and anticipation of the tariffs. That Q1 is, of course, very particular, more than peculiar, and is clearly giving momentum to the growth that we are seeing and anticipating for 2025. Again, I would not exclude that that number of 0.3 be revised upward, given the volume that we are seeing being traded out of some countries in particular. We are not revising 2027, and we are very marginally revising 2026, because there is a carryover, number one, and because we believe that the impact of tariff, if and when they materialize, on the export that we have towards the United States, which I remind you is only 17% of our total exports outside from the euro area and European countries, will impact predominantly on 2026 and will then be significantly offset, sorry, by the expected investment in both military equipment and construction, or infrastructure, if you will, particularly out of some countries. Our assessment is that that will have a bearing on 2027, predominantly some in 2026, but predominantly in 2027. You have this offset between the two. Are we confident? I think that would be far-fetched, because we are in a good place. As I said, I think we are well positioned as, you know, after that 25 basis point rate cut and with the rate path as it is, we are in a good place. We will face uncertainty. We do not know what the outcome of the negotiations will be between the various partners. We do not know the level of retaliation that might be decided, which incidentally is not included in our baseline, as you will see published later on. As a result, we have to be prepared, and we will be assessing meeting-by-meeting data as they come in. You know, as I said again, we are well positioned at the moment. The path of inflation that we see certainly returns to 2% in 2027. We start from a place where we have inflation for 2025 at 2%. It goes below target in 2026 for reasons that have predominantly to do with the price of energy and the value of the euro, because, as you know, it is based on our current assumption of those prices now. That is what explains these numbers. Next question Francesco Canepa for Reuters. Francesco, please. Thank you very much. Good afternoon. Good afternoon. You said that the current level of rates leaves you in a good position. Are we to understand that as an indication that you are done cutting interest rates, or if I can rephrase the question in another way, what would you need to see for you to cut rates again? Again, we are in a good position. We are in a good position on the basis of the current rate path and with the 25 basis point cuts that we decided, so that we can face the uncertainties that are coming our way. As you have heard in the monetary policy statement, we will decide meeting-by-meeting on the basis of data. We will assess, as and when data come in, whether or not that position is secure in order to deliver on our 2% medium-term target. What I am saying today is that we are in that good position. Next question to Ole Gulsvik of BFM Business. Ole, please. Thank you, President Lagarde, for taking my question. First question, would you say the monetary stance has now shifted to neutral, or is it still restrictive, even slightly? Second question, some countries are facing higher debt and may struggle to attract investors. At what point does that become a concern for the ECB in terms of policy transmission and financial stability? Thank you. Thank you for your two questions. We have not discussed this wonderful concept of the neutral rate on the occasion of this meeting. I think that we know, we all know well that as we are getting closer to that zone, we need to be particularly attentive. We need to be confident in our resolve to deliver with the appropriate monetary policy our medium-term 2% target. We have not discussed that neutral rate. I alluded to that at our last press conference. You know, the neutral rate is predicated on the absence of shock. Great equilibrium, no shock. I wish there was no shock. We have just nearly concluded a cycle of monetary policy that dealt with a series of shocks: pandemic, war in Ukraine, energy crisis. I think we have done that decently well. Inflation is at target, 2% medium term. We are currently around 2%. Expectations are well anchored around 2%. Those elements that I told you repeatedly over the few last conferences were of concern to us, namely inflation on services, evolution of wages, evolution of profit. Those three elements are coming really in line with what our projections were in order to deliver on our 2% medium-term target. For the moment, we are facing significant uncertainty. You will read in the material, in the monetary policy statement, I think we quote uncertainty nine or ten times. It abounds. There is plenty of that. Clearly, we are trying to improve our game as much as we can in order to anticipate, measure, calibre. It is proving obviously quite difficult. That is the reason you will be not only receiving our projection exercise, but also the scenarios which encapsulate some of the channels of transmission to growth and inflation. Some of them, not all of them. In particular, I would mention one that we discussed quite extensively during the Governing Council, which is the disruption of the supply chain. That is not included in any of our scenarios. The next question goes to Sliviya Ilieva of the Bulgarian newswire BTA Oh, welcome. Thank you. I hope all your colleagues have welcomed you to the circle. According to the ECB Convergence Report published Wednesday, Bulgaria is ready to join the eurozone on January 1 next year. What do you expect to be the effects of Bulgaria's accession to the euro area, and will the currency zone be stronger with the likely new member state? First of all, I would like to congratulate Bulgaria, the Bulgarian people, and welcome them. This is not yet a completed decision-making process, because, as you know, while the Commission and us have validated under the Convergence Report that the criteria are met, the European Council still has to approve. I do not want to prejudge what the European Council will decide, but there is a very strong likelihood that Bulgaria will become our 21st member around the table. We are delighted that the circle gets larger, and we will be looking forward to the Bulgarian contributions, both in terms of, you know, intellectual input, economic analysis, monetary policy determination. As soon as the decision is final with the European Council, as you probably know, we will welcome for several meetings before January 1 the Bulgarian representative at the table of the Governing Council in order to, you know, sort of facilitate and do the onboarding properly, and so that we can also get to know a new colleague. I also hope that the Bulgarian people will value the solidity of the euro area, the solidity of the currency that we have. Some of you have probably noticed that the supportive judgment of the Europeans has gone up and is now at 83%. You have 83% of the Europeans, based on a survey that is done on a regular basis, 83% actually value and appreciate the euro as their currency. I hope we can together do everything we can so that Bulgarians can also appreciate the value and the shield impact that the euro constitutes for new members. The next question goes to Stefan Riecher of Handelsblatt. Stefan, please. Thank you very much for the floor. First question is, some analysts have entertained the idea that you could skip July to make a concession to those Governing Council members who have already become reluctant to cut rates further. Could you walk us through today's deliberations in this light? My second question is, you have been reluctant to declare victory over inflation for quite some time. Is this the right time for a victory lap, and if not, why? Yeah, victory laps are always nice, but there is always another battle. You know, as I said, I think that with today's cut and the current level of interest rates, number one, I think we are getting to the end of a monetary policy cycle that was responding to compounded shocks, including COVID, including the war in Ukraine, the illegitimate war in Ukraine, and the energy crisis. Of course, we are now into a different time with different players, with different partners, with different policies. We will continue to analyze and assess and measure and make sure that we deliver on our 2% medium-term target. This is, in a way, the thing that is certain. You should not doubt for a second our determination to deliver with the appropriate monetary policy, the 2% medium-term target. What we're seeing currently with this, you know, 2% projected inflation for 2025, around 2% for 2027, and 1.6 in 2026, caused predominantly with our current assumption on the price of energy and the value of the euro, we have a good path to this target. We'll make sure that we, I don't mean to use the word oscillate or navigate, but it will be, you know, close navigation around our target. That's where we have to be and want to be. Next question to Ole Gulsvik of the Financial Times. Ole, please. Thanks. My first question is on this concept of the direction of travel, which you earlier used in this rate cycle. Your today's remarks suggest to me that the direction of travel now probably is more a sideways movement rather than kind of a downward, as it was by the end of the year. Would that be the right takeaway from your current, from your today's remarks? My second question again is on these remarks by Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum. Some people suggest that the disclosure that you considered leaving the ECB early could undermine your ability to do your job properly, as you might be seen as a lame duck. What would be your response to those concerns? Thanks. Thank you for your two questions. On the first one, you know, the reason I used the direction of travel concept was when we were really at a distance from our medium-term 2% target. To talk about the direction of travel when we have our medium-term 2% target in sight, sustainably so, when underlying inflation is not budging. For those in doubt, headline inflation in 2026 is clearly oil and gas and the value of the euro, which we assess at the time when we cut off the period when we do our, when staff does its assessment. Underlying inflation, core inflation, this is hardly moving, and it is at around our target. There is no point talking about the direction of travel. There is no point talking about sideways. What I am saying is that we will be determined to deliver that 2% medium-term target. We will be looking at all data that come in. We will be deciding meeting by meeting, and we will constantly assess and reassess how we are delivering on this 2% medium-term target. Now, to your second question, I will repeat what I have said. I have always been driven by my mandate, and I'm determined to complete my term. Period. The next question goes to Isabella Bufardi of Isole, Isabella, please. Thank you for the opportunity. I have two questions. One is on APP and PEP in the sense that the ECB no longer reinvests the principal payments of these portfolios. Would the Governing Council have to put on hold quantitative tightening if it were to decide for a pause in interest rate cuts? Even if these no longer investments have a very small impact, keeping interest rates unchanged during QT is somehow a restrictive stance as the ECB is draining liquidity. My second question is on the role of the euro. The Governor of the Bank of Italy, Fabio Panetta, warned in his speech on the 30th of May in his concluding remarks that the recent U.S. depreciation raised important questions about the future structure of the international monetary system and the dominant role of the U.S. dollar as both a reserve and a trade invoicing currency. I would be very interested to know your opinion, given your vast and very important special experience in the United States. What do you think is happening now with the dollar, and also what could be the implications for us, for the role of the euro and hopefully also euro-denominated safe assets? Thank you. That's like four questions in two. On your first question, while I appreciate that some of you would like to hear me talk about pause, hold, or whatever, I just can repeat myself that we are currently well positioned to navigate the uncertainties of the next months. I think the risk of inconsistency, anyway, is not, sorry, the risk of inconsistency of QT associated with interest rate policy, which is our main tool, is probably less critical in the event, that I am not confirming here now, of a pause than it is in the event of a cut. I do not see that, but neither do I say anything about future decisions, which, you know, would only be predicated on major shocks that we are not seeing at the moment. Now, on the role of the euro, I highly regard the speech that was given by my colleague and friend, Governor Panetta, Gentile Governatore, right? I happen to be very much on the same page as he is. I gave a speech in Berlin about 10 days ago now at the Hertie School of the Jacques Delors Institute, in which I tried to identify the key pillars that would need to be consolidated and further developed if the euro was to play a critical role as an international reserve currency. My conclusion is that there is an opportunity that is opening now in order to strengthen the role of the euro as an international currency, as to take it further towards possibly the international reserve currency of choice. My conclusion is that it is not going to be granted to us. It should not be taken as a given, and it will require in particular that member states, the Commission, the European Council make very substantive discussions, decisions that will have to do with consolidating the economic and geopolitical role of Europe, that will simplify, streamline, and develop the role of the Capital Markets Union in particular, the Savings and Investment Union, if you will, but particularly the Capital Markets Union. We will have to continue to sustain the effort of making Europe a place where the rule of law is respected, where a contract is a contract, so that there is certainty on the part of the investors, of the economic actors, that Europe is actually a reliable place of business. I, you know, I think it's not a question that can be responded in yes or no. It's a fairly thorough and deep debate that we have touched on during the Governing Council meeting in the last two days, where we strongly feel that we have done our part, we'll continue to do our part, but we also strongly advocate in the monetary policy statement the role that authorities have to play if we want to develop in that direction, which is a window of opportunity now. Now, Andres Gulsvik, of Expansion. Andres, please. Good afternoon, Madam President. I've noticed you're wearing the InCharge necklace, if I see correctly. I suppose it was intentional today. Just in case of doubt, you know. Yeah. Going to my questions. With a 1.6% inflation projected by next year under your baseline scenario, would not it warrant more rate cuts for itself regarding of it coming from the euro and the energy, and regardless of the outcome of the trade war? Second question, I also wanted to ask about the BBVA-Sabadell merger, which is now being checked by the Spanish ministers, and even though it has the ECB's green light and the one of the competition authorities, do you fear that political opposition to mergers could hamper the advances on the banking union? Thank you. Thank you so much. I hope you do not mind if I ask my colleague, Vice President and friend, Luis de Guindos, to address the latter part, and I will turn the floor over to you, and I will come back to yours afterwards. Thank you. Thank you very much, President. Good afternoon to everyone. As you have said, you know, we produced our report and we released our report. I think that it was almost one year ago. Now the antitrust authorities in Spain, they have given, you know, they have given their opinion and the remedies that they have imposed for the deal. Now, according to the Spanish law, we, you know, the government has the possibility to analyze the conditions imposed and, according to the general interest, to modify these conditions. As you can imagine, you know, we can wait. We can, we should wait until we have, you know, a definitive opinion from the Spanish government. Otherwise, what we could be making is a sort of speculation that I think that it doesn't make much sense in this moment of time. Thank you, Vice President. On your first question, I just want to remind you that our forecast is 2% inflation in 2025, 1.6% in 2026, 2% in 2027. Our core inflation is even more stable than that. It is 2.4% in 2025, 1.9% in 2026, 1.9% in 2027. Of course, you think, oh, 1.6% in 2026. That is exactly part of the assessment that has been produced by staff. If you look at what other institutions have forecasted, it is at the very low end of the range for 2027. That is also because they take into account most recent data available, not including Q1, because I think Q1 will give us some surprises. If you compare headline inflation and core inflation, you can see exactly where the difference lies. That is energy prices and the value of the euro. We also have inflation, both headline and core, returning to 2%, 1.9% for core in 2027. The cuts of today, the 25 basis points cut, is deliberately taking care of that inflation path. We are confident of the analysis of our staff on that basis. As I said, we will do what is necessary in order to make sure that that inflation stays at our 2% targets. Monetary policy will be appropriately determined on that basis. As I said, we are very well positioned. The last question goes to, sorry, to Chelsea Dulaney of the Wall Street Journal. Chelsea, please. Yeah. Thank you. I'm also going to ask about inflation. I mean, the narrative of the past several post-pandemic years is higher for longer, structurally higher inflation for all of these different reasons. Looking both at the core and the headline forecast and your expectation potentially for a structurally stronger euro, is that still the expectation, higher for longer for inflation and for rates? My second question is also about the euro. Whenever the euro goes up, people worry about how that's going to impact exporters and some of these export-dependent economies. I'm curious if you think the eurozone is strong enough now for a strong euro. Is the eurozone strong enough for a strong euro? That's your bottom line question of your second question, right? You know, when I look around and reflect on the work that we have done in the last six years, we have a very solid labor market, labor market where participation has, including most recently, increased, where we have been at rock bottom unemployment rate ever since the euro was created. The fears of recession that abounded only about, you know, a year ago have not materialized. We are forecasting 0.9, 1.1, 1.3, with very limited revision to growth. The output gap closes at the end of our projection horizon. Wages have increased over the course of those years, particularly with a view to catching up with the lost purchasing power that citizens had suffered as a result of inflation. It is now decelerating just in line and in time, I would say, to deliver on our 2% medium-term target. The monetary policy is transmitting quite smoothly to the economy. Credit is up. Could be further and higher up, but credit is up. Rates are transmitting, including to corporates and mortgages. I would say that the economy is responding quite well to our monetary policy and is delivering on that front. I would add, as I did in response to one of your colleagues earlier, that more needs to be done. What we have seen, the Vice President and I, when participating in the finance ministers' meetings in Brussels, whether it is Ecofin or Eurogroup, or on the occasion of Pascal Donohue, the President of the Eurogroup, when he had dinner with us a couple of nights ago, we perceive a serious momentum to improve, to change, to simplify, to streamline, and to encourage and lock in, well, not lock in, but welcome capital into Europe. We are seeing it. You know, the reverse Yankee bonds, significant increase that we have seen in the last few weeks is a clear indication that there is trust in our system. The capital flow that we are seeing as well, whether it is, you know, European investment returning to Europe or a bit of non-European investment coming to Europe, all that is an indication that at least market forces, investors, those who move real money around, actually see value and have confidence in Europe. That would be my answer to your second question. I'm not sure what you meant by higher for longer, because I think I have gone out of my way to say that we are in a good place and we are well positioned now, and that we will be assessing, meeting by meeting, on the basis of data, what, if any, needs to be done in terms of appropriate monetary policy to return us to the 2% medium-term target. I think that that really sort of brings together the discussions that we've had over the last two days. With that, I wish you a happy day, happy summer for those of you who leave early, and see you soon. The next press conference is on the 24th of July. Up until then, all the best. Thank you.