31st of December 2024. This is the first set of results since InfraRed was appointed Investment Manager, so I'll do some brief introductions before handing over to the team. My name is Mohammed Zaheer. I'm the Managing Director of InfraRed and I head up the Listed Investor Relations team. You can't see me on screen, but to my left we have the main presenters. The presentation will be led today by James O'Halloran, Fund Manager for Digital 9. James is a partner in our Investments team with over 25 years of investment experience across infrastructure sectors. He is supported on the Fund Management side by Marc Durka, who is a Director and has come up through the investment side of InfraRed's business, initially in InfraRed's Sydney office. We are also joined by Mike Osborne, a Managing Director in InfraRed's Asset Management team with a particular focus on regulatory assets. Mike is a Director on a number of the most complex assets managed by InfraRed, including Affinity Water, London St Pancras High Speed, and Arqiva. Finally, just off camera, we're also joined by Richard Crawford, Senior Advisor, who many of you may know as having been the Fund Manager for TRIG for over a decade. I'll now hand over to James to be set. Thank you, Mo. Good morning to everyone. Before we move into the presentation, I think I'll just start by saying we appreciate it's been an incredibly difficult 12 months for both the company and the shareholders. This has been a really challenging mandate for InfraRed, and the new board in sort of picking up this situation. It's required some really tough decisions, difficult messages to deliver to the market, but we've not shied away from any of this. Since coming on board in October, we've been managing multiple critical priorities to deliver a realization plan for the fund. This has included rebuilding trust with our lender group, taking very difficult decisions on the valuations and the divestment processes, and actively stepping into the portfolio company board seats to help provide the management teams with strategic direction following long periods of uncertainty with D9. As part of this plan, we've performed a bottom-up assessment for each of the portfolio companies' business plan and valuations, and this has led to a number of outcomes. Firstly, the difficult decision to sell Aqua Comms at the value and for the reasons that have previously been articulated, some material write-downs for the year ended 31st of December 2024, and the identification of a potential prior year adjustment with respect to a number of the 31st of December 2023 asset valuations, which is still in the process of being investigated. Finally, a sort of reprioritization of a number of other value realization and optimization initiatives which we're advancing on. Look, while we appreciate it's been a very turbulent year, we're optimistic that these decisions that we've taken, the difficult decisions we've taken, provide a firmer foundation for the strategic wind down through the repayment of the RCF, followed by the return of capital to shareholders in due course. While we're confident these decisions have been in the best interest of shareholders, this clearly resulted in the continued uncertainty in the NAV, which is reflected in the current share price disconnect. The purpose of today is really to give more transparency on the underlying drivers of the portfolio, including our largest asset, Arqiva. Now moving into the presentation, starting with slide three and the key highlights. I'm not intending to cover this tile by tile because we cover a lot of this through the course of today's presentation, but a couple of things to highlight. Firstly, the new board and manager relationship is working really effectively. The board's got a strong and diverse experience set, and we've got an aligned philosophy of improving both transparency and confidence in the NAV for shareholders. InfraRed created the realization plan through a strategic review and a comprehensive bottom-up valuation process, and this was delivered to the board in November. The plan has really allowed InfraRed and the board to balance the critical priorities I mentioned earlier. We've successfully agreed to divestments in EMIC and Aqua Comms, as well as making good progress on the sale of Sea Edge. Really, the progress with these divestments since InfraRed's appointment has given the lenders the confidence to agree to the refinancing that happened earlier in the year. Moving on to the next slide on the realization plan update. I think everyone's aware that when we came into the role, the real first priority of the realization plan was to conclude the divestment of EMIC One and Aqua Comms. To InfraRed, stepped into the late-stage M&A transaction during October, and it's at this point that we identified an alternative buyer for EMIC One and a faster solution for D9. The alternative buyer was really essential for a number of reasons, as we've previously reported. The EMIC construction project was in a precarious state. D9 had limited government rights, and this meant that there was a really narrow pool of buyers that were prepared to take the risk on acquiring this asset. A stapled sale with Aqua Comms would have resulted in a long 12-month regulatory approval process, and it would also have given D9 a lower price as buyers would have to take the risk on a future sell down of the asset, and it would have give n RCF lenders material uncertainty on the refinancing of the facility. Under these circumstances, it was a reasonable outcome for D9. On Aqua Comms, this is subject to a two-stage regulatory process, which is well underway, and InfraRed continues to actively manage the business and drive the management team to optimize value as part of the closing mechanism with the buyer. Marc and I both sit on the board and work hand in hand with the management team on a day-to-day basis, with the key objective of returning the business to its core focus of the Atlantic network. Subject to regulatory clearances, we expect Aqua Comms to close towards the back end of 2025. On the right-hand side of the chart, we really recap the next steps for the remaining assets. Sea Edge I mentioned, sale has been progressed, and we are expected to realize the value ahead of the RCF expiry in June, and all the outstanding rent has now been recovered. On Verne, a number of options are being evaluated from holding the term of the earnout mechanism or negotiating a settlement. There are a few points to sort of flag on Verne. The latest valuation has been adjusted down to reflect a sort of contractual mechanism of the earnout, which is really tied to a pipeline of development projects that were set out in the vendor business plan. The earnout will only pay out if at least 80% of the target earnings are generated from this pipeline by 2026. Finally, the latest valuation, as I think people are aware, is not disclosed due to the ongoing commercial sensitivity. On Elio and Arqiva, Marc and Mike will take you through these in a bit further detail in the presentation, but we see these as an opportunity for value enhancement for D9 through InfraRed's active management approach. Moving on to the next slide. The progress on deleveraging, as you can see on the chart on the left, GBP 375 million on the balance on the RCF at the beginning of the year. The Verne proceeds has allowed the repayment of GBP 321 million, and GBP 53 million remains outstanding on the RCF today. The good news is the relationships with the banks are now really stabilized, and this has been done through a combination of InfraRed's progress on the realization plan as well as our strong relationship with the banking group. On the back of this, the refinancers agreed in March to the middle of June with two potential extension periods of three months, subject to future lender consent. Really, a refinance that we achieved through the existing banks allowed us to avoid costs of at least GBP 13 million of alternative lender options of a refinance. To conclude on the deleveraging, we remain confident in repaying the facility ahead of the June expiry by the sale of proceeds and capping savings on EMIC One, plus the sale of Sea Edge. I'll pass to Marc now to go through the financial overview. Thanks, James. Moving on to slide seven, the financial overview. As you have all already seen, final audited NAV for the year was GBP 297 million or 34.4p per share, which was marginally below the unaltered disclosure in February of GBP 302 million. This has been derived from a total portfolio value of GBP 331 million, which is down 22% from GBP 424 million in June. Whilst we acknowledge that this valuation has been disappointing for shareholders, from an InfraRed perspective, we see this as a critical part of our mandate to be transparent with the market and rebuild the company's NAV. Whilst it might not be welcome news, we see the 2024 NAV as a necessary step, rather, in rebasing portfolio valuations to reflect a more balanced market position and restore confidence going forward. It's also worth noting that the NAV result is inherently more anchored to market data points, with a material portion of the current NAV reflecting agreed divestments on Aqua Comms and EMIC, which are supported by signed transaction documents. Clearly, there are no doubt major variables yet to be confirmed that will impact this valuation in the future, particularly in respect of Arqiva, which could result in a wide range of outcomes for shareholders, as Mike will expand upon later in the presentation. The current NAV represents our balanced assessment of fair value based on a fulsome valuation exercise taking into account the specifics for each portfolio company. As such, while very significant losses have been recognized in NAV over the last year, we're of the view that that period of highest volatility should now have stabilized. In terms of signed and completed divestments, as it stands, aggregate completed and signed divestments to date, which include Verne, of course, as well as Aqua Comms and EMIC, total GBP 419 million. We fully acknowledge that it's been frustrating for shareholders to see proceeds come in from the Verne transaction and go straight out to repay lenders. As James already mentioned, we should see the fund fully delivered by the end of June, with repayment of the remaining GBP 53 million in RCF balance following a receipt of EMIC proceeds and completion of the Sea Edge transaction. This should see some proceeds flow to shareholders upon completion of the Aqua Comms transaction, which we expect at the back end of this year or beginning of 2026. In terms of Market Capitalization and Loss Per Share, clearly, market cap remains at a material discount to NAV, despite further write-downs, which indicates continued shareholder skepticism of the NAV number. Whilst this is clearly understandable, given continued reductions in NAV over the last year, as James alluded to, this number has been derived by applying a dose of realism to underlying portfolio company business plan assumptions and our investor overlay in terms of risk, premia, terminal value assumptions, and financing outcomes. Whilst the Loss Per Share of GBP 0.45 is not welcome news for anyone, we have confidence in the rebase NAV as a balanced reflection of value today, and we will continue to promptly inform the market of any future material movements, as well as interrogating loss attribution for 2023 via potential prior adjustment with input from specialist third-party expert. We'll move on to slide eight to talk a bit further about the details of the NAV reduction components. As you would expect, the vast majority of the NAV movement was attributable to changes in fair value of the underlying portfolio assets falling into three key categories, which are the three largest blocks you see on this chart. Firstly, recognition of forecast proceeds under signed transaction documents for EMIC and on Aqua Comms. On the chart, you can see that of the total 44.9p movement, circa half of this, or 21.7p, was due to the delta between prior year NAV estimates on these two assets and the proceeds forecast to be received pursuant to signed transaction agreements on both of those EMIC and Aqua Comms, which are now reflected in the December 2024 NAV. This GBP 0.217 has risen chiefly from Aqua Comms, with EMIC only representing a very small portion of that relative to its December 2023 carrying value. Clearly, whilst Aqua Comms result in particular was below prior NAV expectations, we remain confident that the decision to sell at this value was the right one for shareholders and was ultimately a reflection not only of a competitive open market sale process run by Goldman Sachs, but recognition of current market and business-specific factors, which were verified by InfraRed through our own detailed financial analysis and diligence at the time of that decision. The second key component is a reduction in value of GBP 0.096 on Arqiva. This followed a fulsome review of management business plan and complete model rebuild by InfraRed, including a revision of refinancing assumptions in 2027 to current market rates, modeling of cash flows all the way out to 2050, and a bifurcation of terminal value assumptions against broadcasting revenue, which clearly have an earlier phase-out date, whether that's 2035 or in the 2040s, depending on your view, versus other revenues for the business, which do not face the same inherent future value drivers. Clearly, 9.6p is a material downward movement, noting that Arqiva does make up 24.9p of the 2024 NAV. Of course, the current valuation of Arqiva goes to the heart of our purpose here today, and I'll leave it to Mike to pick up that in much greater detail. The key message is that we're now comfortable that while there are no doubt major variables that are yet to land with respect to that valuation, which may impact it in future, we are working with a solid foundation in terms of at least the valuation modeling. The final other material element of the bridge is that there are some other fair value movements on remaining portfolio assets totaling GBP 0.084. That comprises several elements. Again, the key message is that these valuations have all been rebuilt using first principles. That includes revaluation of Verne against the specific nature of the contractual mechanism that James mentioned earlier, as well as an adjusted valuation for Elio taking into account offers in the recent sale process, as well as our revised view of the business's fundamental values as it stands today. You have some other movements related to portfolio level, sorry, fund level costs, as well as subsidiary losses, which are much less necessary. Moving on to slide 10 to begin the sort of asset by asset deep dive on Elio Networks. Clearly, one of the smaller assets in the context of the overall portfolio, but we think a real genuine opportunity to add value prior to an eventual exit in line with the overall portfolio realization timeline led by Arqiva in 2027-2028. On Elio, we stepped into a live sale process just as we did with Aqua Comms on our appointment and had to make a decision on both as to best next steps for the fund. We see Elio as being in a fundamentally different market position to Aqua Comms. As previously reported, Aqua Comms had multiple credible bidders with late-stage bids and a high risk of future value erosion in a market facing persistent margin decline in the mid-teens for the foreseeable future and limited cash conversion. By contrast, whilst Elio operates in a market which has recently suffered margin declines due to a structural deregulation of the fiber market in Ireland, we expect the impacts of that to be less persistent and systematic than the factors influencing the subsea sector. Elio has managed to set itself apart from its competitors by demonstrating resilient earnings and cash conversion, and it remains the only distributing business in the D9 portfolio. Not only does Elio's consistent earnings profile and ability to maintain margins of circa 50% despite intense price pressure, particularly given the deregulation environment over the last 24 months, provide helpful liquidity to D9 to support operating costs, but it also creates a strong basis for scaling the business via an inorganic growth strategy through acquiring target peers who operate at lower margins and transposing Elio's business model to generate an uplift in equity value. We see a large number of potential targets to execute that strategy. That should result in Elio sufficiently scaling its operations and earnings such that it attracts a greater pool of more mid-market buyers at D9's eventual exit point and achieve a better value outcome for shareholders. That active value-add approach plays to InfraRed's experience in value-add investments, which is a business we've been, as part of our business we've been doing for over 25 years. We are on our seventh vintage fund that focuses on that strategy. That is the part of the business that I personally have the most experience in, and I'm personally on the board of that business. I have strong conviction around that strategy, which is well developed, and we're currently finalizing that alongside management ahead of getting board approval to begin implementing the first steps of that strategy. I'll leave that there on Elio and now hand over to Mike, who will take the Arqiva. Thanks, Marc. Good morning to everyone. You can see on the first Arqiva slide there, as Marc said, the valuation has declined, but it remains a substantial number in the context of D9. That decline is driven partly by a more prudent view that we've taken on some of the key assumptions, including the future of broadcast or digital terrestrial television, DTT, as it's referred to, and also on the refinancing. The other driver of the decline there is factors in the period, most noticeably competition in the capacity market, which is where we sell spectrum to commercial broadcasters, essentially. The financials at the EBITDA level are around flat, and that's partly the capacity market point, but also slower growth in the new businesses versus previous assumptions. The more significant variables than the current year financials are really the events that drive the future cash flows. Future of broadcast will be the biggest determinant of what we're able to realize from this business. It's a very complex stakeholder decision matrix, the discussions that are at a pretty early stage, and hence there's a wide range of outcomes possible. Broadcast will eventually be phased out slowly over time. It is about how much capacity is maintained and for how long. All of that is closely tied to the BBC Charter process, which is concluded in 2027, and the associated BBC funding settlements that go alongside that. Another factor being the government policy on broadcast versus fiber and the implications for universal coverage that that has, given not everyone has fiber. Negotiations will therefore be pretty complex, not necessarily sequential, and hence that timeline we have on the chart there is not particularly detailed, but we think that they come together in around that timeframe, about three years. As a start to this process, the government's laid out some scenarios for what happens after the current contracts with the BBC and others. That range is from a kind of status quo, where we've provided fairly full capacity to the market, down to the so-called nightlight scenario, where there's a bare minimum service provided and much less revenue as a result. There are various scenarios in between where some service continues, but some spectrum is released. That gives the government the dividends to be able to resell that spectrum to somebody else. On the next slide, that kind of range of possible scenarios, we've turned into three valuation scenarios. In the middle there, you have our valuation case, and that's intended to be a balanced position within that range of scenarios. Then on the left, we have the low case, the so-called nightlight, and on the right, the finite case, which assumes a more favorable outcome and the consequent risking. We roll that forward to look at what that could imply in terms of what we are able to realize at exit. As you can see, there is a wide range of valuation outcomes that are possible. The low case on the left, if you have to look at these chunk bars in two parts, you have the dark blue piece is the gross equity value, and then the light blue dotted piece under the line is the VLN, the vendor loan note we have against this piece. On the low case, you can see that the light blue piece is bigger than the dark blue piece, which means that in this scenario, our net equity value is essentially zero. We do believe this scenario is unlikely, not least because it is politically very difficult, but it has not been ruled out, and therefore we have shown that as a bookend. The other scenarios, however, imply material upside versus the current share price. That middle scenario, which is our valuation on NAV case, on a net basis, net of the VLN, implies GBP 0.25 NAV. If we are able to get the upper end of plausible outcomes, then that could see us by early 2028, potentially returning GBP 0.43 to Digital 9 Infrastructure. That range is really informing our strategy for managing Arqiva. Our top priority is securing the future of broadcast, which is probably, we think, a three-year exercise, as we've said. Second is refinancing and/or stabilizing the credit ratings and the market perception of the credit such that we de-risk the capital structure ahead of exit. Third is driving the new business to a point where we're producing cash, but also that the growth prospects are credible to an incoming buyer. We are looking at all of this through the lens of where we need to be for a successful exit on Arqiva in three years' time and what story we need to tell, which is really around a de-risked, cash-generative business, stabilized capital structure, and real credible growth opportunities that somebody can value. We do have to give, based on that chart, a word of warning, which is we could do everything right on this asset and still fail if the government policy goes against us. We are optimistic that the fundamentals of broadcast remain solid and that therefore we have a good chance that we are not in that scenario and that we are in the middle or the right-hand side. Our job is to give ourselves the best possible chance of making sure that is the case. Now I will hand back to James to conclude the presentation. Thanks, Mike. As we move on to the final slide, and before I come on to the concluding remarks, I think it is worth just sort of looking at the timeline that is set out at the top of the slide. This really recaps the key milestones that we've discussed through today's presentation, namely the RCF will be fully repaid through the M1 and CH proceeds by the end of June. The Aqua Comms transaction will be closed by the end of 2025, and when then we expect distributions to commence to shareholders in early 2026. Then subsequently, the sale of Elio and Arqiva are expected from 2027 onwards. Probably worth just noting on that point, we will continually reassess the optimum time for exit for both Elio and Arqiva. Should there be an opportunity to arise to exit those at an earlier stage, which can maximize value for shareholders, we're open to that. We're continually reassessing that on an ongoing basis. That is really the timeline and the roadmap of the next few years. I think probably just to recap or reiterate a few points, appreciate it's been a very, very difficult 12 months. There's clearly a number of factors that are impacting the market sentiment of D9. There's been a new investment policy, a move to a strategic wind down, new board, new manager, implications of the overhang of an RCF and lender sentiment towards D9, material value write-downs, and some challenging divestment decisions. We fully appreciate that all of these have materially contributed to the current disconnect between the NAV and the market cap. Hopefully, what you've heard today through this presentation will give you a bit more of a sense of the roadmap of how capital could be returned to shareholders, as well as having a bit more confidence and transparency in the NAV, particularly in respect of the largest asset in the portfolio of Arqiva. The RCF lender relationships have been stabilized, and there's a clear path to repayment before the facility expires. While we recognize there's a range of outcomes on Arqiva, which Mike has taken us through, we believe that the NAV today represents a really balanced view and applies a material risk premium by the discount rate adopted. If you look at the share price currently trading between GBP 0.07-0.08 against a NAV of GBP 0.344, if you take Arqiva out of this, it leaves you with a NAV of around GBP 0.09, and of which we think roughly half will be returned upon the completion of Aqua Comms later in the year, early next year, subject to those regulatory clearances I mentioned. Realizations are now happening at a managed pace, commensurate with delivering value to shareholders, materially in excess of the current share price. There really are some plausible scenarios where there could be outperformance of the current NAV based on the range of outcomes for Elio and Arqiva. Thank you for everyone's time. We hope that you found the presentation helpful, and we'll now move on to Q&A. Sean O'Tonny from Panmure Liberum. Thanks for that. Just on Arqiva and the shareholder loan, so when you're diligencing the business, to what extent would the shareholder loan, assuming, let's say, a base case on a high level, how would the shareholder loan potentially kind of form part of the return profile in terms of how you're going to look to it? You're focusing on the vendor loan note. The Arqiva shareholder loan, so what D9 would have acquired the stake from when they bought it? For the most part, the ordinary shares and the shareholder loan are held pari passu, but the majority of the loan relates to a previous equity financing. There are a few minority shareholders that did not participate, and they fail to say that the vast majority, if not all, of the current, what we call equity value is really the shareholder loan. If you only hold ordinary shares, as some of the small minorities do, then the residual value of that is small. I've got a few questions, if you don't mind. Just with Arqiva, has there been any discussion with the other shareholders in terms of looking at an exit? Is your upside scenario, does that reflect potentially a control stake presenting with the other holders? Because currently, D9's got 48% voting rights. We have had a lot of interaction with the other shareholders around the board and the management and having constructive conversations with them. We have not made an explicit assumption around any kind of control premium, and it is feasible that this sells as separate stakes or together. One might take the view that it is going to be rather more saleable after the conclusion of the future of broadcast and stabilization of the capital structure than it is beforehand. There are certainly supportive drivers to think that there would be some kind of coordinated transaction. Thank you. Just on that downside scenario you had, I guess with all of those VLN bars, is that the current VLN value, or does that account for accrued rolled-up interest through to 2027-2028? It does. It rolls forward the VLN to that point of exit across all three scenarios. Okay. On Elio, could you just maybe talk a little bit more about what you've got there in terms of levers that you can pull to change the business? You talked about business transformation. Is it cutting costs? You also mentioned acquisitions. How are those going to be funded? Is there significant cash within Elio today? Yeah. It is certainly not a cost-cutting exercise. I think the beauty of that business is it is run exceptionally lean, and that is why it has got such a high margin relative to its peers in the subsector. The CEO is extremely focused on cost management, and that is what drives high margins. What will deliver an uplift in value is more the application of that business model to acquisitions who do not apply the same level of rigor to their business operations. I guess by virtue of the fact that the business has persistently high margins, it has sort of single-digit revenue growth across the last five years. It has got a well-maintained CapEx base, and it has good cash conversion with absolutely no debt on balance sheet. There is funding capacity that is sort of latent on the balance sheet to finance that strategy. We have sought interest from a number of domestic lenders in Ireland around that strategy, and there's strong appetite for that. Have you got an indication of what kind of leverage you think that business could support as a multiple of EBITDA broadly? I think historically, the business has had up to GBP 30 million of debt on its balance sheet. I do not think we probably want to push it too far. It is a conversation we are still having with the business as to how far we would push that. It will be, I think, definitely a measured approach. We are conscious that shareholders have obviously endured a lot on D9, so we will be taking an incremental approach on this. Yeah, maybe a step-by-step in terms of that M&A strategy. Smaller to start with and then build up from there to sort of prove the concept and make sure it works. It is not going to be a big bang acquisition. We need to make sure that we trade carefully with it and build it up. Yeah. Before we'd involve any debt, I think there's already cash on balance sheet for this business. All these targets are very small, so you can actually test the waters without involving any debt at all and just use cash. Okay. Is that all clear? Yeah. Thank you. We have had a number of questions through on the webinar. Maybe I will just start with a continuation on the Elio theme. Why does it make sense to delay Elio Networks' sale for two years and undertake a certain value initiative in the business versus letting a new buyer do these initiatives themselves according to their wishes and strategies? If these initiatives make sense, the buyer will do it themselves. On the other hand, have you considered the potential risks for the next two years? Of course, the strategy has inherent risks attached to it, and that's successfully transposing the business model onto any acquisition targets, as well as also the financing, although we clearly have undertaken a process for that, which has proven the appetite. In terms of why are we doing this and not letting a buyer do it, as I mentioned at the beginning of the discussion on Elio, we stepped into a live sale process when we took on this mandate. Clearly, the decision was made that the bids there were not necessarily credible at the numbers that were being presented and also were low relative to what we thought was fair value for that business today. I think it's fair to say that they weren't sufficiently representing what we felt the value of the business could achieve over a relatively short time horizon. Clearly, you will always receive better value for a strategy that has proven itself. I think it's our job to prove the value-add thesis so that an incoming investor can ascribe more value to that than what we saw in the process that we stepped into. It is clear from the outset on the acquisition of Elio by D9 that this was always the central part of the strategy to grow the business in this way. The incoming buyers were looking at it in the same way, however they were valuing it on an opportunistic basis and looking at D9 as a sort of slightly distressed scenario, which was not valuing the business for the upside through the M&A growth. I think the other point, Mo, is as well scale. The business, as it stood, has sort of low, I guess, EBITDA below $5 million. In order to get a more compelling pool of buyers, mid-market buyers, you need to push that up. The scale of the business needs to be increased. Getting it just past a certain point of scalability will increase competition and drive value as well. Perfect. We have also had a number of questions on burn, kind of centering on the mechanism for the earnout and how realistic we think it is that the earnout will be, what the range of outcomes could be on the earnout, and an indication of the level is included in the NAV at. I mean, I think we've sort of set out that there has been a reduction in the NAV at the end of the year versus the middle of the year. I think we did a comprehensive process in the sort of bottom-up exercise that we undertook across the whole portfolio. Looked at the mechanism in detail to assess the prospect of paying out. I think all we can say at this point is that it remains sort of quite commercially sensitive in terms of the discussions between the parties and also us assessing the options to drive best value for shareholders. Great. Thank you, James. There are a number of questions around the board kind of governance. Given clear failures of Triple Point on several levels, not least the previous valuation and the fees they've received based on those valuations, will the board be seeking to be paid past fees? Similarly, there's a question on, as you noted in the annual report, on the GBP 2.8 million loss linked to external fraud. Who is responsible for that? What was the nature of the fraud? I think what we can say at this point is that the board is in discussions with Triple Point over both matters. As soon as there's any news, there will be reported to shareholders on the outcome of that. Yeah, it might just be worth saying, and this is perhaps a relatively new point that's come up in the meeting, but this was an event that happened. Two years ago. Two years ago, and there's absolutely no exposure current, and the NAV doesn't assume any recovery. You can relax from that perspective. Perfect. Similar, I guess, a topic around, and then a number of questions on this topic, but around fees. Why are the costs of disposal so high relative to the proceeds of sales? I mean, this relates to the Aqua Comms dynamic transaction. I mean, this is an arrangement that was entered into by the previous board and the previous manager on the basis of a NAV that was clearly much higher at the end of December 2023. It was clearly on the outcome, which is disappointing for everyone, but obviously, as the reasons that have been articulated as to the rationale to go ahead with that sale, it clearly looks out of kilter with the final sort of price. We have attempted to renegotiate terms on that, but unfortunately, given that was negotiated some 18 months plus ago, it has been very difficult to achieve anything on that. I think we are very conscious of the level of fees that have been charged by financial advisors on past transactions. Not to say that we will not use financial advisors for future transactions. Of course, we will, but we're very conscious of fee arrangements, and we think we can ensure that there'll be a more competitive process around ensuring financial advisors are procured at lower cost going forward. We're also doing everything we can to mitigate reliance on advisors where possible by doing things in-house as well. Perfect. There is another question here that touches on a few common themes with other questions that are already dealt with, which might be difficult for you to answer, James, but you can try your best. The original business case for Digital 9 Infrastructure seems strong, but clearly, it has not worked out as planned. In your view, what has been the cause of the company's difficulties? Did the company overpay for assets? Did it fail to manage them well? Have there been fundamental changes in the market, or is there something else? I think it's a combination of factors. Clearly, these are growth-orientated businesses that are capital-hungry, and maybe an investment trust wasn't the right vehicle for this. Clearly, faced with significant macro headwinds from 2022 onwards and sort of availability of capital drying up, that's obviously challenged the business significantly. Just another question on fees. Fees relating to asset disposals, are any of these going to Triple Point or related parties? No. Perfect. The remaining questions kind of center around investor interaction, opportunities to interact with the board and the manager, and also the availability of the slides. The slides will be going up on the website shortly after this webinar. We are beginning our roadshow pretty much from today onwards. Please do reach out to the companies: Financial Advisor Panmure Liberum and broker JP Morgan to organize meetings. Their contact details are available at the bottom of the RNSs. If not, you can reach out to us here at InfraRed as well, and we can slot you in. Otherwise, that concludes the presentation there. Any other questions that we have not been able to get to, we will come back to you directly. Thank you everyone.