Hello everyone, this is Moriyama, Representative Director, President of T&D Holdings. Thank you for attending our IR meeting today. On March 31, we held a conference call to explain the early achievement of our Group adjusted profit Target of JPY 130 billion as set in our current Group Long-Term Vision, as well as to outline our future profit forecast, review our capital policy, and shareholder returns policy, all announced under Notice of Earnings Forecast and Shareholder Return. Today, I would like to provide an update with a particular focus on our profit forecast going forward, with the aim of deepening your understanding of our management strategy. To begin, I would like to briefly review our initiatives under the current Group Long-Term Vision. Please turn to page 5. The greatest challenge of our current Group Long-Term Vision is the improvement of capital efficiency. This slide outlines our key initiatives. By allocating both the stable profits from the domestic life insurance business and the capital released by reduction of investment risk to gross areas, we have been working to improve capital efficiency while also strengthening shareholder returns. Furthermore, by reducing investment risk, we are working to suppress profit volatility and lower shareholder capital cost. Please turn to page 6. Through various measures, the risk amount was reduced by approximately JPY 130 billion over the past four years, and Group MCEV had increased by approximately JPY 890 billion, including the reduction from shareholder returns. Please turn to page 7. Our financial KPIs have generally progressed smoothly. Both Adjusted ROE and Group adjusted profit have achieved their targets ahead of schedule, as originally set in the Group Long-Term Vision. In addition, ROEV has averaged 7.9% over the past four years, exceeding our mid to long-term target of 7.5%. As shown on page 8, our non-financial KPIs are also progressing steadily. Please turn to page 9. This slide shows the trend of our ESR. In our past dialogues with the market, we have received many comments from investors and analysts regarding the effective utilization of capital and excess of an ESR of 225%. We have recognized this as a critical management issue. Taking into account the JPY 120 billion investment in Viridium and the JPY 100 billion share buyback, our ESR level is expected to be approximately 225%. Page 10 outlines our capital allocation and dividends received from subsidiaries over the past four years. Over this period, we received a total of JPY 466.4 billion in dividends from our subsidiaries. Of this, JPY 188 billion was allocated to gross investments. Combined with JPY 250 billion in share buybacks and JPY 145.5 billion in cash dividends, the total shareholder returns amounted to JPY 395.5 billion. As a result, the total payout ratio against the cumulative Group adjusted profit over the four years reached 106%. Page 11 illustrates the achievements of shareholder returns since 2012. As shown clearly in the graph, shareholder returns have been significantly increased under the Group Long-Term Vision. Please turn to page 12. The improvement in capital efficiency under the Group Long-Term Vision is also reflected in our share price. Our PBR has risen significantly from 0.54 times prior to the Group Long-Term Vision to 1.25 times. In addition, both our stock's beta and earnings yield have declined, indicating a reduction in the cost of shareholders' capital. On the other hand, while our PEV ratio has improved from 0.26 times to approximately 0.4 times, it remains at the low level. We recognize that further improvement in capital efficiency is necessary to enhance our valuation. Page 13 shows our TSR, which has progressed steadily relative to industry peers, driven by initiatives under the Group Long-Term Vision. This concludes the review of our progress to date. I will now move on to discuss the outlook for future growth in Group adjusted profit. Please turn to page 15. As explained during the March 31 conference call, we expect Group adjusted profit to exceed JPY 200 billion by fiscal year ending March 31, 2031. There are three main drivers behind this projected profit growth, with the most significant being the expansion of the positive spread. We expect further improvement in the positive spread through portfolio enhancements and rising interest rates, among others. The second driver is profit growth from the closed-book business, managed by T&D United Capital. In addition to the commencement of profit contribution from our new investment in Viridium, we also anticipate further profit expansion at Fortitude. The third driver is an increase in insurance bottom line. We expect this to rise steadily through the growth of policies in force. On the other hand, we anticipate a decline in net gains on sale of securities in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2031. While we expect some gains to continue in the near term as we reduce our equity holdings, we aim to improve our investment portfolio so that it generates stable income, allowing us to achieve Group adjusted profit of over JPY 200 billion without relying on gains from securities sales. Please turn to page 16. On the left is the image of positive spread expansion, which was also presented during the March conference call. While the average assumed investment yield is expected to decline, the book value yield of yen-denominated bonds is expected to rise, resulting in a stable yield expansion. Compared to returns from equity dividends and alternative investments, the book value yield from yen-denominated bonds represents highly reliable income. On the right, we show the extent to which yen interest assets cover our assumed interest. In FY March 2025, 74% of the assumed interest was covered by interest income from yen interest assets. With improving yields, this coverage ratio is expected to exceed 100% by March 31, 2031. The assumed interest is projected to remain flat at approximately JPY 150 billion, as the decline in the average assumed investment yield is expected to be offset by the growth in policies in force. We are also forecasting a reduction in FX hedging cost, a decrease of approximately JPY 20 billion year-on-year in FY March 2026. These costs are expected to continue declining gradually thereafter. Please turn to page 17. Through the promotion of ALM, we will continue to reduce domestic interest rate risk and aim to increase the proportion of yen interest assets in our investment portfolio to approximately 70%. We'll also continue to reduce equity risk. However, from a risk diversification perspective, we intend to maintain a certain level of equity holdings. As of the end of March 2031, we expect to hold approximately 5% of our portfolio in both domestic and foreign equities combined. Page 18, please. The charts on the right show the asset and liability cash flow positions of Taiyo Life and Daido Life. We'll continue to pursue cash flow matching to minimize interest rate risk, while ensuring to avoid overmatching in the event of an increase in policy surrenders. Please turn to page 19. Regarding Group collaborative asset management using T&D Asset Management as our platform, we have been gradually expanding the scope of assets since 2021, starting with highly liquid alternative assets. For traditional assets, following the transfer of domestic listed equities by Daido Life in July last year, Taiyo Life will complete its transfer this July, marking the near completion of asset consolidation. We are now in the stage of exploring collaborative management of foreign risk assets. As part of our efforts to sophisticate asset management, we are working to reinforce and streamline investment structures, enhance talent development, and ultimately aim to improve investment yields. Page 20, please. From this point on, I will explain the initiatives of our three domestic life companies in the area of insurance sales, as well as our efforts to improve underwriting profit. This slide was also presented at last year's IR meeting. As shown here, the domestic life, which is our group's core business, plays a highly public role. Within this framework, our three life companies segment the insurance market and create value by addressing social issues in their respective specialized markets. Page 21, please. This slide shows the performance trends of our three domestic life insurance companies, all of which have enjoyed strong results in sales of new business, leading to a steady accumulation of policies in force. Since policies in force are the source of future profits, the consistent growth presents a significant strength of our group. Please turn to page 22. At Daido Life, we are working to further grow our policies in force by expanding the number of corporate clients enrolled in total coverage plans, which combine death benefit with disability income protection. While Daido Life currently serves approximately 360,000 companies, many are enrolled in either death benefit or disability income protection alone. We see significant potential to expand the number of clients with total set of coverage. To strengthen our customer base beyond insurance offerings, we provide unique services tailored to SMEs, such as the KENCO SUPPORT PROGRAM, which supports health and productivity management, and Dodai Web Community, a dedicated platform for SME owners. Both services have steadily grown in users and are recognized as distinctive offerings unique to Daido Life. Through these initiatives, we aim to broaden our engagement with the SME market and ultimately increase the number of corporate clients in the future. Please turn to page 23. At Taiyo Life, the promotion of hybrid-style sales that integrates both face-to-face and non-face channels has led to a steady increase in policies in force of protection-type products, along with growth in the number of in-house sales representatives. By strengthening our training programs of in-house sales representatives, we are aiming for an increase in experienced, long-tenured sales representatives, which in turn will contribute to higher productivity and improved business performance. To further enhance profitability, we are continuing initiatives such as reducing surrender and lapse rates, sophisticating underwriting framework, and revising assumed business expenses. We recognize that the expansion of Taiyo Life's insurance bottom line is one of the group's key priorities, and we will continue to engage in discussions at the holdings level. Please turn to page 24. At T&D Financial Life, the proactive use of reinsurance and a well-balanced product portfolio level have led to steady growth in the amount of policies in force. As a result, maintenance cost-related profit and loss has turned positive, shifting the business towards a structure capable of generating stable profits. Going forward, we will work to further expand policies in force, thereby aiming to increase profitability and eliminate accumulated losses. Please turn to page 25. Regarding the closed-book business, we made the decision in March to invest in Viridium of Germany. We are building a closed-book portfolio that is diversified both geographically and in terms of business models. Through this, we aim to contribute to consolidated group profits by diversifying revenue sources and achieving profit growth. The closing of the Viridium transaction is scheduled for the second half of 2025, with full-year profit contribution expected from the fiscal year ending March 2027. Our planned investment in Viridium is approximately JPY 120 billion. We have established a hurdle rate based on our cost of shareholders' capital plus factors such as the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates, and we expect Viridium to generate returns above this hurdle rate. At Fortitude, we are also working to improve profitability through the acquisition of new closed books and yield enhancement via asset rotation. Please turn to page 26. As this closes on March 31, in light of increased confidence in our profit outlook, we are shifting to a policy whereby profit growth will more directly translate into higher cash dividends. With the expansion of Group adjusted profit and the application of a 60% dividend payout ratio, cash dividends are expected to surge significantly. In addition, by leveraging the five-year average of Group adjusted profit, we aim to significantly improve the accuracy of dividend projection. Please go to page 28. Lastly, I would like to share some thoughts on our initiative towards the next long-term vision. Among the five strategies outlined in the current Group Long-Term Vision, we believe it is particularly important to revisit and further examine two key areas: promotion of integrated group management and diversification and optimization of business portfolio, both of which are essential for the group's continued growth and transition to the next stage. Regarding the promotion of integrated group management, we have made significant progress in group capital management under the current Group Long-Term Vision. However, we believe there remains considerable potential to further realize group synergies. This slide highlights four key areas for consideration. These items will be discussed by board directors and reflected in the formulation of the next long-term vision. We intend to disclose specific measures through IR meetings and similar opportunities from the second half onward. Regarding the business portfolio strategy shown on page 29, under the current Group Long-Term Vision, we have positioned the closed-book business as a growth area and allocated capital accordingly. As we look towards the next long-term vision, we will revisit and further discuss the optimization of our overall business portfolio. Please turn to page 30. This is a logic tree that was also presented last year. By enhancing earnings power and ensuring appropriate capital allocation, we aim to improve adjusted ROE and ROEV while also working to reduce our cost of equity capital and raise our expected growth rate, thereby improving our PER. Through these efforts, we seek to achieve share price appreciation and an enhancement of our stock valuation. This concludes my presentation. Thank you very much. Now, let me introduce our first questioner, Mr. Muraki from SMBC Securities. Please unmute yourself and go ahead with your questions. This is Muraki from SMBC Nikko Securities. I have two questions. The first one is about asset management. Thank you for newly disclosing the right-hand side of page 16. You explained that assumed interest can now almost be covered by JGBs alone. While T&D hasn't done this extensively, the life insurance industry has historically taken on various risks to offset negative spreads. If those times are truly behind us, is there room to further reduce the JPY 400 billion equity risk as of March 2026, as shown on page 17, during the next long-term vision period? If, for example, JPY 100 billion were reduced with an ESR over 200% target, this would translate into theoretically over JPY 200 billion of freely deployable capital for the holding company. My first question is how you view the potential for further equity risk reduction. The second question concerns insurance bottom line, which you early identified as a key management challenge at the holding company. Thank you for continuing to disclose the IRR figures on page 56. Looking at the data, Taiyo Life's IRR and time-to-reach profit have worsened, and this clearly appears to be due to bank assurance. Could you tell us what discussions are currently underway at the holding company regarding the insurance bottom line, including how to handle bank assurance? Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Muraki. Let me answer your first question about the potential to reduce equity risk. As stated in the materials, we plan to continue reducing equity risk, aiming to lower both domestic and foreign equities to around 5% by March 2031. This figure reflects the current situation, and we plan to finalize our next long-term vision over the course of the coming year. As part of that process, we will re-evaluate the appropriate equity risk ratio. That said, we intend to continue holding a certain amount of equities from the perspective of inflation hedging and risk diversification. That is all. Next, regarding the bank assurance issue. Thank you, Mr. Muraki, for the question. This may partially overlap with our past explanations, but after the holding company was established, TDF experienced at one point a significant performance decline. They lacked the resources to sufficiently develop bank assurance channels. At that time, Taiyo Life developed different products with non-overlapping content to supplement TDF bank assurance operations. Currently, we are addressing short-term issues such as a rise in surrenders by utilizing reinsurance arrangements and product replacement. Meanwhile, the group continues to discuss how to handle bank assurance going forward. In the next long-term vision, we aim to revisit how the group approaches bank assurance channels. We plan to provide a thorough explanation of this from the second half of this fiscal year onward within the next long-term vision. That is all. Thank you very much. The second point concerns the sales representative channel versus the bank assurance channel. One of the reasons for using bank assurance was to help cover fixed costs. If Taiyo Life were to exit bank assurance channel and consolidate it to TDF, for example, and fixed costs are reallocated, would that impact the profitability of the in-house sales representative channel? Have you simulated such a scenario? How far have the internal discussions progressed at this point? Yes, as mentioned, Taiyo Life does have a certain volume of sales, which contributes to the amortization of fixed costs through assumed business expenses. Transferring that channel may impact the profitability structure, so this is one of the issues to be addressed. However, when considering whether Taiyo Life should continue bank assurance, we are comprehensively evaluating the impact on both Taiyo Life and the group as a whole. Even if this temporarily reduces the efficiency of the sales rep channel, that is, unit cost deteriorates, if it results in a net positive for the group overall, we may consider such an initiative. That is all. That makes perfect sense. Thank you very much. Now, let us proceed to the next question. Ms. Sujinol from BOV Securities, please go ahead. Thank you very much. First, regarding Taiyo Life. Although the number of sales representatives has increased and a new policy, A&P, has also grown, new business EV has been declining. Since third-sector products have been harder to sell post-COVID, from the standpoint of economic value-based profit, efficiency is probably declining. That may be inevitable, but before the pandemic, Taiyo Life had differentiated itself well through unique marketing. Now, with a changing environment, I think productivity and efficiency must be improved by pursuing different initiatives. Page 23 seems to suggest everything is fine, but looking at it critically, I imagine there is also an internal concern. Can we expect concrete strategies to address this situation? My second question is about the sharp rise in super long-term interest rates. There was a helpful slide about the EV calculations showing that if duration is matched, when cash flows extend 60 years, like at Taiyo Life, depending on how interest rates rise, EV can decrease. Also, under mass surrender frameworks, there may be increased surrender risks. This cannot be perfectly hedged in EV calculations. Meanwhile, Taiyo still has considerable mismatch. Given this, how are you assessing the impact of rising super long interest rates? What can and can't be done? If these factors negatively affect KPI figures, how do you plan to respond? Some may be minor enough to ignore in the short term, while others must be addressed. I would like to hear your overall approach. Lastly, I think the approach to the recent buyback and dividend policy was very positive. Going forward, under what kind of timing and logic will future buybacks be decided? Could you give us any hints? That is all. Thank you for your comments, Ms. Sujinol. First, regarding Taiyo Life's in-house sales representative channel. As I mentioned earlier, improving productivity and profitability at Taiyo Life is a key issue for the entire group. Within Taiyo Life, the core focus is on strengthening the in-house sales representative channel. Since COVID, we have focused on hybrid-style sales activities to improve productivity. It is important that any expansion of sales reps be accompanied by productivity improvements. We are also focused on developing and retaining human resources over time. We believe we are beginning to see results in terms of increased productivity. Now, page 43 shows that hybrid-style sales productivity has plateaued somewhat. To address this, we made major changes to sales methods last year, including switching sales devices. We are now monitoring whether these changes will lead to productivity gains. Our current priority is to fully establish these initiatives and ensure they lead to tangible results. Beyond sales activities, we are also focused on improving profitability. In December of last year, we revised premium rates for core products. Immediately after the revision, sales performance dipped temporarily, but we are now seeing a recovery. This is expected to lead to increased assumed business expenses going forward. We also plan to continue revising our products going forward. Given the rise in surrenders and lapses and claims payments, we are strengthening our monitoring system to drive improvements. For the sales representative channel in particular, surrender rates are trending down, so we aim to continue making steady progress there. At this point, we are not considering any major changes to sales rep activities or market approach. We believe we need to steadily improve productivity within the current framework. That is all. Let me answer your second question regarding the rise in interest rates, particularly super long-term rates. As you know, when interest rates rise, the value of liabilities decreases, but asset values also fall. However, in our group's case, liability duration is longer and the cash flows are larger. Therefore, when interest rates rise, the positive impact from the reduction in liabilities outweighs the negative impact on assets, resulting in a net positive effect on EV. Furthermore, in the current bear steepening yield curve environment, super long-term rates are rising along with the curve. As the chart of cash flow shows, around the 30-40 year mark, liabilities significantly exceed assets. Beyond 40 years, we hold very few corresponding assets such as bonds. In this environment, rising rates have a larger positive effect by further reducing liabilities, enhancing EV. On the other hand, under ESR, rising interest rates also increase mass surrender risk. Currently, with our ESR ratio at 200%, our capital-to-risk ratio is over 1-2. This implies that this would act as a factor reducing ESR. Now, regarding unrealized losses on bonds due to rising interest rates, we basically follow a buy-and-maintain policy for policy reserve matching bonds. So even if unrealized losses emerge to some extent, we continue steady bond purchases and interest risk reduction based on economic value. As for negative impacts on insurers from rate hikes, it increases surrenders, which may require selling bonds midterm. In our group, Taiyo Life and Daido Life, we mainly sell protection-type long-term products. We believe the impact of rate hikes on surrender risks for these products is minimal. We recognize that some surrender risks exist for savings-type products. TDF, where such products are concentrated, has MVA, market value adjustment features in place, so we are not overly concerned in that regard. Therefore, depending on the extent and nature of the rate hikes, we will continue steady long-duration bond purchases as part of interest risk control in this steepening yield curve environment. That is all. Thank you, Ms. Sujinol. Let me briefly add to the earlier point about Taiyo Life's in-house sales rep organization. Due to the nature of the insurance business, improving insurance bottom line takes a certain amount of time. In that sense, it is essential to persistently implement the measures explained by Mr. Moriyama earlier. Also, with the sales rep organization, as headcount increases and, of course, digital tools are utilized, customer touchpoints expand significantly. Here, our key differentiator, that is, hospitality, can be fully delivered to customers. This, in turn, leads to sustained high-quality policies. To achieve this, we need a certain period of education or training. When sales rep numbers increase, efficiency may temporarily drop, but with intensive training, we can foster high-performing sales representatives. From the third year onward, we aim to steadily grow the number of efficient sales reps. That is the approach we are steadily implementing now. Also, regarding the increase in claims payments, as mentioned earlier, sophistication of underwriting is required. This is not something that yields immediate results. However, by ensuring appropriate underwriting at the entry point and analyzing claim payments data to collect various insights and data for future products, we are working to improve the bottom line. That is the additional point I wanted to share. Regarding our third point on the share buyback, this time, we revised our cash dividend policy. As a result, we believe the predictability of cash dividends has improved significantly. As for buybacks, while not yet finalized in our next long-term vision, we believe the key themes will be growth, integrated management, and group resilience. Considering gross investment, capital levels, and share price conditions, we aim to conduct buybacks flexibly. With the recent JPY 100 billion buyback and gross investments, we also carried out capital adjustments to a certain extent. We do appreciate your positive evaluation of this stance, and our stance on this will remain unchanged. Going forward, buybacks will be considered flexibly, taking into account gross investment and capital levels. That is our current thinking about buybacks for the next phase. This concludes my explanation. Thank you. Next, Mr. Watanabe from Daiwa Securities. Please go ahead and ask your questions. Thank you. This is Watanabe from Daiwa Securities. I have two questions. My first question is on shareholder returns on page 11. Total payout ratio for FY March 2025 was exactly 100%. You mentioned your plan to invest in growth, and given that the ESR is at the upper range of the target, is it fair to assume that the cash flow from the profit generated is unlikely to be used for share buybacks? I get the impression that the total payout could be 100% in FY 2025. Please share with us how you plan to manage the capital level. My second question is on page 57, regarding interest rate sensitivity on ESR. What were the factors behind the increased negative interest rate sensitivity on ESR? You explained that the company is proceeding with purchases of super long-term bonds to avoid excessive increase of interest rate sensitivity, but does the increase in ESR's interest rate sensitivity have any implications? Also, what is the current interest rate sensitivity on ESR under the previous standard, excluding the mass surrender risk? Thank you, Mr. Watanabe, for your questions. In responding to your first question, our basic approach to capital levels remains unchanged. We disclose what we believe to be the appropriate level. That said, we review our future growth investment plan, and based on that, we would like to assess whether to implement share buybacks and at what scale. Fundamentally, we intend to review the matter after confirming the results of the end of the fiscal year, as well as the potential for new growth investments. On your second question, one of the factors that caused the sensitivity to expand negatively is basically the impact of the increased surrenders, including the dynamic surrender behavior. That was the primary reason for higher negative sensitivity. In terms of ESR, considering the one-to-two relationship between the denominator and the numerator, it is affected more by the ratio than by the absolute amount of risk. Including this, we do not make decisions or management judgments based solely on the ESR level or sensitivity. Rather, we consider the stability of the portfolio, the stability and soundness of earnings, and overall earnings power. We have no intention to stop purchasing super long-term bonds due to the increase in sensitivity. As shown in the material, our ALM policy remains unchanged. Ultimately, we aim to stably and reliably match insurance liabilities with ALM assets and then utilize excess capital to generate additional returns, including through selective investment in risk assets and alternatives. We have not calculated the interest rate sensitivity of ESR under the old standard, which excludes the mass surrender risk, so I will refrain from responding to that question. Thank you. I have a follow-up question. Regarding the impairment risk of the bond holdings, you explained that the bonds are mainly held to correspond to policy reserves, but how to respond if their prices fall by more than 50%? In the event of impairment, would it be possible to cover that by using the reserve for price fluctuations or with the excess provisioning? When the prices fall by 50% or more, whether or not impairment is required is basically decided after discussion with the accountant each time it occurs. Basically, we show our intention to continue holding the bonds to be matched against the policy reserves and demonstrate that there is no issue even without selling the bonds. I'm not sure if this is the appropriate expression, but in a way, it is showing our ability. By clearly stating the policy of, in principle, holding the bonds corresponding to policy reserves until maturity, we do not treat them as subject to impairment even if their prices fall by more than 50%. In the context of ability, if mass surrenders were to occur and it becomes necessary for us to sell the bonds during the fiscal year, impairment risk would materialize. In such a case, we would manage the balance of income and expenses by using measures such as reversing the price fluctuation reserve and realizing gains from the sale of other assets. I see, thank you. Would the reversal of the price fluctuation reserve be covered by the statutory portion or by the excess provision? I would like to understand if that accounting treatment would affect the adjusted profit. Currently, there is a certain balance in the price fluctuation reserve, but rather than using the reserve to offset the impairment losses, we have the following in mind. As we did last year, the process of reshuffling bonds to build a better bond portfolio amid rising interest rates resulted in losses on sales. Daido Life has accordingly made the certain level of excess provision to the reserve for price fluctuations in this fiscal year's budget. In this case, it is excluded from adjusted profit, so it does not result in a negative impact. Were you also asking about the drawdown of the reserve? Yes, if losses were to occur on bonds, I believe that the impact on adjusted profit could be offset by utilizing the price fluctuation reserve within the statutory allowance. However, if the excess portion of the reserving is reversed, in principle, the loss will remain as it will be deducted from adjusted profit. Do you intend to mitigate the negative impact on the adjusted profit? Yes, we internally manage the reserve for price fluctuations, but how it will actually be used and reflected in adjusted profit hasn't been officially decided yet, and the policy hasn't been disclosed either. But in theory, if we reverse the amount that was added as an excess reserve, it ends up being a loss because it was already booked as profit. On the other hand, the amount added as a statutory reserve was already booked as a loss, so the impact is offset accordingly. Understood. Thank you very much. Now we will move on to the next question. Mr. Sato from JP Morgan Securities, please go ahead. This is Sato from JP Morgan. My questions are on the interest rate and ROEV. Regarding interest rates, while you've explained that the current level and the shape of the yield curve are manageable, is it fair to assume that there would be no issue regardless of how high the rates go? I ask this because the issuance history of 30 and 40-year Japanese government bonds is relatively short, and the yields are currently at historically high levels. In contrast, 10 and 20-year government bonds had yields exceeding 5% back in the 1990s. Even if 30 and 40-year JGB yields were to go up another 100 basis points or more, would the tone of your explanation remain largely unchanged? Since you mentioned that you are internally looking at dynamic surrender scenarios, it would be helpful if you could share the threshold level if you have any. My second question is about ROEV. On page 7, you've shown us the trend, including the current year's plan. I understand that by definition, there can be fluctuation from year- to- year, but this year's 6.2% projection and the value of new business is below the initial target. Would this return to the previous target level of 7.5% ROEV, or JPY 200 billion in value of the new businesses, if the sales result challenge at Daido Life is resolved? Or is 7.5% a level that cannot realistically be expected during a period of the next long-term vision, since the denominator, the EV, has become larger? I would appreciate the management's thought on this topic. Thank you for your questions. On your first question regarding the risk of the rising interest rate, it is difficult to say that there is no issue however high the interest rates may rise, but our basic view is as I have explained earlier. I repeat myself, but what's important is not just the rise in interest rate, but also the impact on surrender risk. We mentioned that the sensitivity of surrender on the protection type policies to interest rates is low, but surrenders can still occur due to other factors. To deal with a certain pickup in surrenders, we conduct stress tests from the perspectives of how the rising surrender from higher interest rates affects earnings, whether the levels remain manageable on both an economic value basis and on the current accounting basis, among other perspectives. We manage risks considering interest rate levels as well as the current and future economic environment. Based on the current levels and surrender risk, we believe there is no problem in continuing to invest in ultra-long-term bonds according to the plan at this point. On your second point, ROEV, it is difficult to evaluate because it is greatly influenced by the financial environment. At the planning stage, we will pay close attention to whether we can achieve 7.5% ROEV under certain conditions. We closely monitor the feasibility of achieving the 7.5% target, confirming it as an important indicator of capital efficiency and growth. As to whether 7.5% is appropriate in the next vision, it is affected by the size of the denominator, as you pointed out, and we believe the impact is greater compared to that of the financial accounting-based ROE. Based on the outlook for new business performance and achievable new business value, we continue to consider whether it is necessary to revise the target, i.e., should we keep the 7.5% or lower or raise the 7.5%? Let me confirm one point on my first question. I understand that some life insurance companies hold derivative positions not so much as to hedge the risk of bond value decline, but to hedge the downside expected from a sudden surge in interest rates. Is it correct to understand that you do not have such position? We do not use derivatives to hedge against rises in super long-term interest rates. However, if it is just necessary to hedge not only against the rising interest rates but also against associated surrender risk, I will consider the options available. We have done the stress test, and as hedging comes with a price, we have decided not to have hedged positions currently. Thank you very much for your responses. We will now move on to the next question. Mr. Sasaki from Nomura Securities, please ask your questions. This is Sasaki from Nomura Securities. I would like to ask about page 17. You mentioned that the interest income from your yen-denominated assets is sufficient to cover the assumed interest rate, but could you share your views on the future asset management policy? If the yen-denominated asset cannot fully cover for the assumed interest rate, your obvious strategy would be to take investment risk to generate return to cover for the cost. With yen-denominated assets expected to cover for the assumed interest rate, what is the management's assumption on the expected return in considering the structure of the investment portfolio? The expected return would probably determine the asset mix. Page 17 shows the asset management portfolio as of the end of March 2031. Is this based on any specific data or economic assumptions, or does it reflect T&D's own market outlook? What is the risk return that management expects from the investment portfolio, assuming the yen-denominated assets to fully cover the assumed interest rate? That is my first question. The second point is for confirmation. Regarding policy reserve matching bonds, you explained that they are basically not subject to impairment. Do you talk to the auditors and decide on the accounting treatment on individual security basis? If so, would such approach limit the investment flexibility? Those are my two questions. Thank you for your questions. Market view or market outlook may not exactly be the appropriate word, but the portfolio is designed based on the expected return and risk characteristics of each asset class. From the perspective of effective capital utilization, we aim not only to cover the assumed interest rate through ALM-based investment, but also to seek excess returns by utilizing capital and decide on the exposure of the risk assets. At the same time, as we need to lower the cost of capital, we take measures to control the volatility that could lead to higher capital costs when building the portfolio. In the next 12 months, we plan to refine and further examine our specific policy as we prepare for the next long-term vision. Regarding the second point, the policy reserve matching bonds. Basically, when the bond price declines by more than 50%, we review the policy for each individual security. As long as there is no concern regarding intent and ability to hold the security, we do not recognize the impairment. It is hard to respond to your question on the investment flexibility, but policy reserve matching bonds can only be reallocated within a certain regulatory framework, within a certain range of duration regardless of impairment or not. Even if we were to reshuffle these bonds by utilizing the sales gain of equity holdings during a period of rising interest rates, it would be within the constraints of the policy reserve matching bonds. In the sense that they cannot be traded without limitation, there are certain constraints. May I ask a follow-up question? The principle of bond investment is that companies may face challenges in the sales of bonds. Given the current interest rate environment, holding JGBs and engaging in carry trades through REPL could be an attractive investment strategy. Is T&D considering the possibility of engaging in such an operation? While we do not take on significant leverage, we do make limited use of REPLs. I see. Thank you for your response. We will now move on to the next question. Mr. Sakamaki of Mizuho Securities, please go ahead. This is Sakamaki of Mizuho Securities. I have two questions. First, in the first part of your presentation, you mentioned that you have not yet reached the level of corporate valuation you are aiming for, so you explained that you need to further improve your capital efficiency. In the next long-term vision, will you consider raising the capital efficiency targets, such as ROE targets? My second question also relates to the next long-term vision. On page 29 of your presentation material regarding the business portfolio strategy, six months ago, you explained that portfolio changes would be considered as needed. Has anything changed in management's view, for example, over the past six months? Thank you. Those are my questions. Mr. Sakamaki, thank you for your questions. Regarding the first question on improving capital efficiency, this will remain a key theme in our next long-term vision. We are starting discussions on how to set our KPIs, including ROE. For the ROE target as well, we are taking a strategic approach, not leaving it to chance by clarifying the level of confidence and the specific challenges we will take on to achieve the target. Therefore, we are, of course, having discussions about raising the targets. In terms of business portfolio changes, this has been an ongoing practice from before. We have always tried to renew the business portfolio. However, as for each of the timing, optimization, and the ideal form we aim for within the group, we are currently reviewing the business portfolio strategy comprehensively. As such, at this stage, there's nothing new to share yet, but these discussions are ongoing within the board of directors. That's all. Thank you. By changes to the portfolio as needed, I was expecting something like divestiture, among other things. I just wanted to confirm the progress. Thank you. We will now move on to the next question. Mr. Niwa of Citigroup, please go ahead. This is Niwa of Citigroup. Can you hear me? Thank you for the opportunity to ask questions. I have two questions. The first one is a follow-up to Mr. Sakamaki's question. The second question is on surrenders. I am looking at page 29. I understand you will continue to pursue growth going forward. My question is, going forward, is there a possibility that the business portfolio will undergo significant changes? Is it something you are considering in the next long-term vision, or are you looking at the portfolio as essentially a continuation of the current composition? I would like to get some color. Will you focus more on growth, or will you focus more on profitability? What is your priority? That is my additional question. My second question is, I would like to ask about the likelihood of policy surrenders with yen interest rates rising. If it is possible for you to share with us, what level of interest rates, for example, on what maturity of government bonds would trigger surrenders? What are the levels that you are looking at? What proportion of Taiyo Life's and Daido Life's policies have interest rates below that level that you are referencing? I would like to understand how to think about the likelihood of policy surrenders since I have no experience in this matter. I would appreciate your guidance on this. Thank you. Mr. Niwa, thank you. About the first question on the business portfolio, on page 29, the Y-axis is showing growth potential and the X-axis is contribution to revenue, and each business is plotted. First, the area that requires the most in-depth consideration going forward is at the top right, the closed book business, which is positioned as a growth area. The acquisition of Viridium marks a milestone for the closed book business for now. However, we are now looking to broaden our scope in this business, exploring a wide range of regions and business areas. This is one area in the overall strategy map that is going to change. Particularly for the growth of this area, we have talked about this since before. While our core domestic life insurance business still has room for growth, it is expected to grow steadily rather than a significant expansion. We aim to circulate the capital generated from this core business within the group. From the longer-term perspective, we are exploring ways to diversify our sources of earnings so that the group can continue to grow even amid such mega trends as a declining population. We would like to have a more in-depth discussion to drive such growth. As for our priority, whether it is growth potential or capital efficiency, both are two wheels of the same cart, and we do not intend to overlook either in our next long-term vision. As this was covered in the previous questions, we plan to announce our next long-term vision next year. If there is anything we can disclose ahead of schedule, we will try to do so. I would like to ask a follow-up question, if I may. Looking at the long-term, overseas profits are currently just over 10%. What level do you think is a reasonable target for the group going forward? It depends on how we define long-term. Looking ahead over the next five years through to the final year of the next long-term vision, we expect the proportion of overseas profits to increase from the current levels, but not to an extreme degree. Beyond the next five years, it is difficult to comment on the profit ratio as the profit outlook for the domestic life insurance business remains uncertain. In the next long-term vision, five years or six years from now, we are setting JPY 200 billion as the minimum target for group-adjusted profit. On top of that, how much discontinuous growth we will have. We will be considering how we can pursue growth investments on top of that. Once we have more clarity on these, we will be able to give more concrete profit levels on a relative basis. This is our current approach. I appreciate your understanding. Thank you. I see. Thank you. I would like to answer your second question. Honestly speaking, we do not know what interest rates would trigger surrenders. In the past, interest rates rose in Japan, but it has been many years since then, and consumer interest rate literacy has also changed. Therefore, it is difficult to refer to the situation at that time. However, as we have already said, the interest rate sensitivity of production-type products at Taiyo Life and Daido Life is extremely low. The recent increase in surrenders at Daido Life was mainly due to factors such as a worsening economic outlook, specifically after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Last year, the peak of repayments on zero-zero loans also resulted in an increase in surrenders. At Taiyo Life, the impact of interest rates is limited as it primarily sells protection-type products targeted at senior customers. TDF sells yen-denominated products as well as foreign currency-denominated products. TDF is not currently seeing an increase in surrenders of yen-denominated savings-type products despite the recent rise in the interest rates. I see. It's clear. Thank you. We will now move on to the next question. Mr. Majima of Tokai Tokyo Intelligence Lab, please go ahead. This is Majima speaking. Thank you. On page 8 in the presentation material, the employee engagement scores of each company are shown. What is interesting to me here is Taiyo Life's score. The score appears low for the year ended March 2025, and also there has been little improvement since March 2021. I would like to ask, what are the reasons for the low scores at Taiyo Life? What are your thoughts on this? Is it due to poor benefits, or is it that the working environment is not favorable? If you have an idea for why the scores appear low, I would appreciate your explanation. My second question. The May 7th press release announced that TDF would offer Tsumitate Keizoku Insurance. What was the background behind this decision? I understand this is a strategy to sell SBI Realty' product online. It seems like the kind of offering that would typically be handled by Taiyo Life. Why then was it assigned to TDF? Have the vertical silos within the group become less of a barrier than before? I would like to know the background of TDF selling this Tsumitate Keizoku Insurance product. Those are my two questions. Mr. Majima, thank you for your questions. Regarding the engagement scores, although you mentioned that the engagement score is relatively low, we recognize that 3.72 represents a high level of satisfaction. As you see, for March 2025, the score has improved from 3.58 points in the previous year. Within Taiyo Life, the engagement scores were somewhat lower among the general staff, partly due to relatively limited interaction with the management and financial constraints, but efforts have been made to improve this. In this way, wherever scores are relatively low within each company, we identify the issues and work on improvements. As for the areas that have relatively high scores within the group, we are working on improvements by sharing their initiatives across the organization. It is not that the scores are low when compared to side by side, and we are also seeing solid improvements. The relative scores overall are at a high level. Thank you. I see. Thank you. I will respond to your second question. This is a so-called embedded insurance, which is a product that incorporates protection into investment trusts. It allows you to continue investing even in the event of an accident. As for why this product will be offered by TDF, TDF has been selling protection-type insurance products through financial institutions since before and has built strong relationships with them over time. In the course of discussions with the asset management divisions of these institutions on whether there might be ways to enhance protection against risks, this product, Tsumitate Keizoku Insurance, was developed and offered. We would like to expand this series in the future. This is based on our prior collaboration and relationships that we have built with the financial institutions over time. I see. May I ask, additionally, was this initiative proposed by TDF to SBI, or did it originate from SBI's side? I would like to know more of the background. We are unable to provide an answer regarding which party made the proposal, but this kind of protection exists in other countries. Through our discussions, we knew we had the capability to develop such insurance product, and there would be needs for this type of product. That's how the product came to be developed.