Okay. Terrific. All right. We'll go ahead and get started. Again, very thankful to welcome the FMC team, Pierre Brondeau, the CEO, and Andrew Sandifer, the CFO. I've known these guys going back years. Been kind of a quiet last year, I guess, jokingly for you guys. I mean, it's been a tough last year. So, you know, Pierre, maybe you know, just take a minute and kind of a little after-action review. If you were sitting here a year ago, what you would have expected to happen versus what has happened over the last year, you know, just to kind of level set, you know, the changes going on at FMC. You start with a tough question because if I look back when I came back over a year ago, I looked at where the company was and I looked at what needed to take place. Mm-hmm. We really, with the team, we listed all of the things, and I made a decision which maybe looking now might not have been the best decision. I approached the company by thinking more of a soft landing. Mm-hmm. Balancing, protecting EBITDA. Mm-hmm. At the same time, paying debt, slowly. Mm-hmm. Retaining dividend and focusing on some of the very critical things I felt were impacting the performance of the company short-term, which was the level of inventory. Mm-hmm. We had in the channel the Rynaxypyr strategy, the situation in India. Mm-hmm. The leadership, which had to be reshaped. I felt there were other things, but those four should allow us to keep our head above the water and carry on and grow. You know, where I am, where I am today, and a year ago, I thought that that would do it. Yeah. When I'm back now, I'm thinking, no, the company need much more of a rethinking. Mm-hmm. We need to recreate the foundation of this company. I think what we did had to be done. Mm-hmm. But we have to go one step further. I think we need to be more aggressive on the balance sheet side. Mm-hmm. There are multiple ways to do it, not to solely rely on free cash flow. Mm-hmm. Put everything on the table from portfolio to working capital and really think about what are all of the things we can do for 2026. Be a year where we will change significantly our balance sheet. Mm-hmm. I also think that if you think about our portfolio today, we have what we call the growth portfolio. Mm-hmm. That piece is going well. Yeah. And then we have the core portfolio where there is Rynaxypyr. And that was a very big focus I had on with the strategy and the cost. But there is still $2.5 million of what we call the core product, which are molecules which compete with generics and we use to make formulations. This should have deserved more attention. I think we lost share. Mm-hmm. It's a big part of the company. Mm-hmm. I mean, $2.5 billion, we lost share. We had negative growth. Mm-hmm. We are price impacted without being cost competitive. Mm-hmm. I think we have to look at those products and really look at where we make them, how we make them. Mm-hmm. Look at the supply chain and completely rethink the supply chain to be capable to compete with more aggressive generics. Mm-hmm. I think the more aggressive approach to the balance sheet and a more aggressive approach to overall cost. Right. Of manufacturing product should have been taken on at an earlier stage. Mm-hmm. It's gonna be a big area of focus in 1986. Fair. Okay. And then, maybe touch on, you know, when you say be more aggressive on the balance sheet, you know, specifically kind of what are you looking at or what should investors, you know, expect to see happen there? It's an early stage for me to talk too much about it, but we do have tools. Let me first, Andrew, as a top priority to look at working capital. Mm-hmm. We have $2 billion of working capital. I have to believe there is significant money to be extracted. The decision we've made about India and selling the business. Mm-hmm. That's multi-hundred million dollars which could go down to paying debt. We made the decision around dividend. I also think we have to be brave enough to look at the portfolio. Mm-hmm. I think there are things we can do with our portfolio. Okay. It's early to talk about, but I think there are things we can do with our portfolio. And also, we talked about that at the last earnings call. We have five active ingredients. Mm-hmm. Which are very good new molecules. Most of the technology companies have contacted us. Mm-hmm. With some level of interest. Okay. Around licensing. Mm-hmm. I think there are places for strategic licensing with companies which have, maybe a different crop profile than us. Mm-hmm. More in row crops. We are more in specialty. Okay. Maybe molecules which are not used straight but which are used as partners for mixtures. Mm-hmm. And maybe there are some smart ways to do licensing. Okay. Which could also help pay down the debt, debt payment. So there are a series of things we have to look at, but what I'm saying is this year we're gonna put everything on the table. Okay. Okay, and just because you went to 'cause it's always interesting to me. You look at where the market cap of the company is, the enterprise value, you know, you, you're like, "Okay, either I've been doing this wrong for 25 years or there's value there." You know, what if you sold one of the molecules and, you know, flew into Pierre and just said, "Okay, you know, again, not generating a ton of EBITDA today, so that would be very deleveraging." You know, is something like that on the table or that's a step too far? Today. Mm-hmm. It's a step too far. Okay. I believe with the plan I'm thinking we could put in place, we don't need to go that far. Okay. I think there are in-between steps to be taken. Mm-hmm. Between the portfolio and strategic licensing. Mm-hmm. Which would not require us to move away from one of those four molecules because those four molecules do have a multi-billion dollar potential. Right. And I don't think it's. We're still highly profitable. We're still north of 20% EBITDA margin. Mm-hmm. So we're still a good company. Right. We have access to funds. We have a good revolver. I don't think that we are, the stock is more what happened, the stock is more dramatic than the real shape of the company, so I, I don't think we have to go that far. Fair. Okay. And so let's just put some numbers around kind of the BASF on the Rynaxypyr, I think the numbers I've been working with and tell me if they're different. You know, roughly $800 million in revenue as we head into next year, $200 million that you're selling to partners, basically other large ag chem, $200 million that are, you know, kind of in cocktails, you know, different types of mixtures, and then $400 million that's kind of sold, you know, as just a Rynaxypyr molecule. That's the part that's most at risk next year. And, you know, as I understood the strategy, you know, the price of that probably comes down 15%-20%. But then hopefully that leads to volume gains because you would move into, like, let's say, territory that neonicotinoids or something are doing today. So you could actually grow, you know, maybe 20%, kind of offset that so the top line on that 400 stays roughly flat. Is that still, with what we're seeing kind of with generic ag in general, the right way to think about what happens with Rynaxypyr into next year? That's it. Okay. I think your, your math is correct. I would maybe the only thing I would correct a little bit is the 10%-15% pricing could sometimes go all the way to 30%. Okay. So there could be price decrease for the straight molecule. Mm-hmm. To go into some market which could be a stronger price decrease. Okay. There is also maybe more of a formulation work. Okay. Where we have more of a premium. Mm-hmm. We know there is resistance, for example, which is taking place almost everywhere on Rynaxypyr. We do have formulations which will be registered and patented which allow to address resistance. We do have high-concentration product. Mm-hmm. We have multiple mixtures like the one with fluindapyr which extends the spectrum. So what you said is completely correct. Okay. Maybe some pricing a bit more. Yeah. drastic than what you say and a bit more work towards still technology-based formulation. Interest. Okay. And then the just, round number is 30% work. If price does come down 30%, obviously you've known, you know, that it was gonna come down. So there's work you can do on the cost side. And I always think about it, you know, again, I own a couple of farms. It's like, you know, they take you to play golf, you know, maybe you go see a baseball game. All that stuff comes out if I wanna buy at a generic price. You know, I don't get tech support. So how much cost can you take out of, you know, that Rynaxypyr, you know, COGS to offset, you know, again, maybe $100 million in price decline? I think you talk about everything coming with a silver product, and I would talk a lot about agronomist organization. Mm-hmm. Which are helping the farmers. I believe we can sell at a premium somewhere between 10% and 20%. Mm-hmm. We don't have to go down to generic pricing. Okay. Okay. Between the quality, the brand, and the tech service, we can sell at a premium. Okay. Some cases, we've been selling up to 20% premium. Mm-hmm. So it depends. Okay. But we don't have to go to this pricing. Okay. Okay. Fair enough. But then, is there a meaningful margin hit to that or the volume plus the cost takeout can roughly mean that the margin stays the same or, you know, should we think about, again, for every 10 points in price, margin comes down half that? How to think about roughly the margin hit on it? The cost has been going down significantly. Yeah. I mean, an order of magnitude. Mm-hmm. the volume. Mm-hmm. Will have to be significant. We have a simple objective which is keep the dollar earnings of the business flat 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028. Mm-hmm. So it's we don't expect any growth in earnings. We're gonna look more at the dollar at the bottom. Yeah. Pricing and cost is not everything because remember, we're gonna still have most likely multi-hundred million dollars of molecule where we have $200 million. Mm-hmm. Which are sold at a premium. Yeah. Okay. Because they avoid multiple spray, because they address the resistance issue and more efficacy. So it's not only a single equation of. Right. Price, cost, and volume. There is also all of the premium market we'll be addressing. Okay. And then the sister product, Cyazypyr, I think in my model I've got it at roughly $500 million in revenue. That's correct. When you're at 475 or something. Yeah. As Rynaxypyr comes down, does that do anything to Cyazypyr? 'Cause the gap between the two in price would increase. Do you either lose volume from Cyazypyr to Rynaxypyr or do you have to make any price adjustments on Cyazypyr? No, they are different products. Okay. Rynaxypyr is a very narrow spectrum with a very high efficacy. Yeah. Cyazypyr is not used for the same application. It's a, it's a product which has a very, very broad spectrum. Okay. Okay. They are not pe growers never have to make a decision between I buy Cyazypyr or I buy. Mm-hmm. Rynaxypyr depending upon the type of pest. Yeah. They would buy one product or the other. Okay. Cyazypyr is on the data protection in some places until 2029, so which is equivalent to IP protection. Yeah. So there is no impact of what's happening on Rynaxypyr onto Cyazypyr. That being said, 2027 is tomorrow. Yeah. We don't wanna get surprised with Cyazypyr the way we did it with Rynaxypyr. So we are starting the process. Mm-hmm. Of working on the manufacturing cost, bring it down to the same level of cost we have for Rynaxypyr. Okay. Preparing the formulation. All of this work is taking place to be ready when the molecule is in the public domain. Okay. And then if we jump around the next bucket, kind of the core price, or at least on my numbers, if you back out Rynaxypyr, Cyazypyr, you're kind of $2 billion to $2.2 billion on the core pesticide, something like that. So that's. Not pesticide. All right. Co, co-product. Crop products. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Fair. So that seems to be where the latest trouble has kind of popped up is in that group of let's just call it $2 billion 'cause I like round numbers. So what's changed there relative to what you thought before? What's the solution that needs to happen and kind of what's the financial impact on that $2 billion as we go through the process? I think multiple things have changed we could have anticipated. First of all, if I think about 2018, 2019, 2020. Mm-hmm. Customers needed Rynaxypyr, Cyazypyr. There was no generic to be seen for another five years. Mm-hmm. And growers usually, when they buy a couple of molecules, need to buy a broad range of molecule because there is the rebate system and there is a limited number of suppliers. So there was a natural sale of a lot of products coming with Rynaxypyr and Cyazypyr. That is going away because Rynaxypyr is not gonna be. Mm-hmm. It's gonna be in the public domain, so we'll have less of a leverage. Mm-hmm. For that. I also think that we have a strange period of 2021, 2022, 2023 where there was lack of supply because China shut down post-COVID. There was this big inflation period where pretty much people were so worried about supply that you could sell at whatever price. That doesn't exist anymore. Pricing is going down. We are in deflation period, so pricing is more important. Number three, we are in a period where farm economics is not as good. Mm-hmm. People buy more on price than they did before. Mm-hmm. You put all of those things together. I think it would have been wise in 2020, 2021, 2022 to have rethought our manufacturing cost. Mm-hmm. For those molecules because there would be one day where you would be facing competition against generics, maybe with less levers. Right. To sell those products at a premium. Okay. And so as you're making the changes now to that $2 billion, how should investors think about the impact as they're trying to model that? You know, what changes happen there as we get into 2026, 2027, 2028? You know, is it a dip and then a bounce back or is it kind of a steady glide down or how to think about, you know, either margins or. Yeah. Just contribution? That's, you know, if I think about 2026, we are in the process of doing the budgets. I, I don't have much information, but if I think about 2026, the probability for 2026 to be better than 2025 is very, very small. Mm-hmm. There is more headwind. Mm-hmm. Then there is tailwind. Mm-hmm. Pricing is not going better. Pricing is stabilizing. Okay. Okay. It's stabilizing, but it's been going down so fast in 2025. Mm-hmm. That the average pricing in 2025 versus 2026. Right. 2026 is gonna be lower. Okay. So we're gonna have a lower pricing overall even if there is more stabilization of pricing right now. Tariffs. Mm-hmm. We still don't know about India. We don't have the rules, but tariffs are gonna be a headwind. Mm-hmm. In 2026, we are not expecting much of a change in the market and the demand. Okay. So we don't expect there's gonna be a step change in the market. And then last, it's gonna take a year for us to fix our manufacturing footprint. Mm-hmm. To be competitive on our market. So 2026 is the year where we're gonna be recreating the foundation of the company. Mm-hmm. 2027, here is the objective. If things go our way, we do what we expect to do on the balance sheet with all of the options we have today, and we finish 2026 or end or start 2027 with a balance sheet in a much better shape. Mm-hmm. We do all of the changes we wanna make, especially around our cost. Mm-hmm. In 2026, and there is an EBITDA jump in 2027. Mm-hmm. Now we start 2027 with a much smaller balance sheet. Mm-hmm. A higher EBITDA and a debt-to-EBITDA ratio which makes much more sense. Yeah. So the way I see it is that 2026, which will be a year of very deep transformation. Mm-hmm. It's gonna be heavy lift. Mm-hmm. Benefit seen right away in 2027. Mm-hmm. I think we'll talk about 2028 target where, in addition to everything I say, by the time you get to 2028, your four new molecules are gonna be starting to get closer to $1 billion. Right. That's meaningful. Mm-hmm. That's another. This year, it's 250. Most likely, we're gonna be expecting a number like $400 million for next year. Mm-hmm. But then by the time you get to 2028, we will have three of the four which will be commercial, and we'll be launching the fourth one, Rimisoxafen. Yeah. That's when you start to get to $1 billion with molecules which are. Mm-hmm. Which are growing 20%, 30%, 40% a year. So then, it's a very different profile. Right. You get much more to the type of company we were in 2017, 2018, 2019 with a large part of your portfolio growing fast. Mm-hmm. At a premium and being IP protected. Fair. And I would if you had to rank those four molecules for, you know, seven years out, again, when they're at maturity, how would you rank which ones have the shot at being the biggest or the best for the portfolio? You know, funny enough, they are in the same range. Okay. They're all a $400-$700 million molecule. Okay. Okay. Together, they are $2 billion-$2.5 billion. Okay. They are about the same. Okay. The same range. They could be bigger if we find the right licensing partners. Mm-hmm. Which have access to markets where we have less of an access. Okay. We like part of the sales under licensing. Mm-hmm. Because you sell them at a cost plus. Right. It's quick cash. Right. Those are paid in 45 days. Yeah. So to have a part of a portfolio in a cost plus supply. Mm-hmm. From a cash standpoint is beneficial, and you increase your market reach. Because some companies have access to crops we don't. Okay, and when you, you know, just do the whiteboard exercise, either by crop or by geography, where is it that you are weaker that you would look for a partner? Is it, you know, Africa? Is it, you know, like the, you know, fruit trees? You know, kind of like where is it that you would need the most help or could get the most help selling product? Samuel, I'm gonna ask for help from my CFO next to me, but to give you percentage, but generally speaking, as a company. Mm-hmm. We are much, much stronger in what is called specialty crops. Mm-hmm. Than row crops. Okay. We make most of our business sugarcane, cotton, fruit, vegetable, tree nuts. I don't know the percentage of all of those together, but it's. Yeah. Corn and soybeans are about 30% of the product mix. Fruit and vegetables and other specialty crops are significantly larger. Yeah. Collectively, it is more fragmented by individual crop, but when you think about those categories. Okay. So I think certainly compared to some of the other major players out there, we are less levered to, you know, particularly Americas corn and soybean. Okay. I would bet you that, and I don't know their numbers, but I would bet you that a company like Corteva is almost the reverse because. Mm-hmm. Being also a seed company. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It's normal that most of their crop chemical work. Mm-hmm. is dedicated toward row crops. Right. Right. Okay. And so the idea would be if you could do, you know, the perfect deal would be to do a deal with another large, you know, Syngenta, Bayer, BASF, Corteva. You would get some money upfront, and you would get a partner that could help, you know, basically accelerate the sales of that product, you know, one of the four products or maybe all four products. And that is a big driver in kind of bringing down the leverage on the balance sheet. That's. That's one of the best. The best sell outcome. Okay. That's one of the options we have. And besides using, like, licensing deals for the, the molecules, kind of, I guess, what are the other more aggressive ways that you can attack the balance sheet? You know, again, working capital, I think you called out. Is there stuff within the core business within that $2 billion or, again, that doesn't make sense to try to monetize from that? I'm gonna have to be super vague, but. Okay. Yes, there is India. Yes, there is licensing. Okay. Yes, there is working capital. Yep. Yes, there is portfolio options. Okay. But I at this stage, I cannot. Fair enough. Talk more about it. Okay. But there is portfolio options. Okay. And if you look at the market to sell or to license into today, you know, you can go back. Obviously, there's a period that Ag, you know, everybody went to acquire, you know, the 2000, you know, early 2000s. People were rolling up the industry. We haven't seen a lot of acquisition, you know, done lately. Is there still appetite there, do you think, for people to wanna get bigger in AgChem or, you know, is this a tougher time to do deals? I think if you talk to all of my colleagues who run technology-based ag crop company. Mm-hmm. We realize that it's getting more and more difficult because of regulatory. Mm-hmm. And more and more expensive. Mm-hmm. To develop new molecules. We also know that you need new molecules because the amount of generic resistance increases very fast. Right. So you need new modes of action. So today, lots of people say if we could join forces on the technology front. Mm-hmm. which would imply consolidation. Mm-hmm. Frankly, I do not know if consolidation would be possible. Six, seven years ago, we know we acquired the DuPont business. Right. Because Europe wanted five technology companies. Right. Has that changed? I don't know. Mm-hmm. But if that has not changed, consolidation will be prevented by antitrust. On the other hand, authorities could very well be realizing that developing new molecules is gonna require bigger. Mm-hmm. And more powerful companies. So that could be a driver. Yeah. To bring new molecules to the market, so I don't think there is less appetite. Mm-hmm. But for all of us, there is still uncertainty around the antitrust rules. Okay. Fair. And then, just 'cause we get asked it a lot, you know, I think people would be interested in your view, you know, the announcement that Corteva was gonna separate itself, which is kind of 180 degrees versus, again, what everybody always wanted to do, which is kind of roll things together and glom them together. What's your take on that? What that means for the industry? You know, just kind of how you see that impacting, you know, FMC and the industry going forward? You know, I cannot comment on the decision Chuck made. I'm sure he has reasons. Mm-hmm. To believe that those two companies will be operating better independently. Mm-hmm. that each of those businesses and to some extent I understand that the model may be different. Mm-hmm. As I discussed, the crop chemical business is gonna require a blend. Mm-hmm. Of innovation and high focus on cost. Mm-hmm. Which you might not have on the seed side, so there are gonna be different drivers in those business. Mm-hmm. That could be one of the reasons for which he believes the focus and the type of management has to be. Right. Has to be different. For FMC, you know, an independent crop chemical company creates an additional partner. Mm-hmm. In fact, they're saying, I hope my friend Chuck is not gonna be mad at me, but today, the crop chemical side of Corteva. Mm-hmm. Serve the Pioneer seed side. Right. It's almost a captive. Now, Corteva is a very smart company, and when a competitor has a better product, they don't hesitate. Right. To bring this product into the package. But the separation for us. Mm-hmm. Should open up a bit more. Okay. I would say the Pioneers. Mm-hmm. Actors. Mm-hmm. Than what it is today. So I don't see a negative for us. Okay. We have a potential additional partner, and we have more acres open to us. So, I don't dislike the move at all. Okay. Okay. I guess, obviously, you've talked to a lot of investors, you know, in the last several months. You know, the stock has done poorly. Where do you think when you talk to them, you know, your view of kind of where we're going over the next several years and the value there versus, you know, what they push back on, where do you see the biggest disconnects between your view of FMC and investors? You know, I think 2026 is a turn. There has been what I still believe an exaggerated reaction from a stock standpoint. Mm-hmm. The company has a capability which is much beyond the market cap today. Mm-hmm. I would say that we are paying the price, and our shareholders are paying a price maybe of not enough of an aggressive change of the company. Mm-hmm. A soft landing I thought would work, would not work. This company has a tremendous portfolio. We have four new molecules and nobody else is putting four new molecules on the market. And we have Cyazypyr, which is a fantastic molecule. I think we underestimated two things. And we're paying the price for that, but they are not easy, but they are correctable. Mm-hmm. One is the balance sheet. Mm-hmm. And the speed at which we needed to correct that, I missed that, and that's gonna be an area of focus. Mm-hmm. The other one is with all of the challenge around the growth molecule, Cyazypyr, the loss of patent on Rynaxypyr, we maybe forgot a bit that we had $2 billion-$2.5 billion of business to protect. Mm-hmm. All of those are highly correctable in a short period of time. I think in 12 months, we're gonna make a big, big change, and I think the potential of the company is intact. Okay. The reaction was exaggerated. You know what? I would have acted faster. Mm-hmm. At a more drastic change, maybe we would not be where we are. Okay. And then maybe two more for me. We've got about out of time here, but when you think about the price and the volume numbers that you guys will print, you know, let's say back half of this year through next year, you know, we do have some comps, obviously. Corteva has AgChem, you know, Bayer, BASF. How do you think you'll look relative to peers over that period? 'Cause it does feel like, you know, your numbers have looked a little bit lower in the back half. And originally, we kind of thought, well, okay, this is just Chinese generics kind of hitting Latin America, you know, writ large. But do you think your portfolio in particular will do less good versus peers on price and volume next year? Next year, I don't know. I think if I look at the second half. Mm-hmm. We are not dramatically underperforming the industry. Okay. If you look at the numbers from our. Mm-hmm. Peer company, we're not underperforming them. We are underperforming versus what we thought we could do. Okay. Looking at where we came from, looking at how much we were presented to grow because of what we had in the channel. Mm-hmm. We had super aggressive targets, especially in Latin America and especially with the building of a new sales organization. Mm-hmm. This process is working very well, but is working slower than what we're expecting. So I think the disappointment is not as much versus our performance against our peer company. Right. But versus our own targets, which we missed. Okay. And then maybe the last one for me, you'd obviously step back from the active CEO role once before. You know, you just lost your president. I mean, this is gonna be a heavy grind. Is it? I mean, like, the next three years, should investors expect you to be here leading the charge or do you wanna bring in somebody who's kind of more of the COO or kind of what's your thought process around just kind of how to manage the leadership through this change? Yeah. At this stage, I don't have a timing. Okay. I'm committed to the board to only leave when I have a replacement and when the company's on track. Mm-hmm. We are not recruiting a replacement right now, and we are not recruiting a COO. The position which was held by Ronaldo was a bit artificial in the sense that he was creating a layer between me and the region. Mm-hmm. Which is not a normal situation. Mm-hmm. The region need to report to the COO because that's where the action is taking place. Right. I need to sell customers. I need to sell leaders. I need to travel. So, at that point, the way we decided with the board is the best structure was de-layer. Right. Have the regions reporting straight on to me. Okay. Do what I have to do in 2026 and beyond. Mm-hmm. And leave when the company's in place. There is no active search for. Okay. We are, of course, our board has a search committee which is always watching. Right. What's outside, so we are currently listing. We're updating, and we're looking at talent inside and doing talent reviews. Okay. But right now, there is nobody pushing me out. Okay. Yeah. That's good. Yeah. I think the fact, yeah, that you're committing to it, I think. I don't intend to run away, so. Yeah. Okay. Terrific. Unfortunately, I'm here, Andrew. Awesome. Well, listen, we've run ourselves out of time. Thank you so much, team FMC, for coming to spend some time with us, and we'll catch up with you a little bit later. Thank you. All right. Thank you so much.