Good morning. Welcome to the D9 2023 Annual Results Presentation. I am Diego Massidda, and I'm the Head of Digital Infrastructure at Triple Point, the investment manager. I'd like to say upfront that, as you know, some very significant events have happened during the first four months of 2024, which are very important for assessing the financial situation of the company. Clearly, I'm referring to the completion of the sale of Verne Global and the related leveraging. For this reason, in the annual report this morning's RNS, as well as in my presentation today, we will also be providing post-balance sheet updates to the audited accounts to give a fair picture of the situation of D9. I would also like to clarify that I will not be covering the performance of the investee companies individually today, as I covered it in the trading update presentation with yourselves on 28th February. However, of course, you can ask questions on the investee companies as well as any other topic that we cover today. The details of the performance is, however, also still present, of course, in the RNS and in the annual report. I will now get into the presentation, and at the end, I will be happy to take your questions. So 2023 clearly was an extremely challenging year for the company and our shareholders, particularly with the negative performance of the share price. However, there have been a number of highlights which I think represent a very substantial improvement of the situation of the company found itself in at the beginning of the year. First of all, after the initial substantial repayment of the RCF, the revolving credit facility, in March 2024, this Friday, we will make a further GBP 47 million repayment and cancellation, so overall achieving a reduction of more than 85% of the drawn amount on our RCF. Secondly, remaining assets delivered a robust performance in line with plan and valuation of the portfolio companies, excluding Verne Global, which has now been disposed, was down by only 3% overall versus 2022, as established by the board on the basis of an external valuation, further enhanced by the scrutiny applied by our auditors, PwC, which has led to a slightly revised valuation versus the unaudited valuations published back in March. I will cover this point in more detail later, of course. Following the suspension of the dividend, extensive consultations, as you know, happened with shareholders, and the strategic review was undertaken by the board. The board proposed and 99% of shareholders voted in favor of a new investment policy aimed at executing a managed wind-down of the company. This managed wind-down will be executed seeking a balance between maximizing net value on the one hand, for shareholders, and on the other hand, providing timely capital return. I'm pleased to inform you that the managed wind-down process is already well underway, and the board intends to use the proceeds to first pay down the remaining about GBP 53 million of RCF, which will be the level we will reach at the end of this week, and then to return capital to shareholders, considering also the liquidity needs of the fund, of course, as a priority versus the repayment of the vendor loan note which had been taken out for the acquisition of the Arqiva assets. This is because the VLN has attractive interest rates, also with the option to PIK, and it is now recourse to D9, and moreover, has a long maturity date of 2029. So the base plan would be to repay from future distribution for Arqiva itself, although other options will be considered in due course. Now I'd like to move a little bit more detail to two of the key points that I covered in terms of highlights: the sale of Verne Global on the one hand, and the next steps for the managed wind-down regarding each of the remaining assets. As you know, in November, we agreed a sale of 100% of the Verne Global Group of Companies to Ardian for a purchase price of up to $575 million, including an earnout element of up to $135 million. After obtaining all required approvals, we completed the sale, which was announced on the 15th of March, receiving an initial purchase price of $415 million. Then last week, we also received the deferred consideration of $25 million, which was initially linked to the signature of some power contracts for Verne. Additionally, as previously announced, we had ring-fenced GBP 23 million of the initial consideration for prudent balance sheet management, which is really to cover some indemnifications in the sale agreement. We have been able to insure these risks to which the indemnifications referred, and therefore can now release these GBP 23 million to further enhance the RCF repayment, which will be happening at the end of the week. Therefore, as announced yesterday, we will make a further repayment and cancellation of the RCF, bringing the outstanding drawn amount to around GBP 53 million, as I said earlier. We have calculated that the repayments made since March of 2024 will save the company about GBP 28 million of interest on the RCF until its maturity in the first quarter of next year. So effectively, we can say that the Verne transaction and the related leveraging have now completed or will be completed on Friday, and we retain an asset, of course, in the future earnout payment. As a reminder, this earnout payment will be based on the run rate EBITDA of Verne Global in the year to 31st of December 2026, and of course, after this has been audited and agreed, will be paid in 2027. The earnout will not pay out only if the achievement of the run rate EBITDA is 80% or less of target and will be 100% for an achievement of 100% of target or more, the sliding scale in between. Now a few more details on the managed wind-down. The board has decided to start sale processes for Aqua Comms and EMIC-1, which are expected to be sold together, and also Elio Networks and SeaEdge UK1. All three sales processes have commenced, and outreach to prospective buyers has already begun. At this stage, of course, it is difficult to be precise on timing, but like I say, we expect to receive non-binding offers and possibly select a short list of potential buyers in early summer. As to Arqiva, the only asset we do not fully own, as you know, with a 48% shareholding, no sale process has been started at this stage, as previously announced. However, options for their realization of value continue to be actively explored, also in alignment, of course, with the other key shareholders. So this completes what I believe are the highlights of these results and the year. So let me move now to the key financial highlights. At the end of December 2023, our net asset value being estimated at GBP 686.3 million, which corresponds to GBP 0.793 per share. This is a roughly 28% decline versus December 2022 and 20% versus the latest valuation in June 2023. I was to address upfront that following the completion of the audit process, there has been a revision of GBP 41.5 million to the unaudited NAV, which we announced to the market on 28th of March 2024. Before I discuss this, I think it's worth providing a bit more detail on how our valuations are derived. As in previous years, the main methodology utilized for the valuations is a discounted cash flow model. Cash flows used in the valuation are from investee company five-year plans, which are updated annually, signed off by the respective investee company boards, which are composed of D9 representatives but also independent directors. It is from these same plans that we evaluate both the company performance and assess the performance of investee company management, including their incentives. For the year ending December 2023, for the first time, the board instructed an independent valuer to undertake the valuation exercise. Both the independent valuation process and the subsequent audit of the company's portfolio assets, which has just concluded, involved the key inputs and assumptions for all operating models used in the valuation process being revisited and challenged to arrive at the audited fair value figures. As a result of this process, the unaudited valuations for two of the company assets, namely Aqua Comms and the Verne Earn-Out, have now been revised to reflect a more conservative valuation. The impact of this revision is about GBP 0.05 per share. The announced back in March around GBP 0. 84 per share value is now GBP 0.793 per share. For Aqua Comms, the discount rate utilized was increased for the Asian business to reflect the nascent nature of this business expansion into the Asia region, alongside with its already well-established transatlantic business. This more conservative approach has resulted in a reduction of the Aqua Comms valuation of 7% relative to the unaudited but now published accounts as at March 2024. As for the Verne earnout, as you can imagine, establishing the fair value of contingent consideration presents a number of valuation challenges. As another base technique, a Monte Carlo simulation was used by the independent valuer to produce their valuation and present the report to the board. This technique involves considering discrete scenario-specific cash flow estimates around Verne Global, achieving its run rate EBITDA targets at the end of 2026. These amounts were then probability-weighted and discounted using an appropriate discount rate. This approach reflects the most recent updates to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants guidelines for valuing contingent consideration and recognizes the linear uncertainty around Verne Global's ability to meet future run rate EBITDA targets as the target to be hit is pretty much three years out. And this, in turn, will determine the amount of the Earn-Out to be received by the company in 2027. After extensive consultation with the auditors and the independent valuer, eventually, the board took a more conservative approach to the risk parameters which are then utilized versus the initial independent valuation which had been published. Calculations were, therefore, adjusted, which reduced the earnout valuation by GBP 25.9 million in the unaudited number previously announced, i.e., a 49% reduction, bringing the value roughly to a quarter of the potential maximum Earn-Out. I will talk everyone through the key drivers and movements in the portfolio valuation later, and I'll also run through how these valuations then break to the IFRS investment value of GBP 676 million, which is held on the company's balance sheet. The company had an adjusted gross asset value of GBP 1.1 billion at December 2023. Later in the presentation, I will run through how our portfolio leverage metrics following the sale of Verne Global. Moving on, the company has an annualized ongoing charges ratio, OCR, of 1.33% in 2023, which is calculated in line with the AIC methodology, which excludes exceptional items and transaction costs. Should those be included, the OCR would be about 2% for the year. The company made a loss during the 12 months to December of GBP 0.274 per share. Along with the valuation revisions I described earlier, this predominantly reflects the decrease in the valuation of the company's portfolio, reducing from GBP 1.2 billion as of December 2022 to GBP 1 billion as of December 2023. During the financial year, the company paid GBP 1.5 dividend per share with respect to the first quarter before the board elected to withdraw the GBP 0.06 dividend target. Additionally, GBP 0.015 were paid at the beginning of the year for the Q4 2022 dividend. Finally, total return for the financial year based on NAV was -23.1%, mostly reflecting the decrease in portfolio valuation. Step back a little and look at the same metrics since IPO. Total return stands at -6.8%. Turning now to the P&L, the unrealized fair value loss of GBP 252 million represents a decrease in valuation across portfolio and is a key driver for the GBP 0.2743 earnings per share loss at the bottom of this page. In terms of distributions from investments, the second line, this includes dividends received from Elio Networks, lease income from our investment in the SeaEdge, and also cash received by the companies as a result of the shareholder loan repayment made by Verne Global Iceland during the year. I think the rest is pretty straightforward, so I think I will move on now to the balance sheet. Investments held at fair value, which is the company's holding in its subsidiary Digital 9 Holdco, was GBP 676.1 million at the end of December 2023, down 27% from GBP 921 million reported at December 2022, as you see at the top of the table. I'll walk everyone through the key drivers of decline in more detail in the next few slides. In addition to the investment value, there was GBP 14.8 million of cash retained by the company for working capital purposes. This takes the closing net asset value to GBP 686.3 million at December 2022. I'll run through liquidity and leverage in more detail shortly. Now we're going to have a look at the change in portfolio company valuation in December 2022 and December 2023. Although portfolio valuation overall has gone down by 14% over the period, it is fair to say most of the drop in valuation comes from Verne Global. Specifically, it is due to the fact that the transaction of sale of Verne Global included an Earn-Out element, which, as I described earlier, is only valued a fraction of its potential maximum payout, and you see that on the right-hand side of the slide. Excluding Verne Global, the remaining portfolio valuation has been resilient and only gone down by 3%. Aqua Comms have gone 5%. Despite some profitability challenges, the business has shown resilience, and valuation reflects update to its long-term business plans and continued access to growth opportunity. EMIC-1 is still valued at cost as it has been historically. Increase in valuation, therefore, simply reflects increased capital invested to date. SeaEdge UK 1 is down a bit, reflecting the move from an intrinsic valuation methodology, which we have used in the past, to a market-based valuation using comparables. Elio Networks has also seen a moderate drop in valuation following the re-forecast of the business plan, particularly seeing increased cost of goods sold versus the five-year plan. Finally, the Arqiva valuation, as you can see, is down from GBP 355 million to GBP 341 million, which is 4%. In fact, this drop is actually magnifying that Arqiva's relatively high leverage. In reality, Arqiva's enterprise value was only down 1% over the period, which shows how stable and resilient the business is. Now I'd like to move from the assets by asset valuation to the overall IFRS Holdco valuation. What you can see here in the grid chart on this slide is the buildup of the valuation of the company's portfolio as of December 2023, and we have also provided clarity how this reconciles to the company's IFRS investment valuation held on its balance sheet of GBP 676.1 million on the right-hand side, which is so early. So starting on the left, we have Aqua Comms, which is valued at GBP 222.5 million. Then we have Verne, which we have aggregated together, and this is based on the sale proceeds plus the valuation of the Earn-Out, overall totaling GBP 372.2 million. Then we have SeaEdge, EMIC-1, Elio Networks, and lastly, we show the gross value of Arqiva at GBP 503.6 million and deductions, of course, our share of Arqiva, and deductions for VLN initial principal, GBP 160 million, additional notes issued in June 2023 when we picked the interest of GBP 6.8 million, and lastly, the accrued interest to 31st of December 2023 to land as a total portfolio valuation just over GBP 1 billion. This then reconciles to the IFRS valuation of GBP 676.1 million by adding the GBP 34.6 million of cash held across the group subsidiaries, deducting all the GBP 373.8 million cash drawn on the company's RCF, and also, you need to make a deduction for other counter-weighted assets across the group's unconsolidated subsidiaries. Thus, this brings to the GBP 676.1 million on the right. Now, the next slide shows the net asset value bridge from December 2022 on a pence per share basis. As I mentioned earlier, there were two revisions to the valuations following the conclusion of the audit process with respect to the unaudited figures the company announced on 28th March 2024. These were to Aqua Comms and the Verne Earn-Out and resulted overall in about GBP 0.05 per share reduction, as said earlier, to GBP 0.793 pence, which you see on the right-hand side. The key drivers to the fall in NAV during the year are the fair value movements on the company's investment, GBP 0.207 pence per share, which is the first two blocks. Let's break that down a little further. We have, as you can see on the slide, adverse forex movements that equate to 3.8% per share, then Verne Global representing GBP 0.125 per share movement, predominantly as a result of only recognising, at this point in time, GBP 26.8 million in value for the Earn-Out. Well, as you know, this can move in the future depending on the performance of the company. The change in outcomes in Arqiva contributes a further GBP 0.032 per share with the balance attributable to the remainder of the portfolio. The financing costs of both the VLN and the RCF are GBP 0.048 per share, and the payment of the dividend was GBP 0.03 per share, as I said earlier, half of it relating to 2022 and half of it to Q1 2023. Also included are costs incurred during the year in relation to the strategic review and the Verne Global transaction totaling GBP 0.018. This leaves us with a closing NAV, as I said, of GBP 0.793 per share. Hope this is clear. Let's move on, therefore, to leverage. On this slide, we have shown the leveraged position of the group as at December 2023 and also on a pro forma basis as of 31st of March 2024 so that we could include the impacts of the initial deleveraging. The combined RCF and VLN represented 51% of our adjusted gross asset value at the end of December 2023, as you see at the bottom. Since the disposal, we have reduced this level significantly and now sits at 36%, which was one of the key objectives of disposal. As I said earlier, this is a pro forma as of 31st of March, but at the end of this week, beginning of May, we will pay a further GBP 47 million of the RCF. So we expect this position to fall further to around 31%. Net debt over EBITDA has dropped to 1.3x from 2.5x when considering the RCF and the VLN. Looking through at the adjusted net debt position, which includes also the leverage of the investee company's level, net debt has dropped from 6.7x to 5.5x. Since the disposal of Verne Global, the only investee company which has leverage is now Arqiva, and the GBP 744 million represents deemed share of its debt, as you see down in the slide. Finally, I'd like to cover liquidity by cash. At the balance sheet dates, the group had GBP 49.4 million of total cash, including GBP 14.8 million on the company's balance sheet and GBP 34.6 million which were held in its unconsolidated subsidiaries. Around GBP 31 million was in the form of restricted funds which were available for general use by the company. This was in the form of an interest reserve account which is required under the terms of our RCF, an escrow account which is there to fund EMIC-1 CapEx stage payments. Following the disposal of Verne Global, the company has deleveraged and stabilized its position from a liquidity standpoint, as you can see. As at 31st of March in the middle column, the group had a total cash of GBP 66 million. Of this, GBP 38.7 million was restricted, GBP 27.1 million was unrestricted and available to the company. This GBP 38.7 million restricted included the cash which had been financed as indemnification funds, which, as previously mentioned, are now no longer restricted as we have insured away the risk, and this amount will be used together with other funds to further repay the RCF at the beginning of May. Now, this concludes my presentation, and I am now happy to take your questions. So let me just log onto the system, and I will try to answer. I have waiting two colleagues that will help me. Let's see. So there are no questions so far. I hope it was because it was clear, but in any case, I will wait another minute, give you time to think about questions you may have. I know it's a lot of material that we've established this morning, so there's a lot of details in the RNS and the annual report, so I'm sure that you will find a lot of the answer to the questions you may have there, but I will be happy to address any you have right now. Questions can be asked in the box under the video. We are looking for that button. Right. Doesn't seem to be any questions. So thank you so much for spending this time with me, this half an hour. I hope it was useful. Oh, yeah. Just in time, Marcus asked me a question about timeframes for potential exits. As I said earlier, we are now engaging directly with potential buyers for the three fully owned assets, including EMIC-1 together with Aqua Comms, and we are sharing material about the companies, signing NDAs as you speak, and we are expecting to receive non-binding offers in the next weeks, definitely at the beginning of the summer, and then the process will continue from there. Okay. There are more questions coming in, except from Marcus. Is there still any impact on Red Sea access on EMIC-1? So there is clearly a situation in the Red Sea and in the Middle East which is not very benign, I guess, for the completion of a system like EMIC-1. So there clearly remains uncertainty in being able to lay the cable in the Red Sea. Alternative options are being assessed by Aqua Comms together with Meta and the other parties in the consortium that are building the system. I think it's worth highlighting that most of the CapEx has been spent on EMIC-1. Most construction milestones have already been achieved, with the only exception of the Red Sea wet segment. The buyer would realize the potential upside from future cash flows without having to contribute additional capital to the project. There are currently options being explored whose details I cannot really disclose as this is confidential to the consortium. But this could still result in an RFS, which is the ready-for-service date of 2025, being achieved. Even if this RFS date was further delayed, the project would remain the value accretive to the cash flow profile of Aqua Comms as I think there's no doubt that this cable will be completed at some point in the future, and the cash flow will be accretive at a later point in the future. So, of course, as the situation is common to all the cables in the area, you can imagine that there is a very high demand for connectivity, and so as soon as availability of capacity will be there, there will be a lot of interest. And in fact, Aqua Comms during 2023 in Q4 has already achieved a large presale on EMIC-1 from customers who are keen to secure capacity on this cable even though it's not yet completed. Right. So let's move on. What is the endgame for the VLN if not repaying it? So the VLN is an agreement which has no recourse to D9. So it basically states that any distribution from Arqiva to D9 first needs to be used for the repayment of the interest and soon will be also for the principal of the VLN. And until the VLN has been completely paid off, no distribution can actually be upstreamed to D9. So, as I said earlier, the natural expiration of this paper is 2029. So at the moment, the board does not consider it as a priority to repay it because, based on the business plans of Arqiva, there's a good probability that we will be able to repay the VLN from future distributions from the company. And we believe that it's not in the interest of shareholders to first pay down the VLN earlier than required. It is a very interesting piece of paper in terms of interest rates given the current interest rate environment. It's currently 6% interest rate, and it is clearly something that, in due course, if we are getting close to 2029, we could also refinance. In case, for any reason, the board decided not to repay it and not to refinance it, and we wouldn't have enough distribution from Arqiva to repay it, then the company that provided the VLN would have executed our shares in Arqiva. How much transactional evidence was available to support the independent valuation? Arnaud y ou want to answer this question? Sure. Thank you, Diego. I can take this one. So I understand your question because some of our assets are in niche subsectors. For example, subsea show that there are not so many transactions happening, only once a year or once every two years at best. And same for some fixed wireless or broadcast. Those are not super common sectors. However, there are enough transactions either in this or similar transactions in similar markets that have been used by the valuers to support the transactions. I repeat what Diego said earlier. All our valuations were based on free cash flows. However, they were all cross-checked with transactional evidence, and there was a pool of transactions in the report that was used to cross-check those valuations. Okay. Well, thank you, Arnaud. Let me take the next one then. So advisor costs. So look, the costs we have already said. Also, please, RNS, the transaction costs for disposal of Verne Global were affected by the complex process that took place, particularly being three companies in three different jurisdictions with three different regulatory environments and requirements for clearance, plus a number of phases which went from initially minority syndication objective which didn't turn out to be the best for shareholders, then moving into majority sale, and then finally a full sale, and that's required a number of changes of direction to make sure that the best outcome would be secured. So I don't think we should take that transaction cost as indicative for future. I think that the sale of Elio and Aqua Comms will have a lower level of costs than Verne. We definitely should not take that. But it would be in line with similar transactions in the market. Now, Sean's asking questions about debt. I'm not sure. I fully understand. Arnaud, can you make up? It says, "Annual costs of" So yeah. The annual cost of the GBP 981.6 million debt. So this is our adjusted net debt number consolidating all our net debt. I think it's fair to highlight that most of this debt sits on the Arqiva balance sheet. So close to GBP 750 million is actually our share of the Arqiva debt that we do not pay with D9 cash. So this pool of debt at Arqiva is actually publicly available from the internet. I don't have the number on my mind right now. However, if we want to look at a blended type of cost for that, that overall GBP 981 million-pound debt, we have the RCF which, in that number, corresponds to GBP 100 million. As Diego highlighted, this is going to drop to GBP 53 million by the end of the week. And this debt is costing us close to 9% at the moment, fast shrinking, though. We have the vendor loan note of GBP 169.8 million which is costing us 7% annualised but PIK. And then the rest, as I said, GBP 744 million is from Arqiva with overall blended cost around 7% as well. Yeah. Which is paid out of the cash flows of Arqiva itself. So it's given the overwhelming part of this whole GBP 981 million comes from Arqiva, we could assume that the blended cost is around 7%. Okay. Right. I don't see any other questions. So with this, I will close this call. Thank you very much for your attention, and we are always available to answer further questions you may have once you have had time to go through the materials. Thank you very much.