Right. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Super's Interim Results to the First December 2025. I'm gonna start this off with a strategic overview, and then I'll hand you over to Mike to take you through the numbers. It's been an incredibly busy period for us, with significant levels of activity as we've delivered on our strategy to grow earnings. Shareholders are now seeing the benefits of this as we're increasing the minimum dividend uplift to 2% from the next financial year onwards. We're positioned for further growth with an attractive near-term pipeline of over GBP 500 million. Just to take you through some of the proactive steps we've taken over the last year to create a platform for growth. We've achieved much greater shareholder alignment through the internalization of the management. Shortly after that, we completed the joint venture, which has allowed us to undertake capital recycling and also generate management fee income. During the period, we scaled up to GBP 845 million, demonstrating our access to capital alongside the debut bond issue that Mike will talk through in a moment. We've established a cost-efficient and scalable platform, evidenced by our 9.2% EPRA cost ratio, and it's continuing to trend lower as we look to grow the business. To support this future growth, we've also been making investment hires. Just to take you through a couple of the more recent names that bring a depth of grocery property expertise. Jamie Cowen, who joins us as Trustee Director with 30 years of experience in real estate, the majority of which has been with Sainsbury's as a Director of Estates and Investment. Also Justin Upton, the head of investment, who most recently was CIO at Urban Logistics REIT, and also prior experience as a fund manager, investing in a portfolio that also included supermarkets and grocery-anchored retail parks. We've doubled down on our sector specialism and now have a team, a dedicated team of 18 across investment, asset management, finance, and investor relations. It's this sector specialism that allows us to underwrite opportunities for growth across grocery real estate. In the left-hand column there, you've got UK food stores across a range of both formats and grocers, but also it's about investing in mission-critical, top-performing food stores for us, and sometimes that comes with adjacent retail. We absolutely have the in-house capability not only to manage that, but also to maximize the return. Lastly, the column on the right there, our European exposure, and we've taken from France to scale now with our latest tranche of sale and leasebacks to Carrefour. Lastly, along the bottom of the page there, you've got some of the grocers that we see opportunities to work with going forward. With these plans to grow, we have ambitions to double the size of the portfolio, but all the while maintaining those attractive investment fundamentals, such as 90% or so grocery income, long leases on average of around 12 years, and of which around 80% is inflation-linked, and always maintaining that high quality of income, with around 70% being investment grade. What we've shown at the bottom of the page is an illustration of the evolution of the portfolio as we double in size. You'll see that the core driver of the business is still UK food stores, but with an allocation, as we already do, to grocery-anchored retail to European food stores. Lastly, you'll see the new addition there, grocery distribution. Now, what we're saying here is that it will be opportunity-led, and it will come down to where we can best allocate capital to deliver returns, but that we've got the team, the expertise, and the relationships to be able to underwrite anything in the grocery property investment universe. With that, I'll hand you over to Mike. Thank you, and good morning, everybody. As Rob said, it's been an exceptionally busy period for the company. We've delivered a number of important strategic milestones, each designed to position the business for growth and create long-term value for our shareholders. As anticipated, these proactive steps had a short-term impact on H1 earnings. However, they have significantly strengthened the foundations of the business and our ability to deliver sustainable returns. Returning now to the headlines for the period, which we'll explore in more detail shortly. Net rental income was GBP 57 million, down 2%. Our EPRA cost ratio improved to 9.2%, a reduction of 440 basis points. We paid dividends of GBP 0.031, up 1% on the prior period. The portfolio, including post-period end activity, increased to GBP 2 billion, up 20% since June 2025. Our EPRA net present value was marginally higher at 87.5 pence. Taken together with dividends paid in the period, we delivered a 4% total-account return for the first half. Net rent income reduced by 2% period, which is in line with our expectations. This was largely driven by the timing gap between receiving the JV proceeds, which completed in May 2025, and the subsequent redeployment. Operationally, performance remains very strong. On the left-hand side of this chart, you'll see we completed 19 rent reviews, achieving an average uplift of 3.8% above the previous payment rents. These contributed an additional GBP 1.1 million of income versus the prior period, more than offsetting the impact from the three lease break years that complete early in 2025. As a result, like-for-like net rent increased by 1%. Acquisitions added GBP 6.2 million of income, which was offset by the assets transferred into the joint venture. As Rob said earlier, the JV proceeds have now been fully redeployed with the financial benefit expected to come through for FY 2027 onwards. We continue to have a highly secure and efficient income profile. Another period of 100% occupancy and rent collection. 76% of our portfolio is investment grade, providing strong visibility and security, and our gross to net rent ratio of 99.5% is among the highest in the sector. Turning to our administrative costs. We've made very good progress so far and delivered over GBP 2 million of cost savings in the first half. As the chart shows, our EPRA cost ratio of 9.2% now places us firmly at the low end of the peer group. As I mentioned previously, we're still working through a small number of transitional costs following the internalization. However, we remain on track to reduce the cost ratio to below 9% for FY 2027. Bringing these elements together, EPRA earnings per share were 2.7 pence compared to 3 pence in the prior period. The main drivers were as follows. Firstly, and as I set out earlier, the transfer of assets into the joint venture reduced earnings by 0.2 pence. Management fee income from the JV, alongside GBP 2 million of cost savings, increased earnings by 0.3 pence, which has fully offset the increase in debt costs that is due to our proactive decision to refinance and extend the term of our debt. Finally, 0.1 pence reduction from a general increase in the weighted average drawn debt compared to the prior period. Returning to our portfolio, which has increased by 20% since June 25. On the left-hand side of this chart, you will see we have deployed GBP 398 million of capital at a 6.5% net initial yield. The portfolio delivered revaluation uplift of GBP 7 million or 1.3% on a like-for-like basis, outperforming the MSCI All Property Capital Growth Index by 90 basis points. The movement post period end reflects the agreement with Blue Owl to transfer five of our assets into the joint venture and the deployment of a further GBP 9 million of capital. Altogether, this results in a combined portfolio value of GBP 2 billion. The chart here illustrates the movement in EPRA NTA per share, which increased to GBP 0.875, up from GBP 0.871 at June 25. Starting with the bar on the left, EPRA earnings were 2.7 pence. We paid dividends of 3.1 pence during the period. The portfolio delivered a 2 pence uplift on a like-for-like basis, which was partially offset by acquisition-related costs. The total accounting return for the period was 4%, driven primarily by income, which represented approximately 88% of the return and is underpinned by a portfolio predominantly of investment grade occupiers. We've also been very active in the debt capital markets, and we continue to manage our structure proactively. In July, we issued our debut GBP 250 million unsecured bonds, extending the average maturity and further diversifying our funding sources. The chart on the left shows our maturity profile. We have only one drawn facility maturing in the next 12 months, which we expect to refinance immediately. Of the debt that's maturing in FY 2028, GBP 284 million benefits from extension options out to FY 2030. Our debut bonds and U.S. Private Placement notes were issued with a blended tenor of just over six years and an attractive fixed rate of 5%. As the chart on the top right shows, we have successfully diversified our sources of funding, giving us access to greater pools of capital and the flexibility to enter different markets when conditions are favorable, as we have demonstrated in the period. At 4.8%, our weighted average cost of debt has now largely adjusted to market levels. Importantly, 92% of our drawn debt is either fixed or hedged, which we expect to increase towards 100% in the coming months. In December, Fitch Ratings reaffirmed the company's BBB+ investment-grade credit rating, and we remain fully committed to at least maintaining this rating. We have been very active in the investment market and have taken leverage to 43% as we executed on our pipeline. We monitor our leverage through both Loan to Value and net debt to EBITDA. On a pro forma basis, net debt to EBITDA is 8.2x. With a full period of income from recent acquisitions, we expect to operate at the lower end of the 7x to 8x range within the next 12 months and consistent with historical levels. Our income is largely backed by investment-grade covenants, which supports operation at the current levels. However, we do remain prudent in managing leverage and maintain significant headroom across all of our covenants. In summary, we are delivering material cost reductions, a 32% reduction in overheads in the first half. We completed earnings accretive acquisitions, deploying GBP 398 million of capital at an attractive 6.5% net initial yield. We are pleased to upgrade our dividend guidance to a minimum uplift of 2% per annum for FY 2027 onwards. With that, I'm going to hand you back to Rob who will take you through the market and investment update. Thank you. UK grocery is one of the world's most competitive markets. It's really impressive that we've seen Tesco and Sainsbury's in this environment continuing to grow market share. Of course, that comes from like to like sales increases from existing stores rather than new store space. Asda remains the third largest grocer, but has continued to lose market share. There is a clear new management and a clear turnaround strategy for that business. Another name just worth calling out on the page, Lidl, impressive market share growth, but of course, that is coming from new store openings. I mentioned some of Asda's challenges there and we did undertake a further 10-store sale and leaseback into our joint venture at an accretive 7.4% net initial yield during the period. As ever, it's about strong trading established grocery locations for us, evidenced here by the 23 years of average trading history. That just gives us absolute confidence that there'd be alternative occupied demand for these locations and a mission-critical asset with low competition. The rents have also been set low at GBP 19.90 per square ft, which is highly affordable relative to the store turnover performance. Being a sale and leaseback, it means we get three years of trading history to be able to diligence that. We've also got attractive lease terms of 25 years of annual inflation linked uplifts. Then the last point on this page, capital value per square ft is around 250 GBP, which is well, well below replacement cost. That's a function of that wide acquisition yield and also the low rents. It's worth pointing out that if we had Tesco or Sainsbury's on those same attractive lease terms, that capital value would be more like GBP 400 to GBP 500 per square ft. This is a great deal for us, and we'd love to do more of it if we get the chance. It's the scarcity of new food store locations that supports this demand from alternative occupiers. We've shown you an example on the left here, a site in Wolverhampton, over 40 years of trading history as a supermarket location under multiple grocers. Most recently Tesco, who acquired from Waitrose. We know that Tesco have been looking to get into that catchment for over 25 years. The point being that strong food store locations simply don't go vacant. On the right-hand side of the page, the Homebase administration and a vacancy that provided a rare opportunity. Sainsbury's paid a premium to take on 12 of the former Homebase leases. Some of the rents there that we're seeing are upwards of GBP 28 per square ft. That's been some strong evidence for us. Right. Online grocery. We've seen now a return to its long-term growth trend, reaching 12.2% last year, and that's the highest it's been since the pandemic levels. When you drill down into that growth, you can see that it's the omnichannel grocers that continue to dominate online. On the left-hand side, you can see strong growth from Tesco and Sainsbury's. Yes, Ocado was the fastest growing. When you look on the right-hand side of the page, and if you look at Tesco's online market share, the light blue at the top of the bar, you can see that that Tesco's online business is more than double the size of Ocado's entire business. When you take account of the in-store sales as well, GBP 44 billion of annual sales for Tesco, that's more than 14x the size of Ocado. Grocery is all about scale. You can see it's the omnichannel grocers that are best placed to win. An interesting area of the market is that we've now seen rapid online grocery where consumers can get their products within a 30-minute drive time. That's now around 10% of the convenience channel. A few years ago, we saw a number of disruptors attempt to come into the market, investing significant amounts of capital to try and establish their own dark store networks and supply chains. In the bottom left there, we've given the example of Amazon that shows you even the most well-capitalized entrants to the market, it's not easy. In the middle, you can see again, it's the omnichannel grocers that are able to respond to this new competition. They've introduced rapid online fulfillment at a low cost through existing store networks and supply chains. That's both through their own solutions in the middle, but also on the right through those third-party delivery providers. It just creates a very high barrier to entry or to disruption. It's the mission-critical real estate within supermarket tenants that we own. We've shown you on the left, Tesco's online omnichannel distribution map, the blue dots being each of the omnichannel stores in their network. On the right in that illustration there, the green dots on the map are the regional grocery distribution centers, of which there's around 20 in the country. That supports the entirety of the store network. These are absolutely mission critical, supporting their 800 or so large format stores, around 3,000 convenience stores. It doesn't matter whether a product is sold online or in store, it all goes through that same distribution network. Of course, when we're acquiring these properties, we're talking to the tenants, the grocers, to understand exactly how important they are for their distribution networks. Coming now to the joint venture. We've mentioned that we rapidly scaled this through a series of transactions to now being 23 stores, total value of GBP 845 million at net initial yield of 6.5%. This is really demonstrating the value of both the platform and our sector specialism as we're generating GBP 2 million a year of management fee income there. We've been recycling that capital from the joint venture into GBP 398 million of earnings accretive acquisitions since July. On the left, again, that range of both store formats, but also grocers. We put that, our French exposure to scale, which I'll come on to in a moment. I mentioned earlier our ability to maintain those attractive investment fundamentals as we grow. You've got that on the right-hand side of the page there. 6.5% net initial yield. Average lease length of 15 years, 100% of which is inflation linked, and again, maintaining that high quality of income with 70% being investment grade. All the while we're targeting this mission critical grocery properties let to the leading grocers. In keeping with that was the EUR 123 million French acquisition with Carrefour sale and leaseback. Now this is a great grocer for us to be working with. 21% market share, EUR 42 billion of annual sales, and again, investment grade credit rating. At the store level, we've acquired at a 6.6% net initial yield, so it's accretive. Also being a sale and leaseback, we get that three years of store trading history. We're able to ensure, again, the rents were set very low and it's producing a very low capital value per square ft, which again, is below replacement cost. As we grow, we're absolutely maintaining our capital discipline with that focus on quality and return. We've just shown you a few examples on this page. On the left-hand side, a Tesco in Hampshire, which on the face of it, rents are affordable, relative to trading. The returns would have stacked up, but actually when we did our diligence on it, site cover is high, competition is high, and that just meant store trade was actually pretty average, so it didn't meet our quality criteria. The example in the middle there, another Tesco, which on the face of it, 14 years annual inflation linked lease, strong performing store, omnichannel, so it ticked the boxes, but actually it was really quite over-rented. Where the pricing got to on that, it just started to stretch our returns assumption too far. We walked away from that one. Lastly, on the right-hand side, a store we did buy. 16 years annual inflation linked lease to Sainsbury's. Very strong performing store. The rents are very affordable. This was the store that we acquired in a truly off-market transaction. Just proving how our sector specialism unlocks those unique opportunities for us. Now we're well positioned for the next phase of growth. We operate in a highly defensive sector that's resilient through economic cycles. We own a portfolio of mission critical food infrastructure assets with those attractive property fundamentals and triple net leases. The proceeds of the JV have now been fully redeployed, and with that, we've updated our guidance to that 2% minimum dividend uplift per year from the next financial year. As I mentioned, we have these ambitions to double the portfolio in size through an attractive pipeline. That is where our sector specialism comes in. The team, the expertise, the relationships to underwrite anything across the grocery property investment universe. We have the access to capital, as we've shown, through the joint venture and through also the bond issue. With that, we will hand over to questions. Thank you. Morning, John Cahill from Stifel. Complex presentation, particularly pleasing to see the significant increase in the dividend guidance. Just wanted to refer back to slide seven, in terms of your longer-term ambitions. Two questions, if I could please. Based on the grocery distribution and 10% element, maybe you could just give a bit of detail as to what that might look like in terms of, you know, the size of the unit, if you even go for something forward funded, if you look at the dark stores, a bit more color on that, please. And then secondly, not to plan for the week to witness too much, but it will take time to achieve the ambition. When you get there, is the view that you'll then be in a position to perhaps look at a dividend that is more closely aligned to inflation increases in good years of 2%, or is that what is more the holy grail? Yeah. I'll take the first, John, and I'll let Mike do the second. No, the point for us is, it's again about mission critical properties. We're open-minded as to what that might exactly look like. What we've shown here is an illustration because we may sit here in a year, two year time and we've not bought any. It will be opportunity led. It will come down to where we can best drive the returns. What we want to be clear about is anything that is in that grocery property investment universe, the same tenants where we're speaking to them and we can understand there's mission critical and we can deliver returns, we will absolutely kind of be looking at. We've brought the team. That's why we talked to some of the team members we brought in who have that expertise in the whole range of grocery property, whether it's distribution or stores. Just on the dividend point. Clearly the last 12 months have been very transformational for the company. We've worked extremely hard to deploy the capital that from the joint venture proceeds, so we are now fully deployed, which gives us also, in addition, the cost savings, gives us the confidence to increase the dividends, that minimum 2% target. Of course, with being so heavily linked to inflation in terms of our lease structures, that would be the ambition at some point that we can pass through the inflation uplift that we're getting on the top line through dividend growth. I think notwithstanding the point that we've worked incredibly hard to get from the position where we were to where I'd say, where we can upgrade our guidance to a minimum target of 2% uplift from next year onwards. Thank you. Morning. Jonathan Barnett from Goldman Sachs. Obviously strong vision in general trades, would all these types of assets also apply to non UK assets? I mean, would you also look at distribution assets in the consumer interest question? Second, on your call for disclosure, scale up, potentially over time, where do you think that type of conversation takes place or who controls it within government or multiple stakeholders? I'll do the first bit, Mike. Can you do the second? You know, again, I think what I'd say is we're open-minded. I think the move with Carrefour was a good example of working with an operator that ensured we got sufficient scale in the market, but we could also understand that market. Any geography or asset class in that, whether it's stores or distribution, we will be doing a lot of work before we enter that market. I think the easiest move for us in the near term would be Tesco, Sainsbury's, given our relationships and the extent of our exposure to them. That's the obvious step if we were to do something in the distribution space. Anything over and above it will be very measured to it always. Yeah, fine. Just turning to the cost ratio point. We've again very pleased to see the benefit from centralization coming through 32% reduction in overheads in the first half. 9.2%, we're very much on target to be about sub 9% for next year. Obviously, we've made some investment hires. Operationally, we've got a very efficient book platform. As we scale, yes, I would expect that kind of hurdle to reduce. Probably be reckless to put a number on it today, but clearly there would be a lot of operational levers we could pull to get that, drive that more close to 8%. Morning. It's James Carswell from Peel Hunt. Obviously you rotated some of the assets from your own balance sheet into the JV, and that makes it pretty accretive. I mean, in terms of the appetite from Blue Owl side, is there more assets to do more of that? And equally on your own balance sheet, do you have more assets that would be suitable for that JV that you could rotate in? Then thinking further afield, I mean, what's your thought on kind of establishing new JVs in some of the kind of site bases which you've discussed? Yes. Look, aspirational target when we created the joint venture was GBP 1 billion. We've got to just shy of GBP 850 million already. Certainly, look, we just transferred that further set of stores into the vehicle. The appetite is definitely still there from Blue Owl. From our perspective, it's a great way for us to be able to scale. It's very efficient for us to generate that management fee. There are more stores that we potentially would have earmarked for new cost. What it means is if there are stores that are in the market that don't necessarily fit the JV, well, we can acquire those direct on our balance sheet and bundle them in with some more across both. Yeah, it's just a very flexible way for us to grow. We've been again open-minded to how we deliver that. And yes, the Blue Owl vehicle has a kind of specific strategy and therefore there is room for further joint ventures. Given the platform and the specialism and our unique portfolio, there is potentially an ability to do something maybe at the lower yielding end. We're absolutely having those conversations. Matthew Saperia also from Peel Hunt. 4% total returns have been very respectable, but clearly the backdrop is an awful lot of activity in the period. Any idea how much that held the total returns back buying? Looking forward, what do you think a sustainable total return is for the portfolio and the business as we are today? Yeah. If I take an overly simplistic view of what the adjusted accounting term might be, we showed that there was about GBP 25 million to GBP 26 million of acquisition-related costs. Again, simplistically that's just over probably 2p. I would then say our adjusted total accounting return would have been more like 5% or low 5%. Notwithstanding the point that we've made, the strategic importance of entering into the joint venture and deploying that capital. All things being equal in a stable yield environment, you know, you can comfortably see a payoff where we're delivering kind of 8x to 10x total accounting return or 20% total accounting return towards the upper end of that is very achievable for us. A lot of the growth coming through over the last few years has been capitalizing from the rents like this we get in a portfolio that are contractual. You've seen that growth coming through. Yeah, absolutely the upper end of those 10% should be achievable for us. Jonathan from Goldman Sachs again. On valuations, I mean, obviously we've had these discussions before about are you recognizing where you could find ERVs and evidence versus what they're pricing? Where are we on that debate today? Valuers are ultimately conservative, I'd say. Look, we proved when we re-geared some stores last year at rents that were 13% above ERV, and we saw a capital value uplift on those stores of around 10% to 15%. under the valuers' numbers. We're again, give or take 9% to 10% over-rented. Our view is we're absolutely affordable at that 4% rent to turnover average of GBP 24 of sq uare ft. One of the jobs we've tasked Jamie, our new arrival from Sainsbury's, with is to get out there and educate the market on what an affordable rent is and pushing on that growth agenda. It's as much on us as anyone else, I think, to drive that. In the meantime, you know, we're very comfortable that the rents are absolutely affordable in the portfolio. Thank you, everyone. I think that's everything. Good. Thank you. Sorry, Rob, just online, so it'll keep you there for a moment longer. What's the rationale for operators to sell their mission-critical assets into the market, when they could potentially find cheap credit using their own balance sheet? From Super's perspective, should the high-yield segment be most interesting to the company or is it attractive other opportunities across the yield? Yes. I guess from operator perspective, Tesco, Sainsbury's, for instance, still own only around 60% or so of their stores. It's the one element of their financing and balance sheet strategy. We've seen obviously Asda, Morrisons undertaking certain sales more recently, and that's in part driven by the private equity buyouts, but also historically owning 90% or so of their stores. They've absolutely had the capacity to do it. Yeah, it's a great way for us to access stock and we're absolutely focused on making sure we buy the best performing stores when we do that. Chris, what was the second part of the question? Sorry to come last minute. It was for Super, how do you balance, I guess, high yields versus slightly higher yielding stores? How do you think about that in terms of Yeah. Benefits to the company? I look, I think if you, if we were to try and only buy things that tick every box, we wouldn't buy very much. It has to be a strategy where we acquire some stores that are higher yielding and some that are lower yielding, and provided on a blended basis, it's all accretive then, that's how we manage that strategy. I talked earlier to those investment fundamentals so 70% or so being investment grade, 9% or so grocery income, the long leases, the inflation linkage. That's the strategy. We will buy stores that are high yielding within that. Is that online, Daniel? Okay. Good. Thanks everyone.