Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us for Nationwide Building Society's interim results call. I'm Debbie Crosbie, Chief Executive, and with me on the call today are Chris Rhodes, our Chief Financial Officer, Muir Mathieson, our Treasurer, Robert Gardner, Nationwide's Chief Economist. I'm gonna run through the highlights of the period and provide a brief strategy update before handing to Chris, who'll take you through the numbers for the six months to the 30th of September. I'm gonna keep it brief so that we've got plenty of time to respond to any questions that you have. Nationwide has again delivered a strong financial performance, and our mutual model means that we can continue to support our 16 million members through the current economic uncertainty. We've reported profits of GBP 980 million due to growth in income, driven mainly by rising interest rates. This has meant that we can further strengthen our capital and leverage positions. We continue to deliver competitive products, high-quality services, and great customer experiences. We've remained number one for satisfaction amongst our peer group. We successfully grew our Mortgage and deposit balances, and we continue to attract new Current Account members, demonstrating the impact of leading on value and service. Chris will take us through the financial highlights in more detail shortly. First of all, I thought I would touch very briefly on our cost of living support and our strategy refresh. We've responded proactively to the cost of living crisis by extending our branch promise until 2024 to provide practical in-person support for our members, and we've also launched our new dedicated cost of living telephone helpline, which does the same. We've also been very careful to make sure that we deliver real value and reward to our members, and we're doing this with tailored and competitive products, particularly for Savings, Mortgages, and Current Accounts. We've maintained our Mortgage lending through the recent disruption and recently moved our switcher rates to below 5% for our current members. We were able to provide this level of support because our mutual model provides us with opportunities that aren't available to many other financial services providers in the U.K. Mutuality will remain core to our refreshed strategy. It's central to delivering a distinctive experience for our members today and in the future. This also means we can secure change for the good of society with our social investment activity, our community charity boards, and the partnership that we have with Shelter. Our mutual purpose is at the heart of our strategy. We want Nationwide to be considered the number one choice for personal financial services, and we'll build member value, service excellence, and operational excellence around it. We also want to build upon our reputation for great customer service. Branches will continue to be part of our approach. We're also gonna develop our digital capabilities so that members benefit from round-the-clock convenience, as well as access to personal support when they need it most. Over the strategy period, we will grow sustainably by attracting more members and deepening the relationships that we have with existing members. Service excellence will go hand in hand with our operational excellence, delivering simple, streamlined, and flexible member experiences, grounded in resilient controls that protect our members and their money. I'm now gonna hand over to Chris, who's gonna take you through the numbers. Thank you, Debbie. Good morning, everyone. Over the last six months, we have been focused on supporting our members with great value products and investment in services that ensure they can get the advice and support they need through these challenging times. During the first half of this year, we have seen profits increase as a consequence of Bank of England base rate rises. Provisions for expected credit losses are elevated due to the uncertain economic environment, with coverage levels just below those seen at the height of the COVID pandemic. We have continued to strengthen our balance sheet and now have a leverage ratio of 5.8% and a 12-month average LCR of 179%. Turning to our financial performance, underlying profits are GBP 980 million compared with GBP 850 million a year ago. Statutory profit is GBP 11 million lower than underlying profit due to below-the-line hedging items. Total income was 16% higher, largely reflecting improved savings margins following base rate rises. Other income reduced by GBP 53 million due to the non-repeat of investment gains seen in the first half of last year. Operational costs are GBP 58 million higher as a consequence of higher inflation and investment in services to support our members. We expect total cost growth in the second half of the year to moderate. Asset quality remains strong, with stable arrears and forbearance levels during the period. The impairment charge of GBP 108 million reflects the deterioration in the economic outlook, as well as an increase in model adjustments to recognize the impact on borrower affordability of rising inflation and interest rates. The charge for other provisions was GBP 19 million compared to GBP 53 million in the prior year, reflecting ongoing remediation of legacy member processes. Member financial benefit improved to GBP 320 million for the half year and is now tracking above our GBP 400 million annual target. The balance sheet is 3% larger than the year-end, reflecting an increase of GBP 5.5 billion in mortgage balances and a GBP 3.3 billion increase in liquidity, partially offset by a reduction in other assets. Deposit growth of GBP 3.2 billion reflects ongoing current account inflows and a good performance in our traditional deposit franchise. Our stock market share of deposits was 9.3%. Our cost of retail funding, including current accounts, improved during the period as a consequence of the base rate rises. Our average member deposit pay rate is 91 basis points. This is 45 basis points higher than the market average deposit rate compared to 10 basis points 12 months ago, reflecting our higher pass-through of base rate changes. Capital ratios remain strong. The CET1 ratio increased to 25.5% and the leverage ratio increased to 5.8%. Income increased compared to the same period last year as a result of higher retail savings margins and the timing benefit of base rate changes. Approximately 50% of the change in base rate has been passed through to our retail deposit base, including current accounts, and approximately 60% when looking at retail variable savings. This compares to a market average for total deposits of approximately 20%. The mortgage market continues to be highly competitive, placing downward pressure on net interest income. During the period, the margin on the mortgage book reduced to 151 basis points, reflecting ongoing competition for both prime and buy-to-let mortgages. Mortgage margins are now below pre-pandemic levels. Completions in the first six months of the year recorded a margin of 101 basis points, whereas the current new business margins are 114 basis points, and the pipeline of new business expected to complete over the coming months has a margin of 68 basis points. In the second half of the year, mortgage book margins are expected to decline at a similar pace to H1. Deposit margins improved by 48 basis points during the period as a consequence of base rate rises. We expect this margin moderation to continue into 2023-2024 with ongoing mortgage competition. Costs excluding restructuring increased by GBP 58 million, of which GBP 29 million reflects inflationary impacts, including a GBP 15 million cost of living payment for colleagues alongside incremental investment in member facing services. Restructuring costs increased by GBP 23 million, reflecting decisions we have made to reduce our property estate, which will reduce future running costs. These have been offset by a reduction in historic fraud losses. The cost of risk in the half year has increased to 5 basis points, an annualized equivalent of 10 basis points, reflecting the increasing economic uncertainty and the affordability challenges presented by higher inflation and interest rates. This compares to an annualized cost of risk before the pandemic of 6 basis points. We have included model adjustments in our expected credit loss assessment to reflect risks that we do not believe are captured adequately in our core models. Firstly, arrears levels remain low, and some of this is judged to be temporary as a consequence of support provided during the pandemic. We retain a GBP 51 million provision for this risk. The increase in inflation to levels not seen for 30 years creates a risk that may not be adequately captured in our IFRS 9 models. As a consequence, we continue to hold a model adjustment to reflect the impact of rising inflation on those borrowers most exposed to the cost of living challenge. This has been refreshed to include higher inflation and higher wage growth, but we have also looked at payment shock and included an expected credit loss of GBP 16 million for those accounts rolling off fixed rates in the next two years. This total provision is now GBP 124 million. We also continue to hold a provision of GBP 26 million for cladding risk. Arrears and forbearance levels remain stable and below pre-pandemic levels. Mortgage three months plus arrears fell slightly to 32 basis points compared to the industry average of 72 basis points. Three months arrears on the unsecured portfolio rose slightly to 128 basis points, but remain below the 132 basis points recorded in December 2019. Based on the economic outlook and continued cost of living pressure on borrowers, we expect arrears to rise in the coming months. The average stock LTV reduced to 51% over the period, reflecting the strong housing market. As part of our assessment of expected credit losses, we have looked at upcoming fixed rate mortgage maturities and used a model adjustment to reflect the risks associated with possible payment shocks. We thought you might like these charts. They show that over the next 12 and 24 months, that 22% and 43% respectively of the total book will roll off from a fixed rate. The average pay rate for maturities over the next two years on the prime book is around 2%. Whilst these mortgages were originally stressed to a pay rate of circa 6%, we do assume there will be an increase in the 12-month probability of default as they mature. Assuming they move on to a new fixed rate of 6%, the probability of default increases from around 27 basis points to 88 basis points. As described earlier, this results in an additional expected credit loss of GBP 60 million reflective of the low LTV of these accounts. Only 5% of these prime accounts have an LTV greater than 80%, with only 0.4% above 90% LTV. We only offer buy-to-let mortgages up to 80% loan-to-value. The economic outlook continues to be uncertain and has deteriorated since the year-end. This is reflected in our economic scenarios, which continue to cover a wide range of potential outcomes. Our base case scenario is 45% weighted and assumes a small rise in unemployment and broadly stable house prices. We attach an aggregate 45% probability to our two downside scenarios, which include material falls in house prices as well as growth in unemployment. The upside scenario, which is 10% weighted, is aligned to a rising rate environment with a gradually improving labor market and rising house prices. The weighted average house price assumption across all four scenarios is a decline of 8% by the end of 2024. We estimate that a further fall of 5% in house prices compared to our weighted average would increase the expected credit losses by around GBP 20 million. We remain cautious about the outlook given the uncertainties that lie ahead. Total provisions for expected credit losses have increased by GBP 68 million to GBP 814 million since the year-end. Coverage ratios since the year-end have increased by four basis points for mortgages and have remained stable at 11.4% for unsecured. Coverage levels remain elevated and just below the level seen at the height of the pandemic. The increase in Stage two residential mortgage balances is largely due to rising interest rates in the economic scenarios, with the buy-to-let portfolio stage allocation being particularly sensitive to interest rate changes. Rising interest rates also resulted in an increased probability of default for buy-to-let loans in Stage One, which led to higher model-driven provisions and hence higher coverage. We are comfortable with the asset quality of our buy-to-let portfolio, given the LTV profile and the high interest coverage ratios. We remain strongly capitalized. The U.K. leverage ratio increased to 5.8% and the CET1 ratio increased to 25.5%, driven by retained profits in the period. Our capital resources are in excess of regulatory requirements with substantial buffers across risk-based, leverage, and MREL frameworks. The Society holds surplus capital of GBP 5.4 billion to the leverage requirement and GBP 7.7 billion to risk-based requirements. The leverage ratio is expected to remain our Tier 1 binding constraint. Based on our current understanding of Basel 3.1, our CET1 ratio would be 20% on a fully loaded pro forma basis. I have previously talked about our desire to manage our surplus CET1 capital more flexibly through the ability to repurchase CCDS periodically at our discretion. I am pleased to confirm that we are actively exploring implementing a facility that would enable us to do so, and we have made an application to the PRA for general prior permission, which is one of the prerequisites. Subject to this permission and completion of internal governance, we are targeting having such a facility available to us from early 2023. Our liquidity and funding ratios support our financial strength with a 12-month average liquidity coverage ratio of 179% at the half year. We aim to remain active in wholesale funding markets in both secured and unsecured formats across a range of currencies, with an expected total issuance of GBP 8 billion-GBP 10 billion equivalent per annum. Our plans assume we retain our prudent approach to wholesale funding by targeting maturities beyond the TFSME redemption window. As TFSME drawings mature, we expect to optimize our LCR in the range of 135%-145%. We continue to ensure our issuance plans reflect credit rating agency requirements for loss absorbing capacity. Thank you. We'll be now happy to take your questions. Thank you, Chris, and good morning, everyone. We've already had some questions, but as a reminder, please send any questions you may have via the Q&A function on your screens. Our first question is from Leigh Street, and there are two parts to it. Firstly, really helpful to hear plans for CCDS, but given the very high capital ratios, for Chris, interested in whether you have a maximum leverage ratio target. For Debbie, could you please share your thoughts on M&A, including consolidating smaller building societies? Lee, in terms of a maximum leverage ratio, no, we don't. Let me explain how we look about our capital position. We aim via stress testing to the Bank of England stress test as well as our own stress test to keep us at a CET or a total capital level above MDA threshold at the absolute peak of the stress. That becomes our binding capital management strategy. The leverage ratio is the number that flows from that, albeit we are clearly sitting on excess at the moment, and you can see the strength of our performance in both SST or the solvency stress test of 2021 and the ACS of 2019. Okay. You know, I'd just reiterate that our immediate focus is on the strategic pillars that I've outlined, which is essentially making sure that we deliver member value and absolutely focus on doing the best job we can with the society that we have today. You know, however, in the future, you know, there's no question that new capabilities can bring value. You know, my thoughts are that M&A in financial services doesn't often deliver the value that was expected, so we would set a very high bar before we would do anything, and it must be something that would deliver a capability that was really about driving longer-term value. Right now, you know, I just want to reiterate, we're very focused on the society that we have today and making sure that we do the best job we can for our members. Thank you. We've got a question from Alvaro, probably for Chris, around the volume dynamics in the mortgage market during October and November, please. Okay. Right, let's try and unpack this. Buy-to-let has seen the biggest impact. Buy-to-let volumes are probably down 75%. Clearly, purchase business in prime is down, but switcher business, i.e. folks booking future deals as they expect to roll off their fixed rates, is up. That's what we've seen during the most recent period, increase in switchers, fall off in purchases, but actually the prime market's still relatively good. 75% fall in buy-to-let. The expectation is that will continue for the rest of the year as well. We've got some questions from Alastair about the margins in the mortgage market. I think that the outlook you described, Chris, he's interested to understand what it would mean for the net interest margin outlook. In terms of net interest margin outlook for this year, there's clearly downward pressure from mortgages, but ongoing or potentially ongoing benefit from base rate rises. You will see that our core scenario is for a 4% base rate in early 2023. If that were to transpire using our assumptions on pass-through, the margin in the next 12 months would be broadly stable as the decline in mortgage book margins is offset by the ongoing benefit of base rate changes. Thank you, Chris. We've had a few questions coming in on what you said about CCDS. Muir, I'm wondering if you could provide any clarification regarding the size of a potential purchase. Yeah. Thanks, Sarah. As Chris mentioned, we as a mutual are able to apply for a general prior permission, and we have applied for that with the PRA. The size of that general prior permission is for 2% of our CET1 resources, which as at 30th of September equated to GBP 259 million. Now, I will of course emphasize that we would not necessarily use the whole of that prior permission, but that we could go up to GBP 259 million. That prior permission is in place for a 12-month period. Thank you. There's a follow-up question on CCDS, Muir. Can you provide some guidance on when you expect this facility to be available, and will it be an ongoing facility or will it be time-bound? As Chris mentioned earlier, our hope would be that we can conclude internal governance and we hope that we would get regulatory approval by the end of this calendar year, and hence be in a position, should we choose to do anything with this permission, to launch in early 2023. In terms of would it be a continuous operation? No is the short answer to that. As some of the people on this call will be aware, we have to operate under Section 9A of the Building Societies Act. We cannot be a market maker, so we cannot be a market maker in CCDS. If we do choose to use this facility and exercise it for CCDS buybacks, then in practice, what we would expect to do would implement a small number of discrete and time-limited exercises. Thank you, Muir. A question for Robert, please. Your base case MES looks relatively benign compared to those published by peers. Why are you so confident in the outlook for the housing market? I'd say the outlook is very uncertain and that's reflected in the probabilities that Chris described earlier, where we do have significant weight attached to the downside scenarios as well. In terms of the central scenario, that does envisage still a significant slowdown in activity and house price growth going towards zero. It already does envisage a significant slowdown. I think there is a significant chance of a relatively soft landing given that the labor market, though it's expected to soften, is softening from a very robust position. The labor market has been remarkably resilient to a wave of shocks in recent years. Household balance sheets are also in very strong position. If you look at net wealth relative to assets, relative disposable income is still very high. Households retain a significant buffer of liquid assets. They do still have significant protection from interest rate changes in the short term, with over 85% of prime mortgage balances on fixed rates. Obviously the impact of affordability testing has helped to ensure the households that are refinancing are in a better position to deal with any increases in their outgoings relative to previous periods. Fundamentally, there's still a constraint in the housing supply in the U.K., which will also help to provide support for prices as well. As I say, I think there is still a good chance that we do manage to achieve a relatively soft landing, but the risks are also clearly skewed to the downside, and that's also reflected across our scenarios. I guess I'd also point you towards the coverage levels. If you were to benchmark the unsecured coverage levels, you'd see we sit at the top end. If you look at the coverage levels of 13 basis points across the portfolio, mortgage portfolio, we're bang in the middle of the pack, and clearly we've got a risk position that sits below half the industry average. I think we remain, with all the mixture of scenarios that we process, really comfortable with the overall level of coverage. Thank you. A similar question. Can you provide a sensitivity of RWA inflation in the context of a significant fall in house prices? Wow. Okay. Probably not. In a sense that you will have noted from previous stress tests a significant volatility in risk-weighted assets driven by the point-in-time models. The step down in our CET1 ratio earlier on, well, at the end of last financial year was driven by the move to our hybrid models. We're still waiting approval from the PRA on the hybrid models, but they will dramatically dampen the volatility of risk-weighted asset growth during a stress. We've yet to run those models or the effectively the hybrid adjustment through the current stress test. All I can guide you to is a lot less volatility than you've seen before, and all indications would be at the height of the stress, the risk-weighted asset inflation would be lower with the hybrid models than it was with the point-in-time models. Thank you, Chris. I think another one for you, I'm afraid, Chris. Can you give a bit more comfort on the risk profile of Buy to Let in the context of rising rates? Yeah. We've given you the chart. Interestingly, you might note there is no expected credit loss addition from that piece of analysis. Largely because of the LTV profile of the book. If you look at that chart, you'll see current pay rates are 2.5%. Whilst it's fair to say a five-year fixed rate at the moment is 5.5%, we see that fixed rate going below 5% in the not too distant future. The reason why I tell you all that is I'm now gonna tell you that if I look at the interest coverage ratio alone and strike the number of 200% consistent with being able to afford the mortgage at that kind of higher rate, well, only 3% of the Buy to Let book has an ICR below 200% and an LTV above 60%. A tiny proportion of the book is potentially exposed to rate shock, and that's why the ECL adjustment is 0. You've got all the data in that slide. Above 60%. Above 60%. I knew I was gonna get that the wrong way around. Yeah. Try and get the signs in the right way. Let's repeat that. Only 3% of the book has an ICR below 200% and an LTV above 60%. Got it the right way around, Muir. Thank you. Moving on to the deposit side of the balance sheet. Has the 60% deposit pass-through been consistent across the rate increases, or has it risen as rates have moved higher? How do you expect deposit pass-through to evolve? Following on from that, is there an upper level beyond which you will not let the net interest margin rise above, i.e., where you give 100% pass-through of higher rates to depositors? Let's start at the beginning of that. Yes, as we have progressed through base rate rises, the overall deposit pass-through rate has increased. On average, it's now 60% as we caught that up. Our assumption going forward is it's broadly 60% of base rate rises will get passed through to retail variable savers. I think the important context, though, is actually that's an assumption. The way we manage the book is the other way around. It's to look at total market flows, competitive position. We aim for the product set to be delivering value to the members, and therefore, the margin is effectively a solve to on the basis of retaining a very competitive deposit book that meets the needs of funding the balance sheet. Thank you, Chris. When assuming the severe downside scenario plays out with large house price declines, what% of the current book is at risk of moving into negative equity? We'd have to get the calculators out for that. I mean, at the moment, the negative equity in the book is GBP 8 million. We'll revert on the detailed calculation. It's not, compared to previous scenarios, a very significant number, but I will have to get the calculator out, I'm afraid. I've got a question on funding plans. GBP 8 billion-GBP 10 billion per annum, is Nationwide planning to start pre-funding the TFSME maturities? That's a question for Muir, please. Yeah. Thanks, Sarah. The short answer is we already have. With a target of, or guidance of GBP 8 billion-GBP 10 billion of pre-funding per annum, as you can see on the maturity slide, we've got less than that maturing year-on-year. We have already begun in that. As we've already said, we've already issued since the start of our financial year, GBP 5 billion. We are well on the way to pre-funding TFSME. The other points just to really emphasize here is that we have not lent all of the TFSME that we borrowed, so we do not need to replace all of the TFSME. As Chris mentioned earlier, our LCR, which currently sits at 179%, will move back to a more normalized range of 135%-145% post TFSME repayment. Thank you, Muir. Um, Chris, can you describe to us the key drivers of stage two loans, especially what causes borrowers to become an up-to-date stage two loan, and how can we, um, think about the propensity to move into a stage three from this point? All right. Okay. The reason why you go into stage two is because of a significant increase in the credit risk versus the credit risk at origination. As you look at the stage two table, vast majority of what's in there is not in arrears. Therefore, it's subject to a significant increase in credit risk. There's a number of qualitative factors that drive that, but the two most significant are a doubling of the origination P.D. or an absolute P.D. greater than 75 basis points, which will move a performing loan into stage two. The move through to stage three is a mixture of default, i.e., 90 days plus or more in arrears. As you hit the 90 days point, you go into stage three. Forbearance, longer-term forbearance would drive you into stage three. Other indicators, for example, if you've got a borrower who is paying, but there is a bankruptcy mark via the credit bureau, that would put them into Stage 3 as well as a default. Thank you, Chris. There's a question about the deposit market. Can you give your view of the trends on this market and whether you expect competition to intensify? Yeah. As you will note, if you've unpicked the numbers in detail, the market share fell very slightly from 9.4%-9.3%, or perhaps more accurately, 9.38%-9.33%. Largely driven by the impact of JPMorgan Chase in the early part of our half year. In the second part of the half year, we've done really well. Flow share, for example, in August was 9.6%. We think competition has leveled out. The current pricing we've got with our 60% pass-through is really competitive, and we are now seeing excellent inflows. Clearly, that's in the context of a slightly slowing growth in the deposit market. At the moment, we remain very positive about our relative position, both in terms of flow and value back to members. Thank you, Chris. We don't seem to have any more questions at the moment. As a reminder, if you have any questions, please put them into the chat function on your screens. I've got a question about the buy-to-let market. Can you talk about the future of this market in the context of rising rates and legislative changes, please? Yeah. Look, I think in terms of new investors, if you like, your profit and loss account looks very diminished compared to what it would have looked like prior to the rate rises, which is why broadly, I think we've seen a 75% fall in volume. I think there's a set of challenges around future growth at this interest rate level on whether people will enter the buy-to-let market. From an affordability and credit point of view, I think I've gone through the numbers that says we're comfortable ultimately with the buy-to-let credit quality, but I think new business flows will remain depressed. I think that, you know, there's a slightly bigger social issue there in the sense of private rented sector being roughly one in five of all properties in the U.K. A falloff or an exit of buy-to-let investors with mortgages, which is where the pressure flows, will potentially put even more pressure onto rent rises. I think we're in an interesting dilemma at the moment where buy-to-let investment for new investors doesn't work. I've got a question from Alastair Ryan asking about, in the context of the Mortgage margin guidance given, why would we be writing business at such a low margin? As you will see, Alastair, current pipeline is between 60 and 70 basis points on a marginal return on capital basis that remains good. When you take into account the overall shape of the margin and the cost of funds of retail, that enhances the overall society return as well. I think as we have said previously, 50, 60 basis points, you still make a good marginal return on capital. Thank you. I've got a question about the distribution of our outstanding mortgage and consumer credit books across household income profile. I don't know whether that's one for Robert or Chris. I'll start, and then maybe Robert or Muir can add. Look, the natural credit policies that the Society adopts and the natural profile of homeowners, which is not just the Society as the market as a whole, will drive our overall demographic profile of those who have credit to be towards the higher end, because that's how you get through the affordability. In lots of ways, folks on average or below average earnings will not be able to afford Mortgages and/or unsecured credit. Thank you, Chris. A question on the pension fund for Muir. Given market volatility, how is the Society's pension scheme positioned, and are there any matters you'd draw to our attention at this point? Yes. As we've disclosed in our interim results, Nationwide did provision GBP 400 million of a short-term loan at arm's length to our pension fund. Now, the Nationwide pension fund, our DB scheme, which is now closed to new members, is a very solvent fund. It's very well-funded, and they have plenty of liquidity and did not need that liquidity from the society. The trustees of the pension fund want to run a very prudent fund and wanted to build in significant additional headroom above the peak in gilt yields that we saw in October. In order to have that significant surplus for much higher gilt yields and real yields than we saw at the peak of the market turmoil, we provisioned them with that short-term loan. Since the half-year end, the fund has already returned over GBP 100 million of that loan back to the Society, as they are converting longer-term assets into liquidity. Thank you, Muir. Another one for you. Has the recent change in interest rates impacted the Society's structural hedging strategy? No. Our structural hedging strategy is very programmatic, so we tend to hedge or we do hedge 1/60 every single month. We have a five-year rolling caterpillar hedge against our current accounts and reserves and CCDS, so an average duration of two and a half years. Just to remind everybody, the purpose of a structural hedge is to smooth income through the interest rate cycle. As interest rates fall, our profitability will decline more slowly. As interest rates rise, our profitability will rise more slowly, and so we have smoother earnings through a cycle. The disclosures we've got in the appendix to the investor presentation today, you'll see that we're achieving slightly lower income than compared to prevailing SONIA rates as of today, half-year-on-half-year. The hedge is doing exactly what it is designed to do, that it is smoothing through the cycle. We do not take directional views on interest rates in Nationwide. We are here to provision products and services to our members, not to take views on interest rates, hence we follow a very programmatic approach. Thank you, Muir. Back to the mortgage book, can you give a split of the mortgage book between variable and fixed rate, and the proportion of two year and five years being written on our book at the moment? Book's broadly 85% fixed. The majority is five, but I don't have the percentage off the top of my head. Vast majority is five though. Thank you. There's a Q&A question on interest-only mortgages and whether if interest rates remain at this high level, we would consider bringing them back. I don't know whether Debbie or Chris, you want to come in on that one. Look, I mean, we think about interest-only at the moment as a forbearance option, and it can be very useful in the right circumstances. We want to go through affordability discussions with our members and make sure that that solution was right for them. In the future, it's not something that's on the pad right now, but we would, as you'd expect, keep a very, you know, open mind as to see how things develop. I don't know if you want to. No, no. I mean, there's a very small interest-only book already. We do small amounts of it, but fundamentally for the average borrower needs to be on a repayment basis, and interest-only is a good forbearance option, but ultimately isn't the way of buying a home. Thank you both. A question about savings that were built up during COVID. Have we seen this, and what do we expect to happen to those savings pools going forward? For Robert or Chris, oh yeah. Sure. If you looked at the trajectory of household deposit growth at market level through the pandemic, we've got about an additional GBP 200 billion or so accrued over and above what we would've expected the market to increase by since the pandemic began. That's equates to sort of more than GBP six and a half thousand per household. Obviously, it wasn't evenly distributed across households. It was disproportionately accrued by older, wealthier, higher income households. It is a significant additional buffer that households have accrued over that period, albeit, as I say, not evenly accrued. I guess it's fair to say, Robert, as we look at the deposit market, we expect growth to slow. Mm-hmm. We don't expect the deposit market to go negative. No. As you say, deposit growth has remained actually surprisingly resilient to date, given the pressures on household budgets from high inflation. As you say, looking forward with those headwinds expected to remain and the labor market likely to soften, so households' ability to save is likely to diminish. Also, if the mortgage market slows in line with the housing market as is likely, that's also likely to act as a damping effect on deposit growth as credit creation slows as well. Thank you, Robert. There are no further questions that have come in, so I'd like to hand back to Debbie, please. Okay. Look, I would just like to thank you all for joining the call, and thank you for your questions, and look forward to talking again soon. Good day.