Hello everyone, and thank you for joining C1's 2026 Outlook webinar. We have a great presentation lined up that takes a data-driven look at the U.S. economic outlook and the forces shaping markets as we head into 2026. Investors are balancing persistent macro uncertainty with evolving portfolio risks, making it critical to separate short-term noise from signals that truly matter. Before we get started, I wanted to run through a few quick housekeeping notes to help you get the most of today's session. You'll see a set of engagement tools at the bottom of your screen, including the slides window, the Q&A panel, and our resources list. Everything is movable and resizable, so feel free to customize your layout. We encourage you to use the Q&A panel at any time. Just type in your questions, and we'll address as many as we can towards the end of the session. In the resources list, you'll find additional materials related to today's topic, and today's session will be recorded, and an on-demand version will be available after we wrap up the session. So now I'm pleased to introduce Matthew Vegari, Head of Research at C1. Matthew leads C1's research desk, delivering investment and portfolio insights at the intersection of macroeconomics, markets, and C1's proprietary data, which helps identify the shifts shaping both tactical and long-term decision-making. So with that, I'll turn it over to Matthew. Thanks so much, Val. Pleasure to be with you all today. Happy holidays to those who are celebrating. I entitled this outlook for 2026 as "Will the Economy Hang On?" The choice of words was quite deliberate because while a recession is far from my base case for next year, I don't view the current macroeconomic environment as one that is particularly comfortable for households, that is particularly comfortable for consumers. The question that really is top of mind is, will the economy hang on? Not will the economy thrive next year, but will it kind of stay away from the precipice and kind of muddle through for the next few quarters? As an economist, I tend to view the macroeconomic environment often through the Federal Reserve because the central bank is a little bit like the maestro for the economy, setting the short-term interest rates, which can influence long-term interest rates, and really trying to restrain the economy from moving too quickly and trying to prop it up when it's moving a little bit too slowly. It was an interesting year for the Federal Reserve, however, because it has two policy objectives principally. The first is price stability, and the second is full or maximum employment. They became a little bit in tension this year with the arrival of a new presidential administration and the imposition of the highest tariffs for several generations in the U.S. So to begin, I wanted to talk a little bit about the inflation story because the Federal Reserve was actually reasonably on the way to accomplishing its goal of returning to 2% price growth after the pandemic surge, and that's the dark yellow line on the left here. You can see that inflation was coming down. It was getting close to that dotted white line, getting close to target, but not quite there. But what happened was with the imposition of these new tariffs, durable goods inflation and goods inflation generally actually reversed course. It was providing a deflationary impulse through the economy after the pandemic frenzy. And actually, as you can see with this arrow of the light yellow line on the left, durable goods inflation turned positive this year. Why? That has a lot to do with tariffs, which we'll talk about in a little bit in a few slides. But I think it's important to note that the Federal Reserve was getting close, but not quite there to the finish line with respect to inflation, and it became a little bit tricky for it. Why was it particularly tricky? Because the other side of its mandate, which I'll now show on the right, was getting a little bit softer, and that was the U.S. unemployment rate. The labor market, while the unemployment rate remains particularly reasonably low, there has been a notable uptick in the second half of this year, and now the Federal Reserve really is dealing with two sides of its mandate. It's an ongoing question of which side is more important. Should the Federal Reserve be prioritizing price stability, even though inflation might be reigniting or prove sticky above its 2% target, or because monetary policy has been in reasonably restrictive territory and the labor market has continued to soften, should policymakers be more concerned with the job market and the state of whether new jobs are being added and whether people can keep their jobs and firms are not having to lay off workers? And so this is the tension that was a big theme for the second half of 2025. It will remain an ongoing tension going into 2026. But I'd like to point out here that the unemployment rate still is reasonably low. Yes, it has ticked up, but it hasn't surged. And what you'll notice, and this goes back to 1990, the unemployment rate tends to do two things. It's either falling gradually or it's surging suddenly during a recession. I have taken the series on the right here and plotted it since the 1950s on a cycle-by-cycle basis on this next slide. You'll see here, I plotted every single unemployment rate since the 1950s indexed to its low. While the unemployment rate sometimes hits a low of 4% or a low of 5%, generally speaking, it is either falling, and then once it hits that cyclical low that people often will consider the peak of the cycle or when the cycle is at its strongest, within two years, the unemployment rate tends to surge. Now, why does it tend to surge? It's because weakness tends to beget weakness. When things go awry, they tend to go awry very quickly. Firms lay off workers. Those workers no longer have spending power. They can't spend money. Then other firms have to lay off workers. This is kind of a result in a surge in the unemployment rate. This is typical of business cycles going back to the 1950s. What has puzzled economists this cycle, but is actually a bit of a good thing for how strange and unusual it has been, is that for this cycle, the unemployment rate has not surged. If you look now, I've added a pink line for the current cycle, and you'll notice that we're well past the two year mark. The unemployment rate, though it has ticked up, it has not surged. So the question is, has the inevitable just been delayed, or are there intrinsic things to this economy that are conferring strength and keeping a lid on the unemployment rate so that while things are softening, they're not rapidly falling apart? I view that as my base case. I think the unemployment rate could continue to tick up a little bit, that the labor market will continue to soften a bit, but there are reasons to think that this is an anomalous cycle and that while things are softening and might not be the most comfortable right now, we should not expect a full-blown recession in the next quarter. Now, why do I think that? The first is that while hiring has been low, so has firing. So people are calling this the low hire, low fire economy. I tend to agree. On the left here in the yellow line, I have plotted unemployment claims. Now, unemployment claims are like the economist's proxy for layoffs because when workers get laid off, they tend to file for state unemployment insurance, and that data comes in weekly. As you can see, it has remained extremely low since the pandemic. This is also a chart that's not adjusted for the U.S. labor force. It's actually even lower than it seems because the labor force has grown considerably since the year 2000. But right now, people are not really hiring. Excuse me, people are not really filing for unemployment, which means they're not being laid off by their firms. That's keeping the unemployment rate reasonably low. When we think about what would cause the unemployment rate to go up, it tends to be two things. It's either firms laying off workers, just what tends to lead to a recession, or not enough jobs are being added relative to the people who are entering the workforce. How do people enter the workforce? Well, they can graduate high school, graduate college, start looking for jobs, or they can be immigrants who come to the United States looking for opportunities. Right now, we are seeing that firms are not laying off workers, which means that the unemployment rate, which is slowly ticking up, which I showed previously, is not due to layoffs, but it's due to the supply of workers slowly increasing. So people are entering the labor force, and there just aren't quite enough jobs for them to keep the unemployment rate from rising. What else is keeping the unemployment rate from rising? Well, I mentioned that one way that labor supply goes up might be college graduates or high school graduates. Another way is immigration. And on the right here, you can start to see that the Trump administration's immigration crackdown is apparent in the government statistics now. This is the foreign-born labor force for the United States, and that's the pink line. I've plotted the 2022 to 2024 trend for what we would have expected prior to the Trump administration, the foreign-born labor force to look like. Right now, you can see we've been knocked off that trend pretty considerably. There are about 2 million fewer workers in the U.S. that were born in other countries. What that means is it's restricting labor supply. Even though workers are not being hired at a particularly high clip, they're also not entering the workforce at as high a clip as they were last year, in part because of immigration. This is an ongoing story. I don't expect it to change materially next year. And so if we can think of the unemployment rate being pushed up by low hiring, we can also think of it as being pushed down a little bit because there are fewer immigrants entering the United States. What does this mean from a monetary policy perspective? The unemployment rate is ticking up. Inflation remains sticky and elevated. Well, it means that the Federal Reserve has to continue with this balancing act. On this chart, I plotted the Fed funds rate. That's the Fed's policy rate in dark blue relative to a kind of estimated neutral rate. Now, when the Fed has rates above this dotted blue line, we can think of it as putting the brakes on the economy. The conductor is starting to conduct a little bit more slowly because things are overheating. It's creating price pressures. What you saw during the pandemic was when inflation kind of jumped for the first time in 40 years, the Fed had to rapidly raise rates. Inflation came back down, more in line with the Fed's 2% mandate, and the Fed started to ease. What's interesting is that the expectation for this year, the Fed wasn't going to be doing that much cutting. You can see I've plotted the path for January 2nd, 2025. You can see that the Fed was expected to remain in restrictive territory, but instead, the Fed actually cut three times this year and is expected to cut a few more times next year. The question is, why? Well, it's because the labor market started to soften, in part because tariffs pushed up price pressures for firms and the business environment got a little bit squeezed. So while price pressures did remain elevated relative to the Fed's target, the labor market softened. Chair Powell had a pretty good quote a few months ago, and I'm paraphrasing here, but he basically said that when two sides of the mandate, that's price stability and full employment, are in conflict with each other, or if they're a little bit imbalanced, then policy should be near neutral. It's almost like the Fed is hedging its bets a little bit. It knows the labor market is softening. It also knows price stability isn't where it wants it. And so it's reduced the Fed funds rate very close to neutral, or some would say even at neutral today, as a way of not restraining the economy, but not hitting the accelerator either. For those who are anticipating a lot more cuts from the Federal Reserve next year, I would say the only way that that would happen is if things really unraveled quickly in the labor market. That's not my base case. It's also not a desirable situation. When the Fed is cutting a lot very quickly, things tend to have gone very awry. So I view a cautious approach to monetary policy as my base case. It's also the most desirable thing for the economy. Again, that doesn't mean that policy is going to become easy next year. It's not below this dotted blue line materially, but it's not going to be the headwind that it's been for the last few years. Inflation is elevated, but it's not so elevated that the Fed needs to keep rates at 4% or 5%. But the labor market also hasn't unraveled so quickly that the Fed needs to cut to 1% or 2%. So we're in this in-between phase where the Fed is in wait-and-see mode and by its own predictions, thinks that the economy will hang on next year. And I'll talk a little bit more about that momentarily. What does this mean at C1? Well, at C1, we are constantly monitoring how our clients in our database are allocating both tactically and strategically in their portfolios. On the left, I've plotted corporate cash allocations for corporate treasurers and CFOs and the like. And on the right, I've done it for insurers. And what you can see is that on the left, median cash allocations have fallen to the lowest in at least seven years, in 2025. I suspect this line will continue to drift lower next year. Why are cash allocations falling? Well, the Fed is cutting and corporate clients are adding slightly more duration, call it six months, call it a year to their portfolios as a way to lock in yield because the Fed's not going to raise rates next year. They might as well kind of cash in on more duration. And actually, we can see in our system that firms that have the strongest returns this year also have the highest duration exposure, which is to say that they foresaw the Fed cutting before a lot of their peers did. They locked in yield. And when the Fed cut 3x at the end of this year, those that had locked in yield prior to that benefited from not holding as much cash. On the other side of the page, we have insurers. Insurers hold far less in cash, but they're also holding more cash than they did, let's say, two, three, or four years ago. I suspect that this will stay true next year, drifting down a little bit. But if insurers want to hold cash and cash is offering three, 3.5% for those that want to maintain a small, potentially meaningful cash allocation, a cut of 25-50 basis points from the Federal Reserve is not going to be a deal breaker when you're only holding three or 4% of your portfolio in cash. I talked a lot about what is making the unemployment rate not surge and why the labor market is not unraveling quickly and why inflation might remain a little bit elevated. But I haven't really talked about actual sources of strength for the U.S. economy. What is keeping the ship afloat? The main thing that is keeping the ship afloat is the same thing that has been keeping the ship afloat for the past few years. That's a strong U.S. consumer. Now, consumption comprises 2/3 of U.S. GDP. What consumers spend, the homes they buy, the furniture they buy, going out to dinner, everything that we would consider consumption is of huge importance to the health of the U.S. economy. There are two principal ways that consumers in the U.S. can increase consumption. The first is if we add more jobs. If there are more jobs being added, there are more paychecks. Those paychecks then get spent at different stores around the country. As a result, consumption grows. On the flip side, if we're not adding that many jobs, and we know right now we're really not adding that many jobs, that's why the unemployment rate is slowly ticking up. The alternative is that the individual wage earner is gaining spending power. So that is workers getting raises, and those raises are ahead of inflation, and that's giving them increased purchasing power year-over-year. So on the left, I plotted wages and inflation, and on the right, I plotted the net of those two curves. And as you can see, when things were particularly bad in 2022, 2023, when inflation was 8% or 9% and wage growth was only 5% or 6%, workers were particularly upset because they were actually seeing their individual purchasing power fall. Right now, with the labor market that's been softening, we see that wage growth is easing down. Inflation is holding above the Fed's target, somewhere between 2.5% and 3%. What that means is that real wage growth has been slowly eroding, but it remains positive. This is crucial. To my mind, the thing that will keep the U.S. economy out of a recession next year is the fact that individual consumer spending, while not as strong as it was, let's say, a year ago, will continue to be a tailwind to the economy and keep things from unraveling. If inflation suddenly surged as the labor markets continue to soften, which was the expectation for a lot of people due to tariffs, we would have seen this line on the right plummet below zero. But right now, we're seeing a gradual easing. I do think that with somewhat strong individual purchasing power increases next year, the U.S. Economy, while again not particularly comfortable, not thriving by any means, but will avoid tumbling into a recession, in part because of a very strong consumer. I don't want to dwell too much on what's keeping inflation up, but the main story here is tariffs. You've got energy prices really low. You've got a labor market that's cooling. So what's pushing up on prices? It's tariffs at the border. The U.S. is now collecting $200 billion per year in tariff revenues. So firms really are paying these tariffs. The reason that the inflation statistics haven't surged as much as many thought is because this thing takes time. I won't go into detail through every single step, but all you need to know really is that there is a food chain, if you will, of how prices get passed off to consumers. 2025 was a lot about firms absorbing these costs. 2026 will be about consumers absorbing these costs. So there was a margin hit for a lot of firms in 2025, and those costs are slowly going to be passed off to consumers. So we're not out of the woods yet with respect to consumer prices, but it didn't happen as quickly as some foresaw. And this is excellent news. We want a slow grind of prices because that's the way that the consumer can kind of muddle through with spending that's not gangbusters, but that hasn't collapsed. Because when the consumer loses purchasing power, the saying goes, as the consumer goes, so goes the U.S. economy. But keep your eye out on consumer prices next year. They're not going to fall as many. They're not going to grow as slowly as some would like, but they're also not going to accelerate as doomsdayers would like to have you think. It's not just consumer spending that's a source of strength. Another source of strength, which is also a sign of strength, has been strong corporate profits. Why do strong corporate profits matter? Well, they keep the equity market afloat, which is great. But firms that are doing well can also reinvest in human capital. They can invest in physical capital. And on the left, I've plotted after-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP. Corporates are doing reasonably well right now despite the margin hit. And there are sector specific differences here. I'm a macroeconomist, so I tend to think in terms of the aggregate, but there are absolutely individual sectors that are getting hammered, let's say, by tariffs or by weaker demand. And there are also obviously some sectors that are seeing boom times, be it tech firms and AI and cloud computing, what have you. Another source of strength is, I think I talked about the low-hire, low-fire situation. On the right here, this is a survey of CFOs and their hiring plans for the year ahead. You can see that CFOs are not anticipating that much hiring going into next year, but they're also not anticipating firing. And I think this is crucial. There is a major difference between a labor market that is defined by layoffs and a labor market that is defined by not that much hiring. And we are really in this kind of low-hire, low-fire, cool but not cold labor market. And this chart of CFO sentiment for the year ahead kind of indicates that. When you look at 2007, 2008, 2009, when hiring plans turn negative, that's when you really worry about a recession. But by and large, CFOs, while they might not be planning, firms might not be planning to do as much hiring next year as they have for the last few years, they're by no means planning a bunch of layoffs. I think it's helpful to look at what policymakers are thinking because that can give us an indication of where the Fed's head is at and how it might adjust policy accordingly. You'll note here this is a screen grab of the Summary of Economic Projections, which gets published a few times per year. I've shown an up arrow here for GDP projections for 2026. You'll notice that in September, the Fed was anticipating 1.8% GDP growth next year, and as of last week, was now projecting 2.3%. These numbers will inevitably be wrong. I'm not saying that is the GDP growth that we're going to get, but it's important to understand how Federal Reserve policymakers are thinking because that's going to influence how they set policy. If they see 2%, if they think there's going to be 2% plus growth next year, then they're not going to slash interest rates to 1% or 2% because they don't view the economy as on the precipice of falling apart. So I tend to think that we'll probably be on the lower side of this, but I'm hoping to be proven wrong. But I also have no belief that we're going to enter a situation where growth will turn negative this year or be even meaningfully low. There are still a lot of good strains in the economy that we've talked about, and they're not necessarily going anywhere. So to shift gears a little bit from Fed policy and short rates, I'd like to discuss long rates a little bit because I know that a lot of people on this call are not simply allocating towards cash. They're also thinking about longer duration fixed income. The question I get asked a lot is, where's the 10 year going to be? How low can interest rates go? And I tend to view that there is a structural floor below the U.S. 10 year. One way that I think about it is to decompose the 10 year a few different ways and to see what would it take to change these different components to make the 10 year rise or to make the 10 year fall. On the left, I've decomposed the U.S. 10 year to breakeven inflation and the real yield. Breakeven inflation is just calculated using government TIPS yields, inflation-adjusted yields. You'll notice what's interesting is that break-even inflation, the light blue, hasn't really changed the last few years, despite the fact that the Federal Reserve has seen inflation stay above its 2% target for many years now. Investors, at least in the market, still think that inflation remains under control and is not going to rise meaningfully above 2%, 2.5%. What has risen is the real yield. I'll talk more about why the real yield is up, but essentially you'll see that it was negative during the pandemic and only modestly positive prior to the pandemic, but has been strongly positive the last few years. On the right, another way of thinking about the 10 year is the 10 year is, in essence, a lot of short rates combined plus a term premium. What I mean by that is you could buy a 10-year bond or you could kind of buy 10 one-year bonds. And so when you're thinking about how a longer-term treasury should be priced, you can think in terms of the average short rate that shorter-dated U.S. Treasuries will take over the next 10 years. You'll notice that the short rate has surged over this time. Why? Because the Federal Reserve has raised rates to the highest since prior to a Great Recession. And as a result, there's kind of been a belief that rates are going to stay in this higher environment because inflationary pressure is now pointing upward as opposed to pointing downward. I'll talk more about that on the next slide. But I do want to draw your attention to here is the term premium. So as I mentioned, we can decompose the term this way and think about the short rate. And then in addition to the short rate, investors want additional compensation for holding a longer-dated bond to term. What's interesting is that prior to COVID, the term premium was actually negative for many years. What does that mean? It means that investors were actually paying to hold 10-year Treasuries. They were not getting a positive term premium. On the contrary, the yield was actually being lowered relative to what the short rate was. Why has the term premium gone up? There's a lot of reasons that people put forth. One of them is the fiscal outlook for the United States has gotten a little bit more dubious. And as a result, investors demand a little bit more compensation for holding an asset that is not as risk-free as it once was. I tend to view that with a little bit of skepticism. What I view as a more reasonable cause for the rise in the term premium is that bonds are just not quite the hedge that they used to be. They used to be reliably negatively correlated for a few decades. We saw over the last few years that sometimes equities and bonds will sell off together, and they're not always negatively correlated. As such, you're not getting that portfolio hedge, that portfolio insurance that you once were. That's another reason why there's a bit of a structural floor underneath the 10 year Treasury. Zooming in a little bit, what's creating that floor with short rates? What's pushing up the real yield? Well, it's because of Fed policy. Essentially, this is the long-run neutral estimate from policymakers. You'll notice that the median has gone up, as has the lower estimate over the last few years. So policymakers view that neutral rate, that dotted blue line that I showed earlier, as going up slowly because the economy is getting stretched. There's high demand for capital. We're operating in a tighter pressure economy, in part because of this AI CapEx boom, in part because of demographic changes. But essentially, there's a little bit of a structural floor now below the 10 year because the Federal Reserve has to keep rates higher than it used to, even when it's at neutral. And what that does is that eventually it translates into higher long rates. How do we view these things at C1? Well, at C1, I'm happy to introduce the C1 Duration Activity Index. On the left here, I'm showing how much duration is being added to corporate portfolios. On the right, how much duration is being added to insurers' portfolios. When it's above, the lines are above zero, firms are adding duration, and the distance from zero essentially tells you the magnitude. What's interesting is that right now, duration exposure for both corporates and insurers is treading water. Corporates and insurers like their duration exposure right now. They're not going out and buying longer-dated bonds. They're also not holding onto more and more cash. So what this shows is that portfolios are reasonably imbalanced right now from a duration perspective. This is really exciting to announce because I think there's always a lot of commentary on how institutional investors are positioning their portfolios. But we can actually show you at C1 what we see in our anonymized and aggregated databases by institutional investors. Here, I've happened to zoom in on corporates and insurers, but there'll be more to come next year with respect to other institutional investors like state and local governments, like family offices and the like. I'm cognizant of time, so I don't want to spend too much talking about credit, but I get asked about risk to the credit system a lot. On the left, I've plotted credit spreads for high-yield corporate bonds and noticed that they are the lowest in almost 30 years. You'll also notice on the right that high-yield issuance is up. So a question I get asked a lot is, ooh, are spreads low? Is there a lot to be worried about? I would say that the reason things are low is because the economy is actually doing pretty well. On the left here, I've shown business delinquencies, which remain really low. Business delinquencies, these are for small, tend to be for smaller commercial industrial loans from banks. And I've paired them here with high-yield corporate bond spreads. When things go wrong for the little guy, they tend to go wrong for the big guy. And right now, the little guy is paying his debts. As a result, spreads are low right now, but it's because there's not that much risk in the system. Additionally, on the right, I've plotted the MOVE Index, which is a measurement of volatility in the Treasury futures market. You'll notice that it's coming down quite a bit. Why? Because Federal Reserve policy is becoming much clearer, and we have a better sense of where bonds are heading in the year ahead. As a result, spreads are low because the economy is doing pretty well and businesses are paying their debts, and there's less volatility in markets. So bonds are not as risky as they were a few years ago. I want to end on a bit of an analogy. This economy has been counted out kind of again and again. And one of the, I think, epitomes of that was this year when the Trump administration announced the tariffs on Liberation Day in April. You'll see that a lot of people, you saw that a lot of people thought that there would be a massive divestment from Uncle Sam, that people would be pulling their money out of U.S. markets and U.S. assets. And interestingly, at C1, we did see this for foreign investors in our insurance database. You'll notice that this is book value of investments, and I've broken it down by non-U.S. assets, all holdings in U.S. assets. And you'll notice that all holdings have been rising for close to two years now. At the start of this year, there was a bit of divestment from foreign investors in our system for U.S. assets. It became particularly pronounced in April and May after Liberation Day. What happened, however, was that as the U.S. economy hung on, those outflows soon became inflows, and this trend reversed course. This is a story that we published over the summer and then again in the fall. It was covered by MarketWatch and Bloomberg. But this is one of the benefits of the power of C1's databases is that we can see how investors are positioning themselves live. This is one of the interesting stories from this year that I think is kind of a little bit of an analogy for how the economy is going. People keep counting this economy out. They keep thinking that we're going to tumble in a recession, there will be short-term jitters, and then eventually the economy continues to defy the odds. So I said that this economy would hang on back in June. I am still convinced that it's going to. I hope I've presented some views here that would suggest that. But thank you so much for your time, and looking forward to a little bit of Q&A. That was great, Matthew. Thank you so much. Let's see. Looks like we have a question that came in. Is Fed independence something to worry about next year? That's a great question. I would say the answer is no. The reason is because we're already seeing a little bit of disagreement among policymakers this year. We've had dissent for the last few meetings. It shows that, at least with the current chair, there is a willingness for open debate and dissent. There are people who believe that once Chair Powell is replaced by Trump's appointee, that independence will erode. I think that policymakers are going to continue to debate things. I don't think that the chair has some sway, but I don't think it has all the sway that people confer to him or her. So I view it as a kind of tail macroeconomic risk that Fed independence gets hindered. I think it's not as big a risk as some people say. I think I'll leave it at that. Perfect. Thank you so much. I'm trying to think. Oh, it looks like there's one more question on; looks like there's a question on tariffs. So yes, I do have a chart that shows how much firms are paying. You'll see on the left here that relative to last year, firms are paying hundreds of billions of dollars more. One of the reasons, the question was about if firms are paying tariffs and if they are paying tariffs, why haven't we seen in the inflation? And it's kind of what I mentioned about the margin hit earlier. Firms are definitely paying these tariffs. And the reason we haven't seen it in consumer prices is because firms have been absorbing these costs themselves, which has been basically taking a margin hit and an earnings hit in this year and slowly passing on these prices to consumers. That story is going to continue to play out, but it's not going to be a jump discontinuity like a lot of people thought. It's just going to be a slow grind, which I think is the best-case scenario given how high these tariffs are. Great. I think that's all for today. Well, thank you so much, Matthew, for walking us through that. I think that was really helpful. Again, there will be an on-demand version that will go out after the session is done. We will follow up with that. Thank you so much, and hope everyone has happy holidays. Thank you.