Good morning, everyone. Over to you. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us on our first half results briefing. I'd like to pass it over to Piyush, our CEO, and Sok Hui, our CFO. Actually, why don't you pass it on to the Q&A because there's not that much I want to say over and above what we said in the media section there. Thank you. We can go to Q&A, please. Operator, can we have the first question, please? Sure. Participants with audio conference refreshments and calls, please press zero one on your telephone keypad and you'll be placed in the queue. Okay. There are no questions. Operator, do you have any questions? Okay. Is Edna there? First, we have Jayden from Macquarie. Your question, please. Thank you very much. Thanks, DBS team, and comments earlier. I guess I am just trying to square the credit quality outlook. Just a couple of questions on it if I can, Piyush. Earlier you were saying that provisions will not be any more than SGD 500 million. That suggests up to SGD 400 million for the year, given the first half has been very benign. Your comments earlier sounded very upbeat on the outlook for credit quality. Is it possible that this guidance is just too high and that we actually need a far lower credit charge for the next two quarters than the first half? Second of all, I know the last quarter, a lot of the release had to do with, at the time, sort of model adjustments, which took out macro variables. My concern if that was a big factor this quarter or if there was any sort of discretion that came into the general release. How much of the write-back had to do with repayments versus upgrades to the credit outlook? I'm just sort of curious of some of the mechanics on what we should expect for the rest of the year. Thank you very much. All right. I'll take the first question. Sok Hui, you can take the next two. The SGD 400 million is down. I used the words carefully that I'm hedging my position saying SGD 400 million. I think it could be a lot less. Based on actually everything we're seeing, I'm not seeing a pickup and I'm not seeing provisions come through. It's just that the final impact of the Delta variant on consumer portfolios in Indonesia, Taiwan, et cetera, is still a little uncertain. You could see some pickup from that. Second is as the loans are coming off moratorium. So far, I'm not seeing a pickup but it could be that it's very early. That as you go down next two, three months, you might see a pickup in NPLs and therefore provisions related to the loans coming off moratorium. If I had to make a bet right now based on what we have, I think there might be some upside to that number. Sok Hui, you want to talk to the other two, the model and this thing as well as the repayment process. Yeah. I understand your question to be around the general provision. We said that there was a net write-back of SGD 275 million, and the large part of that came from repayments and credit upgrades. The way the model works, you should expect some reduction when cases move into NPL because that's how it's supposed to operate. You release general provisions to go into specific provision. Within the category, you would check improvements also when, in our methodology, you move from, say, weak to red or to amber. That means there's an improvement in the credit quality of the borrower, and that corresponds to typically a counterparty risk rating upgrade as well. You could have write-backs from maturity or simply repayments by the borrowers when they refinance out. For a number of reasons, these were the ones that contributed to the SGD 275 million, of which both the institutional banking and retail banking both contributed the larger component from the non-retail base. The downgrades were largely offset, and we had repayments totaling, without the ECL, of about SGD 75 million reduction, upgrades about SGD 37 million reduction, and some due to just a reduction in maturity. Within the stage two, improvements in the rating from weak to red or red to amber. These were the main drivers for the SGD 275 million write-back. Let me actually give you a different perspective on that. Our total general provisions are about SGD 4 billion and change. Out of that, about SGD 1.5 billion are what we call modeled overlay. The model only reflects a downside scenario that we take, we build provisions in case something could happen. About SGD 2.5 billion of that reflects what GP we keep because it gets built up through our model. The modeling GP, of course, is a function of ECL and the probability of default, loss given default, and the risk rating of our portfolio. When the portfolio risk rating improves, either because a customer has upgrades or the customer's actual outstandings fall because it clears back and so on, that obviously results in an improvement on that modeled component, right? That's the part of what reflects in the GP. Yes. Thanks. Many years ago, I actually was scoring corporates for their credit quality, so a lot of it has to do with the outlook. If I take the comments carefully, it sounds that the actual write backs were SGD 75 million and the improvement in the outlook for these customers is SGD 200 million. Am I reading that correctly? It covers outlook. It might be also the outstanding. If a customer's got a SGD 1 billion loan and he sort of pays it down, I don't count it in repayment because it's not fully paid. It's just the outstanding for that customer in his current category reduces. It could be that the maturity of the same loans are actually shortened. Our methodology takes into account the maturity profile within H2. Yeah. Sorry, just to be really clear, do you have the breakdown between the three? Like how much of it was repayments, how much was just because of maturity shortening, and how much was it because the opinion of the customer's prospects has gotten better? That's what I really want to understand. Yeah. Of the SGD 275 million, about SGD 18 million would be due to retail. Retail has come off because a lot of the general provisions that were set aside last year were much higher given the outlook. Given that unsecured loans, they have either actually sort of provisions being removed into specific provisions or the loan base has declined because we are actually not doing from this portfolio. The retail ECL has declined by about SGD 18 million. The balance is really from the institutional side. From the institutional side, I mentioned repayment would contribute about SGD 75 million, upgrade about SGD 37 million. The others are all due to maturity and other sort of improvements from the modeling point of view. Okay. Thank you so much for clearing. I appreciate it very much. I'll pass back to Edna now. Thank you. Next we have Melissa from Goldman Sachs. Your question please. Hi. Thank you very much for taking my question. Maybe just a little bit back in terms of the provision. Did I hear right that you have still SGD 1 billion as the management overlay over the provision? Does it mean that you're still keeping it and perhaps you might consider maybe releasing it next year if things are really better? Can you just, moving on onto the margin, can you just give a little bit more of the split in terms of the four bits compression, what it actually made up of, and perhaps in the second half you mentioned that there'll be pressure. Can you just give some indication of how margins might trend in the second half of this year? Thank you. The overlay that we have is actually about, Piyush mentioned, about SGD 1.5 billion. That is the amount that we set aside, partly last year and partly built up in previous periods to cater for kind of stress events. We are likely to write back the entire amount of overlay because in our modeling, there will always be something that would cause us concern. Prior to COVID, we had also overlays to cater for example, the geopolitical tensions, et cetera. A good gauge is the, I said we are SGD 800 million above MAS minimum requirements. That's one sort of a debt post we can use potentially if things really improve, how much we can actually or prepare to release. Melissa, does that answer your question? Yes. Can I just check back in terms of what is really a normalized credit cost? Like say if you had to tell us, what can we expect normalized credit cost? I can kind of look like SGD 800 offset that what possibly can be spent if everything is better. We expect that this will be released in tandem with, I guess, the outlook for the economy in particular. Whether travel restrictions are lifted. We are going to take a conservative stance, and it's not like we're going to release an entire amount. It will be gradual and will be in line with what we are seeing on the horizon. All right. Thank you. Melissa, what we said in the past is that about 22 bps, 25 bps should be a normal cost of credit in the past. I think a normal cost of credit, if you get all of this noise from building up a provision, the release of provision. It is likely to be sub 20 bps. I think that reflects the quality of our portfolio and our credit processes as we are today. The cost of credit, especially in the second quarter, was 14 bps, as you can see. As Chng Sok Hui pointed out, we do think that we've been very conservative in building up our buffers. So if things really get much better, we do have the capacity to release some of those. Some, I think, will automatically reverse because of what the earlier question from Macquarie was. The models will push us to improve as the customer's credit quality improves, the exposure comes up. Some of it will unwind because of that. This balance, SGD 1.5 billion, which we've kept as an overlay, Sok Hui pointed out, we're not going to release all of that. We always like to keep some in our hip pocket because you don't know what might come along the road in excess of models. We have the opportunity to do that as well. The way I would work a model is to look at standard cost of credit in that 18 bps, 20 bps range, and then adjust it up and down depending on what's happening to our provisions and reserves. Right. Thank you very much. On the NIM, please? Yeah, on the NIM, I think you're referring to second quarter versus first quarter, where we saw a 4 bps decline. That's really a function of the surplus deposits that we have, which are then deployed to mainly central bank deposits with central banks. I think you heard the response earlier. These are 0% weighted. They do not eat up capital. It can be accretive to our income as well as bottom line. It does mean that we have some volatility due to the interbank interest rates. This quarter is down a bit. You see some drag from the surplus funds that are placed with central banks. Melissa, I think that's the bulk of it. There are two other reasons. One, LIBOR and IBOR came off this quarter compared to the first quarter by 2 bps, 3 bps. That has a little bit of an impact. Obviously the flow through into the rest of our fixed income portfolio, there is still some last residual impact of that. Our outlook for rates in the beginning, we guided for rates NIM of between 1.45% and 1.50% for the year. I think our NIM for the year will be at the lower end of that, 1.45%, which means that you will still see a little bit of a drag of a couple of 2 bps, 3 bps through the back end of the year. Right. Thank you very much. Thank you. Next on the line we have Terence Chua from Phillip Securities. Your question, please. Hello, management. Thanks for taking my question. I have one question. What is the% of loans coming off loans moratorium? My second question is which sectors are they coming from? Coming off loans moratorium or the loans in moratorium? Loans in moratorium and loans coming off moratorium. That is very difficult. Let me answer that. We have SGD 5 billion in the mortgage moratorium in Singapore. We have another SGD 5 billion in the SME moratorium in Singapore. That is SGD 10 billion. At its peak, we had about SGD 7 billion or SGD 8 billion in moratorium in Hong Kong, SGD 17 billion or SGD 18 billion out of our total loan book of about SGD 400 billion. That was about 4% of our loans were at its peak in moratorium, if you will. Right now, we are left with half a billion in mortgages, SGD 400 billion in SME, and about SGD 1.2 billion, SGD 1.3 billion in Hong Kong. About SGD 2.2 billion, SGD 2.3 billion on SGD 400 billion. We are left with about 0.6% or 0.7% of our loans is currently in moratorium. On top of that, we have the ESG-linked loan, which is our 90% government protected, that's another SGD 5 billion, a lot of ESG-linked loans. The risk on that is about SGD 500 million for us. If we want to throw that into the pot, I would say everything put together is about under 1%, 0.8% or so maybe. Right. Just to make sure I get it right. About 0.8% of loans are currently under moratorium. Is this correct? No. I said only 0.6% are under moratorium. The 0.8% is if I add the ESG-linked loans. I think about 0.6% are under moratorium. Yeah. Thanks so much. That's all from me. Thank you. Thank you, Terence. Next on the line we have Harsh Modi from JP Morgan. Your question please. Hi. Thanks for the call. Three questions. First is, if we start thinking about 2022, is it fair to say that provisions should be in line with 2021 or lower given the extent of GDP you've had? What even is a central base case right now for asset quality? Harsh, I think it's tough for me to say. When I'm doing my budgeting for next year, I'm not planning to budget at this year's low levels. I'm planning to budget at the through-cycle level that we've had. The reason for that is that at the margin, the net impact of the government's fiscal and monetary stimulus responses finishing in many of the countries is still relatively unknown. That's the only thing. I can't tell you what happens because right now in every country, the governments are still providing some form of support in one way, shape, or form. That's one uncertainty. The other uncertainty is the taper. If you figure that liquidity starts draining out and because of taper, you start seeing some pickup in rates, that's another uncertainty. I wouldn't rush to say it'll be as good as this year. It could be. You could be right. It's just that there are some unknowns yet about next year. Got it. Okay. That's fair. Second one on capital. Again, kind of similar question to you. 13%, there are multiple paths to it, returning more capital, reinvesting the capital as we have been doing. Most likely it's some combination thereof. How should we think about timeline towards that CET-1 and the path towards 13%? It might happen tomorrow if we wind up doing all the Citi deals. Right. Harsh, that's the cute way of saying one part of the answer is a function of do we do any M&A or not. If we wind up not doing any M&A, the Citi deals don't come through or we don't want to do them, which is equally likely, we'll go back and take a more aggressive view of what we want to do with capital and capital management. Going with that logic, let's say next six to max 12 months, we should see some conclusion on the three markets you talked about, Indo, India, Taiwan. Is it fair to say that by the time we are thinking about SGD 10 billion or at maximum dividend next year, we should have a much better clarity on payouts, on the dividend per share and payout numbers? Harsh Modi, view on the dividend per share payout will obviously that we will continue to increase it steadily over time, and that policy still remains. If we are making more money, we will obviously pay out more. M&A thing, Citi is the immediate possibility, but of course, over the next couple of quarters, I still want to keep my eyes and powder open if there are other of these bolt-on deals that become available because of the macro environment, and those could be banking or non-banking deals. Yes, I think over the next 12 months or so, it's reasonable to say that we should have a good sense of if anything else comes along our way in the back of this crisis. I remember the two deals we've done basically were an outcome of the crisis or because of the crisis we got an opportunity. I'm keeping some powder dry if something else might come along. If it doesn't and things become normal, then we'll go back and take a fresh look. Right. Just on that, what kind of internal hurdle rates are you assuming for any of the deals? Is there a broad guidance on IRR or payback, anything in those sort of. I said before, I want to make sure that the deals become accretive in about three years or less, and which means they've got to return cost of capital and upwards of that. Okay. Final one, Lakshmi Vilas, how's the progress there? Any milestones that you would want to suggest that could be reached or that you're aiming for, let's say, by end of the year for that deal? Lakshmi Vilas there's good news and bad news. The good news is that things are proceeding on plan in terms of integration and in terms of credit quality. We've actually been getting repayments on some of the stuff we had provided for earlier. Integration is smooth. Deposits are up. Cost of funding is down 60 bps. Gold loans are up for the year. All of that is proceeding well. The bad news is that because of the India pandemic and COVID situation, we are about two, three months behind in terms of actually being able to sweat the franchise. That's deliberate. I don't feel because remember, the franchise is a large consumer SME, et cetera, and I'm reluctant to push the pedal on that just yet till I'm more confident and secure about what the overall macroeconomic situation in India is. That part is a little bit slow. In terms of therefore the thing to watch out for by year-end, I think year-end might be a little early because of that. We need to dial up a bit, but being very careful about dialing up. I think the chances are we'll probably have better line of sight to what pickup we should expect next year rather than in the next quarter or two. Okay. Just final question on that, Piyush Gupta. That let's say by end of next year, do you get to a point where you become comfortable enough to inject more capital, where now it is genuine growth capital rather than precautionary capital, so to say? By when do you think steady state there? No. I won't be saying that. If you look at our current view, we think that over the next five years, we will actually put a lot more capital into India because the expanded franchise we have gives us very significant growth opportunities. We have a very ambitious growth agenda for India on the back of this acquisition, which will need capital for at least the next two, three, four years before it starts leveling off. Right. No, exactly. That's what I'm trying to gauge, that in terms of timeline, when do you get enough confidence to go back to the board and say, "All right, this is the amount. We have enough of a track record now to commit this much of capital." That's the state I'm trying to figure out, when do you reach that? We've already done the work. Our plans are in place. We actually haven't taken it to the board yet. We will do that in the next couple of months to get board blessing. Informally, we've run it through this thing. It is an ambitious plan. The board is fully supportive of it. I mean, the board basically took line of sight to that when they approved doing the deal. Okay. Thank you so much. Thank you. Next is Nicholas Teh from Credit Suisse. Your question, please. Hi. Thanks for taking my questions. Just have a couple of questions. wanted to ask on Hong Kong, China specifically, I guess with the rising cases in China and the shutdowns there, and also the delayed border reopening in Hong Kong, have you started to see any impact on the accounts there? The second question I had is on the deposit side. Deposit growth has been very strong. any sense or any thoughts on how to think about whether these deposits could be stickier than what we initially anticipated, and hence, starting to think about deploying some of those deposits into higher yielding assets rather than with MAS? Those are my questions, thanks. On the first one, the short answer is no. I mean, the increased cases in China and the border is not creating any instrumental downside or headwind there. You've got to remember that in Hong Kong, we've been through stresses, say now for two years, well before the pandemic. It was because of the China-U.S. tensions and the economic supply chain. These issues have been with us for two years, and we've been managing very tightly to that. I think we've actually corralled ourselves quite well. I don't anticipate any further downside. In China, the significant increase in cases, back to my earlier comment in the media discussion as well, if you look at the translation of that into the macroeconomic indicators, this is very sectoral. If you, like us, don't have a consumer book in China and don't have an SME book in China, it's unlikely to make any material impact to our portfolio and our kind of business that we do. On the deposit, I think the answer is some. I fully expect that some of this massive deposit increase will run off, partly when the taper happens, partly when interest rates start to come up. It's just there's too much money sloshing around. How long that takes is anybody's guess. It's not clear to me that the central bank will be able to eliminate this liquidity anytime soon. If you think about the GFC, right? The Fed increased its balance sheet to what, $4.5 trillion. They wanted to bring it down to sub $2.5 trillion, I remember. They got to $3.7 trillion, $3.8 trillion, and then it turned turtle. It went back up. Now this time, they put out SGD 12 trillion. How long it takes to squeeze that liquidity out of the system is anybody's guess, but I don't see it disappearing soon. Nevertheless, at some stage, if you assume that surplus liquidity starts going, rather than how much, second part, how much of that is sticky with us? I do think that there's a fair element of that, because a lot of the liquidity that we've got is CASA. It's not FD, it's CASA and it's operating accounts liquidity. Our CASA ratio is 76%. A lot of that, in fact, is operating balances that we're getting. A lot of that is to do with the digitization and the API connectivity and the engine and the supply chain integration and all the work we've done. If I had to hazard a guess, I would say 30%, 40% of the surplus liquidity will stick. Again, this is a guess more than anything else. Now, how do you use that money? Of course, you can put the money to work, but on the other hand, you also got to have a view on the risk. Who do you want to give the money to? This part of the earlier question from Harsh. I do think eventually we can put the money to work with growing the SME and the consumer franchise, but you've got to be thoughtful about the time and when you want to start doing that. For the time being, we really been continuing to grow our business in the large corporate space. We've been very careful about the risk we want to take in the more risky segments of the market. We'll get there when the economy stabilize some more. Okay. Got it. Can I just slip one last one in and ask what your stake in the carbon exchange is? Our stake in the carbon exchange is, I'm trying to remember. We were originally 25%. I think we might be a tad bit below that now. Okay, sure. Thank you. Thank you. Next on the line, we have Aakash Rawat from UBS. Hi, morning. Thank you so much for taking the question. Can you hear me all right? Yes. Hello? Yes. Great. My first question is on the revenue opportunity, like SGD 200 million number that you talked about earlier. I'm just wondering, what is the expense growth associated with this group of businesses? What would be the cost-income ratio for the group of businesses? Do you have any idea on that? Yeah. Under it, actually expense associated with everything other than Lakshmi Vilas Bank is non-material. On the Lakshmi Vilas Bank, expense is material. Right now, the cost-income ratio of the bank is close to 100%. That's not 100%, actually. It's lower. It's including the provisions and credit that's not projected. Close to breaking even, yeah. Okay. It's LVB which is mainly that would be the bottom end expense of that group, not this expensive. I think because of the existing expense. Actually, the expenses are going to be reducing because LVB expenses come to a large extent from a franchise. We're already looking at rationalizing the franchise. We need a lot of it, but not all of it. Also, head count. When we got LVB, we started with 4,000 people. We're already down to 3,300 people, approximately. We're already down 5, 600 people as part of our integration and rationalization. We will see improvement in the cost-income ratio for LVB as well. Right now, the cost-income ratio is still high. Got it. Can I just also ask you about the impact this has on your long-term ROE targets? You've said in the past that even 30%-35% is where you think ROE should be when rates recover to the pre-pandemic level. Has this new growth initiative had an impact on that target, or is it still broadly similar? I've given this indication some years ago that as we continue to try and find alternative avenues of growth, structurally, the ROE of the company will keep improving. It takes time for that structural improvement to trickle through the system. If you look back over the last five years, without doubt, the fact that wealth management today is a SGD 3.5 billion income business for us, or cash management makes us SGD 2 billion, all of that improves the structural ROE. That's why our ROE has gone up from 8.5% to 13-odd%. A lot of that is a structural shift in the nature. All of these activities will help you to have that. In a given year, we are lucky to see 0.1%, 0.2% from these activities. It's collectively over a period of time, we can look back and say, "Okay, I've got 0.5% or something up from these activities that we've done. Understood. Just on a related note, we've talked about this 40% CIR in a steady state, again something we discussed in 2017. What's the progress towards that and how you consider that number now? We continue to work at this. Some of that, of course, is a function of income, the 40% is the biggest thing on that is interest rate. The interest rate impact to the income line between last year and this year is almost $3 billion, $2.8 billion. It becomes much harder to get a 40% ratio when your denominator has got suddenly impacted by that. As you know, from income, we clawed back most of the fee from the other thing we've done, but nevertheless, our income is still down from that level. We need to see some benefit from the interest rate to improve the cost-income ratio as well. Yeah. The best indicator to look at, this one we've disclosed in our annual report, with the cost-income ratio for the digital segment that we track in consumer banking and SME in Singapore and Hong Kong. Excluding the benefits from rates, you actually see the cost-income ratio is actually improving year-on-year or at least stable in the period where rates are going down. Okay. Understood. Thank you. The last one I had is on the crypto business. What's the progress on that and the latest crypto license that has been granted in MAS? How crucial is that for your business? Is that a positive in general for the ecosystem, do you think? Let me answer your second question. Frankly, I don't know the answer. I've just asked my people this morning to try and understand why the crypto license is any different from the crypto license we have, or if it is different at all. Because the FT reported that this is the first crypto license, and I know there's three, four exchanges before us, and we certainly have a license to do everything. I'm not fairly clear what the difference is. I'm going to find out. I don't know the answer, short. On the first one, I'm actually quite happy. We've now got to a tad under 400 customer investors on the exchange. We did about $170 million-$180 million of trading volume in the quarter. We have about $130 million-$140 million of assets under custody in that business. As you know, we're very selective. We're not doing mass market because just the total noise around this is a challenge. My target is to get to about 1,000 customers by this year end. These customers obviously are active and trade well. One of the things that we need to do, which we need to do by the next month or two, is make it a 24/7 exchange. We started off as an exchange which operated in the Asian time zone. A large part of this activity actually happens outside the Asian time zone. Once we do that, I expect the volume of activity to pick up a lot more. I'm quite pleased. It's going quite well. Okay, great. Thank you so much for that. That's all from me. Thank you. For new participants who have questions to pose, please press zero one on your telephone keypad. You'll be placed in the queue. Next, we have Robert from Citi Research. Your question, please. Hi, everyone. Thanks for the opportunity. I've got a few different pieces of questions, but I'll start with my main question. Just thinking about the math around capital. Let's just start with the 13% CET1 ratio. You've got a return on risk-weighted assets, I think, was something like 0.9%, I think, and maybe a sustainable RWA growth might be a high single digit or maybe high single digit. With those sort of parameters, what would be the optimal or neutral payout ratio if you were starting with a 13% CET1 rather than the current CET1? I'm just trying to get a sense of the math. I can leave Sok Hui Chng to answer that question, Robert, I haven't done that math. Part of the answer goes back to what I told Harsh Modi. It really depends on our outlook to M&A. Do we need to keep any capital buffers if we think opportunistically we can do those bolt-on and bulk up, either in line of business, wealth management, SME, maybe some digital activity. We might want to keep some cushion for that in addition to the organic 6%, 8% growth rates that you're talking about. We have to cater a little bit for that as well as you do your math. If you look at where we've been in the past, we've been able to get our payout ratio into the high 50%. In fact, I think it probably got close to 60% as well. I hate working with a payout ratio because then I get committed to a number, and if I need the flexibility from quarter to quarter, it's not that easy. My guidance is we keep looking at the income we generate and make sure that we are very consistent in the dividend payout relative to the income that we generate over time. Okay.Hui, A re you able to offer the thoughts? I think the CAR ratio currently is about close to 50% anyway. The other sort of timeline to watch is 01/01/2023, when the new Basel IV, or Basel I call it Basel IV, it's Basel III reformed, finally kicks in on capital floors. I think with a slew of changes, it's going to be beneficial for us. We are less likely to be impacted compared to, I guess, a lot of European banks that have models that are overly sort of calibrated and probably would hit some constraints, or their very high CAR ratios will be brought down. That will be another timeline where we can sort of calibrate and see, with the sort of improvement in the CAR ratio, how do we assess the surplus capital? Robert, part of the, just say for the timing reason, we've not been more specific. As you know, the regulators are also still very guarded about how much capital we return. While they removed the restriction, they were also very specific in the guidance about removing restrictions that we need to be very careful about what kind of capital return we are doing. They called us several times to make sure we're not going to offer a new share buyback, for example. We've got to keep a little bit of eye on that as well. Okay, thanks. I have some bits and pieces questions. The SGD 1 billion excess deposit. Could I argue that your adjusted NIM is closer to 1.5% and dropping 5 bps is the impact? Last I saw, it's about 7 bps impact. I didn't do the work recently, but when I backtest, I thought the impact was about 7 bps. Okay. Thank you. The next one is, are there any interesting wealth portfolios that are possibly out there for sale? Is there any more consolidation that you could see in the industry? That's obviously one of the ways that you grew over the last several years. Well, I'm not seeing anything imminently, though you still continue to see people who want to exit the region and every one or two people who floated the idea. I'm not seeing anything imminent, no. By the way, just to set the record straight, the two inorganic deals brought some benefit to us in terms of AUM, but not material. The bulk of our growth in wealth management has been organic growth. Okay. Then, this is a slightly tongue-in-cheek question, but I had an interesting discussion with, during I nvestor the other day. You may know that in Indonesia, all the traditional banks are getting very jealous because these small digital banks, which don't make any money, are being traded almost at the same market cap. The question is there a way we could split DBS and say, we know that roughly, I think from the annual report, 38% of your business is retail, and I think 72% of that is now digital with an ROE of 2x that of the traditional. I'm just trying to think if there's a way we could split your digital business out and we give it a slightly different valuation from the parts or something like that. I'm just trying to think if there's a way we can do that. Robert, this is music to my ears. This has been my big bugbear for the longest time. The only way you can do that is you need to pass on the function from you to your technology colleague. Life has been that because all the research world looks at banks through your EBITDA model, and it's the Roberts of the world who've done this for the last 30 years, that's how you think. Your technology colleagues are open to saying, "I'm going to give you 80 x valuation over revenue." All the traditional banking world has seen, where you saw what Bill Winters said yesterday, he has the same thing that, we've got such fantastic not only digital and revenue-generating businesses, but your models don't pick it up, whereas your tech colleagues' models take it and then they fly into the sky, right? When we did our 2017, when we unbundled the bank and said, "We'll show you exactly line of sight between our digital activity, what is the difference of the digital activity, what it means to our shares, what it means to our revenue, our cost-income ratio and our ROE," that's exactly what we did. Today, for half the bank, we actually show that. Exactly what it means in terms of improvement in growth, ROE, and this thing. Unfortunately, nobody's sort of taken that and said, "Okay, this part of the bank, we should do a different valuation too." It hasn't really worked. One of the things that we are actively considering, which I think what Bill also said, is to see whether we really need to look at start unbundling some of these activities from the mothership. Then once you do that and maybe get some private equity interest in some of those activities, then maybe they will get start getting covered not by you, but by your tech colleague. Let me give you an example. One of my favorite examples, which I am actually looking to see if we can do. We have this product called Remit. Our Remit product is like TransferWise. We do instant transfer in some 60, 70 countries around the world. Our total volume of business is meaningful. It is like the last I saw, it is about 15%-20% of the volume that TransferWise does around the world. Our profitability is massive because that business makes us SGD 60 million-SGD 70 million in the bottom line, which is a lot more than Wise makes, right? If I could unbundle that business, why is this large valued at SGD 11 million? There's no reason in my mind why this business should not get a valuation of anything between SGD 5 billion and SGD 10 billion. It's hidden inside DBS. And the fact that our total market cap is SGD 55 billion, nobody's arguing the fact that I've got a SGD 5 billion to SGD 10 billion business lying over there. If you just compare it to TransferWise business, it's actually a better business and does the same thing. If I could take that business and spin it out into a separate entity and then get some SoftBank kind of investor to come and put money on it at that value, maybe somebody would start seeing that this business is there. By the way, this is not the only one. We've got a host of businesses where we think we have the capacity to take them and spin them out at this stage. It's something we're going to be looking at actively over the next year or two. Okay, good. Thinking in the same direction. Now, I was just trying to figure out how to do this. You've got, let's say, your consumer bank, wealth bank, first half profit before allowance is over SGD 1.1 billion. If I could separate out a certain portion of that and say, this is your digital customers, we can put a separate ROE on it and a separate valuation on it. This is the way I'm trying to think about it. It's just hard to do it with the existing public numbers. Robert, it's not hard. We actually disclosed that. When was the last time we disclosed that, Tan Su Shan? Annual report. It was in annual report. You go back and look at the annual report. We started disclosing that in 2017, we have a very rigorous framework which we developed. A customer who does more than 75% of their activity digitally, we call a digital customer, and we build a complete P&L for that digital customer, fully allocated, all costs allocated, all credit allocated. For that segment of customers, we demonstrate the growth rate of that segment, we demonstrate the cost-income ratio of the segment, and we demonstrate the ROE of that segment. It's not small. It's quite material. If you just go back and take a look at our disclosures, it's there. Okay, I will. I'm trying to figure out how to do this. That's why I'm asking the question. Also, it's a similar question. Your wealth business, what kind of ROE can we attach to the wealth business? Again, we have the revenue in your consumer disclosure, I'm just trying to think, is it like a 30% ROE business? It's actually north of 30% ROE business, the wealth business. Effectively it's counter risk in times. Of course, we have some credit portfolios in the business because there's some leverage. Until that, it was just only operating risk and no other risk. Well, now there's some credit, but even then it's north of 30%. By the way, the same thing. I think the other business I have in there, which is doing so well, is the retail wealth distribution. I talked about it before, that we've launched this end-to-end budgeting planning, financial planning, et cetera, business. It's like The Charles Schwab and Robinhood kind of a model. We've got 2.5 million people who Actually, how many downloaded the budgeting tool? No, 2 million people have downloaded the budgeting tool, and 1 million people are using the budgeting actively. I've got SGD 1 billion now from that in regular savings and digital portfolios, which are all managed digitally. If I unbundle that business, it's also got this open banking element to it because I give an aggregated balance sheet drawing balances from everywhere. If you actually take that business and compare it to any fintech business who's in the space, I think we've got better capability and we've got the revenue, and we've got the customers. That's the other one we're trying to see. Actually, we've got a lot of interest from third-party players who want to try and see if they can participate in that activity, or we can spin it out to them. That part of the business is also very attractive, not just the high-end wealth business, which is obviously a north of 30% ROE business. I think we're thinking in the same direction. Thank you. Those are all my questions. Thank you. Thank you. Next on the line we have Anand Swaminathan from Bank of America. Your question, please. Thank you. I just wanted to get some more color on the slide four you put out, especially on the acceleration path, the number one and three things you highlighted. Just a bit more color in terms of the particular life within these segments and what is incrementally leading to that acceleration, whether it's more demand or more digitalization, regional expansion, what is driving that? Especially also the supply chain financing product. Thanks. I was at acceleration, there are three things I had there. One was the securities JV in China. That's a demand thing. I think the China capital markets opening up is a big thing, which is why everybody's trying to get in there with the sort of investment banking capability. Our JV, which we are up and running with, we have 51% the balances held by various entities, the Shanghai government. We have the option to buy the balance 49% over the next two, three years, so it can be 100% owned. That business has actually got off to a fine start because they have an active pipeline of mandates both in the Asia market, but also helping us to originate for the Hong Kong market across board, DC and DCM. I'm actually quite bullish on that. That's the demand side consideration. I think the market is going to be big. The other two things I had there were retail wealth, which I just spoke about. The retail wealth is essentially around the same Robinhood phenomena. If you look at the last 12 months around the world, the retail investor is getting more and more active in participating in the market. Because our timing's been good, we've got this complete end-to-end process right from budgeting, planning, surplus, advice, and it all goes digitally and driven by AI and contextual. We are seeing a significant pickup in that activity. Now that's because of our digitalization coupled with the fact that there is a market change. The retail investor is going to be more active in the space as well. The last one, I think I had there was the supply chain. The supply chain is also a macro element as well as a digital piece. The macro element is last year when the supply chains started giving people arms. The biggest thing people started looking for was supply chain efficiency and how do you digitize the supply chain, and particularly how do you get more transparency in the supply chain. Level II, level III, level IV parts of the supply chain. Now we had, as part of our digital activity in the corporate side, built out this whole slew of APIs focused on that to be able to plug ourselves easily and seamlessly into various supply chains. We just decided to go for a land grab over the last 12, 18 months. We went to every industry, company we could find everywhere and said, "We've got the tools. We can plug them in, and you can get digital visibility in the supply chain." We're seeing a massive pickup in our volume from logistics, auto, TMT, a whole range of this thing where we plug into the supply chains, providing digital connectivity and visibility, and thus giving us greater throughput and greater business. Sure. Thanks. When you say this part of the supply chain, the API connectivity, is this directly with your customers or through players in that space? It's actually at three levels. One is directly with anchor customers. There'll be some cases where a large anchor leads the effort to digitize their supply chain. We plug into that. Two is through the platform. We are plugged into some of the biggest platforms now in the region, especially, for example, the Chinese platforms or the Indian platforms. We plug into that, and through them, we participate in the suppliers and buyers. The three is actually at industry level. A lot of that is in Singapore, where we've been able to digitize and plug into the construction industry supply chain, for example, building and construction. We also plugged into the logistics industry supply chain, the truckers, hauliers, warehouses in Singapore. At all three levels, at anchor level, at platform level, and at industry level. We've been able to do that at all levels. Sure. That also means your eventual return on net interest income should be much higher, so probably last level closer to your pre-pandemic levels. Yeah. There are two things we are seeing, three revenues we are seeing right now. The first, obviously, we get a lot of the operating accounts. All the people in the supply chain, the suppliers, the buyer people tend to operate. We get cash. That's not worth that much today because rates are low. Eventually, I think that'll be worth a lot. The second is the financing. Financing is obviously the financing spread. A lot of that is in our traditional spread, depends on whether we're taking anchor risk or whether we're taking spoke risk with it, but it's definitely better. The third is some of the supply chains are cross-border. We get an FX component which flows into our FX thing as well. Sure. That's it. Lastly, just on your point there in terms of the SGD 350 million incremental next year, would we assume sort of majority of that will come from this third bucket, acceleration? No. The third bucket, supply chain detail, I didn't count in the SGD 350 million. That is like cloud business-as-usual growth. We didn't count it in the SGD 350 million. We counted in the SGD 350 million the first two buckets and the securities joint venture. Oh, okay. That's interesting. Thank you. Thank you. Next we have Wilson Wong from Janchor Partners. Your question, please. Hi. Thanks for the opportunity. I think last quarter, Piyush, you talked about a normalized ROE of 10.5%-11%, and if interest rate is coming back, then maybe 11.5%. You also now mentioned that your cost normalization will be more like a 20 bps instead of 20 bps to 25 bps, and your mix of going to higher ROE business, like the digital bank and wealth management business is going up. Wondering if you have any updated view on the normalized ROE in this cycle. Thank you. I don't know. Maybe you should pull out the transcript. I don't remember saying a normalized ROE is 10%-10.5%. In the current interest rate environment. Yeah. For that, obviously, because where we are in this. I think we can get, yeah, 10.5% with a zero interest rate. With a zero interest rate environment. If you go back to what the interest rate pickup is and assume, so you can get at least a couple of percentage points pickup on ROE if interest rates go back to a pre-pandemic kind of normalized level, right? Correct, interest rate environment ROE, I would've said we should be able to get 13% ROE in a normalized interest rate environment. This is back to the earlier question, I think Melissa or someone. All of the other stuff we're talking about, which is improvements in the nature of our businesses, better returns businesses, more digital businesses, I think eventually those will produce aggregates. I think eventually you can see yourself getting up to closer to 14%, but it's not overnight. That takes a lot of time for these to come through. I see. Thank you. Thank you. Next, we have Nick Lord from Morgan Stanley. Your question please. Hi. Thank you very much for taking the question. Two questions from me, actually. First is just on costs, and I heard the answer before on one of the costs, but for this year, are you changing your cost guidance at all? It was 3%-4% above 2019 levels. Obviously you got the 2% from Lakshmi Vilas, but you've actually got sort of zero growth on the underlying. Does that mean for this year we're just going to see the Lakshmi Vilas impact, say, year-on-year and pretty much flat from there? I think that's correct. Our actual funding costs are slightly higher than we anticipated because we have rate pressures and we've responded to that, but we've been able to save that on other lines. Yeah, we should have zoomed that. Correct. If I look at, just so I get the years right, 2020 passes, take a couple of percent on collection roughly getting to where it should be. Anna, what's it? Thank you. Well, the guidance was for 4% up from last year. Yeah a big point from last week from LVB. That's right. Yeah. That's for the full year. That's still the guidance. Still last- Our guidance is still the same. Yeah. You're not running at that rate at the moment, yeah? We're not? We're not running at that rate. No. No, we're up 3% year to date. Year-on-year. Yeah. Sorry, year-on-year. Which is in line with our guidance. Which is in line with the 4%, right? The first half 2% also came from last week from LVB. Yeah. you're up about a% underlying, yeah? Roughly, yeah. Yeah. Sorry, a little bit. Okay. Yes. We had the benefits of Government Credit/Wage Grant last year. It was a smaller component, underlying is really quite flat. No, sorry. It's comparing to 2019. Oh, 2019. Okay. My second question is on loan book. Obviously, from what I've seen the digit and from what you indicated in the media call, looks like we're going to be at the top end of that. Given everything you know today about pipeline, and sort of economic view, do we think that that's the sort of growth rate we can repeat into 2022 as well? I think if you look at our loan book, there are three elements to the loan book. One is the corporate lending space, which reflects matters of macroeconomic activity. That I think you'll see repeat, because the momentum is very strong. We're talking to clients already for next year's activity. There is investment cycles, there's M&A activity, and so on. I think that should be repeatable. The second part of the loan book is the trade finance book. As I've mentioned over the years, the trade finance book goes up and down, which is impacted by commodity prices. It also gets impacted by our own actions. When the pricing gets too unattractive, we just take the foot off that book. That's like it was SGD 6 billion of growth in the first half of the year. That is a little bit less. Part of that SGD 6 billion is the stuff we talked about before, the supply chain financing. That is growing nicely, so that will grow. The other part of the SGD 6 billion is more opportunistic cross-border trade stuff. That is uncertain. The last part of the loan book is the consumer and wealth. Of that is a mortgage book, which this year we care about SGD 3 billion. I think we should be able to get somewhere in that range, unless the markets change dramatically. The other part of that is the wealth leverage, and that's another SGD 3 billion-SGD 4 billion. The wealth leverage is a function of the market. How much people want to lever up or not. Given my outlook on rates, I don't see rates going up dramatically next year. I don't see any reason why that would change in a one-year timeframe. I think that's the same. Okay. It sounds like the swing factor is really going to be the wealth leverage, yeah? That's what's going to change the outlook. Yeah. Okay. Thank you very much. Cheers. Thank you. Lastly, we have Kevin from Bernstein. Your question, please. Hi, Piyush. I apologize, I didn't hear it clearly. When you said the intent is to pay higher dividends if you make more money, did you indicate a higher payout ratio range? And if so, what is that on the basis of 13% CET1? No, Kevin, we didn't give any payout ratio. You know, we don't give a payout ratio. All we said is that we will continue to pay consistently high dividends over time in line with our earnings. That's all. Okay, got it. Thank you.