Dear ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Analyst and Investor Conference Call of Uniper. At our customer's request, this conference will be recorded. As a reminder, all participants will be in a listen-only mode. After the presentation, there will be an opportunity to ask questions. If any participant has difficulty hearing the conference, please press star key followed by zero on your telephone for operator assistance. May I now hand you over to Stefan Jost, EVP Group Finance and Investor Relations, who will start the meeting today. Please go ahead. Good morning, dear Analysts and Investors. A warm welcome to the Uniper Interim Results Call for the first half of fiscal year 2022. I am sitting here with our Chief Financial Officer, Tiina Tuomela, who will take you through the interim results presentation today, starting with a brief summary of the highlights and then commenting on the key financials. As usual, there will be a Q&A session after the presentation. Tiina, please. Thank you very much, Stefan. A warm welcome also from my side. Thank you for participating in our conference call today. Looking back over the past month, it is clear that the year 2022 will mark a fundamental turning point for the European energy system. Uniper, as one of the largest European importers of Russian gas, is massively affected by this paradigm shift. Since 14th of June or already 64 days ago, Gazprom has reduced its deliveries of Russian gas significantly below contracted volumes. This development resulted in enormous financial challenges for Uniper, which ultimately led to the need for a government-backed stabilization package. In today's conference call, I would like to focus on Uniper's financial situation. Starting with operating earnings. Here, the Russian gas containment had already quite a sizable impact in the first half of the year. This significantly weakened the planned increase in earnings in the second quarter of fiscal year 2022. Nevertheless, the Uniper group achieved an Adjusted EBIT of EUR 265 million in the isolated second quarter, significantly higher than the comparable prior year figure. Q2 earnings were supported by catch-up effects from gas optimization. Also, European Generation delivered a solid underlying result, albeit shaded by a high negative carbon phasing effect. A higher than planned earnings contribution from Unipro came on top. Despite the solid performance of isolated Q2, adjusted group EBIT ended up in a negative territory of -EUR 564 million at the half year mark due to the already quite negative first quarter. Adjusted Net Income turned out better than Adjusted EBIT, with a loss of EUR 359 million. Uniper already withdrew its earnings outlook for 2022 at the end of June due to the uncertainty surrounding gas restriction and gas prices. This uncertainty prevails. I will not issue a new earnings outlook for the full year today. What is clear is that Russian gas constraint will lead to record losses in the third quarter as well as for the full year. As of October 1st, the German government will enable gas importers, including Uniper, to pass 90% of the replacement procurement cost for the missing Russian volumes to the final gas customer. This cost, as such, will be implemented via a general surcharge of around EUR 4.4, 0.024 per kWh, set on Monday by the market area manager, Trading Hub Europe. This will dramatically reduce Uniper's losses from Q4 onwards. Overall, we must now classify fiscal years 2022 and 2023 as transition years. For 2024, we see light at the end of the tunnel. The funding from the stabilization package, a structural reshaping of Uniper's gas portfolio, and expected strongly reviving operating cash flows are the decisive building blocks for giving Uniper a long-term business perspective again. When it comes to the stabilization package, the signing of the term sheet was an important milestone, but we have still quite some work ahead of us. I will come to this in a bit. Before I do, I would like to share with you some thoughts on Uniper's positioning in a very challenging gas market environment. European gas prices increased significantly over the last 12 months. This is the result of a change in Gazprom gas supply strategy for Europe. This became apparent as early as 2021 when we were already seeing lower supply volumes and fill levels in Gazprom's German storage facilities. This strategy developed into a political weapon in the course of 2022. At just under 70 million cubic meters per day, Gazprom currently supplies only around 8% of the total natural gas flowing to Northwestern Europe. This is drastically less compared to spring of 2022, where the market share was still around 20% or up to 250 MCM per day. A major part of the gap is now covered by LNG. At about 200 MCM per day, many LNG regasification terminals in Northwestern Europe are operating close to their capacity limits. New LNG import capacity is strongly needed. Germany should be able to commission a first floating regasification terminal in Wilhelmshaven with significant participation from Uniper by the end of this gas winter season. The first FSRU has a capacity of 7.5 BCM per year, which corresponds to 8% of Germany's annual consumption. It should be mentioned that decisions still have to be made to back up the regasification capacity additions with LNG supply. Here, Europe is competing on a global scale with other regions of the world for LNG supply that cannot be increased in the short term. Looking at gas storages, Europe is currently well on track to reach the short-term interim target of around 70%-75% as of September first. However, at least in the case of Germany, it will be challenging to reach the 95% filling level as of November 1st, given the current gas curtailment situation. Demand reduction seems to be inevitable. While industry has already reduced its gas consumption around 14% until the end of July, private households have so far saw little demand reduction, also because they are not yet fully exposed to the current market prices. According to the recent statement by the German regulator, households will be also required to save at least 20% in order to stabilize the system amidst the latest drop in Russian gas volumes. Discussed measures include regulation that would only permit the heating of individual rooms. When it comes to the current situation of Uniper, we have been significantly affected by the reduction in Russian gas flows. Mid-June, Gazprom cut the supply volumes to only 40% of the contractual volumes. Since end of July, the volumes have even dropped further to now only 20% of the committed gas flow. Combined with the increase in the spot gas prices, the economic loss related to the reprocurement of the volumes has increased significantly over time. At the half-year point, the operating loss from Russian gas supply curtailments amounted to roughly EUR 400 million. As of today, August 17th, the operating losses related to the shortfall in Russian gas have increased already roughly to EUR 3.8 billion and continue to grow with a run rate about EUR 100 million per day mark. The corresponding effect on our liquidity and equity position have been addressed in the governmental financing stabilization package. On July 22nd, 2024, the German government and Uniper signed the term sheet for a stabilization package to address the financial impact from Russian gas curtailment and to allow Uniper to continue operation as a system-relevant energy supplier. The package consists of three interlinked pillars. Let's go through one- by- one and see where we stand today. The first pillar aims at limiting Uniper's ongoing financial drain by implementing a mechanism which allows Uniper to pass on 90% of its losses based on the Section 26 of the German Energy Security Act, under which the higher cost of reprocurement will ultimately be borne equally by all gas customers in Germany. Over the last weeks, German authorities have finalized the corresponding ordinance that further specifies the elements of that mechanism. The ordinance provides that the cost pass-through rule will be effective from October 1st, 2022 until April 1st, 2024. For Uniper, this means that we will continue to work on a structural reorganization of Uniper's gas portfolio, particularly with respect to the Gazprom LTC contracts, in order to structurally de-risk our portfolio with regard to Russian curtailment risks. The second pillar of the stabilization package aimed at securing short-term liquidity by increasing the existing KfW credit facilities from previously EUR 2 billion to now EUR 9 billion. The package is primarily intended as interim financing until new equity as well as equity-like instruments from a rating perspective are injected. The current liquidity situation is significantly impacted by losses from gas curtailments. More so recently, we have had to turn increasingly to the exchanges to reprocure gas volumes where transactions are immediately cash settled. When it comes to the margining, net margining paid increased moderately from EUR 4.5 billion at the Q1 stage to EUR 4.8 billion as of June 30. However, as Nordic prices spiked after the H1 cut-off date, net margining has increased above EUR 6 billion as of today. Over the last weeks, we have successfully implemented the extension of the KfW credit line and have now access to the full amount. Given the rising liquidity needs, we have partly utilized the additional headroom. As we speak, we have drawn EUR 5 billion from the EUR 9 billion KfW credit line. We expect to further increase the utilization over the next weeks until all elements of the stabilization package are in place. Coming to the third pillar, straight equity and equity-like instruments in the total amount of up to EUR 8 billion. Additionally, if losses from gas curtailments that cannot be offset by operating profits from Uniper's other businesses exceed EUR 7 billion, the German government stands ready for further support. This backstop mechanism is supposed to happen in a way that is not further dilutive to existing shareholders. As you know, the new equity is to be used to reduce KfW loan drawdowns. This equity injected by the state is essential for securing Uniper's investment grade rating. The fact that S&P Global meanwhile affirmed Uniper's BBB- investment grade rating underlies the effectiveness of the stabilization package. Due to the strong governmental support, including the 30% equity stake in Uniper, S&P considers Uniper now a government-related entity. This status has enabled Uniper to retain its investment grade rating despite an overall weaker standalone credit quality. The current triple B minus rating comes with the outlook negative, reflecting the fact that details of the stabilization package are still to be approved, as well as prevailing uncertainty surrounding gas flows, which in S&P's view may necessitate an increase of the government package. Talking about the next steps, we are now in discussion with the government to agree and specify the individual elements of the term sheet, such as interest rate, duration of the facilities, implementation of the backstop clause, as well as the exact conversion mechanism of the mandatory convertible instrument. An extraordinary general meeting will be held to approve the planned equity measures. We are currently aiming to hold the EGM in the fourth quarter. However, the date of the extraordinary general meeting depends on the outcome of the EU state aid proceedings. As soon as we have sufficient certainty, we will be able to send out the invitation to the EGM. The signing of the term sheet on the stabilization package was a very important milestone for Uniper, and now there is still a lot of work ahead of us in the coming weeks to conclude a fully-fledged agreement. Let's now focus on Uniper's operating business in the first six months of 2022. Let's move on to the development of our main operating indicators during the first half of 2022, which directly reflect the extraordinary environment in which we are currently operating. As usual, we will start with an overview of our physical gas storage levels on the left side. The continuing supply disruptions of Russian gas since 14 June forced Uniper to utilize its flexible gas storage portfolio to mitigate further shortfall losses. Accordingly, reduced filling rates and partial withdrawals led to filling levels of 48% at the end of June. Despite further supply cuts by Gazprom, Uniper was able to resume storage injections since the first half year reporting date. Over to the breakdown of generation volumes in our European Generation segment. We can observe an overall flat development year-on-year as production increases in Hydro and coal are offset by shortfalls in gas and nuclear. However, it should be noted that the coal segment was able to fully compensate for the volume shortfalls related to the disposal of Schkopau lignite-fired power plant at the end of the Q3 2021, as well as regulatory generation restriction affecting the Dutch Maasvlakte 3 power plant. Hydro volume slightly increased by 3% following improved inflows in Sweden due to higher precipitation and snow melting. An unavailability of our Oskarshamn power plant unit 3 in February 2022 led to a minor production decrease of 3% in the Swedish nuclear fleet compared to previous year. Meanwhile, European fossil generation shows only a slight overall increase of 2% compared to the first six months in 2021, with gas-fired power production down 3%, while coal increased by 7%. This is a direct result of the current tight market condition. European wholesale gas prices continue to surge to new record highs benefiting a fuel switch from gas to coal, a trend which we have already discussed in our annual result for 2021, and now being further fueled by the Russo-Ukrainian war. Gas-fired volumes in our U.K. business have been additionally impacted by an unplanned outage due to a storm damage in our Grain power plant unit 7 back in February 2022. The segment Russian Power Generation shows a material increase of around 17%. This positive development can be attributed mostly to three factors. Firstly, the recovered and still growing domestic electricity consumption. Second, decreasing Hydro generation in Siberia benefiting the utilization of the Berezovskaya power plant. Thirdly, the full contribution of Berezovskaya unit 3, which returned to service in May 2021. Unsurprisingly, the strong increase in fossil-fired power generation in our Russian business also impacts our group-wide carbon emissions, which increased by 12% year-on-year. At the same time, emissions for the isolated European Generation segment actually decreased by 7%. This reflects the successful replacement and phase out of less efficient coal power plants. Our specific carbon intensity increased in the first six months of 2022 to around 489 grams CO2 per kWh compared to the previous year, which can also be explained by the higher utilization of coal units in Russia. Let's move on to the financial KPIs for H1. Overall, looking at Uniper's financials after the first six months, we see, as expected, a significant decrease in the key metrics. However, there are three important messages around those figures. First, as highlighted earlier, the major risks to Uniper's earnings and liquidity has been addressed with the support of the German government. Second, the underlying business arising from the Russian long-term gas contract is sound. This might not be visible at first sight, but we will get to the underlying business drivers in a bit. Third, unprecedented high prices in combination with extreme market volatility have a strong impact on operating cash flows and net debt. Having said that, let's take a closer look at the KPIs on this chart. Uniper's Adjusted EBIT is negative by almost EUR 600 billion, and thereby down by more than EUR 1.1 billion in a year-on-year comparison. However, we experienced a strong isolated Q2 with a positive Adjusted EBIT of roughly EUR 270 million, which is around EUR 420 million higher than the last year's second quarter. Due to somewhat increased depreciation, the negative swing year-on-year is slightly more pronounced for the Adjusted EBIT than it is for the Adjusted EBITda. The Adjusted Net Income generally followed the EBIT development but decreased only by roughly EUR 840 million year-on-year. The ANI was positively impacted by lower taxes and re-measurement of provisions for Hydro assets according to the higher interest environment. Nevertheless, the absence of interest income from Nord Stream 2 somewhat offset those positive effects. The reported IFRS net income shows a loss of more than EUR 12.3 billion. Already since Q3 2021, Uniper is experiencing a substantial divergence between the Adjusted Net Income and the reported IFRS net income. Overall, there are three key drivers that led to this very significant gap between reported and adjusted earnings. I will come to this later. The highly negative IFRS net income consequently also leads to an equity deficit of EUR 4.5 billion as per end of the first half year, 2022. Moving on, the operating cash flow amounts to -EUR 2.2 billion. Finally, the economic net debt ends up at around EUR 2.1 billion, which is EUR 1.7 billion higher in comparison to the year-end 2021. As usual, we will now continue with a more detailed view on the key metrics, starting with the Adjusted EBIT on the next slide. This chart highlights the key components of the year-on-year development of the Adjusted EBIT. The overall delta for the first half year is significantly negative with -EUR 1.1 billion. The main driver being the losses related to Russian gas curtailment. On June 14th, Gazprom decreased gas flows to Germany via Nord Stream 1. Two days later, the curtailments grew to a level of 60%. Uniper needed to re-procure the missing volumes at significantly higher prices in the spot market in order to supply its customers. As mentioned before, the total number at the H1 stage amounts to roughly EUR 400 million. The second largest driver year-over-year is the well-known carbon phasing effect. Even though CO2 prices have stabilized in 2022, they were still considerably higher compared to H1 2021. This led to significantly higher CO2 provisions at the H1 stage. This is a temporary intra-year effect that will, once again, fully reverse in Q4. As CO2 prices increase, we have to increase our CO2 provisions, leading to higher expenses within the year. Economically, we have hedged our CO2 exposure, but the offsetting gains on our hedges are not recognized within Adjusted EBIT until the hedge deal settle, which is in Q4. Given the increase in CO2 prices, the CO2 phasing effect reached EUR 400 million in absolute terms, which is about EUR 250 million more than one year ago. The gas curtailment and CO2 phasing effects amount to already roughly EUR 650 million in total. I explain more than 50% of the recorded earnings decline. With those two last effects out of the way, let's have a closer look at the underlying business. European fossil generation is down roughly EUR 160 million year-on-year, driven by disposal of our last European lignite assets, Schkopau, at the end of Q3 2021. Higher procurement costs and lower quality related to the replacement of Russian coal. Lower U.K. capacity income from decreased auction results in the current period. Higher optimization results, especially from favorable clean dark spreads in Germany and higher clean spark spread in U.K., were largely offset by a higher depreciation in 2022 as a result of write-ups for our fossil fleet at the year-end 2021. In our outright generation business, results are down by roughly EUR 70 million year-over-year versus prior year. In the Nordics, our assets mainly suffered from significantly lower achieved prices driven by deteriorating EPADs, i.e., Electricity Price Area Differentials. Those reflect the differential between Nordic system price and the price in the corresponding delivery zones. Due to limited market liquidity, the exposure towards EPADs cannot effectively be hedged. Especially in the Sandefjord area or SE2 area, where Uniper's Nordic Hydro assets are located, EPADs have reached historic lows driven by oversupply and contested grid connections. This development resulted ultimately in significantly lower average achieved prices for our Nordic outright portfolio. On a very positive note, our German Hydro assets are performing very well, despite slightly lower Hydro volumes and buybacks of hedged volumes caused by lower precipitation. Uniper's German Hydro assets benefited from the generally positive power price development and higher spreads for pumped storage power units. After having separated the effects from gas curtailments, let's have a closer look at the underlying performance in the gas midstream business. Without the curtailment effect, the contribution from the gas midstream business would have amounted to roughly EUR 120 million after six months, which is about EUR 100 million lower than the performance last year. If you remember, in Q1, we saw here a negative year-on-year deviation of EUR 1.2 billion. Back then, we had highlighted that this would be only a temporary margin shift driven by the way how we optimize our storages. We can conclude that the backswing has materialized at the H1 stage. Next, the Global Commodities business, which is down by nearly EUR 200 million versus prior year after a very strong previous year when our U.S. and LNG business strongly benefited from volatile market developments during extreme weather events in the first quarter of 2021. With regards to our LNG business, as you know, there was an explosion at the Freeport LNG liquefaction facility in the U.S. Due to the explosion, LNG offtakes have been fully stopped until October. Afterwards, the operation will only partly be resumed until year-end. As we have long-term LNG offtake agreement with Freeport LNG, our cargoes will be impacted as well. However, at the H1 stage, no cargoes were yet affected. Hence, there is no financial impact visible yet. When it comes to our Russian Power Generation, we see a very strong performance with an increase in earnings by more than EUR 80 million versus prior year. The business benefited from higher utilization of the fossil fleet and significantly higher day-ahead market prices, especially in the Siberian price zone, as Hydro generation decreased, while energy consumption increased with the commissioning of an aluminum smelter. Furthermore, [inaudible] 3's CSA capacity payments contributed fully to this year's earnings after its commissioning in May 2021, which overcompensated for the transfer of units 7 and 8 of the power plant Surgutskaya from the CSA scheme to the lower remunerated COM scheme. Additionally, the current ruble development supported the earnings by around EUR 10 billion. Finally, the other category, which amounts to roughly EUR -50 million year-on-year, and summarizes for the most part consolidation effects. Over to the reported net income breakdown. Usually, we focus on the adjusted KPIs in our financial communication in order to clarify the underlying operating drivers. However, given the very extraordinary negative amount of around EUR 12 billion and the underlying components, it is also important to understand the drivers of the unadjusted IFRS net income to avoid misinterpretations. In total, there are three highly negative effects at play. First, the expected losses related to Russian gas curtailment for future delivery periods are already reflected within the non-operating earnings as the mark-to-market from the corresponding hedge deals is, to a large degree, no longer offset by positive mark-to-market values related to Russian LTC gas. The corresponding amount of EUR 6.5 billion has been determined in accordance with IFRS rules as of 30 June and is based on the set of scenarios. Those losses will realize within adjusted earnings at the time when the deliveries actually take place. Second, net impairments in the amount of almost EUR 2.7 billion related to Russian invasion and the gas curtailments. This figure includes the full impairment of the Nord Stream 2 loan and the impairment of the goodwill, as well as the assets in Uniper in the light of revised country risk premia, as well as lower growth assumptions for Russia at the end of Q1. In Q2, also a full impairment of goodwill within the segment Global Commodities was recognized. The latter is fully related to the non-performance under the gas from LTCs, which also led to a corresponding growth rate decrease from 1% to 0.5%. Third, like in the previous quarters, the IFRS net income is suffering from an asymmetric accounting treatment of hedges and underlying assets. As commodity prices have increased, the mark-to-market values of our sales hedge position have significantly decreased, which is reflected in IFRS net income. However, the corresponding appreciation of the underlying assets, like inventories and power plants, is not reflected within IFRS net income as those assets are capped at historical costs under IFRS. Therefore, the corresponding value gains from the underlying assets are not recognized until the assets go into the delivery. If prices decrease or at the latest once the delivery takes place, this mismatch is resolved. Finally, there is an offsetting positive effect that is primarily driven by tax effects on the non-operating losses. Hence, in a nutshell, the -EUR 12 billion in IFRS net income are driven by effects that either have been already anticipated, i.e., the potential economic impacts from the gas curtailments and the impacts done in the light of Russian energy crisis, or are not reflecting the economic situation of Uniper, i.e., the already familiar IFRS accounting mismatch when it comes to valuation and hedges and our underlying assets. Next slide addresses the operating cash flow development. The operating cash flow after interest and taxes amounted to roughly -EUR 2.2 billion after six months or almost EUR 2.6 billion lower than last year at this point of time. As mentioned in the full year call, Uniper implemented measures that improved OCF in Q4 2021 by approximately EUR 2 billion in order to ensure liquidity for margining requirements in an already extreme market environment. This led to an extraordinary high operating cash flow of EUR 3.6 billion. At the year end 2021, which will burden the cash flow rates for 2022 and 2023 as expected. Looking at the reconciliation of Adjusted EBIT to operating cash flow, it becomes clear that there are, besides the already discussed operational development, two categories driving the overall OCF development. First, the item other, with an amount of around - EUR 800 million. This category records primarily all CO2-related provision and working capital movements. The high negative effects reflect one of the main cash steering measures around year 2021, the postponement of payment for CO2 certificates from Q4 2021 into Q1 2022. Accordingly, the OCF in 2022 is burdened by roughly EUR 1 billion from this measure. However, this effect is partly offset by a high CO2 provision build-up in the first six months of 2022, which is burdening the Adjusted EBIT, but not the cash flow, and is therefore positively reflected in that category. Second, changes in working capital with as well around -EUR 800 million. This category summarize all movements in our inventories as well as in operating receivables and liabilities. In the first half year of 2022, this category is primarily driven by inventory movement from the ordinary business, like injection of gas in our storages and the build-up of coal inventories, in both cases, at elevated price levels. Next, the development of the economic net debt. After six months of 2022, the economic net debt stands at EUR 2.1 billion, which is about EUR 1.7 billion higher compared to the beginning of the year. Obviously, the main driver here is the negative operating cash flow of - EUR 2.2 billion, which is overcompensating the main positive impact stemming from lower provision for pensions. Since the beginning of the year, inflation rates have increased to levels not seen in decades. Accordingly, central banks replied by significantly increasing interest rates. Rates used for pension measurements moved in Germany from 1.2% at the year end, now 3.4%, and in the U.K. from 2% to 4.1% respectively. Due to those higher discount rates, pension provision decreased by roughly EUR 600 million. Net provision for asset retirement obligation, on the other hand, increased by around EUR 100 million. This was driven by an increase in the value of Uniper's Swedish nuclear waste fund, so-called KAF assets, due to downward trends in stock and bond markets during the first half of the year. Now the final slide of the day, where we would like to give you at least some flavor around future earnings prospects. Even though it might seem far away, it is not too long ago that Uniper concluded 2021 as one of its strongest fiscal years. Back then, we expected 2022 to turn out in a similar fashion. However, as a consequence of the gas curtailments, and due to the resulting uncertainty, Uniper had to withdraw its 2022 financial guidance end of June. How to think of 2022 now? When we had communicated the stabilization package on July 22, we had disclosed that the expected curtailment losses based on certain assumptions until October 1 would already exceed EUR 6 billion. As you know, even in good years, Uniper's other business cannot fill this gap. Furthermore, even though one can expect certain parts of our business, such as the dark spread portfolio, to develop positively in the market environment of 2022, there will be also negative impacts, i.e., related to already mentioned Freeport fire that will significantly affect our LNG business. Having said that, there will be no new earnings guidance given today. However, based on the public information, it should be quite clear that Uniper will probably face a substantial loss between a mid- to high-single-digit billion EUR figure when it comes to the operating earnings for 2022. Looking at 2023, the picture will improve significantly. With the 90% cost pass-through mechanism being in full swing and an overall less severe gap between gas sales prices and re-procurement costs, Uniper should be able to take a material step towards positive territory. However, as Uniper still has to bear 10% of the incurred containment costs, the break-even point will most likely not to be reached until 2024. When it comes to the year 2024, it is expected that the cost pass-through will end after April 1. However, due to the fact that only a small fraction of gas volumes has already been hedged for 2024, this year is more like a blank canvas for the future setup of Uniper's gas business. It is clear that we cannot continue to apply the same concept that have been beneficial for us and our customers throughout the past years. Therefore, we are currently working intensively on redesigning the way how we run our gas midstream portfolio in order to fully mitigate gas curtailment risk going forward. This will have an impact on how we market our gas volumes to customers and therefore shape the future gas system of Germany. Hence, there is ample work ahead of us, but Uniper is ready to take responsibility in reshaping the future gas system. This brings me to the end of my presentation today. Now I'm looking forward to taking your questions. Stefan, please? Thank you, Tiina. We are opening the Q&A session now. Dear investors and analysts, as usual, please limit yourself to two questions each. Operator, the first question, please. The first question is from Wanda Svinovska. Please go ahead. Your line is now open. Good morning. Wanda Svinovska, Credit Suisse. Two questions from me. The first one is on the Freeport LNG terminal outage. Could you please quantify the expected losses? Then the second question is, how the backstop of guaranteeing no dilution of shareholders beyond the EUR 7 billion losses will work? I mean, given where the TTF forward curve is today versus one, two, three months ago, the losses might be higher than we previously expected. Moreover, your 2023 guidance suggests negative EBIT. It's pretty obvious that the EUR 7 billion threshold will be met. If I may squeeze one more comment from you on the low levels of the Rhine River in Germany. I mean, where do you stand on the gas and coal supply? Hello. Good morning, Wanda, and thanks for your questions. The Freeport losses clearly will depend on the repurchase prices. Maybe to give you some kind of size, it is mid- to- high triple digit number, what will in a way will occur. Of course, we will come back to that later when we know how and when the port is back in operation and in which form. About the backstop, I think this is really one of the key elements in the stabilization package what was agreed, particularly exactly for the reasons you mentioned, that the prices, the curtailments, values in a way move. It was in a way set up that there is kind of the toolbox. We have the loan element, we have the equity element, we have the cost pass-through element, and then this backstop in a way putting in place to have some kind of limit to the part what Uniper will carry. What is the exact element? Unfortunately, I cannot exactly say it today because it is under discussion. I think the important part is that it's not diluting the ownership of the current shareholders, and it is in a way also impacting to our equity in the accounting-wise also to keep our ratios in good order. To the Rhine, yes, we can also see it here in Düsseldorf that the levels are really low. What we can see that it is impacting to our operation somewhat in the power plants. How we dispatch, how we put operation, what is the maximum capacity of the power plant. We are taking account the levels and also anticipate what is coming. What we can say that in so far, there are no significant impacts what comes to our numbers and our in a way readiness is that we try to keep the coal stock about two weeks stock reserve. We have reserved for different roles. In some places it is the Rhine way it comes, but also we use trains, so there are also other alternatives. Clearly something what we monitor and steer very closely. Thank you, Tiina. Just a quick follow-up on the backstop, because when we think about the potential measures, I mean, the equity, it's a no. Debt or additional credit line will not solve it. The only thing that comes to my mind is basically 100% pass-through or some state aid. Is there any solution that I missed in my list or anything that you can share? At the moment, unfortunately, I can't share. I know we have very clever people from all sides, Fortum, German government, Uniper, many advisors also looking. We are working to make a good mechanism and in a way will fulfill the purpose of the backstop, clearly very important element for us. Would you be able to basically confirm that neither debt nor equity would be a solution? At this point of time, I would not like to speculate. We have all the option in the table, and it will depend the conclusions and negotiations, what we have currently with all the parties. Thank you very much. The next question is from James Brand, Deutsche Bank. Your line is now open. Oh, hi. Good morning. Thanks for the presentation. I had two questions, but I might try a third, seeing as Panda got away with it. Firstly, I was interested in understanding how the tax works on these losses. You had EUR 2.1 billion of other on your provisions, which you said was kind of mainly, you said in the slide, mainly non-operating tax effects. Should I think of that as you get a EUR 2.1 billion deferred tax asset that you can utilize over time? I presume it's non-cash. You're not expecting to actually get payments back from the government. That was the first issue, understanding the tax losses. And secondly, on the kind of bailout and potential equity injections, at the moment, minorities don't have any right, as far as I understand it, to participate in that. It seems a bit harsh to be planning on potentially issuing huge amounts of equity at big discounts and not giving, you know, the 20% minority any right to participate in that. Is that right? Or is there some possibility that minorities might have the option of participating in any convertible equity issuance? Then the third one, if I just may try and get away with it, on the levy, the EUR 0.024, was that a bit lower than expected? Because I know you'd expected kind of EUR 0.02-0.03, but since then, the Russian deliveries had gone down and the gas price has gone up a lot. I kind of had in my mind that it might be, might even be as high as 4%. Was that 2.4% lower than expected? Thank you very much. Thank you, James, for the questions. The first question related to taxes. Yes, those taxes on the losses are deferred, and it does not have the cash effect. As the biggest losses are coming in Germany relates to gas curtailment, it is the 31% on tax loss, which impact mostly this number. What comes to the equity and the minority, in a way, participation. Currently, this convertible instrument is only for German government exclusively. No, in a way, mechanism at the moment, which would, in a way, take the wider shareholders into the account. The levy or surcharge of EUR 0.024 per kWh. From our point of view, of course, the calculation is not that transparent that we know how it is calculated. We know this is the value where the surcharge will start, but it will be updated on three-month basis. I think what is from our point of importance is that relief of the 90%, and that will be adjusted accordingly what is the curtailment value and prices. This is the mechanism which in a way is now tested, and I'm sure that on the way it will be further defined. Thank you very much. The next question is from Vincent Ayral, JPMorgan. Your line is now open. Yes, good morning. Thank you. First question on the gas curtailment again. You've been talking about EUR 3.8 million and a run rate of EUR 100 million per day or more. That would be about EUR 8.4 billion of losses by the first of October. Look at the denominated at EUR 6.5 billion, being on the net income, that's about EUR 9.3 billion. It means another 900 billion only. It's close to the EUR 700 million you were expecting for Q4. Have you impaired anything for 2023 in your accounts on this H1 results? That would be the first question. The second I'll come back. I mean, obviously on the backstop, we don't have a... We won't have any visibility today on what could happen there. I'll skip to the convertible here. You got up to EUR 7.7 billion of convertible, but it is self-referencing the future Uniper share price. That puts greater pressure, especially on its trading and exacerbating the implied dilution. Can we expect a minimum conversion price or what is the support to the Uniper share price? What we're seeing is Uniper is willing to take responsibility here for shaping the German gas supply system, which was among other things designed by German politicians. Uniper is taking the full responsibility, and Uniper is out paying the full price. Is there any support to Uniper share price in this convertible coming? Is it something you're looking at with the authorities? These will be the two questions, and I'll pop the last one then. It seems to be not the day for that. It's good to see that your Russian division is doing well with the return of Berezovskaya. Now, the question is, how can you repatriate this cash? I come back to a question already asked before. Basically, what allows you to keep consolidating these activities, and what would be the threshold where basically you would not be able to do it anymore? I mean, I'm talking here about Uniper. Thank you. Thank you, Vincent, for the questions. The first one related to gas curtailment and the impacts to our accounts. Basically, the EUR 6.3 billion what we saw in our IFRS result, this is the anticipation of the losses as of 30th of June. That was made with the different scenarios. As we know, curtailment prices might change. Board of management made a set of scenarios with certain probabilities, and in a way, calculated the net present value of those impacts. Of course, this is the estimation and will be further defined. The other important impact is that of course, the curtailment was also reflected to any items in our balances. We had the impairments in Q1 made to not directly the curtailment, but Nord Stream 2 and then Uniper. Now also the Global Commodities in a way, LTC contract plus in a way, the goodwill written down. What comes to 2023, all impairments as of today are done. Of course, if the assumption will change, we look at that later then and reflect the current in a way situation. Is it fair, sorry, just to recap the answer to be sure I understand. You're saying it was based on assumptions as of 30th of June. When I do the math, it shows that it would already be materially too low, and you say it will be updated further down the line. Is it a fair understanding? Sorry about the answer. It is fair to say that assumptions made, in a way, reflect the closing balance sheet date. Of course, I think the scenarios will be updated. I wouldn't put any, in a way, exact number. At the time, the gas price was around EUR 145 per MWh. For gas, we also use the higher gas prices. This is clearly challenging item to calculate and forecast, but clearly says that we anticipate losses from the gas curtailment. Hopefully that gave some more clarity. Clearly, we will update in the Q3 and of course the losses that occur on daily basis. Those are kind of gas impacting the 6.3, also the future looking. Question about the backstop. Now if I remember any more of that question. It was on the convertible. The backstop has been asked a few times, and, you're not providing visibility there. My question was the convertible. It's self-referencing future Uniper share price. That means if the market anticipate the coming dilution, the share price goes down, and therefore the self-reference goes down, and it's even more dilutive. The question here is there any support, any minimum conversion price, anything we can see, coming? Is it something which has been accounted for, by Uniper, the government? Has it been fed back? Can we expect something positive there, the support to the share price? Yes. Clearly understand your concern, and we are looking at that topic also. The terms in general are still under discussion, including what is the exact convertible mechanism. Unfortunately, I'm not able to provide more information at this stage, but we will come back. We come back as soon as the whole stabilization package and the terms are agreed. The third questions related to Unipro and how do we consider that in our accounts. As presented, we will consolidate the accounts and the basic reason is that we still hold the controlling rights. We make the decision, we have the controlling rights, from accounting point of view, it is fine to consolidate. Clearly, this is also the item what we monitor, and see that if there are new, in a way, restriction coming on, but for the time being, still part of our group company. Thank you. The next question is from Deepa Venkateswaran. Bernstein, your line is now open. Deepa. Hi, your line is now open. You can ask. Yes, we can hear you now. Yeah. Sorry for that. I also focus on one question, and I hope you can answer. It is on the backstop, but more around the mechanism of the set off of losses, sorry, profits from the other division. I was just wondering whether it is based on your current year's profits from the other division, or will it look at future profits? Is it some kind of cumulative set off? I'm guessing it's either operating losses. I was also curious that in the credit report from S&P, they don't refer to this backstop. They talked about all the other measures but not the backstop. I was just wondering, is this a lower level of assurance to them because the details are not clear? I'm just wondering why they've not talked about it and, yeah, and how this loss from the other or profits from the other businesses is taken into account. Clearly, this backstop is important topic for us and also for the investors. What is in a way said that this is the accumulated loss, EUR 7 billion, which cannot be offset from the profits. This is the basic mechanism. The backstop purpose is to be very positive to the company, but also for the shareholders. Hopefully, this is giving the floor how far this could go and drive also the stabilization and the share price development in the future. Unfortunately, today, I'm not able to provide more details as this is fairly complex topics and under discussion. Clearly, your point and concerns will be taken account also in our discussions. When do you think we can have clarity around the backstop? Because I think that's clearly probably what we are most important to your shareholders. Is it before the AGM or what's the timeline? Yes, I think this is very key element. We have these three pillars in the package and then the backstop. This is the full package and we need to take all the different elements into account, get the EU approval from the state aid perspective, and then we will take the package to the AGM for the shareholders to decide. I think it is only when the full package is in a way all elements come through, so it will be disclosed. Okay. Thank you. The next question is from Sam Arie, UBS. Your line is now open. Oh, hi. Thank you. Good morning, everyone. Can I check you can hear me okay? Yes, we can hear you, Sam. Good morning. Very good. Good morning, and thank you for the presentation. I think I just want to start by acknowledging. I guess this is a pretty exceptional situation. Must have been a very tough few months for everyone at Uniper. We really appreciate the extra patience and details that everything has today. I think, you know, most of the questions have been covered already, but I just want to add one, if I may, on Unipro. I think you and Fortum have said in the past that you are now actively trying to get an exit from Russia. I just wondered if you could comment a bit more on whether at this stage you feel there is going to be a viable way to exit from Unipro with any value. And also a further related question, is it still fair to think that the kind of worst case outcome on Unipro would be that, you know, the shareholding isn't worth anything? Or are there any scenarios in which, you know, as a parent company, you could be called upon to, you know, cover any other liabilities at Unipro, and then the value of it could become negative in some way? Thank you. Thank you, Sam. Clearly, Unipro, as we can first of all see, is performing greatly in the challenging environment and made very strong results. That clearly also has raised the interest for the assets in Russia. While we started the process at the end of last year and put it on hold, currently we are evaluating options and figuring out because our strategic goal is to exit from Russia, as we in a way communicated earlier. What comes to the individual discussions with parties, you surely understand that we can't comment any detail how to take that into account. There are. The regulations are changing, and new elements are coming out. If we refer to the recent presidential decree related to energy assets, I don't think it really has fundamentally changed anything since in any case, the transaction to take place, we need to get the approval from Russian authorities. I think this was the case earlier, and it will be the case now. When we are at that stage, we will go through that formal process. I'm sure that as the asset is vital for Russia performing well, it will sooner or later have a good new owner. It's very clear. On the second part of my question, and I sort of acknowledge, of course, the performance is good at the minute. Are there scenarios where you could be, I don't know, under a local obligation in Russia. I mean, you could imagine, for example, you're operating an asset, but due to the sanctions and so on, you know, spare parts can't be obtained or servicing or maintenance can't be done, but you have an obligation to deliver, and somehow as a shareholder, you get called on to somehow put more money in. Is that a scenario we should think about, or is the worst case scenario from your point of view for Unipro that it is worth zero? Yeah. What comes to the operations, so as for example, the Berezovskaya new plant and overhauls, usually the bigger ones comes in a way later on. In that sense, we don't foresee any big hiccups. What comes to the financial risk, I think the impact to us is in general fairly limited and in many places, so no. How the external world sees, so not that much value put on that one. I wouldn't see that there is a big financial risk for us. Okay. Thank you. Thanks for everything else today. You know, ton of information in the presentation today. Thank you very much, Sam. The next question is from Piotr Dzieciolowski, Citibank. Your line is now open. Hi. Yes, good morning, everybody. It's Piotr Dzieciolowski from Citi. Two questions from my side, please. Firstly, I wanted to ask you about the net debt. How do you think you will end up the year considering the kind of a negative cash flow for the convertible, and is there anything else? And where this net debt needs to end up in absolute figure for the credit rating, for you to achieve the credit rating you want? Second question, I wanted to ask you about this indication for 2023. How much of these rational losses you embed within this number, and why these losses are treated different than the losses for the second half of the year, where you simply impair them straight away into your P&L? Hello, [inaudible]. Thank you for the question. Clearly, the net debt is burdened in the short term with the additional loans. However, when we get the full package in place, including the equity, the net debt equity, we will go back to our normal in a way levels, and it would be compatible with our rating KPI. Clearly, this is the one very important key parameter how we look at the stabilization package and the different elements that we need to have our main KPI so that we can keep the investment rating. Sorry. No, no. That's. Oh, I understand. No problem. Let's go to the second question then. Very good. The second question related to how we have, in a way, impaired. I think the EUR 6.5, what we indicated today in our results, it is the combination of the different scenarios at a specific date. Basically because we are not able to say that what is the exact curtailment percentage or price. IFRS in a way requires that in that case it is you look at the different scenarios, and you put the different weights, and this is the estimation done from that date. What comes to the 2023. I can't exclude that there wouldn't be any new number, but we need to look at that one when the day and the numbers is present. I think it is clearly very different when the stabilization package backstop is also in place. We know what kind of, in a way, element that is and also the share chart. It will be a different scenarios and losses in any case should be lower. Accounting treatment, 'cause the losses for the next half a year, you put through the non-operating elements and into Adjusted EBIT, you don't show or I'm not sure how, you know, the EUR 6.5 billion will convert into the Adjusted EBIT loss, which you're guiding for the second half of the year and then into 2023. I just wanted to understand how you will treat these losses. Okay. Yep. Very good. Basically in our actual numbers, like in Q2, we have already incurred losses and the number was EUR 400 million. If we were to make the accounts today, our incurred losses are EUR 3.8 billion, that would be seen in our Adjusted EBIT. Basically, while the losses are realizing, the number is kind of transferring from the non-operating part to the Adjusted EBIT part. The other one is in EBIT actual number and then other operating losses in a way the anticipation of the future. The number EUR 6.5 billion should go down the further we go. I understand. EUR 3.8 billion, that relates to the second half of the year, right? Unfortunately it is only up to date the number. Okay. 17th August. Understand. Thank you very much. This concludes our today's Q&A session. I hand back to Mr. Jost. All right. Thanks for your interest. Yeah, this concludes the session for today. Thank you for joining us. Speak soon. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attendance. This conference has been concluded. You may disconnect now.