Okay, operator, let us know when we're ready. We are live. Excellent. It's a pleasure to have senior AIG management with us today. We've got Mark Lyons, Executive Vice President and CFO of the company, and Sabra Purtill, Deputy CFO and Treasurer. The way I'm going to approach it today is I'm going to ask a series of questions. Toward the end, I'm going to take a number of questions, whatever you may have, via email. My email is andrew.kligerman@credit-suisse.com, and the last name is K-L-I-G-E-R-M-A-N. Happy to take those email questions if you have them. Mark and Sabra, I'll kick off with some general questions that I think people want to get a good feel for. A little tricky. Thinking about AIG's intermediate term adjusted return on equity, how should we think about that with the potential divestiture a year or two out of the life business? General Insurance recorded an ROE of 3.8% in 2020. Of course, that was impacted by elevated cats and COVID. 8.8% in 2019. Is there any kind of snapshot or thinking around an intermediate term adjusted ROE? Yeah, great question, Andrew. I would say that at this point, we're more comfortable with some of the guidance we've given to date, which I would say is more around the steps for GI to get to the actual combined ratio that we've targeted, sub 90, which I'm sure we'll get into. The fact that there's premium growth that we plan associated with that and so forth. It's really difficult on the capital markets and the NII side of the house, both at AIG in totality as well as L&R, which is inextricably linked inside of that. The reason there's more feeling on GI is because that's really principal as opposed to principal and interest, if you think of it, in terms of what garners down to the bottom line. We have that. Interestingly, because you sparked something when you said the intermediate. You made the L&R reference. The L&R with separation down the line and the ongoing discussions with key constituents or rating agencies and so forth, it's a little hard until you anchor and really finalize on structures as to what some of that might be. Back to the intermediate point that you made is everybody's looking at what's the change in accounting principles, right? What's LDTI going to do, for example, because that's kind of intermediate. We've done some preliminary work, of course, there's more work to go. Given that that affects 560 more than anything else, which is likely term insurance and whole life and some UL on that. Our initial view on that is, I can get into why. Close to neutral if not minor favorable. Remember, retirement dominates life on a relative proportional basis for us. When you get into term and whole life, we kind of view that really as the net positive. It comes down to where you think your loss recognition margins are and everything else on that. It's the UL side that, although that's kind of unlocked as you go anyway, it's the change in the amortization that becoming more straight line that'll be more front and center and be the offset to some of the gains we might get out of that term and whole life. I know there's been conversations about the difference in the scope, right? Where under FAS 60 you had a lot of aggregation, you had a lot of freedom as to how you could put things together. Kind of like a PDR on the property casualty side, right? In the case of this, you got to really look at every issue year, and everything else. The interesting aspect is that you don't any longer have the provision for adverse deviation. You have that drops because it needs to be expected value or best estimate on a go-forward basis. Between the net of the two, much more favorable associated with a term and whole life with an offset on UL, mostly because of the back amortization. We still view that as a net neutral or minor net positive. Anyway, you said intermediate, okay to move on. Got it. Those are some very good data points, Mark. Maybe one area that's just a kind of a top-of-mind issue around AIG in the General Insurance business is that targeted 90% accident year combined ratio. That would be by the end of 2022, I assume. You had 94.1% in 2020. That was a nice improvement over 96% in 2019. Mark, maybe you could give us the construct of that. What are going to be the key drivers of pushing that down another four percentage points over the next two years? Yeah, happy to. I think Peter Zaffino touched on it a little bit, we can certainly get into that as well. You do have componentry on the expense side through AIG 200, probably through the course of this discussion, I'll be reaffirming a few things in that regard, as well as the favorable environment and AIG's approach to that favorable environment. On the expense ratio side first, let's just talk about AIG 200. AIG 200, we stick by the numbers, was a $1.3 billion investment over the three-year period to have an ending $1 billion exit run rate on that. We talked about where we had achieved in this year, which was better than we originally planned. If you go back to what we originally said that we'd adhere to, at the end of year two, $650 cumulatively run rate, exit run rate, and then at $1 billion at the end of year three. If you think about 2022, which is your question, you're going to have the $650 coming forward, and effectively, you're going to have half of the balance. Right? Let's call that $25 in a calendar year perspective. Right? And we still feel that over the long haul, roughly three-quarters of that will accrue to GI, to General Insurance. You can kind of do that arithmetic and math, right? And then you can pick where you think net or premium might be, but you're probably in the two and a half points range of that. Again, make some assumptions along the way. The balance, and the interesting thing I think we all need to keep in mind is AIG is not a monolithic entity. The way we report externally with the segments in North America Commercial and that's subdivided in personal lines, commercial lines, we tend to focus where the excitement is, right? Which is in commercial lines. It's mostly in North America Commercial lines, secondarily in international commercial lines. Personal lines, because of the regulatory nature of it, and so forth and so on, you're not going to get this kind of massive uptick or massive downtick depending where you are in the cycle. The personal lines acts as kind of a ballast on that overall portfolio. I think it's good to keep that in mind. I think the loss ratio improvement is going to come out of North America Commercial first, International Commercial second, in a kind of a rank order. Personal lines side is, I think I've kind of addressed that, right? You're going to get some improvement, but you might see more expense ratio improvement than loss ratio improvement on that side, where we would expect more loss ratio improvement on the commercial side of the house. I think the combination of the AIG 200 efforts, that's why I tried to give you that mix answer on the geography and kind of business, is going to drive it. We're confident that we're going to achieve that. That math makes a lot of sense, especially with all the strength in pricing we're seeing these days. One quick sidebar, though, on AIG 200, Mark. You mentioned that three-quarters of it will be General Insurance related and a quarter to Life and Retirement. With that separation, is there any disruption? Do you have any concerns about the ability to kind of smoothly transition? Well, a couple things. First off, I view that three-quarters as an end game. In a quarter or a year, it's going to fluctuate a little bit, but at the end of that period, we would expect that to be the case, firstly. Secondly, I really didn't mean to imply that the remaining 25% is L&R. There's going to be what we'll view as corporate today, right? That in a post-separation would be combined with GI, right? There's going to be savings accruing to corporate on that as well. Now with the separation lens, there's further elbow grease associated with a further consolidation of costs and functions, both in corporate and then what does L&R need on their side of the house as a standalone public entity. I see. No disruptions, maybe even a little bit better, a little smoother. Is that the right way to interpret what you said? Yeah. On a composite basis, we would expect them to close to offset each other. I think Peter's kind of mentioned that in the past as well. That's where we are on it. That's great. Another item that's come up quite a bit, I know you can't apply specific numbers to a valuation or an IPO or a private investor that hasn't happened, but some people have brought up similar or companies with comparable businesses, such as Equitable, that trade at what we think is an extremely low multiple of five times estimated 2022 earnings. We think the sector is really undervalued. If we look at AIG's Life and Retirement business, what might give you some confidence that you could do better than the life sector as a whole? Or would you be willing, Mark, to accept a multiple that's comparable to some of these other companies, like Equitable or Lincoln? Yeah. There's a couple thoughts that come to mind on that, Andrew. First off is really are in a different position, I think, than many of those. Let me kind of enumerate a few of those and feel free with the dialogue with it. We're not a one-note tune. We have a lot of products at our disposal. We have a lot of distribution also, that is diversified. That is very helpful. We don't have the back book issues anymore. I mean, whether it's old business that we've made a different comment on, LBP or anything else, I mean, that's been solved through the whole Fortitude. Transaction. We think that diversification provides a lot of good ways to manage a full fair cycle and the macro cycle without the fear of back book, really coming back, and hitting. I think that's a point of differentiation. To the extent on whether it's public or private, again, that's idiosyncratic, right? You got to say what's the terms or conditions that someone might come forward with, and does it make sense? We'd only want to value that if it was in the best interest of shareholder, and we could really see increased value accretion, and it either enables or doesn't hurt the ability to deal with the balance of what we would need to sell post that. That's probably the best answer I can give you now. That's helpful. Mark, just again, I know you can't speak very specifically to it, a lot of questions out there about the rationale for maybe on the one hand, keeping the whole life and retirement business together versus potentially selling blocks of business, notably the annuity blocks or, just altogether different sub-segments within Life and Retirement. What's that rationale for keeping it together? Would you indeed consider some breaking off some portion of the business and if so, how? That was a long question. I'm sorry. Yeah, no issue with that. Well, I would say that to some extent, I can rely on some of the answer I gave you on the prior one with the diversification, because you do leverage one to the other, as well as a common view of longevity, a common view of mortality. The hedging program, quite frankly, is across the board. It's not a legal entity one. It's an aggregate view on the hedging program. When you get to blocks, when I look at the history of those things within the industry, sometimes you could be left with something much less attractive, or at least in the eyes of the outside world. That's all point of view. If the most attractive blocks or subsets go off first, by definition, they don't have to be poor books, but they're poorer books by not having the cream left in there. That's always an issue you have to really push the pencil on. Mark, it feels like AIG is leaning in the direction of keeping this business as a whole, as opposed to separate pieces. Is that a fair statement? That would be our preference. Yes, that would be our preference. Preference. Okay. That's a good word to use there. In terms of the separation, could you talk to us about the capital implications? Would AIG be able to free up capital? Will there be more capital constraints? How do you view AIG from a capital standpoint post-19.9% divestiture, whether that be private or IPO? A couple points of rationale that maybe just to recenter everyone is the 19.9 is the level which It's a consolidation line in the sand, right? It's whether you consolidate or not consolidate. Because of AIG's long history of the DTA, a piece of that being foreign tax credits, the FTCs, there is a material amount of that expected to be utilized over the next two years. There could be some overhang into year three, but dominantly in the first two. That's one consideration for the percentage and the timeline associated with that. A lot more of the work, as Peter I think alluded to on the call that's been done is that we are increasingly comfortable that no equity capital would need to be invested into the operation. We still anticipate in order to come out of this with two strong entities, with two strong platforms, that the debt leverage of the capital structure makes sense and it makes sense within a reasonable period of time, so that it's comparable and not disadvantaged and still comfortable with rating agencies, a timeframe X that we would go to. On the equity side, we don't see it. On the debt side, I think we've already alluded to it in the past. I'll ask Sabra if you have anything else you might want to kick in on that. No, I think you've hit on all the key points. I know back, I guess it was five or six years ago with a different management team, they talked a lot about the diversification credit that AIG received having both the GI and the Life and Retirement businesses. While some of that diversification credit does go away, both GI and Life and Retirement on their own are very diversified, as Mark has commented, relative to the risk profile of Life and Retirement. With the strength of the balance sheets, the GI pool's risk-based capital levels are the highest they've been in about a decade in improving profitability. We were happy to be able to confirm that the capitalization structure that we're talking about is achievable without having to downstream any capital into subsidiaries. That's nice. I guess just in general, talking about capital, and I don't know if you'll answer, but we kind of estimate about $4.8 billion of excess capital in AIG. Are we in the ballpark? If so, what are your priorities? I know you've announced plans for $500 million in buybacks in the first half of this year. I think you've got a leverage ratio of 31.4% ex-AOCI. Where would you like to take your kind of proceeds? Is it de-levering? Is it repurchase? Do you have any growth investments? What are the priorities there? That's actually a mouthful, that question. I think Sabra and I will fork and frack it as we go through. I guess, starting with your discussion of the AIG level leverage, which on a GAAP basis is 28.4%, and I think you were kind of looking at it as with and without AOCI and so forth. As we said on the call, we've already dealt with a maturity in the first quarter, right? That we had kind of pre-funded for anyway when we did the $4.1 billion debt raise. That's already taking us down towards glide path, towards where we wanted to be pre-separation of 45% on a GAAP basis. That improvement continues. I think that's the first thing. The second thing, on your 4.8, I'm not totally sure where that may come from. I think it's easy to Because we talk about liquidity a fair amount, so it's easy to kind of transpose the two. I mean, on our invested assets, I could have them all in cash and have inadequate capital but be massively liquid, right? I think that might be more of a liquidity view, Andrew. I'm not completely sure. Back to the rest of your question, the debt reduction still is paramount. I think one message we are trying to leave is, although that continues to be a high priority, we see a lot more flexibility now, not only in the $500 million that you noted on share repurchases, but that on the minority sale, we see a portion of that being also additionally, additively as a share repurchase potential in that. Other uses, we have the investment, as we've highlighted, of the $1.3 billion into AIG 200 at share repurchases, as we mentioned. There's always holding company expenses, so forth and so on. Into absolute excess capital, whether I'm at AIG or Arch, as you know, Andrew, I never go there. Right. Sabra, anything else on the liquidity side you wanted to bring up? Well, I would just mention that Peter talked about it, in terms of capital management priorities on the call. Just a reminder that March 1st is when he is appointed as CEO. I think that we'll probably try to be a little bit more systematic in how we talk about our capital management priorities. As Mark reviewed, we are managing the debt situation and have been for the last couple of years. With the beginning of COVID, we kind of took a side step for a little bit because we raised the money in May of last year to basically pay off all the maturities that we had coming up over the course of the next, effectively, year. We've actually done that. The $4.1 billion that we raised has been used to pay off maturing debt and to repay the revolving credit draw. From where we sit today, we're frankly relieved that COVID did not have as bad of an impact on our balance sheet as I think we all feared back in March and April. With the debt maturities that we've had, we'll continue to look for opportunities to get our leverage down. Really, the big event for capital, as Mark has referred to, will be with the separation and the setting up the Life and Retirement capitalization, paying off debt at AIG, getting the proceeds from the 19.9%, and that'll be kind of the next big time frame for when we'll be able to do significant capital management activities. One other thing, Andrew, if I could just append one thing. Sabra and I kind of go back and forth on this anyway. The $4.1 billion clearly was pre-funding. It was economically advantageous. We had a weighted average coupon, effectively 3.3%, right? We had three tenors on it, weights to that. That part was attractive for us. Given the uncertainties back then, we didn't know what the impact would be on the global economy, because we're a global organization, not just a national organization. How the U.S. government and other governments around the world would react to help sustain those economies. You wanted to get in and be liquid, for all the contingencies we knew about, the known and the unknown that could have happened. With that maturing debt schedule, we knew how much time we had with excess cash on our hands in case something went south that no one could predict. It was just as much a risk management move as it was an economical. Makes sense. Just so you know how we had calculated that $4.8 of excess, we estimated roughly $10.5 billion of holdco liquidity. I guess you've got $1 billion through tax settlement due in the second quarter of this year. $1.5 billion of debt due in February and another $3 billion of holdco cash needs. That's kind of how we did it. I don't know if you want to say anything to address that because you don't always address excess capital, but. That's a liquidity approach. Yeah, that's a liquidity approach. I would add to that the share repurchase. I would add to that the AIG 200 expenditures and so forth. Yeah. Which kind of narrows that. Yeah, I got you. There is a gap. Makes sense. Yeah. I would just say every company has a different approach and framework. In general, in our industry, which relies on capital to write business and support risk, we look at base case and stress scenarios as well. Excess capital is really measured through the lens of a stress scenario, not the current balance sheet, which is why, as Mark was saying, you're looking at a liquidity framework and what are our near-term cash needs. We actually manage and evaluate capital in a stress scenario. Having said that, like I said, the subsidiaries are very well capitalized right now. The credit losses and downgrades that we had through the COVID situation thus far are maybe a third of what we thought they might've been at the worst of late March before all the Fed Reserve programs kicked in. The subsidiaries are very well capitalized. We have very strong liquidity at the holding company. Obviously we wouldn't be saying they're going to repurchase $500 million of stock if we didn't think we had excess capital. Similar to many of our peers, we don't put point estimates out there because stress scenarios, you can run 10 different stress scenarios and we're going to come up with 10 different numbers. Wonderful. Shifting a little more to General Insurance on the topic of premium growth, net written premiums off about 9% in 2020, 5% in 2019. You were alluding to some of the benefits in commercial. There were some announcements, I guess, that you had decided to retain a bigger piece of some important casualty quota share treaties. I think you're retaining more with respect to catastrophe reinsurance. It sounds like even on the quota share, you're getting a better ceding commission. Between the rate increases that you're seeing in commercial, particularly North America, and the changes that you've made in 2021 to reinsurance, how might you see premium growth playing out in the next year and maybe two or three years after that? I would actually look more towards 4Q over 4Q as a better indicator than the full year, as you commented on. As you know, we had a lot of noise in personal lines, especially in North America through the travel book that got hit hard, roughly in the 80% reduction area. With PCG or high-net-worth structure we did with Syndicate 2019 and some outside reinsurers and spread that creative approach, it created calendar year accounting havoc. There was also unearned premium reserves that came in, not just new and renewal, and that had a different little structure to it. Anyway, it created noise, and that was dampening noise that was contributory to the reduction that you quoted in net written premium. I think it's Peter Zaffino joked on one of the comments on the call was, second quarter of last year, we had negative net written premium and that he thinks we should be able to exceed that, jokingly so. I think the quarter-over-quarter growth of fourth quarter is a better reference point than the year to begin with. There's clearly going to be different growth in different pockets. To the point of the reinsurance piece, yes, you're right. When the quota share is less on the casualty side. One thing I just want to correct, because you mentioned on the property cat that there's a lesser reinsurance and there's a lesser spend. I don't want the listeners to think there's a different exposure. There's lower attachment points associated with certain elements of the cat program, including the per risks as well at Aon, and without really sacrificing anything. That's a testament to the continued improvement and characteristics of the gross book that enables that as well. The exhaust period, the exits are very comparable with any other carrier as to the return period of exhaustion. All of those feed in. Yes, there's going to be some growth areas, and that can be accelerated a bit by a reduction in ceding. Great. Again, if anybody has questions, please do email them in. I see two emails now that have come in. Maybe just on the Life and Retirement segment, Mark, we asked about intermediate-term growth in pre-tax income. Again, a lot of noise in that segment or that business as well. I think there was a 3% drop-off in 2020 ex notables. You had a 9% increase in 2019 and mid-single-digit declines in 2017 and 2018. What kind of growth is this diversified mix of business capable of generating over time? What should investors be thinking about? If I look backwards to inform the future, I look at calendar 2020. Yes, the annualized fourth quarter was buffeted nicely by alternatives that came through, and you got to flatten that out. Normalize that out. When we tend to look at that and say, "Okay, that's uncharacteristically high," we also have to remember that the first quarter had an annualized 9.1% because of the reverse of what was happening back then. Over the course of the year, it was just shy of 14%, 13.9%, 13.8%. Even with those kind of offsetting each other, that's a good indicator coming forward. I would probably carve a little bit out of that because the averaging, I'll say, of that high annualized fourth quarter with the low annualized first quarter goes partway there, but perhaps not all the way there. I think there's a lot of good momentum still coming in. As you saw, I think in some of the net flows that we have, you saw some sequential rebounds, not necessarily year-over-year rebounds, but sequential rebounds. Given the economy, I think sequential is the better look at premiums and deposit and the net flows. The index annuities really seem to have regained their legs. It makes sense, I think, once you hear it, is that distribution had to just get used to the new world, and a lot of that stuff is still sold in a face-to-face context. They just had to get over that hump, I think. I think that's where you're seeing the growth of that occurring more. In the fourth quarter, in the institutional markets, there's going to be pension risk transfer opportunities here and there on flows and other sorts of mechanisms. Fixed annuities with a current interest rates environment are going to be tough for a while. We think the growth area is really on index and to somewhat variable. I would just add on the group retirement side, which is our VALIC business, early part of the year was really impacted by the lack of new business contracts in the environment that we were in. The school systems and the hospitals that we sell those plans into weren't out shopping for new providers. That turned around later in the year. Actually, in the fourth quarter, we signed two large contracts, about $500 million of assets under management, and we feel good about the momentum we have there. Just one quick observation, though, to make in terms of profit forecast for Life and Retirement. The last two years have been really strong on alternative, particularly on private equity. Our annualized yield on the Life and Retirement portfolio was almost 19% this year, and it was, like, 16% last year. When we build our forecast for that business, like many others in the industry, we have a placeholder of around 6% or 8%. When we think of 2021, we wouldn't project those kind of alternative returns. There is obviously a headwind on APTI coming from our just base assumptions for private equity. One thing I think, Andrew, also to help that is when you think about there's so much more that goes into it, but of course, we kind of tag the 10-year as an industry on the yield, and we've given some sensitivities. We've said $10 million-$15 million on a 10 basis point change. Let's go in the middle of that, $15 million APTI, pre-tax income. At year-end, that was roughly $90. Now we're in 150 lands. That's six times 15 is 90, and tax effective, that's $70 million-$75 million. Just to kind of put numbers to your question, as a function of that alone, gives you some scale. Got it. Very helpful. I see one email question. It says, AIG issued $400 billion of term insurance in the 1998 through 2004 time frame. As much of this is coming up on its level term period, how is the business developing, and could there be risk of adverse selection? My take, I guess earlier you were just talking about the term insurance being a good guide, but that's an interesting question. What do you think on that, Mark? Well, a couple thoughts on that. First off, AIG was a bigger term writer back up through, I'd say, the early part of the 2000s. Most of it was 20-year term. You can kind of see that that's going to roll off I think pretty dramatically on that. I guess the additional question associated with that is what happens then? Because you made an adverse selection comment. On post-term, what happens? Everybody knows they get jacked up beyond belief. It becomes one year at a time, and it generally goes to standard life as opposed to preferred life or something like that. You can get 10x, 20x movements. There's two views. You got the policyholder view and then the portfolio view. A policyholder view, their IRR is great at any time. It's the best, so bear with me on this when I say great. The return on an IRR standpoint, if you die within the term of a term policy, is attractive. That attractiveness, if there was sane, rational decision-making, probably no more than two years after that term expires, if you pay those premiums, it's a horrible financial decision to make. On a portfolio basis, yeah, I think there is that potential. I think the industry and AIG has undergone programs to try to soften that and perhaps make it not as steep an increase that encourages more people to buy it, and therefore, a different profile of remainers who continue to pay those premiums. I think we and others have done something like that in that regard. I think the biggest takeaway is that a lot of that was written in that time period, and it was mostly 20 years, so its end date is right in front of us. Let's see. I have another question that reads, can you ask about loss exposure to the Texas freeze, and maybe give us a little color around that? It'd be very little color, actually. It'd be very pale. It's very early, as you know, and I think it was just the day before yesterday, we're beginning to even have the ability to inspect. Reported claim experience at this point is light. There's not a lot I can tell you from an actual basis on it. There'll be personal and commercial exposure. I think the interesting thing would be that from a personal side, the way the vertical works, let's say on the personal line structure on the reinsurance, it's $150 million attachment on that. Which is nice because it's a nice low attachment on that. If you think of it on the commercial side, we touched on this in the 10-K, is the reduction from $500 million to $200 million on the attachment points of the North America Commercial cat program, except for Southeast and Gulf. That deals with windstorm and earthquake and so forth. This is a winter storm event, it qualifies as a $200 million attachment. I think they're good data points, I think, for you and your group. Got it. Very helpful. I guess as we I would just note in general, though, obviously, first quarter is normally one of the lighter cat quarters, particularly in North America. We also have a large book in Japan where there was an earthquake about 10 days ago. In general, I would say that the, I guess it was Storm Uri, is probably going to make it a higher cat quarter for the industry and AIG than you would normally expect for a first quarter. Yeah, that's a great point, Sabra. Also, when you talk about the volatility of that, if you look at the modeling firms, right? You had Karen Clark go from $10 billion to $18 billion, I think in the span of a couple of days. AIR just came out with $10 billion, I think, yesterday. It's too early. Even the modeling's parameter risk is all over the place. Got it. One last one as we kind of come up on the hour, I had wanted to ask. I don't see any more questions via email at this stage, but I'm curious as to your confidence in reserves on years written outside of the Berkshire Treaty, which stops after 2010. The 2016-2018 accident years generated $351 million of negative prior year developments in the fourth quarter, $171 million in the third quarter of 2020. Mark, and I think you were even touching on it a bit on the fourth quarter call, but could you give us a little color on why you may be confident or concerned in the 2016-2018 block? Yeah. Sure. I look at it like this. When you look all in, because after all, every company has some pockets of plus and minuses you go through in any quarter. If we look at the original accident year picks, right? 12 months into an accident year, and where is it today, right? At 2019, it's the greenest, right? It moved one tenth of a loss ratio play, right? At this point, all in, with all recoverables and everything else. If you flip to 2017, that moved half a point, half a loss ratio point from the original to where we are now. When I look back as to when that happened, when I came in on the second half of 2018, I jacked up reserves in both the third and the fourth quarter. Half of that half a point, if you will, in the 2017 year, I did when I first got here. A quarter point. There's been another quarter point since then, which is still in bullseye territory, right? When you get to 2016, which I think is probably most of the question on that, the original to where we are now actually deteriorated 4.5 loss ratio points. We should dissect where that came from, or more importantly, when that came from. The 2016 year had about two-thirds, 2.7 loss ratio points of that four and a half loss ratio points was in 2017 on the 2016 accident year. There was some recognition of that. Similar to what I said on the prior accident year, I came in and did some jack up, and that affected the 2016 year as well, and that pushed it up another close to a point, I think. Between the 2016 year Having an increase in 2017 and me moving it up, that was 85% of the difference right there. That's one of the reasons, because there's been enough of a look. There was a correction made almost within the second 12 months of the 2016 year, in 2017. 2018, I'm going a little out of order here, 2018 moved a point and a half from its original. That you have to put mostly on me, because in 2018, I didn't really affect the 2018 accident year as of 12 months. That movement has been 1.5 points, and it's moved some in 2019 calendar year and 2020 calendar year for a little differing reasons. When I think back of it, 2019 didn't really move much. Let me go in order. 2016 moved the most, but for the reasons I just itemized, and therefore, that's why I have comfort on that. 2017 really didn't move much at all. 2018 moved 1.5 points, and it's, I think, more a function of some of these things we've talked about along the way, inclusive of some of the financial lines I think I mentioned on the call. 2019 hasn't moved at all, really. 0.1 of a point is noise to me. That's how I'm looking at it, and that's why when I look at it in broader terms, I get increased comfort. I see, Mark. Just kind of taking what you said, it sounds like when you came on board in 2017, you scrutinized it, you took some hits. You kind of sized it as what you thought, and you were taking into account all of these issues like social inflation, severity increases, et cetera. It sounds like you feel like you've gotten your arms around it at this stage. Again, is that the right way to think of it? It sounds fairly true. I would just correct one thing. It was 2018, the latter half of 2018 when I joined AIG. Oh, I'm sorry. I meant, right. When you did get there in the latter half of 2018, that's when you kind of attacked it, though. Is that right? Yeah. Well, you try to get your arms around as much as you can, given the sprawling nature of this organization in six months, and then after that, I got yanked up to corporate. Pardon the interruption. We are out of our allotted time for the broadcast. Mark and Sabra, thank you so much for your great insights. Really appreciate it. Appreciate the invite and the time. Thank you, Andrew. Thanks.