Okay, good morning, everybody. Thank you for being here. My name is Manav Patnaik. For those of you who don't know me, I'm Barclays' Business and Information Services analyst. We're very pleased to have with us today Will Lansing, who's the CEO of Fair Isaac Corporation. More commonly we just refer to them as FICO. Will, thank you for being here. Great to be here. Will, you know, there are some new faces to the name, perhaps we could just start with a broad, you know, overview of, you know, what are the different businesses that FICO, you know, is involved in and, you know, kind of the mix of each of those businesses? We're about $1.4 billion in revenue, and split almost evenly between a software business and a scores business. Maybe the best place to start is with a little bit of history, how we got to where we are, because we really have these two business, but they have kind of a common heritage. The business was founded in the mid-1950s by a mathematician and an engineer, and their thesis was that by applying analytics to problems, they could make superior decisions and help their clients make money. It was really an analytics consulting firm. It was a body shop, and we did a lot of custom analytics for whoever was interested, and it was actually a wide range of industries. We quickly settled into financial services because that's where the money is. That's where you have high-stakes decisions, and it made sense to apply analytics and expend energy in doing analytics to get to a better answer. That went on through the '50s and '60s and '70s, the people running FICO at that time got this idea that if they could get some of the analytics into software, we could get returns to scale, we could, like, get higher margins, and we wouldn't just be a body shop. That was really the genesis of the software business, moving from consulting professional services to a software business. We built some applications for banks that were pretty effective, and then we also bought some companies. The software business developed through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and we wound up with some very strong franchises with financial services, including Falcon, which is transaction fraud detection, and originations, Collections and Recovery, and customer communication, customer management. These were big franchises for us. At the same time, we were building these scorecards for banks, you know, helping them to make their lending decisions. This, you know, banks would approach us. We'd build them a proprietary scorecard. In the 1980s, the mid-1980s, we had this idea that if we could build an industry scorecard, it could be used much more widely. We partnered with Equifax and developed something called the BEACON Score, which was the very first FICO Score. What that was all about was, you know, if we can put the algorithm on top of the credit file and score a large population, we have this low-cost way of evaluating risk you know, in a large population, and lots of lenders could use it. They did. That worked out pretty well. Well, we got this idea that we could put the same kind of a score on top of not just the Equifax credit file, but all the other bureau credit files. We went and we did that for Experian, we did that for TransUnion, and lenders really liked this. I mean, it the value proposition started out by being, you know, pretty effective, you know, as a low-cost way of evaluating risk, and it also gave them a little bit of flexibility in terms of where, you know, where they and how they managed their credit. That's kind of how this thing developed. Got it. Just on the FICO Score itself, I mean, you know, I think some people don't appreciate the benchmark industry standard nature of it, the regulatory aspect of it. Could you just elaborate on that a bit more? Yeah. It's kind of a case study in how do you become an industry standard. It happened for us over 30 years. I mentioned we started out by having a good value proposition for the lenders. You know, here's a very efficient way to evaluate credit risk. What happened was the regulators saw this and they said, "This is a pretty good tool for us." When they regulate the banks and they want to understand what's the risk of this portfolio, what's the profile of that portfolio, how will they behave in a downturn, it turns out that a very useful metric for them for evaluating that risk is the FICO Score. Now you have this constituency of lenders using it 'cause it's a good value proposition. Now you have a new constituency, the regulators, who are relying on it. The investors get into the act. A lot of the lenders securitize their paper, and the investors say, "How do I evaluate the risk of what I'm buying?" Again, the FICO Score becomes a very effective tool for doing that. Now we've introduced a third constituency that's interested, and now you're starting to see the network effects of using this Score. Finally, about five, six, seven years ago, we introduced something called Open Access, where we provide the Score to the consumer. We told lenders that they should feel free to share the FICO Score. This is in the US predominantly. Feel free to share the FICO Score with consumers, and they do. You know, if you're a US consumer, you'll typically get your FICO Score from the bank in your statement every month. There's, you know, yet a fourth constituency relying on it, the consumer. Now we have consumer pull for the Score. We've become very, very embedded in the ecosystem, and then we don't charge a lot. I mean, it's a good value. The combination of all those things kind of puts us right in the center of the ecosystem. Got it. It's interesting 'cause you know, you're still saying you don't charge a lot. 5 years ago, you used to charge a lot less. Before that, you didn't, you know, I guess FICO never changed their pricing before. Again, just for a little bit of history, you know, why did it not change for 40, 50 years and suddenly in 2018 things began? Well, there's a big value gap. We don't charge anything like the value we provide. The reason the pricing was so low for many years was that we don't sell directly to the lenders. We sell through channel partners, the credit bureaus. For over 25 years, the prices were fixed in contracts with evergreen renewal provisions, and so we just never changed the price. That was under prior management. Then we decided back in 2013 that we should have price changes. You know, there was something off about freezing your pricing for 25 years. So we started to raise prices. Got it. I wanna get back to the pricing and stuff first, but just to stay on a more broader picture, you know, the hot topic nowadays is around, you know, generative AI and the potential opportunities, but also from the investor perspective, who's at risk. You know, first, let's just touch on the scores business. You know, I guess you guys have talked many times how the FICO Score has been AI or machine learning for a long time, but where do you see the risks and opportunities? Look, you know, there's really two places where AI touches FICO. One is that, you know, the large language models that we're seeing today obviously have all kinds of implications for cost reduction and for productivity improvement. In that respect, we're like every other company, so call centers and those kinds of things will be affected that way. Salesforce management will be affected in all the ways that you read about. I think the more interesting use of AI is when you get into the core of our business, which is risk, when you get into originations, when you get into underwriting decisions, how does AI play there? Remember, we're in a highly regulated industry, highly regulated environment. We have, you know, in the US and in Europe, we have all kinds of laws that protect the consumer and policy decisions. AI violates a lot of that. You know, you can, you know, you could have redlining kind of embodied inside of AI and not being, not have it very visible. That's not a good thing. We at FICO have spent a tremendous amount of time thinking about this problem, anticipating this problem. We've got a number of patents in the area of explainable AI. We can explain how the AI works and make sure that it conforms with policy directives and with regulation. Got it. Maybe just on this XAI, this explainable AI component, because that's important in the regulatory framework, but, you know, just talk a little bit about the patents and, you know, maybe a little bit more on what explainable AI really means. You know, I wish I had my chief analytics officer here to really answer that question, but I'll give you a kind of a lay answer, which is we essentially what we have is a breadcrumb trail that lets us understand how it is that the AI got to the decision that it got to. Got it. That's the explainable part. Yeah, makes sense. Then just before we move to this topic, you know, for other companies, I guess the investor questions are how much of your data is proprietary or not? You guys do not own any data, and I think that's been deliberate. Can you just explain why you believe in that strategy? Yeah. We have a little bit of data in our myFICO business, but we are in general, the math, the IP, the algorithms, the analytics, but not the data. We do that because we're not a credit bureau. We're not a credit repair organization. We don't want the liability of holding that data. Strategically, it's because we know where our skill is. We focus on what we're good at, which is the analytics piece. We've never really been in the business of trying to build a competitive edge by having proprietary data sets. It's a perfect business. It's just not our business. We partner with the bureaus on that. Got it. ... and with others. Okay, fair enough. On the software side, again, you know, ever since GenAI has come out, a lot of software companies have been under pressure. What is it about your software portfolio that you feel like is more an opportunity than a risk? Well, maybe it's worth taking a step back and talking a little bit about our software portfolio, and then we can talk about that because we are fortunate that we're under a lot less pressure than some other software companies today. I think it's because our software's really strategic. We're really meeting a market need. It's very strategic for our customers. You know, for the benefit of people who aren't close to what we. Sure, yeah. ... what we do, you know, I said that our software, the software business we built up was designed around the credit risk life cycle. It was very specific point solutions, applications that banks, lending institutions would use to make these risk decisions. About, oh gosh, 10 years ago, we came to a view that we should broaden it. We should really think about ways to make all this work together. I, you know, it was a journey. The first thing we did was we identified a kind of an R&D opportunity. We had a different decision engine in each one of our software applications. We said, "You know, there's a lot of commonality here, and we could definitely have some returns to scale if we could just put the same decision engine into the next generation of each one of these applications." That was a big push in 2012, 2013, 2014. We got this kind of common decisioning. Then, we noticed that all of these analytics engines required ingestion of data in similar ways, and yet we did it differently in every one of our applications. Could you standardize the data ingestion, the wrangling, the cleansing, the, you know, the manipulation of the data to feed into our analytic engine? That was kind of the next step. This is around 2014, we started talking about the FICO Stack, if you remember the terminology from those days. You know, we also noticed other similarities across the applications, and came to a view that really what we were doing was building a platform, that really we're, you know, we were now combining all these applications in a way that was really a platform business. We became much more deliberate about getting all the components of a platform so that it would really support the needs of our customers. If you kind of peel back what it is that we do, you know, people think of us as decisioning, they think of us as, you know, superior analytics. What it really is when you think about it is, it's really kind of next generation CRM. What we do is we use data and apply analytics to make decisions about how to optimize an interaction with a consumer customer. For our bank customers, for our lending customers, and it could be any B2C company, but we, you know, we tend to focus on financial services. For them, it's all about how do we optimize that interaction with a consumer? The difference between the way we do it and the way it's historically done is, you know, most of the time interactions with consumers are based on segmentation, and we say, "Here's consumers, here's some soccer moms, let's treat them a certain way. Here's a different segment, let's treat them a different way." You're treated as a member of a set, and you have some rules around how we're gonna treat those people. The FICO approach is personalized, it's customized, it's one-to-one. It's leverage all the data we have about a particular individual, the last 25 transactions we've seen. We understand their price elasticity, we understand their brand proclivities. We understand what makes them tick, and we know what they'll respond to. We build a relationship, a digital relationship with a consumer based on everything that we know about them, and then applying the analytics. If you're a bank and you're wrestling with, "How am I going to change my business from waiting for people to walk into a branch," and, you know, kind of the old-fashioned way of doing business, to a future business, which is, "I need a digital relationship with a consumer. Everything has to be relevant. I can't do something in the call center or in email or by text that conflicts in some way with something else I just did with this consumer. Let's not trip on ourselves. These are not separate activities. It's all gotta be integrated. You want a 360-degree view of the customer, you want it to be digital, and you want every single one of those touchpoints to be optimized. The best way to do that is with our software. That's what our software does, and it's great for banks and financial institutions. It's also great for other verticals. We just tend not to focus on those right now. Got it. Let's stick with software. The platform business grew 600% last quarter. The non-platform also grew, I think, 70%, if I remember that correctly. It's not like you're moving from non-platform to platform driving the growth. What is driving that 60% platform growth? The big growth is coming from a few things. The first is this really is strategic for banks. You know, your bigger banks are looking at fintechs who are developing these digital relationships with their customers, and they feel like they need a really strong digital relationship, too. They don't wanna be left behind. Frankly, they are leading the way on this. There's the strategic need to do this, there's also cost. I mean, the return on investment is really terrific. It can be as little as inside a year for return on investment with our software for our bank customers. The cost of entry is quite low, they don't have to convert everything in their entire bank. They can try it in one business or one portfolio. They can try a few use cases and see how they like it, and then expand from there. Low cost of entry. You know, those are really the, you know, it's rapid payback, high ROI, low cost of entry, and strategic imperative, and add them all up, and we got a booming business. How about competition? Like, is that... I mean with FICO, with the score, I should say, there is no competition, but how about on the software side? I think the competition on the software side is really from internal, so it's build your own. There's really no other company out there that does quite what we do, the end-to-end, next gen CRM. You know, it's so much more cost-effective for a customer to use FICO than to try to build it themselves, that, you know, as they explore the options with us, they decide to use us. Got it. 60% growth, easy to integrate, use, no competition, but breakeven margins. When do we see the margins grow? Well, that's the debate internally. This is a debate in every software company, is, you know, margins versus growth. Clearly there's a swing, a pendulum swing in the direction of margins right now, you know, from a fashion standpoint. I would say that because we have this commanding lead in the space, we're well ahead of any competitors. We love the growth rate. We're gonna continue to focus on the rapid growth for the next few years. I think margins will come naturally with scale. You know, R&D is essentially a fixed expense, so as we get bigger, you know, our margins will improve. Then I think we'll be more deliberate about margin in the future. The primary goal right now, the next several years, is growth. Got it. What are the main areas of spend in that software side? You know, I don't think R&D has changed a whole lot, so where's a lot of that money going? Well, R&D's a big piece. I mean, we're building features and functionality, and that's the biggest piece, and we're actually investing heavily in the platform, in enhancing it, making it stronger, more powerful, more capable. There's also spend in direct sales and distribution. There's spend in partnership and indirect distribution. We have a little bit of spend in retiring technical debt, some of our legacy systems. You know, there's spend across the board. Then there's obviously professional services and installation, although we try to give that to partners as much as possible. Got it. You know, you explained the history of how the two businesses came about. There doesn't seem to be a lot of connection, or business, you know, need for the two to be together. How should we think about how you think about that portfolio, you know, in the next five years? You know, I get asked that a lot and we do run them as two businesses, and we kind of report the numbers separately. There are synergies. For sure there's opportunities in analytics where we work together, and then the customers for scores and for software are the same customers. Not always the same person inside a bank, but it's the same customers. Our sales force is a common sales force, global sales force that supports both businesses. There are some points of, you know, integration. Got it. Then maybe one last point on software. You know, most companies you talk to at, are, talking about, you know, sales cycles lengthening. On the last call you told us your sales cycles were shortening. You know, why is that? Like, what's the difference there? Yeah, that's quite fortunate for us. I think it's what I said before. I think it's because it's a strategic thing, it's not being postponed. Obviously these are tough times and, you know, people are tightening their belts and tech companies are laying people off. There is tremendous demand for what we do. Now some of it's because the return on investment is very rapid, so, you know, it's easy to justify. I think the bigger driving factor is the strategic nature. I think it's just, it's something that banks feel like they have to do, and they have to do it now. They can't postpone it. Got it. Okay, let's go back to scores, and first question is more from a macro picture. You know, you had a mini banking, whatever you wanna call it, crisis, failure, you know, session. You've had, you know, lending standards tightening. What are you seeing in terms of, you know, some of the lending environment dynamics out there? We haven't seen a lot of change, frankly. I mean, we, you know, you can get into, drill down into categories and obviously refi is almost dead, and, but, and other mortgage volumes are lower, much lower than last year. We think they've kind of stabilized at the level they're at, and eventually they'll go back up. I don't think that the banking crisis, such as it is, really affected things very much. Got it. Card is typically your biggest volume. Do you see any big risks? I mean, it's obviously growing really nicely, but, you know, in a, in a potential, whether it's a mild recession or worse, like how do you think about how that portfolio moves? Look, I think we have to be realistic. If we have a recession, I think that you'll see card volumes come down. They always have. So far we're okay. Okay. Let's get back to what you said earlier between the, you know, the gap between the cost and value of the FICO Score. You know, you've obviously, in the mortgage side, for example, you've gone from $0.05 to $0.50 to now a range up to $2.75. How should we think of, you know, how much more of a gap there is? I think that if you think about a mortgage, for example, if we're talking mortgage. If you think about the size of a mortgage, you know, $250,000. You think about the fees that are associated with the mortgage, thousands of dollars. You think about the credit evaluation, credit consideration kinds of fees within that. You know, you're still in very big dollars, the FICO Score piece of that is tiny. It's, like, single-digit dollars. Against that backdrop, you know, we're a very small piece of a much bigger set of fees, we arguably provide the most value in the whole, in the whole package. That's why we think there's still opportunity there. Okay. Then sticking to mortgage, you know, the FHFA obviously just, you know, gave you a stamp of approval for the foreseeable future. You know, the other shift there is them going from mandating 3 reports to 2 credit reports. That would mean 1 less score pool as well, but how do you look at that, you know, risk or opportunity? You know, we think of it less on a per score basis and more on what's the value of our IP, and the value of our IP against a mortgage that happens. Whether you divide that into 2 scores or 3 scores or, you know, any kind of combination like that, it doesn't really matter because we would just price to, you know, just to make sure that we're capturing the value of our IP. It's kind of on a mortgage-by-mortgage basis. Got it. You know, within the, within the other category, like, sorry, within mortgage, and you did this with card as well, I believe, but from, you went from a flat score per transaction to a tiered, volume score. I just wanted you to explain that to the audience. Well, we have tiered pricing. Like, as in so many other industries, we have tiered pricing where big customers get volume discounts and small customers pay much higher prices. It works because the absolute dollars that the small customers are paying are still small. So that, you know, that's very common in other industries and, frankly, it's common in our industry across all the other score categories. We had this kind of anomaly in mortgage where everyone paid the same price. So last year we put in tiering where we charged the smaller customers higher prices. Got it. If we shift a little bit to on the auto side, you know, if you could you know, go through that same dynamic. I think on the mortgage side it's easy to understand the high cost of, you know, the house and the fees, but on the auto side, like, how would you describe, you know, the opportunity there? You know, we do get used. We have auto scores. We have FICO Auto Score. They're used by lenders, and they're used by dealers. The lender really makes the decision about what score to use, and so they drive the use of the FICO Score. The, you know, the dynamic consumer walks into a dealership and says, "I wanna buy a car," and the dealer says, "What's your Social Security number so I can get your FICO Score, because I'm gonna go find out from the lenders what you're good for." They do. They pull the... The dealer will pull some FICO Score, a FICO Score, then on the basis of that, they're pretty skilled, they say, "Oh, this kind of FICO Score, I'm gonna go to these lenders and get offers versus those three lenders." They reach out to lenders and say, "What will you do for this individual with this kind of a score?" They go back to the consumer and say, "Okay, you can afford an F-150," you know, "with payments of, you know, $295 a month," or whatever it is. I mean, that's really how it works. You know, obviously there's different elasticity of demand in different pockets of that business. Got it. Then maybe something similar on the card side. That's probably the smallest ticket item, but is that still a bigger opportunity? Well, we have a lot of card volume, so it's always a big opportunity from that standpoint. That really does move the most with the economy. It's... that's a lower priced score. Got it. Then just on a high level, you know, you do some of this special pricing, once a year, but how do you think about, you know, where you go next and, you know, how much you up the price there? you know, I think we generate many you know, 12, 13 billion scores a year. Every year we think about where should we go to get our revenue increase for the next year, and we're pretty systematic about it. We look across all of that, and we say, We look at price elasticity and say, "Where's the demand elastic and where is it not?" We try to put the increases in places where we think we can. Sometimes the cost of the score is passed on to someone else, and so the person making the purchasing decision is not even who pays for it, so those are obviously the best kind of opportunities for us. We, you know, we're pretty systematic about looking at everything. Got it. The direct-to-consumer piece of the scores business, maybe first let's touch on the myFICO.com, which obviously had a nice bump during the COVID years and now coming down. What's the dynamics there, and how do you see that business? Well, the dynamic there is that the biggest driver, this is the credit report monitoring business. We have our own called myFICO, and then we are partnered with others, including Experian's a big partner in that space. We provide FICO Scores for free and also on a paid basis to the consumer through Experian and through myFICO. The dynamic in that business is consumers who are contemplating a big purchase, whether it's a home or a car, tend to think about what's my FICO Score, and, you know, they wanna figure out what they're gonna be able to afford. That's when they tend to come to us and sign up for a subscription. We saw that, you know, when with housing and mortgage volumes up a year ago we had a lot of growth. Now we're lapping that growth on lower volumes. We're seeing some of that fall off. I wouldn't say it's a bad thing about the business, it's just a reality that the front end of the direct-to-consumer business is diminished because you have less of that activity going on. On myFICO.com specifically, it's fair to say you guys didn't really up the marketing ante or anything to drive that. It was all organic. [Crosstalk] You know, you mentioned Experian, you know, I was hoping for a little bit of history on that relationship, 'cause they went from being almost a frenemy to a very good friend. Like, how did that develop, and how did you get to where you are? Well, yeah, that's absolutely true. I, you know, there's a, there's a score that competes with the FICO Score called the VantageScore. It's owned by the three bureaus. We had a lot of friction over that 15, 20 years ago. When they first came out with the VantageScore, we actually thought that they, that they had stolen our IP. We had a lawsuit about it, which we lost. It caused a lot of bad blood. I mean, you know, there was a period where relations with our channel partners, the bureaus, were quite frosty. That really ended more than 10 years ago. We recognized that it's kinda dumb. Like, you don't wanna be at war with your channel partners. You wanna be partnered with your channel partners. That's really, that's kind of the way we operate today is we get along pretty well with our partners. We have a deep partnership with Experian in the consumer business where they leverage FICO scores for customer acquisition, and we have a rev share arrangement with them that works for them and works for us really good. We also have a partnership with Equifax around the software side. you know, we have, you know, pretty strong partnerships with both Experian and Equifax, we obviously work with all three bureaus. Got it. since you mentioned the Equifax partnership and they're up next year after you know, what is the objectives of that partnership and, you know, what are you sharing and versus what are they sharing? Well, you know, the question is can we, combined with their fabulous data assets, And our software and analytics, can we go to market together and provide a value proposition for customers that's attractive? I think the answer to that is yes. All partnerships require a lot of work, we've been at this for a couple of years and it's, you know, it's taken work. Both sides are committed. Got it. Is there any timeline on when you think that, you know, that work will produce some revenue benefits or? We have revenue today, but we're, you know, we're not making promises to the world. Got it. Okay, the last broad topic I wanna touch on is just capital allocation and, you know, this is something you guys have done fabulously over the years. You know, you've done a few tuck-in deals. You know, you acquired the CCS business. Maybe first specific question is how do you think about, you know, M&A and, you know, what kind of areas, if at all, would even interest you? M&A is an interesting area for us because almost anything we look at is accretive. You know, we have pretty high multiple, and from an accretion standpoint, almost everything looks good. However, we have a really fabulous business. It's in a special class. When we look at M&A candidates, it's not just rare, I have never seen an acquisition candidate that I like as much as our own business. As, you know, that's a fact, and I've been on the board for, you know, 16 years and CEO for 11. That's not to say we never do it. We do small talent acquisitions, small technology acquisitions, tuck-ins, little ones. In terms of doing something significant that really consumes a lot of cash, that's just not who we are, and the reason's just we can't see anything that we like as much as ourselves. If you love your own business, what do you do? You buy back your own stock, and that's what we do. We, you know, our high point I think was 74 million shares. That was long ago. When I joined the board, we were 36 million shares. When I became CEO, we were 31 million shares. Today, we're 25 million shares. You can see we're kind of a slow-moving LBO, public LBO. You know, we can do that because we have very predictable cashflow. We don't take a lot of risk. We understand, you know, how much leverage we can handle. We run 2.5-3 times leverage, and are very comfortable with that. We periodically go higher than that, and we certainly can. Particularly there's, every once in a while there's, you know, a buying opportunity where we size up our purchases, but we're in the market all the time. Our goal is to spend at least our free cashflow every year and to keep the leverage up in that 2.5-3 times range. Got it. In the last couple of years, you've done several divestitures in your business, Collections and Recovery, the TransUnion business, et cetera. Like, how much is left? Like, you know, how does that process work? Yeah, it's a great question. You know, I mentioned that we had acquired a whole bunch of software, businesses over a 30-year period, and then a handful on my watch in the last 11 years. Those are all part of kind of classic FICO, legacy FICO. They're great applications and they're in use today, and we get renewals with them, and we continue to invest in features and functionality for the benefit of customers who use those products. They're not our platform strategy. All of our energy this nowadays is really directed at the platform side of the business. We, you know, we've kinda done the survey of the portfolio to say what is really not strategic, what is never gonna migrate to the platform, maybe those things should be passed to someone else who could take better care of it than we're prepared to. That was the case with both the Collections and Recovery business and with the Compliance business. We passed those. You know, I think we still have some businesses, some software businesses that are... Yeah, I don't wanna say they're not strategic, but they're not critical. They're not part of the platform strategy. At the same time, disentangling them from the rest of the software business is somewhat painful. It's, you know, it's just, it requires a lot of management attention. It's easier for us to keep it in-house and continue to manage it and take good care of our customers than to divest it. Very long answer to your question, but we do not see a lot of divestitures in our future. Got it. Last question, since we, you know, are outside the US here, I mean, most of FICO Scores is a US story. I know your software business is more mixed internationally, but why can't you replicate the success or why haven't you been able to replicate the success in the US in other countries? Well, we actually have had some success in other countries, and we're constantly working on the international scores business. Today we have scores in India and China and Brazil and Mexico. I mean, you know, we're in a number of other markets. The dynamic of every market is different. Sometimes the bureau is government-owned, as it is in China, and that changes the dynamic quite a bit. Sometimes you can't, you don't have the same access to data. That changes it. You know, whether it's positive or negative data changes it. There, there's different things that drive the dynamics in other markets, but we are committed to serving them, and we have an active international scores expansion effort on. Got it. All right, cool. I think we'll end it there, but, thank you so much, Will. Thank you. you. That was great. for your time. I appreciate it. All right. Thank you, everybody