Thank you for joining us again. If you are only joining us now, of course, this is the Bank of America Securities 2022 Insurance Conference. We're in the Arch Capital session. If you want to ask a question, you can email me or through the Veracast app, type it in and send me a question, and I will be happy to ask it. There already is a question coming in, that's happening pretty fast. We'll get to it. We have here CEO Marc Grandisson and CFO François Morin of Arch Capital. I don't think they plan to make any introductory remarks, we can go right into Q&A. Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. Hope you're having a good day meeting with investors. A question that I asked a few companies today, and I'll ask you. Arch recently celebrated its 20th anniversary as a company. Congratulations. Thank you. A few stats in 2001, it says the reinsurance had 36 employees, and the insurance had 37 employees. I think you're around 4,500 employees today. That's pretty good growth. The pandemic has told people they can do a lot of things remotely. Some of you are rationalizing the real estate footprints and trying to add more flexible for people. What does this mean for Arch Capital in terms of, A, trying to balance the option to give people the work-life balance they want, but also how does this factor into the culture, training young people to be successful in the business who don't already know how to underwrite for success? How does Arch maintain the desire you're looking for a team as opposed to just collecting a paycheck if you're working out of your house? That's a lot of questions. I could probably ask the same thing from all you folks at Bank of America. I think everybody had the same, a very similar story. It's great to be here, Josh. Nice seeing you. Wish we could do it live. I'm in London, as you know, it's great to be here and spend some time with you and answer some questions. At a high level, I think that it has made life, at least at the beginning, for the first year, a lot more productive. I think the meetings were happening much cleaner, much more on time, and they would end up on time a lot more. I think overall, it's been a net gain from our perspective. I think we're able to contract and really get in touch with our clients and brokers to make sure that things were not slowed down at all. I think we sort of lost a little bit of that productivity, probably like everyone else in the second year of the pandemic. I think it's about time we get back to the office. I think what happened early on, why we were so productive is to your point, is because we had this good cultural set all together, really knowing each other, how to work and what needed to be done, and that really made a big, big, big difference in delivering what we need to do. We have a pretty unique culture, Josh, as you know by now. We're a cycle manager. We're very collaborative in terms of making decisions. You're right, getting new people in to onboard them and make them aware and make them adhere to the culture is harder during the pandemic. I think most of our executives, most of our managers have said that we'll have to go back to some kind of face-to-face working together to make sure it happens. I think the day of the 45 hours a week in the office are probably not going to come back in full force. I think we'll always have a presence because there are cultural aspects, and I'm in London this week. I haven't been here in a long time, and there's something to be said for being face-to-face with people and really getting the nuance and the color and really all the different shades of discussion that you can have. Sometimes off the cuff, most of the discussions we have that make a difference in the company could be over the water cooler, over a coffee. They don't necessarily have to happen during a staged meeting, one hour or half an hour meeting. I think it's probably more of a challenge than we want to admit in terms of keeping the culture. Although now we're coming out of the COVID pandemic, I think I have every assurance that we'll be able to maintain it. I really think that to be a true Archie, you need to live with the manager and really understand how we operate and look at the business. Sometimes it's not as important, probably when the market is hard as it is right now, because a lot easier to say yes. We also have developed data analytics that allow us to really do a lot of work mining the data, the submission counts, and whoever's producing the business. It's a bit easier to do than to have to travel to all the various locations to get that data and actually be more productive that way. I think that we'll need our people to get back to really continue this culture. It's very unique at Arch, and it's something that really, I believe, makes a huge difference in our results over time, as we've demonstrated. I'm going to ask you a question I asked before, but I think it's maybe the most important question, just because you have an infinite amount of opportunity sets, but we'll divide them really into three capital return. Mortgage, insurance, reinsurance, and the capital return. Can you sort of give us an ROI view on what each of the returns are from your options right now in the market? Yeah. I'm not sure if we mentioned them. I'll have François correct me if I'm wrong. I think that the three underwriting units, we also have two other units with two other opportunities we have to deploy capital, as you know. Yeah, you're right. One of them is share buyback and turning into capital, the other one is obviously the investment function, which we're taking a much more proactive view of and a lot more bringing as a fourth leg of the stool, if you will, to the extent possible. We're doing pretty good initial work there as well. We've been working it for a long time, but it's really starting to pay off, we believe. In terms of the three operating units, which I think you're asking for, I think mortgage is still in the mid-teens, solid, very solid return. I think reinsurance is right behind Or on par with that, 13%-15%, with the insurance about 11%-13%. Insurance is actually continuing to build momentum. You'll say, "Well, why did you deploy capital in insurance? Why not all-in mortgage?" Well, it's a question of balance, the question of risk management and capital management and diversification that we also are very keen to have, right? Diversification is one of our core principle, one of our key operating principles at Arch. I think insurance, as we know, takes a little while longer to really ramp up. Mortgage was already a really solid market after even pre-COVID, but soon after COVID, still had really good opportunities to deploy capital there. But we're among the largest, if not the larger MI provider in the U.S. It's kind of hard to do a lot more than that than where we are. On the reinsurance, it's a lot easier to get access to market more quickly. I think on the insurance, we're still building momentum because I do believe that our rates are still above trend on pretty much all lines of business, and they're actually improving the smaller risk, which is an important piece. It's also, I know we have about $1 billion worth of small business that is currently as we speak, we're getting double-digit price increase for the first time since that market hardened. That really makes the insurance, where it is competing, if you will, to get towards the mid-teen return. We have a pretty good choice opportunity set as you mentioned. At about 11:34 last Thursday, the stock started to go down. Yeah. I think that you could time it to the moment that on the transfer, someone said the stock is trading at 1.4 times booked. People looked up and said, "1.4 times booked. Oh my God, how could it be so expensive?" Look, I have followed the company for 20 years. I think that there's been sort of a transition. I do not know when it was, but when the buyback began, the idea was that Arch shares were worth buying back when the best use of capital if you could buy them below 3-year ahead book value. One time I heard you once said that maybe we should buy at 5-year ahead book value because the mortgage earnings are so forecastable that it increases the valuation. I feel it seems like it's changed in some ways that we want to buy at 1.3 times book or below. I do not think that is what you. Has it changed? Is 3-year ahead book value the right benchmark that we should be thinking about? I do not want to be too persnickety, but I can tell you that the number 1.4 freaks everybody out. I am trying to figure out what we can do here. Yeah. I will let François mention that. I will let François carry on with this and clarify if he has to. With the easy question here. You talk about people, and I'll talk about capital. You're spot on, Josh. I think a little bit of, I'd say slight confusion maybe. Your description is spot on with the intent and how we've operated for quite some time, right? That's really a three-year payback based on the forward-looking view of ROEs. As you know, our ROEs weren't as high as they are today a few years back, and I think along the way, people converted the three-year payback to a 1.3x book. It's still the three-year payback. In this environment, as you know, we think that it could certainly support us buying back at a higher price than, or higher multiple than what we've been buying at. On top of which, Marc touched on it on the call, I think there's other factors that we consider, namely reserve strength, the strength of our balance sheet, the embedded value in the mortgage portfolio. Those are things that are call it off balance sheet that aren't necessarily captured, but we have a view on, and that informs how we think about share buybacks. It's not to say that we would always buy back at that price. There's always M&A or other needs for the capital that come into play. We've had many questions on that topic today with all the one-on-ones, and hopefully we've clarified a little bit of the comment. As you can imagine, it's not a static thing. It's something we talk about all the time, and we adjust as we move forward. In the early days of Arch, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, obviously, there was a lot of fear in the insurance markets. You didn't have a complete data set. You guys knew what you were doing. It turns out it's not just you, but a couple of your other Class of 2001 companies, the loss picks that you picked in those early years turned out to be wildly redundant. Yeah. We're now in the best pricing we've had in 20 years. Everybody that I'm one of the gray-haired people, and I still think I'm kind of a young guy, but it shows that nobody really knows anything that happened before 1997, I think. Yeah. Does it repeat itself? Are we going to see an industry that's wildly over-reserved for the past few years? I add to that the pandemic and the closure of the courts and whatnot. Yeah. It has really messed up our ability to look at payment for ratios as any indicator of actual payout trends. A, what advice do you have an investor to think about reserve adequacy? Two, does this play out the same way? Is this a different story than it was 20 years ago? I think not much has changed, unfortunately. I go back more than 20. I go back 25, 27 years ago. I have no hair unlike you. At least you have some hair. You should be proud of that, happy with that. I think that you'll see a very similar situation. I think if you look back at the initial pick of the insurance industry, it tends to hover around a very narrow band, much narrower band, regardless of the underlying condition. That's because we're looking back in a rear-view mirror and trying to pick up the numbers. It's very hard for people to say or to believe that a portfolio is 15 points better than it was or 15 points worse than we think we're pricing it for. I think what you end up with is misses on the upside and downside. I think we're going to continue to see that kind of mismatch, and that's what creates cycles, actually, because you don't have perfect information, and it really takes a long time for development to happen. I think that COVID probably, or might have slowed down the recognition of some of the losses that we believe probably should happen. I think that the loss pick will probably maintain at a high level, and the question is, are they truly maintained there because there's cushion built in the current numbers because of the uncertainty, or is it because maybe it's too early to declare victory? The other question I may add is, well, maybe that's because some of the ones that were picked 4 or 5 years ago are maybe on the lower side, and maybe the reserving process is sort of a holistic, total global approach within each companies. I think I wouldn't be surprised if we see a very similar phenomenon, Josh. I think that from my perspective, I'm one of the lone believer in the cycles for the long run. They're not going to go away. For as long as we have inability to predict the future, we're going to have people making decisions based on their best knowledge, and their best knowledge is never really, truly perfect. I think we're going to see some of that. The one thing I would say, I would tell investors that I feel proud about for ourselves is, if you look at the way we've looked at our insurance group, François and I were reporting numbers in 2017, 2018, 2019, that were not great, right? 100%, 102%, 98%. I think that what we're trying to tell the Street, the Street was telling us, well, everybody's printing 92% or 91%, and we need to tell you that we're trying to target mid-90s, and we're really trying to improve the portfolio performance. I think that the market helped us there. I think our numbers are fixed, and the way we've improved the results of our insurance group sort of speaks to the consistency and it's congruent to what we've been telling the Street, that pricing is improving. We've kind of migrated the loss pick in the region where we think it should go, which is it should go down because the price went up. Which means to me as an investor, well, the numbers that you're picking up now probably are solid, are fairly solid. It's one thing to go from 100% to 92%. It's a different one to go from 95% to 94%. This market is truly, the rates are going up, and it's truly improving your performance. I would tend to look for people that are truly booking numbers, and there's a differentiation between years and rate levels within years. Between years, right? The loss ratio in 2017, 2018 is not as good as it was in 2021. It's just mathematically almost impossible, right? Despite the COVID. I think the COVID, to your point, exacerbates possibly the improvement that is perceived at this point in time. But that improvement may not be there. That's why I would tend to think that the loss ratios are not going to show the full possible credits for the rate above trends for a little while, because there is indeed more uncertainty, clearly, in this time than there was in 2002, 2003, or 2004. There's a lot more stable market in liability side, for instance, after the crisis of the Enron and the World Trade Center. It's not the same now. It seems like we have a sort of in-between war kind of feeling right now. We'll have a little bit of an interesting time to go through in 2023, 2024. The pricing is good. That should cater for a lot of potential huge deviation for what we think it's going to be. The market's getting better. I think if I was an investor, I would look for consistency or logic in terms of how the combined ratio has been selected through the cycle. That's a good indicator. When you talk about use of capital, we didn't really pay enough attention to M&A as an option. At the beginning of the pandemic, you took a 29.5% stake in Coface. Just last month, Natixis has sold its last 10% stake in Coface to a third party. They didn't seem to want to wait the two years for you to be an eligible bidder in case you were interested in that asset. You did say on the last conference call that you're still interested in Coface at the right price. It seems like that from a game theory perspective, to wait one more month or whatever it would take for Natixis to see what Arch's price might have been, does the buyer, whoever bought that business, are they seeing themselves as a poison pill? What does the mentality behind that transaction mean for you acquiring Coface at a reasonable price? I'll start, I'll ask François to come in as well. He'll chime in on the call. I don't know what the belief was. I think certainly the bankers are telling us that the people who bought from the Natixis are fully expecting a stopgap of sort that we'll just pick it up at some point, they were fully expecting it. There is no plan, right? There's no immediate plan. We don't think in those terms. I think the Natixis, as François mentioned on the call, that did that transaction really without telling us much for a couple of days before it happened. Just let us know that was happening. I think it was a truly poor desire of the Natixis to get out of the stock, I think some people might think that it's not a bad price to pay for. There was somewhat of a discount to the price that it was trading at. I mean, it's hard from a perspective how they were thinking. From our perspective, we're patients, as you know, Josh, we'll see how that works. I mean, we're barely working with them for like a year. You know us, we'll take our time to make sure we know and understand fully what's happening before we go in the full distance. We do. So far, so good. We're really pleased with what we're seeing. It's a very well-run company. They also had COVID issues, as you know, like everyone else, so that certainly put a little bit of a higher distance in terms of our aspirations, perhaps. You're right, we had some time consideration that needed to be taken out. I'll leave to François anything to add on this. I'm not sure. Yeah, just a quick clarification, Josh. There was multiple buyers in that stake. It wasn't only one buyer. It was multiple institutional investors. From what I recall, I think not a single one of them had more than a 5% stake in the overall stake that was available. I think the timing was very much around regulatory approval. If we had gone forward with that 11% or 12% stake, it would have required regulatory approval, and that would have taken time. I think, to Marc's point, not quite sure how anxious Natixis was to sell out, but certainly if they'd come to us and we'd offer them what they thought was a better price, then it would have been the trade-off. Hey, we got to wait six months, maybe longer, and then things could happen. Just take the money and run might have been their thinking. Quick note, you may have been busy, but Coface reported tonight after the close in Paris and had another very solid quarter. I think it supports our thesis that it's a very good business that we have a lot of appetite for, and how it plays out going forward, we'll keep looking at it. If I look over the past two years, premium base has grown by about 40% each of the last two years. Yep. You spent $530 million to acquire that Coface stake. You spent $210 million to increase your stake from 10% in Watford Re to 30% in Somers Re. You have also incurred about half a billion dollars in losses associated with the mortgage insurance industry, which may come back to you. We'll see what happens. That's obviously chewing up capital in the interim. You have raised some debt preferred. What's the level of capital flexibility on February 15th, 2021 compared to February 15th, 2000? François, go ahead. Well, I just want to make sure, February 15th, 2021 or 2022, today you mean? 2022. I'm saying here's the big growth in the footprint. You spent $750 million on acquisitions. Yep. You have to hold the capital for $500 million in losses on the MI business. Yep. I mean- Today to a year ago was really the, I mean- Two years ago. Yeah. Before, pre-COVID. Yeah. Pre-COVID. Yeah. Right. Along the way, we raised $1 billion, which was really, we said it was both defensive and somewhat us playing a bit of offense. We thought the market would get better, and we wanted to have the resources to grow. No question that things have worked out I think a bit better than what we would have thought at the time. Yeah, when we look at flexibility and what we have, we're capable of doing today compared to even early 2020, I'd say we're in a much better position. The market has improved, I think, faster and in a bigger way than we thought it would back then, even though we thought it would get better. $2 billion of earnings last year. We were able to buy back about 60%, return that to the shareholders. I'd like to think that 2022 has a lot in store for us to the good. That gives us a lot of flexibility. Whether it's, again, we talk about M&A, we talk about capital management, we talk about growing the business. I think we got a lot of things that we can do with the capital base we have, and we feel that much more confident with it. Do we know what the January 1st, 2022 PML is yet for the peak zone exposure? Has that number come out? Yeah. We quoted that in the earnings call. It's about just under 6% of tangible equity. Yep. All right. 6%. It's a little below where it was back at 3Q20. Prices are up in property cat, maybe not nearly up enough where they should be. Yep. Maybe just a return, just better opportunities elsewhere. Yes This is really, how do you figure out what the right amount of balance sheet to put at risk for the peak event is? I mean, at some point, it just builds itself. It's not like every year you fire all the deals or say no to all the deals and you rewrite the whole thing. We're anchoring ourselves through a cycle, up or down. I think the question we have to ask ourselves is, well, the pricing has gone up 10, 11, maybe 8% over the last year. If you look at the return on the cat XOL versus the return on other property deployments, including some property E&S and fac, for instance. The returns pale in comparison on the excess of loss. We do believe that the excess of loss is somewhat, the returns are still subdued and still lagging, and they're nowhere near what they should be. I think when you say, "Well, okay, we were at 8.4% PML last year. Pricing is going up, you know what? We have better way to deploy it somewhere else. It doesn't really add to as much to the PML in other ways to deploy capital." That's a better deployment and better use of capital for us. The PML goes down, and it's totally okay, and we're totally fine with that. I think it's more like the way we build a portfolio. I mean, we have guardrails as to where we want to be, which is up to 25, which is we're nowhere near that as we speak. I think that we sort of let our team figure out what kind of return and what they're seeing and how they will deploy the capital as they underwrite and renew the business. I think what we've seen in terms of the PML going down slightly from last year tells you what you need to know, is that there are better opportunities somewhere else. The property side clearly to 40 share is better than the excess of loss at this point in time. Yeah. I can quote all the virtues of mortgage insurance. I'll give you a few of them. Okay. The underwriting of the underlying mortgage is extremely tight. Yep. The inventory of affordable single-family homes in this country is very thin. Yep. The tail for a major mortgage disaster is in the reinsurance fixed income markets. Your underwriting in particular and the underwriting at UGC was multivariate long before the rest of the industry adopted it. Whatever the industry results, your results are going to be better for the back book. Again, the stock price is what it is. You can see where your comparison mortgage are. The investors don't like the mortgage insurance industry. Is there a price where it behooves you to sell the future earnings to somebody else and realize more value? Is that an option available to you? I mean, is that a desperate option? I mean, like in the end, if you can't beat them, join them. What is your view on saying, "Look, the market doesn't get it."? We can deploy that capital better and at a better price." How do you feel about that sort of characterization? I'm ambivalent with that character. I think that it's totally, I agree with you, underappreciated. I mean, it's got so many good things going for it. It's a vastly different industry than it was pre 2006, 2007. It's really just a lot more discipline, a lot more attentive to risk, and a lot more focused on doing the right thing. The fact that most people don't like mortgage insurance, actually in a silly way, or non-obvious way, probably makes for those returns to be as good as they are for as long as they have become. The fear of mortgage. Mind you, the mortgage insurance is not alone in being extremely difficult making money. Banks don't make money issuing mortgage. Mortgage originators are struggling. The margins are thin. The whole mortgage industry, forget only mortgage insurance, the mortgage industry is nowhere near its heyday. If you told me everything in the mortgage space is back to where it was in 2004 or 2003 or 2004, and we would be lagging, I would feel a lot different. I think it's just a reflection of the market. I think it's a heavy hangover that we have from the 2007, 2008. I think it allowed us to get those pricing, the pricing, however healthy it is, for that long because of that sort of lack of faith in the numbers. What it means in terms of multiples, we are at Arch firm believer, we said this since 2001, that if we keep doing the right thing, and we do the underwriting well, and we do cycle management the way we do it, the market will over time recognize the value we bring. At some point, the mortgage insurance is doing 15% plus return. It's been doing so for a long time. It keeps on doing it. We're very prudent, very careful, as you know, in the way we price it, the way we manage it through the Bellemeade and whatever else is out there. I have confidence. I have faith. I'm a man of faith. You got to believe at some point, people will realize that this is a beautiful business because we do believe it's a beautiful business. Listen, being contrarian, guys, is what it's all about. Sometimes we'll do things that the general market or that you, the analysts, that the investment doesn't want like. What matters to us is our shareholders like what we do. Our shareholders actually appreciate that we're building book value at a healthy clip. Frankly, without MI over the last 4 or 5 years, it would have been a lot difficult, a lot more difficult for us to invest and maintain discipline in the P&C space. I would do that deal 5 times over if I could do a deal like that. I have to believe, I have to say that over time, those multiples will become more reasonable. In the third party- Just quickly, Josh, I mean, let's not forget that we were trading at 1.8 times book literally two years ago. May seem like a long time ago, but it wasn't that long ago. We got to have a slightly longer-term view than just the- Right. That's right. That's why you buy back more stock. That stock to you. You said it. Third-party capital. In 2019, you bought Barbican, I think a big part of the idea was that Arch become a bigger player in the third-party market. The hedge fund remodel maybe didn't work out as planned, you sort of reworked your homegrown third-party business, Watford, turning to Somers Re. Where does Arch see itself as a player in third-party capital? That business really has seemed only successful for cat writers or principal cat writers in some ways. You have your eyes on a longer term. Where do you see Arch in third party re? We think it could work. Third party capital in the long tail line has worked in other places. Lloyd's is a clear example. It has not worked for some of them, but it has worked for some if you do it well. I think that we're not giving up on that one either. I think that Somers Re being private, as François and I have been talking about this for a long time, it's better in a private setting than it is a public setting. It's a very different kind of model. You're right, that the increasing risk on the investment side may not be as appropriate. Frankly, now we have a great market or a hard market. I think at a high level, I wouldn't mind if we had more and more third parties able to manage. We'll never have the majority of our capital being third party managed, because we want to still be able to manage and be able to trade through potential issues in the marketplace. I think the biggest key for us, Josh, on the third party capital is to build it the right way so the returns are there, so people have faith and confidence and trust and want to invest with us, a long time with us. You're right, it's worked a bit better for the property cat because there's entry and exit. Also because of ease of entry and exit also means that if there's a crisis, the money's going to come out of there faster than probably you would want as a manager of that third party capital. That's why, in a way, the third party capital was interesting to us, because it has to stay for a little while longer than usual. I think there's still a model viable there. I think that we want to leverage on the ring platform, right? That's what we're all about. We want to leverage what we do well, which is the underwriting function. It's a build that's going to be slow because we want to do it the right way. Again, Josh, we're not perfect. We make mistakes like everyone else. We may have had a few missteps. We learned from it. I think that over the next five or 10 years with the hard markets and the expense we have, I think it's going to be a lot more solid than it was. I think it's there to stay for. From my perspective, third party capital is there to stay. I think we do provide a good proposition for an investor. We are very good at underwriting, hopefully people recognize this and want to invest alongside with us. one last question on cyber. My personal view is there's not that many companies that made money in cat over the past 20 years. Yep. I think you guys have done it, RenaissanceRe's done it. I think Validus did it. Not many others. Maybe I'm wrong. I feel like the major cyber cat event hasn't really happened yet, everybody's playing in cyber, and we're going to see who's wearing the pants when the water goes out. Can you sort of tell me, is cyber like cat? Is there going to be a major reckoning? Are you making money? Is everyone making money? Is it only going to be select few make money? How does that shake out? I think the industry has not lost as much or actually has made some money historically. It's just there's a lot of squeeze because those events hit, frankly, the front page of the paper, and they do come in probably bigger than people would expect them to come in. I think that we're bullish on the cyber to some extent because the pricing has increased, as you know, Josh. Being a cyber manager, our playbook is while it's price increase, we start sniffing. As we start sniffing, we start realizing that the terms and conditions are also improving, right? There's a lot of cutting in terms and conditions, and there's a lot of oversight. This one line of business, which I love about is the moral hazard is really minimized. Companies do not want to have a cyber event occurring to them. I'm not talking about the major ones that could happen that sting the whole industry. If I'm talking about individually or even a cyber event that affects a portion of the industry or a certain industry, there's a desire to protect clients and reputation, frankly, against that. I think the amount of investment, Josh, that we've seen over the last few years by our clients to question is the level of insight and questioning that even ourselves as a buyer of cyber, we have to go through. It's night and day from what it was 18 months ago. The market is really focusing and paying attention. Reminds me a little bit of terrorism event after the 9/11 events. There was a heightened scrutiny on what the risk meant and what it meant, and people are tracking their aggregates. People are watching it and looking at it. It's like insurance to us is very simple, right? At a high level is how much are we willing to lose? Like the cat, we talk about 6% of PML, this is what we're willing to risk for this year on behalf of shareholders because the returns are giving us this. I think that cyber is nowhere near that amount. Obviously, it's starting. We're starting. We're doing a lot of small risk. We're looking to do some of the bigger risk, but we're buying some reinsurance. I think we're establishing our cyber practice to be long-lasting, we believe it's going to be profitable. I think it's a very profitable market right now. Fear is driving the market right now, which we want to hear. The fear is driving what's happening. This is the kind of market that Arch will do well in, because we're not going to risk the balance sheet of the whole company. The big event happens, Josh, I think we're keeping track, as I said, of our aggregates, but it's going to be manageable from our perspective as usual. It will also depend on how much further it improves throughout the year. It's improving almost on a weekly basis. It's a very aggressively hardening market. It's impressive, actually. It's a very interesting market for us. It is. Well, we are out of time. I do appreciate, especially late at night for you, Marc. Sure your time today. François, thank you. You might have some more meetings, but the day's running to a close for the public events. If anyone wants to ask a question, reach out to me. I will connect you. We're done for today. See you tomorrow morning on the webcast. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. Be well. Travel safe. Thank you, Josh. Thank you, Josh. Thank you. Bye-bye. Okay.