Good afternoon, everybody, and good morning to those of you in North America. I would like to welcome you to the 2021 Just Eat Takeaway.com Capital Markets Day. We had hoped to welcome you in person to this event, but unfortunately, the ongoing pandemic and travel restrictions for many of the people that would be interested to participate changed our plans, and we need to do this from a studio in Amsterdam. I am Jitse Groen. I am the founder and CEO of the company. Thank you for taking the time to join us for what is a really important session and something we have been looking forward to for quite a long time. There has been a lot of change in the company over the last year. We are now seven times larger than in March 2020 in terms of GTV. As you well know, we have completed two major transactions. Therefore, now is the perfect time to present our latest thoughts on the company to you and how we plan to drive growth and shareholder value over the next period. Overall, we plan to use the next few hours to set out to you why we are so excited about the future of Just Eat Takeaway.com. In the last 21 years, we have built a fantastic business, which we believe is extremely well-placed to enjoy further long-term profitable growth as the industry continues to develop. Let me introduce you to the speakers here today who we will take through the presentation. They will be Brent Wissink, our CFO; Jörg Gerbig, our Chief Operating Officer; Maurine Alma, our Chief Marketing Officer; Andrew Kenny, the Managing Director of our U.K. business; and Adam DeWitt, the CEO of Grubhub, our U.S. business. Brent, Jörg, and I are well known to most of you, I assume. Maurine, Andrew, and Adam will provide a short introduction to themselves at the beginning of their sections of the presentation. On slide three, we have shared an overview of today's agenda and the structure of the presentation. I will take you through the first two sections myself, our vision and strategy for the group and our business model, including how we see the evolution of our hybrid model spanning both marketplace and delivery operations. Jörg will speak in more detail about the strategy for delivery as well as about our markets across the world, with Andrew Kenny covering the U.K. specifically and Adam DeWitt covering the U.S. I will then come back to talk about our product and tech in our innovation section, after which Jörg will discuss our expansion into convenience grocery delivery. Maurine Alma will cover our environment, social, and governance efforts. Brent will take over after that for our financials, including background on our longer-term targets and our revised presentation of our financial reporting, which we will introduce effective January 1st, 2022, alongside a bridge to our current segmentation for the full year 2021 results. The presentation is expected to take approximately two hours, with an hour set aside for Q&A. We will have two short breaks, one after the strategy section and one after the market section. There will also be two opportunities to ask questions after the last break and a final one at the end. Participants can submit their questions via the player by using the Ask a Question button. We might combine or bundle questions. Our vision is to empower every food moment. We help consumers get the food they love every day without having to worry about cooking, order their family takeaway on a Friday night, help them buy that morning coffee with JET Pay, order food in companies' canteens or on campus, or let them use our app in a restaurant to order food to the table. We help restaurant partners grow and become thriving businesses, not just by giving them access to a huge pool of consumers, but by helping them run their business even more effectively with fully integrated tech solutions such as POS systems, payment services, and marketing tools. Our vision is to be a part of every food moment by connecting consumers to local restaurants and food outlets through our platforms. We want to supply the technology that brings everything together, the consumers, the restaurants, and of course, our own delivery network. We want to be part of every food order, whether it be breakfast, lunch, dinner, or even a quick snack in between every day. We will now show a short video to illustrate this. [Presentation] You will, of course, have seen these metrics for us before. What I would like you to take away today is not only that we have a great global presence and exceptional scale, but also that we are fully focused on being the best in online food delivery. We are agnostic about the model we use across our businesses, whether marketplace, delivery, or a hybrid of the two. Simply put, consumers do not think about the method of delivery when they are making their order. It is our job to provide all restaurants for each of our nearly 100 million consumers across the world. The consumer, in the end, makes the choice whether the restaurant delivers the food or we deliver it. We began as a marketplace operator, and this remains a highly profitable and growing business for us. This foundation allows us to invest in and grow our delivery operations and expand into new channels, such as B2B and new verticals like convenience grocery. More on this in the next section of the presentation. Apart from the focus we have around the business model, we are also very much focused around the geographies in which we operate. We are not everywhere on the planet. We are very selectively only in markets in which we believe we can make significant profits, and we choose very carefully where we operate. To illustrate this, it is important to realize that approximately 90%, nine zero, of our GTV is in North America, the U.K. and Ireland, and in Northern Europe. More importantly, more than 80% of our GTV is generated in 5 countries only: the U.K., Germany, the U.S., Canada, and the Netherlands, and 3 of these 5 countries are already highly profitable, which makes the company unique in our sector. You should remember that we operate in a fairly new industry, and that there is still significant scope for growth, with penetration growing in all markets. Penetration of our brand is still low in most of our markets. The highest levels of penetration are the Netherlands and the U.K., where 40%, respectively 32% of the adult population use our services. We, however, are after circa 80% of the population, and in most countries, we are best placed to achieve that target. It is important to understand that the bigger the scale of the number 1, and the higher the overall penetration of a country, the more difficult it will become to overtake the market leader. In addition, consumers are ordering takeaway food more often. Monthly order frequency has strongly increased from 2.4x- 2.9x over the last two years. It is also notable that this increase continued in H1 2021, even as the effects of the pandemic began to subside and countries opened up. As an example, at 50% penetration and monthly order frequency of only 5, our business would be over 6x larger. While our online food delivery business already has a very significant scale, it is still early days in terms of penetration, and there is huge room for further growth across our markets for many years to come. This is an updated slide we've used many times to explain why we believe scale and market leading positions are so important. Just to recap, our business benefits from powerful network effects, which are self-reinforcing and fuel our continued growth. We believe that offering the broadest selection of restaurants will continue to draw consumers to our websites and mobile apps. Due to the broad variety, these consumers continue to return more often and order more frequently every year, leading to a multiplier effect on our orders. Because of how network effects work in food delivery, the two major factors influencing future growth are new consumer additions, which are usually greatest for the local market leader, and also new restaurant additions, which again, are also usually greatest for the local market leader. The numbers are very large. As at H1 2021, we had over 98 million active consumers who placed more than 1 billion orders over the last 12 months from our 588,000 restaurant partners. A clear indicator of our success is the cohort data across our group. This chart covers all the markets outside of the U.S. Adam will specifically address the U.S. cohorts later in the presentation. First of all, let me walk you through the basics of food delivery cohorts. These are generally the same everywhere on the planet. It is crucial to understand that most of the orders for any food delivery company are from existing customers. These consumers are highly recurring and order more frequently over time. Theoretically, therefore, if a food delivery company doesn't spend any money on marketing, it would still grow. The battle in food delivery is therefore only around winning new consumers, and the ability to gain new consumers, in turn, is a function of scale. Having said that, we have made extraordinary progress in the last year. The first thing I would like to point out is that our consumers have become far more loyal. You can see that in all the cohorts, we have more consumers returning and ordering more frequently. Especially the 2020 consumers have a very high return rate. You can see that if you compare the light blue color on the slide between 2020 and the half year in 2021, in which our 2020 consumers already ordered almost as much as in the entire year 2020. You can see in the incredible improvement of all the cohorts that we have regained a lot of consumers that left Just Eat in the U.K. as a result of Just Eat not adding enough restaurant supply before we came in. You will probably remember that before the merger, we talked a lot about reducing churn in Just Eat, as we made the analysis that that was the biggest problem for the brand. The increasing orders from these older cohorts indicate that we have been highly successful at reducing the churn. This chart, of course, also includes the legacy Takeaway.com, I encourage you to look at the U.K. cohorts that Andrew will disclose later in the presentation. The effect of consumers returning to Just Eat is very visible on this graph. Rest assured, though, that we have seen this happen in many legacy Just Eat countries, such as Australia. Lastly, if you look at the dark blue color on this slide, you will notice that just like in the year 2020, we will add a record number of new consumers this year. As I said before, the capability of a food delivery platform to add new consumers depends on its scale. We are adding far more new consumers than our competitors in most of our markets, and because we are already the largest in most cases, I think it's not so difficult to understand why we expect the gap with our competitors to only become larger. I want to spend some time to talk about the crucial elements of our strategy. Firstly, we take a very long-term view of our business. We invest to maintain and expand market leadership in our target markets. We believe these market leadership positions will drive the strong network effects that characterize the food delivery sector and will enable us to grow efficiently and be sustainably profitable over the long term. We are in an investment phase currently, most obviously in the U.K., but also in a number of other countries in our portfolio. Most of these investments are around restaurant supply and the rollout of a bigger delivery network. Because as I explained before, new user addition is so important to expand our leadership, we continue to enhance brand awareness across countries to always be top of mind of the consumer. We do such things through, for instance, television spots and outdoor billboarding, but also via long-term partnerships such as our Champions League sponsorship. We enhance our consumer and restaurant experience through best-in-class tech and product. We will show you a couple of the exciting things we have been working on later in this presentation. We are continuously working on improving the profitability of our proven hybrid model by leveraging powerful network effects. We are extending our delivery operations and are continuously working on driving efficiency by increasing our tech, operational efficiency, and our density. On top of that, we are further expanding our market through convenience grocery. Jörg will talk about that later on. Lastly, we pursue a disciplined portfolio management approach on which Brent will elaborate. We have a very strong and diverse bench of management talent across the group, well beyond the presenters you see here today. We run the business via a European-style management board and a highly committed Executive Committee. As per the 1st of December, the MB comprises of myself, Brent as our CFO, and Jörg as the COO. We have over 42 combined years of experience in the sector. The ExCo comprises a further 10 members with a cumulative experience of more than 60 years in the online food delivery sector. Our senior leadership community that meets on a regular basis consists of circa 165 people who are responsible for either countries or functions. Our business is very international, with many different nationalities in our top management teams alone. Excluding the couriers and the delivery network, we have more than 18,000 colleagues that put all their efforts into building the best online food delivery website on Earth. Of course, for a technology company, product innovation is at the core of our future success. We have more than 2,000 people working across our product engineering and tech teams in multiple locations on the planet. A critical element underpinning our growth is our hybrid marketplace and delivery model. Simply put, it benefits both consumers and our restaurant partners and enables us to offer the broadest selection, thereby driving positive network effects. For consumers, a benefit of the marketplace is that we offer the broadest selection of restaurants available, including local heroes and popular QSRs such as Domino's Pizza and many more. Very important also, food from marketplace restaurants is usually at a much lower price point than food from delivery restaurants. I am talking about food price here and not about delivery fees. The benefits for restaurants are also clear. We expand the pool of consumers, provide a huge addition of orders, provide access to new tech and marketing capabilities that these restaurants typically wouldn't have, and offer lower commission versus delivery. The benefits of our delivery network to consumers are a wider selection of brands and other full-service restaurants, typically premium food, poke bowls, salad bars, sushi places, but also QSRs. We also offer a premium delivery experience, including super fast delivery and food tracking. I should note, though, that we are also currently in the process of launching the exact same tracking for Marketplace. We will talk about this in the innovation section. For restaurant partners, the key benefit is accessing a far larger consumer base than they have ever been able to do without us. Depending which type of restaurant, whether local or large chain, we take care of areas they do not want, or they don't need to take care about. For the local restaurant, we bring technology and marketing capabilities they could never develop. For the QSR or chain, we bring fulfillment capabilities they do not want to own or manage. Of course, for us, consumers who join our company searching for any of the restaurants we offer, then have ability to access our fantastic range of high-quality meals they can order in the same way on the same app. As a result, we have a significant competitive advantage in delivery through our hybrid model. Our marketplace business is very profitable on an underlying basis and allows us to invest in the delivery network for the long term. We have higher density in our markets because of our large consumer base, which allows us to deliver increasing operational efficiencies. We also have the ability to offer competitive delivery fees to consumers, allowing us to provide the broader selection at an attractive price point and to take share from our competitors. Our delivery operations are already profitable in the U.S., of course, excluding fee caps, and Canada. We are getting very close in countries like Poland and Germany, and we will also get there in the U.K. Jörg will speak about this later in the presentation. Let me take you through a couple of specific examples here. Germany is the most profitable food delivery platform on the planet. We have nationwide coverage, but we also operate a fully hybrid, meaning marketplace and delivery model, in close to 70 German cities in which we provide a huge variety of local heroes and all of the QSRs. You can see here that we have consistently grown the user base, the revenue, and the adjusted EBITDA over the past 13 years. The Netherlands follows exactly the same pattern. It is one of the most profitable food delivery businesses on Earth, and it is also a hybrid, offering, in essence, almost all the restaurants in the country. This business, too, is unrivaled, while most of the competitors that we face in other countries have been active in the Netherlands for many years. Our Canadian business is almost entirely delivery only, and it is one of the few profitable delivery businesses on the planet. It follows exactly the same pattern as Germany and the Netherlands. Again, the thing to look at in these markets is scale as a function of the population, not the underlying delivery model. The point of these examples is that the same team that has created the very few highly profitable food delivery platforms on the planet has just doubled the size of the largest food delivery business in Europe, namely the U.K., and will return that business to profitability. I will now hand over to Jörg. Thank you, Jitse. My name is Jörg Gerbig. I am the Chief Operating Officer of JET and founder of Lieferando, which has developed into the market-leading business in Germany. I will now expand further on Jitse's comments. In particular, I will elaborate on why delivery is key to our strategy and how it will be profitable for us at scale. I will also explain how we were able to build and expand market leadership positions across our markets. We have been investing heavily in our delivery operations for several years and have achieved much in this time. Our delivery operation is one of the largest last-mile delivery businesses globally, with almost 500,000 couriers. In the last 12 months, we were delivering EUR 10.8 billion in gross transaction value from our partners to the consumers. The investment in our infrastructure has allowed us to support incredible growth in this area. Delivery-based orders growth was 112% in H1 2021 over the same period of 2020. We've already reached profitability in some of our geographies where we are established at scale, most notably in Canada, where we are a full or almost full logistical player and are EBITDA positive. Let me take you on a journey and show you the operations that we've built over the last couple of years in this video. [Presentation] As you have seen, delivery is key to our success. A critical factor when deploying our delivery model in our different markets is our adherence to local employment laws. We believe we lead the food delivery industry in this area, and we will continue to do so. There are various differences across the markets, and we apply the most suitable delivery model. As you can see from the map on the right-hand side of the page, our businesses are already aligned to these local frameworks, and associated costs are baked into our guidance and long-term planning. This includes that we have rolled out the employed courier model across most of continental Europe by now. As a pioneer in this space, we have optimized the employment model over the last couple of years. Despite some higher costs to us, the employment model provides a superior consumer experience to quality and reliability of the service, courier retention, and last-mile visibility. Speaking of consumer experience and quality of service, we are constantly monitoring our service levels. Here, you see our fulfillment times compared to our competitors in our largest markets. These were gathered by a reputable third-party provider across Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 cities. We are very proud of our couriers' efforts and commitment to achieve great quality of service and performance in delivering their food to our consumers. In the U.S. and Canada, we are the fastest. That is particularly worth noteworthy given most of the orders in both countries run with our own logistics and logistics is profitable in both countries. In U.K., there's a more mixed picture. Overall, we are second fastest nationally, but outside of London, in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, we are the fastest. This is driven by our scale in cities and regions outside of London. It is worth pointing out that the rollout in London is yet to be complete, and therefore, the operational performance in London will improve going forward. In Germany, we are highly competitive, equal or within two minutes of our peers in terms of fulfillment times. This reflects the huge investments into logistics in Germany and the progress we made over the last couple of years. As we continue to optimize our delivery operations, we expect to improve our delivery times further. On the following slide, we show the gross profit of our already profitable Canadian logistics business on the left-hand side and the gross profit of the German logistics business on the right-hand side. The markets are structurally different, driven by various factors, including, amongst others, employment type and tipping culture. Turning to Canada on the left, the X-axis shows the number of orders by delivery zone, whereas the Y-axis highlights our profitability per order. As you can see, the more orders we fulfill, the less profit variance you have. Once we reach a certain scale, orders in all zones are profitable. Turning to Germany at the right-hand side. As a reminder, in Germany, we employ our couriers. This, combined with the differences in consumer behavior laid out earlier, impacts our cost per order beyond the operational benefits from the model. As clearly visible on the right-hand side chart, subscale cities in Germany are least profitable, while larger cities are close to or already are profitable. It is worth noting that the average delivery fee in Germany is currently below EUR 1.50, which is about a third of the delivery fees charged in the U.S. by our competitors. We expect to achieve further operational efficiencies and pricing optimizations. For reference, if these achievements were to improve the business by EUR 2 per order, more than 80% of all orders, and therefore the overall logistics business in Germany, would be profitable. The next slide shows the U.K. logistics business and underlines our comments regarding the impact of density and scale on profitability and the operational improvements we've seen in the business. As visualized on the left-hand side chart, as zones mature and density increases, we achieve more efficiencies through learnings and scale. The cost variance decreases significantly, meaning we are able to plan and run the business more effectively. On the right-hand side, you can see the results of these improvements and the impact they've had on fulfillment. The graph excludes Scoober since it is still in rollout phase and therefore yet to be fully efficient. We were able to decrease the cost per order by 16% since January 2020, as order volumes and scale increased substantially. Even as the U.K. lifted all COVID restrictions in June 2021, we have been able to maintain fulfillment costs despite a lack of courier supply. As you've seen, we've already made great progress towards a profitable logistics business, and we have further levers to enhance this. The three main levers are revenue per order, couriers cost per order, and overhead and OpEx. Revenue per order is driven by increasing transaction values, optimizing consumer fees, and yielding improvements. Improvements in courier cost per order are mainly driven by scale and density, as well as tech innovation. In our markets, we typically have the leading market position, which brings the consumer density. This is critical to increase the number of drops our couriers can make per hour and reduce cost per drop. This picture is being enhanced by our use of technology. Among others, this will include enhanced demand management as well as optimized pooling of orders and focused efforts on reducing waiting times. Overheads and OpEx will be improved by automation and economies of scale. There's considerable operating leverage as we continue to increase volumes and revenues. We'll now have a short break of about eight minutes, so see you soon again. As laid out, delivery is key to our success and has supported us in building and expanding our market-leading positions around the world. [Break] In Europe, we have an unrivaled position. We have approximately 70% online share of online food delivery across all our markets where we have leadership positions, and in most cases, we are multiple times larger than the next largest player in the market. Over 95% of our gross transaction value in Europe is generated from countries where we have clear online market leadership, such as Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and Poland. Outside of Europe, we're number 1 in Canada, Australia, and Israel. iFood, in which we hold a 33% minority stake, is clear number 1 in Brazil, multiple times larger than the number 2 player. Given the importance we attach to market leadership positions, we've developed a clear strategy to build scale and network effects in our targeted markets. We focus our investments on three strategic pillars. First, network effects always start with the supply. We have focused around supply expansion and increasing our delivery footprint throughout our logistical rollout. Second, we are driving brand awareness by investing into share of voice. Third, having the consumer experience and value proposition at the core of everything we do. On the following slides, we will dive deeper into these three pillars. Let's start with the first one, supply expansion. We want to have all the supply, including QSRs and independent restaurants, as choice is the key driver for creating demand. Our focused investment in sales has allowed us to grow the number of restaurants on our platform by almost 3x in three years, from 209,000 in 2018 to 588,000 in 2021. We have strong partnerships with a huge number of local restaurants on our marketplace, as well as a number of the largest global chains, including the brands visible on the right-hand side, as well as high street chains such as Pret A Manger, Greggs, and Leon. These partnerships drive huge volumes of consumer orders through our business, which helps drive the network effects we've outlined earlier in the presentation. The second pillar of our playbook is to drive brand awareness. Our brand awareness is fundamental to the success of the business. Top of mind brand awareness asks consumers for the first brand that comes to their mind when asked which delivery provider they think of first. We focus on top of mind brand awareness, given the ordering food delivery is mostly an impulsive decision, which means you need to be top of mind of the consumer when he's hungry. To take our major European markets as an example, as you can see from the chart, we enjoy the highest top of mind brand awareness, which is in most cases multiple times higher than of competition. Our Euro 2020 sponsorship was a major success. It positioned our brand as a leading consumer brand and provided the foundation for our ongoing role with UEFA competitions, including the Men's and Women's Champions League, having signed a deal through to 2025. We'll now show you a short video on this. [Presentation] Last, we also want our leadership to translate into a best-in-class experience for our consumers. As an example how consumers experience our product, we looked at the ranking of our app in the U.K. and Germany. In both countries, we always rank number one in our consumers' assessment of user experience of our app, irrespective of Android or iOS. This picture is similar across most of our markets, and we will continue to be a key source of focus for our technology teams. Jitse will elaborate further on technology later. Moving on to slide 33 to look at a few specific examples of our markets and how we've been able to leverage network effects to build on our market share and increase the gap to competition. Looking at our major profit pools in the Netherlands, Germany, and Canada, markets which we expect to continue to support our long-term growth and profitability. In Germany, in the first nine months of this year, we added more than 40 million incremental orders versus last year, far more than all of our competitors combined. In Canada, the market remains highly competitive, but we've been able to widen the absolute gap in 2021. It is worth noting that our competition in Canada has already been around since 2015. In the Netherlands, our market position is very strong, and as you can see, we continue to outpace our competition despite the competitors having already entered in 2015 and 2016 respectively. They are not able to build significant scale. I will now hand over to Andrew, who will take you through the success we're having with our investment program in the U.K. Thank you, Jörg. A few brief words by way of introduction. My name is Andrew Kenny. I'm the U.K. Managing Director of Just Eat, and I've been at JET now for almost five years. I initially joined the business to run the sales and account management organization in the U.K., then later wider commercial functions before taking over the U.K. business a couple of years ago in 2019. During this time, we've seen tremendous change in our U.K. business. In particular, the rapid evolution in the last few years from essentially a marketplace business to a true hybrid offering across both delivery and own delivery. We've seen very strong growth in the U.K. market as a result of the additional investments that we've chosen to make since the completion of the Takeaway.com and Just Eat transaction in early 2020. These necessary investments have driven the top line of the business and have consolidated our strong leadership position, a position that had suffered some erosion in prior years through underinvestment. Essentially, our U.K. investments have been focused across three main areas. Firstly, scaling our logistics infrastructure on the back of rolling out all of the major QSRs and thousands of chains and local hero independents that require logistics. Secondly, price leadership, including investment across delivery fees and an up-weighted focus on the London market. Finally, sales and marketing. We've more than doubled our sales teams and have invested very significantly in our brand. As is clear from the chart on the left side, this investment in aggregate has delivered promising results with the order gap between our business and the two other major competitors widening further through 2021 to date. This chart is sourced from credit card data, but you can also see this widening order gap with the number 3 player in the reported numbers, of course. We've also managed to make significant headway in London, recapturing close to 10 points of market share that had been lost over a number of years. We have plenty more to do in this city, but are very encouraged by the progress that we have made to date. The chart on the right-hand side gives a sense of how our U.K. restaurant offering to consumers is unrecognizable to what it was just 18 months ago, with growth of 65% in total restaurants on the platform since January of 2020. This momentum, where signing velocity has continued this year, with year to date the overall estate growing by another fifth, with now 61,000 restaurants on the platform spread right across the country. In fact, our restaurant partners deliver to 95% of all U.K. postcodes over the last year. Although undoubtedly a big part of that restaurant estate growth has been weighted towards brands and independents that require our logistics, we've also seen a significant growth in new restaurants joining the platform and opting to do the delivery themselves on our marketplace, up almost 30% since the beginning of 2020. Even this year to date, we have seen low double-digit order growth in marketplace restaurants. The success of this investment program is ultimately clearest in the underlying drivers of that order growth that help us frame an encouraging picture of the behavior of consumers on our platform over the coming years. Our active customer base in the U.K. has swelled to over 18 million. We've added 4.4 million consumers since the merger. Even in recent months, as the U.K. has begun to return to normal, we've been very pleased with the continued trajectory around new customers. Importantly, our monthly order frequency, a number that had stubbornly flat-lined for a number of years, is up approximately 30% over the same period, and has also remained strong in 2021 to date as the U.K. has opened and relaxed its lockdown measures. In the final chart on the right, you can see that we are achieving a significantly higher proportion of new consumers placing a further order within six months. Perhaps most importantly, the result of what you've just seen plays out in a very promising way in our consumer cohorts that have fueled the growth of the business over the last 18 months and will fuel it going forwards. As you can see, between 2018 and 2019, the business was experiencing challenges on the back of a number of years of underinvestment in both the brand and the choice available to consumers, which resulted in a decline across most of our annual consumer cohorts. The result of these declines became evident in Q1 of 2020 when U.K. order growth dropped to a low single-digit percentage. This decline was reversed in 2020, and the growth accelerated meaningfully into 2021. This is driven by growth across a number of key consumer groups, which of course, have been influenced by consumer behavior changes that spawned during COVID, but have also grown as a consequence of our focus on choice, on marketing, and on price. Finally, as I mentioned before, one of the most important battles is about new customers, and I'm very pleased with our U.K. business's latest full-year cohort, as we've added a record number of new consumers in 2020, which given our very strong retention rates, makes me very optimistic about the prospects of our business going forward. Our substantial investments have, however, hit the profitability of the U.K. business as we knew they would. If we take the first half of 2021 on the left-hand side of the chart, you can see how costs per order were running above revenue per order in this period, and how this gap widened as we came into the summer. There are a few reasons for this. In the first half, our increased QSR business impacted our gross margins. Secondly, we invested significantly in price leadership, including free delivery in London and select other cities, as well as offering low delivery fees for key brands nationwide. Finally, we also invested heavily in sales and marketing, including our sponsorship of the delayed Euro 2020, and "Love Island" platforms. Some very material investments. What we are now seeing is that those losses have clearly peaked. This improvement has come from three main areas. On the revenue per order side, we've successfully begun to optimize consumer fee pricing. For example, we are no longer running free delivery campaigns on a citywide or national level. We've introduced a variable service fee on delivery, and we've made select other adjustments while still maintaining a highly competitive price leadership strategy. On the cost per order side, there are two key areas. Firstly, marketing spend has begun to normalize as we move away from peak summer spend on the sponsorship platforms that I just referenced. Secondly, we are starting to see efficiency improvements from both the network effects of the increased scale and consumer density in our business, as well as technological improvements that help drive efficiencies in our delivery and operations platform. On the back of this, we feel very confident that EBITDA is therefore on an upward trajectory. We are seeing that come through right now. Overall, to sum up, we are very pleased with the turnaround that we've executed over the past 18 months. We feel we are in a very strong position and have a lot of momentum now to continue to extend our leadership position in what is undoubtedly one of the most attractive markets for food delivery in the world. Looking forward, we are really focused on executing across three key areas: optimizing consumer pricing while maintaining our successful price leadership strategy, driving down delivery costs by improving efficiency in our delivery network while delivering a great consumer experience, and continuing to ensure that we have the best choice in the market by closing any gaps around key restaurant supply, as well as launching and scaling convenience grocery delivery. With that, I'll hand you over to Adam, who will take you through the next section of the presentation. Thank you. Thanks, Andrew. My name is Adam DeWitt. I am the CEO of Grubhub. Originally joined the business 10 years ago as a CFO. During my time at Grubhub, we've grown from EUR 250 million in GTV to more than EUR 10 billion, EUR 20 million in revenues to more than EUR 2 billion. Like JET, we started as a pure marketplace model. We have grown to profitably deliver most of our orders, close to 2/3 of our 700,000 orders every day. I'm excited to talk to you about the U.S. market a little more, focusing on our strong growth over the last couple of years, also on how and why our competitors have grown faster, and our plans for gaining back share. Even though our competitors have grown faster than us, particularly during the pandemic, we think it's important to highlight that Grubhub has never been stronger. We are a large, at-scale business that grew very rapidly during the pandemic. The U.S. market is one of the biggest markets in the world for online takeout. Our active diner base of 32 million diners is roughly half the total population of the U.K., and almost twice the total population of the Netherlands. The New York market alone has 20 million people in it. As I said earlier, annually our diners place more than 250 million orders, and generate GTV of more than EUR 10 billion. Our GTV is up approximately 80%, and our orders are up approximately 50% since 2019. In the last 18 months since we announced the merger with JET, we have had our greatest period of growth in many years, easily our greatest on a nominal basis ever. We are also encouraged by what we see in our diner cohorts. For one, as Jitse noted earlier, we are still early in the adoption of online ordering in the U.S. compared to other countries, so there are many more new diners out there. Second, for the most part, our cohorts have been stable over time. That said, similar to Just Eat prior to the Takeaway acquisition, as Andrew just walked us through, our cohorts from 2017 to 2019 have somewhat underperformed. We talked about the reasons behind this at length back when Grubhub was a standalone public company towards the end of 2019. A much longer story short, we under-invested in both restaurant supply and diner loyalty. We think that the churned and/or dormant diners from those 2017 to 2019 years will be a great source of future growth as our dramatically improved restaurant supply, compelling subscription program, leading logistics capabilities, and improved targeted marketing bring them back. That said, we are excited about what we are seeing in the behavior of U.S. diners as we emerge from the pandemic. Our most recently acquired diners are performing significantly better than diners acquired back in 2019 because of our better supply and Grubhub+ subscription loyalty program. Diners are sticking around longer and ordering more. Our new diners are 20%-30% more productive than they were in 2019, and trends continue to improve. As I mentioned earlier, in 2019, we talked about a need to invest in both restaurant supply and diner loyalty to drive consumer retention and frequency. We've made a ton of progress on both of those fronts. Heavily investing in sales, we have more than doubled our restaurant inventory in the last couple of years, including adding almost all popular QSRs in the platform. We now have over 300,000 partnered restaurants. We have grown our subscription loyalty program, Grubhub+, from zero to 2.5 million current members, and those subscribers now account for approximately 30% of all of our current orders. We love what we see in terms of retention and frequency from these subscription diners. I talked about the dramatic recent improvement in new diner behavior as a result on the last slide. We included this slide because it highlights something about the U.S. that is somewhat unique. Our markets, both big and small, are almost without exception, highly profitable on an underlying basis. We are only showing you our top 125 markets to make it easier to see, more than 98% of our volume is in markets where we are profitable on an incremental basis. As you can see, we have many markets that are highly profitable, even at small scale, and as a result, our non-stronghold market profits can support our focused incremental investment in our strongholds. In fact, assuming that fee caps are eliminated at some point, which I will talk about in a few minutes, we would be able to completely fund aggressive incremental investment in the U.S. strongholds entirely from U.S. operating cash, without the need for additional funding from JET's parent. While the business is strong and the opportunity is great, we also acknowledge it is facing two main challenges today. These have raised questions that we want to address. First, while we have grown during the pandemic, our competitors grew faster because the demand surge in online ordering came disproportionately in the suburbs and particularly from QSRs. Diners were forced to stay home. Dining rooms and takeout counters were closed. Our competitors had greater presence in the suburbs and better QSR inventory. As a result, we lost market share and are fighting from behind our U.S. competitors in many markets. Second, we are facing an economic headwind in fee caps, arbitrary price controls introduced in many U.S. cities in the second quarter of 2020 during the height of the pandemic. Because of our leadership position and significant volume in N.Y., the city with the most aggressive fee caps, we are affected disproportionately relative to our peers. Among the approximately 100 cities and counties that imposed fee caps linked to the pandemic, the vast majority have now removed them or will expire shortly, with a few exceptions, such as N.Y. and San Francisco, that I'll talk about. We believe the fee cap-related losses peaked in the first half of 2021, as many of the caps expired, but they continue to have a significant impact on our business, particularly in New York City. As we reported, we made positive adjusted EBITDA in the first half of 2021 of EUR 63 million, roughly $75 million excluding the impact of fee caps. We have a plan to address both and help us achieve long-term profitable growth, each of which I'll go into more detail on in a moment. We will increase and focus our investments in our strongholds. We're aggressively fighting the illegal fee caps and have already filed two related lawsuits. To drive long-term growth in our strongholds and throughout the country, we will roll out new verticals like convenience and focus on new products to help restaurants grow their online businesses. As mentioned earlier, during the pandemic, we saw volumes in suburbs grow significantly faster than the rest of the U.S. market. As I noted earlier, because of our QSR and broader restaurant inventory was less robust, we benefited less than peers by the surge in online demand in the suburbs. That said, we do believe some of the surge in suburban demand is temporary and will revert as people return to the cities and dining rooms as they become more full. People are slowly starting to return to these urban environments, our strongholds, where we maintain relatively high share. We have many attractive inner city markets with many pockets of relative strength within our biggest markets, New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philly, from which we can expand from. Finally, we are at scale in many markets, with more than 1 million orders a year in 40 markets throughout the U.S. This slide demonstrates that we are the clear leader in Manhattan and our market share is fairly stable, one of our strongholds that we plan to invest behind. It also reinforces my earlier comment that much of our decline in market share is a result of our competitors capturing outsized growth in the suburbs and other areas we have low penetration, and a lot less about us losing in our strongholds. As I mentioned in the last slide, we have many pockets of relative strength in our biggest markets that we plan on investing around. Manhattan is a great example of one of these pockets of strength. With those really attractive city centers with relatively high market share, we're confident our business can achieve much more, in particular as part of Just Eat Takeaway. We are already leveraging their experiences to help us roll out what we are calling internally the JET playbook in U.S. stronghold markets. We are aiming to reinforce and extend our strongholds, investing behind strong regional network effects in those markets. This means we're going to invest directly in the stronghold cities and also their surrounding suburban areas. We're doing this on a number of fronts. One, we're expanding supply aggressively with increased sales effort. We've significantly increased the number of salespeople focused on these areas to close all gaps and create supply leadership. In many cases in the strongholds, we have tripled our resources. Two, we are driving top-of-mind awareness with localized marketing spend. That means local channels like out-of-home, local TV, and also localized messaging. Three, we are delivering a great consumer experience, delivering price leadership by using our subscription program, Grubhub+, aggressively to enable diners to receive free delivery while creating attachment to Grubhub. We are also standing behind our consumer experience and price leadership with our Grubhub Guarantee, which compensates diners if we are not the lowest price or we are late on an an order. In fact, you are probably already seeing a lot of this in action already. We are highly encouraged by what we are seeing from the Grubhub+ momentum and diner feedback on the Grubhub Guarantees. With regard to fee caps, our position could not be clearer. We believe all fee caps, which are effectively price controls, are illegal. We abided by the emergency orders introduced during the pandemic in order to help restaurants that were in the firing line of the pandemic closures. We will vigorously fight any permanent fee caps, which are essentially arbitrary government interference into private contracts. They violate a number of provisions in the US Constitution because they directly interfere with contracts entered into by willing parties, and they violate similar statutes of state constitutions as well. Now that restaurants in our cities have reopened, we have joined other industry participants to file lawsuits against permanent caps in New York and San Francisco, and we're confident that our position will prevail in court. We believe we will win over time and these fee caps will go away. In the meantime, we of course, have flexibility to mitigate losses if and when we need to by increasing the burden on the diner. Ironically, permanent fee caps would most likely hurt our restaurant partners by depressing demand. Finally, in addition to our investment push in our strongholds, we are also rolling out new verticals and exploring other ways to drive growth. Convenience is a great example of a vertical that we are rolling out because we believe it will reinforce diner retention and loyalty. We already have 6,000 convenience stores on our platform and have started testing our own convenience product. We've recently launched a test store in Brooklyn with an extremely limited inventory to get our feet wet, but we like what we see and will ramp inventory and marketing over time. As a reminder, our campus business allows college students to use their meal plans to order from campus dining rooms and kiosks from the Grubhub app. We are currently integrated on college campuses that cover 3 million college students. These students become great marketing targets for Grubhub during school and after they graduate. We've taken this campus technology and have applied it to hotels and stadiums. We are live at Resorts World Las Vegas and FedEx Field, the home of the Washington American football team, and we are seeing some initial traction. This is a potentially great source of new diners for us who order at the hotel or stadium, but then have a Grubhub account set up, an app on their phone that they can use to order Grubhub from home. Finally, as the world returns to normal, we still see a large opportunity in B2B corporate orders. First, we still have a long way to go with ordering from our core legacy Seamless customers, big banks and law firms that have not yet fully returned to the office. That volume is climbing every month, but is still less than half of what it was pre-pandemic. Second, we have had a lot of recent success selling the corporate product to SMBs and plan to invest in greater sales resources there. In summary, I'm excited as ever about where Grubhub is as a business, our recent progress, and our strategy for growth. With that, I'm going to hand it over to Jitse to give a few additional thoughts on the U.S. business. Thank you, Adam. To summarize on our position in the U.S., the U.S. is a huge market, the size of the whole of Europe, with a number of sub-markets at different stages of maturity. While Grubhub has some specific challenges today, it is a large and growing business with good underlying profitability. We recognize that the business faces challenges, but we do have a clear improvement plan to refocus on our strongholds to accelerate growth and profitability. We can therefore do a lot with the business and are very excited about the opportunity. We do believe that over time, there will inevitably be consolidation in the wider U.S. on-demand delivery market as various of the players combine to optimize the last mile. The Just Eat Takeaway.com management team expects Grubhub to be involved in this consolidation when it comes, and intends to do so from a position of strength, a position that reflects the strategic value of Grubhub. You will now have another short eight-minute break, after which we will reconvene and do some Q&A. Remember, you can submit your questions via the player by using the "Ask a question" button. See you soon. [Break] Welcome back, everyone. Thank you very much for submitting your questions. My name is Joris Wilton. I'm responsible for the broader corporate communications and investor relations. The first question is from Monique Pollard. It's a question related to the U.S. fee caps. There's the EUR 42 million in the third quarter of this year. What will be the expectation for the fourth quarter? I'll take that. Thanks, Monique. In terms of the fee caps, I don't think we give out specific guidance, but based on my comments, I think it's fair to assume that the impact is going down. I also talked about how New York is the largest impact that we have on the fee cap side, so still significant, but lower than it was in the third quarter. Thank you, Adam. Another question from Tiago on the employment model. Jitse, you mentioned that we, as Just Eat Takeaway, opt for the legal employment model per region. Competitors clearly opt for gig economy models, and governments seem to allow this. How do you fix that situation? First of all, we also get quite some benefits from this employment model, right? I can give you a clear example. If you order with one of our competitors, and people I'm sure have done that in the past, sometimes the orders get canceled. What is that? That might be a courier that goes to a McDonald's, figures out that the queue is too long, and leaves, and therefore cancels your order. That's not a great customer experience. We don't have that problem because that courier needs to deliver that order despite having to queue up. We have, of course, the marketing impact also is from having all these couriers on the street. That's very clear now, for instance, in a place like London, where we have a lot of these couriers that first weren't there. If you ask people, "How did London look last year?" It looks dramatically different now with the couriers all being around. Those are all benefits. We have tried to also paint a picture of the current legal situation in predominantly Europe, and you see that the situation is changing. The EU will demand from governments in Europe to change the burden of evidence. To say, these people are employees unless you can prove to the government that they are contractors. That means that you will see quite a lot of this change in Europe. We've seen that most recently in Spain. One of our competitors left Spain because of this reason. If you also look at where we use freelancers and where we use the employment model, you will see that we use the employment model where we are legally obliged to do so. Germany is a very important example. If you don't do that in Germany, even some of our competitors that actually usually use freelancers doesn't dare to do that in Germany. They will close you down in a week. In other countries, things are still going through the courts. It's not yet clear when the law will change, but it will. In these countries, we're quite certain that it will change, and therefore, we choose the safe option because we don't want to leave a country because we usually have market leadership position, so we have no interest in leaving a country in which we're very strong. In countries such as Canada, the freelance model is allowed, and we're fine with that. Most important thing for us is that people are insured and that they can make a living wage, because obviously these people come to the houses and they serve our customers, so it is very important that we have decent quality in there. Thank you, Jitse Groen. The next question is from Marc Hesselink from ING. It's a question on London and network effects. Is London a market in itself? Are you breaking network effects of the number 1 player in central London? Is, in your view, the absolute growth in London higher than that of competition? Any idea on the gap and how it changed in the previous year? I think it's fair to say that there is local network effects in a market like London. It's a market that we have invested very heavily in over the last 18 months, since the completion of the merger. We've launched Scoober in central London, that's brought a huge amount of visibility to the street, something that was acutely lacking. We've doubled our restaurant supply base in the space of 18 months. Hopefully anyone that lives in London can attest to seeing the extent of that change. Now, there's still more to go. There's pockets of London that we still have some work to do in. We're taking a very analytical approach, borough by borough, to make sure that we have all the right supply that we need. The result of all that is that we have generated almost 10 points of additional market share in relatively short order. We've clawed London back to being a three-player market. I think we feel very optimistic. It's a market that we will continue to place maximum pressure on. Thank you, Andrew. We're jumping a little bit from the U.S. to the U.K. and back and forth. Jitse Groen, you commented on the scope for consolidation in the U.S. and the role that Grubhub will play here. Sreedhar Mahamkali from UBS is wondering if you can expand those comments a little bit. I don't want to comment on that too much. I will say that the consolidation in the U.S. will likely be outside of the food delivery sector. I don't reference, in particular, food delivery companies. It might also be adjacencies. The big difference, of course, between basically Northern America and Europe is essentially that the logistics in the U.S. and in Canada is actually quite profitable. We can deliver anything, and that makes this, of course, very interesting to adjacencies. It's more difficult in Europe because you need a bigger scale than in the U.S. In the U.S., you have more opportunities in teaming up with somebody else. Thank you, Jitse. The next question, Jörg, is from Georgios Pilakoutas from Numis. He would like to know a little bit more about the role that is played by the hubs. This isn't something that most of our competitors are using. What are the advantages of such a system? Thank you. Just as a reminder for people, these hubs actually is where we usually store e-bikes, where basically our drivers come before they start the shift. Basically, they meet other drivers, they can exchange experience, they can meet their supervisors. It's a very good thing to actually have a bit of community feeling and actually have the drivers closer linked to our company. Basically what we feel and what we see from the hubs is, first of all, it increases last mile visibility because we store the branded e-bikes there. We make sure the drivers are actually branded with the right clothing. Also for the drivers, it's great experience because they're exchanging learning experience with their colleagues, and they feel closer to the company and actually providing a better service in the end. Rather than just having an app which is instructing them the whole day, they can actually meet their colleagues in person and their supervisors. We feel it's a very great thing to have these hubs, but we use them pretty selectively, so we don't necessarily need to have them in all the zones. We are applying them specifically in the large cities. As you've seen in the video, we are also able to run a remote model pretty quickly now and roll that out pretty quickly across various zones. We're running a mixed model wherever we feel like last mile visibility and reducing churn is very important. We selectively deploy hubs and in other areas where we can also go for a remote model. Thank you, Jörg. The next question is from Wim Gille from ODDO. He repeats basically the U.S. problems that we've defined around restaurant supply, about location and suburbs, and customer retention. Is there any feel on how many months, quarters, or years we would need to fix the issues? Yeah, look, I think we've made a lot of progress already, as we talked about during the presentation, right? In the last year alone, we've added 100,000 restaurants. We're up to 30% of our volume going through the subscription program. I think there are more restaurants to add, both to close the supply gaps in certain areas, and also create some supply leadership, and we want to expand that subscription program. We also talked about new verticals. I think it's iterative. I think a lot of the stuff that we've done already will start to have an impact. As we showed in the presentation, already our new diners are performing significantly better than the new diners from last year, but it takes time for that impact to accumulate. We also have to go back, like I mentioned, and kind of reacquire almost the diners that came to us in 2017, 2018, and 2019, and have them experience Grubhub in a new way. Yeah. Thanks. Maybe related to that, there's also a question: what will be the market share in Manhattan, assuming that the B2B comes back due to the office trends? Interestingly enough, the market share that we show is consumer only. It doesn't include corporate. Really, if you add our corporate business, our market share is significantly higher. I think, another key point there is we talked about corporate business. That legacy, New York, hardcore law firms and banks is still sub 50% where it was pre-pandemic. Once it goes up, we not only get the benefit of those orders, but also the halo effect to the consumer product. We'll see consumer orders go up as well. Thank you, Adam. To down under, Australia. We are saying we are number one. Can you give a little bit more color on what metric? Andrew Ross from Barclays is wondering, what do you think the market share is by orders or GTV? Yeah, I can happily take that. If we look at Google Trends, which we think is a depiction of where new customers go, we are leading the market. Also, if you look at Similarweb, we're also leading the market. Those are the two metrics we're mainly looking at. Usually then if you look at these metrics, the market share is between 40%-50%. Thank you, Groen. Yeah. There's a question from Sander Kwadijk. Deliveroo recently announced a partnership with Amazon Prime to provide subscribers to Amazon Prime a discount on orders above GBP 25. This should provide Deliveroo with a competitive advantage on the long term compared to competitors, just as Just Eat. How are you able to differentiate yourself as Just Eat in this perspective, and are you planning to pursue similar partnerships in the U.S.? Let me take the last question first. It depends on the partnership, right? On the economics of that partnership. The main difference, again, in the U.S. is that even in the subscription programs, you make quite some money on the order. I think if you look at this specific program in the U.K., it looks like a lot of people have converted their Amazon Prime subscription into free delivery on something that they were already using. That's an outside in look, so you would have to ask these other guys, but if the amount of subscribers goes up a lot, but it has no effect on the orders, that's what I assume is going on. That doesn't mean it can serve as a new customer addition tool, but again, it depends on the economics. If it's very expensive, yes, you might be very happy with these customers, but if you lose money on a per order basis, it's not a good situation. You would have to ask them, not per se us. Yeah. Thank you. That was the second question. The first question? Sorry, help me out. Whether that's a competitive advantage. If you do it right, yes, it can be a competitive advantage. It depends a little bit on what you try to accomplish, right? It depends on which order part, which order segment do you capture with it, and is it cannibalizing? It's the same answer. Yeah. Thank you. There's another question on the U.K. The U.K. fulfillment costs have been flat basically since December 2020, despite volumes continuing to rise. Why is that? Can U.K. fulfillment costs fall further, or is this a floor? Can you maybe also discuss fulfillment costs for Scoober in the U.K. relative to non-Scoober in the medium term? Sure. I think as we look forward, we're certainly optimistic on how we can drive efficiency within our delivery network. I think the context here is important. We went from doing 1 million orders in January of 2020, and 12 months later, we were doing almost 10 million delivery orders. The focus as a team has been very much centered around making sure we can absorb the volume, and less about efficiency. As you start to move forward, obviously those priorities are in a position to change, and we've started to see that coming through. We've also dealt with scaling at that pace and not only dealing with year-over-year growth, but significant month-over-month growth. At times this year, as lockdowns eased, there was a tightness around the courier market that drove short-term cost increases. We're pretty optimistic now that we're in a good position to really drive efficiency in the delivery network going forward. As relates to the Scoober piece, Scoober's in its early days in the U.K. Naturally, there's more costs associated with setting up that model in the beginning, and there's less efficiencies. We're already seeing progression, and good progression, on those efficiency numbers. I think, again, directionally, we'll continue to see improvement there. Thank you, Andrew. As part of the refocusing strategy, refocusing on the strongholds in the U.S., are you looking to exit smaller, less profitable markets at the bottom left of the slide that we've shown? Is a question from Rob Joyce from Goldman. Would you close operations here or would you need a buyer? No, thanks, Rob, for the question. I think that's one of the points that we were trying to make in the presentation, is that we are profitable in large markets and small, and really, if you take that cut again and look at market share, it doesn't really impact the profitability story that much. We absolutely are maintaining a presence in those cities. I think what we were trying to say is we're going to invest behind the strongholds, right. We're going to invest more aggressively than we have before to drive back market share. Absolutely are going to maintain a presence, and we're growing in those markets. Thank you. Maybe related to that, a question from Scott Abraham. How important is it for Grubhub to become an everything last mile delivery platform in its core markets to improve its customer value proposition relative to competitors who have been gaining market share? Is grocery, for instance, a first step towards this? First I want to clarify, grocery in the U.S. has a specific connotation, so I'm going to talk more about convenience, which we talked about in the presentation. I think our story and our strategy is very similar to the rest of the JET portfolio in that we're thinking about how do we maintain retention and drive frequency of our diners. We're thinking about those adjacencies, like in most cases, more food-related adjacencies first, to make sure that we keep diners on our platform and have them ordering more frequently. Anything that reinforces the restaurant-diner connection, we're going to take a look at. Convenience is absolutely a first step on that journey. Thanks. I think one of the last questions before we go back to the presentation, it's on the potential market share, the slide nine that we've shown. The upside is still very large, would like to have a little bit more comfort on that upside potential. What is the risk that you overestimate the potential market by looking at population instead of households? Any qualitative or quantitative data on how many unserved population is actually served via that household's account. There's also monthly order frequency going to 5 times. Is it your expectation that it will go to that order frequency? Any data to back that up, in what timeframe? Yeah, I can happily take that. Yeah, you're right. Our penetration level is at 14%. There's still huge upside in all of our markets. You're also right that people on average order for two people. Like they might order also for other people in the household, but at the same time, our measure is actually that you measure it by email address. For example, if you change your email address, then you will again be a new customer. That's then again, downplaying the market to a certain extent because you might have churned then. Therefore we think there's quite a lot of potential on this side. In terms of order frequency, five times is very well doable because we already have markets where we're actually reaching that level. For example, B2B is a huge opportunity for us and there is 90 times, you eat probably per month. There is a huge upside potential. As I said, markets, for example, like Israel with a strong B2B business, are already reaching that level. We believe it's very well doable. There's going to be a journey towards it is a target which we can achieve. Thank you. There's two more questions coming in. Firstly, from Giles Thorne, from Jefferies. Is Just Eat Takeaway now delivery-led? A second question related to that, is an employment model scalable enough in this delivery-led era of the sector? I think the best way of answering is that we're a hybrid. Makes no sense to us to throw away a business that is generating hundreds of millions, which is the marketplace, just in profits. We are using those profits to invest in delivery. We've also said that it doesn't really matter to us whether we provide delivery or marketplace. A very good example is Domino's. Domino's delivers themselves. Should we remove Domino's from our website? No. We're just going to keep Domino's there because a lot of people order with Domino's. Similarly, with a local Chinese restaurant. I think it's important to understand that the offering is not the same. You can eat for two days with your whole family if you order something for EUR 20 with a Chinese restaurant. If you order something for EUR 20 with a salad bar, you get one half salad. It's a very different price proposition. These models don't compete with each other. I would not say that we are delivery-led. It is a very important element of our strategy. If you look at the employed model, actually our churn is much lower on the employed model than on the freelance model. A lot of what you see happening in freelance are people that if our competitors show you figures of, oh, we have so many drivers, what they mean is that, oh, there were so many people filling out the form. It doesn't mean that they actually are employed or are working for those businesses. Actually, our churn is quite low. We run huge employed operations. I think actually quality-wise, don't forget, these people need to come to your home. You would probably much rather have somebody that is at least a little bit educated in how the meal is being delivered or how the meal needs to be handled on the way. If you look at the freelance model, yeah, you can just fill out the form and you can start, and that sounds very nice, but it provides very little quality assurance, of course, to the customers. Yes, that can scale and it's a huge business already in most of Europe. That can obviously scale everywhere. Thank you, Jitse. The last question of this Q&A section is from Alex Compton. It's when do you expect consolidation to occur in the U.S., and what is your openness to consolidation today? Look, I think to answer that question, we need to go back because sometimes people will tell us, "Oh, but are you guys open to M&A, consolidation, et cetera." You're talking to the people that were 7x smaller in March last year. We've done two of the largest M&A transactions in the sector in the last year. We are always open for that. If you look at the management bandwidth and all the things that we've been doing, we're very happy where the integration with Just Eat is currently at. We've done this during the pandemic. That took us a year. Very happy where we are there. Grubhub is fresh. It's a couple of months in, so we have a lot of work to do there. Obviously, what we have said about the U.S. is that it is a very big country. The dynamics are far more around delivery than what they are in most parts of the world. Delivery is highly profitable, and therefore it is very logical that a lot of people, you see that in the U.S., a lot of companies are involved in the last mile, and some companies do not have a last mile solution. We're very open to that, and anything that makes Grubhub a much stronger player, we'll look at. Thanks, Jitse. Well, that concludes the Q&A section. Back to the presentation. Back, Jitse, to you. Thank you. We're now at the innovation section. As you may know, I have a background in business information technology, having studied at one of the major Dutch tech universities. I'm somewhat of a tech geek, people may not always realize maybe, and enjoy talking about this topic. I definitely would like to take this opportunity to show you some of the things we are working on as a company. It is important to understand we have a very large tech and product department, and we do many things. Please don't think that we will be able to talk about all these developments, but we will do our best to shed some light on what we have been working on and what things are currently being deployed. I also think it's important to understand that we are never satisfied. Being in this business means we have to constantly innovate. These might be smaller things that our users barely notice, or it could be larger projects that we would be working on for more than a year. Technology is the absolute backbone of our business. Without cutting-edge technology, we simply would not have been able to maintain and grow our leading market positions at the pace that we have done. This means everything from having first-class IT architecture through to the entire consumer experience, which essentially covers everything between restaurant selection and delivery of the order. Given the huge changes in the group following our two major acquisitions over the last two years, our platform integration and unification remains a work in progress. That having said, we are already much further today than we were last year. The many Just Eat platforms have been reduced to just one within a year after the transaction, and by Q1 next year, we will have a single global app outside North America by combining the legacy Just Eat and Takeaway systems. This new app will have a much better look and feel on the legacy Just Eat markets. It also makes sure we have a consistent user experience across every market. It provides better recommendations and personalization, and we will be able to faster roll out new features across the markets. Importantly also, this reduces complexity and frees up 20% of our tech resources. One example of a new functionality with huge value for both our consumers and our partner restaurants is Food Tracker for Marketplace. Now, of course, for our delivery restaurants, we have already had accurate tracking of the entire ordering process since 2016. Our marketplace tracking was always rather limited after the moment at which the food left the restaurant. With this new system, though, we will also have advanced live order tracking for marketplace restaurants. This will essentially eliminate the difference between delivery restaurants and marketplace restaurants from a consumer perspective. The benefits are wide-ranging and bring huge efficiency to the planning, order preparation, delivery, and consumer experience for ourselves, our restaurant partners, couriers, and consumers. It helps us by reducing the burden on our call centers because it tells marketplace consumers exactly what their order status is. It helps the restaurants by allowing them to plan and run their businesses efficiently. Having real-time data on how long things are taking on all parts of the process allows them to manage and prioritize their orders far more effectively. It helps the couriers with their route planning and general navigation. It gives them visibility on the next order so they can plan accordingly and allows them to communicate more effectively with consumers during the delivery process. Finally, it benefits the consumer, as they will have more ability to track their order and have good visibility over the arrival time. We are rolling out the new functionality now and expect it to be available to all marketplace restaurants by the end of the year. We will play a short video, which brings this to life better than I can. [Presentation] I think it's great that we can now expand tracking to all restaurants everywhere in our business. We've talked before about moving people from ordering on average only three times a month to a much higher number. A big component of how to get us there is the corporate ordering ecosystem that we are building. Now, to remind you, both 10bis, our huge corporate business in Israel, processing tens of millions of orders a year, and Seamless in the U.S. are such successful B2B businesses. We have been working hard to expand these services into the rest of our countries. We have developed a broad suite of technology-based products and systems to support our push into B2B and corporate consumers. As the world reopens post the pandemic, we see real growth opportunity in this area, especially because of the more flexible nature of work. It will, for instance, be difficult for most companies to still maintain a corporate canteen when people are only going to be in the office a couple of days in the week. The ease of ordering and flexibility are key to driving consumer engagement and order frequency. B2B services that are now available are JET Pay, vending machines, corporate catering, and gift cards. I want to focus on the JET Pay and especially the JET Pay card for now, as it is an exciting new part of our corporate offering. The JET Pay card allows our consumers to expand the use of their allowance from app ordering to payments in restaurants. It was introduced in August 2021 in the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland, and we plan to roll it out to other European markets still this quarter. The card is not restricted for use in JET's partner restaurants only. Any restaurant or food outlet on the planet which accepts Mastercard will accept JET Pay. For example, the user can opt for lunch, dinner, coffee, or grab a snack on the go. The card is linked to existing allowances to ensure the spend always stays within preset budgets and time allowances that the employer sets. It's easy to administer, it is a one-stop solution. Everything is managed through an admin portal with records clearly shown on a single monthly invoice, which by itself is, of course, its immense benefit for employers. I will show you a short video. [Presentation] I encourage you to do that. As I said, as a tech geek, these things are always very exciting. To give you an idea of some of the other things we are working on or have launched, there's a lot of innovation going into our delivery network. As we've told you during this presentation, we still have an incredible opportunity to optimize the network. Predicting traffic and weather is very important, for instance, both for planning purposes and for real-time situations. We are also looking to increase the percentage of orders that we are pooling, which means that couriers carry more than one order at the same time. We have been doing this for a couple of years now, but the limitation is always that the food needs to arrive warm. Pooling creates better economics, but can actually create a worse consumer experience. Some of the work we are doing is, for instance, making sure that in the case of a corporate consumer, that we only go to an office once if multiple people at that office order at roughly the same time. This, of course, saves us a lot of money. Dynamic pricing is something that we expect a lot from as well. Currently, delivery fees on our platforms are not elastic. Pricing does not take into account whether we are busy or not. We do, of course, have other demand throttling mechanisms. We believe that we can use dynamic pricing to generate a higher gross profit while achieving the same goals. We have also spent significant effort on predicting arrival times of the food with great accuracy. I'm happy to say that these mechanisms are now live in all our markets. This, by the way, will now also come available for marketplace restaurants. We are also now launching a much better search across our markets. Many countries already benefit from that. Furthermore, we are making sense out of the many POS vendors we are connecting with globally and have decided to make Flyt, a company that Just Eat acquired before the merger, the API integration layer for the purpose. This, again, also simplifies the complexity that we have to deal with as a business. Lastly, we have made great progress in automating work in our call centers. While we are committing to insourcing our call centers, we recently, for instance, opened a 20,000 square meter call center in Sunderland in North England. We are at the same time reducing the load for these call centers. We have reduced the amount of outbound calls to restaurants by 80% with introducing text-to-speech, and there are ever more self-service options for restaurants available. I would like to hand off back to Jörg. Thank you, Jitse. Grocery is a huge market opportunity for us, as a global convenience grocery market represents several hundreds of billions of EUR per year. It's an adjacent market which enhances the proposition to our convenience-focused active consumer base, and hence is expanding our share of their wallet. By offering this increased supply of choice, it is also a major opportunity for us to capture new consumer segments and increase order frequency. This will ultimately drive further network effects, and with that, significantly improve restaurant and consumer density. In parallel, the new offering will broaden our peak times throughout the day, but specifically at night, thereby complementing our current restaurant offerings. This, combined with a higher density, will improve our entire fleet utilization. That, in turn, will positively impact the profitability of our entire logistics arm, and therefore group EBITDA in the long run. The convenience grocery has been included in our 2022 EBITDA guidance, as Brent will elaborate on later. We are actually very well positioned to be successful in convenience grocery delivery as, first of all, we have almost 100 million active customers and have learned a lot about their food ordering behavior and needs. Providing a new offering will lead to more touchpoints with our existing customer base, and therefore drive engagement and loyalty. We have top of mind brand awareness with consumers in multiple geographies, which extends across food ordering. Convenience can instantly connect our new offering with our 100 million active consumers. With hundreds of thousands of active couriers, we already have established large scale efficient logistics operations, allowing us to quickly scale by leveraging our expertise and assets. There are two potential avenues for us to continue to explore, as we set out on the right-hand side of the slide. First, the partner model. We could provide our existing online marketplace to connect consumers with our partners, such as online players, but also offer our delivery logistics to more traditional retailers. Secondly, the dark store model. We create micro warehouses from where we fulfill orders, and as shown on the right-hand side, provide last mile logistics ourselves. We've made good progress with our convenience grocery strategy to date. On the partnering model, we're actively expanding our partnerships with major retailers. We now offer access to over 8,500 stores globally. We are in late-stage discussions with major grocery chains across Europe, which we hope to announce in the coming weeks and months. On the dark store hub model, we have opened several dark stores in Canada and have started trials in New York. We already have a very profitable logistics operations in these markets. This will allow us to absorb the cost of developing our own grocery hub network, which we are starting to roll out. In Europe, we are focusing on partnerships with supermarket chains, which is a more efficient and fast way for JET to enter the grocery delivery market. We might roll out dark stores on selective basis in locations where we feel convenience grocery supply needs strengthening. In Canada, we are at the forefront of the dark store convenience development. We're gaining valuable experience with our latest dark store openings. Let me show you a short video of our Skip Express Lane. [Presentation] We have been active in Canada for more than a year now on two fronts. We have partnerships with retailers, most notably 7-Eleven, and we've been testing dark stores through Skip Express Lane. We are seeing encouraging signs in the market. Convenience grocery is a new order occasion, and we don't see cannibalization of our restaurant food sales. As you can see on the left-hand chart, groceries have increased the order frequency of our 2020 cohort by 24% of orders per month, which had a significant impact on overall economics. Notably, aside from our newly added grocery orders, we've also seen incremental increase in food orderings. 1 of our most common use cases has been complete the night, addressing late evening orders. People order online food first and order a snack bar or chips after. As you can see in the center chart, these have broadened our peak and trough of our distribution across the day, which allows us to improve our courier utilization. As a result of all this, we've seen our incremental profits for convenience grocery steadily increase since January 2020, as you can see on the far right. With that, I'm handing over to Maurine for the ESG section. Thank you, Jörg. My name is Maurine Alma. I'm the Chief Marketing Officer at Just Eat Takeaway.com, having joined the business in 2017. During the time I've been with the company, I was leading the global and local teams focused on all marketing activities ranging from brand performance and retention to partner marketing across all our markets. Since the merger with Just Eat, we have established a dedicated ESG team, which is working across the business on several initiatives. We are delighted with the progress we have made as a market leader in the area of ESG. We know we have further to go. We believe we have developed a good base to work from. Let me share some background first. Our ESG framework is designed to be aligned with the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, which aim to promote prosperity while protecting the planet. For companies, they provide a valuable framework against which to map and monitor responsible business activities. We assess that 11 of the UN's 17 goals are directly relevant to our model and to our objectives as a responsible global business. We have increased the transparency on our progress and developed robust systems for risk assessment and reporting on key indicators. This year, for the first time, we have reported our environmental impacts via CDP, the Carbon Disclosure Project, a not-for-profit charity that runs the global disclosure system for investors, companies, cities, states, and regions to manage their environmental impacts and covers over 5,000 companies. CDP's rigorous processes ensure that our calculations are independently checked and disclosed in a way that is useful for our business, investors, and other stakeholders to track our progress. In a few weeks, we will be publishing our business responsibility update on our website, which reflects our most recent work within this field. It addresses both the impact of our direct operations, as well as our ambition to influence our wider marketplace towards positive change. As part of this, we have already developed a clear framework for measurable action under three key pillars: planet, food, and people and society. More on these areas later. We have set an initial reduction target for our direct operations to be net zero by 2030. As part of this, we have worked with an external specialist partner, 3Keel, to calculate our full 2020 impact. Our direct emissions, greenhouse gas Scope 1 and Scope 2, were approximately 4,400 tons of carbon equivalent, comprising emissions from our facilities and travel from our corporate car fleet. Looking at all our emissions, including our supply chain, our Scope 3 footprint was 152,000 tons of carbon equivalent, excluding our recent acquisitions in the U.S. and Slovakia. To ensure we meet our 2030 target for Scopes 1 and 2, we are targeting the following areas of improvement. Improve the energy efficiency of buildings through a number of measures, including the installation of LED lighting, smart controls, thermal efficiency measures, and electric heating systems. Switch all offices to green energy tariffs. In 2020, nearly a quarter of our facilities already had green energy tariffs in place. Switch 100% of our corporate fleet to electric vehicles by 2030. Last, we will work on the same basis for our recently acquired businesses, in particular, Grubhub. For a business that relies on delivery, reducing related Scope 3 emissions is an ongoing area of major focus. The next slide shows how we are already approaching this. Scoober is an important part of our ESG strategy in two main ways. We are creating jobs which contribute to society and the overall economy, under our commitment that our couriers and workers deserve decent working conditions and equipment. It gives us greater control over our impact on the environment and is a key part of our plan to reduce the overall impact of our business. As we expand our Scoober rollout, we will offer more couriers e-bikes or e-scooters to ensure that increased deliveries do not mean greater emissions. For example, in 2020, we supplied over 6,000 e-bikes and e-scooters to our couriers in the U.K. and expect to see this grow in 2021. Today, our Scoober delivery model has a 9x lower footprint than that of a car delivery model, and as it grows and its order share increases, emissions intensity per order will continue to be reduced. In markets where the contractor model is challenged or under pressure, we provide our couriers with an employment contract with an hourly salary above minimum wage, employment insurance, Social Security, and equipment such as e-bikes and clothing. Takeaway.com always employed its delivery staff since the launch of its own delivery service in 2016, either directly or through agencies. Since combining with Just Eat, we have started to introduce this same model in other European countries, including the U.K., France, and Italy. As you have heard, we have made lots of progress, but we know there is still much to do. I would like to pick a few areas I'm excited to share with you. First of all, on packaging. We're working with sustainable packaging innovators on solutions that could be commercially scalable. For example, we're working with startup Notpla, trialing seaweed source sachets in the U.K., and we have developed a recyclable and home compostable seaweed-lined takeaway container for restaurant. This avoids the use of any harmful chemicals present in most compostable packaging used for wet foods. We're exploring the viability of packaging reuse. We're trialing schemes in the U.K., the Netherlands, and Germany to investigate and overcome challenges with reusing food takeaway packaging. We are working with some first-class partners in this area of innovation, including REBOWL, CLUBZERØ, and PackBack. Wherever there are alternatives available, we've also stopped the sale of single-use plastic packaging on all our partner web shops globally. There is food waste. We're committed to reducing food waste and are trialing potential solutions. We partnered with environmental charity Hubbub to develop the Food Waste Race in the U.K. We've analyzed the causes of food waste amongst consumers, and it's clear the majority of food waste occurs in the home. We have taken a number of households on a trial journey to tackle waste, save money, and live more sustainably. We will continue to work hard in this area to help reduce this issue. Working with partners. We're partnering with The Vegetarian Butcher in the U.K., Germany, and the Netherlands to inspire restaurants to expand their plant-based offer. This is a commercial opportunity as much as a sustainable choice. Consumers across the food industry are driving sales of meat alternatives, and we can help our restaurant partners to offer the same breadth of choice. For example, 55% of our consumers in Germany identify as flexitarian and want to make more sustainable choices. It is the single most powerful action a consumer can take to reduce their own impact on the planet. Building inclusion, diversity, and belonging. We have created a dedicated global inclusion, diversity, and belonging team responsible for defining our global strategy that we will launch at the end of 2021. We are a proud sponsor of many organizations and events on diversity and inclusion, such as the annual British LGBT Awards and Pride in the U.K. Lastly, we have improved ESG ratings. This year, Just Eat Takeaway.com received an A rating from MSCI, up from triple B in August 2020. An assessment designed to measure a company's resilience to long-term ESG risks. This improved rating reflects the efforts that we are making to deliver real impact, while we do understand that there is still ample opportunity to do more, both in our direct control and wider influence. Now, I would like to hand it over to Brent for the financials. Thank you, Maurine. I'm Brent Wissink, Chief Financial Officer, and would like to take you through the financial section of this presentation. Firstly, I will spend some time talking about the regional structure we've introduced to simplify our organization, which will also be reflected in our external reporting going forward. I will walk you through our short and long-term goals and how we plan to achieve them. I will conclude my section by providing you with an update on our view on portfolio assessment, iFood, and our cash position. The business has grown from 10 countries at the time of the Takeaway.com IPO in 2016 to 25 countries today and is unrecognizable from even two years ago. The two major transactions completed since 2020 have greatly increased the scale of the business, and we believe now is the right time to refresh our internal structure. The principles we have used to implement the change to our structure are as follows. First, we have grouped together countries into regions with similar market structure and geographic locations. Secondly, the new structure will better reflect the way we run our business internally and more appropriately allocate management time to country and regional level. We believe that this segmentation will also help the investor and the analyst community to more easily assess the dynamics and future prospects of our various markets. Each region will have critical mass, generating more than EUR 500 million in annual sales. We implemented this new structure internally from the start of this quarter. To assist investors, analysts, and other users in transitioning to the new structure, we will bridge the new segment numbers to the old segments at our Q4 and full year 2021 results. Next slide will set out some key characteristics of the four new regions. North America, consisting of the U.S. and Canada, represented approximately 40% of our GTV in Q3 2021, and has a high delivery share. U.K. and Ireland, representing circa 25% of GTV, have a developed online food delivery market and similar cultural and market dynamics. The Northern European region, also representing a quarter of GTV, consists of several established markets, led by a large Dutch and German business, and including some smaller, high-potential countries like Belgium, Poland, and Switzerland. Last, the Southern Europe and ANZ segment, our smallest segment with 10% of GTV, includes markets with significant growth opportunities and where we will continue investing heavily to develop sustainable scale. The larger markets in this segment include Australia, France, Spain, Italy, and Israel. Next slide will provide our H1 figures under both the new and the old segmentation. Now, let's move to slide 74, which outlines our guidance for the next year and the long term. Our strategy is and has always been to prioritize long-term growth over short-term profits. 2021 has been an investment year for the JET, which result in peak losses. In 2022, we will start to see the tangible benefits of these investments, with adjusted EBITDA improving to a range of -0.6% to -0.8% of GTV, while still delivering GTV growth in the mid-teens. The long-term goals of the group has been split into two components. Firstly, we expect to grow our annual GTV in five years by EUR 30 billion, which is effectively more than doubling our current annual GTV. Secondly, we will achieve an adjusted EBITDA in excess of 5% of GTV in the long term. We are confident that we will reach this objective by executing the strategy as outlined by Jitse, focused on growing sustainable profit pools. We are one of the few online food delivery companies already achieving this in some of our markets and have a clear plan how to get there for JET Group as a whole. On slide 75, we set out simple bridges to explain our path to achieving long-term profitability of 5% of GTV. On the left side, you can see the weighting of revenue, the key cost items, and the adjusted EBITDA as a% of GTV. These are the actual figures for H1 2021. On the right side, we show an illustration of how these metrics will evolve in the long run. The bars in the chart can only be illustrative, as there are multiple factors within each which will determine the actual results, but we feel confident of the overall picture. I will now explain the movements between the bridges. At a high level, the improved performance is driven by the network effect, as Jitse and Jörg have described earlier today. These effects drive increases in revenue per unit and efficiencies in fulfillment cost, marketing, and operational expenses, which will bring operational leverage to the business. Improvement in revenue per unit is driven largely by increased delivery share, but is also impacted by driving AOV growth, pricing optimization, and ancillary revenue opportunities. Delivery mix also drives higher unit costs, of course, but we expect to offset the effect of this mix shift by continuing to improve delivery efficiency, as explained earlier by Jörg. The next slide illustrates the potential for significant efficiencies in marketing. As a long-term target, we believe that we can broadly half the marketing spend per order, which we were seeing in 2019, which was around EUR 1 per order, if we include Just Eat, Grubhub, and Takeaway.com's legacy operations. Our investments over more than 20 years have made us one of the most recognizable consumer brands in each of our markets. Our smaller markets will continue to benefit disproportionately from our global brand campaigns, driving the cost per order down over time. Next slide will provide you a reiteration of the guidance for this year, as we already provided last week when we released our Q3 trading update. I want to take you through our overall financial framework underpinning our strategy. Simply put, we will only invest in markets if we believe we can attain leadership positions, which are, of course, or will become sustainable, profitable, and cash generative. We will leverage the profits we make in our established markets to fund investments to develop positions in our growth markets. As required, we are ready to invest significantly to defend and restore our leadership positions. We will always invest to innovate and test adjacent markets, such as in convenience groceries, as described earlier. We will continue to evaluate markets to assess their growth, profitability, and cash flow potential. As part of this framework, also addressed on this in slide 80, I would reiterate, we remain open to divest our stake in iFood. On this slide, I reiterate that what we have said before, iFood is an asset of significant value to our company. It is the clear market leader in a huge market of over 200 million people and has continued to deliver almost triple-digit growth in 2021, even against the strong comps of last year. We have received interest from multiple parties for this asset, including an indicative offer for our stake of EUR 2.3 billion. We believe that these offers did not reflect the underlying value of our stake in the business. Of course, we are in no hurry to sell the stake as it continues to increase in value, given its strong growth. If we were to dispose our stake, I would like to reiterate that we intend to return half of the net proceeds to our shareholders. The next slide provide our cash position. The company is well-financed with EUR 1.5 billion cash on our balance sheet at the end of June this year. This gives us a strong foundation to continue to invest as we seek to increase our market shares across the group. I will now hand you over to Jitse. Thank you, Brent. Thanks to all of you who have listened to what has been a long session, and also I would like to extend my gratitude to our fantastic JET team that has put this presentation together. I will now wrap up briefly before we head into Q&A. The most important point to make is that we are very well-placed for the future. We have some highly attractive positions in some of the most attractive markets in the food delivery sector. There is a huge amount of growth to come, and we will continue to operate our hybrid model, which will underpin this growth and see us return to profitability. We have been through our period of peak losses given the necessary investments we have made in our business, and we believe we have a clear path to profitability. We will be disciplined owners of our businesses and make sure that they perform in line with the company strategy. What I also hope you have taken away from today is that we have a highly committed team in place who are determined to continue to win in our industry and drive value for our shareholders. We believe we can continue to drive improvements for the benefit of our consumers, restaurants, and for the communities in which we live and operate. We will now open the floor for Q&A. Thank you, Jitse, and thank you all for submitting loads of questions. Luckily, we have sufficient time to hopefully answer all of them, if not most of them. Brent, you talked about a longer-term EBITDA margin of 5%. What is the time frame for this? Should we expect the margins to be here in five years' time? What we clearly said is that we're going to double our annual GTV in five years with EUR 30 billion. With respect to the margin, we said it's going to be 5% of GTV long term. It, of course, depends also what will happen. The long term is certainly longer than five years, but we would like to have the flexibility to invest additionally, if necessary, if and appropriate, if opportunities would come along. Thank you, Brent. The next question is also on the guidance from Andrew Ross, Barclays. To clarify on Grubhub, are you expecting broadly breakeven in 2022 despite the fee caps, or only broadly breakeven when the fee caps drop away? Yeah. Well, Adam is not here. The fee caps are in the guidance. I think that's important to point out. We'll work to get rid of the fee caps. It's not under our control. We have also said that we can manage the fee caps if we have to, but the consequence of that is that the consumer is going to have to pay for it. Obviously, our preference is either to prevail in court or to come to some sort of negotiation with the cities to get rid of them. Thank you, Jitse. There's two questions on our strategy with regards to QSRs. Firstly, from Monique Pollard, "Do you think the strategy of focusing on the strongholds in the U.S. will impact your ability to negotiate good terms with national restaurant brands and QSRs versus competitors that have a broader national presence? Maybe also on the U.K., there's a number of chains which remain exclusive to competitors, even recently extending initial deals. Are you attempting to compete for these restaurants, or is there a reason for this? Thank you for those questions. Yeah, first, on the U.S., we definitely are still a national player. While we focus more on the strongholds, we are still a national player. Please also don't forget, we have a strong global business. A lot of these QSRs actually are also global businesses. We are by far the strongest player in Europe, and therefore we provide a very solid partnership for most of these players. That is actually not a problem in negotiations with these partners, with regards to the U.S. question. With regards to the U.K. question, indeed, there is a couple of mid-size chains which we are still very focused on working together with them and providing them even more orders than they already have. A lot of them are still in contracts which are exclusive, but obviously working on that, but obviously we have to wait until these exclusivities are running out. We definitely are all over those players. Thank you, Jörg. On the 2022 guidance, Brent, mid-teens GTV growth implies EUR 5 billion-EUR 6 billion of additional GTV, and you've added EUR 7 billion each of the two past years. Just curious, why do you expect GTV as a lower addition given the cohort behavior you described? Well, I think if you look at the last year in particular, COVID has certainly contributed to our growth. With respect to the next year, you will probably see a mixed effect where also less established markets will continue to grow rapidly, so that may create a little bit of a difference in the mix, and that might also have an impact on this number. Thank you, Brent. Also a question on the mix. In terms of the longer-term EBITDA margin of 5%, what is implicit within that for the logistics portion of the business? Well, we give guidance as a whole. We do not make a big distinction between where the growth's coming from. As we said, we are agnostic whether it's logistics or whether it's marketplace. That's how we predict our growth. Thank you. Is there any breakdown that you can provide in terms of contribution of non-commission and commission-based monetization? No, not yet. You will probably see it in the financial disclosures, which has always been broken down into the various components. Thank you, Brent. When we think about every food moment, what share of orders comes from food moments other than dinner already? Do you know, Jörg? It's actually quite a lot already. Yes. This is probably a question from somebody in Holland, my guess, because we don't really have lunch. In other country, we have two peaks in Germany, for instance. We have people ordering lunch pretty normally in Germany, and then a bigger peak in the evening. It's very difficult for me to comment on it, also because if you talk about our B2B businesses, it actually has quite a big lunch component. If you look at Israel, we do quite a lot of orders around lunch. Yeah. No, I mean, in most countries, the dinner is still by far the most. Usually around, let's say, 70% to 90%. In the Netherlands, it's definitely the highest, more or less, I would say, because like Jitse was alluding to this. Try not to insult our country. There's not so much lunch orders going on. In other countries, like in Poland, it's pretty much spread throughout the day, interestingly. Then you have other countries like Australia and the U.K., where we've also launched very successfully and extensively breakfast. Breakfast in these countries already take on quite a big share. The dinner component actually in countries like the U.K. and Australia are even to a lesser extent important than in countries like, for example, Netherlands and Germany. Thank you, Jörg. Jitse, there's a question on the company culture. What are the most important elements of our company culture, and how, as analysts, can we best recognize this? What is, from your point of view, so special in the Just Eat Takeaway.com culture? First of all, we have three values in our company that we think are important. They're called lead, deliver, and care. Lead obviously means that people need to take their own responsibility, and before they ask their superior to fix something, fix it themselves. I think that's important. It is also connected to the way we lead the industry in basically just following the law in most of our countries, right? The question we got earlier about, "Yeah, if everybody else is breaking the law, why aren't you breaking the law?" I think that's a really ridiculous question. You have to follow, of course, what the law dictates you to do. Deliver is really providing the customer with what you promise. I mentioned already that in our Scoober model, there's very little chance that you won't get your food as a consumer, as opposed to the freelance model where, the courier can say, "Well, I don't think so." I think that's important. We deliver what we promise. Care, Maurine talked about this also in the ESG section, but that relates also to the culture in the company. We are a very international company. Sometimes people describe that as centrally led, but it's very important to understand that our people are everywhere. They're not all based in the headquarters in Amsterdam. They're actually in quite a lot of locations. If you look at our senior leadership team, I'm going to take a wild guess that those are 50 nationalities or something like that. This is a very international company, and I shouldn't say this on the investor call, but we also take the whole company skiing every year which is good for the culture. No, we have a very interesting, I'm not going to call it a family, but it's very close to that. Thank you, Jitse. Two questions from Miriam Ad isa from Morgan Stanley on grocery in Europe. How will you compete effectively here, given peers have a head start and the space is very crowded? Given the number of competitors in Europe, do you see scope for consolidation here? There is definitely a little bit of a head start, if you think about the industry as a whole, it just exists basically for a year or so. Leaving aside now some players who've been around in Turkey for much longer, generally the whole, I would say, hype about that industry has been around for half a year, a year. We always think long term, and we think about building something sustainable, which is built on a solid foundation. We think about long term, five, 10 years. Half a year is not so much of a head start, first of all, and secondly, we are the best placed, really, to run this business most efficiently. We have a huge customer base already, with a high affinity to convenience. We have a huge top of mind brand awareness regarding food ordering, and we have a logistical network. These three things are all things which the other players don't have. I would actually argue we have a huge head start because we have all these assets already, which the other players don't have. For us, it's much easier to build out all of this which is necessary. Thank you, Jörg, and related to that, you already spoke about the extension of the peak hours, when combining grocery orders. Is there also an opportunity to pool food and grocery orders? Potentially there is, but you have obviously quite some restrictions with regards to, especially convenience. If people order, for example, bottles of water and so on, there's weight restrictions, so you can't have one of the couriers going with 10 bottles of drinks and exceed a certain weight minimum. We need to really be careful that that is possible, but there might definitely be opportunities. I spoke about the increased scale we get through that. You might potentially be also sometimes able to bundle those, but there is some limitations to that, but it will definitely provide opportunities like that. I think the more important thing here is that it's very difficult, and we spoke about it, to pool food orders because you want the food to arrive hot or warm. Actually, we only pool when we can deliver from a restaurant to, let's say, two addresses that are very close by, or maybe even the same building in the case of B2B. If you don't do that, you're going to get at least one angry customer there because the food will be cold. In grocery convenience, well, bottles of water don't get cold, actually you have more ability to pool. This is why actually, to Jörg's point, we are much better placed than everybody else to roll this out because we have this huge network, and we can make the network more efficient, which is exactly what we're trying to do in most of our countries. Thank you, Jitse. Then there's a question on ESG from Riens Apma from Kempen & Co. He first of all, thanks for incorporating the ESG initiatives to this Capital Markets Day and providing an overview of the ESG progress within Just Eat Takeaway. Just Eat Takeaway has set a zero emissions target for Scope 1 and 2. Are you also planning to set out zero emissions target for Scope 3? Thanks for the question and thanks for the compliment as well for including the section. Yeah, no, obviously we're starting with Scope 1 and 2 because that's where we have actually first established, measured what actually the impact currently is. As I mentioned in the presentation, we're also very much focused on Scope 3 as well because that's where we actually have a very large potential impact. The complexity of our business and also the pace at which we are growing, especially since Scoober is such an important part of that strategy to reduce emissions in Scope 3. It is a bit more complicated to get to very specific targets on that in the next period. We are taking the time to really assess what is possible, and also to make sure that we're really also making use of the growth that we're having, and also making sure that we're aligning it with all the other priorities that we have in the business. Thank you, Maurine. As a follow-up, will those targets also be verified by an external body or an external auditor, for instance, review those progress reports? As we've already disclosed our first report with the CDP, we will continue to work also with partners to make sure that we're not only disclosing the current status, but also, yes, setting those targets in a verified way. Thank you. There's a few questions on the dark store model. First of all, how does the dark store model in Canada compare to the food delivery business in Canada with respect to average order value and order frequency? Yeah. In Canada, the average order values are broadly in line with the other order values we have on food delivery. It depends a bit on whether you're allowed to actually deliver alcohol or not. Obviously, if there's also the ability, which is not in all the states in Canada the case, to add alcohol to it, then the basket values are even slightly above the current average order values. In terms of frequency, we showed some information on that slide. Basically, it's increasing the order frequency of people ordering. Thank you, Jörg. There's a follow-up. Why not launching dark stores in Europe as well, at least in countries such as the U.K., where the delivery scale is material? We mentioned in the presentation that we will selectively look at this and potentially open dark stores also selectively where we feel there's a need for adding something to the supply side on the convenience side. Our real focus is on the partnership model. As I mentioned, we have all the assets to roll that out faster. If we partner with a retailer who already has hundreds of thousands of locations out there, we can actually roll out much, much faster than anyone could on the dark store side. I think what's also important is the sheer use of capital, right? If you have to build your own hubs, you're going to be slower, and it's going to be very expensive. Now, in a country like Canada, where all the logistics is highly profitable, that's not so much of an issue. If you want to do it here in Europe, and you can choose indeed between, let's say, starting in 70 cities in Germany rather than opening five hubs in Berlin, now obviously we'll go for the chain route. Thank you. There's a follow-up question from Tiago from Granular about the EBITDA margin. Some logistics-only players are also saying that we'll get to a 5% GTV profitability. That's gross profit, I guess, not EBITDA. How is this possible and if they don't have the marketplace business to offset lower margin logistics business? Oh, that's not possible in most of our markets, just to be very blunt and very clear about it. Those things are possible in the U.S. and Canada. Don't get me wrong. It doesn't apply to all the markets. If you are subscale in a country like Germany or Holland, you're not going to get there. End of story. Thank you. That may be a good lead-up to the next question. In Europe, you say that leading market share means actually or equals profitability, but in the US you say that you don't need the scale or the share to be profitable. What is the structural difference between the US and Europe to allow both statements to be true? No, just to be very specific on this. You do need the scale. The share is a different topic. What usually happens within a market, so take a country, is that because of your scale and because we are dependent on new user additions, we usually add far more new users than the number 2. At some point, it starts looking like the graphs that we showed you for Germany and Holland, where the gap is tremendous between us and the competitors. That leads to a very high share of the local market. You don't have to have that in a situation in the U.S., and if you compare that to Europe, we have a very high share of the market in Holland, but we have no share in Croatia. It doesn't hurt us at all because why would we care about the share in Croatia when we're so profitable in Holland? Similarly, that also if you look at market share, it is important to have scale in New York because actually your acquisition costs are very low if you have that scale, but you don't have to have that scale in Los Angeles. If you look at what we also said about Grubhub, we said, well, yes, you can make a profit on the orders in Los Angeles, but you probably cannot get to the scale as opposed to, let's say, the market in Los Angeles that we already have in New York, and therefore the cost of operating in New York is just lower for Grubhub than in Los Angeles. Thank you, Jitse. Jörg, a question from Andrew Gwynn from Exane BNP Paribas. The language on integrated delivery in Western Europe seems to have shifted. It can be profitable in its own right. What has changed? Is it your understanding of the model or something about the model? For instance, consumers that are now much happier to paying fees? Shall I take it first, Jörg? Look, it's very important to understand that when we made our commentary around logistics, that was in 2016, when we just opened, I think, 5 cities in Germany and four cities in Holland. The context was the year 2016, the scale that we had in 2016, and let's say Holland, Germany, Poland, Belgium. That was the scale of the business back then. If you ask the same question in 2021, post the pandemic, in Canada, of course, the situation is dramatically different. If you look at the European situation, Jörg showed you the charts. We're super cheap in Germany and very close to gross profit positive. The situation is just we are huge in Germany. Therefore, we will also make a profit on logistics, but that's something else than when you ask, when Jörg also shows you that. It takes a long time before you get to that scale in logistics in these cities. It is important that we don't only have that logistics scale. This is the hybrid model. We also have that huge marketplace business. We have the brand awareness that's, I think, 90% of the German population. In order to build all that up, yeah, it takes a long time. The situation in 2016 in Holland is not the same thing as the situation for a global leader that is active in a lot of different markets with a lot of different economic circumstances. It's obviously more expensive to hire people, but you have to in Germany. It is cheaper to not do that and have lower labor costs in Canada. There's a lot of variance in the current company. Thank you. Anything to add from your side, Jörg? I think that's very well explained. Okay. Could be the CEO of the company. Good. A follow-up question from Andrew. We've said in the past that food delivery platforms only undertook grocery to maximize GTV, so valuation. Is it a necessary evil to ensure the choice on the platform is best in class, or do you see a route to profitability for grocery in its own right? No, I think it's very important to understand that if we roll out grocery with the chains, the economics are roughly the same as the delivery network. This is why in Canada, actually, it's quite profitable to roll out grocery. The hubs are a different story, because if you have to build 400 hubs. It's very costly, and you have to build that on top of a delivery network. I don't think there's a material change there. Thank you. Talking about different labor models, a question from Andrew Porteous from HSBC. In areas where the gig economy model is in dispute, if it would be allowed longer term, would you switch? Of course. The importance, though, for us is that people can make a living wage and are insured always. It doesn't matter whether it's the freelance model or the employed model. Of course, if something is allowed by the government, and it gives some people an unfair disadvantage, as long as they don't have to pay taxes, because they will have to pay taxes in the end, of course. Of course, we'll do it. Okay. Maybe as a follow-up from Tiago, why are the regulators not acting to enforce the existing regulation in your view? No, but they are. Look, a lot of the things are happening behind the scenes, right? If you look at Italy, the labor inspection is with all these competitors, and they are fining those competitors. That the competitors are not talking about it, that's a different topic, but we should not pretend that these actions are not happening. We had a competitor leave Spain already. We have now in Holland a verdict it's illegal. There are multiple countries in which this has already happened, and there are countries in which this didn't happen. Again, also there is a variance between where you are in the world, but the regulators are doing something. Everything, of course, in European countries is based on companies adhering to the law. Yeah. There is no company police, so it takes some time before this goes through courts and before the tax authorities figure it out. In most of Europe, it's pretty clear that this is currently happening. It's also the direction in which the European Parliament is going. Thank you. Could you comment on the opportunities that you see to enhance the value proposition for restaurant partners? For instance, would you consider rolling out white label delivery for restaurants that want to take their orders directly in your core European markets or other adjacent services? We are actually doing quite a bit already. For example, Jitse was alluding to the POS system. We obviously want to help the restaurants, having a tailor-made POS system and all services around that POS system, which makes their business stronger. We have a whole team around commercial growth, we call it, which help the restaurants also grow their business. Because only if the restaurants are strong, we are strong. Therefore, we are providing them with opportunities to market their service on our website in a certain way, push themselves up a little, or offering stamp cards, getting access to merchandising, or also like, basically other services that we actually provide benefits of scale in terms of supply side. We're doing a lot of these things. With particular note to your point on white label, we have selectively done white label and in the past, it's not the core of our business, especially not in Europe, where logistics is a bit more challenging than in North America. I wouldn't completely rule it out, but it would also not necessarily be at the core at this stage. Thank you. There is also a question on new entrants in markets such as the Netherlands or Germany. Do they generate inflation in the marketing cost per order? Have you seen any impact, for instance, in the Netherlands, despite new entrants in the past years? Marc, no. Look, we are so large that by definition, the cost per order is very low. It's just the marketing cost divided by the amount of orders. If you have a lot of orders, your cost per order is low. Again, it's important, right? Our existing customers are not going anywhere. You see that in the cohorts. They're actually ordering more frequently. We're talking about the new users, and then in Holland, our competitors have been around for five years, so there's no impact. I'm not aware of any new entrants in Holland, so there's no new entrants. In Germany, Jörg was talking about it. In Q3 this year compared to Q3 last year, we've added in Germany 3 million additional orders. All of the competition- Monthly. Monthly, sorry. All of the competition combined in Germany is at 150,000 orders total for the month. We are growing more than 20 times the total size of the competition in the German market. It doesn't mean we don't take these guys seriously, but we also need to face reality that the network effects are there for everybody. If you're small, you don't have them. If you're big, you have them. If you don't believe that, you should not be probably investing in food delivery companies. Let me see whether there's. Yeah. Another question on the Scoober model. Do you eventually expect all of your U.K. delivery business to run under the Scoober model? If so, by when? No, that depends, of course, on the legislation. Looks like the U.K. is not one of the countries enforcing the routes to employed much. It can change, though. We've seen the Supreme Court verdict against Uber, and then two weeks later, Uber employed all the taxi drivers, right? If it changes, and that's our point, if it changes, you apparently have two weeks. Now, if you don't have any sort of employed model in the U.K., what are you going to do? You're going to close down your website? Don't think so. We need to prepare for the case that that happens. If it doesn't happen, it's fine. We're quite fine with it. You should, of course, accept from a responsible business that we take these things into account. Even in countries where we say, Well, we don't quite know yet, we need to be ready for this. In a lot of countries, we do know because if you look at the map, it's pretty obvious that these things are not legal, and then you should not expect us to go against the law. Thank you. We, of course, outlined in the presentation that this business has strong network effects, Just Eat Takeaway managed to build one of the largest logistical businesses in the world in, let's say, the past 24 months. Is the network effect stronger in the marketplace business than in logistics? No, it's the same network effect. Yeah. Look, it's scale. It's not who delivers the food. It's scale. The problem in Just Eat was that they did not have these restaurants. If you don't have the restaurants, yes, you open yourself up for some churn. If you do have them, you have the network effects. Why would the customers go anywhere else? Of course, in the U.K., Just Eat is far bigger than anything else. Basically, you need to have both sides of the supply, no? If you don't have a restaurant XYZ, and it doesn't matter whether it's a marketplace or a delivery restaurant, then you might risk losing that customer, at least for that order, and potentially then even for all his orders. It's enriching itself. That's why Jitse explained earlier the hybrid model and all the advantages of the hybrid model. The hybrid model is the superior model because you have all of the supply, and therefore, this is the strongest network effect you can achieve in terms of the supply side. Thank you. Related to network effects and consumers churning, do you have any plans to route a subscription model in the U.K.? That seems to limit people from churning from competitors. Are you disadvantaged by not doing this, even if the economics are slightly worse? No. The things we've done in the U.K. last year were about market repair. A lot of that was aimed to get a lot of these ex-Just Eat customers back to Just Eat, which we succeeded in. Of course, there is a smaller amount of high-frequency users in London that we are also going to go after. Maybe a subscription model is the best way to do it. We didn't make up our minds yet around that. That's clearly one of the bigger instruments that Grubhub is using currently, and we see that it's already 30% of the order. It is an instrument that we could choose to deploy. In the bigger scheme of things, and if you look at volume and size, that was not the first thing we were doing. The first thing that we were after was just to double the size of an already very large food delivery website. I think the most important thing to understand is Just Eat was growing 4% in orders before the pandemic, then very fast during the pandemic, and now it's still 50% growing. 50% is really a lot higher than 4%. That business is double the size and growing much faster in relative speed, and it is also far bigger than anybody else. It will attract most new customers. This is why those, I think it's two chains that we don't have, those chains will also join us. This is why a lot of the customers in London will join us, and we can undercut people in pricing as well because we have the profits from the marketplace. We have a lot of instruments that we can play with. Thank you. There's a question on investors are concerned that Just Eat Takeaway is more comfortable buying than selling assets, Mexico and Vietnam. Oh, come on. Come on. Jörg started Lieferando from scratch. I started the Dutch business from scratch. This is completely ridiculous. Well, compared to selling businesses. Anyway, this is the investor's perspective. Mexico and Vietnam are immaterial compared to Grubhub, for instance. How do you give investors comfort that you focus on driving shareholder value instead of building the largest possible empire? We're not building an empire. Look, there's a very limited, highly profitable amount of food delivery websites on the planet. We own most of them. There's also companies like iFood that will get there. Again, function of scale. iFood also has a big marketplace chunk in it. Fantastic business. There's not even 10 of those businesses on the planet. We own a lot of these things. We've built a lot of these businesses organically, and we only acquire businesses where we say, "Well, actually Take the Just Eat example. Actually, it's a fantastic business. It's unfortunately growing 4%, so we need to do something about it, but we know what to do and go, "Look, now it's growing 50%." That's organic growth. Of course, we will not claim that we have started Just Eat because that was a bartender in Denmark. Our growth has always been organic, and of course, when you get bigger, you get into the territory of M&A. We are food delivery people, we are operators, and we are about organic growth. I competed with this gentleman in Germany, right? We all understand these network effects, and this is one of the reasons that at some point we decided to put the German businesses together. Yeah. Talking about growth and profitability, how do you balance moving toward profitability and mainly by reducing marketing cost per order, but also inviting new competition into a market? Clearly, the reduction in marketing cost per order seems to come from scale, but when there's a lot of competition, are you better to not reduce your marketing cost too soon? No, you have to, our marketing budget in Germany, right? Our marketing budget in Germany is EUR 100 million. If competitors are now saying, "Oh, we're going to invest tens of millions of EUR in Germany," yeah, sorry, that sounds like a ridiculous joke. Our combined business now has a marketing budget of about EUR 1 billion a year, right? That's the biggest budget that any food delivery player has, at least in those markets. I'm not saying that there's not anybody else globally spending this, but we have a very limited set of markets. If you're not even matching that. Again, the marketing budget goes to new customers. If you're not even matching that, you're chanceless. These things go both ways, right? As Takeaway.com, we used to be in the U.K. and France. I think we're doing a proper job in Germany, but we left the U.K. and France because we couldn't compete with Just Eat. Why? Scale. We did not have it, and therefore we could not get any closer. Yeah, to be quite frank, if you're of that size, the impacts of any entrants are very limited. Actually, they could even be beneficial because there's more attention to the business. Let's say you make a lot of noise in Berlin, and Berlin is only 3 million people out of 85 million inhabitants of Germany. People read the newspapers also in the rest of Germany, I assume, Jörg. It is beneficial actually to the incumbent. Thank you. There's a question from Sherri Malek from RBC. Would you consider offering logistics service to marketplace restaurants to increase drop density and efficiency? Has there been any interest from these restaurants for this as some of your competitors are seeing? I don't think in Europe? No, in Europe, that's not really the case because they actually drive some efficiencies from running that business themselves. For example, they don't really have idle time, for example. If a driver is not occupied, then he has to help out in the kitchen, for example, or do something else. For them, the most efficient use of delivering is having their own drivers. There is actually some differences, interestingly, in the U.S., where the radius, which interestingly there the delivery restaurants are doing is smaller, and then we might be providing also some additional logistics to the outsides of those, to the wider radius, where they don't want to deliver. That's an exception. In Europe, you usually don't really have that demand from the restaurant side. Thank you, Jörg. There's two quick questions on the fee caps in the U.S. What is the timeline on these fee cap lawsuits? If your arguments are right, when is the earliest time that these fee caps could fall away? Linked to it, have you already started to increase consumer fees as a result of these fee caps? If so, what's the impact on demand? In regards to timelines, it's very difficult to say in the U.S., and any U.S. investor will likely confirm that. I think what's important for us is that we get rid of them. That might also be a dialogue with the cities. It doesn't necessarily have to end in a court verdict. I think what's important also for us to explain to cities is that they are currently hurting the restaurants. We've seen we haven't raised prices, but we see competitors raise prices as a result of this. Some call it the Chicago Fee and then get sued by the City of Chicago. There's actually a lot of negative impact from it because you reduce the demand. Obviously, the difference with marketplace is that you are essentially paying restaurant prices and then something on top of it for the delivery fee. It's already quite expensive for consumers to order there. If you then also shift the cost of that to the consumer, then actually these delivery fees in the U.S., they become very large. This is also if Americans come here, they're like, "Hold on, I have to pay only EUR 1 for delivery?" They're actually quite excited. Anybody in the U.S. will say, "Oh, these taxes are now much too expensive, and my food delivery fee is much too high." You already see that that's a different sort of situation than what we have here. Thank you. Yeah. You mentioned a few times that you're agnostic between marketplace and delivery, but this investor understands that when it comes to the U.S. and Canada, that's the case. What about Europe? It's very simple. The biggest mistake that Just Eat made was not to add these restaurants. If they would have done that, let's say, three years earlier, probably there would not even have been competition, or the competition would have been very small. I think it's very important to understand that in the end, you need to make your money on the customer, not per se on the order. We could even potentially lose money on an order in the future and still be very positive on the customer. That doesn't mean, of course, that's something that you would like to entertain as a business, but that's a separate topic. It's very important to have all these restaurants, and that means you have to deliver. In terms of economics, because that's what we're looking at, because we have the scale, our economics are always better than somebody else's. You can ask any random Brit whether they know Just Eat. Everybody knows Just Eat. Theoretically, we don't have to do any marketing. We do, because it's the same thing as Coca-Cola. We do have to market ourselves, but that is such an important instrument for us, and it just reduces all our costs. If there's new players, they don't have these benefits, so they have less efficiency, less density, higher cost, et cetera. That means also then that our competitors, of course, because they're all loss-making, let's face it, they will have to increase prices. We don't necessarily have to do it. We have a lot of efficiency gains we still have to get in the U.K. We don't necessarily need to increase pricing. Thank you. Could you perhaps talk about the advertising revenue opportunities? How big is the business for you currently? I think we're not disclosing specifically how much revenues we're doing with that opportunity, but the opportunity is huge. Just as an explanation, in the legacy Takeaway.com, we actually had a self-service functionality, so the restaurants could actually bid themselves up in the ranking. There was basically a quality index, then they could bid theirself up. You could actually climb a few positions up by spending some advertising money on the marketplace. In the legacy Just Eat, it was sort of say top rank, where you bid yourself up to the top rank, which we don't necessarily like too much because obviously you don't want to have a restaurant up there which is not your favorite restaurant. We're currently trying to bring that to one model. Also, in the past, we haven't really spent so much effort on really making the brands, and the QSRs also spend money with us. For the time being, was mainly mom-and-pop shops spending a lot of money. There's huge potential beyond what we currently have in terms of brands also want to spend money with us and advertise, so we definitely see. I think that was a very large amount of money already that we generated. Yeah. We should not think it's nothing, but it can be more. Yeah. With respect to the EUR 30 billion add-on GTV over the next five years, Jitse Groen, does this forecast include any M&A transactions, or is it just organic? We haven't forecasted any M&A transaction. This should only come from organic growth. Doesn't mean that we're not looking at it, but we count on what we have today, our strength, and this is what we believe is potentially possible. That's the reason for disclosing this number. Thank you. I think we already received this question, but what will be the share of logistics included in this target? The share of logistics is expected to increase, but we're not disclosing a particular percentage here. Yeah. Thank you. Jörg, there's a question on the economics of dark grocery stores. Can you share a little bit more background around it? Yeah. First of all, on the logistics part, the logistics economics will align to the general logistics economics we have. On top of it, we obviously have to run a dark store, which means you have to provide someone who's picking the dishes, but you also have to install the dark store at the beginning, like the whole fittings, potentially air condition, and so on. There's definitely quite some additional cost you have beyond the logistical part with that. You're obviously depreciating that over time. If you look at some of the numbers out there, you can see that some of the losses which are generated in that field are quite significant and going way beyond the losses we are showing on our logistical end at this stage. Thank you, Jörg. A follow-up question from Li Ren from Half Sky. Can we think of dark grocery stores basically as dark restaurants where the dishes are proven consumer products with known demand, so dark kitchens with a lower risk? Yeah, like we said earlier, we have a lot of data points from our convenience orders already where we know what the consumer wants, and how we can complement the consumer's night. Indeed, you talk a lot about snack bars, chocolate, drinks, and so on, which is really complementing your night. We know what they want, and then we would stock like we did in, for example, Canada, we would stock those stores with the items which are most frequently asked. Thank you. On vouchering, there's a question. Your competitors use more vouchers than Just Eat historically. How do you think these cohorts look like when adding vouchers to attract customers and to retain them? I think that's an understatement. That our competitors use more vouchers. Those cohorts are flat. We know it. We've tried these things also in the past because if you look at a lot of what's going on, it looks a lot like Germany in 2012, with a lot of people vouchering, et cetera. The cohorts are horrendous because it's not that people here are then sponsoring the delivery fee or something, or the commission. No, they're sponsoring the whole meal. In that sense, and this goes back to our order frequency. Our order frequency is three times a month. Well, unless you give somebody a voucher on one of these three times, it's probably going to be a competition with a supermarket and cooking yourself because all of a sudden there's free food. This is why we don't believe it works. I'm sure other people will try to make the argument that it does work, but then probably you would not want to hide the amount of vouchers that you are then actually using, which is also something that, of course, a lot of the investors have noticed. Look, we don't feel it works. We think it's fake revenue. There's a question on the brand strategy for the longer term. Could you elaborate if you want to keep regional brands or do you want to consolidate the brands under the Takeaway.com brand? As a follow-up, I believe you did not announce any plans on changing your market listing. Could you give more color on your plans on this topic? Around the brands, take the Polish brand. Our Polish brand is a Polish word. It means tasty in Polish. Everybody in Poland knows that brand. It's also very local, and I'm pretty sure that every Polish person thinks that that brand is a Polish business. It's not a Dutch business or an international business. It's a really local Polish business. Of course, in the football sponsorship, they might see a bunch of other names that would tip them off that it's a bigger business, but I think a lot of people think it's quite local. That has huge benefit to us because there's nobody in Amsterdam that's going to order a pizza in Berlin. You order a pizza 100-200 meters from your house, so it is a local thing. There's a disadvantage that if you go to other countries that you don't have the spillover effect. I don't know a lot of people, apart from maybe ourselves, that move around countries and order in all these countries. That's not a usual thing for holidaymakers to do. You don't go to Spain to order food on. You go to a restaurant, that sort of thing. That benefit is very limited. In terms of marketing, Maurine can confirm that, it is a bit difficult to do that like that. The benefit of being so well known, usually we have a local word. Lieferando means it's a fantasy name for- Lieferando means deliver. These brands are very much attached to these local companies. I think actually changing the names is a bit of a dangerous exercise. We do try to harmonize between countries because we also now use Lieferando in Austria, where they, of course, also speak German. Because in Austria people watch German television, we have a lot of spillover effect. Actually, in those cases, it helps. I think generally, it's a bad idea to change the brands. Thank you. There's two follow-up questions on the guidance. First of all, the GTV growth guidance for the five-year, does that include a significant contribution from convenience grocery? It includes, for sure, a contribution of convenience grocery. Whether it's significant or not, we will invest whatever we consider is necessary. That is included. Thank you. On the EBITDA margin for the longer term, do you expect different margins for different markets? If so, what is driving those differences? For sure, there might be different margins between countries. What is driving it? I would say AOVs in different countries might be different. For example, the Polish AOV is half the basket of the German AOV. Labor is cheaper in Poland also and can also apply for other countries. We provide the 5% for the whole group, but for sure, there might be differences between countries. Lower margins will be offset by higher margins somewhere else. If you look at the business now, we are already at that margin in Holland and Germany. Obviously, it's our intent to increase that margin beyond the 5%. We're not now saying, "Oh, let's keep it at 5%. It's clearly in excess of 5%. We've spoken a lot about logistics and also in the U.K., the different models, but how do you improve the logistics efficiencies in the U.K., given you currently have three different models? Yeah. Obviously, we still have a lot of improvements on the various models itself. We just rolled out Scoober. We're not at the scale yet which we want and at the efficiency level. We were more focused around observing the growth we had. Ultimately, we want to combine the models and get towards one model and make that the most efficient then. Thank you. Well, we're nearing the end of the session, but there's one last question on the user experience, food tracking, and everything. What has been the total time involved to develop this? Were you constrained because of all the things on your plate of your tech department? For instance, the integrations and everything? It's fair to say that having multiple platforms and trying to get rid of it absorbs quite some time. I think Food Tracker in general, because essentially what that is logistical technology that we already applied for years in logistics, and making sure that the restaurants have an incentive and the couriers have an incentive to use it. It's not so difficult to create a tracker, but if you don't employ or you don't send orders to people, but the restaurants actually employ these couriers, you need something else to get that done. I think it took us a year, if you look at the whole time. Thank you. Well, I think that concludes our capital markets here. Any closing remarks from you, Groen? No, look, I'm sorry that nobody could come. We would have loved to strap you to an e-bike and have you drive around Amsterdam at 40 km an hour. That would have been hilarious for us. That's for next year, I guess. In the meantime, if you have questions, you can reach our IR department. I wish you good evening or a good day, depending on where you are. We'll see each other soon.