Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Ellington Residential Mortgage REIT 2023 second quarter financial results conference call. Today's call is being recorded. At this time, all participants have been placed on a listen-only mode, and the floor will be open for questions following the presentation. If you would like to ask a question at that time, please press star one on your telephone keypad. At any time, if your question has been answered, you may re-remove yourself from the queue by pressing star two. Lastly, if you should require operator assistance, please press star zero. It is now my pleasure to turn the floor over to Alaael-Deen Shilleh, Associate General Counsel. Sir, you may begin. Thank you. Before we begin, I would like to remind everyone that certain statements made during this conference call may constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Safe Harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements are not historical in nature and are subject to a variety of risks and uncertainties that could cause the company's actual results to differ from its beliefs, expectations, estimates, and projections. Consequently, you should not rely on these forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We strongly encourage you to review information that we have filed with the SEC, including the earnings release, the Form 10-K, and the Form 10-Q for more information regarding these forward-looking statements and any risks, related risks and uncertainties. Unless otherwise noted, statements made during this conference call are made as of the date of this call, and the company undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Joining me on the call today are Larry Penn, Chief Executive Officer of Ellington Residential, Mark Tecotzky, our Co-Chief Investment Officer, and Chris Smernoff, our Chief Financial Officer. As described in our earnings press release, our second quarter earnings conference call presentation is available on our website, earnreit.com. Our comments this morning will track to the presentation. Please note that any references to figures in this presentation are qualified in their entirety by the notes in the back of the presentation. With that, please turn to slide four for the presentation. I will now turn the call over to Larry. Thanks, Alaael-Deen. Good morning, everyone. We appreciate your time and interest in Ellington Residential. Following the first quarter turmoil in the regional banking system, the second quarter began with investors bracing for the impact of FDIC-directed sales of MBS. The Federal Reserve was no longer buying MBS. Demand, even from healthy banks, seemed unlikely. As a result, early April saw agency MBS yield spreads widening even further. However, when the FDIC-directed sales finally got started later in April, the wider yield spreads attracted strong investor interest from money managers, the sales ended up being well absorbed by the market. With support levels established, the month of May saw even stronger demand for MBS, even while interest rate volatility remained elevated. While this rally was temporarily interrupted by the debt ceiling dispute, once that was resolved, volatility declined and MBS yield spreads tightened further, all the way into quarter end. Accordingly, we experienced moderate portfolio losses in April, but these were reversed in May and June. On balance, Ellington Residential generated net income of $0.09 per share and adjusted Distributable Earnings of $0.17 per share for the second quarter. Over the course of the quarter, we maintained a relatively stable overall portfolio composition and size. We continued to hold mostly Discount Specified Pools, and we continue to believe in the value of our portfolio going forward. In recent quarters, we have highlighted how our research and asset selection efforts have focused on finding pools with the lowest Payups that will get the fastest prepayments. Indeed, as you can see on slide 4, prepayment rates on our portfolio increased nicely quarter-over-quarter from 4.3 CPR to 7.4 CPR. You now flip to slide 8, you can see that we continue to be underrated low-coupon MBS in the second quarter. Keep in mind that over half of the universe of conventional MBS pools have Pass-Through rates of 2.5% or less. This low-coupon cohort comprised a big portion of the holdings of the failed regional banks. Not surprisingly, this cohort severely underperformed in the first quarter due to the anticipation of FDIC asset sales. We've been underrated in this cohort, our results benefited in the first quarter from that positioning. As I mentioned, the FDIC asset sales ended up being well absorbed by the market, which caused this cohort to outperform in the second quarter. EARN did not benefit from that outperformance in the second quarter. Nevertheless, we continue to strongly favor the middle of the coupon stack. Avoiding high coupons shields us from some of the technical pressures of new production, especially with the Fed no longer a buyer. This also reduces our negative convexity and thus reduces our delta hedging costs in what have recently been very volatile periods. With rates this low, we don't think the extra call protection compensates you enough for the lower yield spreads in the low coupons. By contrast, we continue to see both meaningfully higher yield spreads and better technicals in the middle of the coupon stack, namely MBS, with pass-through rates between 3% and 5%. Elsewhere, our non-agency and IO portfolios again contributed nicely to our quarterly results, driven by net gains, net gains, and strong net interest income. Although the total size of our overall non-agency portfolio was roughly unchanged quarter-over-quarter, we did rotate some capital into credit risk transfer assets at some very wide spreads before the spread tightening in that sector in June and July. The loans backing the 2019 and 2020 CRT issues that we've bought recently had both significant home price appreciation and fast prepayment speeds until mid-last year, both of which have helped to substantially de-risk these bonds. Additionally, these borrowers have locked in 30 years of very low fixed-rate payments, and now wage gains are driving their debt-to-income ratios even lower. Combine this with the bond tendering programs this year by Fannie and Freddie, you have a combination of great fundamentals and great technicals, driving strong total returns. This is a good example of how the breadth of Ellington's platform, combined with the flexibility of EARN's mandate, helps drive EARN's total return. Moving to the liability side of the balance sheet, both our Debt-to-Equity and Net Mortgage Assets to Equity ratios were roughly unchanged quarter-over-quarter. I will note, however, that the second metric, which reflects our net mortgage exposure, did fluctuate a lot intra-quarter. With markets choppy and spreads wider in May, we covered the majority of our net TBA short position, then with the market rally in June, we put most of that net short TBA position back on. Similar to last quarter, we ended the second quarter still well below the high end of where we're comfortable adding leverage or net mortgage exposure. Finally, we continue to turn over our lower-yielding MBS with the aim to improve our net interest margin and adjusted distributable earnings. I'll now pass it over to Chris to review our financial results for the second quarter in more detail. Chris? Thank you, Larry, and good morning, everyone. Please turn back to slide five for a summary of Ellington Residential's second quarter financial results. For the quarter ended June 30th, we reported net income of $0.09 per share and adjusted Distributable Earnings of $0.17 per share. These results compare to net income of $0.17 per share and ADE of $0.21 per share in the first quarter. ADE excludes the catch-up premium amortization adjustment, which was negative $376,000 in the second quarter, as compared to a negative $299,000 in the prior quarter. As Larry mentioned, positive results in May and June exceeded net losses in April. Ellington Residential finished with positive net income overall for the second quarter, as net gains on our interest rate hedges exceeded net losses on our Agency RMBS and negative Net Interest Income, which was the result of sharply higher financing costs. Our asset yields also increased during the quarter, but by a lesser amount than our borrowing rates. As a result, our Net Interest Margin decreased to 0.93% from 1.16%. Additionally, we continue to benefit from positive carry on our Interest Rate Swap hedges, where we receive an overall higher floating rate and pay a lower fixed rate. Our lower NIM, combined with slightly lower average holdings on our Agency RMBS portfolio, drove the sequential decrease in ADE. Meanwhile, payoffs on our Specified Pool decreased to 0.98% at June 30th from 1.09% at March 31st, for two reasons. First, average payoffs on our existing Specified Pool decreased quarter-over-quarter with higher interest rates. Second, the pools that we sold during the quarter had higher payoffs than the health population. Please turn now to our balance sheet on slide six. Book Value per Share was $8.12 at June 30th, as compared to $8.31 at March 31st. Including the $0.24 per share in dividends in the quarter, our economic return was 60 basis points. We ended the quarter with cash and cash equivalents of $43.7 million, which was up from $36.7 million at March 31st. Next, please turn to slide seven for a summary of our portfolio holdings. Our Agency RMBS holdings were essentially unchanged at $889 million at June 30th, as net purchases were roughly offset by principal paydowns and net losses. Similarly, our aggregate holdings of Non-Agency RMBS and Interest-Only Securities decreased only slightly over that same period. Our Agency RMBS portfolio turnover was 19% for the quarter. Our leverage ratios were roughly unchanged quarter-over-quarter. Our Debt-to-Equity Ratio, adjusted for unsettled purchases and sales, was 7.6 times as of June 30th as compared to 7.5 times as of March 31st. While our Net Mortgage Assets to Equity Ratio was seven times as compared to 6.9 times as of March 31st. Finally, on slide nine, you can see the details of our interest rate hedging portfolio. During the quarter, we continued to hedge interest rate risk through the use of interest rate swaps and short positions in TBAs, U.S. Treasury securities, and futures. We again ended the quarter with a net short TBA position. I will now turn the presentation over to Mark. Thank you, Chris. After a strong first quarter, EARN had a modest positive return for the second quarter in yet another period of significant volatility. That volatility was across the board, not just in yields. Yields were on a roller coaster ride during the quarter, with the high and low points for the two-year note, a jaw-dropping 112 basis points apart. In addition, the slope of the yield curve oscillated drastically during the quarter, with the spread between two-year and ten-year Treasury trading in a 68 basis point range. Market expectations swung between fear that a wave of bank failures would force the Fed to be more accommodative and fears that inflation would be resistant to higher interest rates. Ultimately, by the end of June, inflation fears had won out t he curve re-inverted to levels seen just prior to the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank. Interest rates rose most dramatically for 5-year notes and shorter maturities. How MBS performed in the quarter depends a lot on what coupons you're talking about. Now, with 90% of the FDIC MBS pool selling behind us, the MBS sector has weathered the supply wave and fared better than many had feared. The supply was absorbed in a much shorter time frame than originally anticipated. When demand materialized for billion-dollar blocks of seasoned discount MBS, the FDIC accelerated their pace of sales. The process is now largely over, well ahead of early expectations. Money managers showed up in size for the opportunity to get invested in coupons and loan attributes that had been difficult to source. As a result, low coupon MBS performed quite well for the quarter after that early April swoon. For intermediate coupons between 3% and 5%, performance was not nearly as strong. Relatively little of this intermediate coupon cohort was included in the FDIC sales. Concerns of a deeper yield curve inversion, combined with less investor focus, caused performance of the intermediate coupons to trail that of the 2.5s and below. On balance, EARN had a modest net gain for the quarter, constrained primarily by limited exposure to low coupons, as well as Delta Hedging costs related to the elevated volatility. We did not make any major changes to our positioning and think we are well positioned for the current market opportunities and risks. We believe that the current environment is very favorable for Agency MBS. Market expectations are that the Fed hiking cycle is largely behind us. We've gotten encouraging inflation data for a few months in a row now. Fears of an ongoing deluge of agency MBS supply from waves of bank failures did not materialize, and we've now just passed the peak seasonal supply months of mortgage origination. Money managers have been big buyers of MBS this year and are no longer underweight MBS, but we think that some bank buying may materialize before year-end, given new capital requirements, which would be a further tailwind to the sector. For EARN, as you can see on slide 15, we did raise our weighted average coupon slightly in the quarter by about 15 basis points incrementally to nearly 4%, which is still well below new production. That positioning should shield us from the current coupon production, with giant average loan sizes and lots of negative convexity, but still provide us with a hefty yield and potential for strong price appreciation if the forward curve is right and we have a recession. Repo rates have stopped marching higher, so as we turn over our portfolio and increase our asset yields, that should support our NIM and ADE. In addition, our lower dollar price holdings continue to deliver consistent paydowns well above TBA expectations. Ellington has had ongoing data studies to analyze out-of-the-money prepayments as a function of loan attributes. There is currently a 22-point price range for liquid mortgage coupons spanning 2s through six NAVs, and also a myriad of different issue years and loan attributes as well. There is a really rich opportunity set now to take advantage of that research. Mortgages remain at wide spreads. The market has just absorbed almost all of the FDIC supply, peak summer origination volumes are now past. So far, in the third quarter, realized volatility has remained high, although the full trading range has been noticeably tighter than what we saw in the second quarter. At the same time, agency MBS have substantially underperformed investment-grade corporates and high-yield bonds, so we think they have ample room to catch up. In the widely discussed scenario where we get a mild recession, we think agency MBS will offer very good relative value versus corporates. Back to Larry. Thanks, Mark. In what continues to be a highly volatile market, I am pleased with Ellington Residential's ability to preserve book value over the first half of the year and generate $0.26 in earnings per share. Looking ahead, our outlook for Agency MBS is positive, as both nominal yield spreads and Option-Adjusted Spreads are still wide. Realized volatility has declined. Higher interest rates are helping to bring inflation down. The Fed may be nearing the end of its tightening cycle. FDIC sales have been well digested by the market, with around 90% of pool positions and 60% of CMO positions already reported as having been liquidated. Longer term, the return of bank demand for MBS should help stabilize spreads as well. As we look forward to the second half of the year, we have maintained excess liquidity and additional borrowing capacity to capitalize on attractive investment opportunities as they arise and to manage volatility if it spikes again. We will continue to be opportunistic about adding leverage, allocating capital between agency and credit, and rotating the portfolio to drive NIM and ADE. As always, we will also rely on our dynamic hedging strategy and active management to protect book value. With that, we'll now open the call to questions. Operator, please go ahead. Thank you. At this time, if you would like to ask a question, please press star one on your telephone keypad. You may remove yourself from the queue at any time by pressing star two. Once again, that was star and one to ask a question. We will pause for just a moment to allow questions to queue. Our first question comes from Doug Harter with Credit Suisse. Thanks. Hoping you could talk a little bit more about, you know, the potential to add, you know, more, you know, mortgage leverage and what would kind of be the catalyst that would cause you to, to increase that leverage? Hey, Doug, thanks for the question. To me, I think the catalyst will be some kind of reduction in interest rate volatility, and you've, you've seen it a little bit, right? You know, yesterday was volatile, last Friday was volatile. You know, we're not making as big a range. I mentioned this in my prepared remarks. Like, the difference between the highs and the lows in this quarter is a lot less than what it was in the second quarter, which the second quarter was pretty extraordinary. You're still seeing a lot of elevated volatility. I think reduction of volatility is important because the delta hedging costs, when things really move around, can be significant. That's one thing. I think the other thing is to see other pools of capital come in and start supporting the mortgage market. What you saw in the second quarter is money managers that had a lot of them, had been sort of underweight mortgages relative to, you know, a, you know, a Bloomberg Ag or Barclays Ag allocation mix, bought a lot from the FDIC. They covered their underweights, right? You haven't seen bank participation yet. I mentioned again, the prepared marks. We think that's something that you could materialize in Q4. I think, I think that's important, that you need to see other large pools of capital. I mean, a lot of people recognize mortgage spreads are wide, but what you need to see is actually, you know, demand. You saw the money manager demand in Q2 that absorbed, you know, sort of simplistic, but like that, that absorbed to a large extent, the selling from the FDIC portfolios. You need to see other pools of capital, you know, want to, you know, want to get invested in mortgages, because you may see money managers sort of not nearly as aggressive in mortgage additions going forward, given that they're not nearly that they're not underweight the sector the way they had been. Got it. How do you think about, you know, the demand by coupon, depending on kind of where that, you know, those other pools of, of capital come from? You know, how, how do you think about which coupons they're, they're most likely to be interested in? It's an interesting question, right? Because I think historically, bank buying was typically around current coupon. I think now, though, with contemplated changes in capital charges, more scrutiny on more scrutiny on interest rate risk, you might, you might see them have a preference towards shorter duration mortgages than they historically have. I haven't really yeah, I haven't, you know. It's just really too early to say. In my mind, just other investors, whether it be insurance companies or banks, coming and taking advantage of not only the very wide spreads on mortgages versus Treasuries, but the wide spreads on mortgages versus corporates. That I, I think I want to see a little bit of that before we would increase the exposure. We kept the exposure relatively constant through the quarter. We still have room to grow it. It's a little bit, if you look at sort of the mortgage exposure we've had over a long period of time, over five years, it's a little bit higher than what we've normally run. Mortgages are wide, but, you know, there's a lot of interest rate volatility. You, you need to see, I think, you know, other large pools of capital, be it foreign investors, insurance companies, banks, or money managers, continue to deploy. You've definitely seen a slowdown of, on the part of money managers, right? They covered a lot of their underweights in Q2, and they've been less sort of just all in buying than they were. Great. Appreciate it. Our next question comes from Mikhail Goberman with JMP Securities. Hey, guys, thanks for taking my questions. Just kind of, capital, management question: How are you guys thinking about the trade-off of, issuing a little more stock at the margin going forward as you see, investment opportunities versus, the use of share buybacks with the stock, I guess, sort of in the upper 80s of book value currently? Thanks. Yeah, thanks, Mikhail. I, I think, you know, we, we, we're sort of consistent with what we've done before. I think once we get into the, you know, around 80%, hopefully, we won't get there, but if we do, I think that's where we have historically repurchased and, you know, I think that's a good expectation barring anything unforeseen. Then, you know, in terms of issuance, I think, you know, to, you know, we're, we're, we're trying to keep our capital base pretty stable. Obviously, there's, you know, issues in terms of G&A expenses as, as, you know, if we get below, you know, let's say $100 million or something like that. You know, I think you'll continue to see some moderate issuance, you know, just, just to sort of keep our capital base roughly, roughly the same. Yeah, so hope that's helpful. Yeah, thank you. What kind of opportunities are you seeing at the margin in the non-agency portfolio? I know it's very small, but you, you always mention you, you could always add a little bit at the at the margin, so just wondering what you're, what you're seeing there. Thank you. Mark? Yeah. We've liked CRT. We mentioned that in prepared remarks. That's a sector that we weren't buying, you know, in 2019, in 2020. We didn't really like it. What's happened to that market is you've had a huge amount of home price appreciation, so you have extremely low LTVs. Like, some of these deals are LTVs in the 50 now. The other thing you've had is the deals that were in existence during 2020 and 2021, and the beginning of 2022, went through periods of time of fast prepayments, so that deleverages the structure. It sort of builds up, on a current basis, the amount of credit enhancement below these tranches. That's important to us because, you know, we see sometimes the biggest risk in some of these sectors isn't, isn't home price decline and high defaults like what you saw in '08, but it can be more weather-related events or sort of idiosyncratic things like that. Building up that cushion and credit enhancement, sort of, for us, sort of raises the credit enhancement levels above sort of the noise you can get from, some of the, you know, some of the weather-related, stress. We've liked CRT. That sector has performed well in the second quarter, so spreads have come in. We've also historically liked, some legacy agency. You know, that sector, over time, isn't as liquid as it used to be, as it's paid down. Sort of our return thresholds of that relative to CRT has changed a little bit, as CRT remains very liquid. Those have been the two primary things. You could also see us add some Mortgage 2.0. Volumes in that sector are lower than what they've been, but you do get opportunities from time to time, very wide spreads, and that'd be mostly Investment-Grade Securities. Got it. Thank you for that, Mark. Appreciate it, guys. Thank you. Our next question comes from Crispin Love with Piper Sandler. Thanks, good morning. Appreciate you taking my questions. Mark Tecotzky, your comments a little bit earlier in the Q&A made it seem like on spreads, made it seem like they will stay stable, kind of, or wide as they are right now, just given the need for more demand. Just curious how you're thinking about the near-t erm, and for EARN, if you would have a preference for tighter spreads or a preference for stability in spreads, and just what those scenarios could mean for EARN? It's a great question. Right now, spreads are so wide, and you make a lot of money on your shorts, right? Like, all the SOFR swaps, you're paying a rate that is significantly lower than the rate you receive, right? As opposed to 2020, 2021, where every hedge you had cost you money, right? You were paying a lot more than what you were receiving. This is the exact opposite, right? Spreads are wide enough now that if you just see stability, you've got, you know, you can put together a very strong quarter. In terms of widening or tightening, what would I'd rather see? You know, I think when you get tightening, what you get is sort of, short-term Book Value gains that come a little bit at the, at the expense of, you know, of longer term ADE. I guess, I guess probably my preference a little bit towards tighter spreads, because I think that would come with a market where, it would probably imply to me that you've seen some reduced volatility. You know, you have, the market expectation that the Fed's gonna sort of not do very much for the next few meetings, probably came to fruition. You've seen, enough demand for mortgages to, offset, offset, you know, just new origination supply or sort of demand kind of exceed that to drive them tighter. I think I'd, I'd like to see that because, you know, you went through 2022, which was a really challenging, you know, year. This year it's sort of been ups and downs, but there's been a lot of volatility. I, I think the sector as a whole benefits from stability, and I think, you know, that'd be a nice thing to deliver to investors, is sort of like not only, ADE, but also some book value gains. if I could just add, I think- Yep, go ahead. I would just add. Yeah, I think less interest rate volatility certainly would be better given how we're positioned, but I think spread fluctuation is a positive for us because, you know, we do have dry powder from a, in terms of our net mortgage exposure and our leverage. As we said, you know, in the prepared remarks, we took advantage of that in the second quarter, covering a lot of our TBA shorts when spreads were wider and then re-putting them back on. You know, I think a fluctuating spread market is actually a good market for us in particular, since we do dial up and down our exposure, you know, with, you know, aggressively sometimes. Thanks, Mark and Larry. That's all, all helpful color. In the prepared remarks, I wanted to make sure I caught this right, but you made some comments that made it seem like banks could come back and be buyers of Agency MBS, I think, a little earlier than some expected. Can you flush that out a little bit? Is this demand that you might expect later in the year, year or early 2024? Just curious what you think there and if I heard you right. Yeah. I think if you go back prior to 2022, you had two giant pools of capital that were really sort of the, the, the cornerstones for anchoring mortgage spreads. It was the Fed, obviously, and banks, right? You know, you had so much COVID-related stimulus, you had this explosion deposit growth on the banks and, you know, they'd like mortgages, they bought a lot of mortgages. It was a time where, you know, they're paying, you know, almost nothing on their deposit costs, so they grew their mortgage portfolios a lot. Even before that, even if you go back to like say, you know, the 90s or the 80s, right? Banks have been big, big buyers of the mortgage market, and they own a lot of it, right? You know, you go through 2022, you have, they all have, you know, tremendous losses on their portfolio. A lot of those bank portfolios you saw was sort of Silicon Valley was an outlier, but, you know, other banks had a little bit of the same issue, but to a lesser extent. Lots of Fannie 2s, lots of Fannie 2.5s. These are sectors that went down, you know, 18, 20 points in price, far more than a lot of these banks thought could have happened. They had big losses on Available for Sale, Held to Maturity portfolios, and now they're sort of underwater with their deposit cost versus the book yield on those assets, right? It's been challenging for them. Some of them, you know, were doing relatively little securities investments last year, and were doing a lot more on the loan side to reduce mark-to-market volatility in their portfolios. Now, you know, in response to Silicon Valley Bank, you're seeing a new regime, sort of like, of bank regulation, talking about different capital charges, especially different capital charges for banks that are $100 billion to $250 billion in size. Different ways of thinking about CECL. So what loan loss reserves you're gonna have to have on loans, you know, referencing FICO. It's all those things in aggregate, sort of, I think tilt, tilt the tilt the attractiveness from banks a little bit away from loans and back more towards securities. I think the issue so far this year is that there's just been-- you know, the, the first and foremost concern has been about deposit stability, because if you're not concerned about-- if you don't believe you have a stable deposit base, then you don't want to buy anything, right? So they've bought very little. I think I think as Silicon Valley and Signature Bank, as those takeovers get further and further in the rearview mirror, and you have, you know, some deposit stability, even at a higher cost, you're gonna start to see some banks that will say, "Look at the investment landscape, wanna make investments." I think when they look at that investment landscape, they're gonna find MBS as attractive relative to treasuries, maybe attractive relative to parts of the commercial mortgage market. So I think you can see the ones that are sort of in the best position take advantage of that. Great. Great. That, that makes sense. Then just one last quick one for me. Do you have any update of, for Book Value's third quarter to date? We don't. Okay. I appreciate you taking my questions. Thanks, Crispin. Our next question comes from Eric Hagen with BTIG. Hey, good morning. How we doing? Hey. One, one follow-up on the spread environment, just the portfolio. I mean, how do you have an idea for how much prepays could pick up in the portfolio if mortgage rates were to rally from here to kind of different levels of, of rallying? Is there a realistic upper bound, do you think, you think about for the portfolio, even in like a, a bigger rally for rates? Well, yeah, I, I think, obviously, that could be a lot of numbers to go over. I think we can, happy to take that offline, but sort of go through, you know, maybe each, each coupon. The, you know, the non-banks are such a big portion, you know, especially as refi activity starts to pick up, of production that I mean, and, you know, loan balances are higher. I mean, there's a lot. If, if rates rally a lot, I think, you know, you could see some very, very fast prints. I think, you know, it probably makes sense to maybe talk about that offline, sort of go through, you know, the market generic coupons, and we can tell you kind of what we think. Sure. I mean, I'm not trying to get too exact, just maybe more, more how you think about it and, and kind of just the, the sensitivity in the portfolio. Just maybe- Yeah. even at a high level. Yeah. You know, just rally. Yeah. Well, you know, the, the. Right. We've got good call protection for, you know, 100 basis point rally for sure if you look at, you know, if you look at our portfolio. More than that, then, you know, obviously, then you start our pools start turning more negatively convex. You know, as Mark said, we kind of like the combination of the call protection that the intermediate coupons provide and the extra yield versus the low coupons. We've got some, you know, we've got good call protection. Mark, anything you want to add to that? Yeah. I guess what I would say is... We've, you know, we've believed in sort of this Lock-In Effect, that borrowers that have, you know, 2.75, 3, 3.25% mortgage rates, that, that, that mortgage, the value of that mortgage, that mortgage that might be marked to market up 20 points, is a significant deterrent to people moving. That's been borne out, right? You look at existing home sales are at generational lows. There's been some more like academic papers talking about the impact it has on the mobility of the workforce. We've kind of believed that, you know, the IOs have benefited from that. Then sort of within that broad brush, then you look for sort of, okay, the market, like, that's not new news, so the market kind of expects that. Then where can you look for incremental speeds above and beyond market expectations and discounts? We sort of talked about that in the prepared remarks. I think what's interesting is that, you know, whatever the statistic is, 99% of the mortgage market is out of the money now, and if mortgage rates drop 50 basis points, 97% is out of the money. It takes a big move to get things in the money. I think what, what is interesting is that the question is, how much do mortgage rates need to drop to get people to, you know, up their turnover, you know, if they're a little bit out of the money? If someone's 300 basis points out of the money, right off the bat, that's a real deterrent. Suppose they're 200 basis points out of the money, and they've been delaying a move for two or three years, then it's not as much as a deterrent. I think it's when we talk to a lot of the non-bank originators, initially they were saying, which is, you know, they all have a little bit different numbers, but I think initially sort of what the conversation was, we think 5% mortgage rate is the breakpoint. If you get to 5% mortgage rates, then, you know, that's you can, you can start talking about, you know, hey, you're, you're, you're starting. You know, you're, you're at, yeah, you've, you're not at the 2021 lows, but you're not nearly at the 2022 highs. They think at 5%, I guess, to do, you know, borrower surveys or whatever, they start to see more demand, you know, more people willing to give up a 3% and go into a 5% if they want to move or get an extra bedroom, whatever. Now when you talk to them, that was maybe, like, eight months ago. When you talk to them, they're saying, "Well, we think you get to a 5.5% mortgage rate. That's enough to get people to move." I think, you know, you've had a bunch of people staying in a house that they'd rather sort of sell and buy something else. There's one thing, you kind of tough it out for six months. Now, people have toughed it out for one year and six months. I think that that rate it takes to get people to sort of have a little bit higher turnover, I think the, that, that rate differential between their, their existing mortgage rate and the current rate, I think that widens over time as people get a little bit, you know, more antsy. The other thing you, you see is that, like, you know, it's no secret housing is, you know, very unaffordable now relative to historical measures. If you just look at like, you know, median income versus, you know, monthly mortgage payments if you buy the median-priced home. It's getting a little bit better, not so much from, I mean, there's three ways to get it better, right? You can have mortgage rates drop, you can have home prices drop, or you can have wage gains, right? You've seen a little bit with wage gains. Compare housing now to the peak of 2022, you've had a little bit of an annual decline, and you've probably had 4% wage gains. Kind of that, that alone lowers DTI. I think, you know, over time, if you see wage gains continue, then things are a little bit more affordable for, for people. It's another motivation to move. I think it, it's, it's a function of time, and it's a function of rates. I don't think we're there now, but, you know, six months from now, if mortgage rates come down a little bit according to the forward curve, you might start to see a little bit of that more discretionary moving going on. Yep. Really amazing context there. Thank you. You know, lots, lots of changes on balance sheets for banks, like you guys talked about, their, their capacity for lending and supplying repo financing, more specifically to, to the street. You know, how are you thinking about, like, the scale for a mortgage REIT and its access to the repo market, which has, you know, historically been supported by banks? Do you feel like there's enough stable financing supported by the kind of non-bank repo lenders out there? I guess for us, you know, and, you know, we're obviously, you know, you know, not the biggest repo borrowers in the space, right? It's been stable, but it's been banks and non-banks. We have not seen banks pulling back at all, right? We've seen a consistent mix between bank and non-banks, and rates have been consistent relative to SOFR. I think there's lots of capacity. Yeah, I don't think- Great. I don't think that's the-- I don't think that's the limitation right now for anyone. Definitely not. Yep. Yep. Great, guys. Thank you very much. Thanks. Thanks, Eric. Our next question comes from Matthew Erdner with Jones Trading. Hey, good morning, guys. I've just got a quick one for you. You mentioned you took TBAs off and then put them back on. Could you just explain your thoughts around that, and how you're thinking about TBAs going forward? You know, I guess we've always had-- I think one thing we've done maybe differently than some of the peer group, if we have liked the use of, being short TBAs, we've liked that positioning of long pools, short TBAs, and certain coupons. There are a lot of benefits to that. You sort of, you know, control your Negative Convexity that way. We think sometimes there's very good relative value doing that, especially at times when mortgage spreads are relatively tight. We'll use dialing up and dialing down that TBA shorts, as an expression of our view on how attractive the mortgage basis is. Despite, you know, all the benefits of TBA shorts I just mentioned, you know, when TBAs get to levels that we think are very wide, and we think they're much more likely to tighten than widen, then we'll reduce that exposure and, you know, just, you know, live with the slightly higher Delta Hedging costs that come with it. That's helpful. Thank you. Sure. That was our final question for today. We thank you for participating in the Ellington Residential Mortgage REIT second quarter 2023 earnings conference call. You may disconnect your line at this time, and have a wonderful day.