Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I am Yamaguchi, group deputy CFO. You may be tired by now attending earnings announcement of all three mega insurance groups, ours is the last one. I am going to highlight three things as an executive summary. First, please go to page three. Let me talk about three key points. First, the overview of the results in FY 2022. As you can see at the beginning of the slide, although the top line grew significantly, the bottom line profit declined a lot due to one-off factors such as natural disasters and COVID-19. On the other hand, we can interpret that FY 2020, 2021, two years ago, profit was inflated by factors such as COVID-19, therefore adjusted consolidated profit on normal year basis in FY 2022, excluding three factors, stayed at a growing trend. Second, FY 2023 guidance. In the absence of one-off negative factors we had in FY 2022, as well as underwriting profit growth in overseas, increase in investment income, including conglomerate premium, will drive the profit strongly. We forecast the record high consolidated net income, as well as adjusted consolidated profit. Third, shareholders' return. I will explain in more details later on, but we decided to pay JPY 260 per share for FY 2022, which amounts to JPY 87.1 billion in total as scheduled, in addition to share buyback of JPY 25 billion. If I convert this to normal year basis, it is JPY 112.1 billion total payout, which is equivalent to 50% of normal year basis adjusted consolidated profit of JPY 225 billion. For FY 2023, we are planning to increase the dividend for the 10th consecutive year in a row based on the shareholders' return policy in the medium-term management plan. On the next page onwards, I am going to explain these three points. First of all, please go to page four, the overview of FY 2022 results. Net premiums written increased significantly by JPY 455 billion, driven by premium increase in SI Commercial, increase in retention ratio, top-line growth of Sompo Japan, Fire, and Allied. On the other hand, consolidated net income came in at JPY 91.1 billion, exceeding the full year guidance, which was revised after the first half to JPY 80 billion by JPY 11.1 billion, mainly driven by increase in proceeds from sale of strategic holding stocks. It was lower year-on-year because of one-off factors such as domestic and overseas natural disasters, such as typhoons, hail, and hurricanes, and a payment for the deemed hospitalization benefits and so on. Adjusted consolidated profit was JPY 152.2 billion against JPY 160 billion of updated forecast. Without -JPY 9.5 billion FX impact on overseas insurance business, it was more or less in line with the forecast. In FY 2022, one-time factor of -JPY 73 billion incurred. Excluding it, adjusted consolidated profit increased year-on-year by JPY 5 billion compared to adjusted consolidated profit of JPY 220 billion in FY 2021 on a normal year basis, namely after deducting COVID-related positive impact of JPY 40 billion from the actual adjusted profit of JPY 261.3 billion. Page five, please. Moving on to business forecast for FY 2023. All the businesses are expected to increase profit, with consolidated net income reaching a record high of JPY 230 billion. The driving factors include a plus JPY 73 billion from absence of one-time negative factors in FY 2022, plus JPY 37 billion from increase in underwriting profit from overseas insurance business, plus JPY 20.5 billion from profit structure reform of domestic P&C business, and a plus JPY 15 billion from conglomerate premium effect. Initiatives taken during the current MTMP are expected to bear fruit successfully. Adjusted consolidated profit shown on the right-hand side is expected to reach a record high of JPY 280 billion, which is a bit short of the MTMP target of JPY 300 billion. This shortfall comes from natural disasters, large losses, and increase in automobile accrual losses. In other words, it is a result of factoring in aggravating business environment. It manifests the will of the management to enhance the accuracy of forecast. Page six, please. Lastly, shareholder return. As shown on the left-hand side of the slide, we will return a total of 112.1 billion JPY to shareholders, combining total dividend of 87.1 billion JPY based on 260 JPY per share as we announced, a 25 billion JPY of share buyback. This means that total return ratio is 74% based on adjusted profit of 152.2 billion JPY in FY 2022. Based on a normal year basis, it is 50% of adjusted profit of 225 billion JPY, the figure which reflects our true ability. For FY 2023, we will maintain return policy based on 50% of adjusted consolidated profit. Dividend per share is expected to increase for the 10th consecutive year to JPY 300 or up JPY 40 per share. This is aligned with Sompo's return policy to increase dividend steadily with profit growth. FY 2023 is the last year of the current MTMP. In addition to cumulative effect of initiatives which have already been executed, we will take flexible measures to deal with more challenging business environment to definitely achieve profits in forecast. Thank you. We'd like to start the Q&A session. Starting with Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities Co., Ltd., Ms. Tsujino please go ahead. Thank you so much. My question is on the shareholders' return. JPY 25 billion share buyback was announced, when you announced your earnings in November, you mentioned that you wanted to at least pay the shareholders' return, which is at least the same amount as the base return of March 2022. The last time, I think JPY 25 billion or so in 2021, in autumn you did additional return and whatever else other than the additional return was accounted for the base return, which is 50% of the adjusted income. For this fiscal year, adjusted profit is down, but because you paid this amount of shareholders' return last year, you wanted to at least do the same. If you're announcing JPY 25 billion buyback, it's lower by about JPY 20 billion compared to the amount you paid in the last fiscal year. What is the background for the lower payout to shareholders? That's my first question. Ms. Tsujino, thank you so much for that question. In FY 2021, the last fiscal year, the bottom profit was JPY 260 billion. Base return was JPY 130 billion. If you go to page six, please take a look at the graph. Excluding dividend, JPY 27.7 billion in dividend, JPY 58 billion was the additional return. We did the buyback, which is 50% of the adjusted profit. On top of that, in November, we did additional return of JPY 20 billion. That's what we did in the last fiscal year. For this fiscal year, we discussed what would be the right level of the total payout based upon the results of the first half in November, based upon the results in Q3, based upon the discussions we had with investors. In the management team, we discussed about the appropriate level of the total return this year, and we discussed about what should be the payout discipline. In the management team, we had active discussion, and we concluded at this level for this fiscal year. Our base policy is that what would be the profit available for shareholders' return. Against that, a 50%, which is a base return of that profit. What is the fundamental earnings capability? That is a key point of all the discussion. As we saw on page four, we reviewed one of factors. For FY 2022, adjusted profit was JPY 152.2 billion. If you add back one of factors which amount to JPY 73 billion, then fundamental earnings capability is JPY 225 billion. That should be the actual profit earnings capability fundamentally. Tsujino-san, based upon the last year's fundamental profit, what would be apples-to-apples fundamental profit? Last year, up to the first half, up to the end of the first half, our fundamental earnings profit was JPY 245 billion. That was the earnings capability up to the first half. If you add back JPY 73 billion one-off factors between JPY 225 billion, there's a difference of about JPY 20 billion year-on-year. Even after we add back one-off factors, still there's a difference of the earnings capability this year due to the trend change. For example, the automobile claims increase due to the inflation and the ordinary Fire loss and the large losses and so forth. Fundamental profit earnings capability came in lower by about JPY 20 billion compared to our assumption. We'll multiply that by 50%, which is the total payout is slightly lower compared to the previous year and compared to our first half assumption. The level was lower, which is JPY 25 billion buyback that we announced. Understood. Thank you. My second question is on the domestic reinsurance cost. First, the assumption for the natural catastrophe is now increased by JPY 15 billion from the beginning of the last fiscal year. In addition, probably reinsurance cost has risen, I understand. What is the rough impact from the increase of the insurance cost? In addition, are you taking more risks? Are you increasing the retention? Is that the reason? Natural catastrophe assumption or budget used to be more conservative until recently, but market said it's not really conservative at all. You made a correction of the conservatism of the assumption of the natural catastrophe. Tsujino-san, thank you so much. Kuroda speaking. First, natural catastrophe budget, as you mentioned correctly, this time, we made the budget more conservatively, increasing from JPY 83 billion budget to JPY 98 billion budget more conservatively. Looking at what's included as assumptions in the budget, in our case, snow damage potential loss is included in the natural catastrophe loss budget. Up to now, with regards to the snow damage or snow loss, there were no sophisticated risk models. We used just estimation based upon the past experience. This time, we scrutinized the model. For the natural catastrophes, we have changed the reinsurance scheme a little bit. This time, there were no losses hit the threshold of the budget, and we had other perils like snow, hail. As a result, our budget is JPY 98 billion, which is conservative to some extent. As I mentioned earlier, with regards to the reinsurance, as before, we cannot give you more details. We have changed attachment points a little bit, and if the reinsurance cost became too expensive, we didn't buy the coverage. Economically, we behaved rationally. As a result, we decided at this level of the reinsurance cost, which is slightly lower on the year-on-year basis. That's how we closed the negotiation with the reinsurers. Thank you. Understood. Ms. Tsujino, thank you so much for your questions. Mr. Watanabe of Daiwa Securities, please. I'm Watanabe from Daiwa Securities. I have two questions. My first question is about adjusted profit on a normal year basis. It was reduced from JPY 245 billion to JPY 225 billion. You talked about the automobile accrual losses and large losses as factors behind it. Could you please be more specific? What contributed to how much of the other decrease? Here is Kuroda answering your question. Very roughly speaking, a natural disaster budget was raised from JPY 83 billion by JPY 15 billion to JPY 98 billion. The basis has been changed. At this moment, we believe that the wish to think based on JPY 98 billion in a normal year basis. Another factor for the change is large losses. We had set it at about JPY 27 billion. As you know, in the last fiscal year, it was increased to JPY 40 billion level. For this fiscal year, we are looking at JPY 34 billion. There was some adjustment for that. The impact there is about JPY 4 billion. I don't remember whether I explained about it when we announced first half results. Originally, we thought that the losses in Brazil is one of factor because the consumer business is to be divested. They could increase rates very successfully, so the losses were limited to JPY 1 billion, improving one of factor number by about JPY 4 billion. As to COVID claims, it was slightly larger than the forecast in the first half. As a result, in the first half, the one-off was JPY 85 billion, but it was reduced to JPY 73 billion by about JPY 12 billion. In a normal year basis, the factors for the decrease, for example, automobile loss ratio, the increase, the how much was it? Actually, we were not looking at the automobile business really because it is not one of factor. It's something that we need to deal with seriously. Okay. Thank you. The next question is about ESR on page 49. ESR decreased from 241% as of December end to 223% as of March end. Why? Well, it is as it's shown here that as to market factors, -7 points. As to interest rate, we have been decreasing exposure significantly, so impact was small. The rising interest rate had some impact. As to stock prices, it's about the individual names. I'd like to refrain from talking about those, the individual names of stock. Other than that, of course, we have been accumulating profit, and based on that, we return to shareholders. Through selling some shares and strengthening ALM activities, we have been reducing risks. At the same time, we have been making investments, for example, in the nursing care business, and we acquired Energy Software Company Limited. The overseas underwriting risk was increased by JPY 15 billion, and we used capital there as well. As to other conglomerate premium initiative, we injected about JPY 200 billion into SI. Also, we are taking some credit risks in our investment activities. Such risk take that has used certain points. During the three months from December end to March end, there was a rapid decrease because those initiatives were concentrated in the fourth quarter? Yes, that's right. It was the end of October that we transferred JPY 200 billion to SI. That is the biggest factor as the reset portfolio in the fourth quarter. Thank you, Mr. Watanabe. Next questions are from Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities Co., Ltd.. Ms. Nagasaka, please. Hi, this is Nagasaka from Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities. Thank you so much for your presentation. I have two questions. First question is on the premium increase in the SI Commercial segment. The premium increase was 7.0%, as I understand. In the last quarter, from the end of September, it looks like the increase of the premium has slowed down. What is the outlook for the premium increase in SI Commercial in the future? Do you have any additional color on the flash report of the premium increase in Q1? I apologize if you have included that in the presentation, but would you please give me additional color? Second question is on the investment for growth. In the medium-term management plan, you have earmarked the growth investment budget of JPY 600 billion. As of the end of Q3, you have spent already a little bit over JPY 300 billion, as you mentioned, as I recall. In December quarter, how much did you spend, and what is the balance of investment budget for growth? According to the public release in December, you acquired equities in Energy Software Company Limited. Are there any other investments you made recently? Thank you. Nagasaka-san, thank you so much for your questions. Kuroda is answering the first question about the premium increase of SI Commercial. As you mentioned correctly, in 2022, premium increase was 7%. In Q1, the premium increase was around 10%. As you mentioned, yes, the premium increase pace has slowed down as you mentioned correctly. In areas such as property and cat, they have successfully increased rates more than they expected. In the area where we are focusing on, which is the casualty area, rate increase was more moderate. In the professional lines such as D&O, in those categories, due to the competition, the rate has increased, but the magnitude of the increase was relatively lower overall. Concerning all of those factors, the total premium increase was 7%. Even with the 7% premium increase, I think this rate increase is enough to achieve the plan, initial plan. For this fiscal year and going forward, in any event, SI needs to price correctly, trying to combat impact from inflation. Depending upon the inflation and other factors, premium increase magnitude may go up and down. In the full year guidance of FY 2023, considering all of those factors I mentioned, we are assuming conservatively. A rate increase assumption for this year is 4%-5% premium increase as an assumption. Looking at the actual premium increase at the end of Q1, at the end of March, they successfully raised their premium by 7.4%. This budget, 4.5% premium increase is relatively conservative. SI may be able to outperform against this guidance. Miss Nagasaka. Yamaguchi speaking. Let me take the second part of your question. Short answer to your question is that we have spent JPY 400 billion out of JPY 600 billion budget for growth investment so far. As Nagasaka-san pointed out, we acquired equities in Energy Software Company Limited, which is a nursing care business. That's one of the investments we made. The biggest one is the investment in organic growth overseas. The ratio of spending in this area is the largest. They are taking more risks, which are driving profits. The investment is in accordance with the risks that they are taking. In addition, to achieve conglomerate premium, they are taking investment risks. This is the largest area for the investment spending. In addition, acquisition in the nursing care business. Also, as we have been saying from before, we are investing in digital areas right from the start of the medium-term management plan. In total, we have spent so far JPY 400 billion or so. Understood very well. Thank you so much. Miss Nagasaka, thank you so much for your questions. Next, Mr. Sato of JPMorgan, please. I'm Sato from JPMorgan Securities. Maybe it's just that I missed this point in your presentation. It's about dividend. It is raised by JPY 40 per share, but it used to be JPY 50 per share increase. Based on the forecast, at least during the medium-term management plan, you assumed that you could maintain JPY 50 per share increase, but this time you changed it to JPY 40 per share increase. Is this because you are becoming more cautious about the business environment? That's my first question. The second question is about overseas investment activities and investment income. Already, you disclosed first quarter preliminary results, and it seems that your initiative is paying off. If you look at page 33, for example. You show JPY 21.4 billion as first quarter preliminary results of investment income. Can we expect that this number is going to increase from the second quarter through the fourth quarter? Also, if it is becoming very effective already, is there possibility for you to increase your risk-taking? Thank you. Sato-san, thank you. Here is Yamaguchi answering your first question. You're right. As to dividend or shareholder return, our policy is to increase dividend with profit increase. Well, we originally set the midterm plan target at JPY 300 billion, and based on that, we were talking about JPY 50 per share increase. It's quite possible. As I mentioned earlier, we reset the target for FY 2023 at JPY 280 billion, so not JPY 50 per share increase. Well, last year it was JPY 50, but we slowed down a little bit and we decided on JPY 40 per share increase. As to JPY 280 billion target, depending on the natural disaster trend, it is not impossible that we could actually reach JPY 300 billion, and it is not impossible that we can pay dividend more. At this moment, the management wants to focus on JPY 280 billion. Sato-san, I would like to answer your question about the investment of SI. Already, the profit of $214 million times four, that could be a good number. As I mentioned earlier, this portfolio was built from January through March, so the full effect is yet to emerge. I'm not saying it could reach JPY 5 billion or JPY 10 billion, but that there will certainly be some add-ons. Also, in the case of SI, duration is about three years, and in many cases they reinvest in the many names. Depending on financial environment, they might take more opportunities, so more add-ons while striking a good balance of risks. Thank you for that. From this time, you changed the method of disclosure of investment results, so it is rather invisible, the changes quarter-on-quarter. If you have some numbers, I would appreciate if you could give us the basis for comparison based on this $240 million. What was the level of the 3rd quarter or 4th quarter of last year? You're right. At SI, there were some segment changes. More specifically, for the investment activities, there was some conversion. For the underwriting side, the commercial business in Asia and Turkey have now been converged into SI to expand more, converged into SI Commercial. Because in those areas they were dealing only with JIA, and they want to take non-JIA opportunities as well. If you do not mind, I would like to come back to you to answer that question separately later. That will be very helpful. Thank you. Mr. Sato, thank you. Next questions are from Citigroup. Niwa-san, please go ahead. Hi, this is Niwa from Citi. Thank you so much for taking my questions. I have a follow-up question on Mr. Sato's question, but my questions are on the investment and also domestic automobile insurance business. I'm deferring to page 33, and looking at the pie chart on page 33, what I'd like to know is that over the past three months, it looks like total has increased by about $200,000, but others increased by about $800 million. Government bonds, agency bonds, about JPY 4 billion, and corporate bonds of JPY 3 billion appears. Were they included in others? Would you please give me more color on the floating rate, fixed rate for bond portfolio? To the extent you could disclose, would you please give me more details in others? Also looking at the book yield, which has increased to 3.8%, what is the assumption for this fiscal year with regards to book yield? My next question is on the voluntary automobile insurance, which is on page 23. Apology if you have explained already in your presentation, but loss ratio is shown at 62.1%. How do you think about this level? Do you think this loss ratio level has gone back to the previous level? You are probably going to work on the profitability improvement going forward, but if I look at the bottom on the right-hand side, repair cost is increasing. Do you think you need to really improve the loss ratio from this level from now on? How would you take this level, which is 62% at the moment? Niwa-san, thank you so much for your questions. Yamaguchi speaking. Let me take the first question. The reason why it has increased is because of the additional capital allocation from Sompo Japan to SI, and using JPY 200 billion in additional capital, SI has invested to enjoy the conglomerate premium. In the future, continuously, I would like to take the advantage of the rate difference between Japan and U.S. We have allocated additional JPY 200 billion to SI from the end of the year to now. SI is using that additional capital to invest. And in others, in the securitized category, we are investing in IG, investment-grade corporate bonds and the bank loans, and partially they are investing in securitized products such as high yield while looking at the credit. That they don't bear excessive risks. They are trying to construct a portfolio of investments in others category. With regards to book yield, Takano answering that question. In December 2022, as you mentioned correctly, as you can see on page 33, SI book yield was 3.8%, as we disclosed. In 2023, right now, market yield is above 5% now. As of now, the assumption of the book yield for year is going to be increased to low 4% level. Mr. Niwa, let me take the second part of your question, automobile question. Page 23, loss ratio. If you look at this graph, as you pointed out, loss ratio has increased and then, staying at that high level. What's happening in reality is as follows. In FY 2022, in auto segment, there was an impact from hail, which was extraordinary, which is a natural catastrophe impact, which impacted loss ratio by about 2 points. Excluding natural catastrophes in 2022, EI loss ratio was 60%. On the apples-to-apples basis in 2023, excluding nat cats, but we are assuming some, but it's 61.7%. We assume loss ratio to increase by 1.7 points. This is a conservative assumption to some extent for 2023. The reason is because, number one, the loss was reduced due to COVID, and this COVID impact almost recovered, but still there was some lingering impact, which was about JPY 4 billion, or 0.4 point lower impact of the loss ratio from COVID. That should be normalized. As you pointed out, repair cost per unit, we have incorporated conservatively 4%-5% increase as an assumption, which will push up the loss ratio by about 2 points. On the other hand, there's impact from the attachment of more safety features, so the loss should go down as a trend. It does not become zero, so there is a benefit from the lower loss from safety features. All in all, including everything, minus 0.7 points. If you add everything, then, it's 1.7% difference. That is our assumption for 2023. Going forward, as you know, in the auto segment, there's the advisory rate system, so it depends on the trend. Our combined ratio is now over 95%. Of course, we have to make efforts internally, but we have to optimize the premiums in the future. I think that could be possible. Thank you so much. I have a follow-up question on Mr. Yamaguchi's answer. In the category of others, would you please give me any additional comments? The private investment credit risks, would you please give me more color on the category of others? Well, as I mentioned earlier, in principle, we are investing in investment-grade corporate bonds and bond-related funds of funds. Although we cannot give you more details, partially, we have investments in high-yield bonds. Based upon their criteria of SI, they are investing in some high-yield bonds, but holdings monitors the specific names of high yield, which are rated in principle BB rates. Sompo Holdings understands specific names of the high-yield investments that SI is doing, and we don't see much problem based upon the credit for each name that they are investing in. At the moment, even though they are high-yield investments, we don't think they entail a large risk. Understand. Thank you. Mr. Niwa, thank you so much. Mr. Muraki of SMBC Nikko Securities, please. Thank you. I'd like to ask about SI and its underwriting. Compared to the past, it seems that the plan is developed rather conservatively at the beginning of the year. The combined ratio is estimated to be 91.6%, while 1 year ago it was 90.7%. Is this because you are becoming more conservative or based on the agri-insurance actuaries, for example, you think that you need to look at the profit and loss more rigorously? That's the first question. The second question, I think this is one of the themes for today, namely how to take credit risks. In your portfolio, BB or lower-rated vehicles is 13% according to page 33. What is the denominator? What is the absolute amount? It would be nice to have the breakdown of newly launched credit portfolio, and we'd like you to disclose it. It doesn't need to be today, but if possible, I'd like to see actual amount. You can talk about it today, or you can explain about it on a different occasion. That's my first. The second question. Here is Kuroda answering your first question on the SI underwriting activities. Yes, the plan is being developed conservatively because we are applying group-wide across-the-board perspective, the factor that you're referring to is playing its role as well. For example, we look at rate increases, retention increases as a basis. At the same time, we are beginning to decrease cat exposure, for example. As to casualty risks that we took a lot last year, though include some the poorly performing the contracts as well, and we need to cut it off, and that factor is being factored in the top line. As to the portion where combined ratio was rising, there were some factors. For example, the the assumed losses turned out to be a bit large. The like casualty, it is stable, but the the different portfolio composition gave it some impact as well. Muraki-san, thank you for your second question as well, which is about the investment portfolio. As to non-investment grade high-yield portion accounting for 13% of the total. If you look at the pie chart on page 33, you will see that the most of it is bonds, and that is the denominator. More specifically, USD interest assets, this is 100% bonds. Non-USD assets, of course, they're all bonds. Others include equity hedge fund or some alternatives. Excluding all that, it accounts for 13% of the total. As to the disclosure of credit risk taking, on that point, let me say that we would like to continue to enhance our disclosure. Thank you. Roughly speaking, in a short period of time, you bought JPY 200 billion in worse junk bonds or lev loans. On that point, we have been working on the conglomerate premium initiative, and as Yamaguchi said earlier, we buy both the IG bond and the high-yield bond. The amount is not that big, but the portion, its portion is slightly increasing. That's clear. Thank you.