Okay, I think we're gonna get started. Hello, everyone, and welcome to KeyBanc's 25th Technology Leadership Forum here in Vail, Colorado. My name is Maddie Schrage, and I cover internet software here with our research team. I have the pleasure of welcoming Daniel Lentz, who's the CFO of BigCommerce. Welcome, Daniel, and we're really happy to have you here. Thanks for having me. I think for those of us who are maybe newer to the story, I think it's important to start with maybe a general overview of BigCommerce as a business. Mm-hmm. Could you talk a bit about the platform, the general customer type, and how you monetize your customer base? Yeah. So BigCommerce is a e-commerce and omni-channel software provider in the SaaS industry. So we have our main platform on the e-commerce side is called BigCommerce, and we also have a company called Feedonomics, which is a part of our portfolio. Also, a web builder called Makeswift, which we recently acquired as well, that we're kind of building into our core product and a lot of the capabilities we're doing with some different tech initiatives, which we can get into later. So, BigCommerce, by way of history, we started off as a small business platform a number of years ago, and then over the course of the last probably 10 years, we've been kind of steadily moving up market, where today, on the commerce platform side, we serve mid-market all the way up through enterprise accounts. I would say our kind of sweet spot would be, you know, accounts that are in the upper end of mid-market and the lower end of enterprise is kind of our most common size. But we also serve merchants that are everything from small businesses and digitally native startups, all the way up through really large enterprises like The RealReal, which we announced went live on our-- went live with us a few months back, and a number of other examples like that. On the Feedonomics side, Feedonomics is a really amazing, amazing part of our portfolio. They are one of the world's best, if not the best, kind of omni-channel, AI-based feed management platform. So for companies that are doing either advertising on Google or they're selling through various marketplaces, Feedonomics essentially can take the data feeds from the native schema on the customer side and then use AI to transform those to have much higher either conversion results or sell-through on the marketplace side and things like that. They work with companies like Patagonia and Dell and Walmart and folks like that. So, as far as our history, started off, as I said, as a small business platform, but kind of steadily making our way up market and, you know, really excited. I think prospects for the future, we feel really good about where the product is. I think for where we are, we're in the midst of a lot of changes and improvements, particularly on the go-to-market side, which I'm sure we'll spend quite a bit of time talking about, and I spoke about on our earnings call last week as well. In a lot of ways, I think that the, you know, there's a lot of continued maturation, which we're going through right now, and kind of really having our go-to-market resonate in the upper market as well as the product does, which I think gives the company a lot of upside. Great. Just maybe taking a step back, could you give some color on the size of the overall TAM? Mm-hmm. Kind of where you think you are on the penetration curve and where you maybe see that going? Yeah, I mean, the TAM is huge, whether you're looking at it from the point of view of commerce, software, or omni-channel. I mean, even what's really exciting to me about Makeswift is really an outstanding product because it also gives us access to start expanding our TAM into content websites as well, that aren't even doing commerce, maybe right out of the gate. So the TAM for us is really gigantic, and our share is really quite small. I think on the merits of the product, our share can be quite a bit higher than where it is today. But I think that, there's really a lot of exciting ways that we can expand the portfolio and really address not just kind of our core ideal customer profiles on the commerce side as well, but continue to expand our offering in omni-channel and also in content builders. Yeah. Great. Let's talk a bit about competition. Mm-hmm. Who do you primarily compete with, maybe in each of your segments? Mm-hmm. Where do you think the opportunity to take the most share is? So primary competitors for us would be, I would say, obviously, we compete with Commercetools, and Shopify quite a bit, also compete with more of the legacy providers, whether that's, Salesforce through their acquisition of Demandware or Adobe through their acquisition of Magento. It kind of depends on the part of the market where we're competing. If it's on the B2B side, we tend to compete with more legacy players there as well, where we're kind of growing disproportionately and doing very, very well. I think that the opportunity for us as we continue to move up market. You look at Bealls as an example, the store-based retailer out of Florida. We just announced on our last earnings call, migrated over to BigCommerce and did essentially almost like a full rip and replace, and it took them three months to migrate over to BigCommerce, which is pretty outstanding. And that was integrating with their existing architecture and, you know, kind of using us to modernize in the areas that made sense for the business, but also kind of plugging into their existing architecture with flexibility so that they could kind of pick and choose the areas that they needed to migrate for us. Great. What about maybe on the pricing side? Mm-hmm. How does Big C sit on pricing versus maybe its competitors? Mm-hmm. How is the business affected when your competitors, such as Shopify, raise their prices? Yeah on, like, the mid-market enterprise offering? Yeah. So from a total cost of ownership basis, we think we have a really strong advantage. Sometimes it depends upon the player, the competitor that you're up against. If we're talking to some of the legacy providers, not just on sticker price, do we have advantage, but also just in TCO. If you're using some of the much older legacy players, it is extremely costly to maintain that tech stack, and it's a lot less expensive to migrate over to BigCommerce. And even if you look at some of our competitors, whether it's kind of more mid-market competitors, whether it's Shopify or others, Shopify as an example, they just took... I mean, they, they raised their, their core rate by 60% over the course of the last few months, which has led to more inbound interest to us coming from Shopify customers. That's not to denigrate Shopify as a platform. It's a great company, as is Adobe and Salesforce and many others. But they certainly are pushing the elasticity with their customers. And from our perspective, from a pricing point of view, we really approach pricing a little bit differently than some others in our industry. We can do pricing that's based on basis points off GMV, which is kind of a pretty popular pricing model. Our core pricing model is based on orders processed on the platform, though. So, for a lot of our customers, they wanna know with certainty what's the cost per order for what's gonna be going through. It makes it a lot more predictable for them to manage what they're gonna be spending with us. And also, I think it's differentiated for us in market because it just can really lead to a lot of really good predictability, that you kind of understand the service that you're buying, and you don't kind of have this tax that's growing with you, like the bps on GMV models can be sometimes. ... Yeah, and I think in the past, we've talked on the pricing side about how customers kind of opt into this pricing, and it's kind of like a minimum, and then as they grow and get more orders than maybe expected, they're kind of automatically defaulted into the newer pricing plan. So I guess, how does that, like, steady base of expected orders per customer help with your visibility? Great question. So, our core pricing model is essentially a fixed minimum plus variable, and it's a step function pricing model, and that's the same whether we're talking about Feedonomics, where the unit of measure is SKUs going through the data transformations, or on the commerce product, it's orders going through the platform. And so, customers contract for up to a certain number of either SKUs processed or orders that go through the platform, and then when they exceed that, order or SKU threshold, they go up into the next kind of block tier that gives them the ability to then get, you know, a higher number of orders. And obviously, you have declining cost per order and SKU as you get further up into the volume commitment. What's really nice about that for our business is that, we have less elasticity with changes in consumer GMV than some of our competitors do because we have more of that kind of predictable stairstep pricing. That, you know, on either the upswing or the downswing, it's - we don't see as rapid a swings in what we see in terms of revenue on the business. Early in the, you know, the, the COVID era, we didn't have as big of a revenue ramp immediately as others that were on the pure basis points on GMV model because it takes 12 months to get that full, if you have kind of a step change event, it takes 12 months to get that through the cycle. Again, but it leads to better predictability for us, but more importantly, it leads to a lot better price stability. Mm-hmm. and predictability for our customers, whether they're a Feedonomics customer or a BigCommerce customer. It also gives us pretty good visibility, I think, from a forecasting perspective and guidance perspective for our investors, helps us be transparent and try to be pretty open with where we are with guidance and outlook. Great, and just moving into maybe differentiation of product. For those of us who are less familiar with the tech stack- Mm-hmm. -of e-commerce solutions, can you give an overview of why BigCommerce's headless strategy is a key differentiator? Yeah. in this sector? So, we talk a lot about headless, and it's one of those... I'm not the world's, like, expert technologist, so I'll give you the finance point of view on this. Yeah. I think sometimes we talk a lot about headless, but it's actually, that's one use case of a composable architecture. Like, the real architectural choice there is composability, of which, basically, the idea of, the way that I think about it is composability is almost like building something out of Lego bricks, right? You can pick and choose the bricks that you want to use. You can use all of them, and or you can use pieces of them. So for our product, it has out-of-the-box core functionality. We have, you know, recommendations that we make on kind of reference architectures that we think are best for customers that are in our sweet spot to say, "This is the way we think you should deploy BigCommerce and be successful." But if you want to modify and change that, you can completely build it from scratch, and it's componentized to do that, or you can use 80% of what's out of the box and customize the 20. Headless is one of those use cases where you essentially use, like, a front-end content management system, so you don't use BigCommerce's core themes or anything like that out of the box. You can, you know, plug into whether it's Adobe or any number of other really kind of high-end and really impressive stores. There's a number of different customer examples that you can go to, where you can see, you can go to Gillette.com and see an example of kind of an out-of-box theme, or you can compare that to Yeti Cycles, which is an example of a headless architecture, where you can see they're doing different things in terms of shopper experience and that type of thing. So the reason that creates competitive advantage for us is because you can simply just implement what's right out of the box and kind of custom-built purpose-ready for that. Or you can do the example like The RealReal did, where they said, "Well, we have a core product we want to maintain for the foreseeable future, but we really want to swap out the checkout. We want to go to a much faster, better converting checkout. We want to have different payment options." They used BigCommerce for that, but didn't use it for some of the other components, which is almost more in some ways like how competitors like Commerce tools or others would go to market, but we can do both. It really creates a lot of freedom and flexibility for our customers, where we're going to have opinions and help coach them on the right way to deploy the architecture that we think is high performing, but they ultimately own the freedom. We're not going to be telling them what they must do. If they want to use, we have, you know, many, many, many different payment providers that they can choose from. We're not out to vertically integrate against our technology ecosystem, which really gives the freedom to the customers to either deploy it the way it's been recommended or modify it as they see fit and as best for their business. Great, and a few years ago, BigCommerce launched the multi-storefront. Mm-hmm -capability, and then this year also added multi-geography functionality. Yeah. Could you talk about how these features are important to your customer base and how it should help support top-line growth? Yeah, great question. So multi-storefront is kind of table stakes to get into the upper mid-market and into enterprise. That's where you've got one common back end that you can use to feed multiple different stores on the front end. Some of our competitors may have the talk about doing multi-storefront, but there are separate back ends for each one of those storefronts, which really amplifies the cost and complexity to run on that store. If you're a small business and you only have one store, that's fine if it's easy to use. But if you're, you know, if you're a European business where you want to have one common back end, but you want to have a different store for different brands, different countries, it becomes much more complicated to do, and that's really table stakes to get into the upper market. Multi-geography kind of takes it to one or two derivatives past that to say, "All right, well, now I want not only one back end with multiple storefronts, but I want each storefront to be able to use either different currencies, different languages, go to different countries, and shipping, like, configurations." And so it's almost like a two-level customization with one common back end. Mm-hmm ... which we're really excited about, which again is really important the further upmarket we go, especially in Europe. Great. And I wanted to spend a few minutes talking about the acquisitions that the business has made. Mm-hmm. You mentioned Feedonomics earlier and Makeswift. Could you talk about the areas that you believe have the most cross-sell opportunity from the acquisitions that you've made? Yeah. So from a M&A perspective, I wouldn't describe us as being particularly acquisitive. Our aperture on M&A is fairly small. It's pretty limited to the point of view of mostly build versus buy decisions, at least in the short run. I think as we grow and get larger and have a, a bigger capital base to draw from, I think that we could do bigger deals. But we've really done four—I think we've done four acquisitions, the largest of which was, obviously buying Feedonomics, which is outstanding from a cross-sell point of view. I'll get to that in a second. We also bought BundleB2B, which is kind of a and also a B2B product called Quote Ninja, which essentially allowed us to take our B2B Edition that we had kind of customized with one of our service partners, brought that in-house, and then B2B Ninja kind of allowed us to do a lot of kind of like customization of quotes and order management that's now built into the core product as well. And then Makeswift is a startup, really an amazing and outstanding team there that we ran into Makeswift because when we were launching our own website, we wanted to be able to have the capability for our marketing team to be able to make changes to the website directly without having to interact with our engineering team. And so Makeswift is uses kind of latest technology to make it to where you can use different design tools to make it to where you don't need to be coding in order to make changes directly to the store and the user interface outside-facing customers. We were using that product ourselves, loved it so much, we said, "Wow, we can build this into the Catalyst initiative," which we're doing, which really lowers the barrier to entry for composable builds in a really, really meaningful way. But you pair that with Makeswift, and now all of a sudden, you've got much easier composable builds with a much easier way of having that go to market, where it's a lot better agility for marketers and for our customers to be able to be much more responsive to consumer trends, which is really, really exciting. And then Feedonomics, we actually already talked about. So from a cross-sell point of view, to your question, we look at where we are in ways that I feel like we are improving, but clearly have, we still need to make a lot of improvements, I would say, is especially in the expansion motion. You know, I'll talk openly about where I feel like we've got a lot of potential and are doing great things, but I'll also talk equally openly about the areas where I feel like we need to improve and have better execution than where we have. One of those areas we've been talking about over the course of the last, you know, probably six to nine months, is when you look at our roots as a small business company, a small business selling motion is much more... It's kind of low average selling price, high velocity. You spend a lot of money on pipeline resources. You don't have as much of an expansion motion as you do where you have much larger accounts, and you have more of a sophisticated cross-sell portfolio. I would say that our product became kind of resonant in the market for the mid-market and enterprise, a year or two ahead of where the go-to-market transformation was behind that. As a result of the course of the last couple of years, we've really been working hard to have a much better balance between where we're spending money between new logo acquisition and expansion and cross-sell, to your question, where I think that we've been disproportionately getting our revenue growth in the past through new logo acquisition, and it's just a lot more expensive, in this macroclimate, to land new logos than where it was probably 2 or 3 years ago, for sure. As we continue to kind of build out our portfolio with smart, not overly expensive acquisitions that can enable us to have a Feedonomics or a Makeswift or B2B upsells, that's gonna give us a lot, a broader portfolio and a broader TAM in order to have a lot more healthy expansion revenue growth. You mentioned that BigCommerce obviously started within the SMB space. Mm-hmm. Could you talk through what the target customer in terms of merchant size looks like today, maybe versus the time of the IPO in 2010? Yeah, so I mean, I would say, on the platform side, our most common customer size would be in the probably hundreds of millions of GMV. I'd say probably the $200 million-$500 million range. We have some customers that are doing billions of dollars a year on the platform, but the most frequent, like, highest number of customers, would be in the, call it $50 million-$500 million range. Feedonomics average customer is bigger than that. And so Feedonomics customers, they're bigger brands. Like I said, it's Patagonia, it's Dell, it's Walmart, it's Nike. It's a lot of folks like that, where they have a lot of spend in an omni-channel basis, and they work with Feedonomics in that area. So the average Feedonomics customer is a larger customer than the average platform customer today. Great, and let's talk a bit about B2C versus B2B. Mm-hmm. Can you talk about the difference in maybe what the sales cycle looks like, retention rates, and maybe any other differences in functionality that the customer is looking for? Yeah, great question. So, today, our sellers sell B2C or B2B. We, you know, our sellers are equally adept at both. Might we specialize in the future? Potentially. But the sales cycle and process looks fairly different, but the customer needs are quite different. So if it's a B2C customer, that buying decision is a lot more based on funnel optimization, conversion rate improvements, whereas on the B2B side, it's a lot more about TCO and about technology differences. Conversion rates in B2B are always going to be very, very high, but if you look at, like, on the B2B side, we just released, you know, we open-sourced, essentially, the buyer portal as an example. So, one of the features that we have on our B2B product is our customers can fully customize the buying experience by individual buyer when they're coming into the site, and again, consistent with our kind of ethos, that customers should have the freedom to make modifications to the software where it makes sense for them. We've open-sourced the code for that, so actually now our customers can actually go through and fully customize that however they want. So you look at the differences between B2C and B2B for the business, they're both equally strong from an economic point of view, but they have slightly different characteristics. So, we had mentioned on our call, like, you know, B2B, on our last earnings call, B2B ARR was up, like, 37% year-over-year in Q2. It's kind of been a disproportionate grower for us for the past couple of years. And when you look at the retention characteristics also between B2B and B2C, B2B, our average B2B customer is larger than our average B2C customer. That's based on kind of the small business routes. Mm-hmm. So when you kind of compare just retention rates, one to the other, the B2B retention rates are higher than B2C, partially due to that mix effect, though, between customer size. When you look kind of apples to apples, like an average mid-market or enterprise customer in B2C or B2B, they have very similar retention rates. It's a little bit higher on B2B, but they're very similar. But they're both very, very healthy. The, the take rate we see on PSR is a little bit higher in B2C. Sorry, PSR is partner and services revenue. It's essentially our revenue share business that we get from our technology partners. It's a little bit higher on B2C than it is on B2B because there's just more credit card transactions on B2B purch-- or B2C purchases, excuse me. But actually, we're making a lot of progress even on the B2B side and kind of rounding out that portfolio and improving the take rates there as well. ... Great! So I wanted to talk about something that I think is on most investors' minds right now- Mm-hmm. That's your new shift and go-to-market strategy. Yeah. Could you give an overview of when you noticed you needed to make a change, and what the strategy is moving from and what it's moving to? Great question. So, if I look back on 2023 and some of the headwinds that we saw in the business in 2023, we had a lot of customers that signed up, what I refer to as COVID vintage cohorts, right? 2021, 2022. And, give you an example. Let's say they contracted to do 1 million orders a year. That's what they had paid for in their contract, ended up growing to 800,000 orders a year, not a million. And so perhaps those customers might reach out to us and say, "Hey, you know, I, I wanna lower my order commitment to take it down by 20%." We would say, "Well, no, you're not gonna get the same, price per you know, price per order as you would. We can work with you on the discount, but we need to talk about payment terms." That whole dynamic was very much a function of what we were experiencing in 2023. So to your question about why did we start to realize we needed to make some change on the go-to-market side, in particular, we didn't really have a really, really well-built-out expansion and retention motion on the sales side. And so when we would have some of those discussions, in some cases, those negotiations would be carried out by the billing team, which worked for me, not the sales team, which landed that account. Mm-hmm. And no disrespect to our billing team, they're great, but they're not our best negotiators if we're having to have that conversation. They should be working with the seller, that the AE that originally landed the deal. And so as we continued to look at this, we said, "All right, well, what's the right way to go about, you know, these, the motions to have a better balance between new logos and expansion?" That's part of why, Brent, our CEO, and the rest of the board decided that they wanted to bring in a president to own go-to-market, all of those go-to-market functions, which had been reporting directly to Brent. And so, we're really excited we brought in Travis Hess as our new company president. He has a really, really interesting background that I think is really great for where we are. He worked at Accenture. He's, you know, been in e-commerce for 25 years. There's different folks that, you know, as we think about the, you know, who we're gonna have in the leadership team, I'm sure we'll look at folks that we can bring in, that he's used to, that, you know, have been successful working with him. He was on Shopify's Product Advisory Council for quite a long time, so he knows both where we've been effective in market but also where we need to improve in market, whether it's the sales motions or our branding and messaging. And as we really kind of looked at where we are, we said, "Well, what do we wanna... Where do we need to get better?" Number one, we need to have a better balance between new logos and expansion. Number 2, we need to have higher efficacy of the assets that we're putting in place. And number 3, we need to have better efficiency in the go-to-market resources that we're putting in place. And when you look at where we are from a sales and marketing effectiveness point of view, and that's not just, that's not a department, that's a P&L line item that I'm talking about there. Pick magic number or whatever efficiency ratio you wanna look at. We're not best in class, and we need to get significantly better than the results that we've been posting in those areas. That really has us looking at, all right, both from how the teams are composed, what we're asking people to do, really, you know, focusing on transparency and accountability on what's working and what's not, and having really good discipline about the ideal customer profiles, where we have really strong reference ability. We've had really good customer success and really concentrating our resources in those areas because ultimately, we are accountable to re-accelerate revenue growth. Yes, there we've had headwinds on a macro basis over the last year or two, but ultimately, it's our responsibility to manage and run the company with high efficiency, despite the macro conditions, and I think we've done okay, but not nearly as well as I think we need to and as shareholders expect. Could you talk about how far along we are on the go-to-market change? Mm-hmm. What, if there's any more investments that need to be made into maybe sales and marketing, and I guess, how much more time you think it will take to show up? I said on the last earnings call, not to be a stereotypical guy and use a sports analogy, but sometimes it's useful. If, you know, if we were in a baseball game, I'd say third inning out of nine, probably, in terms of where we are. What have we done so far? We still have a long way to go, obviously, but, you know, getting everyone on the right measurements, getting the organization in the right place in terms of the leadership. We've, you know, united kind of services and sales into one team so that the general managers own the customer through their entire life cycle. What do we have left to do? We still have work to do on what we're doing and how we're resonating with our messaging to our ideal customer profiles. That's kind of a branding thing. We still have additional changes that we're gonna need to make, to make sure that the go-to-market results are better revenue growth with the same or less dollars that we're spending. Again, that just gets back to accountability and efficiency. But it's not all of a sudden we need to make a bunch of new changes. It's really a continuation of what we've been doing over the course of the last several months. The way that I think about it is, I'm confident that we can get through the remainder of those changes over the course of the next six months, and making sure that we've got, you know, the right resources and the right investments. We're putting money into the right channels such that we can really hit the ground running in the front half of next year, and I'm confident we can get revenue growth going in a place that we can be more satisfied with. Great, and we have about one minute left, so wondering if there's any questions from the audience. Yeah, go ahead, Tara. Hi, first of all, thank you for joining us here. I guess, you know, you sit on sort of the juncture and half of a lot of mid-cap activity. You know, if you just look at macro events that have been happening here over the last few weeks, they would suggest something pretty fractured. But what are you actually seeing? Is it as bad as the market might be perceiving, or in a sense, have the instant sort of market seem the best? Is your question about equity markets or macro signals, or what's going on with us in particular? Just to restate the question for the recordings, I know it's being recorded. The question was looking at some of the, let's just call it choppiness of the last couple of weeks in the market, and trying to understand from my point of view, what signals are we seeing that are kind of either macro signals or the like. What I would say, I've had a number of questions that have come on some of our earnings calls, and even some of the follow-up questions that I get, where it's like, "Wow, Daniel, you almost appear a little bit more optimistic or maybe a little more sanguine about macro conditions than what we're hearing from other CFOs of other companies. Why is it the case? Are you not paying attention, or you have different customers? Like, what's going on?" And some of this, I think, is about expectation setting. I think perhaps we actually had a more conservative view on what we expected the macro to look like this year, perhaps than other companies did. When I look at demand signals, there's really two that I focus on from the growth prospects of the business. One is obviously consumer spending, which has an immediate impact on what we see in our partner and services revenue line item. Not nearly as sharp of an impact as if we had a, you know, that was a much larger percent of our overall revenue like it is for some of our competitors. You know, I'd say, you know, if correlation of PSR to GMV, it's maybe a 0.5, 0.6, something like that. So it matters, but it's not like it's immediate response of elasticity like we would see. So that's one, and the second area with that is that, if there is malaise or growth, you know, a lot of growth on the consumer side, that will lead to additional subscription revenue growth because of what I described it, the way we do pricing. Once you go over those order or SKU allotments, you see growth adjustments and higher pricing. That's very much been in line with what we expected going into the year. We expected the consumer spending realm to be pretty tight across the year. So some months have been a little above where we expected it to be going into the year, some have been a little bit below. We haven't seen anything in recent data that would indicate some sort of precipitous change versus the trend line of where we were before, but I'm looking at the same indicators that all of you are. I mean, like, you know, whether it's... You know, pick your data indicator, whether it's UPS or McDonald's or whatever you want to come up with. Obviously, I look at the same data. The bigger predictor, and I think that is more explanatory for what we're seeing in the business, is not even the consumer spending side, it's more of the platform investment cycle. The amount of money that's being spent on replatforming and top-of-funnel pipeline, especially on new logos, that is quite tight and has been quite tight for a while. I see that even in our own business, where we're in the midst of data management transformation, CRM transformation. We had also looked at other initiatives and chose to table them for the time being because we don't want to have that much cash going out the door on those types of investments, and we've been, you know, cutting software spend in a number of areas over the course of the last couple of years. That's more of the indicator that I see in the business that's making it more challenging this year and even last year than on the consumer spending side. I would say for us, relative to our internal plans, so far, so good on the consumer side, but we'll just have to see. I mean, clearly, the last two or three days of full market have been very, very choppy, and I've been doing this long enough to know not to assume anything until things get a few more days and see where they settle out. Thank you. You're welcome. I feel like we could go on for another hour. Why not? I appreciate the discussion. You want to talk about macro conditions, we can talk about that all day. Thank you, Daniel, so much... Thanks a lot. for being here with us.