To begin today's call. Thank you. Thank you, Operator. Good morning everybody. Welcome to this Analyst and Investor Conference Call to discuss the Full Year 2020 Results for Just Eat Takeaway.com. On our corporate website, you can download the press release, the slides for this analyst and investor conference call, and other related information. I will start off today's presentation by taking you through the business and financial highlights for 2020. In addition, I will show you some market share data for our most important markets. Jörg Gerbig, our Chief Operating Officer, will share additional background on our delivery business, our Scoober strategy, and how we are improving our efficiency within this area. Brent Wissink, our CFO, will then talk you through the financial details of the results at group level and for each of our operating segments individually. I will end the presentation with some concluding remarks, after which we will open up the call for your questions. On slide five, I will take you through the business highlights. As mentioned in our Q4 update, on the back of our successful investment program, our order growth accelerated in three consecutive quarters in 2020. The integration of Just Eat and Takeaway.com is on track, and we continue to roll out Scoober, for instance, in London and Paris, and consolidated our platforms to reduce complexity. We've put tremendous effort into improving the U.K. business, especially. We doubled our sales force and signed new partnerships with leading restaurant chains, which has led to a surge of both delivery and marketplace orders. The U.K. renaissance has become apparent to our followers, and I'm convinced that this only marks the beginning of our journey. We supported our restaurants with various relief measures, and we launched campaigns to support healthcare workers with free or discounted food across our markets. The proposed transaction with Grubhub was approved by our shareholders at the EGM in October last year. We have previously expressed a willingness to sell our stake in iFood if an appropriate offer is made that reflects the size and superior growth of this asset. We have entertained several bids on our stake in iFood, the highest of which to date amounted to EUR 2 billion- EUR 3 billion, which does not reflect our expectations of the value of this fast-growing and strategically important asset. To conclude this slide, last month, we successfully raised EUR 1.1 billion through an offering of convertible bonds at attractive funding terms to retain the financial and strategic flexibility which comes from a strong balance sheet. Now moving to slide six. As a reminder, more than 90% of our GMV is generated in markets in which Just Eat Takeaway.com is the market leader. Our business is in a very strong position. In the next few slides, I want to quickly take you through the market share development for our seven largest markets over the course of 2020. On slide seven, you can see that our relative market share in the U.K. has remained stable during the pandemic. I will come back to this in the next slide as well, but it is good to realize that in a fast-growing market, this of course means that the gap in absolute orders with competitor has widened further. Our current trading is very strong, with 88% year-on-year order growth in the first two months of 2021 year- to- date, while our delivery orders have surged more than 600% over the same period. Our market share can also be seen in the relative share of credit card transactions in the U.K. Based on this information, you can see in the middle slide that the absolute gap with our competitor has increased during the pandemic. We anticipate this gap to further widen in 2021. On slide nine, you see that the wider gap has been realized in spite of a significant increase in discounted orders by our competitors. In particular, the number three has increased discounting significantly in the past few months. Based on our experience, most of these discounted orders are good at creating short-term top-line growth, but do not create sticky user behavior. Almost all of these orders would not have been placed if there would not have been a voucher granted to the consumer. We see competitors inflating their orders in this way in almost all our countries, so this sort of behavior is not a typical British affair. Our strength in the U.K. market is clearly visible when we compare Just Eat in the U.K. and Ireland with the number three player, in this case, based on GMV. Not only are we over two times larger in the U.K. and Ireland, our business in the U.K. alone is roughly of the same size as the number three is globally. Even more importantly, our global business added EUR 4.3 billion in GMV in 2020, which is larger than the total size of this competitor globally. Moving to Germany on slide 10. I think it is safe to say that we are the clear market leader in Germany, and we continue to be excited about the huge potential of this under-penetrated and very sizable market. It is simply one of the best food delivery markets on the globe. On slide 11, you see that SkipTheDishes in Canada is the clear number one, with an order growth of 78% in 2020. As a predominantly logistical market, our market share in Canada has been affected by COVID-19 because of restaurant visit substitution, and our competitors, being smaller, were better positioned to benefit from that. When the world returns to normal, we expect market share gains after the crisis, given our strong position. On page 12, you see that the Netherlands continue to be one of our strongholds. On slide 13, you see the outstanding performance in Australia. Last year, we delivered 104% growth, and as a result, we have expanded our market share. Our current growth, of course, is far higher than our 2020 growth, with our Q4 growth already being at 166% year-over-year. Moving to Poland on slide 14. As mentioned previously, Poland is a hidden gem in our equity story. It has a large addressable population, already representing a high number of orders, while the population penetration is still below 10%. Our competitive position in Poland is unrivaled. Lastly, on page 15, we show the Italian market, in which our business is multiple times the size of each of our competitors. As you might have picked up in the media, there's a lot of scrutiny of the freelance model in Europe. In Italy, this has now led to the labor inspection, ordering all food delivery players in Italy to employ their staff within less than three months from now. Like in other markets, we were already in the process of switching to the Scoober employment model. At the same time, we expect the Italian authorities to claim fines, overdue taxes, and social security premiums with our competitors. The fines alone are set to be around EUR 730 million. We believe that our extensive experience in operating an employment model is a competitive advantage, and therefore, we believe we will gain further market share in Italy in 2021. Turning to slide 16, I'd like to once again focus your attention to the basics of our business model, the cohorts. On the right-hand side, you can see that the vast majority of our orders come from existing users that are extremely loyal. Our users are very sticky, and we have been able to add a record number of new consumers during the year. The penetration of the adult population in our leading markets is just over 10%, while approximately 70% of the local adult population in these markets orders food at least once a year. It is important to explain what effect COVID has had on our market. Restaurants without delivery couriers needed to rapidly shift to online food delivery, which drove massive growth in logistics. The marketplace also grew strongly, but delivery grew faster given a sizable part of the growth was caused by a replacement of restaurant orders. The world delivery market, however, will also get the bulk of the COVID hangover when consumers will return to dining in non-delivery restaurants. Given we have more marketplace orders than delivery orders, and the fact that our delivery orders are growing much faster than the rest of the market, we expect to outgrow most of our competitors in 2021. To summarize, the penetration upside is significant, and we believe that the coronavirus accelerated the adoption of online food delivery for both consumers and restaurants. Ultimately, we see signs that for us, this will lead to further sustainable growth. Therefore, we expect that our order growth will accelerate in 2021 compared with 2020. Which brings me to the end of my update, and I'd now like to hand over to Jörg. Thank you, Jitse, and good morning all. In this section, I will recap our major strategic initiatives that we shared in Q4 results and go into a little bit more detail around our logistics business, which is at the heart of our hybrid strategy. Please move to slide 19. As I talked about in Q4 results, there are three key areas where we are making strategic investments. These will allow us to reinforce and extend our market-leading position across our markets, particularly in legacy Just Eat markets, which have been historically under-invested. The first area in our expansion is our expansion of supply and expansion of delivery. We have already made good progress in this, and across the group, we added over 80% more restaurants in February 2021 than we did in the same month last year. We are also seeing our expansion with branded restaurant groups have a really positive impact on our customer acquisition. For example, in the U.K., over a third of our new customers in February were generated from major chains. The second area we are investing in is our brand, and we've increased our share of voice in a number of markets. This is already having an impact on our top of mind brand awareness. In Australia, for example, we've seen awareness increase by 8 percentage points since the start of last year. We've also increased our performance marketing spend to drive even more new customers to our platform. The final area of strategic investment is in our customer proposition and experience. In particular, we've already started to invest in price leadership, including offering free delivery with major brands such as McDonald's across multiple markets. Our market leading value proposition will continue to drive strong customer acquisition and fuel the positive network effects that underpin our growth. Looking ahead, we will continue to prioritize market share gains over EBITDA in 2021, in line with the Q4 2020 run rate. Please move to slide 20. One of the key areas we are investing in is expansion of delivery. I wanted to share a few slides on our logistics business. This first slide demonstrates our scale and growth in this area. We fulfilled over EUR 3 billion worth of delivery GMV in 2020, and exited the year at a run rate of EUR 4.6 billion. At a growth rate of 163% year-over-year in the Q4 2020, we believe that our logistics business alone was bigger and faster growing than several of our pure play logistics competitors on a standalone basis. We believe that only clear market leading positions will lead to a sufficient scale, order density, and network effects to enable healthy delivery margins in the long run. As a reminder, more than 90% of our GMV is generated in such markets with number one positions, and our strategic investments will continue to reinforce and extend market share. Please turn to slide 21. At the heart of our delivery strategy in Europe is Scoober, which is the model we deploy across a number of European markets, and which we have been expanding to U.K., France, and Switzerland in the second half of 2020. As of December, we were present in 137 cities across 12 countries. Scoober is unique in our industry as being a fully employed model. That means each of our 20,000 couriers receive a fair income above minimum wage level and receive benefits such as sick leave and holiday pay. They're also provided with clothing, eco-friendly e-bikes, and protective gear to do that job safely. Of course, they are fully insured as well. We believe it's important to treat all of our couriers fairly as they are key investors of our brand. They are the physical presence of Just Eat Takeaway on the street and usually increase our brand visibility and top of mind brand awareness. They are also one of the few physical touchpoints we have with our consumers, and that's why it's critical that they understand and represent our brand values. We're proud to be a responsible employer in an industry which is increasingly under scrutiny from regulators looking to protect workers' rights and safety. We've seen landmark legal decisions in the U.K. and Netherlands, as well as regulatory intervention in Spain and Italy, which reinforce our view that the gig economy in European markets is not sustainable in its current form. We have a real competitive advantage by having a model which we believe is fully compliant with local labor laws, while at the same time showing similar economics as our competition. It remains our firm intention to expand this model to all European countries, and we expect to launch our first Scoober city in Italy later this month. Moving on to slide 22. We're also proud of our operational capabilities, and this slide aims to demonstrate the improvements we've made in this area over the past year. This data is looking at Berlin in particular as one of our more mature Scoober cities, and as a good example of how a clear market leadership position can translate into strong operational performance. As you can see, in the last year, we've seen a significant growth in total orders, a 20% improvement in average drop per hours, and a 6% decrease in average fulfillment time from initial customer order to final delivery. As we scale our Scoober business across multiple countries, we're building greater network density and enhancing our process and tech capabilities. That is translating into a better experience for our consumers and a better economics for us as I show on the next slide. Onto slide 23. The chart on the left-hand side of this slide shows our average gross profit per order, including both marketplace and delivery for Germany, the Netherlands, and the U.K., with a delivery share on the right-hand side of the page. What this demonstrates is that we've been able to maintain or even increase our average profit per order in Germany and the Netherlands, despite our strong expansion in delivery. We've achieved that through a combination of improved operational efficiency and margin optimization. As we continue to grow delivery in these markets in 2021, we expect to be able to maintain this level on a per order basis, generating strong growth in our total gross profit. In the U.K., we have deliberately prioritized growth over profit and have invested in our market leading position through rapid expansion and delivery, and particularly on branded restaurant groups, as well as our investment in price leadership. These factors have contributed to a short-term deterioration in our gross profit per order. However, this strategy will further expand our market share, and we believe that as the clear market leader with significant scale and network density, we can ultimately return to the long-term average margin that we have historically achieved. Moving to slide 24. This slide focuses on delivery gross profit. What we show on the left is that at total group level, we are already profitable in delivery on a gross profit basis, generating over EUR 50 million in 2020. This is despite pursuing a price leadership strategy across many of our markets with an average delivery fee of less than EUR 2. What that means is that there is significant headroom to improve our margins if we increase our delivery fees. For illustrative purposes, we've also shown what our gross profit might look like with a EUR 3 delivery fee and a EUR 4 delivery fee. You can see that our total gross profit for deliveries could be almost EUR 400 million if we chose to match the prices charged by some of our competitors. The chart on the right of the page brings that to life for our biggest German cities. On average, we charged only around EUR 1 for delivery in December across these cities. If we were to increase that by an additional EUR 0.50, that would be sufficient to get us to be gross profit neutral. If we were to charge a delivery fee of EUR 4, we would make as much gross profit on a delivery order as we do on a marketplace order. To summarize the key messages on delivery, we are one of the largest and fastest growing logistical businesses in the world on a standalone basis. Our logistics business is highly efficient, and we have made significant progress in terms of improving our operations and tech capabilities. We are already profitable globally on a gross profit basis despite pursuing an aggressive price leadership strategy, giving us significant headroom to improve margins. We believe that market leadership is critical to drive sufficient scale, order density, and network effects to enable healthy delivery margins in the long run, and we are best placed to achieve that, and therefore further investing in driving our market share. I'm now going to hand over to Brent to talk through the financials. Thank you, Jörg. Good morning, everyone. In 2020, we achieved a step change in our scale and performance, both from the combination with Just Eat and from the excellent performance of the markets. At slide 26, you can see comparison between data presentation using IFRS and combined views. For the IFRS basis, where we show the Just Eat combination as from the control date of April 15, please see the annual report. This is depicted in the gray columns of the three graphs. However, given the impact from combining with Just Eat and to provide comparable insights in performance and KPI data, we are showing the data as if the combination took place on the 1st of January 2019. We believe that this is the most accurate representation of the group's performance. The orange columns in this chart are the combined data. Please move to slide 27, where we highlight the development of the three consumer metrics which drive the growth of our orders. As also indicated during our H1 2020 reporting, we are experiencing significant improvement in all our Key Performance Indicators, this is continued in the second half of 2020. As described earlier, our consumer base is very sticky once they are returning consumers. Therefore, the realized improvement has a positive implication for future year growth, and we believe that the increase seen in 2020 is a sustainable improvement of our core business rather than a temporary increase in demand. Turning to slide 28, which illustrates the order development as a result of the improved business drivers. The number of orders processed in the full year 2020 was 588 million, an increase of 42% compared to the year before. As highlighted earlier, the order growth accelerated through the year in both our marketplace and delivery business. Delivery growth was driven by adding more delivery restaurants to our platform, including some key global accounts like McDonald's, as well as the impact of investing in price leadership. Please follow me to slide 29, where we also show the development of our gross merchandising value and revenue. GMV grew faster than orders, driven by an increased average order value compared to the previous year, which was largely due to a business mix change caused by the coronavirus. As you can also see, our revenue is outpacing both orders and GMV growth. This is mainly driven by the growth of our delivery orders, which carries higher revenue per order. Next slide, please. You see in this slide that the revenue increased mainly as a result of the order growth. This growth is expected to be sustainable, whereas we expect to see the gain from higher average order value reducing a bit in 2021 as the coronavirus restrictions are lifted. We also believe that it's really important to support our restaurant partners and the wider society through these challenging times. Overall, in 2020, we provided support initiatives in the form of commission rebates and food orders for EUR 59 million. On slide 31, we focus on gross profit generation. This continues to grow year-on-year, and we maintain to keep one of the highest margins in the industry. Our marketplace gross profit is a main source of profitability, with a stable margin year-on-year. With this strong profitability engine, we can fuel our strategic investments in delivery expansion and price leadership. Our number of delivery orders doubled compared to last year, taking the delivery share to 26% of total orders. This rapid growth was caused by a significant increase in delivery restaurant supply, including popular chain restaurants. As said, one of our pillars of our delivery strategy is to be the price leader in our industry. This means offering lower delivery fees across our markets compared to competition, including free delivery. On top of this, we keep expanding our Scoober delivery service using employed couriers to new cities. All of these initiatives, which mainly took place during the second half of 2020, have impacted our delivery gross profit, however, still delivering positive results. We strongly believe that these investments in delivery will make consumer offering more attractive and will further strengthen our network effects. Please follow me to slide 32, where I would like to highlight the impact of our investments on our cost base and the development of our Adjusted EBITDA. As Jitse and Jörg have already mentioned, we are pursuing a clear vision how to win markets and strengthen our competitive advantage. This slide illustrates how various investments are accelerating to support strong top-line growth. On the previous slide, I focused your attention on the expansion of the delivery business and its impact on gross margin. This slide shows that order fulfillment cost, which mainly comprises courier cost, is increasing as we do more delivery orders, and that these costs are now our biggest spend category. To support our continued growth, our brands have to be top of mind across all our markets. We are achieving this by increasing investments in brand awareness and performance marketing. Even with these increases in absolute marketing cost per order is reducing year-on-year, and marketing as a percentage of revenue is also less, clearly proving the scalability of our business, even when we are investing heavily. Lastly, our other operating expenses, comprising mainly from non-courier staff costs and other expenses, are growing. This is also reflecting the investments we make in expansion of sales teams, growth in logistics and customer services, and an increase in tech and support functions to drive all the improvements to our platform and business efficiencies. All the described investments initiatives were accelerated in the second half of 2020, leading to the Adjusted EBITDA of EUR 78 million in that period, compared to EUR 177 million during the first half of 2020. Despite these investments, we were able to deliver EUR 256 million of Adjusted EBITDA in 2020, which is an increase of 80% compared to last year. Moving to slide 33. As opposed to the previous slide, the figures on these slides are based on IFRS and not on the combined base. The reason for this is to show that although we generated strong EBITDA in 2020, mainly due to expenses related to the combination and integration of Just Eat and Takeaway and other acquisition-related costs, we incurred a EUR 151 million loss after tax. Please follow me to slide 34, where you notice that the cash position of the company at the end of 2020 was very strong with EUR 529 million in the bank. It is clear that the positive operating cash flow was supported by substantial Adjusted EBITDA gain in 2020. The positive cash flow from financing and investing activities mainly relates to the capital raise of EUR 700 million in April last year. However, part of this raise was immediately used to repay the outstanding debt facilities of EUR 359 million. To further strengthen our liquidity, we raised EUR 1.1 billion in February of this year through a convertible bond issue. With these funds, we are well capitalized to pursue our strategic investments. We now will move on to focus on our segments. Firstly, in the U.K., which is our largest market. We grew orders by 35% compared to 2019. However, as you know, we saw a strong improvement through the year and exited the period with Q4 order growth of 58%. Our delivery business in the U.K. accelerated significantly through the period, despite also providing EUR 25 million on temporary commission relief to support our restaurant partners and vouchers for NHS staff. The growing share of delivery orders, certainly also fueled by the rapid expansion of partnerships with McDonald's and Greggs, has meant a reduced gross profit margin in the U.K. On the chart on the right-hand side of the slide, you can see the reinvestment of profits during the second half of the year into our strategic initiatives. We are pleased with the initial returns from these investments, and we therefore expect to continue to investing to gain further market share. Moving to Germany, where delivery orders nearly doubled in 2020, now making up 7% of total orders. Along with the strong performance in the marketplace, this resulted in 62% growth year-on-year or 43% on a like-for-like basis. Revenue grew ahead of orders and GMV at 82% compared to last year. German revenue benefited from the introduction of delivery fees on some delivery orders. This strong growth generated significant operational leverage, resulting in an increase in Adjusted EBITDA to EUR 125 million. This was relatively stable across the year, with slightly more EBITDA being generated in the second half as growth accelerated. Next slide, please. In Canada, we continued our trajectory of significant growth, with order growing 78% year-over-year. With revenue growing by 59%, this figure was impacted by EUR 20 million one-off impact in temporary commission relief to support our restaurant partners. We also reduced average delivery fees with price leadership as a core part of our strategy to maintain and further expand our number one position. Despite these initiatives, our gross margin declined only by 2% points year-on-year and remained at a healthy level of 35%. Due to the quality of our logistics operation and the strength of the SkipTheDishes brand, we were able to operate an Adjusted EBITDA profitable delivery business again in 2020, with EUR 59 million of Adjusted EBITDA generated. Moving to the Netherlands, where we achieved a year-on-year order growth of 30%. Revenue growth was 47%, well above order and GMV growth. In 2020, we saw a further acceleration of our delivery business, certainly as a result of starting Scoober operations in 17 Dutch cities. This naturally put pressure on the gross profit and Adjusted EBITDA margin. Nevertheless, Netherlands has still one of the highest Adjusted EBITDA margins in our industry. Next slide, please. Here we see the rest of the world segment, which comprises our 13 other European markets, as well as Israel, Australia, and New Zealand. We had 29% order growth year-over-year, with our delivery orders growing by 174%, which was mainly driven by our success in Australia. Australia delivered very strong growth, with investments in marketing and pricing returning triple-digit order growth. In France, Italy, and Spain, we saw severe lockdown measures negatively impacting orders, and this effect lasted longer than in other markets. Before these markets also recovered strongly, particularly in Italy. In Israel, we saw a large shift away from our B2B offering from people not being in the offices anymore, which had a negative impact on orders, but a positive impact on the average order values and the growth of our delivery business. Segment revenue grew by 54% on a constant currency base, helped by the mix of delivery orders growing from 10% to 20%. This had the effect of eroding gross profit margins from 65% to 50%. We are reporting an Adjusted EBITDA loss of EUR 54 million in this segment, particularly caused by heavy investment in logistics and marketing in the second half, as well as an expansion of our sales and operational teams to support consumer offering and further expansion. Next slide, please. We like to provide you with some insight in iFood's operations, our Latin American joint venture, in which we hold a 33% stake. The results presented here are on 100% basis and at a constant currency basis. As Jitse discussed earlier, iFood is a very strong business, and this can also be derived from an impressive set of KPIs and financials. Orders doubled in 2020, with revenue up over 200% compared to 2019. At the same time, EBITDA losses reduced significantly, both in absolute and margin terms, showing a route to long-term profit potential the business has. Given the strong performance of iFood and its high potential, we expect to continue to take up our rights to participate in future iFood capital raises as they fund their ongoing investments. I would like to hand over now to Jitse. Thank you, Brent. I will continue with the conclusion of this presentation on slide 43. Most notably from the second half of 2020, we have significantly increased our investments, which are now driving the turnaround of the legacy Just Eat businesses. On the back of the current momentum, we will continue to invest to drive further growth and market share gain in line with the Q4 of last year. This means that we prioritize market share over Adjusted EBITDA. The investments will further strengthen our market positions, and as a result, we expect an acceleration of our order growth for the full year of 2021 compared to the 42% order growth that we reported in 2020. The renaissance of our business in the U.K. is unfolding, with February 2021 year-to-date order growth in the U.K. amounting to 88% and delivery orders up more than 600% against the first two months of 2020. Given our strong current trading and driven by our continued investment program, we expect to grow market share in the U.K. and most of our other markets in 2021. We remain excited to complete the transaction with Grubhub, which is anticipated in the first half of 2021. Last but not least, we continue to evaluate opportunities to realize the value from our stake in iFood, but only for a fair price. With that, operator, I would like to open the call for questions. Thank you. If you would like to ask a question, please press star one on your telephone keypad. Please ensure your line is unmuted locally, as you will be advised when to ask your question. Once again, that's star one if you would like to ask a question. The first question comes from the line of Jo Barnet-Lamb from Credit Suisse. Please go ahead. Excellent. Thank you very much for taking my questions, guys. My first question is with regards to the acceleration in order growth. Can we just confirm that that statement means greater than 42% order growth excluding Grub in 2021, and that would be greater than 835 million orders? In addition, at this early stage of the year and given uncertain competition, what gives you confidence in such a significant guide? Secondly, there's a chunk more investment in the rest of the world than I think a lot of people expected. Brent mentioned some of the places where that investment is going to go. Could you talk a little bit geographically with regards to the areas of investment within that division? Finally, you spoke about potential fines in Italy and the evolution of regulation across Europe. Do you foresee fines in other countries of similar scale as a proportion of the size of the market, and do you believe that Just could see any fines? Thank you. Thank you for those questions, Jo. Regarding your statement about the acceleration excluding growth, that is entirely correct how you described it. We do believe that we're going to grow faster than 42% in this year. To your question, what gives us the confidence? Well, first of all, current trading, we have again accelerated. That's the fourth consecutive quarter of growth acceleration. On top of that, I think that's actually quite important. We started as a marketplace business. I think everybody's aware of that. Our business is now very much a hybrid business, it's still very heavy on the marketplace side. A typical marketplace grows by a function of the amount of customers. If you have more customers, you're going to do more orders, that's very predictable behavior. It's not substitution of restaurants or restaurant visits. I think that's an important distinction with the logistical business that all the growth you've seen with our competitors, but also partly on our side, is related to restaurants being shut. You can't go to a restaurant. Even take McDonald's, you can't go there, so you might choose to order in. In our case, you have to remember that in the whole legacy Just Eat business, there was barely any logistics. A lot of what we've done last year was adding a lot of the restaurants that were only with our competitors, and in some cases already for years with the logistical competitors. That means that for us, whatever restaurant we put on our website, because we're so large in most of our countries, all these restaurants would get a lot of orders. A lot of the growth is simply because we've added restaurants. It's not because of the pandemic. On top of that growth, of course, there was the pandemic, and on top of that, we have invested also in price leadership. Our growth is currently, give you the example of the U.K. Our logistical business is growing 600%, and it is already more or less the size of the number three in the U.K. That 600%, if that falls because people might visit restaurants more, it doesn't fall to 0%. It falls to a very significant, very high growth rate. In the case of our competition, and you can look at the market share development when the virus hits, we will see the inverse. The market share development when the virus hit was beneficial to logistical businesses because people could no longer go to restaurants. In our case, that's certainly also the case, yeah, we have this significant growth in our logistical business that we simply do not see subsiding for the time being. The confidence level for us is very high. It's not a guess. It's not us assuming that we're going to be stuck with this virus until the end of the year. We are actually counting on the virus more or less disappearing by April or May. To your question around the investment in the rest of the world. It's a diverse issue, of course. Brent just mentioned Israel. We are mostly a B2B brand in Israel. We also have by far the largest share in the consumer business, but compared to the B2B business in Israel, that's a relatively small business. We have seen already now, because of the vaccine program in Israel, a heightened amount of orders in that market, which is logical because people are returning to the offices, and we are a B2B brand in Israel. That's a logical thing to see. That's part, of course, of what you've seen in the rest of the world. There's Australia. We are outgrowing all the competition currently in Australia, but it's also requiring a lot of funding. There are multiple different countries in there. In different levels of investment. If you look at, for instance, Poland, we are very advanced. It's also in rest of the world. Help me out, guys. If we want to pick out one specific country in the rest of the world as well. Italy and Spain, those countries are moving very quickly, are growing very fast. They also require investment. There's France here- Yeah, France is one. France is a country, for instance, look, in most countries, we are multiple times the size of the competition. In France, that's not the case. It happens to be in the center of Europe, and we are also investing heavily in France. Of course, our investments in France are also going to hurt the competition outside of France. This is why we do it, or this is also a big part of the reason that we do it. It's a mixed bag. It's very large, that segment. In general, the investments that we make across our businesses are roughly the same. Whether you look at marketing investments or logistics investment, it's not so much different. There's not a lot of difference between Holland, Germany, the U.K., Australia. It's essentially all the same, and in the end, it's about building a market leadership with good underlying fundamentals that will get you to profitability. Your question regarding the regulation. The countries that are most advanced in forbidding the freelance structures are Italy and Spain at this point in time. For both of these countries, we're looking at moving all the couriers in these countries to an employee status. In Spain, all the couriers that we have are already employees, and we have begun doing so in Italy. If there's going to be any hits to us in Italy from a regulatory perspective, it's going to be modest because we didn't have a large logistical business in Italy until, let's say, halfway through the last year. It is becoming bigger, though, and it will be fully the Scoober model in Italy, and we are fully cooperating with the government. It's safe to say that of the EUR 730 million in fines, we would have a very low amount of that, in the range of a couple of million, if you look at those fines. Again, it's not only the fines. You also have to think of taxes that have to be paid and Social Security. In the case of the competitors, that would go back a couple of years. That's a hefty one. In Spain, you will see the same movement. In Spain, you will see the same sort of clawback of Social Security, taxes, and possibly fines. Not for us, because we have everybody employed. Situation in Holland and the U.K. is different. In Holland, one of our competitors lost the court case at the highest instance, in which the conclusion was that the couriers are employees, while we already employ, of course, all the employees in Holland. That is a court verdict. It doesn't necessarily translate into these competitors necessarily to change their business model, although they can now potentially be sued by all their employees, or call them freelancers. The bigger issue, and it's the same in the U.K., is not so much those verdicts. The bigger issue is that most of these companies don't pay taxes and Social Security premiums. Now, of course, with that verdict, the tax authorities in any country can actually claw back taxes that were not paid for the past couple of years. I think that's the big issue for the competition and not so much the labor issue that everybody's focused on. I hope to have answered your questions. Yeah, that's fantastic. Thank you very much. Okay. The next question comes from the line of Miriam Josiah from Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead. Good morning, everyone. Thanks for taking my questions. Three for me. Firstly, just on the guidance, could you just give us a bit more color on what you're expecting for GMV and revenue growth, given the fact that you have the delivery fee investments that you're making, also you're adding a lot more QSR restaurants? Is it fair to assume that GMV and revenue growth should be significantly slower than order growth? That's the first question. Secondly, on delivery, thank you for the detail you've given on the economics. I think you said that you can get to a similar gross profit on delivery if you charge a EUR 4 delivery fee. Do you think there is scope to charge this longer term in Europe? I know that you've said in the past that you don't think there's a willingness to pay. Do you think consumer attitudes are changing, or do you think that this is something that you can do as competition reduces and the market matures? Linked to that, you sort of talked about healthy delivery margins in the long run. Can you talk about what you see as a steady state mature delivery margin in Europe and perhaps what sort of time horizon it takes to get there? Thanks. Thank you. I will defer the last two questions to Jörg, let me answer the first one. The reason that we're not giving too much guidance, of course, is the process with Grubhub, we can't comment too much on it. I would expect generally that our order growth and our revenue growth and GMV growth would move in a similar way as they have always moved, let's say in 2020. I don't think there's going to be material deviations there. It might be different on a local basis because we are seeing mix shifts. Of course, take the Israeli example. We have lower ticket sizes from the B2B business. Yeah, we would see quite a lot more orders in that market if people return to the office. There could be mixed changes in countries, but overall, I think the GMV growth and the revenue growth should follow the trends that they have always followed from us. Jörg, can you take the other two? Sure. Yeah, on the first one, yeah, we have obviously made a significant improvement in delivery operations and efficiency, and we believe still we deliberately chose for the price leadership strategy because we want to gain market share as much as possible. We've always said so in the past, we believe it's winner takes most markets, and only the winner will be able to actually achieve significant long-term margins. That also holds true for the delivery business. Actually, you need to have a certain scale density to actually be able to run that business very efficient. Then also from a pricing point of view, if you're a market leader, you have different optionality on the pricing point. We believe we are best positioned to actually get to such a situation, and that's why we're actually investing so much now. We believe in the long run, we will get there. In terms of where we end up with steady state margins, like we've shown, actually, we believe there could be pricing potential towards that in the longer run, but you won't see that in the short term because if you move too fast, your business will scale down quite a bit. Potentially there will be, but at this current level, it's not. Actually, at this stage, we're really going for market share and not improving EBITDA. That's what we are always stating as well. We believe in the long run, potentially gross profit could be at a similar level. Obviously, we'll have a bit more costs below the line than in the marketplace business, but at a gross profit, we always said, we believe it can be gross profit neutral and even getting closer to a marketplace gross profit. That's clear. Thank you. The next question comes from the line of Sreedhar Mahamkali from UBS. Please go ahead. Yeah. Hi, good morning. Thanks for taking my questions. I can just follow up on that point, please. Is this your experience over the last 12 to 18 months, 24 months, something like that on the delivery side, that's giving you a clear change in tone in terms of delivery profitability medium to long term? Is that right? Is that a change in the way you're thinking about delivery profitability? I'll come back. I wanted you to discuss the price versus non-price drivers to improve the margins. First of all, is that what is driving your growing confidence in logistics? I mean- Go ahead, sorry. We've always said, potentially you can get it to a gross profit, neutral or slightly positive situation. Obviously, if you charge EUR 4 or EUR 5 delivery fee, you might even get it on a gross profit, to similar like marketplace, but that's not the current situation, what we are in, at least not in continental Europe. You have a different situation here in continental Europe versus, for example, outside of Europe. In Europe, you could order with a marketplace restaurant, which is fully tailor-made from a cost structure towards the consumer, to provide the best price value point. Why would you order with a restaurant, which is charging you EUR 5 delivery fee, for example? At the moment, in Europe, we're not really there yet. We actually have the marketplace business, as you know. We're offering a very good price value point to consumers, but we're also offering the logistics at a very good pricing point. We actually have the room to maneuver on that. We actually have the pricing power to maneuver on that. We can spend that for more or less as long as we want because we have a strong marketplace business. As long as we are in the market, and for competition, there's only two choices. They can either also go the same way like us on the pricing side of logistics, which basically means a pure logistics player will never become profitable, or they can actually try to become profitable, they need to increase the pricing point on this and basically lose market share towards us. Our strategy is very compelling. In the long run, obviously, consumer habits might adjust to it. Still, I think there's a structural issue with the setup of how the logistics restaurants are set up versus the marketplace restaurants, how they are set up in terms of the price-value proposition. Okay. A couple of quick follow-ups. In terms of the operational drivers, which you've talked about, which is very helpful, that Berlin example. How much more headroom is there to improve this further? As in, is Berlin, first of all, the representative of what is happening across the platform as in improving metrics at scale, or I'm hoping this is not an isolated example. How much more potentially is there to drive internal operational drivers, please? Yeah. You've seen the overall gross profit margin in Netherlands and in Germany, actually, maintaining overall the gross profit per order or even slightly increasing while we actually quite significantly increased the share of logistics. Basically, we were driving this operational efficiency across the market, so it's not a one-off example, so to say. We actually saw that throughout the organization. Our routing algorithm, for example, to give you one example, is 100% automized. The only times when we really need to interfere is if there's an accident or something like that, and you will never solve these sort of things. From a technology point of view, it's not rocket science as such. It's an algorithm, and it's 100% automized, and it's constantly checking for the best allocations to drivers. We're pretty much there on this. In the end, you could increase your utilization by decreasing radius, which is probably one of the most drivers. The other piece I talked about earlier, in the end, you need to have the density and the scale to really get to a potential profit pool for delivery because, yeah, you need to be pretty large. We are best placed to actually exploit on that situation. That's why we're also even further investing in market share because that scale and density will actually put us in a position to be the best player to actually exploit potential profit pool of this. Okay. Very helpful. Last one. In terms of U.K., what level of logistics exposure gives you that higher order density and network effects that you're talking about to create healthy delivery margins? With sort of around 30%, what is the level that gives you that density, do you think? It's a bit hard to answer that just like that because obviously it depends very much on the structure of a city and even a structure of an area within the city. You're looking at a very local level here, so it's very hard to actually, basically give you the right answer to that in a very much general answer. We definitely see that, for example, in most of the bigger cities in Germany, which we're doing with more than 20,000 orders, we get to a decent amount of density. Like I said, it very much depends on structure of a city, size, how dense it is, and so on. You can't really answer that with a single answer. Okay. Thank you. I think also, if I can comment on it. We are using our scale as a total platform. Of course, we're not singling out the logistical business because people have questions about it. We have a far greater scale than just that logistical business. I think this is also important in answering that question. Also, if you look at continental Europe. We have a far higher share of logistics in the city centers than outside of the city centers. That's also fine for us. It also gets us good results. If we would only be running a logistical business, it would almost be impossible to create a positive EBITDA. Because we have such a large scale, because we have the marketplace business, we actually think we're the only ones that can actually get there. Very good. Thank you. Thank you. Again, I'm referring to Europe now. I'm not referring to Canada and Australia. Yeah. The next question comes from the line of Adrien de Saint Hilaire from Bank of America. Please go ahead. Yep. Good morning, everyone. Thanks for taking the questions. About your guidance on order growth to be higher than 42%, can you give us a bit of a split by geographies? Do you expect this to be all maybe U.K. driven, or is that going to be spread across your other markets? Secondly, I think before you were kind of telling us to annualize the Q4 EBITDA loss to give us a good proxy for 2021, both at the U.K. level and at the group level. Just wondering if that's still the case. Last question around iFood. Before you sell that stake, would you need to do a funding round around that business? If you were to sell it, could you give us a bit more information on any tax liability that may arise? If you could just also confirm on potential use of proceeds. I think you've talked about a buyback before, but if you could clarify this, that would be most helpful. Thank you very much. Thanks for the questions. First of all, where's the growth going to be? Simple answer, everywhere. It's going to be in U.K., it's going to be in Germany, it's going to be in Canada, Australia, Holland, basically all the markets. The reason that we'll grow in all these markets are exactly the reasons that we just alluded to. The difference with the U.K. is that we have a significant additional effort in adding more restaurants that are currently only with our competitors, and the lowering of the price point that will get us the customers of the competitors. That will be causing additional growth for the U.K. The growth, just to be clear, is going to be in all the countries. It's not going to be specific to the U.K. The Q4 results are indeed a good proxy for the loss. Regarding the funding and the tax liability, that will be Brent. With respect to any tax liability engaged with sale, there is not so far we've consulted our tax advisors, and there seems to be no tax over the capital gain to be paid. I'm sorry, what was exactly the question about the financing of iFood? Yeah, there were two questions there. The question was, is there a need for a funding round at iFood now? Yeah. There's a third question there around iFood, which is around use of proceeds, whether you're still considering buybacks if you were to get cash for that stake. Thank you. Well, for us, it is hard to disclose anything else other than we have disclosed about iFood and with respect to financing. If there would be a need for additional financing, we are very supportive, and we will also contribute to our pro rata stake in such a round. With respect to the tax question, I think I answered that already. Yeah. The use of proceeds for potential divestments. We've indeed said that we intend to return half of the net proceeds to our shareholders. That's still the current thinking. Very good. While I have you on the line, if I can just squeeze in one more question, Jitse. Can you tell us what you're seeing in terms of order momentum in countries where the economies have reopened? I'm thinking potentially of Australia, where they're enjoying a nice summer there. Well, I'm glad that you talk about Australia. Australia is currently still our by far fastest growing market, even with more relaxed COVID-19 measures. The reason for that is that, as I said, we're doing a couple of things in legacy Just Eat. We're working a lot on market repair. If you look at Australia, we've added tremendous amounts of new restaurants, including chains, market-based chains like Domino's, also delivery chains like McDonald's. Doing a lot of that. We're investing in the brands. We're seeing significant growth. We've shared the growth momentum with you also in the presentation deck. Australia has grown throughout 2020 and even accelerated now. If you look at, for instance, Israel, that's a clear example of a country in which we saw less growth because we are a B2B brand. We are seeing significant growth from this month, and that must be related to the offices reopening. Maybe to add, because to give you one more indication, if you look at last year, actually after the first COVID wave, which was basically March, April, maybe a little bit into May, restaurants were opening in most countries again, and still we saw an acceleration each quarter in the last year. Despite people being able to go to restaurants last year, we also saw an acceleration throughout each quarter. Thank you very much to all of you. Thank you. The next question comes from the line of Andrew Porteous from HSBC. Please go ahead. Yeah. Hi, team. A couple from me. I think a couple might have been answered already. Can you just talk about marketing? It looked like there was quite a big step up in H2, a bit lower in H1. Is there a notable change in shape between Q3 and Q4 in marketing? Was there a big step up into Q4 as you sort of invested in the business? Secondly, can you talk about the impacts of doubling your sales force? Have we seen that yet, or is that more targeted at premium restaurants? If so, what's the gap that investment is targeting and on what timeline should we expect to see progress? I will defer the second question to Jörg, but to answer your first question on marketing, I don't think there was a big step change between Q3 and Q4. There was a big change between H1 and H2. Again, predominantly on the legacy Just Eat markets. We have, as let's say the ex Takeaway.com management team, very specific thoughts about how to win the market. Part of that is sufficient investment in, let's say, let's call it very bluntly, Google. Another part is reaching the general population X times a week with TV marketing, outdoor billboarding, et cetera. We've brought that to the levels that we feel are necessary to beat whomever is trying to compete with us in these markets. If you would go back a couple of years, that's exactly what we've done in Holland and Germany. We've gotten a lot of questions from 2014 onwards about the level of marketing in Germany. The level of marketing after we raised the marketing to the level that we thought was adequate remained relatively stable in Germany. That's still roughly the same levels as where we came from when we had quite a lot of competition still in Germany. We keep it at a high level. Why? The penetration in all our markets is low. We need to get to 70%-80% of the population. Even in a country like Holland, only a third of the country orders with us. Fortunately, they don't order with the competition, that's good news. We really want to get to, let's say, 70%-80% of the population, and in some countries, we are at 10%. We need to get there. The only way to do that is by shouting your name, and that's only going to stop when everybody knows your name, and when everybody's ordering with you. In countries like Germany, U.K., et cetera, everybody already would know our name, but they're not all ordering with us. We'll continue to do that for the time being. You should not expect tremendous increases in countries like the U.K. after what we're doing now, because yeah, you've probably seen us a lot on TV already if you live in the U.K. Even though it increased significantly, it became more efficient. It's reflected in the marketing cost per order, as well as the marketing cost percentage revenue. It ramped up, but we could even benefit from the economies of scale. It's also true. Jörg, can you take the second question? Yeah. Generally on the sales, overall, in February, to give you one data point, we signed up 80% more restaurants in February this year than the February in 2020. A huge increase in number of sign-ups. If you specifically look at the U.K., we ended up the year with more than 50,000 restaurants, which is almost 14,000 restaurants net more than in the year before. Quite a steep increase here as well, and it's specifically focused around London. That's kind of the only area where we're not leading in terms of the choice. We have huge efforts around the London area where we're almost head-to-head with the second largest player there in the London area. We believe we can close the supply gap within the next 12- 18 months also for the London area, which then basically would have us in the lead in terms of choice throughout the whole of the U.K., and not only U.K. outside of London. Thanks. That's really helpful. The next question comes from the line of Andrew Gwynn from Exane BNP Paribas. Please go ahead. Hello. Good morning. Two questions if I can. First is on Canada. I'm just wondering if you could provide a little bit more color on the trends that are happening there. Obviously, a pretty strong performance from a profit perspective, but I think a little tiny bit of market share loss. The second, unfortunately, just coming back to, I suppose, the U.K., but more generally, in the markets where you have stepped up investment significantly, are you seeing much of a reaction from some of the competition? I suppose it's difficult sometimes to discern noise from the reality. Thank you very much. Thank you. Let me first answer your last question. We don't think that competition can react to our investments in the U.K., to be quite frank. If you look at what we're doing, we are offering, for instance, McDonald's at a much lower price than the competition. If the competition would match that, the losses of that would be so significant that they will never create any sorts of profits ever in the U.K. While that is a choice for them, it probably keeps them from losing market share. I don't necessarily think it will create a healthier business. It will make it worse. I don't think they can react in that way. They have reacted, both of them by spreading a lot of vouchers. Well, you know our opinion on those vouchers. If you take away the vouchers, you take away the orders, then you might as well conclude that they are not there. That's what they have been doing. Other signs we haven't seen too much. Same thing in other countries. A lot of vouchering from competition. Usually, it doesn't dent our market share. Apart from that, we don't see a lot. The number three player especially has reduced marketing significantly in 2020. They've ramped it up now, we haven't seen them too much in most of our countries last year. Regarding Canada, it is true that from the moment that the crisis hit Canada, we lost some percent of market share in Canada. We do believe that that is, again, because of the replacement business. A lot of the restaurants shut, this is a good moment, of course, for logistical businesses to market themselves. I think that marketing got more traction for those guys because they were relatively smaller than us. We do believe that that will fall back into place when the crisis subsides. I'm really a strong believer that you will see the inverse movement from the market share movements that there were in some markets, not in all, we have shown you the graphs. In some markets you do see some market share movements from the moment that COVID-19 hit a certain market. We do believe that you're going to see exactly the inverse of that movement. I hope to have answered those questions. Maybe to add to Canada. We're also investing in Canada a lot, especially in sales and marketing, because we still see a lot of runway, especially in the larger cities, Toronto and Montreal. Because we've historically been strong in the more rural areas there, we have some room to improve in Toronto, Montreal, and the Quebec area, where we're now even exceeding a 200% year-over-year growth. We're accelerating in these areas, spending more money in these areas. We've also introduced a rewards program, which is free of charge, where you can collect points and redeem them. That has also been very well received by the consumers. We will also expect that this has a very positive impact going forward and will be a catalyst for growth. That's great. Thank you very much, Jörg, for covering Canada. Just come back to the competition side. Into the second half of the year, hopefully we're all allowed out to play again. Would you expect a significant change in the competitive landscape, or is it just going to be more of the same as your sort of working scenario? Thank you. No. We believe that logistical competition is going to be severely hit by people going back to the restaurants. The reason that we don't feel that we're going to be hit is that, still, although we are a hybrid brand now, we're not a marketplace brand anymore, but we are a hybrid brand. We have loads of marketplace orders. Those are convenience orders usually. You don't dine at Domino's, you order from Domino's, as an example. In terms of logistics, we also believe that we'll see less demand from logistics. Yeah, as you see in the U.K., we're growing more than 600%. Even if we lose a little bit of momentum there, a lot of our growth is simply because we didn't have those restaurants on our website. A lot of our growth is actually taking customers from competition because of the price point. We don't believe we're going to be severely hit, but we do believe that there's going to be a significant impact for logistics companies. Okay. That's very clear. Thanks so much. The next question comes from the line of Marcus Diebel from JP Morgan. Please go ahead. Hi, everyone. I have also three questions. The first one is again on the gig economy. Obviously you have been very vocal on that topic. If you look at the U.K., maybe more specifically in this context. One comment you gave was that you feel that your delivery business has similar economics to peers. To me, that's not intuitively obvious given that peers don't pay national insurance and taxes. Is it just efficiency, or how should we think about it? Secondly, related to this, how do you think it's going to play out again in the U.K.? It seems there are still very different setups. The U.S. or California had a, obviously, decision, which obviously didn't impact the local player there too much. Over here in the U.K., it seems to that your peers are lobbying, arguing that drivers actually want the flexibility, and this is the key argument why they come to them, and again, they're lobbying hard. Do you think this is just not valid at all, and therefore not relevant? Just would be interested to hear your thoughts on the outcome, more specifically on the U.K. The question on the U.S. and Grubhub. You highlighted it's still on time, but do you feel as enthusiastic about the business as at the time of the acquisition, and how core is Grubhub really to the Just Eat or JET investment case going forward? Thirdly, maybe very quickly. Again, your peers are talking a lot about subscription models and talking, obviously, about strong benefits from those, and therefore have less impact on delivery fees. Would you strongly push back on subscription models, or how do you see it and the economics of those? That would be interesting. Thank you. Thank you, Marcus. Let me first start with our assessment of the Supreme Court verdict in the U.K. I think you guys are focusing on the wrong aspect of that verdict. There is no labor police in the U.K., as far as I'm aware. Theoretically, you could get away, if that verdict is held against you, with saying, "Oh, but this only applies to the people that sue me." The problem with that is that the Supreme Court verdict is very broad. It essentially says these guys, everybody that works in such a way is an employee, or actually is a worker. I should be specific for the U.K. case. The more important thing, though, is not per se in that, because technically these companies are right. Yes, all the workers would have to sue them, which is likely also going to happen, right? We should not pretend that's another problem in U.K. Technically, there's a big issue already in that verdict, given it was so broad, and it could also apply to food delivery in the end. Before it gets to a, let's say, very significant issue for the providers, it will take some time. However, the government could choose, just like Spain did, could choose to legislate. T hey could enforce that verdict by the Supreme Court, creating the same situation as, for instance, in Italy or in Spain, in which you get a limited period of time, three months, to employ everybody. We can do it because we actually have those systems. I doubt that the competition would be able to do it. The bigger issue, though, if you carefully also at Italy, there are some investigations as well in our competitors. There's a gangmastering investigation. I had to look up what that was. I didn't realize it was part of our business model, is a gangmastering investigation against a competitor, and there is a tax evasion investigation against one of our competitors. That is the big issue. The big issue here is that some of these parties are not paying any taxes in the U.K. If you are the HMRC, if I say it correctly, so tax agency in the U.K., you are going to be very interested in this verdict, because this means that no VAT has been paid, no Social Security has been paid, and no income tax has been paid for the couriers. That is the biggest issue in the U.K. I'm not a legal expert, so it's difficult for me to comment on when this will materialize for some of these players, but it is likely coming closer. Of course, in Italy and Spain, it has already materialized. It is now a fact that everybody needs to be an employer there. End of story. No appeals possible. I see the comments of our competitors. They're nonsense. It is end of the line. It's different in the U.K. and Holland, I'll immediately admit that. To be quite frank, this is for the American listener, getting a European government to overrule a court, I think is chanceless. It rarely happens. I don't think it will happen in the U.K. Also, if you look at the whole, this is different between, of course, the U.S. and Canada, for instance, and Europe. The whole structure in Europe, if you also look at the discussion at the European Commission level, is around how can we better protect the gig worker. They're not thinking less benefits. They're thinking more benefits. They're thinking Social Security. They're thinking taxes, et cetera. They're thinking moving closer to the employment model or actually moving everybody into the employment model. That's the direction of thought of the European governments, is not the other direction. I am personally surprised that we see this first in Spain and Italy, given the unemployment in these countries. If you look at the north of Europe, the unemployment is very low. Still, even during the crisis, the unemployment has remained low, and people are more concerned about, let's say, the social fabric of society than in the south. That's gig economy question. Again, our business model doesn't depend on this being resolved in our favor. Still, it would be helpful, of course, if everybody plays by the same rules. If you ask us why it is as efficient, well, first of all, because of our scale. We do have the marketplace business. We already spent our marketing money, so we don't have to spend separate marketing budgets on the logistics. Second of all, because we have become quite good at it. Our churn on the couriers is much lower, of course, than when these couriers are independent, and the service levels are simply better. We give the couriers training. We even wash the jackets every day, believe it or not. They use e-bikes. We have hubs. Today, I saw on Twitter that apparently we have showers at the hubs. I didn't realize, but I've learned something today. If you take better care of your people, you're going to get better output. I think that's the simple answer. On top of it, of course, we don't have any court cases. I think that saves a lot of money. You've seen that disclosure sometimes with our competitors that they actually have to reserve hundreds of millions of euros on court cases. To the investment case in the U.S., can't comment too much, of course, on that. We essentially do the same thing everywhere, right? We don't have a different strategy in the U.K. than we have in Germany. People sometimes think that we do have the different strategy. It's the same thing. We have the largest logistical network in Germany. We have the largest logistical network in Holland. Similarly, in many of our other countries, we are also the largest logistical network. I think it's time for people to accept that we are also a logistical player, and we're actually quite good at it. Jörg just explained it. We have very quick delivery, very high service levels, and that is recognized by all the chains on our network. We did 55 million deliveries ourselves in the Q4 of the last year. You cannot do that without decent technology. Your technology needs to be top-notch, because otherwise it's going to go wrong 55 million times. I'm pretty sure we would not have any customers left if that would be the case. To your subscription model question, I think that's more for U.S. and Canada. In Europe, we are the cheapest, unless you order crazy amounts of times in a month. We should also be able to undercut everybody that is offering a subscription model. In the end, the subscription models are not per se good for these businesses, because it will remove a lot of the delivery fees from the high frequency customers. I don't think there's a lot to gain there. We just want to have the best offer for the general population. Again, we're after 70% of the population. We're not after some hipsters in the inner city centers. Perfect. That's very clear. Could you just recap, when do you expect the Grubhub EGM to take place, and when do you think, as it stands now, the Grubhub deal likely to close as it stands? Only that we have a timeline over the next few weeks. Yeah. We can't provide you a detailed timeline, Marcus, that will come when the F-4 will be published. Both the general meeting of the Grubhub holders, as well as completion, is anticipated in the first half of 2021. Unfortunately, I can't provide any further guidance there. Okay. Thanks, guys. Yep, you're welcome. The next question comes from the line of Wim Gille from ABN AMRO – ODDO BHF. Please go ahead. Yes, very good morning. I have two questions left. First of all, on the U.K. If I look at slide 23, you show that the gross profit per order in the U.K. plunged from about EUR 3 to EUR 2 per order on the back of a surge in own delivery. Assuming that the marketplace does EUR 3 per order, this implies you actually lose about EUR 1 per order on delivery. Also taking into account that McDonald's, in the Q4, had a relatively large share of the logistics pie in the Q4, which basically is the worst mix that you can have. How should I look at this going forward? Is this EUR 1 loss a good indication for 2021 on a logistics basis? The second question is, even if we increase own delivery to roughly 50% of your orders next year, that means that you will have to invest an additional EUR 100 million in own delivery, and you made already in the second half, about EUR 83 million in profitability in the U.K. Mathematically, it becomes quite difficult for me to push you towards a situation that you're actually loss-making in the U.K. in 2021. Can you maybe comment on whether I'm missing something here or whether it is indeed relatively likely that you will be profitable on an Adjusted EBITDA base in the U.K.? The second question is on slide 24, where you talk about gross profit in own delivery. Obviously, that's nice gross profit, but in the end of the story, there's also a lot of operating expenses associated to own delivery. Rolling out hubs, recruiting couriers, and a lot of other OpEx that you do specifically for the logistics part. Can you give us a bit of an estimation how much per order you have to spend in OpEx just to keep the machine running? Thanks for the question. I will first start answering it, and then I will just refer to Jörg, who has more knowledge of this matter. Just to be very clear, we did several things in the U.K. First of all, we increased the amount of really popular restaurants on the Just Eat network. We did that both for marketplace and for logistics. A lot of what we've done has increased the amount of logistical orders simply because we have more offering. That does not necessarily dent the economics too much if you charge enough. That's something that we have done also in Germany and Holland. That's not dissimilar. We've added all these restaurants. Of course, it took us four years in Germany and Holland, and now we're doing it in a couple of months. Hence the reaction that you see also on that margin. Don't forget, though, if somebody comes in for McDonald's, or better, if somebody becomes a Just Eat customer again because of McDonald's, don't forget, our customers are ordering, I don't know exactly the number for the U.K., but it's around 13x a year. If these customers come back, they place a McDonald's order and they stick around, they're also going to place 12 other orders that they haven't placed yet. They're going to do that in the future. This dip that you see is because we simply added almost 1,000 McDonald's stores to the website all at once. We didn't do it over the course of a couple of years. It was all at once. We actually, by doing that, created a lot more additional orders, and we attracted a lot more additional customers. A lot of that dip will actually come back by itself. On top of it, we said, "Well, actually, this is a good moment for us, a pandemic, to get our customers back." We remember, the merger between Takeaway.com and Just Eat happened in April last year. To get the customers back that Just Eat lost to the logistical players. That is now happening by droves. This is also what you see in that margin. Don't forget though, there's a lot of space between our delivery fees currently, sometimes free, and the delivery fees of the logistical competitors. Those are GBP 4, GBP 5 per order. There's a lot of space in between there. Again, Jörg already pointed at it. We're actually quite close to the gross profit neutral level in Germany with a EUR 1 delivery fee. I don't think that the situation in the U.K. is dramatically different. I, of course, realize that these seem like pretty hefty investments, but you have to look at the result of the investments. We are looking at the 88% growth rate in the U.K. Our logistical business is as large as the number three in the U.K. It is growing 600%. That is the result of the investment program. Are the economics always going to look like this in the U.K.? No. You can see it even in Holland. If we open new cities, our margin drops. Why? We open new cities, we have no orders, efficiency is pretty bad until those cities get a lot of orders and the efficiency improves. Look, it doesn't really matter where we open Scoober. The result is always the same. We usually become the largest logistical player in the city. The efficiency is there because it's in a city, and we are large everywhere in our territory. The efficiency for us is a given. We know we're going to be able to get there. As you also can see by looking at the gross profit lines, there's even a little bit more space in the U.K. to play with, compared to Holland and Germany. Again, we're also improving the marketplace business by doing this. We get customers in, they place orders with the marketplace. Marketplace is highly profitable. Don't forget, we're also getting that income. The growth that we see in the U.K. is across the board. It's not only with logistics. On top of it, we do expect a material decline of competitive pressure in the U.K. because of the end of the pandemic. You've seen a bunch of our competitors coming out with very low growth figures for this year. That's the same thing as what we're telling you. It's the end of the pandemic. That's in our favor. Jörg, you can add? To your second question, how much actually is below the gross profit line? You're right. Actually, there is quite some cost below the gross profit line, which might not be in the marketplace. We are not actually specifying that detail of the cost breakdown. To give you a bit of a feel for it, what we published a few years back when we actually acquired the Foodora business in Germany, that on a gross profit level, they were just about slightly negative. I think it was about less than EUR -1 per order, on a gross profit level, and on the EBITDA level, it was about EUR -7. That included also allocation on marketing, for example, and basically all sort of costs, not only the costs which are purely related to logistics. Obviously, we now have quite some more scale. That gets us back again to the scale point, because given we are so large and we can scale, to a certain extent, like the other competitors, actually also like across way more orders. I think the more important point even is, if you look at how we were dealing with the increase in logistics in Germany and Netherlands in the past, despite actually significantly increasing the logistics share over the last couple of years, we were actually able to every year improve the EBITDA on the bottom line. I think that's the most important. Actually, we're driving top line also through adding logistics. Those customers come in. Pieter was already saying they're a huge source of new customers, the logistics orders. People are also ordering with our marketplace business. In the end, we were always able to increase in an absolute amount. Thank you very much. The next question comes from the line of Sherri Malek from RBC Capital Markets. Please go ahead. Hi. Good morning. Thank you for taking my questions. I have three, please. Firstly, what do you think will be the catalyst for industry rationalization? There continues to be plenty of funding available and investor support for growth over profitability. I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on how long that will last. Secondly, it would be helpful to hear how you think about the makeup of order growth this year between customer acquisition and order frequency, considering that the latter is likely to be impacted by the reopening of restaurants. Finally, just to follow up on the point that the U.K. gross profit per order could return to historical levels long term. Could you explain how we get there when delivery penetration will increase, commission rates have matured for marketplace, and the tailwind from higher basket sizes this year will partly unwind? Perhaps put more simply another way, how much is down to improving drop rates or density versus increasing the delivery fee? Thank you. Thanks. I will defer the last question to Jörg. Regarding the order frequency question, we don't expect that to drop. We expect that to increase. The order frequency for us hasn't materially increased during the pandemic, a little bit faster than usual, but it always goes up year-on-year. What has happened, though, is that we have a far bigger group of high-frequency users. I think that's important. That just means that people have changed their lifestyle, and that is actually causing most of our growth. It's not the order frequency. I don't believe that that will drop in the year. I also don't believe that the high-frequency users will all of a sudden think, "Well, that was a lot of fun. I'm going to stop ordering now." They will also stay. I think the first question was more the same as the last. Help me out. No, the situation in relation to the industry rationalization. The industry. Yeah. Okay. I think that's an interesting question because usually, there's a lot of value being created by food delivery platforms. In this case, though, we've said before about the logistical business. Look at the competition that we had in Germany. It just left, and it created a EUR 50 million write-off for that business. It wasn't sold to anybody. It was worth EUR 0. I think that sounds maybe a little bit scary for investors, but apparently, we are in a business that can either be worth a lot of money or nothing. With marketplace, you don't have that problem. Marketplace always is a business that will yield this money. I think it's more difficult with logistics. Sorry. Your guess is as good as mine. I'm personally not that much focused on consolidation. It would not be possible for us in most cases because we're just too big. You see our market share in all these markets. I can't give you a clear answer on what the horizon is for other players. I think it will be very difficult. You've seen, of course, that we know roughly how to create good EBITDA in all our markets. You've seen the examples of Holland and Germany. You know what the reason is that we are less profitable now in the U.K. Again, we said that that is a temporary issue. Yeah, it doesn't work that way for logistics in Europe. You have to be really big to get some sort of a margin out of it. As far as I can tell, Just Eat Takeaway.com is the only company that's really big in most of these markets. I think that's very complicated, and I can't answer that question. Jörg, if you would. With regard to the third one, we have made the deliberate choice to actually invest into, especially here on the logistics part, and therefore, to actually take into account the level. We actually want to go for market share, which in the end will provide us with a market position that we're actually able to generate a decent profit on the whole business, in the long run, and a sustainable profit, which we will then generate. How do you get back to this? In the end, it's a mix. No? It's a mix of the commissions we charge to the restaurants, the pricing towards the consumers, and the utilization and efficiencies, how you run your business. On the commissions, like I said, it's always a choice how much you charge to your customer, in this case, the restaurant partners. Similarly to the pricing, no? We've deliberately chosen on price leadership to actually fuel the business and network effect to be later in a position to have a stronger market share position. Last point on utilization and efficiencies, you can also significantly, even without technology, increase your utilization and efficiencies. One of the biggest drivers to actually improve that is by shrinking your radius, which has an exponential impact on the drivers, but also, it will decrease your orders. Basically, all three things which are mentioned in the mix will decrease your orders. Because the pricing towards consumer will do so, commissions charged to restaurants, you might not get some of the restaurants you want to get, and utilization if you shrink your radius also. We're actually making now here a deliberate choice to invest in the market, but we will be able to go back to more normal levels, if we feel it's the time to do so. Great. Thank you very much. That's helpful. Thank you. The next question comes from the line of Rob Joyce from Goldman Sachs. Please go ahead. Hey, guys. Sorry. Hello. My own technical issues there. Just three from me. Firstly, just so I understand, you're saying that you think EUR 3 an order, across your business, is structurally achievable. Within that, I guess you're saying with a EUR 4 delivery fee, you think with a fully employed rider model, you can get gross profit per order up to that sort of EUR 2- EUR 3 level you're seeing in Germany and Netherlands today. Second one, Oh, sorry. If I may interrupt, that would be the current state of affairs. We're obviously not at the end state of the rollout of logistics. Currently you would be right. We are counting on things becoming a lot better. Okay. Do you think on the current state of affairs, you could get to that EUR 2-EUR 3 level, but you think it could even go beyond that if you get into better shape? Look, you see that we're improving our business every year, right? It would be surprising to us if we become worse next year. Your question also implied that you're going to charge EUR 4 to a German, no? That was what you were saying, which also might be more hypothetical at this time. Okay. Yeah. Understood. If the consumer is willing to pay that EUR 4, the gross profit per order is above that EUR 2 level. Okay. Second one, just to get an idea. Sorry if I missed this on Australia, I guess, where we've got the best evidence of the market opening up. On like-for-like restaurants, core logistics restaurants that have now been on the platform for one year or so, have you seen a big change in behavior to consumers towards those restaurants? It's probably the best indicator we have. Then the final one, just a conceptual one, which I'm still trying to juggle with. What to you is the difference between acquiring customers with free delivery effectively, so loss-making delivery versus acquiring them with a voucher? Let me take the last one. I'll give the first one to Jörg. The difference between free delivery and a voucher. The difference is that when people come to our website, they are looking for something to eat. This might be McDonald's or it might be marketplace, or it might be a nice salad or something else. They do it because at that point in time, they want something to eat, and they want it in 30 minutes. That's why they come to the website. If I start giving out EUR 5 vouchers or EUR 10 vouchers, or even I see that in the case of competitors, EUR 50 vouchers, you are essentially handing out free food. Now you're not competing with the same moment at which people really want to order something. You are competing with the supermarket because now you can eat for free, or you can choose to cook something yourself. Well, that's an easy one for everybody, right? We can pretend that the competition is not spreading vouchers, but they are, and everybody knows it, and you get one every week. It is nonsense. It's a complete waste of money, and it is inflating the orders. You can also see, and we provided the graphs, if you stop doing it, then your orders are gone. What are you creating? You're not creating anything. You're creating a good valuation for yourself. That's the difference with free delivery. Just make sure that everyone understands that if you want a good price point, and marketplace already is a lot cheaper than logistics, you have to go to Just Eat. If you want to, let's say, sponsor somebody else and pay GBP 5 for your delivery, you have to go elsewhere. That's an easy solution outside of the London city. There's an easy choice for most Brits. Yeah. With regards to Australia, we have actually seen a significant acceleration in growth rates. Like always, it's always a bit hard to differentiate what has what impact. Obviously, throughout the whole legacy Just Eat organization, which we believe was underinvested, we invest in quite a significant amount of money now in terms of choice, marketing, logistics, price leadership. Now in Australia, that has fueled growth, but we cannot see any deceleration of growth given people are now able to go to restaurants again. Okay. Very clear. Thank you very much. The next question comes from the line of Andrew Ross from Barclays. Please go ahead. Great. Thanks. Thanks for squeezing me in at the end of a bit of a marathon. I've got two. First one is just to clarify your commentary on EBITDA at a group level for this year. You said that the Q4 loss was the right run rate. Can you just clarify what the Q4 loss was? If we work with EUR -20 to EUR -25 on EBITDA, i.e., EUR -100 for the year for 2021, is that a sensible kind of set of assumptions? That's the first question. Then the second one is about London. You've obviously made good progress on signing up chains. There's a lot of orange bikes everywhere. Can you just fill us in about the strategy of signing up independent delivery restaurants? How long do you think it takes to get to a point of parity with your delivery competition all in terms of supply, such that for Londoners, you're competing both on inventory and clearly on price? Thanks. Let me answer that second question. On supply, we're already at par with the number two in London, and we're on our way to try to overtake the number three. I am going to put down, let's say, a couple of months to get there. First question is yours. Andrew, as you know, the half year EBITDA was EUR 177 million. In the Q3, we said we produced healthy EBITDA and people asked what is healthy. We said sort of same of run rate as H1. Add another EUR 90 million to that EUR 177 million, and you know the full year figure of EUR 256. That will imply a negative run rate on Q4, or not run rate, but EUR -15, EUR -20. If you would annualize that for 2021, you will get to the right number. That's somewhere, call it EUR -60, EUR -80 on EBITDA. Very helpful. Thank you. The next question comes from the line of Silvia Cuneo from Deutsche Bank. Please go ahead. Thank you. I just have a couple of questions left for thinking about the medium term. The first is on this Scoober rollout. I see that as of December, service was available in about 140 cities in 12 markets. Do you have any thoughts you can share in terms of where you see these numbers evolving? The second question is on the 2020 user cohort. Can you please provide some color on how this compares with previous years, for example, in terms of demographics or geography, and where do you see the user penetration evolving from 13% currently? Thank you. Thanks. I think if you look at the Scoober rollout, you need to assume that we're going to have Scoober in place in the whole of Europe. In some countries, it will move really quick, like Italy. In other countries, it will take some time because of the size of those businesses or because of technical requirements. We should be only with Scoober at some point in the future in Europe. It's different for Canada, it's different for Australia, but that's the way we are looking at it. How many cities that will be? I have no idea. A couple of hundred, I guess. Loads of them, at least. If you look at the demographic of the new users, yeah, it's the whole population. It doesn't really matter to us what your age is or where you're from. You're a customer, end of story. Yeah, the penetration needs to go up to 70%-80% in all the countries. Take a country like Poland, it's only 10%, but their business is already quite large. If the penetration would be the same level as Holland, Poland would be bigger than Holland, for instance. A lot bigger. Yeah, that's the way we look at it. Maybe you want to add something, Jörg? That's right. Nothing really to add from my side. Okay. The next question comes from the line of Marc Hesselink from ING. Please go ahead. Yes. Thank you. I have two questions left. First question is on the profitability in the former Takeaway footprint in Germany and the Netherlands. Given that you didn't have to do the repair, I found the operational leverage a little bit less than I expected in the second half of the year. Normally the advice that you have been investing a bit more, is that the case and in what areas, and to drive what exactly? The second question is on the headquarter cost. This is also an area we've been investing more, and I think it was also the guidance that would also continue to be more in the coming quarters. Is that to just justify a larger organization, including also growth in the coming quarters and the acquisition of Grub? What kind of investments are you making in there which should benefit the entire group? Thank you. I will defer the last question to Brent. Regarding your question of the investment in the legacy Takeaway businesses, we have rolled out a significant number of Scoober cities in Holland, for instance, in the second half year. We're now available in almost 40 cities, and we have an unrivaled delivery network in Holland. That, of course, if you open hubs, we're talking real estate, we're talking buildings, jackets, e-bikes, et cetera, that costs money. Again, those impacts you see with those rollouts are always temporary because there will be orders related to those investments. With respect to the headquarter expenses, you've seen that although it increased compared to 2019, if you look at H1, H2 2020, it remained more or less the same. The delta between 2019 and 2020 is fully caused by increase of staff. Well, that staff is certainly to support the bigger organization. Currently, we believe that it will remain relatively stable. Talking about when Grubhub would be added, I'm sure that on the short term, it will increase because also they have headquarter staff. We will certainly also have to invest in, for example, U.S. requirements, particularly like SOX, which is quite demanding for an organization like us who do not have to be SOX-compliant today and have to be it from end of next year. That will require an investment. At the same time, we believe it will remain relatively modest. This year, you've seen that it remained relatively stable. Next year, it will certainly increase, but we try to keep it as low as possible. So far, I believe that it is at a satisfactory level. Great. Thank you. There are no further questions in the queue, so I will hand the call back to your host for any closing remarks. Well, thank you for the many questions that we have received today. I'd like to round off this analyst investor call by thanking you for participating. Should you have any additional questions or remarks, please reach out to our investor relations team. Thank you. Bye-bye. Thank you for joining today's call. You may now disconnect your-