Welcome to the 2026 Annual Meeting of Shareholders for FRMO Corp. My name is Thérèse Byars, and I am the Corporate Secretary of the company. We are hosting our fourth hybrid annual meeting that is both in-person and virtual. It is also our first annual meeting without our former CEO, Murray Stahl, whose memory still burns bright in our minds as we continue to honor his legacy. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our colleague, Cherise Martin, for organizing the logistics of hosting the meeting in this venue. As is our custom, we will conduct the business portion of our meeting first, after which the Co-Chief Executive Officers, Steven Bregman, Peter Doyle, and Chief Financial Officer David Arndt will answer questions. Though we might not be able to answer all of them, we will do our best to provide a response to as many as possible. We have received a few questions in advance on the web portal. Only validated stockholders may ask questions today in the designated field. The FRMO annual and quarterly reports can be viewed on our website at www.frmocorp.com. These items can also be viewed on the FRMO listing on the OTC Markets website by clicking on the Disclosure tab. The 2026 letter to shareholders will be available on both sites in the coming weeks. It is now shortly after 2:31 P.M., and this meeting is officially called to order. It is my pleasure to introduce FRMO's seven directors, all of whom are candidates for re-election. They are Steven Bregman, Peter Doyle, Lawrence J. Goldstein, Jay P. Hirschson, Alice C. Brennan, Rimmy Malhotra, Melinda Newman. And representing CBIZ CPAs, P.C., that is our auditors, are Sougata Banerjee and Lauren Nelson. They will be available to respond to appropriate questions during the question and answer session after the formal meeting. We now proceed to the report on the tabulation of the proxies for the two proposals. The proxy committee appointed by the FRMO Board of Directors is here this afternoon to represent those shareholders who gave their proxies to the committee. The Board of Directors fixed July 14, 2026, as the record date for determining stockholders entitled to vote at this meeting. An affidavit has been delivered attesting to the fact that the notice of the meeting, the proxy statement, and the proxy card were mailed on or about July 29, 2026. The stockholder list shows that as of the record date, there were 44,022,781 shares of common stock outstanding and entitled to vote at this meeting. The Inspectors of Election report that proxies were received from FRMO shareholders holding approximately 32,496,617 shares. Oops. That was the whole number. Of common stock, or 73.81% of the voting power on the record date. Therefore, this meeting is properly organized with a quorum present, and we may proceed. There are two items of business for this meeting. The first is the election of the seven Directors who are nominated in accordance with the company's governing documents. The second is the proposal to ratify the appointment of CBIZ CPAs, P.C. as the independent registered public accounting firm of the company for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2027. We changed our fiscal year end from May 31 to June 30, and there is a lot of documentation of that on the websites. The Board recommends a vote for on both items. It is now 2:34 P.M. on September 10th, 2026, and the polls are still open. Stockholders who haven't yet voted or wish to change their vote may do so by clicking on the voting button on the web portal and following the instructions there. If you have already submitted your proxy, you do not need to vote again unless you wish to change your vote. I'll wait just a moment to give shareholders a chance to vote. Now that everyone has had the opportunity to vote, I declare the polls for the 2026 FRMO Corp annual meeting of shareholders closed at 2:34 P.M. on September 10th, 2026. Based on the preliminary report of the Inspector's Election, all seven Director nominees have been duly elected to the Board, with all nominees receiving 100% of the votes cast and 74% of the shares outstanding. The proposal to ratify the appointment of CBIZ CPAs, P.C. as the independent registered public accounting firm of the company for the fiscal year ending June 30th, 2027, has been approved with approximately 99.9% of the votes cast and 74% of the shares outstanding. There being no further business to come before this meeting, the formal part of this 2026 FRMO Corp Annual Meeting of Shareholders is now adjourned. The next item on our agenda is the report to the shareholders by the executive officers. Joining me here are Steven Bregman and Peter Doyle, Co-Chief Executive Officers, and David Arndt, Chief Financial Officer. They will review key points related to the 2026 financial results. When they have finished their remarks, they will answer questions. At that time, we will begin with the questions received in advance of today's meeting. We will then alternate between questions entered on the web portal and questions from those attending the meeting in person. We will answer as many as time allows, but only those germane to the meeting will be addressed. As noted earlier, we will endeavor to address unanswered questions in the summary transcript that will be posted on the company website. With that, I'll turn the meeting over to David Arndt, FRMO's Chief Financial Officer. All right. Thank you, Thérèse. Pleasure to meet you all in person. I figured since this is my first time on the panel, I would take the opportunity to introduce myself a little more in person. Again, my name is David Arndt. I'm a CPA and roughly just a hair over 15 or so years into my career. I started in public accounting in Denver and then came over to the public company of Scott's Liquid Gold, which obviously merged with Horizon Kinetics a couple of years ago at this point. After selling off all those consumer brands, I've gotten more involved with the Horizon Kinetics financial team, as well as joining FRMO as CFO just a few months ago in April at this point. Most of my efforts so far have been centered around compliance and enhancing our financial reporting function. I hope that the financial statements have become easier to read as we've made a few changes in presentation, including with the unfortunate event of having a restatement and a revision in this most recent annual report. In addition, providing more information to everybody as well. In the annual report that we just issued, we also included a small section of MD&A for the first time as well. That will continue in our financial reports going forward. Moving on to our results for the year. For Q4, FRMO experienced a net loss of $46 million. This was primarily driven by a decrease in TPL during our fiscal Q4 of 25% and was partially offset by an increase in digital assets of Bitcoin and Grayscale Bitcoin Trust Company of 11% or so. For the annual figures that relate to those, we ended the year just shy of $3 million that was attributable to FRMO, and there was a decrease of a significant amount of roughly $100 million, versus $100 million in fiscal year 2025 for us. That was really primarily driven by TPL as well. TPL only increased 6% during our fiscal 2026 versus in the prior year, where it had increased over 80% in our fiscal year 2025 as well. Our loss was also influenced by the decrease in digital assets, including GBTC and Bitcoin themselves. Those decreased by over 30% in our fiscal 2026 versus increasing by 50% in the prior year for our fiscal year ended May 31st of 2025. As a reminder, what also is influenced by many of these unrealized changes in balances is our deferred tax liabilities and income tax expense at that point. As expected, if we have unrealized gains, our deferred tax liabilities increase and have corresponding decreases as those investment balances fall as well due to unrealized losses at that point. As a reminder, and as Thérèse mentioned as well, we have changed our fiscal year-end, so where it was previously ended May 31st, we've now adjusted it to where it's June 30th to align with more common reporting periods and better available information from a lot of the drivers and inputs that go into our financial information as well. What this means is instead of our Q1, which would have just ended as of August 31st, is now ending September 30th. Our Q1 report, which would've previously been issued by mid-October, will now be issued by mid-November, and we'll have a one-month transition period in June of this year. Then we'll adopt a more common quarterly reporting period of ending September 30th and then with Q2 ending December 31st, so on and so forth. That will be a one-month adjustment to each of our earnings calls going forward and corresponding meetings that coincide with the timing of those financials being filed as well. With that's a very high-level summary of the financial statements. Again, thank you, Thérèse, for the introduction, and again, good to meet you all in person for the first time. At that point, I'll turn it over to Peter and Steven for more information on the business itself. You want me to go first or you go? Yeah. Some people are curious about Peter and me and how we work together. I will say that same as my experience with Murray, and Murray with Peter and Of course. Of course. Some people are curious about how Peter and I work together. They are curious about how Murray and I, and Murray and Peter work together and so forth. In each of these cases, if you take all, let's say three points of a triangle, we have very complementary skill sets and ways of thinking, and it is a very nice kind of a blend. I will tell you that none of us, none of the principals who came from Bankers Trust have been together all these years. I do not think we ever had a fractious argument. It is just rational. You talk about it. You talk about things, and an argument makes better sense when explained more fully or not, and that is just the way it was. The only fractious argument I am aware we ever had amongst us, this is inside information, but it is nothing actionable, so it is okay, I think. It was not between Peter and me. It was about some furniture choices in the new office. One of the principals was very emotionally attached to a certain particular look. But that was about it. But as a momentary example of different ways we think and how we work. I have discovered I am kind of a slow learner and a quick forgetter. And it is important to know how your mind works because we use it a lot. I make some notes, okay, just to remind myself of what I know and keep track of things. I just see here, these are Peter's. There is a difference, and it is good. Go ahead, Peter. Thank you all for coming. Difficult time. First time annual meeting without Murray. Murray was a larger-than-life figure. We not only worked with him, but we loved him. Steven and I held a town hall at Horizon Kinetics yesterday, and people thought there was going to be some earth-shaking news that was going to be released. Are we letting people go? Are we merging the firm? Are we selling the firm? Really what it was to say thank you. Over the last five months since Murray's passing, the individuals at our firm really stepped up. For the big chunk of the start of since Murray's passing, Steven and I just needed to get up to speed on what was going on operationally. Murray had a lot of things going on. Now I can walk into a meeting, a weekly meeting with the legal team, with the operational team, and I know every topic that is going to come up. If I were sitting in your shoes, I would say, "What is going to happen to our firm? Is it in good hands?" I can honestly say, I go home on a regular basis, and I speak to my wife, and I tell her, we have a world-class organization. The investment acumen that Murray brought to the organization was legendary, but I do not think that is that crucial to who we are as a firm. We have a lot of other people that have basically that capability or similar capabilities that can find great investment opportunities. Murray's goal for FRMO, as I believe, was to ultimately have a normalized operating business, and we continue that march. We continue to make acquisitions and have over the last year in Winland, and at some point, we are going to consolidate that business. It is not going to move the needle that much, but it is a start. We sit on an impeccable balance sheet. Any project that Murray touched, he left in a better condition than when it started and more enduring, and that is true of FRMO. Steven and I are not afraid to act. We have a long history of making investments, and if we see an opportunity, we will act on that, and things will happen. But as David pointed out, the balance sheet is pristine, our earnings are going to go up and down based on the assets that we hold right now. But ultimately, our intention is to basically have an operating business that's going to get a much higher multiple for the stock, and that's ultimately the goal. I don't really have a lot planned. I was hoping it was going to be more question and answer, and we'll provide you as direct we can with answers to any questions that you might have. I know Steven has a lot more written down on his sheet than I do. So I'll let him see if we. Well, these weren't really intended to be notes for today. We had to put out a shareholder letter, and we're doing so many things that are important and productive that somebody reminded us of just a handful of days ago, we have to get this out. So that's really what a lot of this is. So one of the things we're really heartened by with various employees is not just that they have just stepped up and done what needs to be done, sometimes volunteering, sometimes just doing it. But a lot of them seem engaged in ways that produce creative and capable in all sorts of ways. And Peter mentioned operating businesses. Let me take two ideas and try to put them together. It was always the goal of FRMO Corp to be an operating business. That's how we started out. We wrote it. We actually did it. Now I'll do a tiny history lesson to remind us about it. And that was the goal then. It's the goal now. But let me give you an example. When we first started our very first year, 2021, we had, I think, $3,600 in revenues for that year. And that was not technically a royalty, but it was kind of like a royalty. Economically, it's the same thing. It was contract revenue for providing written research to one particular professional investor. Renowned in his day. He was often referred to as a small cap, microcap analyst and hedge fund manager. His own hedge fund. Really superlative long-term returns. He used to be referred to as the king of the pink sheets, and he'd written work on it. He'd lectured at colleges about it. Some people know him as Lawrence J. Goldstein. Some people call him Larry. So when Larry was helping Murray and me with this idea of trying to get a public company, he introduced us to a man named Lester Tanner, who was one of the most talented kind of applied legal minds I've seen. He was able to do all sorts of things for us. He was worth his weight in gold in terms of all the work he did for us and the value added. But it was a company he controlled that engineered for us, because Murray had this notion of a spinoff. He just engineered a spinoff, so we were de facto public. And one of the things we knew is we had a concept of what we wanted to do. Murray liked the idea of royalties and having written research for consumption by professional investors. We kind of knew what they liked to see. They liked to see recurring revenues that they could put on Excel spreadsheets. They liked to have scalability. They wanted to see that it keeps going. It has to do with some surgery I might have tomorrow, but you guys come first. They like to see a progression upward, right. They like to see scalability and margins. We thought we would do that. That was the business idea. But we had to start with one. And the first one Let me just interject. It's minor surgery on his wrist. You can say that to yourself. I have to hit it a second time. Excuse me. I'm going to step away for a moment. Let him come back to where he was. Starting off right after Murray passed away, the first concern was Horizon Kinetics and just making sure that that. If somebody of Murray's stature passes away, you're concerned that you're going to lose a fair amount of assets. I can tell you that did not happen. In fact, 2026, our assets are up. A big chunk of that is because our portfolio is up fairly substantially. But we really have seen very little in the way of outflows. I think net-net, we might actually have more dollars under management as inflows coming in since his passing. Obviously the stake that we have in Horizon Kinetics as well as the royalty interest we have was our first main order of business. The underlying investments that we have on FRMO's balance sheet are things that we've held for literally decades in some cases. I stated to the employees of Horizon Kinetics at the time, if we merely shut our doors for five years and came back, we're likely to have much higher assets just as a result of the underlying dynamics of what we own. I think we own world-class businesses that are going to continue to compound as they have in the past. From that standpoint, we had no concern. The concern, I think, for investors, if I was sitting in your seat or as a client of Horizon Kinetics, can we find new investment opportunities? From that standpoint, we can, and I'll get into that. I'll let you get back to where you were. My stories take longer. We started that process. We wanted to have some revenues when we started sufficient to cover the cost of being a public company, which would be the audit fees. We budgeted for about $3,600 a year. You wonder, how can you get audited for only $3,600 a year? The reason is because we started off with basically a royalty model. Our income statement, which we published, was about four lines. I kid you not, even shorter than the Texas Pacific Land Trust used to be a decade or more ago. We had revenues of $3,600. We had operating expenses of like $4,150. We had no taxes. The operating expenses, by the way, were auditing fees because we took no cash compensation. This was before, I guess, the PCAOB, the accounting pooh-bahs told us you can't not pay yourself. Eventually they made us put a charge into shareholders' equity to pretend we're paying ourselves even though we didn't pay ourselves. Anyway, so that was it. Then there was net income. We weren't quite conservative enough. We were like a couple hundred dollars short. We also started with $10,000 on our balance sheet because we figured we needed a cushion. Okay? So that first year we had $3,600 in revenues. We began providing advisory services, let's say, to new products we might have that were still in their formative stages. Right? You have a new strategy. Maybe there's $1 million in it. Maybe it doesn't quite even break even for the owner of that strategy, and maybe it goes to zero. But maybe it could be $100 million, right? This point I'm making, we'll return to later. By the time 2004 rolled around, I was referring to 2001. We had $160,000 of revenues, and by 2009, they were $11 million. Okay? We always intended to be an operating company. It's an interesting thing that everything else you see, all the assets we have, was just a product of our having reinvested that cash flow. It wasn't intended to just be investments. We've never given up on that. Winland, which Peter mentioned, that's a major notion Murray had about the next operating business. The fact that we don't have as much in new operating businesses as we'd like is through no fault of not searching for them. We've looked long and hard, but periodically we'd investigate, and sometimes intensively, and we came away thinking that it's too expensive, or it seems a little too risky, or involves leverage, or it's outside of our circle of competence. Cryptocurrency mining, I won't get into it now, but that has the potential to operate on simply an enormous scale as an industry in the future. It has the characteristic that I kind of laid out here, which is sometimes if you're looking for order-of-magnitude potential returns in scientific notation, order of magnitude means basically multiples of 10. Can something be 10 times larger? Can it be 100 times larger? The way you can find those is by something that is very small that might be a lot larger, either to expand into market share of an existing industry or just to be larger at all. Microsoft did so well because the operating system for the IBM PC, which they were paid to produce, went from zero penetration to one day it was all over the place. Same for the iPhone. There's a lot of what we're doing, items we hold, which have that characteristic. They're really early stage, but they're the kinds of businesses that we think can be held for a really long time and operate at a much greater scale. We're still on the ball there, and just because one doesn't see something happening on the surface doesn't mean there's not a lot of effort going on underneath. The other thing I'll just mention shortly, briefly, is that I know there's a tendency for people Peter mentioned something like, and you can see it on our balance sheet. We've held these things for years. You know what they are. You know which ones they are. People think of them as legacy investments. Well, they're just there because we're kind of stuck with them. They've done so well. We've got such low cost. Maybe there are better alternatives. That is so far from the case. We do our own analysis. I tell you that for reasons we can expound upon. I think TPL can make as much value for us in the future as it has already. I think Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies can make as much value for us in the future as they have already. It's not that we think it. We have an analytical basis for that. It's not necessarily an analytical basis that people have worked out. I'm pretty sure of that, too. Anyway The only thing I'll add to that is we were left with playing cards, and we have a great hand. It's somewhat ironic that one of the more challenging things for CEOs is the capital allocation. I think we have the capital allocation actually down. Fortunately for us, we have great operating people as well. If we find something, we'll have the operating aspects of it. I think in terms of opportunity set, we've already found several investments post Murray's passing that without a lot of imagination, in my opinion, these easily can go up tenfold in a decade's time. We're going to build up those positions both in our Horizon Kinetics portfolios as well as on FRMO's balance sheet, and we'll continue to look not only for passive investments, because sometimes that's the best opportunity, but also operating businesses. We are putting more words out to make that happen and have people come see us if there is an opportunity. With that, maybe open for questions. Who do we have? Okay. You said since Murray passed away, assets have grown. A little bit of reason was that maybe the height, the assets- We have a mic for you. Thank you. You said since Murray's passing, your assets have gone up, but I am asking, what about the fees on those assets? I am concerned that maybe the high-fee assets have been pulled, and you had lower-fee assets taking their place. Is that what happened? Yes. There hasn't been any really widespread or any large redemption of assets in either the nominal paying accounts or the hedge funds that might get a performance fee. We just haven't seen that. My expectation is that if we have good performance in those, you'll see very attractive revenue growth for us in those products. Do you think the future of FRMO may be different because of Murray's passing? 100%. Murray was unique, and Steven Bregman is unique, and Peter Doyle is unique. Sometimes Murray, he could come up with a new idea every 20 minutes. I certainly don't have that. Maybe Steve, it's every half hour. But the reality is that we recognize a good opportunity. Murray, as my colleague James Davalos says, and it's true. Not only did he teach us how to fish analytically, but he taught us where to fish, so we know what to look at. I think that the investment that I alluded to, I think Murray would've purchased that on behalf of his clients and FRMO. But we didn't need him to find that. We basically found it ourselves. Yeah. There is also a structural element. To expand on something Peter said earlier when he was talking to all of our employees the day after Murray died. One was people were concerned. Are we going to sell out? Are we going to just close the doors? He said, "Look, we have done something very unusual as far as we know." I do not know if it is unique, but very unusual. It is rare that we deliberately, strategically for both FRMO Corp and for Horizon Kinetics, we built up retained earnings. We kept earnings on our balance sheets, and we built it up because, for one thing, we wanted to have strategic degrees of freedom and tactical degrees of freedom, both for investment purposes, but also we live in a cyclical industry and business. We never wanted if we could build it up enough, we want to be able to insulate ourselves from that volatility and from having to make decisions under duress. Most partnerships or LLCs as we were, they pass out the income as they earn it. We paid the taxes on what we did not pay out, and we built it up. On that front, Peter was able to say, "Look, we have a rock solid balance sheet. We are not in trouble. We have got plenty of time to work things out. You do not have to worry." What he said is, "If all the AUM left today, we would come in tomorrow and turn the lights on." That is one aspect of things. The other is, he said I will just repeat what he said to you just now, which is that the way our investments have been structured, what the balance sheets look like, not just on FRMO, but in our client portfolios at investment advisory portfolios and our private funds at Horizon, is we could close the door, so to speak, on those portfolios, not make another change. The next five years, they will do fine. We found opportunities already to add to them. The new ones for the next decade plus. Part of that, part of the idea generation is that, and frankly, Murray would do this too, and he had the skill set. Let us call it the applied diplomatic skill set to develop relationships with people who were also strategic investors or associated with strategic assets. We are now having conversations with some of those same people and with additional people. Whether it is at Texas Pacific Land Corp or Miami International Holdings or who are the people at Urbana? Urbana. Urbana. What are the family Caldwells. Yeah. The Caldwells at Urbana in Canada. We actually have relationships with all sorts of people who are active in public and private engagements, and we talk to them, and they talk to us. Merely by the fact of meeting or talking with people like this, ideas are generated. New contacts are made. We are talking about real ones. We have met with all sorts of fascinating people who are interested in what we have to say, are interested in what they have to say, and we get new possibilities from that. Those have already shown up. That is kind of a self-sustaining engine, and it grows over time, right? Just by being in the flow of that. That is what Murray always wanted to get to when we started is we did not have a seat at the table. We were just upstarts. How do we get to the table with people who have already been successful at gathering a lot of assets? We are there. I might say, by the way, that the CEO of Winland, which is an operating business, which FRMO Corp is very close to consolidating, has not done it yet. It is modest in size, but that is one of the primary places we do cryptocurrency mining. Its CEO, Matt Houk, who is a Horizon Kinetics employee. He recently developed a model for valuing Bitcoin and projecting what its future price should be based on cost of production, which is the supply side, that as far as we know, has not been done before, right? We put it in the most recent quarterly commentary, not all of it, but some of it. It is actually really something pretty special. There was a lot of work that went into it. If I describe just a tiny bit of it, there have been other charts that show the growth of Bitcoin over time. Excuse me. The price of Bitcoin over time is kind of volatile, but describes a kind of upward curve. Though related to some factor that is related indirectly, it is not the full aspect of it, but it kind of relates to maybe the cost of production, maybe like the hashing power of the total network, right? Because effort has to go, the costs have to go into generating that. But they were not exactly a real cost of production. It is kind of a vague idea of it. He actually built one. In order to build that, some of the things he had to put into it, were he went back in time to look at all the different successive models of mining rigs, including state-of-the-art ones. But the entire fleet, for instance, of mining rigs won't be state-of-the-art. It's going to be some mixture of old and new. And information from that to determine what the worldwide fleet average efficiency was in power draw, electric power draw. Then he went back, and he found a global measure annually of global historical cost of electric power. And he built them up. We're talking about the kinds of spreadsheets that have hundreds or even thousands of rows in them. And he built up a model. If you see it, you can go to the horizonkinetics.com website and look at our most recent quarterly commentary. It's on the back. But you'll see an area chart in orange of the annual cost of production of Bitcoin. Then you look at the price of Bitcoin, which goes up and up and up and down, and sometimes it comes down to rest on that line, and then it goes up again. And it's kind of eerie just how well that fits. That it's not a regression analysis, right? It's a production-based estimate of what it costs to produce a Bitcoin. And just like a gold miner, if you're not getting paid enough to cover your cost of production, you have to shut down. So as long as people want to own a Bitcoin or transact in it, there have to be miners, right? And if one day this Bitcoin experiment is really, believe it or not, still in its early stages. Because if one day, for instance, because Bitcoin is accepted, just nothing exciting, just another parallel currency. You've got your dollar, you've got your euro, you've got your Bitcoin. The scale at which it has to operate is going to be a lot larger. Think of the global money supply. In any case, for that to exist, there has to be an industry called the mining industry to support the blockchain. Anyway, his analysis is that the price of Bitcoin within about 24 months is going to be a lot higher than it is now. And because this is an intrinsically compounding vehicle, if you look forward six years, it'd just be mind-boggling. Don't know if it'll happen, right? But from our point of view, one of the reasons why it's so important is this is like the ultimate monetary inflation hedge, and that's a universal need. It always has been, and it's currency agnostic. I mean, which country's fiat currency are you talking about? Anyway, we've got a lot of intellectual firepower and capabilities at that Horizon. Oh, I should mention something else related to Bitcoin. Doyle, you want to talk about that? Uh-huh. Sure. Yeah, that's a lot of intellectual firepower right there. I only learned from him today. It took him a few years to do this. I think that what Steven's alluding to is that early on, we got exposure to Bitcoin through Grayscale Trust, and the symbol was GBTC, and that had a very high fee. Then they lowered it as new ETFs came into the market, but they didn't lower it to what the new ETFs were charging. So we had to go through, get a legal opinion, we had tax opinion, et cetera. We were able to only literally in the last couple of weeks to swap out of our GBTC into their Bitcoin Mini that has a much lower fee. On an annual basis, we're going to be saving clients close to $7 million a year going forward. This year, because of the fee that the commissions that charge it was about $5.5 million. Just ways of looking at things and working on how to do better for our clients, and I think that people appreciate that. In addition to that, the way the ETFs work, and I think Murray has written about it, Steven has written about it, they have to sell off some of their Bitcoin in order to pay their fees. As a result of being in a much lower fee-charging product, we'll actually have a lot less gains in client portfolios also. So a big win for our clients, big win for Horizon Kinetics. Very proximate to FRMO Corp, if I think of the multi-strategy fund, I think we've got about $60 million we had of GBTC there. The change in fee from 1.5%, I think, down to 15 basis points probably saves about $800,000 a year. I mean, in the scope of FRMO Corp overall, maybe it's not so much. It's not tiny either. Also there are the K-1 pass-throughs that are now much more or less ulcer-inducing than they used to be if you own a lot of GBTC. Do we have any online questions? We have no online questions at this time, but I have a couple that we received before. Oh, we have one in the room. Since there are fewer questions than in previous years, I have a couple of them. Question one, can you say anything about MIAX is very interesting. I'd like to hear more about that. I noticed that in some of your ETFs you added WhiteHawk, WHK. Is there any of the other new investments that you can talk about as future possibilities? I realize you may be accumulating something, you don't want to talk too much. Okay. People who work with me kind of know if they ask a short question, they might get a very long answer. I make you pay for it. I am going to talk about MIAX in a narrower way, which is the way it is usually asked, but also in a broader way that speaks to what we are trying to do. MIAX, as you probably know, since you seem to be a very educated questioner. MIAX is doing very nicely. What does that mean? It has a 17% share, more or less right now of the U.S. options market. That is a moving target, right? In 2025, its trading volume and its options operating segment rose 42%, and the industry volume rose 26%. It had a year-end market share of 15.9%. Now it is 17.1%. At the time of our first investment, its options market share was about 1%. Okay. Then they have MIAX Futures, which is formerly the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, which reached another record in 2025. Now all of this, as you might imagine, led to a lot of revenue growth. 2025, let us just say that 2025 revenue, does not matter what the exact number is, but it was more than 50% higher than the prior year. We are expecting this year something like 25% revenue growth. It is at a level now that it is just beginning to get the scale economies to get the operating leverage, consistent with the exchange industry. As profitable as MIAX is becoming, the operating leverage you see is that the cash operating earnings, some people think of it as EBITDA, but cash operating earnings in 2025 is twice that of 2024's. Okay. It still has not achieved the same profitability levels as the other exchanges. Whether it will get there or not, there are different business mixes and so forth. If they were to reach rough parity with other exchanges, it would be another third more operating margin to have. There is a lot of creative things they are doing. The point I want to make is that we like to buy, if we can find them, companies that are really early in their business cycle that can be a lot larger. That is where the real multiplier comes in. We also own Canadian Securities Exchange, which is a very small investment right now, and we have owned it for several years. It is Canada's competitor to the Toronto Stock Exchange. Toronto Stock Exchange was not all that a conducive environment to small cap companies there because they were like the New York Stock Exchange is in the United States. The CSE, as I will refer to, the CSE's strategic approach was taking on an established monopoly like that. It now lists about half of all the small cap emerging growth public companies in Canada, and TMX, Toronto Stock Exchange, has the other half. CSE is more willing to pay attention and be accommodative to small companies. As for them, the volume of its listed companies, which is now like 700, the trading volume rose about 28% in 2025. The trading value of those listed companies increased by 50%. They are expanding into. They bought the National Stock Exchange of Australia. That could very well be very interesting for them. They got approval to list their first ETF. Maybe they are on their way. Maybe they will be as successful in their way as MIAX. The point is that both MIAX and CSE can be far, far larger. There is a long runway ahead, even though one is much bigger and one is not. I will just add to that. Murray probably understated his involvement with MIAX. Murray willed that company into existence. Yeah. He really put all those pieces together. In fact, the CEO of MIAX will tell you that Murray Stahl made his career. He literally said that to us at, came to Murray's service. We also have an employee of ours, Eric Sites, who was also instrumental in helping that and did a lot of the legwork for Murray, who is a Horizon Kinetics employee who sits on the Board of MIAX. So we actually have still a very large interest in that, we think. Murray was very excited about the prospects of that business. More recently, what made me smile was a name that you have not heard probably, Brandon Colavita, who is one of our analysts. He is focused on MIAX and updating it for us, and he does the analysis. I could have been listening to Murray speak. He goes through, says everything that Steven just says about the growth in market share, et cetera. But then he gets into the futures business, and the futures business is just getting off the ground. He goes, "Either one of two things is going to happen. Either, one, they are going to be wildly successful, and it is going to add a lot of value, or they are going to shut it down, and it is going to add a lot of value." I cannot tell you how- Getting rid of the losses. Getting rid of the losses. I can't tell you how many times in my career that I would hear Murray say something just like that. I stopped Brandon as he was saying that because I was on the phone as he was doing this. I said, "Brandon, you can't see me, but I have a huge smile on my face." Because it really was straight out of Murray Stahl's thinking, if you will. Let me take you down this pathway a little bit more. The commonality, I would say, is in terms of the most important value creation aspect or elements of Canadian Securities Exchange and MIAX, they share one, which makes intuitive sense. They're both securities exchanges. But they also share this particular factor in terms of value creation with Bitcoin. You wonder how are these exchanges related to Bitcoin in terms of central value creation? How is that fundamentally consonant? And moreover, all of those three companies share a very central commonality with TPL, and maybe most interestingly with FRMO Corp. And what is that? Well, I already alluded to it earlier, which is that the easiest way to get a huge return is to buy something that can go up by an order of magnitude. The real art and understanding which Murray had is how do you select for those? That's a separate discussion. CSE is in its formative stages. Our first purchase was, I think, six years ago. It's probably three times the value now. Not a huge amount, but nothing to shake a stick at. MIAX has gone up by multiples for us so far. When we invested in Bitcoin, you want to think about market share? You can measure it precisely. How many wallets are there? How big is the If you want to talk about market share. How much dollar amount is there in it compared to U.S. money supply or global money supply? It was not even a rounding error. If it gets to be a 1% market share, well, that's almost an infinite increase. If it goes to a 5% market share, it would be a 500% increase, right? Or 600%. There's that. That experiment has a long way to go. When we bought TPL, just to refresh memories. It was at the cusp. Murray owned TPL since before Horizon started. I'm talking about when I began and Peter began, and Murray too, to add it in size to portfolios, to really make sure it was a core position across the board. It was around about 2016 when fracking technology started being applied seriously in the Delaware Basin by Chevron and ExxonMobil. In 2015, TPL's proportionate share of the oil production in its royalty interest acreage was 384,000 bbl. It was more than twice that in 2017. In 2025, it was 4.9 million barrels, up from 384,000 bbl. Water sales shifted from $8 million of sales in 2016 to $25 million in 2017, and last year, $300 million. They have a long way to go, too. I talked to you about FRMO Corp and our $3,600 of subscription research revenue, which that part of it peaked around $11 million, and then it was ultimately all those royalty interest or subscription revenues interest were sold to Horizon Kinetics in exchange for one single dollar value equivalent interest or revenue interest. Winland Holdings, really small right now. One of the things we've been willing to do is, first you have to have the idea to try to locate investments with that kind of scalability and know how to select them well. That comes down to business model, unconventional business models, unconventional assets. That's part of what we do. That's part of the rhythm of it. We hadn't finished his second question. WhiteHawk. He asked about WhiteHawk. It came public recently. We were part of the under. I don't. Were we in the prospectus on that? If we weren't, we were cornerstone investor of that. They're rolling up natural gas, and they're able to make acquisitions on a very accretive basis. They'll probably issue more shares in the future, and you could see how this company could go from a $600 million company to being something much larger in the future, and you'll get paid while you wait. It has a very nice yield as you wait for it. It was something I think Murray would have found himself. James Davalos actually is the one who found it. Coincidentally, they happen to have an office located in our current new offices on 6th Avenue. They come up periodically, give us an update on how things are going, and something to be excited about. Hi. Have there been any developments in FRMO selling short of path-dependent ETFs? We still do it. The trick of it is that you have to have patience. You have to have discipline. You also have to have selectivity. If you can look on the balance sheet and see it, but we have millions and millions and millions and millions of dollars over time that we sold short, that is now on market value basis, worth several hundred thousand dollars. Eventually, that cash, that value destruction from the couple of basic sources of NAV erosion in these levered ETFs eventually just becomes yours. The challenges, which requires discipline, is that as Peter Doyle is reminding our employees all the time, and me, discipline, patience in investing is the hardest thing. It is so easy to trade. They are down. We have got securities we have been short-selling for years that might have lost so far 99.99% of their value. Now, how can we still do it? Because they keep adding, people keep buying new units. They keep putting more money in there for us to collect, ultimately through the erosion of NAV, the contango, and the reset of friction losses. They can also go against you 30 times overnight, so to speak. You have a 3% position in one of these. Seems small. It can wipe you out. You can engage in additional aspects of the strategy. You can look at the CFA study books. You can buy defensive calls. Do you do them out of the money and pay a little tiny bit? And so forth. You can engage in pairs trades where you could sell short both the double or triple leveraged biotech or natural gas ETF and also sell short the bear. They have got a certain natural soft hedge against each other. But there are certain patterns of price behavior that work, like a lot of volatility without a big directional move. But then, too, if the underlying, so to speak, suddenly spikes 50%, it can break through and still hurt you. We still do it because Murray could tell some very interesting and amusing stories about some marginal benefit. You are walking along the street, whatever, and you see a nickel. Do you pick it up or not? The idea is you have to have an operating system. So there is selectivity also. You cannot just, let us say, do this pairs trade and think it will work. His hit ratio is very, very high for these. He really decided when it is time to do this and when it is not. Natural gas is just too cheap right now. Oil is just too high. But we do it. And you might say in certain of our funds, like the Polestar, let us say that relative to the size of the entire fund, the percentage contribution is not huge, but maybe in a way it kind of offsets the fee, the management fee. You say, "Well, why not?" It is something we can do. So we do it. How strategically valuable it is in the context of the FRMO income statement, I do not know, but we do stuff like that. On TPL, so you retain a large position. Murray was on the Board. So who is the voice from Horizon Kinetics and FRMO to take over your influence on TPL? Let me just say something first because I just enjoy doing stuff like this. The voice is Peter Doyle, but you won't hear much from him because he's constrained from your hearing much from him about it. All right. May I ask you? I can try to answer stuff. Okay. Peter can try also, but he's got to be careful what he says. Well, let me switch gears and do a different question. I do not really know much about Consensus, but what is the difference between Consensus and Winland, and why not merge them together? Peter, me, you. Consensus was born out of two different partnerships that we created, and we never really had a very large ownership stake in Consensus. Winland is something that we have been buying over time, and one of our employees has been there. We are not in a position necessarily. Consensus is much larger than Winland. We are not in a position to make that call, is to answer your question. But we advise on the Consensus. Soon we will be. I see our attorney coming close. I do not know if I am saying something wrong. We advise on Consensus, and if things go as planned, we are going to soon be the controlling shareholders of Winland. That is the difference. So maybe who ultimately makes that decision on Consensus, they would come to us and say, "Would you like combined? Can I ask a follow-up question then about Winland? I remember Murray saying that what was unique about your strategy, one of the things was to buy equipment very gradually over time. But other than that, there are a lot of other publicly traded companies in that space that mine Bitcoin. Can you just talk a little bit about the universe and who has been successful? Is there a model? Are there any companies that you admire? Or do you feel that you have got an edge on all of them or what? Murray's belief was we had an edge on all of them. In fact, most of those mining companies, Bitcoin mining companies, have pivoted away from that and are now focused on AI. They have all largely blew up a lot of capital because they went out and aggressively bought equipment at very high prices and never got the proper rate of return. Right now, part of what Steven and I discovered, because this was really Murray's kind of avenue. We have operating people that come to us, and they tell us currently that Bitcoin mining is not very attractive currently. Litecoin mining because the price of Doge had been down is not very attractive. Let us not allocate capital to that. They came up with another coin, the Zcash, that has a similar protocol and monetary policy to Bitcoin that, as we speak, is wildly profitable. We pivoted from that. I think Murray would have done that. I have no idea that he would have 100% done that. It is one of those coins that if you believe in what Murray has spoken about regarding Bitcoin Cash or Litecoin or Zcash as an example, there is no reason for those coins not to have a similar monetary value as Bitcoin. The order of magnitude that you would get from Zcash going up to be the same value of Bitcoin, you could make an extraordinary amount of money with a very little bit of capital invested. We are actually being paid. Right now we are able to mine the Zcash, pay for our operating expenses by selling off half and retaining half. It has just started. It is very modest amounts. It has been going on for the last four or five months, but it is something that we got involved with because our operations team came to us and said, "This is the opportunity." What Murray was doing, unlike the other publicly traded companies, he was really using the cash flow being generated from either the cash that we have on hand, the interest that we get, or the profitability from mining the coins to basically build up our position. We are constantly adding on a per share basis more coins unlike anyone else. Let me add some color to that. To take the last thing Peter said is that one of the ways Murray looked at mining was a way to accumulate Bitcoin for less than the cost of the Bitcoin. Seigniorage, right? To give you some color to the question that Peter. To our knowledge, we are the only publicly traded cryptocurrency miner to have generated cumulative operating profits and not suffered grievous losses. The four largest publicly traded miners have an aggregate current recent market cap of $21 billion. They lost money in each, every single one of them, in each of the last eight quarters through March. After eliminating the mark-to-market gains and losses for the Bitcoin on their balance sheets, the average operating loss margin well exceeded 50%. If the central idea of crypto mining is to produce money for less than the money is worth, that millennium-old practice of seigniorage, in this case, the money earned is Bitcoin. Now the trick of it is that in the simple case, the profitability, which is why you can't understand it unless you actually do the mining. You're in business, like you own a corner candy store or a pizza shop. You're actually in business. You're in the store. There are a dozen decisions you make a day and different kinds of decisions you make each month. If you don't do that, you really don't. It's just a pizza shop, right? Seems simple. The simple case is that profitability in mining, it varies from period to period due to the various impacts of how many miners are competing for the Bitcoin reward, like the network hashing power, the cost of electricity, the system's equilibrating difficulty factor, the cost and efficiency of old versus new generation mining servers. Of course, there's the every four-year halving of the Bitcoin reward, which means your operating costs are going to go up by twice on a unit basis. The key to solving all those shifting interrelated factors is to have a rational capital allocation suitable for that market, which, as Peter was saying, is it's got to be gradual. You have to buy the mining equipment, meaning that's how you're committing the capital gradually, and only when you can expect to recover the capital cost of the rig, and then beyond that, have enough time to get an adequate return on that capital you just paid off so you can earn a reasonable return anyway. You really can't just programmatically deploy capital to buy the equipment. That's what the gradualism was about. You might have to hold cash in abeyance until an appropriate entry point. The thing is, the publicly traded miners, everybody acts rationally for themselves. It might be irrational, you viewing it from a different vantage point, but they're acting rationally for themselves. Incentive systems, right? Charlie Munger's not the only person to say some version of this. "Show me the incentive system and I'll show you the man." Right? The publicly traded miners take a different approach, which is they raise capital, meaning sell shares in the public market, and then they promptly deploy it. They don't view their mandate as holding non-productive cash, in their view, or making market timing decisions. Right? If that deployment occurs shortly before there's a more efficient model of server that comes out, then all that newly purchased fleet where they paid $1 million or $50 million or $100 million for it, all of a sudden, that's going to generate a subpar return, maybe a 30% or 40% lower return on invested capital they just invested. Moreover, that equipment is suddenly in the marketplace worth a lot less. That's what was going on. Now, the not so simple case is how could they keep doing this, right? You don't anticipate that. They could. The publicly traded crypto miners, they didn't have to cease operating even though they were losing money, despite those consistent remarkable losses, because until recently, they could continue raising new capital by selling shares at 5- 10 times book value. That's what Peter was talking about. In essence, they turned all that new equity capital into billions of dollars of operating expense and equipment write-downs. Eventually, you would think that the capital providers, people who buy new shares, it'd be expected to cease underwriting that approach, but they didn't. It's happening now. Since the valuation multiples have now contracted to about one times book value, that means they can no longer creatively raise external capital. In response, they've begun to pivot their operations away from mining, and they're repurposing their, some of them have electric power arrangements toward AIs and data center. The thing is, you have to be able to wait for the opportunity. You don't know when it'll happen. Murray was extraordinarily, he was indefatigably patient when he thought he understood the dynamics and he understood what the game was, and he would wait, and he'd make sure he was equipped to be able to wait. The reason he loved cryptocurrency and he understood it so well is he understood that you could not game the system, and that really appealed to him. The advantage that he had was time, and he wasn't in a hurry, and he would watch it play out. That was really why he did it. Fortunately, I think Steven and I and Murray probably self-selected because we do have this kind of much longer-term mindset. That was really why he loved it. He saw that when they were buying those machines at that price, he knew what was going to happen to them. He knew they were going to destroy that capital. He wasn't happy for the people that got involved with it, and shareholders lost their money, but he saw that they were trying to game a system that couldn't be gamed. Ultimately, Steven is constructing this letter that's going to go up on frmocorp.com soon. The monetary debasement is another reason why he loved Bitcoin. He's like, if you use Bitcoin as opposed to a group of people that go into a room and come out and decide what the price of money is going to be, it could actually lead to much more rational behavior. I think ultimately he thought that was the potential for where Bitcoin might go. I might have regaled you today with some fascinating and scary figures about the federal budget deficit and have we reached a tipping point yet into structural monetary debasement. Peter was looking at it and he said, "I don't understand some of these numbers." I looked at him and I said, "I think you're right. I got it wrong." The conclusion's not wrong. I have to rework some numbers. Thérèse has some pre-submitted questions that we should answer related to FRMO. We have two questions. One of them you may have already touched on. Can you explain the mathematics as it relates to the move from Grayscale Bitcoin Trust to the Grayscale Mini Trust above and beyond the expense ratio savings? Was there more? My understanding is that the trick of it was, and it involved a multidisciplinary approach inside Horizon Kinetics operations, legal, trading, and so forth, that ordinarily you can't get out of an existing fund and into another fund and not pay taxes. That was one part of it. But in essence, we moved from roughly a 1.5 percentage point fee, because Grayscale Bitcoin Trust, it didn't have any competition originally, right? The ETFs suddenly were finally approved to hold Bitcoin. That's all part of the whole march of institutional acceptance of Bitcoin. It's important, because money ultimately is just what people agree it is. So we went from 150 basis points, 1.5 percentage points, to I believe I was told something like 15 basis points, 15 hundredths of a percent. That's the spread of savings. This last question is, FRMO owns a sizable position in the Horizon Kinetics closed-end fund, the RENN Fund. Horizon Kinetics Asset Management as a whole owns close to 1 million shares of the RENN Fund or almost 15% of shares outstanding and appears to be adding to the position on a regular basis. RENN is a great fund, but really tiny in terms of the $10 billion or so in overall assets managed by Horizon. Horizon doesn't get any management fees on the fund's assets until it hits $25 million in assets. It's still a couple of million dollars shy of that mark. Any thoughts regarding the future of the RENN Fund and how you see it fitting into the Horizon Kinetics family in the future? I realize that RENN Fund does apparently have some valuable carry forward loss assets. If you were asking my opinion, I would say the RENN Fund is probably our most interesting product. There is a lot of embedded holdings in there that have tremendous upside. It trades at a slight discount. I personally believe it should trade at a premium to reflect that reality. At some point, if it ever does trade at a premium, we are likely to do at the market issuance and to grow the assets under management there. It is something that I pay attention to on a daily basis, and I can tell you that I personally buy it, and I know Murray was a big buyer of it over time himself. I understand exactly what he saw. May I ask a question, Peter? Sure. I understand that one of the advantages, one of the many, but just one of the advantages of the RENN Fund as a vehicle for us is that you can purchase some private investments. Anything worth mentioning or talking about? You can do that in our mutual funds as well. It is just that the RENN Fund, given its size, those private investments could just have a tremendous impact on the performance. There you go. Okay. Well, that's the last question we have, and if there are no more questions, then perhaps we can close the meet. Okay. Bring it to an end. Does someone have to make a motion? No motion. No further questions? So adjourned. Okay. Up to you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.