Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to our Sustainability and Climate Progress Report Presentation 2026. This is the fifth year that we are organizing this event. We are live from our Paris headquarters, and you can follow us from our website, totalenergies.com. We hope that you got time to download our report. The program today will be first a presentation by Aurélien Hamelle, our President, Strategy and Sustainability, followed by two Zoom presentations, one on methane with Guillaume Chalmin, who is our Customer Line Director at OneTech, and one on our decarbonization solutions to our clients by Marc Bensadoun, who is our One B2B Director. The presentation should be one hour and 15 minutes, and then we'll move to a Q&A where you will be able to ask, of course, all the questions that you have, and we'll take some questions online as well. You know, at TotalEnergies, we have routines. In the morning we have, when we are starting a meeting, we have a safety moment. In the afternoon, we have sustainability moment. That can be small initiative, but they need to be very concrete, impactful, and to talk about operations. The example I want to show you today is coming from our Suriname affiliate. It's about electrification, which is a means to reduce our emissions on our operations. You know that we are starting the development of our GranMorgu project, which is an oil project offshore Suriname, 220,000 bbl a day. The first oil is planned in 2028, and the carbon intensity of that project is less than 16 kg o f CO2 per barrel. To achieve that objective, there are some initiatives that are taken by the affiliate, and one is electrify the vessels. You know there is a lot of logistics in the development phase, a lot of vessels who are coming into Suriname to offload the equipment. One initiative is to use electrified vessels and to ask our contractors to install, as you can see on the slides, some charging points. It's like a EV, you know. When the vessel is at quay, there is this option to plug, rather than burning fuel on board, to electricity so that we can save 6 cu m of gas oil per week, which in terms of CO2 savings is 65 tons of CO2 equivalent per month, which is already something before the startup of the meeting. On that note, I give the floor to Aurélien. Mr. Arnaud. Thank you. Hello, everyone. Thank you for being here with us, today. I have the pleasure of presenting for the third time, as far as I'm concerned. I'm very happy to share the progress we've made in our sustainability and climate roadmap, and then with my colleagues who will present to you these two zooms on methane and what we do with our clients in our One B2B division. First, we wanted to look with you at what's happened on the energy markets because, you know, this is framing basically our ambition and our strategy because we evolve in that wider energy market and want to take stock of what's happened in the last 10 years and 20 years, 25 years if you go back. Here you have a glimpse of what's been achieved and what's going in the right direction because what we see here actually is that a transition has started. The main figure to look at that is if you look at the total primary energy demand, it has been growing steadily, you know, between 2000 and 2015, it was 2.1% growth per annum. It was 1.6% between 2015 and today with some COVID effects. Actually more than that, let's say in a normalized environment. At the same time, you've had more energy to the world, you know, which brings energy, especially in emerging economies, which brings energy namely to the 4.6 billion people who do not have enough energy today to have a decent human development index performance. What we see here is that even though that is growing in a very steady way, however, CO2 emissions are still growing. That's not good news in absolute terms for the climate, but the pace of growth has very much declined. You can see that the pace of growth in emissions, that's CO2 emissions here, has been more than halved between the two periods. It means that a transition has started. This is really what we see in these figures. This is also reflected in the fact that GDP growth is basically the same, around 3%, 3.6%, 2.9%, but then there's COVID in the second period per annum. Other good news, there's a big growth in electrification. Electricity demand is growing. Renewable energy supply is growing very much. That's the fastest growing energy, as you can see here. Coal is growing still today. The pace of growth of coal has declined, but it is still growing. Gas is growing steadily, 2.3%. Finally, oil demand is growing at the same pace as population, which is very steady historical trend. The transition has started, but it's not yet where it is supposed to be in terms of pace to reach the Paris Agreement, as we all know. We're just taking here two quotes from experts and scientists, just to underline that. Basically what we know, what we hear today from these experts and scientists is that scenarios that have a 1.5 degrees heating are out of reach. This is what the IEA said in its latest World Energy Outlook report last November. You have that on the left-hand side. We're quoting here James Hansen. The reason is James Hansen is a very authoritative figure in the climate world. You know, he's the one who in 1988 went to the U.S. Senate and made climate change really a political reality. It was a scientific reality before 1988 obviously, but then things started to kick in motion. You know, the 1992 convention in Rio, the IPCC being set up, this was kind of a defining moment. He says what you see here, that it is out of reach basically to reach these Paris goals. He says that in respect of actually 2 degrees heating. The main reason for that is the inertia of their energy systems, and I'll come back to that. I would say equally important is that what we know is that something has been very high on the energy agenda, energy and climate agenda in the last 10 years, certainly, it is sustainability. That's what you see here on the triangle of the energy trilemma. Sustainability has been at the top, maybe on its own actually for some time, of the agenda, and it is still very much on the agenda. It certainly is very much on our agenda still today. It means that we need to bring energy that is more and more sustainable, emitting less and less, and that contributes to human development. What's happened in the last 10 years, and especially in the last five years, is that you have had a resurgence of what has always been in the energy trilemma, that is to say reliability. We need to have reliable energy. Current news are still a testimony to that. That is still an issue, making sure that we have access to energy. That's true for oil and gas. That's also true for electricity. You know, the blackout that happened in Spain in April 2025 is another example of the fact that it is very important to have reliable oil and gas, to have reliable electricity as well. This has come at the forefront of the agenda again because of crisis. I think what's key, and I'll come back to that in the course of the presentation, is affordability. We c annot collectively achieve the transition if the transition is not made affordable. That's a very, very strong, powerful, simple truth. I'll come back to that because we have a role to play in this respect. Now, what needs to happen? What do we collectively need to do to, let's say, accelerate the pace? You have here what we list as the main enablers for success, and you know, technical innovation is key. Let me give two examples. One is EV penetration lagging in a way, EV vehicles, because there is anxiety around namely the range of vehicles, the ability to charge in pretty fast time. This is evolving rapidly, so there have been technological breakthroughs recently in this respect. It needs to happen for every form of energy and every kind of use. It needs to be affordable, as I was saying. As we'll see in some more details, if low carbon technologies on the demand side of things especially, how can we use low carbon electricity in an affordable way? If it is not achieved collectively by the states, by companies, by clients who adopt that, we won't get there, basically. It needs to be supported by public policies. We need to have stable policies in place, and they need to target what makes a difference. It goes back to something that we advocate for a lot, which is the CO2 merit curve of things. Not every ton of CO2 is equal. There are some tons of CO2 that are cheapest to remove or to abate than others. Certainly public policies support in form, in the form of subsidies, it should aim for these tons of CO2 that are the cheapest to abate because this is how you achieve affordability in the transition. Carbon pricing is one of those mechanisms actually, and I'll come back to that, and this is what allows for customers' adoption. What you see here on the right-hand side of the slide is what a world in which things will accelerate would look like. Here we use, you know, where things stand today in terms of electrification of end use, decarbonization of the grid, and where it should be going basically to make that happen. Against that backdrop, where do we stand today? We are in a world where, as I was saying, the transition has started. That's very good news. Not at the pace required to meet the Paris Agreement's goal. There is a scientific consensus, which is very much public in the public domain being shared, that 1.5 degrees is out of reach. Now against that backdrop, what it also means is that because we are a European company, and it's something we explain actually in our S&C report this year, we cannot adopt a net zero transition plan according to the European regulations because such a plan in the European regulations has to be aligned with 1.5 degrees, and scientists say 1.5 degrees is out of reach. So what do we do against that, let's say, wider backdrop against which we operate? We do the same. We maintain the course of our strategy and our ambition. This is what you see here on the right-hand side. We maintain our ambition to achieve carbon neutrality together with society within the framework of the Paris Agreement's objectives. When we say together with society, it means that this is the collective effort I was referring to. We are playing a part in that. States are playing a part in that. Consumers, other corporates are playing a part in that. This is why also we show these enablers of success, and we show these dependencies because we need to make the energy system evolve overall, and we are one of the players in the energy system. Then we reassert our ambition, our aim to be carbon neutral in our operations by 2050. That's Scope 2. We reassert our objective to have a reduction, a net reduction of our CO2 emissions in our operations, Scope 2, by 40% by 2030 compared to 2015. The same is very much true for methane. Guillaume Chalmin will give you a lot of details around that later on. We have the objective to reduce our methane operated emissions by 80% in 2030 compared to 2020, and you'll see we're very much on track to get there. That's key for the transition of the energy systems, where we have a role to play. We are going to continue to put on the market for our clients, and this is why what Marc Bensadoun will present to you. We're going to continue to put on the market an energy mix that's that has a lower carbon content over time, and this is what is going to drive the reduction of our carbon intensity index. We are staying that course. What does it mean in terms of figures? Here you see where we come from and you have the, let's say, historical performance of our CO2 scope one and two reduction, of our methane reduction, and of the life cycle carbon intensity. You see here that last year in 2025, we reduced our operated methane emissions by 65% compared to 2020. Actually, we had started reducing the emissions, the methane emissions before 2020. We reduced the scope one and two emissions to 33.1 million tons. That's compared to 46 million tons in 2015, while actually at the same time, we grew our production and we created a whole new business segment, Integrated Power, with actually some gas-fired power plants. What we show here is that the performance in our, let's say, historical oil and gas sector is a reduction that's already very significant of 38% Scope 1 and 2 emissions over that time period, 2015 to 2025. At the same time, we have lowered the carbon intensity of the energy product we sell to our customers, and you can see that it's been reduced by 18% more than that, close to 19%, in 2025. We are going to continue. You can see the objectives for 2026 and the medium-term objectives for 2030. They are unchanged compared to what you've seen in the last year, couple of years and more than that. Now, how do we get there? It's frankly, and you know, as Arnaud Le Foll explained during the sustainability moment, it's a lot of concrete down to the ground, down to the operations initiatives, and you'll see some of those later on around methane. Here you see the levers on which we can pull to get to our 2030 target. This is what you see here. As I was saying, there is actually an increase in a way in the bottom line, the baseline of the emissions because of the additional gas-fired power plants we've embarked into our operations. That's new. That's been new in the last five, six years. There's the management we have around our oil and gas portfolio, and you can see that's driving a reduction that's actually comparable to the increase of the CCGTs and this is because we have this low cost, and especially here, low emissions approach to our oil and gas projects. I'll give details to you after, afterwards. It's a bit of everything, energy efficiency, electrification, greening H2, methane reduction obviously. Starting in 2030, not before, as we've always said, we'll start using nature-based solutions credits so that we can also drive the reduction and reach our targets, but that will not start before 2030. Until then, it's all work on the ground, basically. With all of that, we have reduced last year the intensity of CO2 per barrel of oil equivalent we produce to below 16 kg. Meaning, when we produce one barrel of oil or gas equivalent, there is a release in the atmosphere of less than 16 kg CO2 per barrel produced. That's roughly half the industry average. We keep reducing that over time, and now that's the new threshold on which we base our investment decisions. Any new project must be below that threshold, and that's a very virtuous threshold. Now let's look at an example on what we do around energy efficiency. As a producer of energy, particularly oil and gas, our primary responsibility is to reduce Scope 1 direct emissions and Scope 2 indirect emissions of our sites. One of the best ways to do this is to improve our energy efficiency. That's why in 2022, TotalEnergies launched a worldwide billion-dollar plan to cut our energy use, the Energy Saving Plan or ESP. 400 projects were launched between 2023 and 2025, mostly on our refining and petrochemical sites, but also on our exploration and production offshore facilities. A collective effort to which all teams contributed, from R&D centers to industrial sites, focused on a common objective, bringing our greenhouse gas emissions down by 2 million tons of CO2 equivalent by 2025. Let's head to Block 17 in Angola to look at one of these projects. In 2023, we stopped one boiler on Dalia, reducing CO2 emissions by 38 kilotons CO2 equivalents. In 2024, we stopped two unused PG on Dalia and Pazflor, reducing CO2 emissions by 29 kilotons CO2 equivalent. Globally, we are reducing 37 kilotons CO2 equivalent per year, sparing 58 million cu m of LNG. In France too, there are plenty of initiatives, like here at the Normandy complex. [Non-English content] This initiative has really delivered results, enabling us to generate energy savings of $200 million per year. A second plan has been launched for 2025 to 2028, the Energy Saving Plan Plus, with another $1 billion of investment as we commit to continue reducing emissions on our sites. These are great examples of what we do and then what, you know, everybody, as I was saying, as it's a collective effort should be doing. Now, let's look in more detail at our transition strategy, which, you know, is encapsulated in four very simple words: more energy, less emissions. This is what is driving our action when we implement our strategy. You know the strategy, it's based on two pillars. Developing oil and gas, keeping producing, and developing new oil and gas projects, and building this Integrated Power segment so that we can produce and put on the market electricity. What's important here is that, you know, there is growing demand, as I was saying, in oil and gas. There is also the natural decline rate of fields that the whole industry has to fight against just to maintain production levels flat. We are investing in oil and gas, but we are prioritizing those projects that have low cost and low emissions because we believe these are the projects that will be resilient in any kind of scenario. The key here is that we can adapt our strategy to evolving scenarios, to evolving futures, because we don't really know what the future holds. We know it will be different from today, and we need to be able to adjust our strategy in this respect. This is exactly the way in which we prioritize our oil and gas investments. As far as gas is concerned, and especially LNG, the key short and medium-term priority is to abate methane emissions. As you know, this is a key priority for us. Finally, when it comes to electricity, we need to achieve scale and size so that we make a difference so that we can provide reliable electricity to customers. When you bring scale, you can deliver affordable energy and electricity to customers, and it allows that to be profitable, obviously, for our shareholders. This is exactly the way in which we are implementing our strategy. What does it mean in terms of energy? On the left-hand side here, you can see the energy production that the split we had in 2015. You see that there was no electricity back then. It was only oil and gas, actually more oil than gas. You can see the evolution of that, let's say, energy production mix. You can see that last year we achieved something where, you know, gas played more of a relative role to oil, and especially there was electricity. The production of power last year amounted to, as you can see, the equivalent of 8% of our oil and gas production. There is also other low carbon molecules we produce, like sustainable aviation fuel. What do we aim for? We aim for a growth in our energy production that's overall 4% per year by 2030. This is more than 3% per year for oil and gas, predominantly LNG. This is a very significant 20% growth per year for our power production, as you can see here. The idea is that in 2030, we are aiming for a production of electricity that's going to be 20% of the overall energy we produce. This is what we are very patiently, very consistently building and delivering. In terms of energy sales, you can see the evolution is the same. It is, in a way, just exacerbated. You can see here that there is the same evolution, in terms of gas playing a significant part in our sales mix between oil and gas, and electricity playing more and more of a very significant part. All of that is driving the carbon intensity of the products we sell to our customers down, as you can see on the right-hand side. Again, we achieved 18.6% reduction in this carbon intensity of the energy mix we put on the market last year, and we are going for -25% in 2030. This is key because the carbon intensity is really the reflection of the fact that we enable our customers who consume energy to reduce their own Scope 1 and 2 emissions. Because at the end of the day, what we want to achieve is that we, as an energy producer, like you saw in the movie just now, we reduce our Scope 1 and 2 emissions. What we want to achieve is that our clients can reduce their Scope 1 and 2 emissions, and this is what this CI, this carbon intensity index is really measuring. We are tailoring the investments so that they can precisely meet those targets. You can see here the investment allocation this year in 2026, and you can see what we aim to do by 2030. There is investment in oil and gas for growth, new projects, and maintenance investments. As I was saying, we are investing in existing projects, any new projects actually, so that we can fight this natural decline of fields. The natural decline rate of fields, the IEA published a report last September, is on average for the global industry, around 7%-8%. This is something we have to fight just to maintain production flat. This is what we're doing exactly when we invest, and we invest in new projects to sustain the growth that I was mentioning, which is more than 3% per year. A lot of LNG. It's not new. We've done that consistently. Actually, we have more than 12 years proved reserves life index, which puts us, you know, in the best league in the industry in this respect. Now we invest in low carbon energies, and we've done something very significant recently. We announced a deal late last year with EPH that has a fleet of CCGTs, so gas-fired power plants in Europe. We're going to be acquiring 50% of that fleet. That's a lot in Italy, the U.K., Ireland, the Netherlands namely. What we're doing here, it's a share deal, so it's going to be a capital increase to do that deal, which should close around the summertime. What we're doing here is that we are really front-loading, accelerating the plan. We had a plan to grow in renewables, still here, and I'll show that afterwards. We had a plan to grow in flexible generation assets, CCGTs, gas-fired power plants. In Europe, actually, with that deal, we have front-loaded a significant share of that plan so that we can accelerate our power production. The investment effort is going to be around EUR 4 billion per year, including EUR 1 billion per year in this EPH share deal that we have, if you look at that over the next five years. We are going for a low CapEx approach to other low carbon activities, and I'll show details of that afterwards, so I'll come back to that. The reason is we are adapting our investment space to market penetration on the client side of things, and again, I'll show you some examples of that. One very good way to look at our effort that's consistent over time is the E.U. taxonomy. You know, 30% of our investment in a proportional view are eligible to the E.U. taxonomy. This is what we achieve year after year to grow that low carbon business, that Integrated Power business, that we've been building. I was saying that what we aim to have is a resilient portfolio when it comes to producing oil and gas. Here you have in a snapshot, that's a very fairly busy slide, but here you have in a snapshot what it means in concrete terms to have a resilient portfolio of oil and gas. What it means first is that we need to have good control of our cost and make sure that the breakeven in our oil and gas portfolio is as low as possible. You can see over the last, you know, almost 10 years now, the breakeven has been very, very consistently low, around the $25 per barrel threshold, so that, you know, we can generate profits in a lot of prices environment, even in low prices environments. The reason we've gotten there is that we've applied, and we keep applying very strict investment criteria. Our investments in oil and gas need to be profitable in a $50 per barrel environment. They need to generate returns in those environments. They need to have a CapEx plus OpEx per barrel technical cost, CapEx plus OpEx that's less than $20 or less than $30 breakeven. These are investment criteria we have been following in the last few years. They're not new. We are still following these criteria, and they achieve exactly what you see. At the same time, our barrels of oil and gas that we produce today, that we produce in the future, they need to be resilient in any kind of a transition scenario. Depending on where things will be going, if things might accelerate in terms of penetration of low carbon technologies, the barrels of oil and gas that will be relevant to produce in the future will be those that have the lowest cost of production. I've mentioned that, and those that emit the least CO2 in the production cycle. This is exactly what you see here. I mentioned that earlier. We have criteria in our investment decisions. We take into account $100 per ton carbon pricing, assuming that if it were to apply, we need to make sure that we make a profit in our investment. As I was saying, we have lowered the intensity of CO2 that goes into the atmosphere when we produce a barrel of oil or gas to less than 16 kg. This is taking the intensity of our portfolio down. What you see on the bottom left side here of the slide is very interesting. We've looked at what are the existing production and projects up to 2040. You can see where our portfolio sits in that in that portfolio of production, global production. We have some of the most resilient, in terms of emissions, barrels of oil and gas to produce. You can see here that they are relevant, these barrels, in many scenarios, including Paris-aligned scenarios like the APS-24 that was published by the International Energy Agency. What it means, too, is that in terms of cash flow per barrel, we are increasing consistently the cash flow from operations we deliver per barrel. You see that on the right-hand side. You can see that the new projects that are being put into production, they bring additional cash flow compared to the average that we have. Again, this is because you see the result of these investment criteria that we've been applying. There is production growth, and there is accretive cash growth because the cash growth is even more important than the sheer production growth in oil and gas. This is what we're achieving by applying these criteria in a very constant way. This is how we are building this resilient portfolio of oil and gas. Here you have. We did the same thing around our LNG projects, and you can see where our projects of LNG are positioned on the merit curve and how they reach low breakeven in a 11% discount environment, that's Asia. You can see that they're best positioned on the merit curve. These LNG tons that will come on the market through these projects, they are resilient, they are sustainable so that they can contribute to meeting energy demand in gas. You can see that again, the performance in terms of intensity on the right-hand side of our new project is significantly better than the average of the industry, as you can see. Now, let me spend some time with you on some very concrete examples of what it means in our investments, in our operations and projects to deliver energy that's affordable and therefore that's profitable because the two really go together. Because this is what will drive customers' adoption. Let's look at electricity first. What you see here on the left-hand side is, you know, the, let's say, benchmark of levelized cost of electricity production of various means of production. You can see that without any surprise, the cheapest sources of electricity production today on an LCOE basis are solar and onshore wind. We take into account that in Europe, $100 per ton of CO2 pricing environment, which is a reasonable, let's say, assumption to make. You can see that, you know, solar and onshore wind, they perform better on a, you know, LCOE basis than CCGTs and offshore wind, and then the rest goes higher. What do we do? We invest in those means of production of electricity that are the best position on this merit curve, because we want to make profit out of that business, and we want to deliver affordable electricity to our clients. You can see that our portfolio is a portfolio where growth is going to come from these sources that are the best position on the merit curve. You can see that we are going to move from 48 TWh production in 2025, so that's close to 50 TWh electricity production last year to more than 100, well, 100-120 TWh production. The technology from which it's going to be derived is described here. That's evenly split in the camembert in French, in the pie. That's onshore solar, onshore wind, a small portion of offshore wind and flexible assets, gas-fired power plants with batteries playing a part. Batteries that can charge when prices are low or negative through solar, through wind, and then they can discharge on the grid when prices are higher. That's good for the reliability of electricity supply, one of the three tips of the energy trilemma, and that's good also for the affordability and profitability of these operations. This is what we are building as a portfolio, and you can see the split that we're aiming for in terms of where the production of electrons is going to come from. You can see what it means in terms of gigawatts of capacity installed. Still the same as you've seen since last year. 100 gigawatts of total gross capacity that we need to have developed and installed by then. A significant chunk, vast majority for renewables and then also from flexible generation. Trading is a key component in that business segment to optimize, and again, to create value for our shareholders. Now here what you see is the electricity generation that I've mentioned. If you look at the cash flow profile of that business, this year in 2026, we aim to generate more than $3 billion in cash flow from our Integrated Power operations. This means that this business segment will by the latest next year and might be sooner, depending on when we close the deal with EPH that I was mentioning. It means that, you know, at the latest next year, Integrated Power, the cash flow from operations will actually contribute to the dividend. It will generate more cash than we invest in terms of cash in that segment. This is what is shown here, and we are aiming for $4 billion-$5 billion cash flow from operations in 2030 in this business segment. It's always very interesting to compare that business with our oil business. You can see on the right-hand side, oil and gas business, that if we take a $60 per barrel environment, the return on average capital employed of our oil and gas oil activities is 12%. That's normal, so to speak. Our Integrated Power segment is going to be generating, that's the aim we have, 6%-12% return on average capital employed by 2030. The idea here is that in this business segment, we deliver the same returns on average capital employed than we do in a $60 environment in oil activities. What's very interesting too is that obviously, and that's shown here, you know, the power division will not capture upcycles in the oil prices as we know for very different reasons, we have one just today. It's going to be very resilient and very constant. It is also something that's very interesting to make sure that we have, you know, this cushion of cash flow from operations that are not, let's say, exposed to volatility in some cycles like the oil price. That dividend, as always, is sacrosanct and guaranteed by a variety of activities, and we derive a lot of value from that integration, and power plays a part in this respect too. Now let's look at some sub-segments of our activities. What we're showing here is really this, let's say, transition, affordability and pace of the transition journey. What you see on the left-hand side is that in our fast and ultra-fast public EV charging activities, we have 2,000 fast and ultra-fast charging points now that have been deployed. You can see that the utilization rate is still fairly low. It reached 9% in 2025. There is a slow growth, but still, that's slow growth. The reason is there is not EV adoption, namely in Europe, at the pace that was expected, required, or anticipated. Have it your way. then what do we do? We adjust our investment to the pace of market demand. There is not the demand that many expected that has materialized, so we keep investing lower levels of investment. We see that here. $100 million per year instead of $200, sorry, $200 million per year. We focus on what makes sense from an operations standpoint, fast and ultra-fast charging in our retail stations, highways and urban areas. We've gone for a low equity approach to what we call B2C. B2C is, you know, the public street charging concessions like in Paris and other capitals in Europe and elsewhere in the world. In France, we've done a joint venture, we announced that last year with Banque des Territoires, that's Caisse des Dépôts, to develop that activity with them so there's less capital we put in, there's more leverage we can have, and we've done the same in the Netherlands and Belgium with TKO recently. This is an approach where we're still going for that business, but with partners, with more leverage so that, you know, we follow the pace of public demand, and we put our capital where it makes sense to put our capital in. Then what needs to happen for that to accelerate? What are the enablers concretely for EV penetration? Prices need to go down, and certainly there needs to be a significant push for small segment cars because they can be made affordable. We know it's the case in China already. Chinese electric cars are more competitive than Chinese ICE cars on the Chinese domestic market. Europe can get there. Other countries can too. We collectively, the car industry, the states and governments that devise the policies, need to support adoption of small EV cars. They need to be made affordable for, and there needs to be support for the used car markets. The reason is this is where people actually buy their car. In France, for instance, 70% of cars are bought on the second-hand car markets, not on the new car markets. These are the enablers. Technology needs to be adaptable. The reason is, as I was saying earlier, there have been very significant developments in technology charging, in ranges that batteries can achieve, and how fast you can charge batteries, namely from some Chinese innovation. We need to make sure that our infrastructure of EV charging will be able to adapt to evolving technologies at a pretty rapid pace, actually. You need to take the power to these distribution points, these EV charging points, so networks, grids need to be upgraded. These are very concrete enablers where policy support, subsidies, money can be put behind. You know, subsidies were taken out by the French and German governments for EV cars for a year in 2024, 2025, reinstated last year, and we saw immediate results in the uptake of EV cars on the markets. It had been plateauing really for three years. There was a decline in 2024, and there was a slight uptick in that figure of EV penetration late last year and earlier this year. Let's look now at aviation mobility. We know that there is an excess cost or an additional cost to produce low carbon molecules for the aviation industry. You can see here the comparison. We take as a benchmark, you know, the cost of jet fuel before March, so let's say in February. Then we look at the merit curve of different technologies. SAF from co-processing is the next cheapest source of production compared to jet fuel. SAF from brownfield, meaning conversion of refineries, is the next one, and so on and so forth. You can see that the most expensive is eSAF, meaning synthetic SAF to produce, which is made from the combination of H2 and CO2. This one is extremely expensive, 10x m ore expensive than traditional oil jet fuel. What do we do in this context? We, as always, invest for what's the cheapest to produce, therefore what's the most affordable and the most profitable. You can see that in our European refineries, we have invested in co-processing capacities because they're the next cheapest ones compared to jet fuel. We've done that in Normandy. We've done that in Leuna. There's no CapEx required because you directly inject into the oil fuel refining, oil jet fuel refining process, you directly inject biodiesel, HVO, or bio feedstock, lipids directly in there. It goes into the process, and then you have a blended fuel at the end of the process that meets the, namely, E.U. mandates requirements or even more than that today, to go on the market. We've also invested in pure SAF, neat SAF, 100% SAF capacity. La Mède is already producing 15,000 tons per year in the south of France. Grandpuits, that's not too far from Paris, will start production by the end of this year, and it will reach a full capacity of 230,000 tons per year. By doing that, we are investing in means of production that are competitive when we go and face customers, airlines that have to buy these aviation fuels. We need to secure feedstock because feedstock is key in producing sustainable aviation fuel. We've done partnerships, namely with SARIA, Quatra, to make sure we have access to the animal fat, used cooking oil that we need to produce these SAFs. Now what's required. What's required is something that's working in a way in the E.U. is mandates. Mandates in the E.U., they're really the, in a material way, the only place where you have mandates for demand to materialize, in the world. That's in the E.U. You have very small mandate in other places like Singapore or the U.K., but that's way smaller in terms of quantities. Then we listen to our customers, and what they say is that, you know, it's going to be very steep because today mandates are 2% SAF in jet fuel. Basically, that's the blend you need to have today on the market. It's going to be 6% in 2030 when you look at the European regulations, with a sub-mandate of around 1% of eSAF in 2030. We can see that eSAF is the most expensive one, so maybe it doesn't quite make sense to have that yet. The steps are going to be very steep. It's going to be 20% in 2035, 34% in 2040, and then going to 70% of blend that you need to have in 2050. That's what you have in the E.U. regulations today. Airlines are saying, we can't have that, not in the current, you know, technology and price environment. What we are saying is that, and this is something that airlines are advocating, no, there should be more technological neutrality in mandates, so that you put in the blend what's the cheapest to produce, and therefore, you know, airlines in Europe can stay competitive. You need to make sure that, there is maybe more, let's say, progressivity in the way in which the requirements are going to be, progressing. Certainly, what's very important is the more we can have global mandates one way or another, the more there's going to be demand certainty and the more it's easier actually for suppliers like us to make our investment decisions, for instance, in Europe. These are the enablers, and again, they're very concrete examples of what can be delivered by governments, by customers, by corporates together so that we can accelerate that pace of transition. Same is true for the hydrogen. Hydrogen was seen as maybe some kind of a phenomenal universal energy vector maybe some five years ago in the discussions. We all know that things have changed in the way in which H2 is being looked at, but still it has not disappeared. There's the typical here what I like to call, you know, the chicken and egg issue on green hydrogen. Green hydrogen is very expensive. You can see it here on the left-hand side. The question is, you know, who's going to come first? Because supply needs to be in so that clients are comfortable they can make investments. You know, suppliers of hydrogen need to be comfortable that there will be demand. That's the chicken and egg issue. What we've done is that because we are an energy producer on the one hand, you know that, but we consume a lot of hydrogen in our refineries, too. We've gone for an approach where we are aiming to procure, produce in joint ventures, low carbon hydrogen, namely, especially green hydrogen that we can use in our refineries in Europe starting in 2030. It will abate CO2 emissions, so that's good for climate, and we'll be able to deliver energy products to our customers. Then what we need to do collectively again is to make sure that we find a way to compensate the excess price, because otherwise that's not affordable, that's not competitive, it's not going to work. How can we do that? Well, when you look at that in Europe, if you compare the gray part, that's the gray hydrogen based on natural gas price. If you add up the ETS, the CO2 pricing cost of producing gray hydrogen, you can see that you really don't get to parity with the price of blue or green hydrogen. You need to have what we call RED III RFNBO eligibility to a significant extent, so that basically using green low carbon hydrogen in our refineries will generate these renewable fuels of non-biological origin credits under the E.U. regulations, and that's for member states to implement. You can basically, sorry, match the price in a way, or the excess cost, excess price that you have. We need that to happen. It's happened in some countries, you know, these eligibility for certificates. It needs to be improved in some countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. We need to have visibility beyond 2030 because we don't make investment decisions in a five-year time horizon. It's more 15, 20 more years that we look at when we make investment decisions. We need to have more visibility. Market size needs to grow because the more you grow the market size, the more you have scale and the more you can basically bring down the costs. When you look at CCS, again, it's the same story. On the left-hand side, you can see that carbon capture and storage is expensive, and you can see that the all-in cost of capture, transportation, and storage of CO2 leaves a significant cost gap to the ETS price that in Europe producers have to pay. Basically, what we've done is we've invested in some capacity. In Northern Lights in Norway, where we have a co-partner, is now injecting, storing CO2. We need to make sure that clients are here, and for that to happen, there needs to be faster permitting in the E.U. for clients to do the capture side, for developers like us to do the storage side of things and transportation in between. We need to have a lot of visibility and regulation, and especially, again, still the same story. There needs to be a way to make up for this, you know, pricing difference that's in excess of the ETS price that, you know, if you store CO2, you don't pay the ETS because you can store the CO2, but then it still leaves an extra price on it. There needs to be mechanisms in place. One of them, it's been put in place in some places. It's CCfDs, Carbon Contracts for Difference. They're policy tools that exist that can be used, again, to make sure that there is enough incentives for large emitters of CO2, you know, cement factories, for instance, to make these investments, to make them, again, affordable, therefore competitive, and make sure that in Europe, for instance, the example we're giving, competitiveness is maintained for the European industry. All of that is putting us in a place where, you know, we are creating value year after year for our stakeholders, for our shareholders, and you can see here where this value goes. You know, taxes, namely in a lot of non-OECD countries, emerging economies, which is very important to our employees, obviously, to our shareholders, and to investments. It's something that we present every year. We have employees who feel safe working in the company. That's very important. Arnaud was saying that we have safety routines in the morning. They trust the way in which the senior management team, the company is evolving, is implementing its strategy. There is a lot of confidence. Therefore, we can embark our 100,000 employees in this journey because if they are not on board, if we as colleagues are not on board, we can't achieve that. They're proud to work for TotalEnergies, which is very important to us. This is reflected in the fact that they are very significant shareholders of the company. They now own close to 10% of the share capital of TotalEnergies. It's growing. Last year, they invested $ 500 million in the capital increase for employees in our company. That's the best, you know, it goes without any speech. I could have just mentioned that, and I think it shows that they feel more than okay working for TotalEnergies and they trust what it is that we're doing in terms of strategy. Now, others, when they look at us, find that we perform more than well. Here you have extra financial evaluations by third parties. I won't comment on that. When you look into more details, you can see that we have very, very excellent ratings by EcoVadis, in our affiliates, in our operations. That's supply chain management, that's environment, that's safety, that's human rights. This is what goes into these rankings and evaluations that we have. Finally, let me conclude here before I leave the floor to my colleagues. You can see here 15 years of evolution, and there's one simple way to look at that. What needs to go up is going up. What needs to go down is going down. We're taking profits up, share price up, energy production up because we're bringing energy to the world. We're taking CO2 emissions, methane emissions, life cycle carbon intensity down, and we have no intention to stop. Thank you very much. Thank you, Aurélien. A very good morning or afternoon to all of you. I'm very pleased to walk you through this presentation and to share with you some insight into w hat we have been doing in the company to fight against methane emission as Aurélien was explaining. Also to explain you what we intend to do to take this fight a step further. You will see that there are many initiatives that we have already undertaken, which I think position us as a leader in the industry. Of course, we would like to maintain this position of leadership. First of all, why does methane emission matter? Methane is a well-known greenhouse gas, like is CO2, but its global warming potential is much greater than CO2. If you consider a period of 100 years, it's 30 times more impactful than CO2. If you consider 20 years, it even jumps to 80 times more. Why is that? Because methane, unlike CO2, is unstable in the atmosphere, and it has an average lifetime which is around 12 years only. We estimate that methane has been responsible for globally a third of the global warming since the Industrial Revolution. If you take the example of the year 2023, out of the 56 gigaton of CO2 equivalent that were released in that year, you have 12 gigaton that were directly linked to methane, mainly because of the activity in agriculture, in waste, and of course in energy. Out of these 12 gigaton, you had 4 gigaton specifically linked to the use of fossil fuel, and 2.4 which were directly associated with the oil and gas activity. Because of the relatively short lifetime of the methane, as I explained, acting on its emission does have a short-term impact on the global warming. We believe actually that it's probably the most efficient lever that we have to fight against this warming. Just to illustrate that, you may remember that it was back in 2021 in Glasgow at COP26, 150 countries committed to reduce their methane emission by 30% over this decade. If this commitment is met, which we hope, it will then have an impact of 0.2 degrees Celsius on the global rise of temperature by 2050. You can see that the impact is indeed very meaningful. Probably contrary to what they have in agriculture and waste, we do have in the oil and gas industry both the technology and the operational expertise to fight efficiently and quickly against methane emission. What we have been doing as a company shows that very clearly, actually it will be the purpose of this presentation. First of all, very logically actually, because of what I've just said, we are strongly supportive of all the international initiatives that have been taken to act against methane emission. The first one that is mentioned here and that we co-funded is the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative that was launched in 2018. It's a CEO-led initiative that gives an objective in terms of methane intensity reduction. Likewise, we also co-funded the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership. This is a United Nations-led initiative that sets a reference framework for methane emission reporting. By the way, we were granted by the OGMP five years in a row the gold standards. We are very proud of that. Then there is a third initiative that is mentioned here that our CEO co-lead, which is, the Oil and Gas Decarbonization Charter, which was launched, in COP 28 in, back in 2023. It's a coalition of 56 oil and gas international or national companies. This coalition represents 40% of the global oil production, and they committed to, we committed because we are part of that, to first of all, eliminate routine flaring, and secondly, to achieve near zero methane emission, and this by the end of this decade. Now moving to what we have done in the company regarding methane emissions. First of all, with the plot you have on the left, you see that we have been able over the last decade, so from 2010 to 2020, to cut by almost half our methane emission in the operated asset. We did that mainly by acting on flaring. Since then, as you can see, we have kept reducing very steadily the emissions. Over the last five years, we were able to cut them by an additional 65%. Interestingly, in 2020, our objective was to reduce the emissions in the five coming years by 50%, and we decided last year to raise this target to - 60%. As I just said, and Aurélien said it as well, we did even better than these reinforced targets. For that reason, we are very well on track to deliver the objective that we have for the end of this decade, which is to achieve an 80% reduction as compared to 2020. By the way, we set to ourselves, it was said previously as well recently, a new intermediate target, which is to reduce by 70% by the end of this year our emissions as compared to 2020. Likewise, regarding the methane intensity, which is the ratio between the methane that we release to the atmosphere over the amount of commercial gas that is produced. Methane intensity is on a very clear downward trajectory. We started this decade with an intensity at 0.15%, and at that time, we were targeting not to exceed 0.1% in 2030. Actually, we already reached this objective back in 2024, and for instance, last year we were as low as 0.07%. It happens that the bulk of the emissions that we have in the company takes place in exploration and production. For this reason, the E&P branch with OneTech support has set up an organization to tackle the emissions very systematically source by source. You have here the four main sources of emission. First of all, what we call fugitive emissions, which is gas leaks basically. Then you have flaring, because whenever you flare gas, there is always a fraction of this gas which is left unburnt, typically around 2%. Third, you have venting whenever by design there are a release of methane to the atmosphere in some area of the processing facilities. Then you have incomplete gas combustion in gas-driven equipment. Could be gas turbines or a gas engine. We did tackle very systematically these sources, but of course, when you embark in this type of journey, the very first things you need to ensure is to have a proper mapping of your emission and to do that with the appropriate technology. Several years ago, when we decided to equip ourselves with devices capable of measuring methane including at low concentration, including in hard-to-reach areas like flare tip, we saw that there were very few technology available on the market and on top of that, not with the accuracy and not with the functionalities that we were looking for. We decided to develop our own technology, and this was the support of two French research institute, the CNRS and Université de Reims. All together we developed a new sensor, which we called AUSEA, which is a gas spectrometer that is indeed capable of measuring low concentration of methane and also CO2 in the air. AUSEA can be either handheld or embarked on drone. We did qualify this technology in 2021 using our TADI platform, which is a testing platform Southwest of France, nearby Pau, through a blind testing program. More recently, the International Methane Emissions Observatory, together with Stanford, performed a benchmark of the various tools available on the market, again, based on blind testing. They came to the conclusion that AUSEA was indeed the best-in-class technology in this category. We have since then industrialized the manufacturing of the sensors. We have deployed AUSEA throughout operated asset. It was a very important achievement because it was truly a step change in our understanding of the emission, and it triggered a number of actions to fight against these emissions. As we were doing that, we also started to offer the operators of our OBU assets to conduct with our support AUSEA surveys. Likewise, we also offered this service to several national oil company. Just to name a few, there was Sonangol in Angola, Petrobras, SOCAR in Azerbaijan, and few others. Interestingly, we also accepted to share this technology with Veolia, so a very different business for them to map their emission in their landfill. Certainly AUSEA was an important step in our journey, but it was not enough actually, because with AUSEA you conduct spot survey, so it's not really appropriate for any discontinuous emission. For this reason, we decided it was at the end of 2024 to go a step further by equipping all our operated assets with a permanent monitoring system that consists of various type of devices such as IoT sensors, infrared camera. It also comprises systems that allows us assessing in real time the fraction of gas that is unburnt, left unburnt in flares or in gas-driven equipment. Thanks to a truly a massive engagement of all the affiliate in the E&P branch, we were able in just above a year to deploy that everywhere. For instance, we deployed in the order of 13,000 IoT sensors everywhere offshore, onshore. As you can see all this for a cost which is, I would say, limited, which was limited to $50 million, limited given the magnitude of the plan. That's where we are, and as we were doing that, we also set up in the head office a Methane Tracking Center, MTC. In the MTC, we collect real-time all the data that are acquired now on site related to methane emission, plus also data that we receive from a number of satellite data providers. The MTC objective actually is twofold. First of all, logically is to support all our sites in their detection program, and also very importantly to try now to make the most of this massive influx of data, leveraging AI digital solution to try and take our fight against methane even a step further. I told you earlier on that the very first source of emission that we have to tackle are fugitive emissions, so leaks. You can see on the top right of this slide an example of a gas leak at the level of a flange. Back at the beginning of this decade, fugitive emissions accounted for close to 10% of our global methane emission in the operated perimeter. Of course, our duty is to detect immediately any fugitive emissions, which we can now do thanks to this permanent monitoring system that I've just described. As soon as you have detected that there is something going wrong in your process, the next step is to be able to identify precisely what is the source of the leak and also to measure the rate of this leak, which we cannot do actually with the IoT sensors. For that, we do what we call a LDAR survey, which stands for quantification leak detection and repair, which is basically a handheld infrared camera survey, which indeed allows us to say precisely what is the source of the gas leak and how much of gas is released to the atmosphere. Of course, the very last step, but the most important actually is to fix all that, to stop the leak, which we are doing exactly like what we are doing for oil spills. We put here a very concrete example of various detection that we've been able to do with this large panoply of tools that we have now in hand. Starting on the upper left of this slide, you have a satellite detection that was done in the Middle East, one of our asset onshore. The colored pixel corresponds to the gas cloud. Actually, it originated from a cold flare after a process event. Moving down, you have examples of detection that were done with AUSEA, either walking the sensors through the facilities or by drones with through flight. Upper right, you have two examples of detection from a fixed camera. The one on the left is very interesting. It took place in South America onshore assets. We were actually able to detect a gas leak from a buried pipe because of pinhole due to corrosion. Then on the right you have another example which is again in the Middle East at the top of a storage tank with gas release. Moving to the bottom part of this slide, right part, you have a very short detection that was done thanks to one of these many IoT sensors that we have now deployed. This one took place in the North Sea after a maintenance operation. Needless to say that in all these cases we act swiftly to stop that. I told you earlier on as well that a second source of emission possibly was flaring. When dealing with flaring, the first thing you need to address is routine flaring. By the way, we are committed, as I said earlier on to eliminate routine flaring from our operations, operated assets by the end of this decade. Here you have the example of what happened in Nigeria. We are offshore OML 100. It's an oil assets, and by design, there, the associated gas used to be routinely flared in a number of satellite platforms. We decided to collect this gas, route it to a central complex, treat it, and then send it to an LNG for this gas to be liquefied. It allowed us to abate our emissions by 1,000 tons of methane per year. Probably more interestingly, it came with a net technical cost, NTC negative - 40 tons per CO2 equivalent abated. Why that? Is because when you combine the revenues that is coming from this extra gas that we monetize, plus the avoidance of paying penalties for flaring, you do more than offset actually the cost of rerouting the gas to the central complex. That was for routine flaring. Another type of flaring is safety flaring. Contrarily to routine flaring, you cannot avoid safety flaring because you always need to flare a fraction of gas to just ensure safe performance of your operations. The least we should do is to make sure that this gas is as little as possible. Here you have the example of what we did in Gabon offshore in two very mature assets, Anguille and Torpille, which were equipped as they were mature by old design flares. We decided to modernize these flares by installing new flare tip with a flame stabilizer, also an automatic ignition system. This plus a few other optimizations allowed us to reduce the methane emissions by more than 3,000 tons a year. Here again, by the way, with a negative NTC. Slightly negative, but negative because of the extra gas monetization. The last example I wanted to share with you regarding flaring is what we call flare gas recovery system, so FGRS, which may be better known as closed flare. Here the principle is very simple actually. Very often in the former design of facilities, all the residual low pressure gas streams are flared. So the idea is to collect this gas, to compress it, and to recycle it in the processing facilities. Today, by design, any new facilities that any new project that we launch is equipped with a closed flare. It's a must-do for our engineers. We also embarked in a retrofit campaign in several brownfield assets. We have installed as part of this campaign a closed flare in Tempa Rossa, which is an oil onshore asset in Italy. This, likewise, we did that in Egina FPSO deepwater Nigeria. Before concluding, two examples that we wanted to share with you regarding a third source of emissions, which is venting, when we release gas by design from our processing facilities. Here the first example we wanted to share with you is taken from the U.S. and more specifically from our shale gas asset in Texas, Barnett asset. There we produce gas from quite a number of wells that are spread over like 400 pads. It happens that these pads were equipped by design with what we call gas instrumentation, which is used to pneumatically power a number of devices on the pad. The issue with this design is that once you have used the gas, it's just released to the air. We decided to switch all that from gas instrumentation to air instrumentation simply by installing air compressor on the different pads. As you can see, it's resulted into just a massive methane emission reduction, -7,000 tons per year, even more. Remember that last year at company level, our total emission in the operated perimeter was slightly above 20,000 tons per year. It was a very meaningful initiative at the company level, and this with a net technical cost that was limited to a $20-ish per ton, thanks to the extra gas monetization. Very last example we wanted to share with you, we are back in Nigeria, but this time in onshore OML 58. We have on this asset close to 10 storage oil tanks, which were equipped by design with what we call a natural gas blanketing system. It is gas that you put inside the storage at the front of it just to avoid any oxygen ingress. The issue with that, and we realized that thanks to all their surveys, that it comes with a significant release of gas to the atmosphere. We decided to change this blanketing system for a nitrogen blanketing. Here again, like for the Barnett, it resulted into a massive methane emission reduction, minus 5,000 tons a year, within a technical cost that was slightly negative. This leads me to my concluding remark, which will be very short. First of all, I hope that with all these examples, very concrete that we shared with you are as convinced as we are that it is indeed quite possible to act efficiently and quickly against methane emissions, providing we do that very systematically and we mobilize the appropriate technology. On top of that, very often we see that we can even do that in an accretive manner. As far as we are concerned, it truly reinforce our conviction that it's the whole oil and gas industry that should follow this path, and we are here to support this move. Also we'll keep very proactively pushing the operators of all our non-op assets to engage in the same journey, sharing with them our experience and knowledge. With this remark, I will stop here and hand over to you, Marc, for the last focus. Thank you, Guillaume. Good afternoon. Before sharing some customer cases, I will sare with you some achievement and also some takeaways where we are regarding the customer decarbonization. As Aurélien told you, we are well on track on our objective to reduce the carbon intensity of the product we sell with an achievement by the end of 2025 of 18.6%. What I wanted to illustrate with you here is how we achieve that. The three main levers to achieve it is first by reducing the direct operational emission. The second one is shifting our energy mix with more gas and less oil. The third one, which is very important, is by expanding the sale of electricity to our customer, which alone account for 67% of this objective. This is what you will see later, how we do that with our customer. Maybe a word on One B2B, just as a reminder. One B2B was created four years ago in the context of the energy transition, with the main mission to support our large customer in their decarbonization journey. Today, this is a team of 35 experts, acting as a bridge between customer needs and capability of the company to design and develop tailored long-term low carbon solution across all the company. We are structured around 10 key segments covering 37 industries. Today we track and support more than 450 customers worldwide. Just a number to give you a magnitude. All those customers, they represent around 2 gigatons CO2 emission per year, which is roughly 5% of the global emission worldwide linked to energy use. Now, from strategy to implementation, in terms of product, one integrated low-carbon multi-energy portfolio tailored to each customer transition, ranging from renewable electricity through classic PPAs or firm powers to decentralized generation batteries, mobility and low-carbon molecules. Together, this solution address our main key challenges of our customers. Aurélien told you, first is securing reliable, affordable supply. Second is of course reducing emission. The third one, which is key also, is to meet their industrial requirements. Where are we now? I will not enter in detail in all what you see here and in numbers, but the slide shows a clear progression. In four years, we have moved from first deals to real scale. The first comment I want to share with you is that we are delivering globally, and of course on our key strategic geographies, Europe, the United States, and of course Brazil. This shows that our model is working across geographies and also through different market condition. The second comment I want to share with you is that decarbonization takes time. This result reflects months and years of work structuring solution, building trust with our customer, and also turning ambition into long-term commitments. The third one is our capability and credibility now are well established on the market. In 2025 mark a clear step change with major agreement with the data center sector, which is certainly one of the most fast-growing and demanding sector. In short, delivery, scale, credibility. Before turning to the examples of decarbonization with customers, I would like to take a step back and to share with you a few takeaways on where our customers stand today with their decarbonization journey. The first main takeaway is that commitment remains strong toward 2030 despite a tough economic context. Visibility beyond 2030 is more limited, to be frank. Most efforts of our customers focus on Scope 2 because reducing Scope 1 remains today complex, capital-intensive, and highly dependent on technology. The second message I want to share regarding my experience with the company and our customer is that across sector we see two distinct dynamics. The first one is that for most of the sectors in industry, decarbonization is not pursued at the expense of competitiveness. Customers face real constraints. First, it's complex industrial transformation, and also the absence in the market of a green premium to justify large investment. At the same time, you have a few fast-growing sectors as data centers, aerospace, defense, but also pharmaceuticals, that are moving faster, driven by growth, strategic positioning, and strong sustainability commitments. Finally, when it's come to solution, low carbon electricity clearly stands as one of the main lever today to decarbonize. Hydrogen has moved down the agenda, and CCS still remain critical for specific sector as the cement industry. Now let's illustrate with four example. The first one is data center. I want to share with you some highlight on this sector. You know that it's the sector is really booming. AI is accelerating demand, and data center players are really engaged in a race for capacity and for market share. Their horizon is quite short-term, before 2030, and energy is really their top priority. It's critical for them to grow. The electricity demand from data center is expected to double, exceeding 1,000 TWh by 2030. They face three immediate challenges to well understand what we will do. First is fast access to land with a stable grid, reliable and 24/7 power, and meeting very ambitious sustainability targets. Now let's take the example of Google to highlight what we have done with this major player. In 2025, we have signed 2.2 GW PPAs with Google. 1 GW in Texas with TotalEnergies assets, and 1.2 GW in the U.S. through our JV Clearway on over three grids. In Texas, it's a real breakthrough what we did with Google. We provide an integrated, scalable solution and access to land to install a data center with grid connection, renewable generation, and possibility to install batteries. Beyond the U.S., our partnership also with Google is global. Earlier in 2025, we also signed a PPA in Malaysia for 20 MW. All those projects directly support the big ambition of Google to be 24/7 carbon free. The second example I want to share with you is also another strategic sector, which is the semiconductor. The semiconductor, it's upstream part of the data and tech industry, and demand is also driven by AI and also by connected devices. Energy consumption is growing at the same pace as data centers, and the production of semiconductors remains mainly in Asia, but with some selective reshoring in the U.S. and in Europe for critical technologies. This is not really a new territory for us. We were in 2023 a founding member of the Semiconductor Climate Consortium's Energy Collaborative launched during COP28. Now, let's take the example of STMicroelectronics, which is a leading European players supplying hyperscalers and major electronics company worldwide with a ambition for them to be 100% renewable energy by 2027. In 2025, we signed a major clean firm power contract in France, 1.5 terawatt-hour over 15 years, new solar and wind assets, firm 24/7, power align with their continuous industrial operation, which was key for them. The third example is the aviation industry. The aviation sector, it's an important emitter of CO2, around 4%, of the global emission. And also it's a booming industry. The global passenger traffic and the commercial fleet will double by mid-2040s, and with around more than 40 thousand new aircraft expected over the next 20 years. In terms of decarbonization, conventional propulsion should remain dominant, meaning that sustainable aviation fuel, the SAF, is the main near-term lever to decarbonize Scope 3 emissions. One of our key customers, Airbus, is strongly committed to pioneering decarbonization aviation with an ambitious roadmap targeting 63% CO2 emission reduction in Scope 1 and 2, and also 25% use of SAF by 2030 in their operation. TotalEnergies and Airbus share a long-standing partnership of over more than 50 years, and recently we have strengthened it on SAF innovation, including the development of blends above 50% compatible with future and current engines. In 2025, the partnership reached a new milestone with electricity, with the signature of two clean firm power contracts to supply the sites in Germany and in United Kingdom, representing 3.3 terawatt-hours over the next decade. This showcases the full extent of our multi-energy positioning with one customer. To conclude, I want to share with you a case in the steel industry, which is certainly one of the hardest sectors to decarbonize, accounting for around 8% of the global CO2 emission. We will focus here on the downstream of this industry with Vallourec, a global leader in premium tubular solution, mainly for the energy sector. Vallourec aims to reduce its carbon intensity by 30%, and green electricity is certainly the main key lever for them to achieve this target. We will go to Brazil. Brazil is a key geography for Vallourec, where they have a strong integrated industrial footprint, especially in Minas Gerais, which is north São Paulo. In Brazil, you may know hydropower, which is dominant, the reliability can be a challenge during the dry seasons. That's why Vallourec signed with us a 10-year PPA for 235 GWh per year of wind power through our joint venture, Casa dos Ventos. This power is produced thanks to a complex called Serra do Tigre, which is one of the largest onshore wind sites in Brazil. This contract will secure to Vallourec low carbon, reliable electricity, and marks really a new step in our partnership with a strong supplier for us that has become now an important customer. This is all for me in terms of example. Thank you very much, and I'm sure you are in contact with customer. If you have some customers who have strong challenges in terms of decarbonization, don't hesitate to tell who to call. Thank you. You can start the Q&A. Sorry for the diversity on stage. We are four men. Questions? Yes. Should I just- Yeah. You have a mic coming, yeah. Thank you for the presentation. Camille Bisconte de Saint Julien from LBPAM. I have a question that's not really related to the presentation, so I'm really sorry. It's more related to the current geopolitical context. Basically, given the exposure of the group in the Gulf and in the Middle East, I would like to know, and could you please share how the company basically anticipates and manages the risk that are related to the conflict, especially with regards to the protection of workers, subcontractors, migrant workers, local communities, and the protection of the environment, and give us some detail on crisis management at the moment. Thank you. I will take the question. The crisis happened on Saturday. On Tuesday morning, next Tuesday, we decided to evacuate all the families which were in the Middle East, including some non-essential workers, I would say, colleagues, and the ones which would not like to stay in the region because I would say of some anxiety. It represents 1,300 people which were in the U.A.E., in Qatar, in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq. We evacuated all of them. I think it was all in seven days. Six, seven days. We still have today some people on the ground, limited workforce, mainly Abu Dhabi and Qatar, people who are seconded in the operations. There are still some operations running there. We have also 15 people in Iraq. We have also, w e don't put everybody out because we have some local staff as well, you know, and that's part of the, i t's not only expatriates which we have to take into account, we have local staff. For local staff, we have offered to some of them if they wanted to exit. Most of them, of course, live in the country, and very few, in fact, the offer was not really followed up, but we have taken into account what we could do with them. We think it's important to keep a presence as long as we have some local staff there to keep the relationship. There are also some contractors who continue to work, in fact, on the ground. Everything is not stopped. It's not because we have stopped production or not us, by the way. Yeah, we stopped our production in Iraq and in Qatar, as you've seen. It was decided at a quite early stage to stop. Offshore Abu Dhabi is stopped. We are still running offshore. Onshore Abu Dhabi operations are still there. SATORP in Saudi Arabia is still running. We have some operations we need to take care of, and of course, keeping a presence there is important, for all our stakeholders as well. We have been, I would say, quite reactive to take all that into account and people first. It was the first priority, to be honest, for all of us to continue to keep the relationship and a close relationship with stakeholders at different levels of the company. They appreciate a lot, of course, the fact that we continue to be in contact with them following the events. I would say that's what we can do. That's the setup we have put in place, and it's quite reactive. Catherine, who is there, who has spent some nights to welcome people at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle, told me that everybody was quite happy. We have a good travel agency now in the company. I can tell you after the COVID, now with crisis, we are well accustomed to do it. Of course, I will tell you, including the families today, they would like to know when they can come back. For the time being, we of course, they will stay here, and we take care of them in their country. Families were not all repatriated here. They were repatriated where in their, I would say, home country for some of them because not all of them are French. There are people from all the many countries in the planet. Okay. Question? Yes, in front, please. Yeah. Thank you for the presentation. I have We have a mic here. Oh, okay. Sorry. My name is Nina. I'm from PFA, and thank you for the presentation. I have one question, whether you could elaborate on the rationale behind striking the recent deal with the Trump administration, cutting wind power projects in exchange for starting new oil and gas projects. I think in particular, given that you, Aurélien, also said the transition is happening, how is this compatible? I mean, how is your general significant oil and gas growth and LNG growth compatible with decarbonizing and creating long-term value in a transitioning energy system? I'll start with the second part of it and then address the first part of your question. Energy demand is growing in oil, gas, power. Power is growing the most, but still growing in oil, still growing in gas. Actually, you know, when we produce, we look at what may happen by 2050, gas is going to grow and then not decline in the foreseeable future and by 2050. One day, maybe there will be a peak in oil demand, but that seems to be further away, and then a slow decline. That slow decline will be slower than the decline rate of fields. In other words, oil and gas production today and in the future is relevant to address that energy demand. Because we want that to be resilient, that's why we work very hard on our operated emissions, on methane emissions in oil and gas. Oil and gas is very relevant in that transition journey as well because transition is not moving overnight from one given system A to system B. It's a gradual phasing of system B and then very gradual and slow phase out of system A. There's no phase away, let's say, of system A for the time being. Oil and gas production, in this respect, is very much relevant, and then this is why we have the two pillars. This is why we work on the resilience of the portfolio. Now to your first question, I think, you know, I'll make a- I will take the first question because I negotiated this story. Let's be clear. It's very simple. There is no way to invest in fact, offshore wind is an uninvestable topic in the U.S. You cannot invest billions of dollars in a country where we have no stable policy. If at every four years, somebody will tell you it's good or it's not good. You know, we are also there to create value for our shareholders, and we studied a lot. We know we were committed. We spent, in fact, the money we will give, which is given back to us, is exactly dollar for dollar what we put on the table to the Treasury to get the license. There is no taxpayer payment to TotalEnergies. We gave $923 million, $28 billion in 2022 to acquire these two licenses. They gave back the two licenses. Why? We came to the conclusion first after having studied all that it was quite honestly expensive energy, $150 per MWh. It's true that in the context of the U.S., where you have a huge amount of land, you can develop onshore solar, onshore wind, and we continue to develop onshore solar, onshore wind. We are definitely committed to that, and we did not renounce to none of our strategy in Integrated Power in the U.S. On the contrary, we are building 2 GW per year, more or less, and we continue to do it, and the administration did not ask us to stop. I mentioned that in front of the press conference that onshore wind is good for the U.S. I have no problem with that. In this energy mix of the U.S., in the specific case we do not need to develop this offshore wind, which is much more expensive than onshore renewables, I would say. Secondly, when you have a government which tell you that there is a national security concern, it's difficult to argue against, you know, and we are a private company. It's not up to me to decide if there is a national security concern. We came to the conclusion that we could have two ways. Either to arbitrate for what? Because at the end of the day, I would not have decided to take FID in a country where they could tell me three years after you have to stop, you know, what unfortunately happened to some of my colleagues. We are early enough, so we decided to engage in dialogue to say, "Okay, look, if what you say is the case, we give you the license back, and you give us our money back." That was the point. They asked us to. We proposed, by the way, it was our proposal to reinvest in the country. They preferred us to invest in traditional energies. We say, "Yes, but then it's LNG and it's gas because it contribute to security of supply for Europe, and by the way, we are investing already in LNG, so it will not be oil, it will be gas." That's the choice we've done in the dialogue with the U.S. authorities. At the end of the day, I think we are being pragmatic. It's not renouncing to offshore wind. We have projects, you know, same this year we got a project in France, we have a project in the U.K., we have enlarged our portfolio in Germany. I think in Europe it continues to make quite a lot of sense offshore wind because we don't have the same type surface of land, because we have more scarcity to develop the renewables. Maybe also because as you have a scale, you can have the cost down, which is our objective. We will not renounce offshore wind in Europe. In the specific case of the U.S., we are being pragmatic, and it's better for us to get the money back. We are investing in the U.S. in gas, yes, it's true, but LNG is contributing as well to our the life cycle carbon intensity factor diminish also with gas, more gas and less oil. That's part also of our transition strategy. That's the rationale of it. In fact, to be honest, for shareholders, better for us to get the money back by making a write-off, which was the alternative, and to say, you, we have made a write-off. EUR 1 billion, it's an accounting line, you know, forget it. I'm quite happy to have been able to convince them to enter into that discussion because it was our initiative. There was none of them. We went to them, tell them, "Look, let's be pragmatic now. Questions? You will see that other companies will follow us. Questions. Lise, there, please. Yeah. Yes, thank you very much for the presentation. Lise Moret from Banque Hottinguer. I've been following this discussion. My first question would be, could you give us some color about the geographical split of your green or let's say, low carbon CapEx? I mean, what you just described in this presentation. The second question is, how far would you say your objectives in terms of Scope 3 or, well, overall supply chain carbon intensity, that is - 25% by 2030 would be at risk regarding, I mean, this sort of situation where you will have to arbitrate, I mean. On your first point, you know, we something that's we've decided to make, I think, very simple, on the Integrated Power segment, so renewables, flexible, as I described, we have three main geographies in which we invest, Europe, the U.S., that's in three grids in the U.S., that's PJM in Northeast, ERCOT, Texas, and CAISO, California, and then Brazil. These are the three main geographies where we concentrate, I would say, more than 70% of our efforts of development, in terms of Integrated Power. Then there are some other areas where we make more targeted investments, you know, some renewables in some oil and gas countries actually adjacent to our oil and gas activities in the Middle East and Africa, for instance. Asia, for instance, in India, where we, you know, we have renewable activities and developments. In terms of power, this is where, to your question, we're basically putting our investment. Low carbon molecules, you know, as you saw, sustainable aviation fuel, it's really driven by mandates for the time being. Mandates are in Europe, so this is where you've seen this approach where we've invested in the conversion of Grandpuits in the south of Paris, converting this traditional refinery into a biorefinery that's going to be producing sustainable aviation fuel 100%. And then we've made adjustments so as to co-process traditional jet fuel and a blend of sustainable feedstock in our European refineries in Germany, in France, and in Belgium. That's a European story as far as SAF is concerned today because that's where there is demand to make it very simple. EV charging is something that's also very much European as far as we are concerned, because again, it's really demand driven for the time being. 25% will be reached. Like it's a strong winner. In the company where we use the word objective, generally we deliver. This will be delivered. It's why? Because we stick to what we said. We want fundamentally, and it's a clear strategy has been set. We want Integrated Power to represent more or less 20% of the company, and mechanically it will represent 20% of the company and will drop this carbon intensity 25%, even maybe a little lower than that, in fact. I'm confident, you know, this acquisition we've done in the U.S., it was 1.5 gigawatts. By the way, the way we are developing it, I think it was not there for 2030, I can tell you. Maybe 2033 or 2034. Offshore wind is more for the next decade, even in Europe. You know, the cycles offshore wind is very different from onshore solar and wind. Onshore solar, you have a cycle of investment to two to three years in many countries. Offshore is more eight years, 10 years. It's more an oil and gas, I would say, type of CapEx cycle, in fact. It does not impair at all the targets we've done. Okay. Questions? Yes, we have questions there. Over there. Thank you for your presentation. Annie from MUFG and Asset Management. On slide 21, it was quite interesting to see your 2030 power generation. If I understood quite well, it was 100-120 terawatt-hours electricity production target, would it still be 70% renewable and 30% flexible asset? The other question I had was also on EPH, if the electricity generation will mainly be peak load or base load. You can see on the pie, you know, slide 21, I think that's the one. You can see the divide between, you know, onshore solar, onshore wind, flexible, and you can see that's around two-thirds renewable, one-third flexible gas-fired. This is what you have to see. This is the order of magnitude we want to reach, and then, you know, we're on that track. Actually, last year, that was the split, two-thirds, one-third, you know, in our 48 TWh production. On the EPH deal, these are European gas-fired power plants, so they're not base load. I'm not the one expert. Stéphane Michel in the Excom is the one, but they're not base load. They're here to meet, you know, marginal demand and then peak rather than base load, obviously. Question in front, yes? Some of them are more used than others. You know, it's a question of course of merit curve in some countries. In Italy, clearly the coal to gas-fired power plants is coming much quicker than in France, for example, because so it depends really in the countries where we have invested with EPH. Some electricity system are asking, are calling these gas-fired power plant quite quickly. Some it's more peak, so it depends on the countries. Yeah, we have a question on the front. Yeah. Yeah, thanks. Harry Ashman from Robeco. Brilliant. Thank you very much. Thanks for the presentations. On a couple of the slides, you mentioned regulatory dependencies, policy dependencies, which we all know and understand, particularly SAF hydrogen, for example. To what extent are you able or currently already pushing policymakers directly to bring in the kind of policies that you need to see these opportunities? So taking, I guess, a transition or a Paris positive approach rather than being just a policy taker. How are you working with trade associations to do that as well? An example is on the E.U. Methane Regulation. We spoke the other week earlier about, and we were really pleased to see you come out and say, "We support elements of this, and we think it's a good thing. This is how we would like to see this be implemented." We think that's a real positive, but we know many of the trade associations you're a member of are saying almost the opposite thing. How are you able to do that on some of these other opportunities like SAF and hydrogen? There's one thing we can do and we do, is we approach the policymakers, especially at the European level, for SAF, for instance, an example you gave, or H two. It happens at national level for H two for the implementation of this RED III directive by member states and we reach out to them, and we make those points. I mean, the points you heard today, these are the points in more details we make to them saying, "We need support." We do that with the players in the industry, so, you know, it's not only just us energy producer, it's the clients really. We work with them so that they make the same advocacy points so that we increase the chances to have these supporting policies. Now, let's be humble. We do make that. Do we get the results? Not all the time, but we keep working very hard to make that happen. So yes, we do have that engagement, and we do advocate for these public policies to be put in place, and we work with, namely, you know, other sectors to make that happen. You know, that's true for aviation, that's true for EV mobility, for instance, and the same is true for hydrogen also. On the methane, to be clear, we have an intense dialogue with the European policy, myself with Dieter Jorgensen. Even with Chris Wright in the U.S., I've been asked to go to him to explain why this regulation is maybe not as all terrible, but they think that it will be better to find a way to compromise with it and to be pragmatic, so to not to renounce. I think the dialogue which we create, and I'm participating, others are doing, we try to make the link, you know, and to show, look, it's better for us to engage. Of course, we all know that in the U.S., on the methane, you know, the regulation has been built on the idea you have one field, one plant, which is what happens in the Middle East, for example. In the U.S., unfortunately, you don't have one field, one plant. You have a huge amount of gas production, a network, and then a plant. Obviously, we need to find a way to evaluate what is the methane content of this network. It does not apply like that. It does not mean that we should renounce, and I explained that to Chris Wright, Dieter Jorgensen. We try to really engage on it and not to just say everything is bad, but forget. No. I think, and on the SAF, for example as well, which we said about being more gradual, trying to understand technologies. We are also. I was in Brussels recently with some parliament members to explain, but not to say it's not good, just to find a pragmatic way to progress. In fact, that's what we need to do. Regulation will work only if it's implemented, if it's accepted by customers. You can see on SAF today a big pushback of some customers, airline companies who say it's too expensive. No, it depends what is too expensive. Let's progress progressively. I think we can do it. We engage. Your question about trade association is a real question, and how each time I'm going to the U.S., you know, we left the API, I can tell you. I'm not very popular from some people there. They want to convince me. I told them, "Look, we cannot, I cannot go." It's because of methane that we left the API. Because around the table, there was, so large corporations like my peers we agree on methane, but then this type of trade association sometimes are more governed by the small ones where we want to do nothing, you know? We said we cannot just pay to a consensus to have a sort of minimum consensus because most of the trade associations are working on the basis of minimum consensus, you know. Sometimes this type of policy are putting, I mean, this type of governance, unfortunately, does not allow us to be progressive enough. On the OGCI, for example, we are only 13. We try, and that's why I want to keep. We had a discussion in Houston two days ago about officially it's 0.2%. Can we drive down the 0.2% on methane intensity to 0.1%? We think that if the leaders are all going to 0.1%, maybe we can engage the industry. This is where we are. We can do something. Methane for me is perfect example. That's why I push all the teams to have to be leader on it. Now we want to use it, and this presentation, which was very well done by Guillaume, we'll use it all over in many places, in many countries. That's why we can engage. Trade association, honestly, sometimes we are frustrated, you know? The point is that do we, and it's like you can be shareholder of TotalEnergies and engage with us or not be shareholder, and then you, we continue. It's the same exactly the same position for us. Do we want to have a seat around the table to say our voice and to have one person which say, "Look, ETS is good and don't stop saying that it's it will solve all the competitiveness of European industry because we give up on ETS." It's nonsense. That's such trade association basically could say that. Further to have one or two large companies say, no, it's more complex than that. I prefer to have my representative around the table by getting out. That's really the same debate that you could have by staying or not with shareholder of TotalEnergies. Questions? Yes, we have one in front here. Hi. Will Farrell, Federated Hermes. Thank you firstly for the LNG merit curve. Very helpful analysis to be able to see. So appreciate you bringing that in this year. I did want to ask if you have a comment based on the current geopolitical context and reflecting on the fact that previously you've spoken about that a future LNG price drop could stimulate demand in the key markets that you're targeting. Do you see that challenged by the current conflict, or do you remain of that view? That's a very good question. We said that to the U.S. authorities, including U.S. energy producers, you know, they promote. We told them, "Be careful. We had a crisis in 2022, another crisis in 2026. This could push some customers in some emerging countries being afraid of that energy, which is going very volatile." The problem is that the alternative for them is to switch back to coal, which is that we will do. We warn the U.S., and honestly, we've done it because I'm convinced that the idea that some countries which are very price sensitive will hesitate to engage in long-term contracts with an energy which could be suddenly so volatile. That's true that long-term contracts is a way to avoid the volatility of the spot market, but there is something of affordability, in fact there. That's a challenge. Yes, it does not help. Having said that, again, I don't know what will happen in the Middle East, so it's very difficult. I don't want to make 20 scenarios in front of you, but you know, we made a presentation. We go up to 650 million tons by 2030 of production. Market is 4,400. Even if we limit all the Middle East, it's still 500 million tons of energy. This will have an impact on the price, you know. It will. My view is that industries in emerging country, in Asia, for example, Southeast Asia, they have the optionality. They can continue to use fuel, they can go to coal, they can switch to gas, and they will be, I would say, versatile depending on the affordability, which will lead their choice. That's my view on them. That's point. It's clear that it's not very good to have this for this energy to be also. By the way, it's not good, and as we are today speaking about sustainability, it's good for renewables, fundamentally, all that. I want to tell you my view is that for two reasons, is good because it's domestic energies. Domestic, so very controlled security of supply. I think countries which are more and more afraid to face this question of security of supply will move quicker, probably. It will encourage to go to renewables, I'll call it. The question for some of them, does it mean that this is a mix of coal and renewables or what is the space for gas? It's a question. I agree with the question. Again, let's continue to believe that it's better to continue to push, and we'll see that. I think globally, this crisis is good for renewables. Other questions in the room? We can take maybe questions online. We have one question from Schroders. Pretty impressive work on methane. When do you expect to reach level five OGMP methane measurement in non-operated assets? The sooner the better. Actually, for obvious reason, we first put our focus on the operated portfolio because we have a direct control. It does not mean that we did nothing in the meantime to push the operator of the non-operated assets to move forward. I explained that we already shared the AUSEA technology with some of them. Now we have reached a point where we think we need to change gear for the non-operated asset and that's why we really push our managing directors in all the affiliates where we have non-operated assets to share the kits I presented to you guys and really encourage these operators to move forward as we have done actually. The very pragmatic objective this year, each of these guys must make the same presentation to each of the non-operated to show them that it's possible. You know, with pragmatic topics, with technologies. It's a matter of technology, and it's not so expensive. We can demonstrate now that we have done it, and this is the objective, to move the non-operated. Methane emission may be a last point. Methane emission in the non-operated perimeters decrease as well, but not as fast as what we have done in the- You know, a country like Qatar, we are working closely. They were not happy at all. I can tell you last year when I met the minister, he did not receive the gold standard. He was very unhappy, and he said I told him, "You know, we can help." He said to his team, "We need to build OGMP 5." You know? Even if they are not necessarily agree with all of his Paris Agreement, fundamentally, it's a question also for them to be the leader of industry and that's possible. We can push these all non-operated assets, we must push them. Questions in the room? No questions in the room. We have two questions on Mozambique, one from HSBC and one from AP3. The first one is: Do you have an update regarding the complaints filed by PNAT regarding the Mozambique LNG incidents? And are there any findings from the Mozambique government's investigation as well as the independent Mozambique National Human Rights Commission investigation? This is the first question. The second question from AP3 is: When you lifted force majeure in Cabo Delgado, you refer to the improvement in the security situation in the area. This was linked to the presence of national security forces, but also international support. How will you act if Rwanda withdraws its support in the area? Will you still consider the situation to be safe and secure? On the first question, there was a communication by the National Human Rights Commission, I think it was around 10 days ago, actually. They say that, you know, they're still ongoing with their investigation on the ground. They've said they've gone to Cabo Delgado actually, and they've conducted inquiries, verifications, as I understand, interviews. They've said to this stage, they haven't found any evidence that the serious, very serious allegations of torture and murder were actually supported by any evidence. That's where it stands today, basically. That's what we know from the Mozambique side of things. No, there's no news from the French complaint filed in France. We'll just, you know, provide information as and when we're asked, as always. The second question is quite clear. Yes, the presence of international forces is part of our evaluation of situation. We would have to reevaluate if they were leaving, but they will not leave. Other questions in the room? We have a last follow-up questions from, again, from Schroders on Mozambique. Given your focus and disciplined capital allocation and the low cost of supply portfolio, how do you assess and price above-ground risks such as geopolitical instability, human rights issues when evaluating opportunities? In particular, what concrete changes to governance in decision-making have been implemented since Mozambique? How are these applied across other high-risk projects, and what thresholds must be met before capital is deployed? I think the first answer to that is that actually the fact that we have projects in very diversified geographies, and by the way, we are the most diversified in geographies where we invest and produce oil and gas namely, is an answer to that. This diversification in the many places where we operate, build projects, oil and LNG, is a protection against the possibility that in any given place, today that's the Middle East actually, there can be a crisis. The fact that we are in so many places is a protection against geopolitical risk in and of itself. Now to the more precise question around Mozambique. First, in Mozambique, you know, when the project was under force majeure, there's something that we did that I think was very important, is in spite of the project not being under construction, it was suspended for, you know, more than four years. What we did, however, is that Mozambique LNG endowed a foundation with significant capital, and there are still obviously ongoing socioeconomic development activities taking place. Even though the project was not moving forward, the contribution to socioeconomic development on the ground around the project in the communities was still being advanced. The reason is you want to be able to do that so that there is some benefit felt short term immediately by these communities, so that there is some buy-in in the project, basically. I think this is a very good lesson learned, I would say, when investing in these, you know, geographies that can be risky, that can be tough, in environments that are poor, that we make sure that there is some socioeconomic development going on at the same time as the project is being built, because projects will only generate revenues, you know, five years, 10 years down the line, and you need to make something happen before that for the community. I think that's one of the big lessons learned from that experience. Yeah. The question was about governance, and I would say for future projects. We of course draw some lessons of what happens. We observe that fundamentally, and it's for companies in general, that onshore projects clearly raise more complexities from human rights, from stakeholders, because we are onshore, we have to have land acquisitions, all that. The answer to that for me is we need to anticipate all that, and we cannot just go, "It's a project, let's do it, and we will do it in parallel." The parallel engineering does not work very well. We need to anticipate the phase and taking care of the people, local population, to take care of all this land acquisition before to really engage. If we want to do everything in parallel, our teams, of course, are dedicated to build the projects and maybe not enough efforts done. That's a point. We want absolutely on this type of projects to have a clear view of what is the status and to have done it before. If we need to acquire land, let's do it before we engage the company in the tech. Then the second point, of course, is that I can tell you, there is more focus clearly on this type of issues. We have a risk committee and even with the board where we have. When we have such a project, we go through the different issues one by one to explain what are the action plan and what we plan to do to cope with it. We have to be convinced that we have, I would say, the solution in place to be able to face the challenge. That's the point. Unfortunately, we cannot anticipate terrorism and conflicts, I mean, armed conflicts. We have a question on One B2B: Following Mr. Pouyanné's comments on LNG, do you already see impacts from the Middle East crisis on your large clients, notably the gas-intensive ones? Do you expect lasting effects on their demand? Which ones? No, but honestly, TotalEnergies, we have made one decision, which is not to declare force majeure for any of our LNG customers. It's a strong decision. We said to our customers there will be no, we will not invoke force majeure to tell you we will not deliver the gas. Why? Because we are a portfolio company, we have a large portfolio, so we want ourselves to be the security of supply for the customers. We will absorb the fact that we'll have a miss of LNG coming from Qatar and Abu Dhabi, but the portfolio is large enough to redirect part of our portfolio. We know we have some molecules that we are keeping for ourself at our discretion. We told them, "You will receive the gas." We will respect the contract. It's a way to tell to our customers, "Okay, look, yes, there is a mess somewhere, but you will not be impacted by the supplier, which is TotalEnergies, of course, in terms of price and in terms of volume." We respect all the contracts which have been signed with our customers, and I think this is the answer to the risk you mentioned. Questions in the room? Last chance. Yes. Thank you very much for the presentation. Marc LaVeau, WHF. I wanted to have your view on the recent events that we saw with the E.U. ETS. It was briefly mentioned earlier, but I wanted to know what your view was on the outlook of the regulation because the review is going to come pretty soon, the impact it has today on your refining margins, for instance, and what you expect for the future of the regulation. Well, E.U. ETS, you know, this is really carbon pricing in targeted sectors. This has been a cornerstone of the E.U. policy around abating especially industrial emissions. I must say it's been efficient. There has been a cost to competitiveness. It's been dealt with and managed by the free allowances. The question to us is not whether or not ETS should stay in place. ETS should stay in place. It's been efficient, effective as a tool. And there should be a fairly high CO2 pricing through the ETS so that it does drive investment decisions. Otherwise, investment decisions are not driven if the price is too low. Now, having said that, there are namely two important things that need to either be maintained or happen for the other one. What needs to be maintained is to make sure that there is a very careful thinking around the free allowances that goes to industries that are exposed to international competition. Because through the free allowances that some sectors receive, then you can compensate the ETS pricing for some of these industries. The other thing that needs to happen, and that's not really the case today, is that the revenues collected from ETS, they need to be directed to support initiatives, investments to decarbonize. Basically, there should be some kind of a closed loop between, you know, that's money taken through the CO2 pricing ETS system, and that money should be channeled back to investments made to decarbonize, to electrify the use and to decarbonize. This is something that we actually are pushing for. Yeah. Fundamentally, we push for ETS, keeping the ETS system as much as we can is our position. I confirmed it to many governments, to French government, to the commissions, to other governments. We think that the issue of competitiveness of the industry is not just ETS, it's the energy price today, and other factors, regulations as well. We cannot ask ETS to solve all the issues alone. I think it would be strange for me that Europe clearly needs to strive for security of supply. The renewables are part of it. If you lower the ETS system, you will not help renewable system to be developed. We have this question of consistency. We mix two things there. I think at the end, if we need to give support to industries, to chemical industry, you can do it also by industrial policies, by having some special PPAs price, et cetera. So we are on this position also. I see many countries, in fact, are supportive ETS system, you know. Having said that, they also would like to keep some industries in Europe, so we need to find a way. The system which was explained by, fundamentally the idea is, okay, you collect taxes from carbon, so please, the ones which are investing to decarbonize, you have to support them. In particular, you know, on the example of carbon capture and storage, it costs $150 per ton. The ETS is $80. If you don't have, you need to find a way to compensate the difference, and that's where the ETS revenue should be used in order to support that. I think that's more what the scheme we propose rather than just trying to make the same instrument many policies, you know. That's what we think. Where will it land? I think it should. I would be surprised that the amendments will be major. They will need to do something for a few countries, but fundamentally, most of the countries want to keep the basic system. Any last questions from the room? Okay, so we have no more questions. Aurélien, do you have closing remarks? Well, as always, thank you to all of the teams who've put that together. That's a huge work. Even more importantly, thank you to all of the teams on the ground, as you've seen, it's very much on the ground work, who are now making that a reality. Thanks to everyone for having done that. Thank you for your time today. Thank you very much.