Thank you, Operator, and good morning everybody. Welcome to this analyst and investor conference call to discuss the half-year results for Just Eat Takeaway.com. On our corporate website, you can download our press release and the slides for this analyst and investor conference call. I will start off today's presentation by taking you through the business and financial highlights for the first six months of the year, and I will share some additional background on the results of our investments in sustainable growth. Jörg Gerbig, our Chief Operating Officer, will give you an update, including some market share data, and Matt will specifically address the U.S. Brent Wissink, our CFO, will then talk you through the financial details of the results at group level and for each of our operating segments individually. I will end the presentation with our guidance for the full year and some concluding remarks. After which we will open up the call for your questions. My fellow board members, Brent Wissink, Jörg Gerbig, and Matt Maloney, are also here to answer your questions. If you would please follow me to slide four. Just Eat Takeaway.com is the number one food delivery app in Europe, Canada, Australia, and it is a major player in the United States. In our number one markets in Europe, our online food delivery share is roughly 70%. Many of our businesses are already consistently profitable. With regards to our investments, we are agnostic about the model that is used, whether that is marketplace, delivery or a hybrid model. In the end, we want to provide the choice that consumers want independent of whether restaurants are delivering themselves or if we have to provide the delivery service. Delivery is already profitable in Canada and in the U.S. when excluding temporary fee caps. Although unit economics in Europe are more challenging, delivery is close to gross profit neutral when we exclude our current investments in the U.K. We expect to further improve the profitability of delivery driven by our increased scale, logistics optimizations and delivery fee improvements. Our strategy is focused on investing in markets that are or will grow into profitable market leadership positions, as we believe that only market leading positions will return a profit. New York City is one of our strongest and most profitable markets and one of the main reasons to acquire Grubhub. The legacy Just Eat markets were historically under-invested and following our investments into these markets, which started in the second half of last year, the U.K. and Canada have already been turned around. As a result of our cemented leadership positions, our adjusted EBITDA will increase going forward. As stated previously, we don't consider our partial ownership of iFood as a market leading position, and therefore, we still intend to divest our stake if an appropriate offer is made. Now please follow me to the next slide. The combination of Just Eat Takeaway.com and Grubhub is one of the largest food delivery companies on this planet. The map shows a global footprint and the number one positions that we hold in Canada across the major European markets, Israel, and Australia. Slide six, you will see how this translates into our half year results. We served nearly 100 million active consumers by the end of June, an increase of 21% year-on-year. Our percentage of returning active consumers increased further to 67%, while the number of orders per active consumers grew significantly to 2.9 times per month, mainly driven by our enhanced restaurant offering and investments in growth. This resulted in 547 million orders, representing a GTV of EUR 14.1 billion in the first half of 2021, up 50% on a constant currency basis compared with the same period of 2020. We generated revenue of EUR 2.6 billion, up 52% compared with the first half of 2020. Adjusted EBITDA on a combined basis with Just Eat Takeaway.com was minus EUR 190 million in the first six months of 2021, representing an adjusted EBITDA margin of - 1.3% of GTV, reflecting our significant investment efforts. Brent will further elaborate on the financials in the financial section of this presentation. As a reminder, our investments are focused on the acquisition of new consumers and adding new restaurants to our platform to drive powerful network effects to compound the growth of our market leading positions. Throughout this presentation, you can see that we specifically target these drivers with our investments. Please follow me to slide eight. Our investment efforts in the historically under-invested legacy Just Eat markets are built on three strategic pillars, supply expansion and rollout of delivery, brand awareness and share of voice, and customer experience and value proposition, including price leadership. On slide nine, you see that these investments have fueled network effects. We have added a record number of new restaurants. Active consumers grew 22% to over 65 million, and their average monthly order frequency has strongly increased from 2.5 times- 2.9 times. This development is also clearly visible in dramatic improvements of all the cohorts, both for new and existing customers. Although the significant growth of the cohort speaks for itself, I want to focus on a couple of things. The 2020 cohort in blue has already ordered nearly as much in the first half of 2021 as in the full year of 2020. In the second half of 2020 and the first six months of 2021, we have added far more new consumers than usual. The 2020 cohort has proven to be a lot stickier than usual, caused by reduced churn and higher order frequency. Lastly, the existing consumer behavior, both in 2020 and 2021, has improved dramatically, caused by significantly higher order frequency driven by enhanced restaurant selection, higher top of mind brand awareness and higher app usage. It shows that the targeted investments pay off, both in the short term and on the longer term. The investments in the first half targeted sustainable growth and focused around our three strategic pillars. On slide 11, you see a bridge showing the key investment areas for the first six months of 2021 versus the first half of the last year for our company, excluding the U.S. I would like to call out a few areas specifically, starting with the EUR 122 million in price leadership investments on the left. As we have often said, we invest heavily in price leadership through consistently low delivery fees, or in some cases even no delivery fees at all. Compared with a normalized fee level, this resulted in an additional investment of EUR 122 million for the first half of the year. Now please note that on the right-hand side of the chart, that we have increased pricing in July and August, which, if that price level would have been applied to H1, would increase the EBITDA by EUR 81 million on a half year basis, without materially impacting growth. Given the gap in delivery fees compared to competition further widens, we believe that there is further flexibility to increase prices, but we will always determine what is best for the growth of our business when looking at our delivery fees. Further investments have focused predominantly on marketing, sales and logistics, with specific focus on the legacy Just Eat countries. Over two-thirds of the EUR 182 million in additional spending was targeted at those historically under invested markets, which allowed us to successfully expand our market share. Lastly, I would like to highlight the impact of fee caps and voluntary COVID-19 commission rebates. In the first half of 2021, this impacted EBITDA by an additional EUR 22 million versus the first six months of 2020, again excluding the U.S. The total impact of fee caps and voluntary commission rebates on our adjusted EBITDA was EUR 142 million, of which EUR 110 million was related to fee caps in Canada and the U.S., and EUR 32 million was related to voluntary commission rebates. On the right-hand side of the chart, we have shown the illustrative EBITDA level for the first half year, assuming no fee caps, no commission rebates, and current pricing. Please note that this is not guidance for the second half, as we will continue to invest. We do believe, however, that losses have peaked and profitability will improve going forward. On slide 12, I'd like to spend some time to share why delivery is key to our strategy. First of all, it expands our restaurant selection while offering a consistent delivery experience with last mile visibility through our courier network, wearing our branded clothes and backpacks. The delivery business represents a less mature market to our platform with greater underlying growth, providing new consumer opportunities. We do have a significant competitive advantage in delivery, with our delivery already being profitable in the U.S. and Canada, while it is close to profitability in Europe when excluding the investments in the U.K. We have higher density because of our larger consumer base, and we have the ability to offer lower delivery fees because our consumer lifetime value is superior to others due to our marketplace offering. Our global scale and brand help us to secure partnerships with key restaurant chains. We have a clear path to profitability where our increased scale will further increase operational efficiency. Furthermore, product and technology improvements will drive profitability. Given the widening gap in delivery fees, we have the flexibility to optimize pricing, while we will continue to invest significant amounts in providing the best and most affordable service to our consumers across the world. On slide 13, we believe that convenience will bring new revenue opportunities and additional scale efficiencies. It is complementary to our current food offering, and it serves as a consumer acquisition tool. Our fleet utilization can improve, thanks to increased density and broadening of our peak times. The unit economics are in line with delivery and, as delivery in Canada is already profitable, we are now testing dark stores or our Skip Express Lane next to the convenience offering that we already have in Canada through 7-Eleven. For Europe, we will focus on partnerships with existing and new supermarket partners using our existing delivery network. Although Brent Wissink will share financial updates regarding iFood, I just would like to emphasize that our stake in iFood represents significant value to our company, given the fast growth in an exciting market. We continue to be open to sell our stake in iFood. To indicate how fast its value is increasing, the $2 billion-$3 billion offer we received is already almost six times higher than the highest offer we received two years ago. I would like to hand over to Jörg, who will take you through some of the segments in more detail. Thanks, Jitse. Good morning, everyone. As Jitse just talked about, our strategy is to build clear market leadership in every country so that we can benefit from the positive network effects that characterize the food delivery sector and which provide a strong tailwind to growth for the number one player. In this section, I want to give a little more color about our performance in key markets and how our investments are helping to reinforce and extend our market leadership globally. Please turn to slide 16. In Europe, JET has an unrivaled position. We have roughly a 70% market share of online food delivery and are multiple times larger than the next largest player. Over 95% of our GTV in Europe is generated from countries where we have a clear market leadership position, including the U.K., Germany, Netherlands, and Poland. That market strength also translates to our brand, and JET has a very high top of mind brand awareness across Europe, as shown on the chart on the right. As you can see, in many markets, our awareness is more than double that of the nearest competitor, which makes a real difference when it comes to which brand customers choose to make an order from. As we've talked about before, ordering food delivery is typically a very spontaneous decision, so being our customers' first choice is really important to us. We've continued to invest to improve our top of mind brand awareness. We've increased our marketing share of voice in legacy Just Eat markets, which were historically under-invested, and have also agreed major regional partnerships to leverage our brand strength across Europe, including sponsoring the Euros and UEFA Champions League. We've seen very strong results already in our brand metrics and expect these to further improve over the coming months and years. Please move to slide 17. I want to focus on the U.K., where we have seen very strong growth as a result of our additional investments. We've invested in a number of areas. First, we've massively scaled our logistical business, including rolling out of QSRs. McDonald's, for example, we grew to over 1,000 branches across the U.K. and Ireland and now are fully at scale. We are convinced about network effects created with these additions of QSRs and the positive contribution to marketplace that comes with it. QSRs, amongst other things, have impacted our gross margin though, and contributed towards a net EUR 55 million decline in EBITDA in H1 2021. Second, we have invested significantly in price leadership, including offering free delivery in London and very low delivery fees for a number of key brands nationwide. This accounted for EUR 77 million of EBITDA investment in H1 2021. Given the widening price gap and improved competitiveness versus competition, we have flexibility around pricing and have already reduced this investment during the second half. We've also invested our sales and marketing to step change our restaurant supply and our new customers, as well as launching our employed logistics model in a number of UK cities, including London, Birmingham, and Manchester. This has driven EUR 43 million of increased cost between H1 2020 and H1 2021. In combination, these investments have transformed our performance in the U.K. Total orders increased by 76% between H1 2020 and H1 2021, and we also added almost 50 million orders additionally, in terms of delivery during that period, which represents a phenomenal 733% increase year-over-year. We now fulfill more than twice as many orders as in 2019. Turning to page 18, we can see that this investment in our network effects has made a big difference in all of the underlying drivers of growth. Our active restaurant estate has grown by almost 40% to 58,000 restaurants, which makes us the largest player in the market on a like for like basis. We also increased our active customer base to 17.5 million, a 23% rise and our average monthly order frequency to 3.2 times, which represents a significant step change from H1 2020. We've also maintained this increase in frequency despite recent relaxations in COVID restrictions. Please move to the next slide. This slide shows our share based on online metrics. On the left is Google Trends, which we believe is a good proxy for new customers. On the right, the data is from Similarweb, which is more indicative of orders. What we can see is that in both charts, Just Eat has not only stabilized historic declines in share, but also has started to reverse the trend and gain share during the last few months. In fact, if we dig deeper into the data from Similarweb, there are a number of positive trends that we are seeing about our customer loyalty. Just Eat has best in class returning customer behavior in June 2021 at 76%, compared to about 70% for the number 2 and number 3 player. That number has increased by 600 basis points since the start of the investment program. Just Eat has also the highest proportion of customers who exclusively use that site with 58%, versus 45% and 38% for the number 2 and number 3 player. Just Eat has also the lowest bounce rate at around 5% compared to 15% for our competitors, which suggests that we have a better ROI on our PPC spend. On the right-hand side, this chart shows our total orders for U.K. and Ireland combined for comparability purposes. What this shows is that based on H1 reported results, we fulfilled twice as many orders as the number 3 player in the market. We also gained market share in terms of GTV on both a relative and absolute basis with 9% growth quarter-over-quarter, versus 8% growth for the number 3 player. We are really encouraged by this data, which we believe strongly supports our investment case. That is also further supported by slide 20. This page shows data from credit card transactions and clearly demonstrate that on a national level, Just Eat is growing faster in absolute terms than competitors and widening the gap in terms of orders. On the right-hand side, we can also see that we've significantly closed the market share gap in London and have gained around 10 percentage points since the start of our investment program. There's still further to go, and we know that we need to continue to expand supply, improve top-of-mind brand awareness, and enhance customer experience. However, this gives us real confidence that our investments are paying off and that we are on the right track to success, both in London and in the U.K. as a whole. Turning to the next slide. We're now moving on to Germany. Our performance in Germany continues to be very strong. Over the last year, we've grown orders by over 60%, processing nearly EUR 80 million in the first half. Our GTV has also increased by 77% during this period, and we've increased our EBITDA from EUR 58 million in H1 2020 to EUR 94 million in H1 2021. Delivery has grown at triple-digit growth rates and is now at significant scale. Our delivery operations is approximately five times and our total German business is approximately 70 times larger than the Delivery Hero logistics operation when it was acquired by us in April 2019. We now have 30,000 restaurant partners in Germany, with 20% of these made up by delivery restaurants. We are also partners with all of the large chains in Germany, we're continuing to expand our logistics footprint to more cities. From a consumer perspective, we have an unrivaled brand awareness in Germany, with top-of-mind brand awareness reaching almost 70% and aided brand awareness at around 90%. Finally, to put our size in perspective, our German business is more than 30% larger than the whole European business and almost the same size in terms of GTV as the whole European and Americas business as one of our competitors who now just reentered the German market. Please move to page 22. The next two slides in this section show our online share metrics for a few of our key markets. We have been experiencing competition for many years from various national and international players, as you can see from the chart and the dates when they entered the market. Looking first at our major profit pools in Germany, Canada, and Netherlands, we can see that we continue to defend and reinforce our clear number one position in these markets. In Germany, we've seen a couple of new entrants into that market over the last 12 months. However, neither of those have made significant inroads, and Just continues to attract the majority of new users, as indicated by Google Trends, and to the extent our lead in terms of absolute orders, as indicated by Similarweb visits. Canada continues to be a highly competitive market, but we've been able to hold our share and market leadership position. In absolute terms, we believe we've grown orders faster than competitors over the last 12 months. We've also expanded our convenience grocery operations with the launch of Skip Express Lane, as Jitse mentioned, a dark store model that will complement our existing partnerships with convenience retailers. We expect this to be profitable in line with the rest of delivery in Canada. In the Netherlands, the story is very similar. Our market position is very strong, and we continue to outpace our competitors in absolute terms, despite the largest competitors being present in the market since 2015 and 2016, respectively. In combination, these three markets will continue to support top-line growth and generate significant profits. Please turn to the next slide. On this slide, we show the same data for Australia, Poland, and Italy. Across all of these markets, we continue to outpace and outperform our competitors. In Australia particularly, we have made significant gains over the last 18 months and now are the market leader in online food delivery. In Poland, we have continued to maintain our number one position, while Italy remains a very strong market for us, and we remain the only player to have successfully transitioned to a fully employed logistics model. Our continued leadership in these and many other markets are a real source of strength, and we are confident of reinforcing and extending our position through our continued investments. I will now hand over to Matt to talk about the U.S. Thank you, Jörg. Good morning, everyone. Grubhub has nearly doubled since we announced the deal, and we are still very excited about our opportunity in the U.S. In line with our strategy, Grubhub holds strong leadership positions in many key, densely populated urban areas. Specifically, we are the clear number one leader in New York City, which is one of the world's largest and most profitable delivery markets in the world. As a business, Grubhub is already at significant scale, generating $10 billion GTV on an annualized basis in the first half of 2021, with a year-on-year order growth rate of almost 30%. It's also fundamentally profitable from our marketplace business, with an adjusted EBITDA of EUR 63 million in the first half of 2021, excluding fee caps. Before COVID, New York City also had a very strong B2B offering that is barely registering now. We are starting to rekindle as offices start to reopen. That is obviously pandemic dependent. Looking forward, our strategy in the U.S. is in line with our global strategy to reinforce and expand our existing strongholds, drive network effects, and enhance profitability overall. We will focus primarily on New York City, expanding and concentrating our platform there. The great city of New York does not appreciate the billions of dollars in food sales and millions of dollars in tips we've generated for them over the past 20 years. We will still focus on helping restaurants there. We believe all fee caps on an advertising model are illegal. We abided during the emergency orders in order to help restaurants there that were bearing the brunt of pandemic closures. Now that restaurants are open in New York City, we will vigorously fight any attempts to curtail a free market there. Once these fee caps have fallen away, we will continue to reinvest that amount back into the business and drive further growth for local restaurants. As part of our strategy, we also want to consolidate our marketing assets and transition Seamless to Grubhub later in the year. Seamless is iconic in Manhattan, but it is less well-known in the suburban New York areas. As the market gets more and more crowded, it is important to leverage a single brand across the city, and we will also get a local bump from a much more efficient national Grubhub television campaigns. We currently spend over a $500 billion in growth in the U.S., and without fee caps, we would also have an additional $250 million in profits to spend here. We intend to invest significantly to gain back share and grow in our key leadership markets without tapping into global profits. We do not want to be a drag on our corporate EBITDA. We have a lot of plans for how we will win back the U.S. and we will share further strategic updates at our capital markets day in October. In the meantime, I'll hand it over to Brent, who can take you through the H1 results for the group and our segments. Thank you, Matt, and good morning, everyone. In the first half of 2021, we achieved another step change in our scale, both from the combination with Grubhub and from the strong organic performance of the markets. On this slide, you see a comparison using IFRS and combined views for orders, revenue, and adjusted EBITDA. The IFRS basis shows the Just Eat combination as from the control date of April 15th, 2020, and Grubhub as from 15 June 2021. Please see the notes to the press release for the exact explanation. The combined figures show the data as if the merger between Takeaway.com and Just Eat, as well as the acquisition of Grubhub, took place from the 1st of January 2020. This makes the figures fully comparable and easier to assess the performance. Unless explicitly mentioned, all the figures in the financial section are combined figures. Please move to the next slide, where we highlight the development of drivers behind the growth of the orders and revenue. As indicated before by Jitse and Jörg, we achieved significant improvement in our key consumer metrics. In particular, because of targeted investments, we generated an active consumer base of 98 million in the first half of 2021, which is an increase of 17 million active consumers compared to the same period last year. 67% of these 98 million active consumers are returning consumers, which means that these consumers are ordering minimally 2 times in 12 months. This 67% is an increase of 3 percentage points compared to last year. Our consumer base is very sticky once they are a returning consumer. Therefore, this improvement is expected to have a positive implication for future years' growth. As a result of the above and the improvement in order frequency, we saw a further acceleration of order growth. The number of orders processed in the first six months in 2021 was 547 million, an increase of 51% compared to the year before. Strong order growth is seen in both marketplace and delivery. Delivery orders grew by 106%, which was driven by investments in restaurant supply expansion and successful partnership with big global QSRs, as well as investments in reduced delivery fees following the price leadership strategy across major markets. Strong order performance fueled increases in both Gross Transaction Value and revenue. Revenue growth of 52% at constant currency, outperforming Gross Transaction Value, even despite the significant impact of COVID commission rebates. In the first six months of 2021, we provided COVID commission support of EUR 142 million, of which EUR 110 million is related to government-imposed commission caps in the United States and Canada, and EUR 32 million relate to voluntary rebate programs to our restaurant partners. On slide 28, we focus on half-year adjusted EBITDA, broken down by segments. We are pursuing a clear vision on how to win the markets and strengthen our competitive advantage. In the first half of 2021, we focused our efforts to drive growth and online market share gain through targeted investments. These investments were predominantly made in the historically underinvested legacy Just Eat markets. As said before, we believe that we had to catch up in these markets to maintain and regain market share. Overall, we estimate that EUR 230 million were invested in Just Eat legacy markets in price leadership, additional marketing, continued rollout of delivery business, and expansion of the restaurant base, of which more than half went to the U.K. and Australia. In the first half of 2021, we've invested EUR 122 million in price leadership by reducing delivery fees versus competition in most of our markets. We believe that these price leadership investments contributed significantly to the regain of market share and growth in the Just Eat legacy markets. Given the significant gap in delivery fees versus competition in most of our markets, who by the way, has increased delivery fees further in the meantime, we have the opportunity reduce the levels of price leadership investments going forward and still provide a competitive value proposition to our customers. To support our continued growth, our brand has to be top of mind across all markets. We are achieving this by increasing investments in brand awareness and performance marketing. Specifically, the UEFA EURO 2020 sponsorship has positioned our brand association as a top-tier sports sponsoring brand, and has laid the foundation for our further work with UEFA through 2025. Our operational expenses are growing to reflect investments we made in the expansion of the sales teams to drive higher restaurant acquisition, growth in logistics and consumer services teams to support our top-line growth, and an increase in tech and support functions to drive all the improvements to our platform and business efficiencies. We are continuing to generate strong adjusted EBITDA and healthy adjusted EBITDA margins as a percentage of GTV in Germany, Netherlands, and Canada, despite the rapid expansion of delivery and the impact of COVID commission rebates. The significant investments together with the fee caps and the voluntary commission rebates led to the total group adjusted EBITDA of -EUR 190 million in the first half of 2021. Please follow me to slide 29, where you notice that we ended the first half of 2021 with a strong cash position of EUR 1.5 billion, which includes the EUR 1.1 billion we raised in February of this year through a convertible bond issue and some funds we acquired on the acquisition of Grubhub. With these funds, we are well capitalized to pursue our strategic investments. Now we will move on to focus on our segments. In U.K., the additional investments have successfully contributed to the strong order growth of 67%, with delivery orders growing by over 700% on a year-on-year basis. Revenue growth surpassed order and GTV growth despite significant investments we made in reduced pricing, which helped us to regain market share, including the triple-digit order growth in London. We have seen new consumers increase 28% year-over-year despite lapping exceptional new consumer acquisition from the first U.K. lockdown in 2020. In addition to the aggressive price leadership, we stepped up our investments in marketing and restaurant supply to catch up for previous years of underinvestment. We invested significantly in brand coverage, both nationally and in London, with our global advertising campaign, local activations of new restaurants, and successful sponsorship of UEFA Euro 2020. Our expanded sales teams signed up over 16,000 new restaurants as compared to June 2020, and we now have over 1,000 McDonald's restaurants on the platform. Altogether, these targeted measures led to a reduction of adjusted EBITDA, which set the strong base for sustainable growth for the future, as have also been shown by Jörg when discussing the developments in the U.K. Moving on to Germany, where orders grew strongly at 62% to EUR 80 million in the first half of 2021. GTV surpassed order growth by 15 percentage points, supported by higher order baskets and growth of delivery. Revenue growth was slightly below GTV at 76%, impacted by EUR 11 million of temporary commission relief measures to support our restaurant partners. Adjusted EBITDA increased by 63%, demonstrating the strength of this business. In addition, we continued investing in Germany as we've always done to further secure our leadership position. Next slide, please. In Canada, we continued our significant growth with both orders and GTV growing 54% year-over-year. Revenue grew by 38% on a constant currency basis. Revenue, though, has been impacted by EUR 32 million due to temporarily voluntary and involuntary commission relief measures to support the restaurant partners, and which doubled compared to last year. At the end of 2020, a loyalty and reward program was launched, driving high retention, increased frequency of our consumer base. Canada currently has the highest order frequency within our reportable segments. Despite the fact that these initiatives impacted our margin, we remain profitable in Canada, which is certainly caused by the quality of our logistical operations and the strength of the SkipTheDishes brand. Moving to the Netherlands, where we achieved a year-on-year growth of 37%, with delivery share increasing by 3 percentage points to 10%. GTV grow well above order growth, driven by larger basket values. Revenue growth surpassed GTV, benefiting from a greater mix of delivery orders and promoted placements revenue growth. The growth of our delivery orders, as well as an increase of investments in marketing and customer services, had a negative impact on our adjusted EBITDA margin. Nonetheless, we are pleased to announce a EUR 40 million profit in the first half of 2021, which is just a slight increase compared to the year before. Next slide, please. Here we see the Rest of the World segment, which comprises of our 14 other European markets as well as Israel, Australia, and New Zealand. We had a 54 order growth year-on-year, with growth in all countries. Delivery orders grew 190%, which is mainly driven by our success in Australia. This growth in delivery orders meant revenue growth exceeded that of both growth in orders and GTV at 62% on a constant currency basis. This growth came despite being adversely impacted by over EUR 30 million of price leadership strategy, particularly in Australia, as well as the impact of temporary commission relief to support the restaurant partners across Europe and Israel. The Rest of the World produced an adjusted EBITDA of -EUR 136 million in 2021 compared to EUR 7 million+ profit in the same period of last year. This investment mainly focused on the previously under-investment legacy Just Eat businesses. The investment in the Rest of the World was in three key areas. Firstly, the temporary period of price leadership, particularly in Australia. Secondly, expanding delivery coverage, including the rollout of the employment model in France and Italy. Finally, significant investments in marketing, particularly our sponsorship of UEFA Euro 2020, leveraging our consistent branding across all over Europe. We will continue this investment strategy in the Rest of the World across the remainder of the year to further fuel the growth going forward. Moving to the U.S. The United States Grubhub processed 134 million orders in the first half of 2021, representing a growth rate of 27%. Orders grew across tiers and throughout the country. During the first half of 2021, Grubhub began to see post-COVID-19 recovery in large city downtown areas, including markets like Manhattan, as well as in corporate businesses. GTV increased 31% on a constant currency basis, outperforming order growth. This was primarily driven by a higher average transaction value during COVID-19 lockdowns. Revenue grew 33% on a constant currency basis to over EUR 900 million in the first six months of 2021. Revenue growth reflected a mix shift to delivery orders offset by an approximately EUR 70 million year-on-year headwind from fee caps and voluntary partner support initiatives. The lower adjusted EBITDA in the year-on-year comparison is predominantly driven by the impact of the temporary commission fee caps. Removal of fee caps will positively impact future market profitability and will provide room for additional investments to strengthen the market position. As you might know, some big cities have announced to extend the relief measures, we are planning to oppose it as we believe that these measures are unlawful. Next slide, please. Finally, we provide you some insights in iFood's performance, our Latin American joint venture in which we hold 33% stake. The results presented here are on 100% ownership and constant currency basis. As Jitse discussed before, iFood is a strong business, and we can see that in other impressive set of KPIs and financials. Orders increased by just under 70%, with GMV and revenue increasing ahead of order growth, driven by the impact of increased delivery and grocery share. At the same time, EBITDA losses decreased in absolute terms, and EBITDA losses as a percentage of GMV decreased by over half to approximately 1.5%. Given the strong performance of iFood and the high potential, we expect to continue taking up our rights to participate in future iFood capital raises as they fund their ongoing investments, the latest being approximately EUR 50 million in July to fund iFood's current financial year. With this, I conclude my part and hand over to Jitse. Thank you, Brent. On slide 39, we would like to reiterate our guidance in terms of order growth, GTV, and adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of GTV for 2021. We guide for an order growth for the full year of 2021 of at least 45%, excluding Grubhub. For the full year of 2021, GTV for the combination is expected to be in a range of EUR 28 billion-EUR 30 billion, which clearly establishes us as one of the largest online food delivery companies in the world. 2021 is an investment year to expand our market leadership, in particular in the legacy Just Eat markets. We believe that adjusted EBITDA losses peaked in the first half of 2021, and we expect our adjusted EBITDA to improve going forward, driven by a few factors. The removal of significant fee caps and voluntary partner support in the U.S. and Canada. Improved unit economics in our delivery network, increasing benefits from the investment program in the legacy Just Eat markets. As a result, for the full year 2021, we expect Just Eat Takeaway.com, including Grubhub, to generate an adjusted EBITDA margin in a range of - 1% to - 1.5% of GTV. We continue with the conclusion of this presentation on slide 40. Our investment efforts in the historically under-invested legacy Just Eat markets are built on three strategic pillars: supply expansion and rollout of delivery, brand awareness and share of voice, and customer experience and value proposition, including price leadership. Delivery will become profitable in the medium term through increased scale, providing further efficiencies, product and tech improvements, and pricing optimizations. In the U.K., we continue to show online share gains on the back of our investments, and we have delivered continuous profitable growth in both Germany and the Netherlands. We reached the peak of our absolute losses in the first half of 2021. Improved profitability will be driven by the growth and increased scale of the business, flexibility from the widening price gap with our competitors, product and technology improvements, operational efficiencies, as well as fee caps, which are partly expected to fall away going forward. We reiterate our guidance in terms of order growth, GTV, and adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of GTV for the full year of 2021. We continue to be open to sell our stake in iFood. Last but not least, we will be holding a Capital Markets Day on the 21st of October to provide the market with further details on our strategy and increase visibility on how we will capitalize on the exciting long-term growth and profit opportunities across our business. With that, operator, I would like to open the call for questions. Thank you, sir. Ladies and gentlemen, we will start the question and answer session now. If you have a question or remark, please press star one on your telephone. Go ahead, please. The first question is coming from Ms. Estia Ryan, Barclays. Please go ahead. Your line is open now. Ms. Ryan, please go ahead. You've got Andrew Ross on from Barclays. Can you hear me okay? Yes. Sorry about that. Morning, everyone, and apologies for that. I've got two questions going. First one is on the fee caps and what you're including in the guidance for the second half. Clearly, since you provided the 2021 guidance in the middle of July, there's been some news in New York. Could you just clarify what is in the guidance regarding fee caps in the second half and kind of an overview of key cities would be great. The second question is on groceries and about the dark store you're opening in Canada. Can you just give us a bit more color as to where the plans are going regarding dark stores in Canada? You said that you think we should get to a similar underlying profitability as your core delivery business. Should we interpret there's going to be a big rollout on that basis or not? Any color around that would be very helpful. Thank you. Thank you. Regarding the question about fee caps, there was, of course, the announcement by New York that the fee caps are going to be extended. We decided to be rational about this and swallow those fee caps in the guidance, and that effectively then means that we will move certain resources from other parts of the U.S. to the cities in which Grubhub is strong, and therefore not use the additional investments that we were expecting to get from the roll-off of those fee caps. Now, when those fee caps are going to roll off, we will use the additional investments from the fee caps going away to invest in the major cities of Grubhub. Again, these investments will be very much like the investment that we have made across our European businesses. They will be in sales, they will be in marketing, they will be in delivery. They will be in the quality of our business, essentially. It's easier for us, just like it is in Europe, to increase the efficiency of our business in places in which we are already large. You can see that example in the U.K. I think the U.K. grew from 11 million orders to 25 million orders a month in the course of a year, which is, of course, very significant, but it's a lot easier to grow a very big business into a much bigger business than what it would be to grow a tiny business into a large business. We are always very much concentrated about these investments. Again, we are a rational player. We're not going to spend money that we simply do not have. It's very simple. In terms of the question around grocery, we have now opened two test stores in Canada. Those tests are going actually quite well. We're quite excited about it. Should we be happy about the unit economics and also about the stability of that business, we're going to roll out that model throughout Canada. Of course, these are tests, and we have to await the test results for that. At this point in time, we're quite enthusiastic about how these hubs function. Again, we already have a profitable underlying delivery network, so for us, it's quite easy to add something on top of that. In Europe, that's much harder, of course, because the unit economics are more challenging, and therefore, the investments that you would have to put into the rollout of dark stores in Europe is going to be significantly greater than what you would see in Canada. This is also why we have chosen to partner with supermarkets in Europe to achieve the same outcome. Helpful. Thank you. The next question is coming from Joe Barnet-Lamb, Credit Suisse. Please go ahead. Excellent. Morning, gentlemen, thank you for taking my questions. Three from me. The first couple are on the profits bridge, just to better understand it. You mentioned EUR 81 million impact from the August price increases, and in the U.K., that's EUR 31 million. Can you confirm, is that the impact solely of the admin fee change, or does it include a rise in delivery fees too, which seem to be starting to take place according to third-party data providers? Any color you can give on that would be great. Secondarily, building on Andrew's question relating to fee cap, can you break the EUR 110 million fee cap, involuntary commission cap impact down between New York and the rest of North America? Finally, just on the step up in Rest of World, Brent spoke a bit about this, but can you talk more about what you are doing in that segment? Brent said that that investment would continue through the balance of the year. As such, can we assume that Rest of World adjusted EBITDA losses will also peak at some stage in this year, or could it step up further in 2022? Thank you. Okay, thanks. I will take the last two questions. I will refer the first question to Jörg. Regarding the Rest of World, you can assume that has also peaked in H1, because a lot of the things that we're doing in Rest of World are the same as what we're doing in, for instance, the U.K. The Rest of World is a little bit of a mixed bag. We have profitable countries in there, large countries that are growing pretty nicely. Think of Poland. We also have a very significant investment program, for instance, in Australia, and that program actually reestablished us as the market leader in Australia, so it's very successful. It's our fastest growing country as well. Yeah, those investments cost money, but we're also there at the peak of those investments. You will also see us improve the unit economics in Australia. That's very much in line with the rest of the legacy Just Eat businesses. Regarding the fee caps, can't give you an exact split, but obviously a lot of the business of Grubhub is in New York, so you can also assume that that's quite a significant part of the fee caps. It's unfortunate that these fee caps have been extended, but it is what it is. We're going to have to swallow that difference. Regarding the U.K., I think Jörg can do that. Yeah. Regarding the price increases, it's a mix of the, what you said, admin fee change and price increases on delivery fees. For example, you have seen probably that in London, delivery fee went to GBP 0.99, which was previously zero for most of the QSRs. It's a mix of both. Excellent. Thank you very much. Thank you. The next question is coming from Rob Joyce, Goldman Sachs. Please go ahead. Thank you for taking my questions. Sorry to build on a familiar theme, but it does seem most investors are most concerned that you can maintain current momentum and also see those EBITDA losses improve. In the U.S., just firstly, should we, on the second half, should we be expecting losses to broadly stay at the same rate of the first half in the second half? Just building on in Matt's comment about EBITDA not negatively impacting the group level, assume on Grubhub, but broadly EBITDA break even. Second one just on that, in terms of peak investments, can you just give us a bit of an idea how we should get confidence outside of the U.S.? Is that mainly through delivery fee increases or underlying improvement economics? A final one, just in terms of the portfolio. I think you mentioned you'd talk more about this at the Investor Day in October. Would you consider monetizing assets outside of iFood, not just the iFood stake? If EUR 2.3 billion isn't the right number for iFood, can you give us an idea of how you think about what is the right number? Thank you. Thanks, Rob. Let's first address this question around iFood. I can't give you an exact amount, because also, you've seen a growth in that business. Actually, the longer this takes, the more value that business has. You would have to ask me at the moment that we can actually announce a sale of that stake, and why we then did it. I think that's very dependent on the moment in which we actually sell that asset. As we said, the value is very significant, and we believe that we're going to get a very good price for that. We are always looking at our portfolio, I think. That has always been the case. As you will remember, we divested Mexico last year. We have divested our Vietnamese business. We even divested the U.K. and France. We've always talked about network effects and how difficult it is to beat a successful incumbent. We've left the U.K. because we could not compete with Just Eat back in the day. Similarly in France, we were chanceless because we were just too small. We have done this in the past. We are very much about owning very profitable market leading positions. We know that sometimes our competitors say, "Oh, it doesn't matter when we are just number two or three." It does matter. We don't know any number two or three that is even remotely close to profitability. It does matter. We don't think that the only way to be profitable as a number two and three is to decrease your marketing efforts. Therefore the number one is just going to increase its gap with you as a number 2 or 3 player. We don't like those positions. We are very much after these very strong positions, these profitable businesses. There are not that many of those businesses, but we happen to own a lot of them. If it fits that profile, we're not likely to be a seller. If we can see that to get to profitability is going to take ages, we will divest that asset. In the case of iFood very specifically, if we would own the whole business, we would certainly not divest the business, but we own a stake and therefore we can't control it, and we need to sell it because we don't see why we should own stakes in competitors. It doesn't make any sense because everybody can own stakes, but we're not a financial investor, so it doesn't make sense to us. Regarding the momentum, a lot of what we have done, and you can see that on the cohorts slide, has significantly increased order frequencies and our customer base and the restaurant count. Those things are there to stay. If there's no more pandemic, that doesn't matter. We essentially added a lot more customers than we would have been able to do outside of a pandemic. We made use of that pandemic to actually, mostly on the Just Eat side, to improve that business significantly. I just mentioned it is a big difference if you have 11 million orders in the U.K. or 25 million orders, right? All the network effects are much greater. You're able to attract all the QSRs. We've become the largest McDonald's partner in the U.K., for instance. That's very significant as well. There's all these benefits that you have when you're bigger, and these benefits, they will materialize because it's a cohort. We can predict cohort behavior. It's not that difficult. We are quite confident about the momentum. If you look at our pricing, even with the July, August increases, we're much cheaper than everybody else, right? We have a lot of upsides there as well. We're going to be very patient with the increases because we see that our strategy is working. We plan to overtake the number one in London. We have very good momentum in the London market. That's the next aim for us in the U.K., and we plan to put quite a big gap between us and the then number two in the British capital. That's the current plan. We're after that. You should not expect us to all of a sudden raise the delivery fees to not be competitive anymore in the market. That's the trade-off that we make. Regarding the EBITDA loss in the U.S., I think it's safe for you to assume same rate in the second half. That having said, a lot of that is dependent on the fee caps falling away or not, and in which area. We'll have to monitor that. As we said, and also as Matt said, we plan to run it roughly at breakeven. Yeah, the fee caps are a question mark to us. We have to look at what will happen and when it will happen. In some cases, the fee caps have fallen away. In other cases, we are expecting them to fall away within a month or so. We have to look at that. I think those were the questions, if I'm correct. Yeah. Just the, sorry, yeah, it's very helpful. The EBITDA beyond that, I think you mentioned not being a negative drag at a group level. Is that a comment that you might run at breakeven for the longer term? It is, yeah. Thank you. I think it's important, actually, around the Grubhub. Grubhub has a very profitable core. It owns a large marketplace segment. It owns a large B2B segment. Of course, a lot of the B2B has been impacted because of COVID. Yeah, when people return to the office, that's going to come back because there's all these corporate contracts that are contracts, right? People are obliged to keep on ordering with Grubhub. We have good visibility on the profitability of that business. Yeah, we are in a little bit of a strange situation, of course, with the pandemic hopefully behind us now, but we'll have to see. Okay. Thank you. The next question is coming from Silvia Cuneo, Deutsche Bank. Please go ahead. Thank you. Good morning, everyone. My first question is about the U.K., just building now on your comments to one of the last answers earlier. Can you please talk about your near-term ambitions? Like where do you see the delivery share of orders going from the current 39%? How do you see the competitive landscape playing out in major areas like London? You talked about aiming to become the number one there. Does it mean the market share can grow by another 10 percentage points next year, for example? My second question is about the U.S. As you confirmed, the adjusted EBITDA loss has peaked. Is that fair to assume the U.S. does not need a major step-up in investments like it has been the case for the Just Eat delivery markets? If that's the case, to what extent is that due to the different riders model? It would be great if you could also talk about whether you are considering transitioning to an employment model there at all. Thank you. Thank you. Let me first answer that question around the U.S. The U.S. requires further investment in the strongholds, and there's two ways that we can go about that. We can move resources from the rest of the U.S. to those strongholds, and we can use the fee caps falling away. Now, if the fee caps fall away slowly, we'll use more of the assets outside of those cities. If the fee caps move away quickly, we use the fee cap money. That's how we look at it. It's a lot of money, right? It's actually quite a big additional investment, and I think what's also something that people often don't see with us, the combined business has almost a EUR 500 billion of marketing in half a year. If you look at runway for that, it's about EUR 1 billion of marketing that we spend. Matt was also referring to it. We actually have quite some investments already going for us, and we do believe as, let's say, the legacy debt management, that investment needs to be targeted at the major cities. It would be easiest to use the fee caps for that, but we are where we are. We have to await that, and therefore we will likely move resources to get the same thing done. Around neutral EBITDA, I think that's a sensible way forward after this year. We won't change the employment model unless, of course, the government requires that from us, and then everybody has to change the employment model. Regarding your question around London. Look, we plan to be the absolute largest food delivery website in the whole of the U.K., including London, and whether 10% absolute gain is enough or 20% or 30%, that's difficult to say. We just know that the number 1 will make money and the number 2 and 3 will likely not make money. That's a more important thing to remember, I think, about our business. Same thing in Germany, right? There's a lot of players that want to become the number 2. Well, that's going to cost a lot of money to be a serious number 2 against such a formidable company like Lieferando, and it's not likely to become profitable ever. I think these are the most important things in our business. Just show us a highly profitable number 2. They don't exist. Regarding the delivery share. Well, delivery in the first half is growing more than 700%, clearly that's still going to become a larger segment. Our aim is to decrease the losses on those delivery orders and turn those losses into a gross profit benefit. Of course, we still have the very profitable marketplace business, we don't necessarily need to be gross profit positive. We are a rational company, and we believe that the costs need to be covered, right? This is the way we look at it also. Yes, delivery will grow. If we add grocery chains, also by a lot. We feel that that business also needs to be profitable, and therefore we'll do everything that we can to get there. We have given specific guidance also for it. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you. The next question is coming from Marc Hesselink, ING. Please go ahead. Yes. Thank you. Actually, my main question is about the price increases and how you think about that going forward for the delivery. Is that something that you approach on a country-by-country basis or city by city or maybe even restaurant by restaurant, like really looking at what it adds to your network effects? How many new clients does it bring in? How much gross profit is that per order? I really like to know how you think about that and also going forward. Yeah. Indeed, we look at it in a very granular basis, especially from a competitive point of view. There should be no reason for a consumer to go to another platform than us. We should always provide the best price-value proposition to the consumer. That's one of our key strategic pillars, and we want to make sure that this is the case. We're looking at it indeed like very granular with regards to competition, but even on a city level, because also like providing some of the smaller cities might have less density than some of the larger cities, so that might impact pricing, but also whether it's QSRs or non-QSRs businesses. We definitely have a various range of factors which are being included in that decision. That's something that you can optimize like every, I don't know, every month, every quarter, you look at, okay, is this still the optimal level and you can change it a bit or? Well, actually, that's the way we currently do it. We want to move to something that basically changes every minute. We're actually investing some money into those sort of projects. Again, for us, there are several drivers. It might be that for certain QSRs, we have a different rate. It might be that in certain suburbs, we have a different rate. We look very carefully at the competition, of course. The most important thing to look at is the customer. What's the customer willing to pay, and are we the most affordable option? We believe that it's often overlooked also in our business, but the marketplace business has a much lower price point than the delivery business. I'm not talking about delivery fee, because that's where the focus is on a lot. I'm talking about just the price of the foods. Marketplace restaurants are much cheaper than delivery restaurants because they don't need waiters and that sort of thing. Actually for the consumer, we are in mostly, basically in all the markets, the most affordable choice, right? We also would like to be the most affordable in delivery, and we think that we can outlast any competition because we have that marketplace business. In that sense, we look at this in a, let's say, very scientific manner. Then as follow-up to that, how do you then think about the QSRs? If I'm correct, they still pay slightly lower commission rates typically than like another restaurant. Also the basket sizes are smaller, so they cost you more. Is that something that you would like to repair or you just accept that because they bring in so many new extra clients? Look, you're talking to a bunch of entrepreneurs, right? You are very much focused on the current situation. We are thinking about how does the company look like in three years? How does the competitive landscape look like in three years? How do AOVs develop, et cetera. We are looking far more long-term, and we're looking at what can we expect that the consumer is going to do in a couple of years from now. Having worse terms on QSRs while they bring us more new customers and a better product, a better proposition, while we also know that commissions can increase in the future, that actually the amount of orders will increase, the density of the network will increase. All these things that will improve over the next couple of years, you need to take into consideration when asking such a question. Yes, QSRs have better terms, but also take marketplace. Domino's has better terms than a mom-and-pop shop because there's more volume. We're very happy that we have Domino's. You could say, yes, because you're making less money on the Domino's order. Yes, that's true. We're getting far more volume, far more new customers. It's much better for our brand image. We have all these benefits. Again, this is a moment in history, and in the end, it's about who runs the largest profitable business in the country. If you don't run that business, you are in a little bit of a difficult spot. Okay. Very clear. Thank you. The next question is coming from Clément Genelot, Bryan, Garnier. Please go ahead, sir. Yeah, morning. I've got two questions on my side, if I may. The first one is on price increases. If I might, price increases would bring EUR 80 million in H2, of which EUR 30 million in the U.K. Where did you also increase prices on July and August beyond the U.K.? How did you increase the prices? Just to follow our competitors and thus realign with them? Whether because you feel that the customers became keen enough to accept a price increase? My other question is on delivery. You mentioned improved unit economics in delivery from 2021. Do you have any more color to provide to us at that front? For instance, what is the current number of drops provided per hour? Thanks. Thank you. Let me address your first question. We constantly evaluate our pricing. We go up with prices, but we also sometimes go down. If we see that we are getting a new competitor that is trying to undercut us, we go down. We don't always go up. You see a result there, which is a positive result, of all the things that we do essentially globally in that business. I think it's important to understand that, take a country like Germany, our average delivery fee is EUR 1, right? Our competitors in the U.S., they charge $5.50 or something. We are at EUR 1, so we are very low, and we have possibilities to change pricing per part of the city, per restaurant chain, per part of the country, et cetera. We can go either direction. If you ask us where was this? It was everywhere. It might be that in the north of a country, we lowered the pricing, and in the south, we increased it. It's a bit of a difficult question to answer in that sense. Regarding what we can improve in delivery, a whole lot. Because first of all, take the U.K., that's the clearest example. In the U.K., we currently operate three models. We currently grow 700%. Obviously, take a city of London, we've rolled out the employment model to parts of London. That means it's not efficient because you would have difficulties getting a courier to go to an area in which you run another model. Your efficiency is actually lower than what it could be. If you run that same model in the whole city of London, you're going to be far more efficient than what we are now. There's a lot of efficiency gains there. Also with 700% growth, you have a lot of waste. You have a lot of things that you need to improve. You don't have the density yet that you want to get. I was just referring to that market share in London. Obviously, because we have slightly less market share now than the numbers one and two in London, our density should be lower than these guys. If we have a higher market share than these guys, our density should be better. In the end, if we look at just the KPIs, our density in countries like Germany and Holland is much greater than what we have in London at this point in time. We have a lot of improvements that we can make. We can't disclose drop rates. We just know that they're really good compared to everybody else. I just mentioned Canada, for instance. Canada is a very profitable logistical business that we own. Actually, the drop rate in a country like Germany is better. Of course, the economics are worse because the labor cost is higher in Germany. The drop rate is actually better in Germany. It depends very much on the country. We can improve everywhere also because we have different systems, right? We have in total, a couple of models in the company trying to leverage the tech, the knowledge, et cetera. We have a lot of things that we can improve. I could give you a very large list. Maybe one thing, because I think you're comparing the wrong figures. You mentioned the EUR 31 million, which is depicted on slide 11, but you have to compare the EUR 81 million with the EUR 31 million on the. On page 17, you were comparing here to pro forma. It is EUR 81 million versus EUR 31 million. That's the right comparison and not the numbers that you mentioned. Understood. Thanks a lot. Thank you. The next question is coming from Sreedhar Mahamkali, UBS. Please go ahead. Hi. Good morning. Thanks for taking my questions. Three quick questions for me then, please. Firstly on Germany, appreciate your newly entered competitors haven't had much of an impact, but as you take a sort of two, three-year view, do you feel the profitability in Germany can remain as healthy as it is currently? Also, are there any elements of your own plans in Germany that might need to be tweaked in response to competition, such as pace of rollout of logistics or groceries? That's the first one, Germany. Secondly, in terms of U.K. restaurant supply, I think you pointed to 58,000 restaurants at the end of the H1, which looking like at our data is Deliveroo is number 2. I think, Jörg, you mentioned you're now number 1 on a like for like basis, if you can clarify that. More importantly, I guess, again, on our data, it seems like last couple of months or so, restaurant recruiting is stalling a little bit. You can talk about your strategy. That'll be super helpful in terms of how you drive choice from here and become a leader. Last one is just a clarification. I think you talked about running U.S. for breakeven. Is that a comment for 2022? Or is there anything else you can highlight sort of slightly beyond 2022? Is that a more of a medium-term sort of plan is how we should interpret? Those are the three. Thank you. Thanks. Yeah. The last question, that is for 2022, because obviously still we have the fee caps now. We expect them now to roll off in February next year for New York, right? That's the 2022 is the accurate year to look at for the breakeven comment that Matt made. Regarding your question for Germany, well, you should expect the EBITDA in Germany to go up. I think you were suggesting whether we could maintain the profitability. No, it should go up. Regarding competitors, Jörg made a good comparison here, right? Our GTV in Germany is EUR 2 billion. We have one competitor that is now reentering Germany that has EUR 1.4 billion in GTV in the whole of Europe. You can't seriously expect that that company's going to achieve a number one position. They must be after a number two position. Again, if you're after a number two position, the chances that you're going to make money in Germany are very slim. Germany is not the easiest country to compete because there's quite a lot of legislation in Germany. I just now put it mildly. I'm from another country with a lot of legislation, but I still think there's a lot of legislation in Germany. It's going to be very difficult to become a serious number 2 in Germany, and you're going to have to invest 100s of millions. Like was already demonstrated years ago, right? This has already been attempted, and we've had 40 competitors in Germany, and they all failed. Our market leadership in Germany is not an accident. We've competed with a lot of people over there. Yeah, are we tweaking? Well, we are looking at what competitors are doing. If they do something smart, we'll certainly look at it. If they do something stupid. You see a lot of couponing again, right? A lot of free foods being handed away. I can just give you the example for Jörg because Jörg lives in Berlin and then tries these things. Jörg first gets a EUR 20 coupon, then he orders grocery, then he gets two free chocolate bars. Remember, he didn't pay for the grocery, right? He gets two days later, he gets two vouchers of EUR 5. I don't want to make that calculation on the return on investment, but that doesn't sound like a great plan forward. If that's what the competition is going to do, by all means, they should do it. Regarding the restaurant count for the U.K., Jörg? Yeah, the 58,000 restaurants. First of all, like I said, it's not like for like. If I look at our 58,000 restaurants, almost 100%, 97% of that is really active in the sense of like having received an order over the last 13 weeks. We're also obviously checking on competitors' websites, and at our competitors' websites, this number is much smaller. When you compare that, for example, with one of the competitors you mentioned, that number was only 80%. That actually would lead to a number which is more like 47,000 restaurants. There's quite some gap there. Also like if you look at the estate, actually, there's quite some multiple lines which are counted as multiple entries. The extreme example is a restaurant in Croydon, Indian restaurant, where we have one entry and competitor has 23 entries. I could even give you the name here. There's multiple examples of that. Just purely taking that listed count doesn't really work so well. Also like, I think the number was not clearly stated, the absolute number, but it was said the competitor added 10,000 restaurants, which was almost 30% increase, which would guide me to a number of they went from 30,000 restaurants to roughly 40,000 of restaurants. If that was the right wording in what they said in the press release, then that number is clearly significantly lower than what we have in the U.K. Last but not least, even then if the estate would be at a similar level, what it also clearly shows is our restaurants, actually, per restaurant partner get a way higher order per restaurant, which is also an interesting metrics. Even if they would be just about 20% below our active restaurant estate, we are almost doing double the amount of orders. The order count per restaurant, in our case, is much, much stronger, which implies that actually our network effects are much, much stronger at first, and secondly, probably the estate which is being added is not necessarily the one the consumer wants or is providing a lot of orders. Got it. Thank you. Two quick follow-ups. In Germany, are there any chain restaurants that are actually exclusive to you? In the U.K., maybe you can talk about how you drive the restaurant choice from here. What are the steps you're taking? I think you talked about local heroes starting to come on the platform the year after you started logistics, et cetera. We don't do exclusivity contracts in Germany. That's something generally we don't want to restrain the market. We believe in the long run, given the network effects and the market position we have, we'll anyways have most of the supply side as well. Maybe on Germany also adding, because you were asking a bit of an outlook, and obviously Berlin is probably the market where competition has been around for the longest. Some of the competitors have been around for more than one year or approximately one year by now. If you look at YipitData data, which is credit card data for Berlin, we are still at 90% share and the competitors are at 4% and then 6%, and they're basically non-existent. Directionally, their share is more or less flat over the last couple of months. You see even in a city where competition has been around for longer, the share gains are not really significant, but obviously if you come from zero, you will always have some share gains. With regards to deals in the U.K., most of the deals with chains are also not necessarily exclusive in the U.K. Like I said, we're not necessarily aiming for exclusivity deals generally. Thank you. The next question is coming from Wim Gille, ABN AMRO ODDO. Please go ahead. Yes, a very good morning. I would like to go to slide 10 first. You are currently investing a very significant amount of money into delivery to successfully acquire new clients. Can you give us a bit of an indication what the profile is of the customers that join the platform through the delivery channel? Is the profile and the order behavior similar to existing clients, or do they exhibit a different behavior? Maybe taking the U.K. as an example, you have a delivery share of about 40%, so that means that a UK consumer currently orders around four delivery orders and roughly six marketplace orders. Per annum, is this profile the same for all the cohorts in the U.K.? More specifically, what is the split between delivery and marketplace orders for the 2021 cohort that you recently signed up? In extension of that question, if we take the marketing cost plus the losses in delivery as customer acquisition costs, what is the payback period that you expect for the 2021 cohort, and how does this payback period compare to previous cohorts? That will be my first questions, and then I have a follow-up. Thanks. Thank you. I will have Brent answer that second question. With just your remark about the cohorts. First of all, our consumers rarely know whether we are delivering the food or somebody else before they order. We have no delivery customers or marketplace customers. I think this is a misconception from the market, and I have to admit that we must do a better job in explaining that, but we do not have delivery cohorts. We don't have such a customer. We just have customers. You can also see this in the order frequency behavior, because that applies to the whole customer, basically. Of course, even if we had a record year in new user addition, most of our customers are actually existing customers, so they influence the order frequency most. I think what you should really understand about what we did in the U.K. is that Just Eat was very late with the logistical rollout. That also meant that Just Eat lost quite a few customers to other players over the course of the last couple of years, in which, for instance, they did not have McDonald's, or they did not have the local salad bar, or they did not have a specific sushi place that people were interested in. We did two things. First of all, we repaired that, and then second of all, we said, "Okay, dear customer, please come back to Just Eat because we now have the offering. By the way, it's much cheaper than that with the competition. You have good grounds to come back and place a logistical order with us, but also the marketplace orders. We have reduced churn significantly, but we also, and you see that in the cohorts, we have reactivated these older cohorts. Those people might have left Just Eat and they're back now. They're back not only for the delivery orders, but also for the marketplace orders. As we said, we're rather agnostic about it. We need to give the customer what the customer wants, and if the customer wants to order with a salad bar that we have to do delivery for, we do it. As said, our marketplace business keeps on growing, that's highly profitable, and the delivery business is profitable in the U.S. and Canada. We need to increase the profits also in Europe. Because the unit economics are more challenging because of the labor cost and lower ticket sizes, the scale needs to be bigger than what would be necessary, let's say, in Canada or the U.S. to get to profitability. This is the way we look at it. We look at it very much from a customer perspective, and the customer, again, you can't see it on our website whether we deliver or a restaurant does. That distinction doesn't exist for the customer. Well, with respect to the second question about the return on investment on a customer, how we look at it, and we look at it per market, is that we do the marketing cost divided by the new customers, that is a customer acquisition cost. Then we compared it with the gross profit per customer over its lifetime. As you can see from our cohorts, the lifetime of a customer can easily be eight years. Actually, in all the countries where we are active, the return on an individual customer is positive. The only big difference is, of course, that in Holland, in Germany, for example, the gross profit per customer is significantly better, and then the return on investment on an individual customer is significantly higher. You recoup your acquisition cost within, let's say, one and a half years. Whereas in countries where gross profit per order is lower, either because more competition, we charge less delivery fee right now, it will take a little bit longer before we can recoup our acquisition costs. Actually, in all the countries we are active, the ROI is positive and would certainly meet the thresholds of an average investor. Very good. Then I have a follow-up question, I would like to move to slide 11, where you provide an excellent bridge on profitability. If you look at that, you see that the fee caps took out about EUR 110 million in profits for the first half. How much of these caps have already lapsed and are no longer applicable in the second half? Also, if I look at the base for the second half, if I take out the voluntary rebates and the price increases that you passed through in August, the base already moves to a loss of about EUR 17 million. Taking a normalized view on fee caps in the second half, you get probably close to break even. Still, on the low end of your guidance, you expect to make another EUR 100 million loss or more in the second half. Can you give us a bit of a feeling where do you intend to invest these additional investments which will come over on top of what you already invested in the first half? Which regions and which channels should we think about? Yeah. Let me take the fee cap question. I will refer the second one to Jörg. The fee caps, a smaller part of that is already gone. Unfortunately, because a lot of this is actually N.Y., a large chunk is still in N.Y., and therefore, it is only a smaller part at this point in time. We do have some expectancies that two of the other cities are going to retract the fee caps. At this point, it is a smaller part of that EUR 110 million. Second question, Jörg. Yeah. With regards to profitability in H2, we have given guidance previously, that actually included an assumption that the fee caps, especially also in New York, would fall away. We've now clarified that despite the fee caps not falling away, we still stick to the guidance. You will see us not massively improving in the second half as compared to the first half. We also will invest additional amount of money in specifically also like rollout of logistics. For example, in the U.K., we are still rolling out more cities and more areas within the cities. In London, we've already rolled out quite a bit, we've not yet covered the whole of the city. Usually, especially the beginnings of the rollouts do actually have lower efficiency levels. Especially the beginning, let's say 6 months- 12 months of these rollouts cost quite a lot of money. We're also hoping for additional additions of maybe some QSRs across our various countries. There is in certain countries still some QSRs which we wanted to add. Like we've explained previously, these unit economics are a bit different. There's also some investments into our headquarters, especially also like IT stuff and a few other things which contribute to that. That would be the main focus on our investments. Thanks. Just to clarify, did you mention that it takes about 12 months for a new Scoober hub to reach normal efficiency? That's a bit dependent on the city. You cannot generalize it. If you add a hub in a city where you're already active and you're just replacing, that can go a bit faster because you already have the scale and density. It depends very much on the partners you're adding and how fast you actually get to a certain scale and density in a city. 12 months would still be kind of a good indicative timeframe for modeling purposes? Yeah. Thank you very much. The next question is coming from Andrew Porteous, HSBC. Please go ahead. Yeah. Hi, guys. A couple from me, if I may. Just wondering, coming back to your guidance again, is there anything in there for your plans with grocery partnerships coming through? Is that accounted for or would that be incremental to the guidance you put out there? Secondly, you're increasing prices, what seems like quite early in the new strategy. I'm just wondering what's giving you the confidence to do that. Is it more driven by what you're seeing in the market around competition raising prices, or is it more driven by the behavior of customers that you're seeing, and effectively, you're winning back those customers already, so you're a bit more confident there? The last one from me was, obviously a lot of the gains that you've had to date come from high volume QSRs. I'm just wondering if there's any plans to push into more premium areas a bit more aggressively in the future, or whether that's an area that's perhaps a little bit small to follow with? Yeah. That last question, I think these questions are good. Especially in London, we are also very busy on getting those more exclusive restaurants online. That, however, is a smaller segment of the UK market. I think it's very important to understand that. Of course, if you live in London, you think that that's the entire business, but it's actually quite a small segment. Therefore, also, let's say we would be able to add all these restaurants, it's not going to make a material impact to the amount of orders. Even with our competitors, the logistical guys, trust me, most of their business is QSRs. It's actually not these local heroes, although, of course, that's the image that these guys sometimes portray. It's mostly the QSR. For us, the most important thing to fix was actually the QSRs in the U.K., not so much these local heroes. We do realize that for London, we need them, and this is also why we signed up so many in the last year. The pricing depends on a lot of factors. If we are still working on getting a lot of customers to go from one of our competitors back to Just Eat, then yes, pricing is very important. If the customers are back, because, in essence, why did the customers leave? We did not have certain QSRs mostly, or certain restaurants. If you fix the supply bits and you have the customers back, you don't per se need a cheaper delivery fee, right? This is also why if you look at markets, this is also what Jörg just mentioned, if we don't have a certain supply in one of these other legacy Just Eat markets, we still have to do that, and we still have to lower the delivery fee to get those customers to come back. Of course, this is a double-edged sword because on the one hand, we gain a lot of customers, on the other hand, our competition loses a lot of customers. I think that's a good situation for us if that happens. In the U.K., it's actually easier for us to raise prices than elsewhere. Similarly, of course, in countries in which we're strong like Germany or Holland. In the end, yeah, we look at the utilization of the network. We also don't want to increase prices to a level that the orders go down, right? We also want to keep up the growth. The growth is more important to us in relation to the pricing than anything else. We want to keep up the growth. We see that these delivery restaurants get us quite a lot of new customers. This is why actually the trade-off is between growth and pricing, and not per se between competitors and pricing. Grocery is included in the guidance. It's important to understand that we roll out grocery in Europe on the back of the delivery network, and the delivery network needs to improve the unit economics. Grocery is included. Obviously, in a country like Canada, if you add something that's already profitable, that's always fine, of course. Even if you have to build hubs, that is always a good situation. Yes, the grocery is included in the guidance. Brilliant. Thank you for the answers. Excuse me, Operator, is there more questions? Excuse me, Operator, are we still on? Excuse me, are we still on? No. 60-minute disconnect. We probably should redial. No one was responding. Can you guys get us back on? I hear you. Oh, okay. We are still live. I think our operator's gone. Okay, Matt, what do you want to talk about? Maybe I can ask you a question. Yes, we can hear you now. Thank you. You're welcome. Please continue, Miss Adisa. Hello, can you hear me? Yeah, we hear you. Oh. Not sure what happened. Great. Sorry. Okay, great. Thanks for squeezing me in. On Germany, could you just talk a bit about the initial learnings that you're seeing with grocery, and are you acquiring a lot of new customers or are the orders coming from your existing customer base? Secondly, on Rest of World, specifically Australia, could you just give a bit of color on the unit economics in Australia, given that's clearly the key driver of the losses in that segment, perhaps where the share of delivery is now, and also what's the latest on the Scoober rollout as well? Are you expecting to move to a fully employed model in Australia? To what extent could that put more pressure on EBITDA there? Finally, just on current trading, if you could just share a bit about what you're seeing in Q3 so far in terms of churn, particularly in the markets that have come out of lockdown the most, and specifically also on the marketplace in the U.K., if you could just share what you're seeing at the moment. Thanks. Thank you. Let me first address the last question, which is also a little bit difficult to address because we're in summer, and not to say we're also in Q3, but summer is always not the growth season for us. We've disclosed those cohorts. The cohorts are strong also now. Obviously we are in a summer period and a lot of people actually have taken the opportunity to go on holiday. It's very difficult now to say trading is higher or lower. It is as expected for the summer period. We have reiterated the guidance for the 45% or higher growth. We still stand behind that. Regarding the unit economics in Australia. Well, actually Australia is our fastest growing country, also in which we invest most. I would say that also the price investments that we're making in Australia are quite significant. I think the current situation to look at is not the right situation. We fixed a lot of the issues in that business. Don't forget that we were actually writing off Australia last year, and now it's our fastest growing country. I think there's quite a lot of moving parts. We are testing the Scoober model in Sydney, which is going quite well, and we're speaking with the Australian government to see whether we can get into a situation that we can roll out an employed model, but in a competitive way. It's important for us to be able to compete with the freelance model, and therefore we need a couple of things from the Australian government, and we are in active discussions with them. We do expect that that's going to have a positive impact on our business because of the service levels. We do see that if we have less churn on the couriers, if we can educate the couriers that the service actually becomes better. Of course, the visibility is very important for us. Don't forget that this is a very small experiment in Sydney and most of the business is on the freelance model actually in Australia. Which is also, by the way, legal in Australia. It's not that we're trying to correct something that's not in accordance with the laws, like for instance, is the case in Europe, if you look very specifically at Spain and Italy, freelance model is just out of the question. The grocery question for you, Jörg. I think one question was also what's the logistics share in Australia. That's around 80%. Majority of orders are with logistics there. With regards to Germany or the grocery question, I guess the best picture we actually have from groceries is in Canada, where we're already doing 100,000s of orders actually from grocery partners. We have also in Germany, a couple of retail partners, for example, Shell gas stations is one example. The shops basically from the gas stations or SPAR stores. The experience we have so far is like it's pretty much complementary to the food offering we have in the sense of you're basically expanding the current peaks of the food ordering. You have the first peak, which is basically food ordering, where you're ordering your pizza or your Poke bowl, and then afterwards you're complementing your night by ordering snack bars or chocolate or drink home. The nice thing about that is actually that this means it's actually an improvement for fleet utilization. You're actually expanding the peaks of your fleet, which is very helpful, especially in the employed model, because you just usually have a very small window of a peak in food delivery, which is usually about an hour and a half or so. A lot of the countries, legally, we have to staff people at least three hours in an employed model, for example. Therefore widening this peak is really a great improvement of the utilization of our fleet. We already see some positive impacts from that. In terms of unit economics, seems to be in line with delivery, what we see so far. Great. Thank you. The last question is coming from Andrew Gwynn, Exane BNP Paribas. Please go ahead. Hi. Good morning, all. Well, afternoon even for you guys. Two questions that I have very quickly. Firstly, on the guidance, obviously there's quite a significant range for the second half. I think about EUR 140 million gap implied between the bottom and the top. I just wonder if you can give us a bit more help on where in the range you would expect to land. The second question, which is for Matt, I appreciate you dialed in very early. Obviously, N.Y., very significant in Grubhub. I guess maybe 50% of Grubhub. The other markets outside of N.Y., clearly very competitive. Any kind of big plans, anything we should have in mind there, any help would be much appreciated. Thank you very much. Thank you. I will comment on your first question and hand over to Matt. Regarding the guidance for H2, you should think about H2 as slightly better than H1. The reason for that is, of course, the fee caps in New York. Those are quite significant. Therefore, we expect improvement, but you should not expect that to all of a sudden become profitable in the second half. Also, we are investing significant amounts still, right? We're not done. The example was, of course, London. We want to be the absolute market leader in London. We need to be, let's say, two, three times bigger than the number 2 in London, then we're going to be satisfied. We have no reason to dial down the investments, especially in the U.K., but also in other countries. We want to make sure that we decrease the losses, because I think it's a sensible thing to do. Matt? Absolutely. Thanks for the question. I would say that the Grubhub strategy historically has been very much in line with the Just strategy, which is focused on the major metro areas, focused on your leadership and the network effects that that brings so that you can drive profits to invest further. We've always done that. We think we are the market leader in multiple densely populated urban areas around the country. What we've seen in the last couple of years, especially around COVID, is the massive acceleration of the suburban orders, which Grubhub was not positioned to take advantage of. We did not have the deep QSR relationships at the time. When you saw the multiple growth outside of the dense urban areas, we did not capture that. However, we also did not erode our positions in the core metro areas, except for the fact that the majority of residents fled the core urban areas during the pandemic. They are now back or coming back. The offices are reopening, but are not fully open. We're going to continue to drive as hard as we can on those markets that we believe we are leaders, and we can drive a significant profitable business in. We're not deviating strategy, we're just really aggressively investing behind our strength. One detail in the US market is that national television ads are very economical as compared to local or regional television ads. We have an aggressive campaign on the television, which obviously reaches all markets all across the country. As we've been building out our QSR relationships over the past year and expanding our supply to match that of our peers so that we can compete in the outer districts, even though that's not our focus, our core metro areas are also receiving the same television ads now. In Manhattan, where Seamless has been a religion for years, that means that the Grubhub brand has grown aggressively and, in fact, surpassed the Seamless brand in New York. That's why it's time now to transition the Seamless brand over to Grubhub so that we can continue to leverage our assets behind strength and further accentuate our leadership position there. That's an executive summary of the US strategy, and obviously more to come in October. Okay, appreciate that. Just to clarify, middle of the range should be the kind of early thinking for the full year, so slightly better in the second half. Is that fair? Well, the GTV loss is -1.3%, and if it's going to be better in the second half, it should be better than the -1.3%. Yeah. Okay. Great. Thank you very much. Have a good day. Likewise. Thank you. I think we're done with the questions, so I would like to round off this analyst and investor call by thanking you for participating and your questions. Should you have any additional questions or remarks, please reach out to our investor relations team. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes this event call. You may now disconnect your line. Thank you.