Hello, and welcome to the RWE conference call. Markus Krebber, CEO of RWE AG, and Michael Müller, CFO of RWE AG, will inform you about the developments in the fiscal year 2021. I'll now hand you over to Susanne. Thank you. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us for RWE's conference call on fiscal 2021 and the outlook for 2022. I'm joined by our CEO, Markus Krebber, and CFO, Michael Müller. Normally, our head of IR, Thomas Denny, would be here. Unfortunately, he has tested positive for COVID. He's doing fine, but that does mean that he can't be with us here today. Thomas, we know that you will be listening, so we send you our best wishes for a speedy recovery. As we have already pre-released our preliminary numbers on full year 2021 and our guidance for 2022, we will focus today's discussion on the current situation and how that impacts our business. With this, let's kick it off, and Markus please. Thank you, Susanne, and good afternoon to you all. I hope you are all safe and sound. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is truly shocking, and we are all deeply sad. Headlines about a war in Europe should be a thing of the past. Our thoughts are with the people in Ukraine. This war marks a tectonic shift in European policies, in our military defense strategy, in our business ties with Russia, and with respect to the European energy policies. The consequences will be far-reaching, both short-term and in the long run. Before I come to that, let me start with a brief preview of RWE's performance in 2021. 2021 was a very successful year for our company. We have exceeded our financial targets. Our green growth is forging ahead. We added 1.3 GW of green capacity, and we currently have 5.6 GW under construction. We were very successful in securing long-term growth in offshore wind with awards of 5 GW in 2021 alone, namely our Dogger Bank South projects in the UK Round Four lease auction, Baltic Two in Poland, the German cluster in the North Sea, and the Thor project in Denmark. Also, the credit rating agencies acknowledged our strategic and financial strengths. In early 2021, we received rating upgrades from Moody's as well as Fitch. For our work in driving the energy transition, RWE was recognized for being in the top 15% of our industry in the 2021 corporate sustainability assessment by Standard & Poor's. The annual assessment takes a close look at the environment, social, and governance performance of companies. We are particularly proud of being recognized for having the strongest improvement in our industry. For this, we received the Standard & Poor's Industry Mover Award. Ultimately, all of this has also reflected our strong share price performance. We continuously outperform the EURO STOXX Utilities Index. Please be assured, we will continue with our clear focus on delivering shareholder value, particularly given the highly challenging and dynamic market environment. The Russian invasion of Ukraine will profoundly change our industry. Short-term, the focus is clearly on energy security and ending the dependency on Russian energy supply. In order to increase the resilience of power generation and explore options for fuel switching, various European governments are looking into options to bring back or expand coal capacity. We are currently looking into our potential contribution, which could be up to 3.5 GW. However, any measure would only be taken on request of the governments. Strategically, we aim to deliver on the agreed coal exit path and a potential acceleration to 2030. Other short-term measures include the diversification of biomass and hard coal supply, as well as ensuring high levels at gas storage facilities before the beginning of next winter. The strategic objective for European energy policy is clear. Sustainable and secure energy supply for Europe. We can expect that this triggers an even stronger push for the green transition. With our Growing Green strategy, this is exactly what we are delivering. To diversify gas supply, Germany now aims to build at least two LNG terminals, with a view to use infrastructure to import green molecules in future. RWE is a strong partner in the development of Germany's first LNG terminal in Brunsbüttel. Our partners in the project are the German government, represented by state bank KfW and Gasunie. In addition, we are looking into further options for green hydrogen, ammonia imports, and import infrastructure. Flexible backup capacities are needed, and faced with the current situation, we believe that these will most likely run directly on green hydrogen. Given the current crisis, we have taken immediate action to improve the resilience of the company. Firstly, let me remind you that we do not have any asset operations or people in the affected regions. Our direct physical commodity contract exposure to Russian counterparties is limited. Namely, a total of 15 terawatt-hours of gas, of which 50% is scheduled for delivery over the next 12 months. As well as a total of 12 million tons of hard coal, of which 2 million tons are outstanding over the next 12 months. Of course, we are actively managing the positions with a clear objective of reducing our exposure where possible. We will not enter into new energy supply contracts with Russian counterparties, and we have ended all non-energy supply business with Russian counterparties with immediate effect. The fuel supply of our own generation assets as well as our customers will be diversified utilizing our global supply and trading business. Furthermore, we have increased our available liquidity and we strictly monitor all counterparties and reduce or cancel counterparty limits where necessary. For the future, RWE is strategically well-positioned. Our Growing Green strategy is set. We will continue to execute it, and we will explore all options to even accelerate it where opportunities arise. Until 2030, we will spend EUR 50 billion of gross cash investments for the energy transition. By 2030, we will call 50 gigawatts of green capacity our own across wind, solar, battery, flexible generation, and hydrogen. On the earnings side, our ambition is to deliver group EBITDA of EUR 5 billion in 2030. We will rigorously execute our strategy even in these challenging times. We are currently building 5.6 gigawatts of new green capacity. The success in the New York Bight auction at the end of February marked our entry into the important U.S. offshore market. We are very pleased that we were awarded 3 gigawatts of leases, which we are jointly developing with National Grid Ventures. Also, our partnership with Tata Power Renewable Energy means a great deal to us. We are working closely in the Indian offshore wind market. The current situation may even trigger additional opportunities to accelerate our transformation. An accelerated push for green energy is a very likely consequence of the current situation. We are further ramping up our own origination activities where possible. In order to meet climate protection targets, the need for storage and flexible generation assets become even more important. We believe a refinement of the strategy is needed so that the new builds will be powered with green molecules from the start. Finally, the faster build-out green import infrastructure, especially in our home market, Germany, creates additional opportunities. 2022 will be a decisive year, geopolitically as well as for the energy industry. The further development of the war in Ukraine is not predictable. Subject to this, we confirm our financial targets for 2022. We will rigorously implement our Growing Green strategy, and we will support European and German governments with all requested measures to support short-term energy security. However, we will stick to our climate protection targets, and we remain committed to becoming carbon neutral by 2040, and to embark on a 1.5 degree compliant CO2 reduction pathway as soon as possible. With this, I will now hand over to Michael. Yeah. Good afternoon also from my side. 2021 has been a very successful year for RWE. We clearly exceeded our guidance. The EBITDA of the RWE group came in at EUR 3.65 billion, and adjusted net income reached EUR 1.57 billion. This is an increase of 25% compared to the previous year. We spent EUR 3.7 billion of gross cash investment on green growth and have 5.6 GW of green capacity under construction. A KPI that shows our speed of transformation is our share of CapEx eligible under new taxonomy. In 2021, almost 90% of our CapEx was eligible. We have started issuing green bonds as part of our sustainable financing. In 2021, we placed EUR 1.85 billion of green bonds at attractive terms. Despite the one-off effects from the Texas cold snap, all divisions put in a very good performance. Core EBITDA reached EUR 2.76 billion and exceeded our guidance. Supply and trading delivered an outstanding performance. Due to a strong fourth quarter, the hydro biomass gas and the onshore wind and solar segment both delivered results above our guidance. With the strong momentum from the operational performance, adjusted net income also exceeded the guidance, reaching EUR 1.57 billion. Year-on-year adjusted minorities were higher, driven by the full consolidation of Rampion, as well as the commissioning of Triton Knoll. The adjusted operating cash flow reflects the impact on net debt from operating activities. It is adjusted for special items and other effects that balance out over time. At the end of Q4, the adjusted operating cash flow amounted to EUR 1.5 billion. It largely stems from our strong result and is partly offset by negative effects in working capital. Trade receivables increased on the back of higher commodity prices at year-end. Net debt decreased substantially to EUR 0.4 billion net debt at the end of the year. Adjusted operating cash flow and changes in provisions reduced net debt, but the primary driver for the decrease were timing effects from hedging and trading activities. Net cash investments of EUR 2.9 billion partly compensated this effect. In 2021, we recorded a net outflow of margins from power generation hedging in the liquid period of EUR 1.3 billion. This is shown in other changes in net financial debt and includes net variation margins from the sale of electricity, as well as the purchase of the respective fuels and CO2. Our net position from variation margins for power generation hedging amounted to EUR 0.2 billion at the end of the year. Most of the remaining effects in other changes in net financial debt are margin inflows from trading activities, as well as for the long-term CO2 hedges for our lignite generation business. The latter was driven by increasing carbon prices in the fourth quarter. For 2022, we assume that the leverage factor will be significantly below our guidance of 3x net debt to adjusted EBITDA as long as commodity prices are stable. With our Growing Green strategy, we are heavily investing into our green portfolio. As we speak, we have 5.6 GW of green capacity under construction across various technologies. With 2.2 GW, offshore wind takes the biggest share. Our Triton Knoll project will be fully commissioned over the next couple of weeks. 1.1 GW of onshore wind will be added in Europe and in the US. 1.2 GW of solar projects are under construction, primarily in the US. At our Biblis site, we are constructing a 300 MW OCGT to stabilize the grid. We won the right to build this project in a capacity auction held by the German grid operator. Furthermore, we are converting our Dutch power plant Amer to run on 100% biomass. Both projects will bring us to a green net capacity of 32 GW. Our outlook for 2022 was upgraded a couple of weeks ago. Subject to the uncertainties in the context of the war in Ukraine, we foresee another strong performance with an Adjusted EBITDA for our core business of between EUR 2.9 billion-EUR 3.3 billion. Adjusted EBITDA for the RWE group is expected to be between EUR 3.6 billion-EUR 4 billion. Adjusted net income will range from EUR 1.3 billion-EUR 1.7 billion. The dividend target is EUR 0.90 per share for this year. With this, I hand back to Suzanne. Thanks. We will now start the Q&A session. Josh, please kick it off. Thank you very much. As a reminder, if you would like to ask a question, it is star one on your telephone keypad now, please. Our first question comes from the line of Rob Pulleyn from Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead. Thank you. Thanks for the presentation. Two questions if I may, and I caveat it by saying I appreciate it's pretty early days in how policies may change as a result of the extraordinary circumstances you highlighted, Markus. The first question is you talked about new opportunities potentially in the green gases infrastructure sort of market. Could you maybe talk a little bit about how discussions so far have led in terms of green hydrogen, regas, gas storage, and of course, potentially we were expecting CCGTs within the German power system towards the end of the decade to facilitate coal closure. I'd love to hear some color around this. The second one, if I may, the existing plan, I think, remains for coal exit by 2030, and I appreciate that may change. Could you talk to the point of how you see that developing and whether this lignite foundation that's been suggested in the media would be part of that solution still? Thank you very much. Yeah, thank you, Rob. I mean, it's indeed very early days, but I mean, we are in constant dialogue with the government, and I think we have a clear understanding what the thinking is, and there's full alignment. I mean, if you look at the current situation, the theory of natural gas being a bridge into the green energy world has a very big question mark. I think you're not gonna find anybody who will incentivize or support investment in this infrastructure. What is the consequences if you wanna stick with your climate protection targets, you need to go much faster green. We discuss now what needs to happen on the import front because it's clear that we cannot produce all the green electricity and the green molecules here in continental Europe because we don't have enough space. What I expect is that there is a much bigger Support available for building this green infrastructure, building the H2 network, building ammonia import infrastructure, and of course, that can also trigger, which typically we have the hen and egg problem, that you have faster investments in the countries of origin, but also faster investments in the offtake, like we would do with our investment in directly green green fuel run CCGTs or OCGTs. It's early days, but I mean, what I hear and what I expect is significant higher support budget from the government, but also a significant acceleration when it comes to planning and permitting processes. Because that will not only help here, it will also help on the renewable side. I mean, our targets are strict, but it could be even possible that we implement them, especially when it comes to Germany and continental Europe even faster. Germany has the biggest challenge of all countries, which means we need to get rid of the dependency on Russian energy supply much faster, and the government is willing to spend for that. That means it creates a lot of investment opportunities for us as the best positioned company in our home market. On the coal exit side, it's very early days again. I think we need to clearly distinguish short-term measures, and short-term measures could mean that we need to extend the lifetime of already closed or shortly to be closed units. We support the government wherever needed, but from a business perspective, it's not relevant. I mean, it's not a strategic focus. I also expect that grosso modo to be value neutral to us. I mean, it will come at additional cost because we need to keep people for longer. We need to invest in the tech into the plants to keep them running. I think that needs to be compensated, but we should also not expect that we earn a lot of money from that. It's neutral. If you ask me what I want it to be, we support the government on their request, it's their decision, their investment, their earnings, their CO2 emissions. We stick to our phase out plan. In the long run, 2030 or by 2032 will not be determined by the short-term measures, but will be determined how fast we can actually turn green without the bridge fuel gas. That is too early to tell. On the foundation, I mean, you can imagine that everybody is now busy implementing the right things but not thinking about structural solutions. I mean, if you read that the other lignite operator had to take state support, I think. Let's see. We probably see that when the worst is over, but that's not the right time today to discuss it. Thank you very much, Markus. That's very interesting. There's tons of questions, so over to the next people. Thank you very much. Our next question comes from the line of John Musk from RBC. Please go ahead. Yes. Good morning. Good afternoon, everyone. I guess two related questions for me, probably all stemming from the volatility we've seen in the commodity market. Firstly, on the various other movements in net debt, which is EUR 5.9 billion, can we perhaps split that out a little bit more? Essentially, I think you mentioned some numbers around the sort of physical power hedging. But can you let us know how much was related to carbon, how much was related to other trading of commodities, and potentially where the balance now sits on those carbon positions in particular? Secondly, I know we're sort of almost at the end of Q1, but I just wanted to ask around the supply and trading business, given all the volatility, is there anything you can say how that business has coped so far in the first quarter? Yeah. John, thanks for your question. I mean, quick answer to supply and trading. I mean, you know that we don't comment on results in the course of the quarter, so therefore apologies if I don't say anything on supply and trading business yet. Related to variation margins, I mean, you know that in this bucket there are various effects. I mean, the one I mentioned is the effect from power, so variation margin for power generation hedges. I stated that at the year-end the balance was EUR 4.2 billion, so completely pretty flattish. But obviously you have to bear in mind that as we progress that number can evolve. Second element is from the trading activities, which also comes with variation margins, typically in the profile more short-term. Then you have the variation margins from the CO2 position, which obviously, you know, is a strategic position and therefore also longer dated. Finally, we also have effects in there, like we mentioned, the other changes, for example, the EUR 880 million of compensation for our nuclear assets in here. I apologize if I cannot comment on numbers, but I think it is fair to say that it's not expected that those variation margins will flow out immediately. Especially on the CO2, that's probably more longer-term developments to be expected here. Maybe just see if I can press on how much you think will flow out. Obviously, you said significantly below three times net debt, but can you quantify that at all? No. Unfortunately, I cannot. No problem. Thank you very much. Yeah, you're welcome. Thank you. Our next question comes from the line of Vincent Ayral from JPMorgan. Please go ahead. Yes. Good afternoon, and thank you for the presentation. You showed some information on the direct exposure on the Russia/Ukraine. Now, Russia curtailing gas or coal supply seems to be quite an extreme scenario. I'd like to get a bit of views on this topic, and what will happen at the end of it in such a situation there. You're talking about 3.5 GW of coal capacity extension. We don't see any nuclear, for example. I understand it's difficult to get fuel rods on a short notice. But what if indeed there were no gas to fill from Russia, could we foresee, for example, I don't know, France providing some fuel rods to Germany and basically nuclear being discussed off as a potential option? That would be on the Russia/Ukraine. The second is on the guidance and the commodity output. You reiterated your guidance despite the recent events. But we understand it uses pretty high commodity prices. I'll take that from your comments at the November CMD. Could you give us a bit more color there on the volume that were unhedged in renewables, lignite, nuclear or CCGT, and what type of basically prices are you using there? It would be quite interesting for us to understand what's basically baked in the guidance and basically outside downside risk from either political intervention coming or not, and depending on its level. Thank you. Yeah, let me take the first question, Vincent, and then Michael will comment on the second. Look, the energy balance in Europe, if you assume a stop of Russian delivery, need to be distinguished between the different energies. I mean, for coal and oil, I would not be so much concerned, and we see already today in the market huge adjustments. I mean, nobody is willing to enter new contracts. Probably, let's call it independence from Russian supply can be achieved over the course of this year if needed, if wanted. It is a different picture for gas, pipeline gas. Here again, the European perspective is the right. I mean, I don't wanna comment on the French nuclear because I don't understand the safety situation. I can tell you that the German government has, 10 days ago, taken the option to extend our nuclear plants off the table. I think for good reasons, because the lead time is too short to refuel them with new fuel rods. It would not help within the next 15 months. That is the period we definitely need to bridge. How we could balance, I mean, you need to look at the power market and then the gas market. Power market first. I'm not so much concerned about the power market because if you look into the options how to save enough gas in the power market, you can bring back coal in Germany, partly in Italy and the U.K., even France is talking about it, Netherlands and so on. I think we could make up a good part there. The rest is a bit more complicated, but if you go to an extreme scenario, we should also consider that maybe European exploration can be ramped up. I mean, in the Netherlands, partly even with a bit more lead time in Germany and in the U.K. a bit more. Of course, when we look into building LNG terminals. If you go for floating units, that can be done within the lead time of maybe two years. We are also exploring like other European countries, all options here. It will take some time. I think currently I don't see the will that the European politicians will sanction energy supply from Russia, but of course, everybody is thinking about the option and everybody needs to consider what happens if they stop delivering. Yeah, on the hedges, I mean, let's start with renewables. So our hedge ratio at year-end for 2022 obviously was above 80% and also for 2023, it was above 70%. I mean, the exposure we have there as merchant position is around 15 terawatt-hours, as you know, plus or minus. With respect to the conventional generation, you know our hedge approach is twofold. I mean, first, we try to convert it into a average portfolio, and then in the second step, we would hedge the price setting spread. So the conversion into the average portfolio is pretty much done for 2023, for 2022, 2023 and also 2024. The hedge ratio for 2022, obviously, also converting the price setting or hedging the price setting spread is completely done. As a rough indication, it's probably two-thirds for the year 2023 to come. If you take that number, especially since we have converted the portfolio or hedged the portfolio to the average portfolio, the upside from gas, which is primarily currently driving the prices, is somehow limited in the front years. Obviously, depending on the scarcity what comes, there may be some upside from price side in spreads. Please bear in mind, I mean, the current situation is very much driven by the current situation, and we need to see how much that really stays into the future. Thank you. Next question, please. Thank you. Thank you very much. Our next question comes from the line of Alberto Gandolfi from Goldman Sachs. Please go ahead. Hi, and good afternoon. Thank you for taking my question. The first one is to go back a little bit to this, REPowerEU, and particularly the German response to that. Could you tell us how much of the 50 gigawatts green net capacity by 2030, how much of that increase from, let's say, about 10 right now to 50 would be from Germany? So I'm just trying to figure out what the upside from a EUR 250 billion-EUR 300 billion potential investment plan in Germany. It seems to me you've put very little. I'm just trying to gauge what could be, you know, your extra EBITDA if you were to achieve, say, a 5%-10% market share, and if you think that 5%-10% market share could be reasonable, too high or too low, perhaps, if you have that, any thoughts about that. Thank you. The second question is on, you know, obviously, certain customers have already faced close to a 150% increase in power and gas bills. We are seeing Europe moving very quickly to guarantee greater consumer protection. In this context, do you think Germany might also implement a measure that could include a price cap or windfall taxes? If so, how many terawatt hours do you think over the next two years could you share with us how many terawatt hours might be exposed to merchants? Just to see what the risk could be. I think it's about a couple of terawatt hours in hydro, plus 25%-30% of your renewable portfolio. Would that be a fair assessment? Thank you so much. Alberto, on the first one, I don't wanna give you a gigawatt number. I mean, because we have not disclosed what our ambition plan for the 50 GW was. I share your view that we have put in very little because when we announced the Growing Green Strategy, that was before the government came with their acceleration plan in Germany. Also, I mean, our recent successes in offshore are beyond what we expected in the Growing Green Plan. Now speculating we can do 5 or 10 more. It also comes to the question, how do we finance it? Is it only gross? Net the same? Do we have more headroom there? I think it would be not diligent to throw out numbers now, and without a credible financing plan and what that means in terms of value. I mean, as we have clearly hinted in the presentation, which we have given, in the long run, we see more upside, clearly, from the achievements we have made over the last even weeks or months, but also from what we see as European and especially German policies. I also wanna highlight that we have not put in any value in the five in the Growing Green Plan from additional business from becoming a significant importer of green energy into Europe, into Germany. I see that definitely as an additional very attractive business in future, which will be, I mean, distributed, I mean, from scratch, right? Nobody is in that business today. On the consumer protection side, I think we clearly should expect measures, because the social consequences which will be felt over the next two, three years when we see the higher prices rolling into consumer bills will be significant. I mean, we are clearly against price caps because price caps are hindering free markets, and free markets, they do their job. I mean, as we currently see more LNG coming, consumers thinking about cutting their demand, which is all helpful to clear the market. Price caps should really be only the ultimate measure and probably only if physical markets break down. I think when you don't have enough physical supply and price signals don't do the trick anymore, then you can think about price caps, but not before that, because, I mean, then you lose the efficiencies of markets. I think then it becomes a question of reallocation of taxpayers' money and maybe even higher taxes. Across Europe, I think I definitely expect windfall taxes. Look, I mean, Germany is an import country. We import a lot of energy, so we are as a country suffering from the situation, so we don't have huge windfalls. I mean, you typically have windfalls when you have huge long positions in oil and gas or upstream positions, which is not the case here in Germany. Also for us closing nuclear, I mean, lignite is very little and under compensation framework. The renewables revenue, I mean, most of them have fixed tariffs. Even with the windfall taxes across Europe, I would say that the impact on us and our earnings is very, very limited. It would in the end only tax away upside, which comes above the guidance which we have given. Compared to our outlook, I don't see another risk. Markus, sorry. Would you allow me like a 10-second follow-up, if you don't mind? Sure. Just picking up on one sentence you said. Thank you so much. I mean, the world really turned upside down in two weeks. You know, I'm sure everyone on the call probably has 10, 15 very relevant questions. Just on what you said, you know, Germany is importing energy. The country is suffering. There are other windfalls. Long positions. Do you believe there is a debate? I'm not asking what you think because it could put you in a tough spot, but do you believe there is a debate out there not only to tax utilities, but to start thinking about taxing upstream oil and gas? I cannot comment on that. Understood. Thank you. I had to try. Thank you so much, and all the best. Thanks very much. Our next question comes from the line of Lidia Wierzbicka-Serwinowska from Société Générale. Please go ahead. Hi. Good afternoon. Lidia here. Two questions also from my side. The first one is on hedging, and I hope it's general enough, so you are able to answer it. How much of your hedging is now done OTC? I guess most companies are increasingly moving towards the OTC market in order to avoid what are quite punishing variation margin outflows. Is there enough liquidity in the OTC market, and is the overall market still functional? I mean, with the kind of prices we are seeing and the variation margin requirement from exchanges, it must be. Well, I wouldn't be surprised if overall liquidity is drying up. So any kind of comment you can make on mix of hedging exchanges versus OTC and liquidity on both. The second one is on a Bloomberg headline that appeared earlier, where you said that you might build provisions to cover risks for high energy prices. Could you elaborate on that a bit? Specifically, what risk are you referring to here? Because most business lines you seem to have, well, if anything, positive exposure. I just wonder what scenarios this need for potential provision might be referring to. Yeah, I mean, Lidia, thanks for the question. Let's start with the latter one. I'm not aware of a comment we made on any provisions for higher prices, so therefore, I can't comment on this one. The second question you raised or the first question you raised around OTC versus exchanges, that's indeed a very relevant question. I mean, the first element is around liquidity. I wouldn't say that we see limited liquidity because of people withdrawing from exchanges towards OTC. It's more that in these situations where you have huge moves, you typically see markets drying out. But that's equally true for OTC as for exchanges. Yeah. Plus, what we are seeing is that in those extreme scenarios, market participants are also driven by creating cash and not obviously by market perspective, and that obviously sometimes puts weird signals into the market. When you talk about OTC, I mean, yes, you are right. There is an opportunity to move some of the trades to OTC markets in order to avoid initial margins being posted. At the same time, you also have to be careful because, I mean, what you wanna have is somehow a balance. I mean, typically, when gas prices go up, power prices should also go up. If you take, for example, our position, I mean, when gas prices go up, we typically should have an inflow of variation margins while, when power prices go up, there's an outflow of variation margins. Ideally, what you wanna have is somehow a balance so that net at the end of the day, you don't have outflows. Therefore, when we optimize our portfolio and positions, it is also looking at the overall net position and how we are exposed to those net position. The same is actually also true when you talk about exchanges because, when initial margins are calculated, they also look at the exposure of the position, and therefore it's also important to have some netting or offsets in the positions you have at the various exchanges. Therefore it's a little bit more complex than just taking a product OTC to avoid variation or initial margin calls. Lidia, it's Markus. Sorry. I mean, it's good to have Thomas in quarantine with Corona because he was not able to send me the Bloomberg article you are referring to. I mean, I think they got it slightly wrong. We didn't say that we need to make provisions for high prices. I mean, the comment was more, what if we see that counterparties fail or declare force majeure and we don't get, they don't stick to the contract? There we said it could be, but to a very limited extent, of course, that will cause losses if people don't fulfill their contractual obligations. Yeah. Nothing to be worried about. Okay, it's just counterparty risk. That's great. Thanks. Can I just go back with one follow-up to Michael. Can you give us a rough idea of the split or what the percentage of OTC as a proportion of your overall hedges? No, Lidia, apologies, I can't comment on the exact split. You can't. Okay. You can try. Thank you. Thank you. Yeah, of course. Next question, please. Thank you very much. Our next question comes from the line of Peter Bisztyga from BofA Securities. Please go ahead. Yeah. Hi, it's Peter Bisztyga here. Two questions from me please. First one I think touches on a previous question. The European Commission mentioned that they will examine different market designs for the power market. You know, there was this ACER document from a few months ago, sort of that talks about potentially moving to average pricing. There's been stuff on potentially taking gas out of the merit order. I was just wondering if you have any views on how realistic it is that the European Commission could actually implement across all 27 member states a wholesale change to power markets or is the reality that we'll just stay as we are today. Just your sort of personal views on that would be interesting. Then the other one is, again, another sort of conceptual question, but you know, we've heard that there's already been a handful of ESG funds that seems to have done a very rapid U-turn on their willingness to invest in defense. I'm wondering if you've heard anything from your investors suggesting that a more relaxed approach to coal might be coming down the way given the social benefit of achieving energy independence in Europe. Again, just your personal view on that would be much appreciated. Yeah, Peter, I mean, we haven't heard anything about investing in coal. Maybe that's going too far. Let's call it investing or supporting security of supply. Maybe we're gonna see that, but I haven't heard about it. On the potential measures on European levels, I think going to average pricing is almost impossible. That would mean a full re-regulation, so an asset-regulated, asset-based type of model, which I think cannot be implemented. I wouldn't support it. Taking gas out of the merit order, that is maybe a bit easier, but I don't know what purpose it would serve. I think it's also more complicated. I think the only measure, the only real measure I can see, which is also discussed among the different governments, is getting a price cap on gas. If you run into very tight supply situations and have gas prices, let's say above EUR 150 per MWh, from which point price signals do not change the market because you attract as much energy as possible, and people try to save on gas as much as possible, that you limit that and that it cannot go to, let's say, EUR 200, 300, 400. But that's the only measure I think is feasible and makes sense. That's great. Just coming back on the sort of ESG question, it was more whether ESG investors, you know, would become more willing to own the shares of companies like RWE, despite the fact that they're invested in, you know, legacy coal, because you're contributing not just to the energy transition from renewables, but also now to, you know, Europe's security of supply and the social benefits there. You know, I realize you might not have an answer to that one. I mean, what you have seen is that there is a clear trend of less black and white views, but more supporting the transformation of companies. I mean, as we have seen with us being awarded the S&P Global Platts Global Energy Awards, which recognizes exactly that, I think that and also the clear statements from Larry Fink and the entire BlackRock investment universe behind it, that it's not about calling good or bad businesses good and bad companies, but more appropriate transformation and inappropriate transformation. We are clearly more the faster ones that could give us additional tailwind about what we do, but also about the valuation levels. Because in the end, what we want to achieve, we want to close the valuation gap between us and then other pure plays. Maybe the current situation can help that people accept, I mean, for a certain time, with clear commitments, still some coal business, and maybe in future, the bad stuff is more dependency on Russia, but not national independence. Great. Thank you, Markus. Thanks, Josh. Next question, please. Of course. The next question comes from the line of Sam Arie from UBS. Please go ahead. Hi, everybody. I'd just like to just start by acknowledging your opening statement, Markus, which I think was very, very well said. Onto questions. I have one on coal and one on carbon. I guess firstly on coal, I'm wondering if you have a view across Western Europe, how many additional sort of terawatt-hours of coal production we might be able to find in total this year? I've got some data on coal generation in Europe last year, around sort of 400-something terawatt-hours. I'm wondering if that could end up being 500 or maybe more this year. I'm not sure if you have an exact figure in your head, but basically I'd just love to hear any further comments on what you think are kind of spare production headroom is in coal across the European fleet. I guess on your assets too would be very interesting. Related to that, I can't help asking if you still think we should expect the EUR 500 million step down from 2022 to 2023 that you've been guiding for the coal nuclear business. Kind of a couple of general questions there on coal. Secondly, on carbon. I suppose I just wanted to ask if you think there's any coal production in Europe which currently could run but does not run because of where the carbon price is. I guess, do you think there is a case that we might see the carbon price somehow revisited, suspended, adjusted, at least in the power sector? Because I suppose one of two scenarios must be true. Either the carbon price is so high that it is keeping some useful coal currently off the system, or because of where the gas price is, it's not having any effect at all, in which case, what's it there for? And it's certainly contributing to higher prices overall. I'd just love to hear your general thoughts on those two topics, spare coal headroom and then what we do with the carbon price. Thank you. Let me start with the latter, and I come back to that at the end. At the current price levels, I think, the merit order is clear. Gas comes last. I mean, coal, especially hard coal, but also lignite runs, even at current carbon prices of close to EUR 80, because gas prices of EUR 100/MWh clearly make gas the least attractive fuel, including the carbon cost to produce, to generate. On the coal generation, I don't have any number, because currently everybody calculates not terawatt hours, but gas. How much gas can be saved by running more coal. We are also in discussions with the government. What is the objective? Is the objective to bring back usually to be closed coal capacity for reserve? To ensure that you have if we have problems with gas supply, at least not a problem in the power sector, so you only have to deal with the problem in the residential heating in some industry sectors. Or is the objective to start saving gas immediately, which would mean you need to run this capacity, which you bring back at more or less 5,000 hours a year? That would mean significant higher also hard coal demand for Europe. That would also mean significant higher carbon emission. You will start immediately saving natural gas. That decision has not been taken, if they want to save gas, that also means we run into a carbon crunch because there are not enough certificates. Probably we would need 50-100 million tons a year more. The decision is not taken and I think it is in the end a political decision. What they think is the likelihood of a gas supply cut from Russia or sanctioning it. I have no opinion on that. I mean, so far what we read and what we hear, they probably go more the reserve way, that they say, "We want to have that capacity in urgent situation available, but we don't ask you to start running it at 5,000 hours immediately to save gas. Thank you. Sam, does that answer your question? I feel like I want to follow up with 10 questions, but I guess that's not the forum today. I'll say thanks at that point, and leave it there. Yeah. The good thing then is, we're gonna find out over the next course of the week. It will be a very dynamic next, I think, two months. I think very dynamic on the carbon scheme, and I think on coal we'll definitely see, you know. Our number was maybe 250 terawatt hours of additional coal across Europe versus where we were a year ago. But let's see where it ends up. I mean, I don't wanna confirm the number, but please keep in mind that given the tight energy markets we are in, and also fuel markets, don't take the fuel supply as a given. You can easily run from a situation where you have no problems on gas anymore, but the hard coal situation is impossible to be met, right? The cap on our number was the seaborne coal trade, is how much coal can we get into Europe, so. Let's see, maybe we'll get more information in coming weeks. Thank you for your presentation today and all your answers are super helpful as always. Thanks very much, Sam. Just could we continue with the next question, please? Of course. The next question comes from the line of Wanda Serwinowska from Credit Suisse. Please go ahead. Hi. Good afternoon. Two quick questions from me. The first one is, there is a lot of discussion about the need to simplify the renewables permitting process and to accelerate the renewables build-out in Germany. Have you seen any significant progress in terms of the discussion with the government since November last year? Because that's the time when you got the CMD. My second question is on the coal exit in Germany. In the past, you stated that you expect the talks with the government in H1 2022. Is it fair to assume that any potential agreement on the accelerated coal exit, it could be delayed because of the current situation and the security of supply issues? I mean, on the first one, I can talk now in specific for Germany. We expect what they call the Easter Package, so it's maybe a surprise Easter egg for everybody, where they're gonna propose higher targets for renewable build-out, also making more seabed available for offshore, higher targets in terms of gigawatts. Also the entire path of accelerating planning and permitting processes and speeding up court proceedings. At least for Germany, we expect clarity by April, so within the next six weeks. I think given the situation we are in, the government is now willing to take even more harsh or propose more harsh interventions to speed it up. We hear the same from other European countries. On the coal exit side, yes, I mean, the plan was to discuss the 2030 plan now. We were prepared for that discussion. The week we wanted to start the discussion, the invasion of Ukraine happened. Of course, now we discuss ensuring security of supply, but the discussion around 2030 has stalled. I think the moment we are clear how we get through the next winter, and what happens with the Ukraine-Russian situation, how that evolves, when it is more stable, then we probably pick up the discussions again. In the end, the determining factor, whether we can achieve that or not, is the first question you had: where are we with accelerating the renewable build-out? I would probably add also diversification of gas supply and, infrastructure to import green energy in future. That are the determining factors to achieve a faster coal exit. I mean, we are definitely strategically up for that. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Our next question comes from the line of Deepa from Bernstein. Please go ahead. Thank you. I had two questions. The first one is a new one, and one is a follow-up to a previous question. First one on storage. I think the German government has said that they want to have 90 days of storage. Obviously, the cost of now filling up these storages has increased almost tenfold. Just wondering from a working capital perspective, what does this mean? I'm guessing, is there funding available? Because I presume I think for overall Europe, we are talking about EUR 200 billion somehow to be found to put into storages. Just any views for Germany and RWE on that. Second question, just to follow back on the questions on windfall taxes and hedging. I think in the EU paper, they clearly say that they will only apply windfall taxes to actual windfall profits, so not to any hedged volumes. I just wanted to go over the numbers, particularly, I think I lost some of the bits on the two-thirds converted for FY 2023. I was wondering if it is possible to clarify what is your unhedged exposure for 2022 and maybe 2023. You know, should that two-thirds conversion matter at all in the principle of not taxing windfalls if there is no profits? Yeah. Deepa, first one on the storage. If you look into the storage situation in the last years, you see that, I mean, usually the storages are even by market forces filled close to 90% before we go into the winter. The significant lower storage level was in the last year driven by certain behavior of individual players. These storages and storage contracts were owned by Russian parties. They did it here in Germany, but also partly in the Netherlands and Austria. The current legislation the government and the European Union will put in force is to ensure that this cannot happen again. If somebody misbehaves like that they can get access to the storages and cancel the storage contract. We are currently in intensive debate what is the best and cheapest and most efficient way to implement it. Whatever the implementation is, the impact on companies like us and others who behave market rational will be very limited in terms of working capital, and especially in terms of cost. We don't expect a huge consequence at all. On the windfall tax, before Michael comment on the hedging ratios, I think what is very positive is that the EU guide said it can only be implemented from the point of decision onwards and not retroactively. It excludes all hedged and sold out contracts. That also, I mean, when you know our policy and also the customer contracts we have long term, the impact will always be very, very limited on our business. Yes. I would fully underline and subscribe to what Markus said. I mean, if again on the numbers, renewables at 2022 above 80% and then 2023 above 70%, so almost hedged. On the conventional side, I think the key aspect is that, converting our portfolio in an equivalent portfolio or an average portfolio in the country is also already completed for 2022 and 2023, and that is the aspect that could potentially increase earnings. Therefore the impact of higher gas prices won't be there on our portfolio for 2022 and 2023. Therefore, I would also say on the conventional side, the impact of price increases is fairly limited and therefore also the risk of withholding taxes or windfall taxes. Just a follow-up. In your renewables, there's quite a lot of generation also which is merchant in the U.S., right? Are these numbers for these and the 15 terawatt? Could you just say what is the European volume within that? Because I'm guessing the U.S. isn't gonna really put any wind farm. When you talk about, I think roughly 15 terawatts, and you can assume six to seven of that is U.S. and the rest is Europe. Okay. Thank you. Thanks. Next question, please. Of course. The next question comes from the line of Louis Boujard from Oddo BHF. Please go ahead. Yes. Hi, good afternoon. Thank you very much for taking my question. Maybe the first one would be regarding the agenda, and more specifically the political agenda in Germany. We see that there is willingness to speed up into the renewable developments for very good reasons. According to you, what would be a normal timing agenda to put into legislation the willingness to get rid of some hurdles in the renewables development and to set new targets? Are we talking about a few months here? Are we talking about something like one year or even a bit more than that, so that we can see where it could eventually trigger for you a decision to indeed speed up the investments and update your assumptions in the mid to long term? My second question would be, maybe still on the renewables since a lot of questions have been asked already about clawback and gas, and maybe more specifically in the corporate PPA market. Considering the current situation, do you see the market as frozen, or do you see the market as completely booming with very significant potential for further growth on this field with very high power market prices at this stage? Thank you very much. Thank you. I mean, when it comes to Germany, the government is presenting the legislative proposals around Easter time. If it follows a normal course of business, I think implementation will take until late summer, maybe autumn, and then it is effective end of the year. It will take maybe another two years before you see the first effects. The first relevant effects, it's maybe the second half of the decade. It has long lead times. I mean, they are also looking into a quick win, so to potentially move all the capacity which is currently in the permitting process through it faster. That is, of course, limited. The PPA market is very active, and we see very good prices, also request for long-term contracts. Yeah, I mean, situation is better than it has been 6-9 months ago. Yeah, too early to see whether that is for a longer time or only driven by the current crisis situation. The market is clearly there. I mean, I can tell you I've never had so much senior requests to discuss sourcing green energy like I had in the last two months. Okay. Very interesting. Thank you very much. Thank you. Our next question comes from the line of Piotr from Citi. Please go ahead. Hi, good afternoon. Thank you for taking my questions. I have two questions, please. The first one, I wanted to come back to the lignite profitability in light of what the market has done, so CO2 going down and gas prices going up. 'Cause, yeah, remember from the history, you've always guided to a cap of EUR 200 million contribution from lignite from 2023 onwards. Is there any possibility that this number goes higher? Do you have some flexibility around the volumes, and what's the limiting factor there on the volumes and on the margin? The second question, I wanted to follow up on this OCGT plant that you're building in Biblis. Can you please explain what type of returns are you getting and what's the framework there? Yeah. Let's start with the OCGT. As I said, that is a regulated income, so that was an auction where the grid operator auctions capacity, so that capacity, once it's built, will be operated by the grid operator himself and also dispatched. I mean, you know that the IRRs that we guided for flexible generation at the capital market day was between 6% and 11%. Obviously the OCGT is also in that range. To be fair, it is an attractive project. Secondly, around the lignite profitability, I mean, I would still stick to the current guided range. Because like Markus said, I mean, in case we would be requested by the government to run additional capacity, that would be more on a kind of cost base or something similar. Nothing where we then would capture a big upside from current market prices. Just to follow up on this one, what do we see on your balance sheet is this big movement of the CO2 reserve that you have, that you entered into this position years ago to basically lock in the value of a lignite asset, right, to hedge the exposure there. Why is it that on the kind of an asset side on lignite, you never change the outlook for the division, even though you kind of delivered the balance sheet through the rise of CO2 over the last two years? Well, look, the CO2 we always communicated this is a hedge. What you obviously have seen with increasing CO2 prices, the margin of our lignite generation has suffered significantly. The CO2 hedge is exactly put in place so that when you have increasing CO2 prices, some of that is passed through to the power price, and the element that is not passed through, that should be covered by the positive mark to market development of that CO2 hedge. Therefore, you should assume that to be a hedge for the longer term. Let me make a comment to that, Piotr. I think your question is absolutely right. If the current market situation continues, there is maybe upside. I mean, for the value of the group and our strategic priorities, that has not a huge relevance. I mean, for us, I mean, how we see the lignite business is, we're gonna run it as long as it is needed for security of supply reasons in very close alignment with the government. If we can achieve an earlier closure, we achieve an earlier closure. If we find structural solutions, we find structural solutions. It's not about, I mean, making 50% more of what we have guided. That is not what is driving the value of RWE. The value is driven by our core business, by our green transformation and the investment program we have there. Okay. Thank you very much. Thanks so much. Thank you. Thank you very much. Our next question comes from the line of Olly Jeffery from Deutsche Bank. Please go ahead. Thank you. Good afternoon. A couple of questions, please. The first one is going back to your exposure to Russian counterparties regarding gas and coal. Can you explain a bit further about in the worst-case scenario where supplies are turned off, on how much of that you think you might be able to claim force majeure, or is that not possible or too early to say? Just trying to understand what the ultimate liability exposure really is. That's the first question. The second one is on two unrelated things to Russia. One is recently in New York Bight, where you guys have been successful, just your views on the pricing there and the prices paid. Was that kind of at the top end of what were you willing to pay and therefore we should consider expected returns there to be rather limited yet meeting your minimum criteria? The last question is on the EU ruling on mining compensation. You know, we've been waiting to hear that for quite a while. I presume that's kind of gonna be kicked into touch for the immediate future given everything that's happened. What's your expectation on that as well? Thank you very much. Ollie, what was the last one on the state aid approval? Okay, good. Mike is nodding. First on the Russian exposure, I mean, we should not speculate on what could happen. I mean, we are actively managing the exposure. We of course look also into potential scenarios to be best prepared what scenario will in the end come true. Of course, if it's a force majeure thing, then we could partly pass it on to our customers. But I think we are here in somewhere in total new territory. I don't wanna speculate on that. I mean, if you take the message that our Russian exposure is very limited, we actively try to reduce it as fast as possible. We don't enter into any new one. We are not reliant on that for fuel supply for our customers or our own assets. Whatever happens, I think we think that whatever the outcome is even not very nice one, it is absolutely manageable for the company. On New York Bight, I mean, please don't force me to tell you whether we are at the lower, mid, or upper range. We don't wanna give competitive sensitive information. I can tell you we are very pleased with the outcome when it comes to absolute prices, but we are also very pleased when it comes to relative prices, what we paid for this highly attractive site compared to the prices for others. I mean, we were already after the invasion of the Ukraine, but the U.S. team here, which is a bit more distant, had a nice evening and celebration after the results came out. The last one on state aid. One thing is clear, whatever we do on our lignite portfolio, it will be very difficult to move and change the plan before we have clarity on the state aid. I think it would be good if that can be accelerated because otherwise our hands are tied, even in supporting the government on other measures. The problem is that DG Comp in Brussels has so many state aid approvals now also stemming from the crisis before Christmas but also from this extra crisis that their desk is so full. Let's see what we can or what the German government can achieve in terms of timing there. We have no clear expectation when we expect a result. Thanks very much. Bye bye. Thank you. Our next question comes from the line of Ahmed Farman from Jefferies. Please go ahead. Yes. Hi, and thank you for taking the question to from my side. I actually first wanted to ask you about your long-term Russian gas contract, which you sort of referred to in the annual report. It does seem like in the past you've been able to manage the price risk. I just wanted to just understand how sales contracting has worked on that contract in the past, and anything you can say about sort of earnings contribution of that contract, that would be helpful. So anything on minimum take or pay volumes. But then my second question is actually on your net debt slide. Just looking at it, I just sort of wonder if you could say anything about how, you know, how relevant the sort of variation margin is in the context of when rating agencies assess your credit metrics or when you look at, you know, your investment capacity. You know, is this also bankable, fungible, or is this sort of seen as a pass-through reversible item? Thank you. Ahmed, Mark, Michael will take the latter question. Let me comment on the gas supply contract. I cannot comment on, I mean, detailed commercial terms because this contract was also, as you know, subject to arbitration in the past. We have not received any deliveries under this contract for quite a long time. The contract is currently also not delivering, without going into the details, but we don't expect that this contract will become a risk for us at all, not in terms of physical delivery, not in terms of commercial consequences. It's for us, like non-existent. Yeah. Coming back to your question on variation margin and the impact on net debt, I mean, obviously we don't share with you the exact roll-off profiles, but we obviously have them internally. I mean, if you look at the three categories, I mean, the variation margins for trading, obviously they can quickly change depending on the position. That's more difficult also for us to predict. On hedging and especially on CO2, obviously we have a clearer view on the roll-off. Therefore, when we look at our headroom for investing, we obviously incorporate that into our net debt. Clearly the margin inflow we got from CO2 has provided us with some additional headroom in the front years to invest into. That's clear. That's actually also the benefit because it helps us to invest more upfront. These upfront investments should then bring up EBITDA and FFO, and therefore help us in the later half of this decade to have more headroom then to continue investing. Very clear. Thank you. The next question, please. Of course. The next question comes from the line of Nadia Al Mehairi from ADIA. Please go ahead. Hi. Thank you for this meeting. It's just a follow-up question on Lueder's question and referring to the same article in Bloomberg. RWE will be forced to buy gas, I guess, from the market at a high power price if Russia to stop the supply. I believe the contracts are not current contract. I think they are 2023 contracts. If you can please give us more colors on this contract in terms of capacity and financial impact there would be any. Thank you. Yes, we do it again, but I cannot convey new information. I mean, it's 15 TWh of gas, 15% to be delivered over the next 12 months. Please keep in mind, it's 15 TWh in total, not per year. 12 million tons of coal, two million to be delivered over the next 12 months. I think this is very limited exposure, but of course, the mechanism, if this contract is not fulfilled, is of course that we have obligations to our customers here. The question is whether we can also declare force majeure. That depends on what kind of contract we have with our off-takers, and how that is being settled. Of course, what is the price level in case you need to buy in the market? The additional question is, I mean, as I have already said, we are actively managing the exposure. Without going into further detail, it is irrelevant, but not too relevant exposure. We think whatever the outcome is over the next course of the month, it is clearly manageable for the company. We leave it there. Thank you. Being conscious of time, we have reached now the end of the call. If you have follow-up questions, the entire IR team is at your disposal. Thank you very much and have a good rest of the day. Take care and speak soon. Bye-bye. Thank you very much for joining today's call. You may now disconnect your handsets.