You are in the meeting now. Recording in progress. It's in many ways similar to AerCap, since the largest component of AerCap's fleet is really the ILFC fleet that I built, that they acquired in 2014. So their Xerox machine was very efficient. Anyway, our long-term goal in the industry is to achieve maximum returns for the investors and take care of our airline customers, as well as take care of our team. So our basic philosophy is buy new assets directly from the OEMs, which our team has done. We've bought over 3,000 new planes from Boeing, Airbus, Fokker, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Embraer, ATR, and so we have a lot of experience buying new airplanes. We hold those assets for roughly the first third of their lives, so the average assets are in the 25- 30-year lifespan. We hold those assets for 8- 10 years, and then we sell them at a gain above our book value. Of course, if we acquire those assets at very good prices, because we buy them wholesale, hundreds of airplanes at a time, per contract, we can then depreciate those assets. At the end of those leases or the point at which we decide to sell the asset, we have a nice gain. Air Lease went public in 2011. Since then, we've bought $45 billion worth of new airplanes. We've generated more than $14 billion of positive cash flow. We sold $7 billion of used aircraft, and we've ramped that activity up since the pandemic came to an end. Last year, we sold, I think, about $1.5 billion. This year, we'll sell probably more than $1.5 billion of used aircraft. And we returned $730 million to shareholders, primarily in the form of dividends. We are benefiting from some really strong undercurrents, robust passenger traffic. This year looks like we'll have about a 13% global increase in traffic. Strong aircraft demand, and that's not only generated by the increase in traffic, but also because the OEMs have not been able to meet their commitments. We have aircraft that are delivering in the second half of this year. They're three to four years late versus the original contracts we had with Boeing and Airbus. So the shortage of aircraft has actually increased demand and has helped elevate lease rates, even in a high interest rate environment. We're also now seeing the beginning of a cycle where long-term interest rates, as well as short-term rates, will begin to decline. So that will be a positive because lease rates are going up and the funding costs for investment grade lessors are gonna be going down. So that will be a very, very nice scenario, hopefully for several years to come. Air travel demand has been very resilient, and in this chart, you can see the various hiccups along the way. Gulf crisis, 9/1, financial crisis, the COVID epidemic, the Russia situation in Ukraine. Through all those times, the long-term trend has exceeded 5% annual growth rate. And this year we'll have the highest RPKs as well as ASMs in the airline industry in its history. So even if we're talking about low single digit traffic growth, because the number of jet aircraft in the global fleet has grown to now approaching 30,000 in the next twelve months, this intrinsic demand will continue, not only because of traffic growth, but also because there's a huge replacement cycle coming up, particularly on wide-body aircraft. So traffic volumes are strong, but what about the airlines? The airlines are probably gonna have record revenues this year, but they will not have record profits. Now I'm talking in a global scale. There's individual exceptions. One of the main reasons for that is that the costs of running an airline have grown faster than the normal rate of inflation and have grown faster than the yields they can generate. I think, Mike, you're the expert at that. Every day I get a rundown on your analysis, and what it shows is as the industry has become bigger and bigger, yield improvement lags cost increases, so airlines will have to figure out how to combat that phenomenon. We've seen pilot wages go up 20%-35% on single contract renegotiations. We have seen flight attendants, mechanics, organized labor across the world, demanding tremendous increases in compensation. The cost of doing business at airports, the taxation of airlines, all of these things have resulted in a much higher rate of increase in airline operating costs that are hard to keep up with. And now we have a phenomenon that lease rates will be going up, so that's another addition to their cost structure. But the feedback that we're getting from the airlines is there's a very strong demand for new aircraft. And even in places like Europe, where we do have this environmental mania right now, where politicians are claiming that the airline industry is destroying the planet, we're seeing much more restrictive situations. At airports, we have curfews on certain types of aircraft. We have onerous landing fee charges at airports like Heathrow and Paris and Frankfurt, depending on the aircraft type. So for example, recently, Heathrow said, "We don't want any more 737-800 s. You got to have MAXes." Pretty soon they're gonna say, "We only want A320neos and A321neos on the single-aisle segment. We don't want any of the CEOs." So those things alter the operating cost patterns of airlines. The main thrust of our business is long-term leases. Most of them are anywhere from 10- 15 years. The longer ones are generally wide-body aircraft, because the cost of reconfiguration, as Gus and others have pointed out, can be very costly. To totally redo a triple 777-300 ER, an A350 or a 787. So our order book for wide-body aircraft is probably a higher proportion than many of the other lessors. But what we're seeing is that there's a tremendous replacement demand for wide-body aircraft that are hitting, like, 25, 27, 28 years of age. And so we see the 787 family, clearly the 9s and 10s, A350-900 and 1000s, continue to gather steam and become more desirable, and lease rates have been creeping up. The next slide is in the same notion that Gus just mentioned. There's no correlation between airline profitability and leasing company, leasing industry profitability. If you look at the slide, going back to 2000, you can see that the airline industry had just about as many years of losses as an industry, as profits. Of course, we had this tremendous drop in 2021, 2022, even the back end of 2020. But the leasing industry, which is in the blue, continued to be profitable, even during the pandemic. And the only loss that we had was a one-time event of the Russian seizure of aircraft, and these were the write-offs that we had to take. But over time, all of us recover a significant part of those losses through the confiscation insurance. We've already recovered some. I know AerCap, SMBC, and others have already recovered significant amounts, particularly aircraft that were leased to Aeroflot. So if you take that out of the equation, the aircraft leasing industry has been profitable for the last twenty-four years, with this one exception, which again, was a temporary cash flow sort of mismatch. Whereas the airline industry has probably had about ten years of losses during that period, maybe eleven. That's something to keep in mind, because a lot of analysts sort of lump us all in the same category, airlines, aircraft lessors, but the results do not indicate that. The next slide I want to emphasize to you is that we've seen all these mega orders and production targets that Boeing and Airbus have set, and generally, they've missed those targets, including the most recent attempt by Airbus to ramp up single aisle deliveries to seventy-five a month by twenty twenty-five. Now, that looks like it's gonna be probably in twenty-seven and maybe even later. But what you see here at the bottom is that the backlog, the blue line, has been growing faster than their production capability. So what that means is that now the backlog is right around 15,000 aircraft, and if together, they can produce, say, 1,200- 1,300 airplanes, we're looking at more than a 10-year, 11-year backlog. That just doesn't seem natural to me, that you have that long of a backlog of orders. So what is the outlook? I think some of these mega orders will get renegotiated. Some of the mega orders that were placed will be cut back. Some will be reallocated. So if you look at these backlogs, our estimate is that between 25% and 30% of those will get restructured in some way or canceled. So the real backlog might be closer to 10,000 that will ultimately deliver to the same customers that order those airplanes. Looking at our backlog, we have 307 airplanes on order. The biggest single element of that, roughly half, are A321neos. We were one of the co-launch customers of the A321neo. We, as a leasing company, were the launch customer of the A321LR, long range, and we're the launch customer of the A321XLR, the extra long range, that will go into service with Iberia, probably early part of November. And we predicted this seven, eight years ago, that the A321neo will become a workhorse that will be accepted and in demand across the whole globe, on all six continents. So we have a very strong position. By 2026, we'll have about two hundred and fifty-five A321neos, and by the time all of these aircraft deliver, we'll have probably close to three hundred and fifty, three hundred and sixty A321neos, depending on how many of the oldest ones we'll sell off as part of used aircraft packages. On the 737, we have 74 on order. They're all MAX 8s and MAX 9s. We've had great success with both of those. Lease rates have come back to normalcy. And then in the wide-body side, we have still six A330-900s that will deliver, 21 787s. We have two more A350 deliveries, and we're also a launch customer on the A350 Freighter. So that kind of gives you a profile of what we have in our backlog. It's about $22 billion worth of airplanes that go from now until probably the third or fourth quarter of 2028. We don't really have any orders beyond 2028, and most of these aircraft will deliver in 2025, 2026 and 2027. So the key themes for today are robust new commercial aircraft demand. We predict that long-term passenger growth will continue even at a more modest single-digit pace. There's major supplier constraints, as Gus mentioned, way down the value chain with subcontractors and suppliers that just can't keep up with the demand, not only in the commercial segment of our industry, but a lot of people ignore that worldwide there's a huge demand for military defense-related aviation, helicopter, avionics, engines, APUs, and in many cases, those get priority with these manufacturers versus commercial applications. We see the yield curve normalization, which I think will be good for the airline industry because it is a high capital-intensive industry, and it will certainly be very beneficial for the lessors. It will reduce our cost of long-term capital at a time where we have attractive pricing from the OEMs on orders that we placed in twenty twenty, twenty twenty-one, when nobody else was buying anything. And so we see that as a real strong tailwind for airlines. And I guess we have a little time for questions. Great. I'll kick things off. You touched on sustainability, and we had a very thoughtful panel yesterday on sustainability, and also a polling question that was asked at ISTAT as well. The industry set a very ambitious target of getting to Net Zero in 2050. In our polling question, we asked the informed audience, how likely is this to be achieved? No one said very likely. A handful said somewhat likely. 30% said very unlikely, and I think 25% selected it will occur when pigs fly on SAF. What are your thoughts on the industry's aspirations of getting to that in 2050? The Europeans are now implementing, imposing goals for 2030 that seem ambitious. Did the industry reach too far? Do we need to modulate what we can realistically achieve, just given the challenges of, I don't know, physics, chemistry, aerodynamics, oh, and economics? And money. There's not infinite amount of money to make the industry green. Ask Willie Walsh. He's the one that made this announcement, and I had a meeting where 2050 was gonna be the target. But if you talk to him today, he's a little more cautious. So my answer would be somewhere between the last question and the, I mean, the last answer and the third one, somewhere on the cusp of that. I don't think we'll ever achieve 100% carbon neutral in the next 30-35 years. I do see hybrids, electrics, maybe some hydrogen applications and SAF combined help, particularly in the short-haul environment. But I just don't see electric airplanes, battery-powered airplanes, or hydrogen-powered airplanes flying nonstop from here to Singapore. I just don't see that. So, it's gonna take a lot longer for the industry to do that. We don't have the infrastructure to deliver SAF to the right places. We don't have the infrastructure to create enough battery power to do what people would like us to achieve. And also, there's a great deal of ignorance of how much energy is used to make SAF, and how much energy is used to make batteries, and how much electricity is, and how much fossil fuels are used to create pipelines and other ground infrastructure. So I think some of these objectives are naive, but they do meet certain political objectives and headlines. But the industry is doing its best. Look, we're all buying new planes. We're buying the best there is, the most efficient airplanes that exist, and that's pretty much all we can do. I think right now, Airbus and Boeing are not motivated to build all new technology lineup of commercial airline jets that have more than 150 seats. I don't see a line in Toulouse or in Seattle to do that. ... So maybe I'll run with that one a little bit. So there's obviously been a change in Seattle, not Chicago or Virginia, but Seattle. I think many people are happy to see it's Seattle. Presumably, you've had more than a courtesy call, but a substantive discussion and perhaps a substantive discussion to come. I guess, after the short-term tactical issue of when are my planes gonna get delivered, when do you fix the deliveries, when are they being delivered safely and on time? As you sit down for the subsequent discussion, looking at the horizon, you know, someone who has been involved, as you said, in launching so many airplane programs, as you look at the horizon with the Boeing CEO, where previously no moonshots, no pen to paper before the end of the decade, what's your kind of intermediate term recommendations and thoughts for the Boeing company and this new management? I've had the privilege of spending a lot of time with Kelly Ortberg and with Stephanie Pope in the last, you know, twenty, twenty-five days. Dinners, meetings, exchanges, in-person dialogue. I think they're committed to fixing and living up to their existing commitments. That's a great priority. They wanna fix the system. They wanna improve morale, they wanna improve productivity, they wanna improve and have fewer snags in their production systems. They're really devoted to that, not just in-house in Renton and Charleston and Everett, but also with their whole supply chain, because if the supply chain isn't performing, then the end producer in the assembly line can't meet the requirements that you stated to deliver airplanes on schedule, on target. So I think the first task is to fix their own shop, their own home, and that process, I think, will take a number of years. It could be four, five, six years. In the meantime, the emphasis will be on analyzing new technologies and what is the cost of implementing those new technologies in a new family of aircraft. But I don't think that's a priority right now, until they can get back into financial condition, that would warrant an investment, which would be well north of $10 billion. Yeah, I think a previous CEO suggested perhaps $50 billion, which was an eye-opening number to many of us. 10 billion is just starting to get something going. Pen to paper. Yes. I think someone once said. You all have seen the difficulty in certifying stuff and the additional scrutiny from FAA and EASA and other regulators. The magnifying glass today from regulators is a much higher intensity than we've ever seen in the history of commercial aviation. So, I know you love to talk about airplanes, so I'll ask a quick couple of technical-ish questions. Sure. A350-1000, there's a very smart, outspoken CEO in the Middle East who suggested that wrong engine, right airplane. The A321XLR, you're the launch order there. We had a CEO in the US make a comment that it's or suggesting it's not meeting spec and the range won't be what's promised. You've got orders for these airplanes. You're involved in design and launch. What do you see there, and what's your counterpart to the remarks made by these thoughtful CEOs? Okay. They're very thoughtful, but let me talk about the A350-1000. The engine on the A350-900, in spite of these last headlines about Cathay Pacific, the XWB-84 engine has actually been the most reliable of the Rolls-Royce Trent wide body engines that we've seen in the last 10 years. So we've had really good experience across a large spectrum of airlines in Asia, Middle East, Europe, on the A350-900. The one thousand, they obviously added more thrust, so the engine is spinning faster, it's a little hotter, and the concern that I think Emirates has on it is in a high, sandy desert environment that engine will not perform as well as the XWB-84 engine on the nine hundred, and that's a valid concern. But so far, knock on wood, the one thousands that we have, for example, with Virgin Atlantic, Air Caraïbes, and others, have performed really well. We haven't seen any chronic engine issues like we did on the Trent 1000, on the 787, and even to some extent, the 7000 on the A330-900. So far, so good. But in that environment, in the Persian Arabian Gulf, with a lot of sand ingestion, it could shorten the on-wing life of those engines. So Rolls-Royce is working on this, to see what they can do to make improvements. On the XLR, I think a big concern is the fuel efficiency degradation of the GTF engine and the CFM fifty-- I'm sorry, the LEAP engine over time. So if you have a 3% or 4% degradation in fuel burn from the time you get the airplanes, say, once it reaches 10,000 hours, say, three years later, that would affect the range of the airplane by 3% or 4%. So I think that's what they're concerned about, but the airplane itself is fine. It's got 500 plus orders and doesn't seem to have a credible competitor. Although, when are you gonna order MAX 10s? I can't hear you. Perhaps we'll. Actually, I have a note here from the previous speaker, who may have heard an echo of your remarks about his company and his acquisitions. He says, "I'm trading at 1.15 times book, you're not. Yes. So what is your comment on what's going on with Air Lease's price to book, as flawed of a metric as we know it is? Look, since we went public, we've had times when we're selling for one point two times book. We've had the pandemic, we've had high interest rates, we did have yield compression. We did have to restructure a lot of leases during the pandemic. Now, those are all going back to some level of normalcy. So we did experience issues in that regard, and we had a pretty strong book of aircraft acquisitions in 2023, 2024. We did not have any aircraft at Aeroflot, so some of our competitors, like AerCap, had a faster recovery of their insurance claims. But once you factor that back in, once we do get our recoveries from our insurance carriers, our ROE should be very much in line with that of AerCap. And then hopefully, the market will respond affirmatively. But I can't put those recoveries on our balance sheet or into our earnings today. Great. I could go on, obviously, forever, and I apologize to my colleagues, Hillary and Mike, for monopolizing the microphone, but it's just too good of an opportunity to let go, so my apologies. You can continue tonight. We will continue. Yeah. -tonight over a nice discussion and more candid discussion. So very much appreciated. Steve, thank you as always- Thank you very much. For your candor and insights. Thank you. Thank you.