Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and a warm welcome to HomeToGo's Investor and Analyst Call following the publication of the financial year figures of 2025. I'm delighted to welcome the CEO, Dr. Patrick Andrae, and CFO, Sebastian Bielski, who will speak in a moment. After the presentation, we will move on with the Q&A session in which you will be able to ask your questions directly to the management. Let's dive straight into the presentation. Patrick, the stage is yours. Thank you, and good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining HomeToGo's Full Year 2025 Earnings Call. I am pleased to welcome you as we present our audited financial results for 2025 alongside our 2026 strategy roadmap and financial guidance. As you have seen in our report published this morning, 2025 was a very successful and transformative year for HomeToGo. We achieved record revenues of over EUR 255 million and significantly outperformed our profitability guidance on both a statutory and a pro forma basis. Today, we will walk you through these strong results which underscore the successful execution of our strategic pivot towards a B2B-centric powerhouse. We are also excited to share our 2026 roadmap outlining how we intend to scale to over EUR 400 million in revenue while more than tripling our adjusted EBITDA to more than EUR 45 million. To give you a structured view of our transformation, our call today is divided into three main segments. I will begin with a high-level summary of our record-breaking 2025 and the key takeaways from our performance. Sebastian, our CFO, will then provide a deep dive into the statutory and pro forma financials. To close, I will return to detail our 2026 strategy roadmap, and Sebastian will briefly outline our financial guidance for the remainder of the year. Then we will open the floor for your questions. Let's dive straight into the first chapter. This first section provides a snapshot of why we consider 2025 a landmark year for HomeToGo. It was a year in which we delivered on our promises. First and foremost, we are proud to have exceeded our profitability targets across both reporting metrics. On a statutory basis, our adjusted EBITDA reached EUR 13.2 million, outperforming our guidance by 20%. On a pro forma basis, we reached EUR 42 million, beating expectations by 5%. This profitability was built on a realized scale transformation. Our statutory revenues grew by over 20% to EUR 255.5 million, while our pro forma revenues reached EUR 394 million. A critical driver for that was the integration of Interhome, which is progressing ahead of schedule with significant synergies already realized. To strengthen our position as Europe's leading vacation rental group, we have defined five key strategic priorities for the 2026 financial year. First, we will capture initial Interhome cost synergies not yet realized. Second, we will target strategic M&A within HomeToGo_ PRO. Third, we will harmonize our group-wide brands to enhance global visibility. Fourth, we will drive operational excellence in the marketplace, where we focus on expanding margins. Fifth, we will maintain our AI leadership with high pace of innovation. This comprehensive roadmap directly fuels our financial ambitions for the remainder of this year. Therefore, we enter 2026 with high confidence and a guidance that targets a massive step change aiming for over EUR 400 million in revenue while more than tripling our adjusted EBITDA. Now let's move on to our business highlights of 2025. I will walk you through the operational milestones that underpinned this record performance. Let's start by briefly visiting the strategic framework we introduced in October last year. This serves as the fundamental foundation for our 2026 initiatives. First, the acquisition of Interhome was a deliberate step in our evolution into a vertically integrated B2B-focused group. Second, as a result, HomeToGo _PRO is now established center of gravity. It provides us with recurring, predictable revenues and is the primary driver of our profit growth, allowing us to deploy capital with high returns at low risk. Third, we maintain a disciplined focus for our B2C marketplace. Our strategy explicitly prioritizes profit over top-line growth. The marketplace operates as a resilient, capital-generating segment that fuels the expansion of our high-return B2B businesses. Fourth, we continue to leverage the powerful flywheel effects across our group, creating a unique competitive advantage through tangible synergies between our segments. Fifth, our growth follows a clear two-pronged strategy: organic growth with a strict prioritization of profitability and a targeted B2B roll-up M&A strategy to capitalize on the fragmented property management and software market. This long-term strategy basically forms the baseline for everything we do. Now let's look at each pillar in more detail to give you some more insights. Our transformation into a B2B-led powerhouse is the result of a consistent multi-year evolution. As you know, our journey began in 2015 as a pure meta search engine. By 2017, we had built what is now known as the marketplace with the world's largest selection of vacation rentals. This B2B success was never the end goal, but rather the essential springboard. It gave us the scale and the unparalleled insights into traveler demand that we needed for our next strategic move. In 2020, we made our first decisive entry into the B2B market by launching software solutions. In December 2023, we officially introduced HomeToGo _PRO as a separate B2B segment of our business. However, the true inflection point, the moment our center of gravity fundamentally shifted, occurred in 2024 and 2025. This is when we added tech-enabled property management through the acquisition of Casa and most notably Interhome last year. Through these acquisitions, we didn't just add volume, we added a whole new dimension of value to our group. As a result, HomeToGo _PRO has now become our primary engine of growth and profit. As you can see on the right, the split has fundamentally flipped. 63% of our IFRS revenues now come from our B2B business, while the marketplace contributes a highly profitable 37%. Beyond just the segment split, I want to highlight the quality of our revenue model. Today, more than 70% of our revenues are recurring or repeat, driven by software as a service, SaaS, and sticky property management fees. This is a massive structural improvement, and it proves that our pivot is not a short-term reaction to market trends, but a successful execution of a long-term strategy that has fundamentally de-risked our business and created a much more predictable and resilient financial profile. Second, as I have emphasized, B2B is now our center of gravity. On the left, you can see the massive step change we have achieved in our top-line scale. We concluded 2025 with pro forma IFRS revenues of EUR 394 million. To put this into perspective, this represents a nearly 100% increase compared to our standalone revenues of EUR 162 million in 2023. Effectively, we have more than doubled the scale of our entire business in a very, very short time frame. Even more significant is the fundamental strategic shift shown on the right. If you look at HomeToGo on a standalone basis, B2B accounted for only about 35% of our business. However, with the successful integration of Interhome, this ratio has completely flipped on a pro forma basis. HomeToGo_PRO is now our primary business segment, representing 63% of our total group revenues. This transition confirms how well we have expanded beyond our marketplace roots into a vertically integrated B2B powerhouse with a highly resilient and predictable revenue base. Now as we move on to the HomeToGo marketplace, here our objective is crystal clear. We prioritize growing profits over increasing top line. If you look at the left side, you can see the strategy in action. While our IFRS revenues remained essentially stable at EUR 151.7 million, despite a significant decrease in marketing expenditures, our adjusted EBITDA reached a major inflection point. We more than quintupled our earnings in this segment, jumping from EUR 2.9 million to a staggering EUR 15.8 million. This resulted in a strong double-digit margin of 10.4%, up from just 1.9% in 2024. This massive profitability boost is driven by our rigorous focus on marketing efficiency shown on the right. Since 2019, we have transformed our cost structure, reducing marketing and sales expenditures as percentage of revenue by a staggering 43 percentage points, reaching a record low of 57% in 2025. By being more disciplined with our B2C spend, we are able to proactively reallocate capital in our HomeToGo_PRO businesses, where we've seen more attractive risk-adjusted returns and long-term growth potential on the B2B side. As we look ahead to 2026, we will maintain this discipline. This will mean lower marketing investments and a deliberate resetting of the marketplace revenue base, as you already know. We also will ensure that this segment remains a highly efficient cash generator for the entire group. If we now take a closer look at the health of our marketplace, specifically our regional booking mix and evolution of our basket size, we see the following. Starting with the regional booking mix on the left, slightly up from 2024, DACH that remains our undisputed stronghold, accounting for 56% of our booking revenues on the marketplace. Rest of Europe share remains stable year-over-year, accounting for nearly 1/4 of total marketplace booking revenues. North America now accounts for 20%. If we now look at the basket size evolution on the right, you see overall our marketplace basket size grew by a robust 6% year-over-year to EUR 1,025. This growth is driven by our European core. In the DACH region, the average basket size surged by 10% to EUR 1,262 if we exclude the short-term business. The rest of Europe followed a similar trajectory, with basket sizes climbing 9% to over EUR 1,200. Turning to our fourth strategic pillar, the tangible value creation from the Interhome acquisition. When we closed this deal, we set an initial target of EUR 10 million in annual cost synergies to be realized within 12-18 months. Today, I'm very pleased to reiterate that we are still ahead of schedule. As communicated alongside our preliminary numbers in February, we have already realized EUR 5 million of these cost synergies on an annualized basis. This was achieved through the rapid migration of Interhome's front-end websites onto our HomeToGo white label technology, combined with personnel cost optimizations and the successful exit of the first transitional service agreements with the former owner. The remaining EUR 5 million in initial cost synergies are well within our sights as we exit the next wave of TSAs and continue to drive operational efficiencies across the integrated organization. What makes this acquisition truly transformative is what you see in the middle of the chart. We have identified an additional EUR 20 million in midterm value creation upside. This upside is driven by two key factors. First, margin internalization. By sourcing more Interhome bookings directly through our own HomeToGo marketplace, we keep the full distribution margin within the group. This effect also highlights the significant synergies which exist between our traveler-focused marketplace segment and our owner-focused B2B segment. Second, tech-driven growth. We are applying our advanced data, AI, and revenue management solution to Interhome's inventory to optimize pricing, occupancy, and marketing efficiency. Combined, we are looking at a total synergy and value creation potential of approximately EUR 30 million in the midterm. This clearly demonstrates that Interhome is not just a scale play, but a significant driver of high margin profitability for the entire group. Finally, let's turn to our fifth strategic pillar, leveraging our proven M&A track record within this highly fragmented market. If you look at the left side, the opportunity for the vacation rental management market in Europe alone is huge. We see a serviceable addressable market of approximately 900,000 vacation homes in rural areas. Despite our recent growth, the top three players combined, including us, hold only about a 10% market share. The remaining 90% is characterized by a massive long tail of hyperlocal agencies and small management companies, many with fewer than 100 properties. This fragmentation provides us with a unique and highly attractive consolidation landscape with very limited competition. Our advantage here is our secret sauce for M&A, shown on the right. Since 2018, we have successfully completed 16 acquisitions. Our approach is notably low risk when we look at these companies. 100% of our targets were already business partners within our network before we acquired them. We don't buy strangers. We buy proven performers whose data and quality we already knew intimately. By applying our standardized integration process, we minimize execution risk while capturing immediate synergies between our marketplace and the B2B operations. Moving into the remainder of 2026, we will continue this disciplined, very value-generative M&A strategy to further strengthen our position as the leading powerhouse in the industry. This concludes the first part of our presentation on the strategic and business highlights for 2025. As you've seen, our transformation into a B2B-led powerhouse is not just a vision, it is already delivering tangible results. To give you a more granular look at how this strategic shift is translating into our financial performance and the segment dynamics behind, I will now hand over to our CFO, Sebastian. Sebastian, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Patrick, and a warm welcome to everybody also from my side. I'm very pleased to walk you through our financial results for the full year and the fourth quarter of 2025. It was a truly record-breaking year characterized by a massive step change in our scale, and more importantly, a significant overperformance against our profitability guidance. Let's dive straight into the financial year 2025. We'll begin with a quick recap of our key highlights for the fourth quarter and the full year 2025. Let's first look at our record-breaking IFRS revenues. We achieved record full year IFRS revenues of EUR 255.5 million, which represent a strong 20.2, 20.3% year-on-year growth. We set a new fourth quarter record with EUR 54.2 million, which was a surge of 52.4% year-on-year. This performance was primarily driven by our significant group expansion and also the successful and rapid integration of Interhome. Secondly, we significantly outperformed our guidance for adjusted EBITDA. We clearly exceeded our profitability targets on both levels. On the statutory adjusted EBITDA, we reached EUR 13.2 million and beat our guidance by 20%. On the pro forma adjusted EBITDA, we grew substantially to EUR 42 million, which was a 5% beat against guidance and also a 27.7% year-on-year increase. Third, we substantially scaled our HomeToGo _PRO segment. Our B2B segment has solidified its role as a massive growth engine. IFRS revenues for this segment climbed 64.1% year-on-year to EUR 114.9 million for the full year, and Q4 performance was even more dynamic with a staggering almost 175% year-on-year growth. Fourth, we successfully turned around performance in the marketplace. Our strategic pivot to prioritize profitability over top-line growth has proven highly successful. For the full year 2025, adjusted EBITDA more than quintupled to almost EUR 60 million. Q4 marked a decisive earnings turnaround with a positive EUR 5.8 million in adjusted EBITDA for the marketplace. Now moving to a detailed look at our statutory financials for the fourth quarter and the full year 2025. Starting with booking revenues. We massively accelerated in Q4. The booking revenues surged by 114% year-on-year to reach almost EUR 107 million. For the full year, we grew by 28% year-on-year to EUR 333.6 million, which was a big jump versus the EUR 260 million which we saw in the last year. This step change was heavily driven by the first time consolidation effect of Interhome, very obviously. On IFRS revenues, we set a new Q4 record where revenues increased by 56% year-on-year to over EUR 54 million. On the full year, we crossed the quarter billion mark and reached EUR 255.5 million, which was a robust 20% year-on-year increase. This strong momentum in the fourth quarter underscored the power of our expanded B2B-led group structure, including the Interhome acquisition. For the adjusted EBITDA for Q4, the statutory adjusted EBITDA was -EUR 8.8 million. While the seasonal Q4 loss increased compared to the previous year, it is important to note that this was mainly driven by the timing of the closing of the Interhome acquisition and the seasonality profile of Interhome, where Q4 is always a quarter with weak revenue and profitability. What happened in the last year is we were unfortunately not able to include the very highly profitable first nine months of Interhome, but only the unprofitable fourth quarter. For the full year profitability, we grew by 3% compared to 2024 to reach EUR 13.2 million. This EUR 13.2 million represented a guidance beat, where we overachieved versus the guidance of 20%. Now let's also take a closer look at the composition of our booking revenues, IFRS revenues, and adjusted EBITDA by segments for the full year 2025, again on a statutory basis. Starting with the booking revenues. On the group level, we increased by 28% year-over-year to EUR 333 million. For HomeToGo _PRO, we clearly established this segment as our primary growth engine. Volume-based revenues in this segment surged by 126% to almost EUR 130 million, driven by the first time inclusion of Interhome in the fourth quarter. Subscriptions also showed very solid growth of almost 20% and reached more than EUR 26 million. For the marketplace, again, the result reflects our strategic focus on quality over quantity. While the on-site bookings grew by 8% to almost EUR 125 million, the advertising revenues declined by 10% to EUR 66 million. This was a very deliberate result of reduced marketing spend, but also our ongoing push, which we have started a couple of years ago already, to replace the advertising revenue with higher value and higher retention on-site revenue. Now moving to the IFRS revenues. On the group level, we saw strong growth of 20% to reach almost EUR 256 million in revenues. For HomeToGo, we saw a jump in the volume-based IFRS revenues. Essentially, they doubled, jumping over 100% to almost EUR 89 million. For the marketplace, the IFRS revenues remained broadly stable. The 5% growth in booking revenues, which is the on-site revenues, successfully offset the managed decline in our advertising business. Looking then at the adjusted EBITDA. On the group level, it improved to EUR 13.2 million. For HomeToGo _PRO, the reported adjusted EBITDA of -EUR 2.6 million reflects again the timing of the closing of the Interhome transaction. As I said before, we were unfortunately only able to include the fourth quarter of Interhome, which was unprofitable, but not the highly profitable first nine months. As we will see in the pro forma view, the underlying profitability of this segment is already significantly higher once Interhome is fully consolidated for a whole year. On the marketplace, we can see the ultimate proof point for our strategy. The adjusted EBITDA more than quintupled, surging 445% year-on-year to almost EUR 16 million. This was powered by strict cost discipline and a massive leap in marketing efficiency. Let's now zoom in on our booking revenues, IFRS revenues, and adjusted EBITDA specifically for the fourth quarter of 2025, again on a statutory basis. This was a quarter defined by triple-digit top-line growth and a significant earnings turnaround in our marketplace segment. For the booking revenues, we saw outstanding acceleration on the group level, with growth of over 100% to almost EUR 107 million. For HomeToGo _PRO, we again see that it is the undisputed growth engine of the quarter for us. The volume-based revenues exploded by more than 400% to reach more than EUR 68 million, and it was obviously the first time where we could also show the full impact of the Interhome consolidation of our statutory numbers. The subscriptions also maintained strong momentum of more than 32% growth to more than EUR 7 million. The marketplace side, the strategic execution was fully in line with our focus on high quality on-site growth. The on-site bookings grew strongly by 30% to more than EUR 28 million. The advertising business decreased by EUR 26 million to EUR 8 million as we continue to prioritize marketing efficiency and on-site conversion. Again, we can see the continuation of the trend to replace the advertising business with a much higher value on-site business. For the IFRS revenues on the group level, they surged by 56% year-on-year to more than EUR 52 million, which is a new Q4 record for our group. HomeToGo_ PRO showed exceptional performance across the board. The volume-based revenues jumped by 374% to more than EUR 31 million, and subscriptions grew by 21% to almost EUR 7 million, showing the continued resilience of our SaaS business. On the marketplace side, bookings, revenues, so the on-site business grew by 21% to more than EUR 17 million, effectively mitigating the managed 18% decline in our advertising business. Looking at adjusted EBITDA for the group, we reported a seasonally normal EBITDA of -EUR 8.8 million. The marketplace showed an inflection point. This is really a highlight of the quarter. You can see the decisive earnings turnaround with a positive result of almost EUR 6 million. This proves that our strategy of prioritizing efficiency delivered immediate bottom-line results in the marketplace. For HomeToGo _PRO, the adjusted EBITDA was -EUR 14.6 million. Again, as previously noted, this primarily reflects the winter seasonality of Interhome's business model and the first time inclusion of Interhome into our statutory Q4 results. Now, let's also look at the pro forma view, where we have included Interhome as if we had already owned it starting with the January of 2023 to show you a true like-for-like comparison of the business that we now own. You can see for the pro forma IFRS revenues that revenues reached EUR 394.3 million for the full year of 2025. This represented a very healthy 10% CAGR of the last three financial years. Even more important than top-line growth is the quality of our bottom-line development. When you look at the pro forma adjusted EBITDA, you can see that profitability has grown significantly faster than revenue, achieving a CAGR of 30%. This also means that the EBITDA margin expanded in every single year since 2023. The adjusted EBITDA reached EUR 42 million in 2025, which represented a 27% increase compared to the previous year. Key takeaway when you look at this development is the fact that adjusted EBITDA growth is outpacing revenue growth and that highlights the scalability of our combined cost base. It also demonstrates the very powerful operating leverage we are beginning to realize within the new HomeToGo, with its core being the B2B side of our business and Interhome being the single biggest business within the group. Now it's time to get a little bit nerdy. We've received a lot of questions from analysts and investors relating to items which are below adjusted EBITDA in the P&L, and I would like to give some background and provide transparency and clarity. For everybody who is not that interested in the finer points of IFRS and how we account for share-based payments, now will be a good time to go grab a cup of coffee and maybe come back in five minutes when Patrick will talk about more important strategic issues. I'll start with the share-based payments. You can see that the non-cash expense was EUR 13.2 million in the last year. This was primarily driven by grant of new share-based awards to members of the management board. Obviously I joined as a new member, but also the other three members of the management board renewed their contracts and in that context also received new grants. We had one-off items below EBITDA of EUR 11.2 million, which was relatively stable versus last year. The main drivers were the Interhome acquisition with cost of EUR 4.7 million, so for M&A cost and also subsequent integration costs of about EUR 3.6 million. Moving further down in the P&L to depreciation and amortization. Amortization amounted to EUR 19.2 million. This includes about EUR 4.2 million for capitalized software and also EUR 14 million for M&A-related intangibles from previous acquisitions. We also had a relatively large impairment charge in this year, which impacted our net result after tax. We had a significant non-cash item this year totaling EUR 61.4 million. This mainly composed a EUR 54.3 million goodwill impairment for the marketplace segment and also a EUR 5.6 million impairment related to the e-domizil restructuring. For all of these items that I named until now, we also have slides, and I will go into more detail. Quickly looking at the net financial result, it decreased to EUR 5.3 million. This reflects mainly the interest expense associated with the EUR 75 million bank loan, which we took out in relation to the acquisition of Interhome. Lastly, also looking at taxes, you can see a positive tax income of EUR 3.2 million, which obviously looks weird because it looks like the tax authorities is, you know, giving us money, which unfortunately is not the case. This was due to the recognition of deferred taxes. The actual cash outflow for income taxes in the last year was about EUR 5.3 million. Let's take a more granular look at the one-off adjustment items. As I said before, the total one-offs for the last year amounted to EUR 11.2 million, which remained relatively stable versus the EUR 2.6 million in the previous years. The biggest single item was in relation to expenses for M&A activity. This includes legal fees, transaction advisory, due diligence costs, and was obviously primarily driven by the Interhome acquisition. We had EUR 3.6 million in relation to reorganization and restructuring. These are non-recurring costs mainly for severance and personnel-related restructuring. In last year, this item mainly relates to the strategic decision to close the e-domizil offices and integrate the e-domizil business operations into the existing Interhome structure. This is one item that is actually a big part of the EUR 5 million of the cost synergies that we have already realized and that Patrick talked about earlier. We had about EUR 700 thousand in relation to legacy tax risks. This relates to a tax risk that we have identified regarding potentially incorrect historical treatment of VAT at one of the subsidiaries which we had acquired in previous years. The last bigger point is the amortization of fair value step-down of EUR 1.2 million. This is a very, very technical IFRS accounting point, and it relates to the purchase price allocation of back when we acquired the GetAway Group and it covers the fair value step-down on vouchers and advanced payments that GetAway had received. Really important to remember, all of these items are non-recurring and non-operational. They do not reflect the underlying day-to-day performance. This is also why we adjust for them to show you a EBITDA that really truly reflects in the most from our perspective accurate way the underlying operational profitability of our business. Now let's address the large non-cash impairment loss that we had to record in the last financial year. Our statutory net loss for the last year was significantly impacted by that one-time non-cash impairment loss of EUR 61.3 million. The biggest part of that being EUR 54.3 million relates to a goodwill write-down which we recorded for the marketplace business. This is a direct accounting consequence of the strategic decision that we announced in October 2025 to reallocate capital away from the marketplace and into our HomeToGo _PRO business. The goodwill which was impaired importantly originated from the de-SPAC / business combination transaction through which HomeToGo listed on the stock exchange. It does not relate to any of the businesses or bolt-on acquisitions we have made since the de-SPAC. It's really truly an accounting technical adjustment that we're doing here. There is also the EUR 5.6 million impairment relating to e-domizil. As I said, this was a part of the cost synergies which we captured last year already. We closed down and merged the e-domizil business. Following that transaction, we also had to write down or impair the M&A-related transaction intangibles that were created when we originally acquired e-domizil. Really important, and I want to emphasize this again, these impairments are entirely non-cash and they are one-time in nature, and they also have no impact on the group's very, very strong liquidity position. Moving into the second topic where I would like to provide a little bit more clarity and transparency, and this is the depreciation and amortization charges. Again, you can see for the last year, we had the big impairment charge. I will not go into detail on that again, but rather focus on the ongoing amortization and depreciation charges. You can see that the depreciation for PP&E, so things like desks, laptops, and so forth, is relatively stable. It's not a big part of our cost base. Also the amortization for general intangibles like software licenses that we acquire is pretty low. There are two remaining points which are big. The first one is the amortization of internally generated software. We capitalize about EUR 11 million per year in software which we develop internally, and this has to be then amortized over the following years. The biggest single item, and that is the dark blue box on this chart, relates to M&A-related intangibles. When we acquire a business, and as Patrick has outlined, we are serial acquirers of business. Since 2018, we have bought a business, at least one business every single year, and we have to go through an accounting exercise called the purchase price allocation, PPA, where we look at the different assets that we acquired, and we have to put into our balance sheet intangibles for things like brand or customer lists or software, and we then have to amortize these over a potentially quite long period of time, right? Brands, for example, we have to amortize over a long time. These charges, they are all non-cash, right? The biggest single point in the EBITDA is really all that stuff that is M&A related, and which accounted for EUR 40 million in the last year. Also another point where we get a lot of questions from investors and analysts, and this is the share-based compensation charge. We try to, again, disentangle this a little bit to provide more clarity and transparency. A couple of things I want to note. The first one is that there were certain share-based compensation programs which actually predate the IPO of the company. These were given to employees and managers, when the business was still private. You can see that over the last couple of years, this was actually a pretty large part of the share-based compensation. This has now worked its way through. The 0.9 million that we recorded in the last year is the last bit that you will see from that. These pre-IPO programs, they're now done, they are terminated, discontinued, and you will also not see any reflection of that in the P&L anymore. The two things that you will see on an ongoing basis is the cost from the LTI program in relation to virtual stock options and also in relation to restricted stock units. You can see that the stock options accounted for EUR 8.9 million last year, and the RSUs, the restricted stock units, accounted for EUR 3.9 million. The biggest point to note here is that of the EUR 8.9 million, about 44% is due to appointments and reappointments of members of the management board. All four of us actually opted to take the maximum amount that we can in the form of stock options. All of us at HomeToGo have the ability to choose a mix of RSUs and stock options. We as senior managers all opted to take as much as we can of stock options, and that reflects really the belief that we see a lot of upside in this business and that this upside should also in the future reflect into the share price. The options are obviously the higher risk, so I will come to that later. At the moment, unfortunately, all of our options are out of the money. Again, we expect to be rewarded for taking that risk once the share price hopefully appreciates in the future. If you have talked to me in one-on-ones before, you probably heard me rant about the IFRS accounting treatment of share-based compensation and how I have a personal belief that it is the opposite of giving a fair and true view, and that it's also a quirk in the sense of that, it is probably the one area where IFRS is for some reason not following a mark-to-market logic. I would like to walk you through again how this actually all works. A couple of things to note. Firstly, all of our share-based compensation is entirely equity settled, meaning no cash transfer occurs, right? All of us, we will actually eventually receive shares, and that is for both the RSUs as well as for the virtual stock options. The structure of the LTI program is such that we as participants can split our annual award between restricted stock units and virtual stock options, with a minimum allocation of 30% to each instrument. For example, personally, I've chosen to have 30% in RSUs and then 70% in virtual stock options. The vesting usually occurs over two to three years in quarterly tranches. Once a tranche has vested, we have a three-year window to exercise the instruments before they expire. For people who join the company new, for example, myself, there is also a one-year cliff. If I would leave the company within the first 12 months, actually all of my RSUs and options will be forfeited. Unfortunately, the P&L recognition does not follow the logic of our program. The way IFRS and the very wise people living somewhere in the ivory tower writing these accounting guidelines have thought and saw fit to make us do this is that the fair value of all the granted units is determined exactly once at the time of the grant, and it is not remeasured. That's what I mean, it is really a break with mark-to-market logic under IFRS. The value is then also recognized in our P&L degressively, and this results in a front-loaded cost distribution. I've given you an example on this slide, and you can see that under a three-year vesting schedule, 61% of the total cost is recognized in year one, and then only 28% in year two, and then 11% in year three. This, in my personal view, nonsensical treatment is made even worse by the fact that, again, there is a cliff. I'm a new joiner, so 61% of the cost of my options is recognized in the first year, even though if I would leave in the first year, I will get exactly nothing. Key takeaway for you here, this front-loading explains why new grants, like the recent management board reappointments and appointments, create a temporary spike in P&L expenses even though the actual vesting period is much, much longer. To conclude our deep dive into share-based compensation, let's look at the accounting recognition versus the actual intrinsic economic value of both the RSUs and the virtual stock options. Again, there is a strong disconnect between IFRS and mark-to-market logic here. IFRS does not follow a mark-to-market approach for these equity settled grants. The cost recognized in our P&L is fixed at the time of the grant and remains unchanged for subsequent years regardless of share price performance. This has an impact on the RSUs. They obviously retain some value, but if you were to mark to market them again, the actual economic value is lower now. That means that the fixed accounting costs shown in the P&L are significantly overstated compared to the actual intrinsic value held by the for the employees who have RSUs. That is made even worse for the VSOs. We have about 34.1 million virtual stock options outstanding. And as of close yesterday, our closing share price was EUR 1.38. We have given you a chart with the strike prices. The lowest strike price any of us actually has at the moment is EUR 1.42. Not a single virtual stock option is actually currently in the money. Also, not a single stock option has ever been exercised in the last couple of years. All of these 34.1 million stock options have strike prices above the current market value, meaning that exactly zero of these options would be exercised today. When you look at the pie chart, you can also see that a significant portion of our options have relatively high strike prices, even 21% of them above EUR 3. These are the oldest virtual stock options, so they have the shortest remaining tenure, and they will likely, unfortunately, expire unexercised. The key message here for shareholders is the dilution which you should expect from our option programs is much lower than what you think from the cost that was recognized in the P&L. This concludes my very public rant about, in my personal opinion, the stupidity of IFRS accounting principles when it comes to share-based compensation, and I will now hand back to Patrick to talk about much more important things. Thank you, Sebastian. I will now walk you through our strategic roadmap for this year, 2026. As I've already shared, the HomeToGo group will focus on five strategic priorities for the remainder of this year, which will further strengthen our position as Europe's leading vacation rental group. As a reminder, first, we will capture the Interhome cost synergies not yet realized, aiming to fully achieve the targeted EUR 10 million in annualized short-term savings. As of the end of 2025, we had already realized EUR 5 million in annualized cost synergies, and we plan to capture the remaining EUR 5 million over the course of 2026. These additional cost synergies will come from exiting further TSAs, so these transitional service agreements we talked about, and additional operational efficiency gains. Second, we will target strategic M&A within the HomeToGo _PRO, within the HomeToGo _PRO segment, leveraging our strengthened balance sheet and the EUR 200 million bond framework to pursue value accretive acquisitions in the property management and B2B software space. We will focus our M&A activities on three specific areas. A, acquisitions of small local property management agencies through asset deals at very low single-digit EBITDA multiples. The integration of these bolt-on acquisitions is straightforward, leveraging our existing geographic footprint and Interhome software platform. B, larger scale acquisitions in the vacation rental property management space to enter new local geographies in Europe or to strengthen supply in adjacent business segments like luxury villas. C, B2B software applications for the vacation rental industry that enhance our service offering for property managers and hosts. Third, we will harmonize our group-wide brand architecture to enhance global visibility, which will be led by the continued roll-up of our HomeToGo Originals umbrella brand for our property management businesses. This initiative will streamline our ecosystem, making it easier for partners and guests to navigate our B2B and B2C offering. We aim to leverage the significant strength of the HomeToGo brand beyond our consumer business. After a successful introduction at ITB earlier this month, we will begin implementing the HomeToGo Originals umbrella, for instance, across our various business units throughout 2026 in the property management area. Fourth, we will drive operational excellence in our marketplace. Our focus will be on expanding margins to optimize marketing efficiency and continued disciplined capital reallocation. We will continue to stay extremely focused on cost discipline, for instance, by using AI at every opportunity. In fact, if we look at the daily operational work we do, we've adopted a very clear rule for hiring. Before we add any headcount, we ask ourselves if the job can be done by AI instead. This aligns perfectly with the strategy we shared back in October. We have already started to scale back marketing spend, as you heard earlier, in the marketplace, and we expect this to drive a significant increase in ROI throughout the year. The first month of 2026 have already looked very promising in that regard and underlined that our pursuit strategy works. Fifth, we will maintain our AI leadership, sustaining a high pace of innovation to remain the leading AI-powered travel platform in our industry. We were the first in vacation rentals to embrace this technology, already launching AI tools for our customers back in 2023, well before it became a global trend. As you know, we have a history of machine learning basically since the beginning of HomeToGo. Most recently, we launched Dash, the next generation of our AI companion. Dash is already making an impact, cutting customer escalations to human agents by 85% compared to our previous third-party solutions. To stay at the forefront of AI, we are also implementing new protocols like MCP. This ensures us that our inventory is directly accessible to the world's most advanced large language models. By doing this, we're ensuring that as new AI agents emerge, they can seamlessly access our supply, positioning HomeToGo as the essential partner for the next generation of AI-driven commerce. This comprehensive roadmap directly feeds into our financial ambitions for next year. Throughout the year, we will give you more information and report on what we have achieved on our strategic roadmap. With that, I hand over to Sebastian for the guidance for 2026. We're entering really a new growth chapter for HomeToGo with the year 2026, and that year will be characterized by a massive step change in both scale and also, most importantly, our bottom line results. For 2026, we're targeting IFRS revenues of between EUR 400 million and EUR 410 million, which represent more than 55% year-on-year growth. We're targeting adjusted EBITDA of EUR 45 million-EUR 47 million, which is more than 240% year-on-year growth compared to 2026. There is a couple of things I want to note on our guidance. As we unfortunately all have seen over the last two weeks, there is significant macroeconomic uncertainty arising from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. While for us as HomeToGo, the direct impact of this is very, very low, we don't really have bookings in the Middle East. It's not a holiday region for us. What is unclear for us is the indirect effects, especially from a prolonged war, and the transformation that could come into the broader economic environment from a sustained higher level of oil prices and gas prices. That is just something that creates significant macroeconomic uncertainty, not just for us, not just for the travel industry, but really for everybody in the world at the moment. With the acquisition of Interhome, we are now also to some degree or an increased degree, exposed to foreign exchange volatility, particularly regarding the Swiss franc to euro pair. What we have seen also in these times of uncertainty is a flight to safety in currencies. That flight to safety means that there is a lot of capital going into Switzerland, which meant that the value of the Swiss franc has increased quite a lot. Again, this is uncertain. I think a lot of that is also tied to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and how that will follow through, and this again is something that is outside of our control. What is inside of our control is the strategic capital reallocation from the B2C marketplace to B2B segment, which Patrick has outlined, and which we have also introduced already in October of last year. Just one thing to remember when you look at our top-line guidance, that capital reallocation away from B2C to B2B results in a one-off step change down for the marketplace segment, which is reflected in our top-line guidance. With that, I'm handing back to Patrick for some closing remarks. To wrap up the three key takeaways from today. First, 2025 was a landmark year for HomeToGo. It marked a decisive turning point where we not only realized a massive scale transformation, but also proved our ability to generate profit. We achieved record statutory, IFRS revenues and significantly exceeded our profitability targets. Second, our strategic pivot is now fully operational. Following our business update in October, we have successfully shifted our center of gravity towards the high-margin HomeToGo _PRO B2B segment. In 2026, we are driving this evolution forward through our five key strategic initiatives, from capturing the further internal synergies to maintaining our leadership in AI. Third, we are scaling to new financial heights. We ended the current year with record visibility and a strengthened capital structure. This gives us the firepower we need. Our guidance for financial year 2026 is clear. We are targeting IFRS revenues of EUR 400 million-EUR 410 million, representing over 55% year-over-year growth, and an adjusted EBITDA of EUR 45 million-EUR 47 million, which effectively means more than tripling our profits with over 240% year-over-year growth. With that, I thank you very, very much for your attention today, and we will now open the floor for your questions. Thank you very much for your presentation. Ladies and gentlemen, we're happy to take your questions now. For an engaging conversation, we kindly request to ask your questions in person via the audio line. To do so, just raise your virtual hand, and if you have dialed in via phone, you can raise your hand by pressing star key nine. Additionally, you can also place your questions in our chat. In the meantime, we have received the first question from Tim Kruse via the audio line. Please go ahead with your questions. Yes. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you very much for that very comprehensive presentation. Couple of questions from my side. First will probably be to Sebastian on the EBITDA guidance. If I remember correctly, the pro forma EUR 42 million for 2025 does not include any cost synergies, right? Is that correct? Yes, that's correct. The synergies were really captured in November and December. The implementation was in November and December, only a pretty small portion is in the last year. Help me sort of because you said on a full year basis you have EUR 5 million cost synergies realized at the end of 2025, and then you are very well on track in realizing the EUR 10 million on a full year basis throughout this coming year. What am I missing on that when I look at the guidance of 45-47 in terms of cost effect? Is that these currency uncertainties or other cost effect that we have to think of sort of counter moving against those synergies you mentioned? Yeah. I mean, broadly, right. The EUR 5 million that we had already implemented at the end of last year will be then fully in the 2026 numbers, right? The EUR 5 million on an annualized basis that we are still generating this year will only be partially in the numbers for this year. Depending exactly when we can get that realized, and there is a couple of operational initiatives which will probably be a little bit back-end loaded for this year. The kind of like the bridge that you're looking for is really what we laid out on the guidance slide in terms of what we said with macroeconomic uncertainty, right? We see effects in the travel industry already. SAS, the airline, has canceled 10% of their flights in April yesterday because they see kerosene prices go up by over 100% in the last two weeks. Air New Zealand has canceled 10% of their flights globally. We see a lot of just things happening in real time at the moment, right? We also obviously have a strong belief that we could be a net beneficiary, right? That we can also see, for example, that very wealthy people are changing their holiday bookings from Dubai to Majorca, but not quite our target audience. Like, our kind of like middle-class families more our target audience. There's just different things happening in real time, and it's very, very hard for us to get a read on it. We just want to take effect of these things that are unfortunately outside of our control. We're continuing to work very hard on all of these operational initiatives and getting the synergies in, which is something that we absolutely have control over. We also just want to be very open and transparent that there could be macro, you know, headwind coming into our face that is outside of our control. Understood. Yeah, I was wondering on sort of the net effect of the current situation. Would you concur that on the one hand, as you say, travel patterns could maybe, like in Corona, sort of move more to the local vacation? On the other hand, you have the sort of, yeah, discretionary spend or the household income being affected by higher energy prices. That's exactly right. I think the benefit will be that I think families are a lot less likely to fly to Egypt or Turkey this year, right? A lot of these families may actually choose to take their summer holidays in Europe, potentially in a holiday house, right? It's that thing that we talk a lot about instead of going to Club Med in Egypt, with kind of like everything included, and you drive your car to Italy, rent a house, and you cook yourself, right? This is definitely something that we expect. However, that is a scenario, right? If oil prices go even higher, right? We saw oil prices spike by almost 10% yesterday alone, right? They stay maybe at over $120 for a prolonged period of time, right? We will see or we are worried about an inflationary impact that you will see coming from the supply side, and we're also worried about what that will do with the mindset of the consumer, right? These are just things that are too early to call at the moment. As a management team, we just want to take a cautionary stance at the moment and not overpromise on something that we may not be able to deliver on because it is just outside of our control. Okay. Just one final on the sort of midterm guidance, the EUR 20 million additional synergies. Can you give some kind of timeline? Maybe the final question for Patrick, in terms of AI leadership, how do you define that, and what are you experiencing in the customer journeys? I was wondering, I saw that Booking has a ChatGPT app already available and how you think about that. Can we expect the HomeToGo app in other LLM models as a sort of direct integration? That would be helpful. Thank you. Yeah. Very quickly on the midterm, EUR 20 billion upside. We've always said that will come three to five years after closing of the transaction. We may see the first part of that maybe next year, 2027, but really I think 2028 onwards. Patrick, AI. Yeah. Yeah. I think like the interesting thing we can talk about this, Sebastian said about nerding about IFRS, we can nerd about AI also for longer time. Maybe we do a separate session on this. Like, generally, what we see, right? Like we've always been at HomeToGo, like leveraging technology, not for the sake of the technology, but to make either our operational business better or obviously like in the end, which counts most like make something better for the customer. Like when we started HomeToGo, we were leveraging long before people were talking about AI, machine learning for various topics, right? Like, consolidating our inventory, and so on, which in the end is nothing. Also the large LLMs are nothing else than machine learning, yeah. Like, obviously with the new advantages that came with AI, we could like, leverage them on the existing pipelines and what we did prior with, I would say, normal machine learning. We could also utilize this then for various like things that you see in our product today, right? Like not only starting with the things early and having now Dash, which is the companion that can go that can on the marketplace, like support you through the whole booking at every step, but you also get from Dash like information about summarizing reviews and these things that you might also know from Amazon. We had it way before them and these types of things for the customer. It also means what you just asked, right? Like that, we have this MCP actually running in the first version already for HomeToGo. Like, LLMs can access HomeToGo via that. We anyway have, as you might know, our integration with Google, with the Google Vacation Rentals, where we also have a partnership with Google where we will also. Where this will also be utilized in the AI mode and in the AI topics. The same is also we are speaking obviously also to OpenAI, and you will also see us being active there with our app and all these types of things. In the end, the interesting thing is for us that we see a huge advantage how our business model is structured with the rise of this new era of AI. This is for us definitely a net positive how we look at it today. No one can tell you where AI and how far it will go. Especially as you know, as a reminder, with the last mile we have to the inventory via software, but even more so via the Interhome business, we have the best moat in this kind of industry with this direct connection to the inventory. Okay. Thank you. All the best. Thanks. Thank you for your questions, Tim. Ladies and gentlemen, before we move on with the questions from Bharath Nagaraj, let me tell you shortly as we're a bit over the time, but we want to cover all your questions. Yeah, and we have some questions in our chat as well. Now, Bharath, we are happy to take your questions. Thank you. Just a couple from me then in the interest of time. With regards to the synergies of EUR 20 million that you have talked about, additional synergies, shouldn't that be a percentage of, let's say, your revenue in the future? Because for every booking that you now make using other OTAs, you can potentially internalize that with the HomeToGo Marketplace. Just wondering what is that EUR 20 million based on? Is that based on today's revenues or anything else? That's the first question. How should we think about the split between marketplace and HomeToGo _PRO in terms of the guidance for 2026? Just to sneak in one more, free cash flow expectations for 2026. Yes. Starting with the EUR 20 million in value creation upside. The biggest bucket of that is actually the internalization of the distribution margin. How you can think about that is that Interhome has about EUR 400 million booking volume at the moment, of which about 25% go through their own channels and also through HomeToGo channels, and about 75% go through a third party channel. You can book Interhome inventory through Airbnb, through Booking.com and Expedia. If that happens, we have to pay them about an average 13% margin for the distribution. What we're intending to do is to increase the percentage of the bookings we receive from about 25% at the moment to 50%. That means capturing another EUR 100 million booking volume for Interhome, and then saving 13% on that. That's EUR 13 million of that EUR 20 million. The reason why we think that is possible is that for another acquisition that we did called Casa, we acquired that two or three years ago. When we bought the business, that portion of the internal bookings was about 30%, and we actually got it to 70% at the moment. It is something where we have shown in the past that we can implement that. In order to implement it, there is a whole lot of small levers that you need to pull. A lot of them require changes in the way that customers can book. Given the timing of the Interhome acquisition closing, we were not able to implement that for the booking season of this year, so we're working on that. We may be able to implement some of that already for next year, but again, this is like a hard slog, right? There's a thousand little things that you need to do, so really I would only expect that to be relevant 2028, going forwards. The rest, the EUR 7 million to get to the EUR 20 million is really about growth in the Interhome business, and that is especially growing the number of properties that we have under management. So we have put in a big push on sales. Also, for example, how the Interhome sales team is being able to be incentivized. Under Migros, for example, it was illegal internally to give salespeople any bonus. You can imagine how easy it was, quote-unquote, "To run a sales team for the Interhome management team where you're not able to give bonus to them," so we've obviously changed that. We're also again rolling up smaller players as a source of growth. Yeah, EUR 13 million of that is internalization and EUR 7 million is really growing the inventory. On the split for the marketplace versus pro, I think you can look at the pro forma numbers and take that as a split. I would invite you to look at the pro forma numbers and take that as a pretty good starting point for modeling. On free cash flow, we have decided not to give guidance on free cash flow for this year. There is a couple of reasons for that. Free cash flow in 2026 will be subject to significant technical noise, right? As we complete the first full year cycle of the Interhome integration, there's just stuff that we need to learn. Unlike our marketplace business, Interhome's managed portfolio involves also complex payment cycles between guests and individual homeowners. We also need to just really figure out how that works with net working capital. As outlined in our strategic road map, we're also actively looking at M&A, so we don't wanna put out a free cash flow guidance which may restrict us in, you know, going after very good, you know, M&A opportunities at lower multiples with high expected synergies. Again, also looking at macro, right? It's hard to see how that works through. We expect as a business to be cash flow positive, obviously, and also significantly cash flow positive, but we do not want to guide at the moment towards a specific number. Yeah. Makes sense. Thank you for the detailed answer. Just if I may just ask a quick follow-up. Because you based your EUR 13 million of the internalization of the margins off the EUR 400 million of bookings currently, so if that, if those bookings grow, that could grow as well, right? Is what I was trying to get at. Yes, absolutely. Yeah. The way that you look at these like synergies or value creation potential is always you pick a point in time, right? Yeah. Yeah. It is a static view, but like you're absolutely right? If we're able to grow the Interhome business, that could potentially grow as well. Absolutely. Thank you very much, Sebastian. Cheers. Congrats. Thanks. Thank you so much. Let's move on with the further questions from our chat box, and there we received a couple. One from Mr. Johansen we already answered with Tim's question, so we move on with the next one. Please remind us on the currency split on revenue and cost given your FX comment. Yeah. Look, as I said before, the euro- Swiss franc is the most important currency pair that we have. I would also invite you to look into our annual report, where you can see like a sensitivity analysis on that. It's in note 36 of the annual report, so you can see how that actually works mathematically. Strictly speaking, our exposure is bigger on the revenue side than on the cost side, so we do have operations in Switzerland with Interhome, but it is higher on the revenue side than on the cost side. Thank you so much. The next question: Do you believe the greater marketing efficiency and improved profitability in marketplace is sustainable? Yes. From everything that we can see, like the answer is an absolute yes. As Patrick has also mentioned, we had a very good start into the year with the marketplace business. The return on advertising spend that we see this year is really stunningly better than last year. All of the operational improvements that we started to do in the last quarter of last year, they have really paid off in the start of this year. We're really happy with the marketing efficiency in the marketplace business. It also shows like the strength of our organic share of the marketplace business, right? Like, because if you scale back marketing on the paid side, this is obviously the interesting part, and it shows that brand and retention, so recurring customers are really working in the way that we wanted it to see. Thank you. The last question from Mr. Johansen: What is the normalized D&A level you expect ahead? I mean, like, number one, my question back would be what exactly is meant with normalized D&A? That's not a metric that we have. We obviously wanted to give, you know, much more clarity and transparency on D&A, so that investors and analysts can form their opinion about that. Most importantly, we do not expect an impairment charge again in 2026, so that, like, EUR 61 million you can take out. The M&A related amortization will continue for a couple of years still, right? This is something that will stay with us. All of that basically, except for the EUR 61 million, is what you could call, quote-unquote, normalized D&A. You can see how it has developed over the last couple of years. I think the trends that you can see, especially over the last two years, is something that you could also expect to continue. All right. Thank you so much. We have another virtual hand. We received it from Benjamin Bailey. Benjamin, you should be able to unmute yourself and ask your questions. Perfect. Thank you. You mentioned in the last earnings call that you see yourself as a tech company, but you're trading at a forward EBIT/EBITDA ratio of six, which is significantly lower than competition. Booking trading at a multiple of 12, Airbnb even higher, and share price performance was very poor against any benchmark over the last 12 months. With that in mind, are you planning for the next six months any measures to increase shareholder value through share buybacks? No, we do not plan any share buybacks. Thank you. Thank you so much. Just a quick question, and then we have a further questions in our chat. From Mr. Friedman, can you please split the sales guidance for 2026 into marketplace and PRO? We do not give guidance on a segment level. Again, the same that I also said to Bharath. I think when you look at the pro forma numbers for 2025, and you look at the split between Marketplace and B2B for the pro forma numbers for 2025, that is a good guide that you could use for 2026. Thank you so much. Then the last question from Mr. Friedman. As we received another question from Mr. Hinkel, but you already answered this question. Mr. Hinkel, you can take a look on the annual report note 36 for further information. The last question by now is, what kind of organic growth in PRO can we expect in the years to come? Look, I think the answer that we've given to that question in the past kind of stays true, right? Like, this is something looking through economic cycles and things like the Middle East, right? What we've said before is that we can see you know, like double-digit growth in the B2B segment. The growth will be a little bit lower than that for the property management side of the business. We expect it to be a little bit higher for the software side of the business. Again, we can see really good growth in the software business that we've also pulled out, right, especially with our SaaS revenues growing very strongly last year. On a blended basis, we would expect double-digit growth over the next couple of years. Okay. I think that was it. I'm not hearing any more questions. In case you do have more questions, we're happy to answer them, and please contact us, especially Carsten from our Investor Relations team or Izzy from our PR team. Thanks very much for taking the time today, and I know we talked long, and I think also longer than we expected to talk. I hope it was useful. Thank you very much for your interest in our company, and yeah, have a very nice day. I hope it is as sunny wherever you are as it is in Berlin at the moment. Goodbye. Thank you. Goodbye.