Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Air France-KLM annual results. Mr. Benjamin Smith, CEO of Air France-KLM, the floor is yours. Good morning, everyone. Frédéric Gagey and I both welcome you to the Air France-KLM Group's fourth quarter and full year 2020 results call. As you are all aware of the current situation of the airline industry, I imagine you are more interested to understand what we did last quarter and what steps the group will take in the near future to overcome this unprecedented crisis. I would therefore suggest we move quickly to the presentation. Of course, Frédéric and I will do our utmost to provide answers to your questions as clearly as we can. Turning to page three of the presentation, we've been dealing with this unprecedented COVID-19 crisis since March of last year, which had and still has a tremendous impact on Air France-KLM. During the first few months of the crisis, we moved from almost a complete standstill in April and May, with almost only cargo and repatriation flights still operating, to a more optimistic summer period, which ended mid-August with the implementation of more severe travel restrictions in Europe and abroad. During the autumn months, we faced a stable yet low capacity situation, and during the holiday period towards the end of the year, we were able to ramp up capacity to some destinations, which is a clear indication that our passengers are still willing to travel and there is pent-up demand if the opportunity arises. In order to keep our employees and our customers healthy and permit them to travel safely, we implemented high level hygienic measures, resulting in a 4-star from Skytrax. To protect our liquidity position, we took immediate action and implemented stricter cost control. The Group and the airlines also adapted full-time equivalent levels to the situation at hand, while reducing capital expenditures and working diligently to preserve cash by deferring tax, social charges, and supplier bills wherever possible. We are grateful to our two largest shareholders, the Dutch state and the French state, for their continued support. Thanks to the loans provided by the two states last year, the guarantees on the bank loans and the wage subsidy programs, Air France-KLM was able to have almost EUR 10 billion in cash at hand at the end of December 2020. Our transformation plan, as presented at the November 2019 Capital Markets Day was well underway before the COVID-19 crisis, and we have accelerated these plans, resulting in accelerated fleet phase out, reduction of FTE, and a step up in our sustainability commitments. Turning to page four. Despite strong cuts in capacity, the Group has still been able to maintain its well-balanced global network. Thanks to the balanced network, both Air France and KLM have the strong cargo presence and performance. We have been able to operate higher capacity than the global industry and two of our large European competitors. Page five. As Air France-KLM has built a balanced network all over the world, we are less dependent, as some of our competitors are, on certain areas like North America or Asia. If border restrictions become less tough, we are able to ramp up capacity immediately, as we have shown during the holiday period and in January on our Caribbean and Indian Ocean markets. Turning to page six. Management remains convinced that our go-forward plan remains the best way forward for Air France-KLM and we have accelerated its deployment and implementation during the crisis, while focusing on efficiency and simplification as our primary objectives. On the left side of the slide, you will see our main unit cost reduction initiatives and on the right, you'll see our plans to increase our unit revenues. I will not go through all these initiatives one by one but one thing I think is important to mention is that the Group fleet simplification and the phase in of the next generation fuel efficient aircraft has already started with the inflow of the Airbus A350, Boeing 787, and Embraer 195-E2, which are all replacing older and less efficient aircraft. We expect to see significant savings from these aircraft, both in terms of a harmonized fleet which has several downstream effects, as well as a significantly reduced environmental footprint, as each aircraft produces approximately 25% less CO2 emissions than the aircraft they replaced. We have also been fortunate to establish very productive relations with our labor partners in both France and The Netherlands, and they have shown their agreement and willingness to work together with management to find new sources of commercial flexibility benefiting all stakeholders. This collaborative approach plays a key role in the transformation of both Air France and KLM. Moving to page seven. I will give a short overview of some of the key indicators for full year 2020, which clearly shows the unprecedented impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the Group's performance. Passenger carries showed a drop of 67% versus full year 2019, and the operating result was down by EUR 5.7 billion. Thanks to strict cost control, government support, and strong cargo performance, the EBITDA loss was mitigated to - EUR 1.7 billion. Our cash position at hand stood at a relatively comfortable EUR 9.8 billion at December 31st, 2020. As already mentioned earlier, the Group continues to work on quasi-equity and equity solutions in order to strengthen the balance sheet and expects progress in the following weeks. Discussions are continuing with the European Commission within the temporary framework. I would now like to hand over the phone to our CFO, Frédéric Gagey, to provide further details on the fourth quarter and full year 2020 financial results and the short-term outlook. Sorry. Thank you, Ben. I propose to go a bit in detail concerning the result of this fourth quarter of the year 2020 and also to try to make a synthesis of the full year 2020. I go slide number 11, where you see the global economic indicator. Sorry, page nine. When I go to the global indicator for the Q4, no surprise, a terrible drop in terms of revenue, which is, of course, true both for Air France and for KLM. Again, it is not a surprise when you compare that to the level of the year 2019. It is almost 2/3 of the revenue, which vanished during this quarter due to the terrible situation concerning the epidemic and the decision concerning lockdown and travel restrictions which are applicable in a very large number of countries around the world. If you compare the change in revenue and the change in EBITDA, clearly, there will happily a difference, -EUR 4 billion for the revenue year-on-year and - EUR 1.2 billion for the EBITDA, which is clearly the demonstration that we have been able to manage correctly, first, of course, the variable cost. We have already discussed that during the presentation of the second quarter with the first estimate of the variability of the cost we provided to the market which was in the range based on our first calculation of 50%. You see that we have improved, I will say, this elasticity of the cost to the reduction of revenue and capacity which explain why all in all, with EUR 4 billion of reduction of revenue, the EBITDA is just deteriorating by EUR 1.2 billion. Which is all in all, of course, a terrible result and the EBITDA for the quarter is at -EUR 400 million. Operating result at -EUR 1 billion which is relatively close to our expectation when we recommend the outlook three months ago, a bit better than what we were expecting, in fact. Last element to keep in mind, you see very small difference this quarter between operating result and net income. This is due to the fact that we have taken maximum of provision in Q2, Q3. I will describe later the provision we have posted during the year 2020. From that point of view, the last quarter of the year was relatively pure in the sense that we have not any additional provision to take. Adjusted operating cash flow is negative, again, not a surprise, last, -EUR 2 billion which is giving an indication of the cash drain per quarter. I move to the next slide. What is interesting is that in fact, the EBITDA in Q4 is relatively close to the one in Q3. That's why I said just on the last slide that we were happily surprised by this result because we were more expecting a worse EBITDA for Q4 compared to Q3, which is not the case. The first element, the revenue index is similar to Q3, index 36 for Q4, 33 for Q3, which was a relatively source of satisfaction. You remember what happened in the end of the year, October, a bit of optimism with the announcement concerning the vaccines, and in November in France and in some countries in Europe and in December in The Netherlands, deterioration of the epidemic situation and stricter travel restriction applied in various countries. From that point of view, we can consider that the revenue index is relatively satisfactory in the current situation in terms of capacity also. Note that we had the same level of capacity, 37 million of ASK in Q4 compared to 38 in Q3. To be totally transparent, we have also to indicate to you that there has been on the Dutch side, a recalculation of the NOW mechanisms which are worth EUR 150 million, not really attributed to the period Q4 in the P&L of KLM. I move to the next slide just to give, as usual, the evolution of capacity, traffic and RASK per sub network. Everywhere, I will say the result are, of course, disappointing. You also note that we have been, I think, relatively agile, but I will come back a bit later in the presentation, in the sense that we have been able to adjust relatively, I would say, rationally, the evolution of capacity to the situation of the market. For example, Asia, ASK - 61% but a sharp drop in the RASK, - 66%, and Caribbean and Indian Ocean, for example, - 40% of capacity only, I would say. The development in terms of RASK, a bit more satisfactory compared to the situation in Asia or in North America. I move to the next slide to illustrate the situation business per business. The only number in green are coming from the cargo, as you probably know already, due to the restriction on capacity, mainly coming from the fact that there is less passenger aircraft operating, means that there is less bellies available for the forwarders and/or clients. Which means that facing such a situation, we have seen the market able to negotiate higher unit revenue compared to the same situation 2019. In Q4, a sharp increase of the unit revenue by more than 100% has been contributing to push up the revenue. Which is, to be honest, an exception when you compare the other activities, pushing up the revenue of the cargo compared to Q4 2019. In a significant way, you see that the revenue is increasing by 54% compared to Q4 2019. For the rest, no surprise. Alas, again, network unit revenue negative, capacity negative which explain why the revenue is close to - 80%. We have the same into Transavia, where capacity has been a bit more cut and the unit revenue has been a bit less negative. It is also for Transavia, quite negative result. The maintenance, the revenue is - 45%. Some clients, when the aircraft are not flying, are taking the fact that they are available for some short visits which explain why we see a reduction of the maintenance turnover a bit less than what you see concerning the network and Transavia. All in all, just a succession of very negative number. Facing such a situation, I move to the next slide. We have, of course, with Pieter and Anne, worked a lot concerning the cost control. They will be able to comment if there is some question from your side during the Q&A session. I will insist on this slide concerning the management of the labor cost to indicate two things. First, the reduction of the labor cost is the result of the reduction of the FTE, and I will say that we are more or less in agreement to what we have explained to you before earlier presentation. You see that the group FTE evolution is - 10% between end of 2019, end of 2020, which is approximately 9,000 people. Which is, I would say, already a quite significant number. At the left of the slide bottom, you see the development we expect for the year to come. In KLM, as it could be explained by Pieter the target to reduce in 2021, again, the number of FTE by around 1,900, to be more precise. Concerning Air France, the fact that the voluntary departure plan has been launched a bit later than into KLM. The reduction of capacity of 5,000 FTEs is expected over the period 2021 up to the end of 2022. At the right of the slide, you can see what I explained before concerning the cost elasticity to the capacity. For the quarter, we have reduced capacity by 54%, and the total operating cost has been reduced by -46%, which is giving an indication of an elasticity of the range of 85% which is something, I would say, relatively significant and better than what we have discussed with you at the end of the presentation of the second quarter. We are also to admit that part of this cost flexibility has benefited from the support of the government. There is a national system in both France and in The Netherlands. The companies, as others, have benefited of this support and the contribution of this support to the reduction of the labor cost is relatively significant for Q4. It was in the range of 65%, but I will explain later that in the year 2021, the contribution of the state aid will be less and the contribution of the restructuring to the control of the labor cost will be higher than in 2020. I move to the next slide concerning the full year. The full year is again something absolutely difficult to present due to this terrible impact of the crisis, -EUR 16 billion of reduction of the revenue. Revenue was EUR 27 billion in 2019. It is EUR 11 billion in 2020. As for the Q4, happily, the reduction of the EBITDA is less than the loss in terms of revenue, -EUR 5.8 billion, so more or less one third of the reduction of revenue. Thanks to, again, the cost control and the impact of the variable cost. Operating result at -EUR 4.5 billion. The net income, this time different for the operating result due to the various provisions we have taken, mainly in Q2 and Q3. Adjusted operating free cash flow, which is the cash drain during the year in the range of -EUR 5.6 billion. As a result, of course, the net debt of the group has increased tremendously by EUR 4.9 billion and reached now EUR 11 billion. I move to the next slide just to explain the difference between the operating result and the net income. To remind you the origins of the various provisions we have taken during Q2, Q3, EUR 800 million to prepare the future. This is mainly the restructuring cost and the restructuring provision for the VDP in both Air France and in KLM even if KLM has been able to manage part of the departures already in 2020, so a bit quicker than what happened in Air France, when a large number of departure will be observed during the second quarter of 2021. Second element in terms of provisions, the fleet impairment, as it has been already discussed in the past, you know that we have decided to phase out the A380, the 747, the A340, which is basically all the aircraft with four engines, have now left the group fleet. It had an impact in the range of EUR 672 million due to the necessary impairment we had to post. The last element to be taken into consideration, the fuel over-hedging impact, EUR 600 million. As many of our competitors, we have prepared the hedging portfolio at the beginning of the year to cover the expected capacity and the expected fuel consumption. Due to the sharp reduction of the capacity, we have been in a situation of over-hedge and it has been necessary to take this impact below the operating income. I move to the next slide but I will not make a lot of comments, where we present for the full year the situation per business, which is approximately, of course, the same as I described concerning the Q4. Terrible result for network and Transavia. Cargo positive with the unit revenue over the year + 77%. In maintenance, a reduction of the operating result by EUR 800 million partly due to the fact that the activity has been reduced, due to the fact that some clients have postponed the decision to make some short visit, or also the loss of some contract but also the fact that we have been able to take some provisions due to bad debt, revaluation of the stock, and revaluation of the margins on some contracts we have then to take in the P&L. Page 19. It is just a slide to try to demonstrate that the network and the revenue management teams have tried to work in a quite rational way. You can see on the graph that each time the share of a sub-network has increased compared to last year, it is correctly correlated to the evolution of the unit revenue. Just to example, if you take Caribbean and Indian Ocean, the share of this network was 8% in 2019, 12% in 2020, and the unit revenue reduced by only - 18%. On the other side, for North America, the share of North American network decreased from 22%- 17%. Of course, the evolution of the unit revenue is worse than in the example of Caribbean and Indian Ocean networks. Just to illustrate the rationality of our decision concerning the management of the capacity. All in all, for the full year, capacity - 54%, traffic - 69%, which means that we have deteriorated, of course, the load factor, but I would say in a relatively limited way. Unit revenue minus 32% for the full network, revenue - 69%. For cargo, I move to the next slide. We have been able, as I told before, to maintain a positive evolution of the revenue, +19%, even if capacity has been reduced by -31%, the increase of the unit revenue has compensated. Just to indicate that we have been extremely active in order to try to take all turnover and cash we can from the cargo activity by developing an extremely agile policy by organizing a lot of flight with a full freighter, but also using the passenger aircraft in order to be able to operate cargo flights and to be able also to answer to the demand of the market. On Transavia, next slide. A very difficult year. Revenue -65%. Deterioration of the margin, a bit less than for the rest of the total network. Transavia preparing itself for its future which is mainly to increase its role on the French domestic operations, which have already started in Q4 2020 with the opening of new routes on the domestic market. Already five new domestic routes which have been launched by Transavia beginning of November. For the maintenance because it is an important element concerning some exceptional items, which have hit the P&L which are mainly the provisions I have discussed before. EUR 120 million for doubtful receivable which is due to the difficulty of some of our clients, which have been unable to pay the bill in due time. EUR 110 million due to provision on asset. Of course, we are losing contract. We have less activities and we have been able to reevaluate a lot of the stocks, mainly. Also EUR 90 million following the revision of some contract margins, according to IFRS, we have to take such a revaluation of the contract margins as a provision in the P&L. To note also that the order book has been reduced. Some contract have disappeared because the clients also disappeared, there has been also some renegotiation sometimes with some of our clients, in total, the order book is still quite high, EUR 9 billion but EUR 2.4 billion below what it was last year. Last slide is a comparison of the evolution of the margin and the absolute margin for the year 2020 for Air France and for KLM. Clearly, alas, the two companies have the same negative operating result, - EUR 1 billion for KLM, - EUR 3 billion for Air France. The deterioration is the same order of magnitude but not totally, -EUR 2 billion for KLM and -EUR 3.6 billion for Air France. There is some explanation behind this difference in terms of evolution of the operating result. Keep in mind that the initial size of the two airlines was not exactly the same in 2019. The bigger you are, the bigger also is the impact on your P&L when you lose 80% of your revenue. The fact that KLM has been a bit more quick than Air France to try to develop the cargo activity, even in such a difficult environment. The situation improved by the end of the year, also in Air France. Now the two Group are extremely active on cargo. A third difference, which is that the state support mechanisms is not exactly the same in France and in KLM, which has also contributed to support a bit more KLM than in Air France. What is important to note is that the impact of the crisis is, of course, extremely negative for both carriers. I move to the next slide to speak about the strategy concerning the cash savings approach. You know that we have, at the beginning of crisis, launched immediately a lot of actions in order to be sure that we can keep the cash at the highest level as possible. You see that it has been effective when you look at the CapEx management. We had a CapEx guidance beginning of the year of EUR 3.6 billion and we have been able to cut by almost 50% the CapEx expenses during the year 2020. All in all, at EUR 1.9 billion, of which almost EUR 1 billion for the fleet CapEx, knowing that all these aircraft deliveries are fully financed. This is the new rules we apply now into the group. If we are not able to finance an aircraft, we don't take the delivery. Good evolution also, I think, concerning the working capital. In 2019, the working capital contribution was + 135, and in 2020 it is + 65, which is, I would say, relatively a surprising positive result, knowing that we have been extremely active to negotiate with suppliers, with administration, with our clients also, the possibility to postpone some payment or some reimbursement in order to keep the cash as high as possible. It doesn't mean that we have not reimbursed ticket, of course. In the full year, the total reimbursement of tickets unpaid reached EUR 2.3 billion, and there is still EUR 1.4 billion to reimburse or tickets or voucher which can be used later for a flight when we will be able to operate. I move to the next slide, which is a technical one. Of course, when you have the CapEx, the working capital, and the free cash flow, you can easily calculate the evolution of the net debt which increased during the year 2020 by close to EUR 5 billion, to reach now EUR 11 billion. I move to the next slide concerning the outlook. Of course, not a surprise. The situation is still extremely uncertain. We still expect, of course, as everybody, that the vaccine campaign will permit a positive evolution of the situation between now and the summer. For the time being, we are extremely cautious for the first quarter of the year which means that in both Air France and KLM, capacity compared to 2019 first quarter will be with an index of 40, more or less split equally in the various sub-network. For France domestic, you see the capacity for January, February, March, around 40%, 35%. Similar result for long haul and medium haul. I would say that, as I told before, the load factor is absolutely not ridiculous. If you look January, for example, load factor was 60% for the France domestic, 51 for the long haul, and close to 70 for the medium haul which means that, again, we see the numbers. We try to illustrate the good optimization and the good rationale in the decision taken by the network, the sales, and the revenue management departments. Next slide concerning the cargo. We think that we will continue to take the benefit of the current situation. The cargo people have even recently increased a bit their forecast for the year 2021 in terms of revenue. We will try, of course, also to take the opportunity concerning the vaccine transportation around the world which is already the case. For example, with some flights devoted to vaccine transportation to Far East, America, Peru, Ecuador, et cetera. Page 29, future evolution of the labor cost. As I explained before, the support of the government with the national system, NOW, and partial activity in France will reduce in 2021. In 2020, the support is estimated to EUR 1.6 and it will be reduced by 50% in 2021. In the same time, we will see the increasing impact of the internal restructuring measures which have been applied or which have to be applied right now in Air France concerning the labor cost. Means that we will compensate not totally but a very significant part of the reduction of the state scheme by the evolution of the FTE and the restriction we have negotiated concerning the unit cost per FTE into both KLM and Air France. Ability of the group to compensate for this reduction of the state scheme concerning the labor cost. Next slide. Again, Anne and Pieter are better placed than me to make some comments on this restructuring program. They are going well, at the right speed. With KLM, the idea of structural benefit in the range of EUR 750 million for 2021. In Air France, EUR 1.2 billion spread on 2021 and 2022, with at least EUR 800 million of structural benefit in 2021. Concerning the FTE evolution, I have already provided the number which is - 6,000 for KLM compared to the beginning of 2020, and minus close to 9,000 people for Air France compared to the beginning of 2020. Next slide. The group has clearly sufficient liquidity, to not be under pressure, to be honest. We have today EUR 10 billion available, drawn or undrawn, clearly it is cash available for us. Of course, we will spend part of this cash in the year 2021. Not a surprise, alas. First, because we expect for the time being, at least for Q1, EBITDA, which is expected below Q4 2020. We have been quite efficient to manage the working capital in 2020 but it could have some negative impact in 2021. Some payment of supplier bills, which have been postponed last year, will have to be paid in 2021, and there is still some tickets to be refunded. We estimate the risk today for the unrefunded ticket for flights having been already canceled at EUR 1.4 billion. Capital spending at EUR 2 billion, of course, for all the part of this CapEx which is consisting in aircraft delivery, it will be financed by the market. Finally, of course, take into account the cash out coming from the restructuring. Clearly, in 2020, we have taken the provision concerning the VDPs. In 2021, we will have, mainly for Air France to cash out for these departures of staff. Last slide, just to conclude. Of course, it's a bit difficult to have a quite clear conclusion due to the uncertainty when we are now. We still continue to expect that it's possible to reach in 2024 level of capacity back to the level of 2019. Clearly, all the effort and the restructuring plans we are developing now will have an impact. It is on that we expect that at the end of the crisis, being back at the level of capacity of 2019, the unit cost could be lower by 9%-10%. Again, following the five-year plan, we expect to come back to a positive adjusted operating free cash in 2023. If things are going well, when the traffic is back to the 2019 level, thanks to the reduction of cost, we expect to progressively be back to the level of margin we have targeted already one year ago. One year ago, when we are present for Investor Day, and the target of an operating margin middle cycle between 7% and 8%. Thanks, Frédéric. Given the major initiatives taken by the group during 2020, as explained at the beginning of this call, we are confident we can maintain our medium-term objective of achieving an operating margin of between 7% and 8%, although it will be delayed. Furthermore, at this point in time, we estimate we will see 2019 capacity levels return to 2024. Once capacity is back at 2019 levels, we expect the unit cost to be 8%-10% below 2019 levels. In 2023, the group estimates the adjusted operating free cash flow levels to be positive again. Turning to page 31. Our path to recovery requires continued reaction and adaptation and by the group, as well as an integrated approach between all stakeholders. The group will continue to improve our agility and swift adaptation of our flight operations in order to seize opportunities as they appear. Transforming Air France-KLM is key to building a successful and sustainable post-crisis model that takes into account strict cost and CapEx control to preserve cash and maintain financial flexibility. Our sustainability commitments are in line with our ambitious environmental roadmap of reducing our carbon emissions per passenger kilometer by 50% by 2030. Finally, our group will ensure it is prepared to capitalize on the traffic growth once the industry recovers, in order to position itself once again as one of the leading combinations of European airlines in the post-crisis era. However, to speed up recovery, we need the harmonization of cross-country policies in order to restart travel as soon as possible. Rapid vaccine rollout worldwide is the key to recovery, and a vaccine passport could be another enabler of a successful recovery trajectory. I would now like to hand it over to the moderator, so we can begin the Q&A. Thank you. Thank you. If you would like to ask a question, please press star one on your telephone keypad. Please ensure the mute function on your telephone is switched off to allow your signal to reach our equipment. If you find that your question has been answered, you may remove yourself from the queue by pressing star two. Again, please press star one to ask a question. We'll now take the first question from Jarrod Castle from UBS. Thank you, and good morning, everyone. Good morning, everyone.[crosstalk] Three, if I may. Firstly, just in terms of the conversations with government about further aid, can you talk a little bit about timing and also the magnitude? Any color on that would be appreciated. Secondly, kind of related, where do you see your cash burn in terms of a closed skies scenario now? Obviously, ADP this morning talking about Paris maybe being 35%-45% on volumes. How do you see or think about opening up? You highlighted, for instance, the North Atlantic, when you look at vaccination rates between countries, is there a chance, for instance, that the North Atlantic opens up to the U.K. before, let's say, France, et cetera? How are you thinking about just the profile of recovery going forward? Thanks. Concerning the discussion we have with the government, I think there is something you all know which is that in the French and the Dutch scheme provided to Air France and KLM in the middle of the year 2020. The composition of this scheme was only debt which is very something different if you compare, for example, to the support provided to SAS, Lufthansa, et cetera. It's clear that this situation has to be corrected. Corrected, modified. That's why we are clearly discussing with the government the possibility to see if part of this support can move from debt to equity, which is clearly one of the concerns we have, to have only increase the debt and not yet improve the equity. This is the type of discussion we have right now. As you know also, when you move from debt to equity, you have to notify this support to the European Commission, and then you are entering which is also normal in a relatively complex and technical discussion which can be a bit long. It is exactly where we are today and where the two governments are also because as you know for this type of notification, it is a discussion between the state and the commission, even if of course, the companies have to be involved. It's complex. That's why it is not totally ready. As I told you today to our board, it is more a question of days and weeks than quarters. We are confident and we think that one day we will find a solution, as always. Concerning the cash, I will not give you right now a forecast for the full year because we have also to see what are the development in the next months. What I will say is that even if we see some source of cash drain in the year 2021, working capital, evolution of the result, and also the cash impact of the restructuring decisions, we are comfortable with the level of cash we have today in the sense that we consider that there is no risk of cash stress for the year 2021, of course. For your last question regarding the possibility of the U.K.-U.S. market opening up before Europe to U.S. Our view is that perhaps it may not happen simultaneously but within the same period. That's our current hypothesis. Okay. Thank you very much. Thanks. We'll now take the next question from Daniel Röska from Bernstein Research. Morning, gentlemen. Thanks. First, from your discussions with government authorities, what is your assessment, what we would need to see in terms of infection vaccination levels to start easing travel restrictions? Secondly, once demand returns, how concerned are you about your mainline narrow body network, given that profitable segments like business travel and connecting travel seem to be impaired for several years? Is there a larger loss in that segment inevitable even as traffic returns? Then maybe a longer-term outlook, Ben, if you will, considering the unprecedented crisis we're witnessing, what are the fundamental shifts or changes in the airline business in Europe you're expecting for the next cycle? You talked about your mid-cycle margin, so you must have reviewed your program. Could you give us, I don't know, the three biggest themes you're considering in your planning when you think about what will be changing in that cycle we're heading into? Thanks. I'll start with question perhaps two and three. Our view is that the model that we have at Amsterdam Schiphol is robust and works quite well, and that our plans for the medium long term, we're assuming we get back the market returns so that we can continue to operate that model. We have a fleet plan surrounding getting back to that as soon as possible. We don't see too many changes in how we operate at Schiphol. At OIC, prior to the crisis, we had already planned to reduce our dependence on connecting traffic and move closer to, or increase our percentage of O&D traffic that we were carrying at OIC, considering the size of the Paris market. We do have quite a bit of flexibility in Paris to alter the numbers of passengers we take on a connection basis or on a local basis. In Orly and the rest of French domestic, we're well on our way of transitioning from smaller regional type aircraft into the Transavia model and our Transavia tool. The cost structure that we have at Transavia is very close to some of our low-cost competitors. We feel that with that model, we will be better able to participate in segments of the market that we weren't before which gives us a lower risk on the future depending on how things play out. In terms of the vaccinations, look, whether a vaccination passport or the rate at which vaccinations roll out, of course, we're extremely anxious as to how long it will take. We believe that in France and The Netherlands and the rest of Europe, there has been a slower start than some other jurisdictions in the world. We do feel that in the medium long term that it will speed up and that Europe will be at least on the same level as the rest of the Western world. Have your discussions with government yielded any indication when that point is? As you said, developments are different, and they speed up. Have governments voiced any indication how far along that road they would need to be to be comfortable to remove restrictions? I don't think we have any information that you don't have. Okay. Go ahead. We'll now take the next question from Neil Glynn from Credit Suisse. Hi. Good morning, everybody. If I can ask three also, please. The first one with respect to your approach to managing what's left to be achieved on the labor cost side. Just interested that you're obviously targeting the full restoration of ASKs, albeit with 7% less claims. That suggests that you're not using schedule recovery as a negotiation tool with labor. Just interested in your thinking, why not? Why that wouldn't be an effective strategy to effectively reward productivity improvements with capacity growth, which we've seen from some other carriers in the past as they're getting through difficult labor situations? The second question with respect to the 8%-10% unit cost reduction plan by 2024, could you give us a feel for what kind of savings on the supplier cost side you expect? Should we expect similar 8%-10% savings on supplier costs, or should they be better or worse? The third question, Eurocontrol published an interesting analysis recently highlighting maybe intuitively the longest flights are generating a very disproportionate amount of the industry's emissions. The state aid that you've already received has come with some domestic capacity conditions. Just interested, do you see any prospect of long-haul operation curtailment due to future state aid as part of the equity solution, or do you think that each respective government is very comfortable with your carbon reduction plans as they currently stand? Thanks. We have both Pieter Elbers and Anne Rigail, CEO of KLM and CEO of Air France, in the room with us here. Perhaps Pieter can start out with answering your questions on the KLM side, and then we can have Anne follow for Air France. Thank you, Ben. Good morning, everyone. To your first question on using the recovery and reinstating the network as a means to increase productivity. In fact, we make a distinction between the various phases of the recovery. The first phase is actually where we're in now, where schedules are still very inefficient. We only fly a couple of flights per week, and in many countries, we do have serious adjustments of our schedules. Quite a few of the flights to Asia are operated through places where we have different crew regimes, and as such, we have a rather inefficient operation at this point in time. I think the priority now is first to make sure that we have the operation running, and you could see the 2020 results, both Air France and KLM did that relatively well compared to our competitors. That's the priority for now. Priority number two, it's probably the second half of the year and early next year, is going to be very much on reinstating the network and bringing back all the frequencies and the destinations. After that, and that's more in the later part, and you see that in Frédéric's presentation, when the capacity is going to be further restored in the 2023, 2024 timeframe, it's also going to be the right point in time to address that matter. Again, today, the operational circumstances are very challenging and already require a large extent of flexibility of our flight crews, and I'm very proud actually that they are doing so, and we are able to keep that operation going for mostly cargo and some of the passenger flows. To complete a bit on Air France side, as Pieter said, I think that the efficiency of the network with the decrease of the frequencies is quite low at the moment, and that the restart will help us to go back to a lot better efficiencies. In terms of efforts, clearly, we have already important steps that have been taken at the beginning of the year with the signature with all the people in Air France, pilots, cabin crew, and ground staff of agreements relating to partial activity that we will implement during two years. We are in the middle of the implementation on the ground voluntary departure plan. That is going on quite well. We have a strong wage moderation, freeze of the salaries that is already planned for two years. In view of the duration of the crisis, we are exploring additional savings opportunities to improve our competitiveness in the short term and during the recovery phase. Of course, we are discussing this with the trade unions. We will now take our next question from James Hollins from BNP. Please go ahead. [Non-English content] Three from me, please. Just on the furlough support, that EUR 150 million of looks like exceptional or surprise income on KLM. I was wondering if you could quantify how much of that was in Q4. I think you said not all of it was. Secondly, I know it's part of the negotiations with the EU but do you fully expect to lose some remedy slots at Orly and Schiphol? Thirdly, I see you've drawn all of the Air France EUR 7 billion package, only EUR 0.9 of the EUR 3.4 on KLM. Just wondering if you can draw further on the KLM and use that for the Air France CapEx and restructuring through this year. Thank you. Okay. Let me, in coordination with Frédéric, answer your first question. That was related to a booking for the NOW in the range of 90 out of the total amount which was put of 150, to the NOW support we got for the month of March. The introduction was done very quick and very swift on the Dutch side, and then there were some sort of different dynamics on the actual starting date, whether it was April or March. In clearing the full year, eventually the start was on March, and then we needed to make some corrections there. That was also sort of aligned with all the parties involved. I think the second question, Frédéric, on the slots in Amsterdam, you or Benjamin or me? Regarding the remedies that the EU is looking for from a slot perspective, there are negotiations going on between the two states and the European Commission. We're expecting to be asked to release slots in Paris and in Amsterdam. We are pushing to ensure that they are proportionate and comparable with what Lufthansa has released. Frankfurt and Munich are somewhat similar to OIC. None of those three airports are fully saturated. There are still openings for new entrants. There are peak periods. Orly and Amsterdam are fully saturated, an impact on slot release would be different than to what Lufthansa is going to be impacted in the future. Orly is much smaller than the four other airports. We are negotiating with the European Commission, and we're hopeful that we will have an agreement, as Frédéric said, in the short term. Concerning your third point, no, you're right. Normally, when there is this type of state support, the money is supposed to remain into the company to which it has been addressed first, which means that EUR 7 billion are for Air France, EUR 3.4 billion are into KLM, and there is some control, which are the rules, by the way, to be sure that there is no flow of money between the two companies with, as an example, all the French state going to KLM or vice versa. There is a relatively ceiling between the companies concerning the money coming from this state support. Very clear. Thanks very much. Next question comes from Stephen Furlong from Davy. Morning, gentlemen. In 2024, you're expected to be back to pre-crisis levels in terms of ASK. I'm just wondering, you talked about O&D versus connecting traffic at ORLY. In terms of the actual cabin mix, would you see more or it being more a function of the aircraft type you will have by then but more kind of growth in premium economy or premium share because of smaller aircraft type? Do you think because of the crisis, we have more economy traffic? I'm just trying to get an understanding of the traffic mix in 2024, obviously a long way away, but compared to pre-crisis. Thank you. Okay. On the Air France side, I think Air France will be better positioned than the other two major competitors we have in Europe, be it Lufthansa or British Airways, premium traffic and long-haul legacy type of flows. The Paris market is the largest destination market in Europe, so it's a big O&D. Also historically, 50% of the premium traffic at Air France has been leisure. The exposure to premium business traffic is somewhat different. As you know, at Heathrow and at Frankfurt, the business cabin and the premium cabins are made up of pure business traffic, which at Air France is not at the same levels. Also at Air France, with all the A380s being removed from the fleet, those airplanes had the largest business cabins at Air France. Of the 68 777 at Air France, 44 of those airplanes have a quick change capacity. What that means is that business cabins can be reduced by up to 50% and that can be done overnight. The mix in 2024, Air France has an enormous amount of flexibility with the A380s out, being able to tap into the local larger French market by balancing out flows versus local, flexing up the size of the business cabin, also taking advantage of the large leisure higher-end business, which does not exist, or at least does not exist to that extent in other cities in Europe. On the KLM side, Amsterdam is the best connecting market in Europe, so it can access smaller markets, already has a very well-diversified network throughout the world. I think when you look at the ability to balance their different options, different flows, and also the business cabin at KLM is relatively small already prior to the crisis versus its major competitors. I think we are well positioned as a group based on the setup of the airline before, based on the evolution of the fleets that have taken place throughout this crisis and on the flexibility that the airlines will have after the crisis, and also taking advantage of the respective markets, the flexibility that we have that some of our competitors don't today. Thank you. Very helpful. The next question comes from Ruxandra Haradau-Doser from Kepler Cheuvreux. Good morning. Three questions, please. First, a follow-up on the unit cost reduction target. Could you maybe help with what impact would the sustainable cost restructuring measures implemented so far since the start of the crisis have on unit cost performance at pre-crisis level of activity? Second, Pieter mentioned in a recent interview that he expects the recovery of long-haul business to be driven by traffic through the hubs, and he believes the strength and power of hubs will be even stronger post-COVID. Does this refer to hubs like Amsterdam and Paris, which rely on strong short-haul feeder networks, or does this apply for hubs in general, even to those that rely mainly on long-haul flights, like Middle Eastern hubs? Third, for Frédéric, could you please talk about your thoughts on fuel hedging policy in Europe post-COVID? Do you expect main players to change their fuel hedging policies? Thank you. Perhaps Anne can take the first question, Pieter the second, and Frédéric the third. Okay. Concerning the first and the third one, it's clear that with the crisis, both Pieter and the management have open discussion, prepare and launch already a lot of plans concerning the restructuring of the group and of the two carriers. To be honest, if you look the reduction of the FTEs, for example, which is in the presentation, it is already extremely impressive. There is some other actions vis-a-vis suppliers, vis-a-vis rationalization of the network. It's mainly for Air France, for example, the domestic networks. If I add all these elements, for example, just for Air France, the action vis-a-vis the suppliers will account for around EUR 200 million. There is the same approach in KLM, and there is also the same approach for group renegotiation concerning some joint contract. When you add everything together, and you say one day the revenue will come back to the level of 2019, in fact, you will be in a situation where you will have the benefit of all the cost reduction we have implemented already from 2020, and we will continue, and we will have the revenue back to the level of 2019. Mathematically, it leads to an improvement of the margin even compared to 2019. It is exactly what we have to do to be sure that the cost reduction we are implementing will be structural and will remain in place even when the revenue will come back to the situation of 2019. Based on our first calculation, we express that by telling you that the unit cost base, when the revenue will be back to 2019 level, will be at least between -8% and -10%, which is, of course, positive for the profitability and for the margin. Concerning the hedging, very good question. In fact, first point, it's true that as many of the competitors, we have been hit by this over-hedging situation. Which is, to be honest, something very strange to suddenly discover that because you reduce capacity by 60%, 70%, your portfolio of hedging is in excess. It has hit, I think, many airlines in Europe, where the hedging policy are more developed than in other places into the world. I think, for example, U.S., where the hedging policy generally is relatively limited. Of course, to answer to your remark, we are already discussed the necessity to adjust the hedging policy. First, to avoid, in the current uncertainty, to be facing such a situation of over-hedge but also because in the economic situation in which we are now, with the balance sheet weaker than before the crisis, with credit lines less available because banks, of course, are a bit more cautious. We have decided to adopt, for the time being, a more cautious hedging strategy by hedging with the tenure of only one year instead of two years before, and by limiting the maximum volume of the hedge portfolio at 50% of full year consumption, when before we were close to 80% of full year consumption. Clearly, you're perfectly right. The current situation forced us to rationally adjust the hedging strategy by being more cautious and more modest in our ambitions for the time being. To your second question. Yeah, indeed, I made that remark, and that was pretty much focused on what we have seen throughout 2020, where by maintaining the network and by operating a very significant number of our destinations, and by keeping a certain level of connectivity, we have seen a relatively good, or less bad, if you wish, performance. That's mostly because a lot of the relatively smaller flows, which could hardly sustain direct flights, they have been canceled, and it will take quite a while before they come back. From smaller cities in the U.S. to Europe or from Europe to the U.S., we will see a slower recovery of these sort of point-to-point flows where no hubs are supporting that. I think that would give a great opportunity for a group like Air France-KLM and for our two hubs in CDG and Amsterdam, where we will have the opportunity to recover on that medium-haul, long-haul connecting traffic. I don't think it's so much the case for the long-haul, long-haul because there's no direct flights anyway. Basically when the traffic is coming back there, it has to go through the same hubs as it was before. My priority would be here on the medium-haul, long-haul, and even on the medium-haul, medium-haul flight with a slower recovery of direct flights because the market is recovering slow. We'll have a great opportunity to take benefit of that situation. Maybe to complete a bit what Frédéric said on the decrease of unit cost. On the Air France side, the global actions, 120 initiatives at the present time represent EUR 1.4 billion. We will reach EUR 800 million by end of this year. The major pillars are the full restructuring of a domestic network with a strong growth of Transavia, a restructuring of HOP! regional subsidiary, and also more intermodality with the train and with the suspension of routes under two hours and 30 minutes by train on the point-to-point network. The second pillar is the decrease of all our support functions, which represent 30% of staff decrease in all the support and the management. We are working on all our operational processes also with a lot of digitization. Overall, it means 8,500 job cuts, and we are in the middle of the whole process. We are reviewing all our external expenses, as Frédéric explained, with a lot of RFPs and adjustment to the current capacities, of course. As I told you previously, we are working on new initiatives to reinforce this plan in a continuing process. Just one last point I'd like to make. Structurally, once KLM, we remove the A330s, we'll have the most efficient wide-body fleet with one cockpit type with the 777 and 787s and one narrow-body cockpit type with the 737. Only two cockpit types, which is the most efficient of the major carriers in Europe. With Air France removing the A380s, an expensive or a lot of money that was supposed to be spent on cabin refurbishment, engine overhaul, and airframe overhaul, we were able to cancel that, which was great. Transavia, which was a major effort, major exercise between Air France and the Air France pilot unions to implement flexibility that was not there before. There was a 40 aircraft limit that was in place which was renegotiated for that limit to be removed. There was also a restriction on flying Transavia in the domestic market. I don't think it's fully well understood in the financial markets how valuable that is for Air France. The cost structure of Transavia France is similar to that of easyJet. With that tool, with the reduction in dependence and size of our HOP! operation, the structural benefit of that change is something that will be clearly evident once we exit the crisis. As Anne just described, it requires a major overhaul of the number of staff and the types of positions we have in the domestic French markets. Great. Thank you very much. The next question comes from Carolina Dores from Morgan Stanley. Good morning, everyone. Three questions, if I may. The first two are on liquidity. You mentioned that working capital has been helped by work on supplier payments, deferring tax bills, and some kind of government support. How much of what has been deferred in 2020 is overall, and how much of that is due in 2021? Second question is on liquidity. Are the EUR 9.8 billion of liquidity available for both Air France and KLM? Or if not, what is the split between the two? And my final question is on CapEx and the EUR 2 billion, and sorry if I missed it, do you have all the financing in place? Thank you very much. On the second point, yes. We have managed all the financing for the aircraft by the end of 2021 which means that there is a large majority of the aircraft deliveries expected into our plan for 2021, which are already financed. Directly by banks concerning the loan, or possibly also by operation of sales and lease back. We can also organize in order to be sure that the delivery of an aircraft is not a cash out for the group. On the first question, if I understood correctly, as I told, the cash provided by the two states for Air France on one side and KLM on the other side, again, there is a ceiling between the two companies in the sense that according to the contract we have signed with banks and state, there is no possibility to move part of the support to one company to the other one which is logical, by the way, and which is a situation you find normally in this type of situation when there is state support to a local company. Sorry, but just to follow up, how much is available for each one of them currently? More or less it is EUR 4 billion, or EUR 3.5 billion in each company. Thank you. We'll now move to the next question from [Morteza Janil] from CQS. Hi. Thank you for your time today. I have an ESG question. I'm just keen to understand what initiatives you have in place for the year ahead, apart from the environmentally friendly aircraft that you mentioned earlier on the call. Thank you. I think we had trouble hearing your question. If you could just repeat, please. Sure. My question was to do with your ESG initiatives for the year ahead. Environment, social, governance. You had mentioned early on the call, on the environmental pillar, you're focusing on upgrading your fleet. Are there any initiatives you're taking across the social or governance fronts for the fiscal year ahead? Okay. I think we've got both Pieter and Anne in the room, so I'll have each one of them answer for their respective airlines. Pieter, you want to go first? Well, regarding the environmental initiatives, I spoke a bit about the fact that we are working a lot on intermodality with the train. We removed some flights to Orly from Bordeaux, from Nantes, from Lyon. We are connecting our network to the train and facilitating the customer experience, digital and physical experience, to be able to have these types of connection. The other issue are around sustainable fuel. It's a key lever to reduce our environmental footprint. We are currently in a process of stimulating the industry to be able to create SAF in Europe and in France, and Pieter will probably speak about Netherlands. We are collaborating also at the European level with the European Commission on the ReFuelEU reform in the European Green Deal. Recently, Air France-KLM Group has launched a brand new program enabling companies to have an active role in the future of sustainable travel with the SAF Initiative. Maybe, Pieter, you can complete? Yep. Thank you. There's a whole range of initiatives. As Ben said, we had a little trouble in getting your question. I understood it a bit broader than just the sustainability part when it comes to the sustainability initiatives. Just to underline and echo what Anne said, I think we've done a lot already on the improvement of our fleet, and the renewal of our fleet is one of the key drivers. In addition, we are investing in alternative fuels, sustainable aviation fuels. I'm actually pretty proud that we had very recently the first flight being executed on partly synthetic fuel. I think that was a great step forward. It was just a small quantity, 500 L, but a very important step. When it comes to the ESGs, I'm very proud of that actually, as a group, Air France-KLM, we are again, one of the leaders in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. The basis for that really is the sustainability goals and we're scoring high on that. Both in France and The Netherlands, we do have an extensive list of social projects in terms of inclusion, in terms of broadening the workforce, in terms of having people from all groups in the society, working close collaborations with schools, with institutes, and all these initiatives in order to play our social role. I think maybe as a last point here during the crisis, we have demonstrated by the transportation of vaccines, by repatriation flights, by all the initiatives we do in order to bring medical equipment, that we are indeed playing a very crucial role in our respective societies. In fact, that will only continue to be stronger going forward. Thank you very much.[crosstalk] To complete a bit on the customer side, it was very important for us to have the trust of our customers with the sanitary measures, with our flexibility on the commercial measures, and we just extended our commercial flexibility to the end of the year so that they can really book with confidence. We observed NPS improve over 48% in 2020. During the crisis, we kept really the trust of our customers within the group. We are also working on the parity for the women. We want to achieve 34% of women at the highest management level and we are committed to this at the group level. On the social side, as I explained to you, we have a lot of negotiations, a lot of discussions about the whole transformation plan, and it's very important for us also to keep the trust of our employees. We are monitoring our employee promoter scores, and we've seen that this employee promoter score is now, at Air France, above what we have seen before the crisis. It means that we really want to change and to make this transformation plan in a collective manner, keeping the cohesion between all the people inside Air France and the group. That's very helpful. Thank you. We will now take the next question from Andrew Lobbenberg from HSBC. Morning, everyone. Can I ask a question about partnerships with other airlines? In a normal world, they would be a big feature of your strategic position and network opportunity, and it makes sense that everyone's focusing on surviving themselves at the moment. It's also the case that your good friends in Atlanta sit on your board and in your ownership structure. What do you see the role of your key partnership going forward in terms of ownership structure and indeed, rebuilding as the network happens? Can I ask a question about the reopening of markets? You stated very clearly that it's really important that we try and get cross-government cooperation to set up standard rules, and I get that, and everyone gets that, I'm just not seeing it anywhere. To what extent do you think that the EU can take ownership of defining the reopening of aviation in Europe? Are you scared of the risk of a whole new layer of bilateral health regulations, country by country, that can just overlay on top of the current bilateral air transport structures that we have? I'll leave it there. Thank you. Regarding our partnerships with other airlines, in particular, the two airlines that have an equity interest in the group, both Delta and China Eastern. As you're probably aware, we have an extensive transatlantic joint venture between Air France-KLM, Delta, and Virgin Atlantic. We don't foresee any change with this very successful joint venture going forward. From our way, we're working day in, day out, and from our view going forward, things will remain the same, and that is also the case with China Eastern. In terms of what is being done, what our hypothesis on a more streamlined border restrictions, in particular in Europe, we're part of A4E and IATA, and we know that both organizations are doing all they can to streamline and ensure there's harmonization for border crossings. We obviously are experiencing this non-coordination or different bilateral policies that are in place today. We don't foresee it becoming more complicated. We do foresee it becoming more harmonized. It's just a question of time. Okay. Thank you. Okay, thanks. We will now take our next question from Muneeba Kayani from Bank of America. Good morning. For the first quarter, you've said EBITDA would be lowered. How should we be thinking about free cash flow in the first quarter, and what you highlighted on working capital? Second question on fuel costs. With hedging lower this year and oil prices having risen, how are you thinking about fuel costs and the ability to pass it to ticket fares possibly this summer? Thirdly, can you talk about how you're thinking about the equity trends in terms of size and what are leveraged targets that you're working with here? No. First element concerning the fuel cost, we have a hedging portfolio which is not whole, which means that there is for 2021, no more over-hedge and a portfolio which is very close to the current fuel price. It can give you an indication of what will be the fuel bill based on our estimates on capacity we have provided into the presentation. Concerning the working capital, it will be difficult, of course, to make an assumption right now. What I have tried to explain during the presentation is that I think that we have been quite efficient in the management of the working capital for the year 2020, as I have shown in one of the slides. Second, clearly, there will be some expenses, some payment we have delayed which will have to be paid into 2021, and there is still EUR 1.4 billion of ticket unflown which are possibly reimbursed in the year 2021. First, it is less than what we made in 2020, where we reimbursed more than EUR 2 billion of tickets. Second, as you know, we have provided new offer to the clients to incentivize them to keep their ticket and to use it later on. We continue to have this commercial policy in order to avoid reimbursement of all the unflown ticket stock we have today. Third type of actions, of course, the two companies, that means the two financial department, but not only, are working with new suppliers, with administration to see if it's, again, possible to postpone some of this payment. I will say that I don't know if we will be as efficient as we have been in 2020 concerning the management of the working capital, but we continue, of course, to develop any actions in order to be able not to be hit too severely by this WCR for the year 2021. I hope to have answered your question. That will conclude today's question and answer session. I will hand your call back over to your host for closing remarks. We'd like to thank all of those who have been on the call today. Thank you for your questions, and have a great day and a great weekend.