Think we can get started. Thanks for joining the GoodRx Fireside Chat here at the Citi Global Healthcare Conference. My name is Daniel Grosslight. I'm the Health Tech and Distribution Analyst here at Citi. I'm very pleased to have with us today GoodRx's CFO, Karsten Voermann, and Chief Accounting Officer, Ramin Nabiey. Thanks, guys, for joining us. Thanks for inviting us. We're excited to be here at the conference and grateful, too. And I'll lead off with a safe harbor statement, if that's okay, and then I'll turn right back to you afterwards. I'd like to remind everyone that today's Fireside Chat will contain forward-looking statements, and all the statements we make that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements and aren't promises or guarantees. Actual results may differ materially from those projected in any forward-looking statements. Please refer to our recent 10-K and 10-Q filed with the SEC for a description of factors that may affect our results. We may also reference certain non-GAAP metrics, which are reconciled to the nearest GAAP metric, and our earnings press releases, which can be found on the overview page of our investor relations website at investors.goodrx.com. And back to you, Daniel. Thanks, Ramin. Okay, let's kick off with a question just on the retail environment, because I think that's been causing a lot of volatility, obviously, with you guys, not just this year, but over the past couple of years. But I think this year, specifically, there's been two big challenges that you've called out. One, store closures, and that's across Rite Aid, with their bankruptcy, but also others like Walgreens and CVS have had issues and closing stores. And then the second big issue is, it seems, at least from your commentary on last quarter's call, pharmacies are being more aggressive with their negotiations with PBMs, and they might be having a little bit more success this year than past years in terms of pushing back on some of the admin fees. It seems like the latter challenge is what's causing some of the volatility on the top line, namely, I think you mentioned that next year we should think about top-line growth in the single-digit range. Let's start there. What changed this year versus prior years that will potentially give pharmacies the upper hand in negotiating with PBMs? Sure. First, Daniel, that characterization was spot on, that the environment is a little different than it was in the past, both because of the store closures, which we'd already talked about and factored into our numbers to a large extent. We talked about the Rite Aid closures, for example, costing about $5 million in the second half, and we talked about $2.4 million of that having hit in the third quarter, so trajectories as we expected. I think what has become a more recent factor is exactly what you're articulating, which is that push-pull between pharmacies and PBMs. They renegotiate contracts regularly, so that part's not a surprise at all. I think what has changed this year, though, is the challenging situation pharmacies find themselves in is such that it gives them more leverage than they've had in the past, meaning specifically that now that they're in a place where continuing to see reimbursement rates from the PBM side decrease isn't really sustainable anymore, and that's one of the reasons they're digging in harder. And as we talk about that single-digit% growth range for next year on the top line, that's obviously a decently wide range. 1% is a lot less than 9%. And the reason for the breadth of the range is we thought about what would happen if nothing changes and the PBMs effectively get everything they want, versus if things do change and the pharmacies get most of what the pharmacies we believe are asking for. Again, we don't have perfect insight, which is one of the reasons we provided a broader range. Yeah, that makes complete sense. When do you think you will have more insight into how those negotiations have turned out? Sure. I think it'll be prior to our 4Q earnings call, because as these renegotiations happen, we expect them, as they usually do in prior years, to culminate sometime around the year-end and probably be effective as of the start of the new year in the majority of cases, and to the extent that happens, we'll start seeing the new rates manifest in January and in February. Yep, yep. And you've also mentioned that you think this is kind of a one-time reset, and so we're not going to have this further degradation in admin fees, likely. What gives you the confidence that this isn't a recurring theme with pharmacies and PBMs, that this is a reset year and from here we can grow? Sure. I think the reality is that historically, the PBMs have generally gotten most of what they want in terms of the push and pull around the profit pool. More has been pulled towards the PBMs. And I think that historical trajectory would likely still be the norm, but for, again, the leverage pharmacies have because of their situation being a little dire right now. So in that context, the source of the leverage goes away as soon as the pharmacies find themselves in a more sustainable position, and the incentive for PBMs to fund even further beyond that does not seem very high. Yep, yep. And given that you're kind of arm's length from these negotiations, what can you do, I don't know, to help your pharmacy partners, to help your PBM partners, and to offset some of these pressures? Sure, I'll take that, Daniel. I think there's a number of mitigants, the biggest of which is our direct contracting approach that we embarked on a couple of years ago. What that does is it puts the agreement in place between ourselves and just the pharmacy. And with that, typically, we find that the pharmacies' experience increases in revenue and margin associated with these agreements. And during our investor day back in May, we talked about, on average, them having about two times the margin in these direct contracts versus non-direct agreements. So for that reason, we've seen significant growth. We've talked about in the past how we have about 30% of our volume flowing through these agreements, and we now have eight of the top 10 pharmacies signed up. So I think that's probably the biggest mitigant that we have. It's ultimately the right answer for the business because it puts control back in our hands and is obviously good for the pharmacies, too. Are you agnostic as to if pharmacies contracted with you directly or go through your PBM partners, or do you have a slight preference for one or the other? Look, I think from an economic standpoint, Karsten just talked about we haven't seen much PTR/MAC degradation at all, so I think pretty much agnostic there, but it does give us more control. Ultimately, we're going to let it be a retail-driven demand versus a GoodRx-driven push, though, so in other words, we're going to work with the pharmacies, the retailers, to understand what their needs are, and they're going to dictate what their preferences are, and our hybrid strategy is going to accommodate for that. So that's just what it's designed to do, and there are things that we can do to help drive that momentum, which is driving more value to them holistically, things like generic and brand reimbursements, helping them with merchandising opportunities, and helping them expand their digital footprint. But ultimately, like I said, it's really going to be driven by what their needs are, and we're going to help meet their evolving priorities by being an adaptive and responsive partner. Yep, yep. And I know that this is probably a difficult question to answer right now, given there's so much unknown about how these negotiations between pharmacies and PBMs actually turn out. But how do you think direct contracting is going to change next year? Because I guess you could feasibly see if the PBMs are pushing back hard on the renegotiated admin fees, you see these direct contracting volume accelerate. Whereas if the pharmacies are more successful, you might see that moderate a bit. How are you thinking about direct contracting given the negotiations that are ongoing right now? Yeah, I think it goes back to we ultimately want to go where the retailers lead us there. So depending on how the market evolves and what industry conditions are, retailers are going to work with us and, again, dictate what their preferences are, and we will be able to accommodate for that. Thankfully, we have a strategy that has direct contracting, which we can work directly with the pharmacies, a hybrid model where we can have some direct and some through our multi-PBM backplane, or just reverting to the entire multi-PBM backplane for the entirety of the volume through a pharmacy. So lots of flexibility in our approach, and so we can adapt to whatever the pharmacies need. Yep, yep. And I'd like to stick to kind of the direct contracting and the potential economic effect on you guys. You mentioned you're kind of agnostic, that it doesn't really have that big of an impact on PTR/MAC. But it was, I think, a tailwind at the beginning of the year, and then it flipped to a headwind in the third quarter a little bit. Can you just walk us through kind of the economics of a direct contract? When is it a tailwind? When is it a headwind? And how can you kind of manage some of that uncertainty? Yeah, I can take that one. So I think in general, we optimize around the direct contracting being pretty much similar to the revenue we make on a per-script basis or overall through our traditional PBM model. And in that context, that's one of the reasons we haven't seen a lot of PTR/MAC flux, is because we've generally been able to do that. Like we talked about, we're now up to over 30% of volume through direct contracts. If you look at PTR/MAC over the last several quarters, there's been some ups and downs, but it's generally pretty consistent. So from that perspective, the reality is that the pharmacy is really benefiting from the fact that there's one fewer, one less player in the mix, meaning it's just the pharmacy and us. So revenue or value that would historically have been captured by the PBM, to your point, gets to be captured by the pharmacy in that context, and to your prior question around, depending on how these negotiations go, direct contracting could be accelerated or decelerated, I think that's partly true, but I think there's also, from our and the pharmacy's perspective, a control aspect of it, too, because in a direct contracting context, there's an ability to merchandise that's incrementally better. Like around this time last year, we talked about Walgreens and us working together to specifically set pricing on seasonal illness medications, things like cold, flu, RSV, etc., because Walgreens had specific ideas around where they wanted that pricing to land, and with us, we can just work that out between the two of us, and it's done. It's much more difficult for a pharmacy to establish and maintain a price point in a funded benefit PBM context in particular than it is working directly with us. Yeah. So it sounds like pharmacies, all else being equal, have a preference to direct contract with you. You guys have a preference to direct contract with pharmacies, all else being equal. I guess that kind of begs the question, and I think I ask this to you each time we have one of these discussions, but at some point, do you think that that starts to kind of cause a little bit of abrasion on the PBM side that, "Hey, now we're competing with GoodRx, who before was more of a partner"? Sure. I can probably jump in on that one, and you might want to jump in too for color, but I think the reality is we haven't seen that. Our relationships with PBMs have evolved, but number one, we haven't had a PBM that stopped working with GoodRx, so that's not happening. Number two, the degree to which some of the largest PBMs are working with us has shifted to the point where they're now effectively distributing GoodRx on our behalf through things like our Integrated Savings Program, where large PBMs allow their benefit plan members to either get the copay price or the lower of that and the GoodRx price to the extent we're cheaper. So they're promoting GoodRx into their plan sponsors to sell that benefit, and that, in many ways, I think, indicates a stronger strategic alignment between them and us, given their channel, than before. It also creates new opportunities for them to earn revenue, obviously, too, which they like. The other thing I'll add is there's really no incentive for them not to continue working with us. If they were ever to pull out of an agreement or decide to stop working with us, that volume is purely incremental to them, and it would just end up going to a competitor. That's part of the reason why, as Karsten mentioned, we've never had a cancellation or termination. In fact, they're working with us more deeply now. Yep, makes sense. Okay, let's stick with the retail channel. And Karsten, you mentioned at the outset that $5 million headwind this year in the second half because of Rite Aid store closures. I guess I want to focus on how we should think about this, not for necessarily this year, which has gone as you expected, but for next year. So obviously, $5 million is a second half issue. Should we just think about next year annualizing that $5 million so you have an additional $5 million headwind next year, or are you recapturing some of that volume? How should we think about that for 2025? Sure. So I think in terms of the impacts, there are probably two comments, one more general than one more specific to Rite Aid and the $5 million. I think the more general comment is that store closures aren't inherently problematic in a significant way. What makes them problematic is when there's concentrated store closures in a given geography. So the contrast here would be CVS has been closing a lot of stores this year and throughout the year, and we did a significant amount of analysis around the impact there. And because CVS is only thinning stores, the impact on us was de minimis, like really small. Rite Aid, however, we called out where we commented on that $5 million of impact in the second half of this year because of the concentration of store closures in Ohio and Michigan, where there wasn't another Rite Aid with GoodRx on file for a user to go to. So from that perspective, that creates friction until the user A finds the new pharmacy and B has GoodRx applied again. So you can imagine that there's some users out there who maybe picked up a GoodRx card at the doctor's office or had the doc recommend that they use GoodRx. They got on script at Rite Aid. The GoodRx card's on file at the Rite Aid store associated with that prescription, and then the Rite Aid store goes away. They may not even have the GoodRx card anymore at that point, right, until they go to the doctor next and get a new one, for example, if they don't use the web or the app as a means of accessing these discounts, so that's why the concentrated store closures are a much different reality than a thinning, like what Walgreens talked about doing when they talk about their store closures, which we saw as favorable, because in a thinning context, the consumer just goes to another Walgreens and has a similar experience at the Walgreens a mile down the street, so Rite Aid's sort of unique in that case. Okay, now getting to impact. Sorry for giving that preamble first to put it in context. As Rite Aid stores continue to close, the impact will continue for a few weeks and months after the closure of those stores in concentrated locations. So to the extent they're still closing stores right now, that will carry over to some degree into next year, and we contemplated that in the context of that single-digit growth rate we talked about as an early indication of what 2025 might look like. Yep. It might be too early to have data on this, but of those early store closures, Rite Aid store closures, any idea on where those patients are going and what your recapture rate has been for those patients? Sure. So yeah, we have a ton of analysis around that, which is what we used to both calculate the $5 million impact for the second half of this year and then communicate that to the investor community, and as you can surmise from the fact that in the most recent quarter, the impact was about $2.4 million, and that's about half of the second half of the year, that should hopefully give investors confidence that we are able to perform analyses and estimate these amounts reasonably accurately, so we certainly haven't been surprised by sort of recapture rates and consumers continuing to use GoodRx yet. Are you able to disclose anything around kind of the percent recapture or where these folks are going or is that proprietary? We haven't disclosed anything on that yet, but it's a good note to incorporate into our forward-looking conversations. Got it. Okay. Okay. I want to focus on Kroger as well, because this has obviously been an issue for you guys for a while now. You signed a direct contract with Kroger recently. I think perhaps that has developed a little more slowly than you had anticipated or perhaps the Street had anticipated, and I think there's probably still a little bit of confusion at the Kroger level of, "Oh, can we actually accept GoodRx again?" so maybe if we can just get an update on how that contract is progressing and how long do you think it will take for Kroger to get to kind of equalize with its overall market share and the claims flowing through GoodRx? Yeah, we still think there's upside because it hasn't equalized out to its market share yet. Going back to our investor day, we said it would probably take a few quarters for that to happen, and I think that's the reality as well. We do, once we direct contract with a pharmacy, look at post-direct contracting volumes and margins and often adjust consumer prices subsequently and optimize those to get the optimal point of elasticity is probably the right way of thinking about it, the margin maximizing point. So in a few cases, we launch the direct contract, and then we'll work to optimize prices with the counterparty and make sure that the pricing drives the amount of volume that they and we expect. But that's not instant. That's somewhat iterative, and that's the sort of thing we would be doing right now. Fair to say a couple more quarters for it to normalize or equalize? Yeah, I think it's reasonable to think that we're not there yet, and it will be a couple more quarters or so. Got it. Let's turn over to the Integrated Savings Program. Karsten, you mentioned this, SmithRx, on kind of your deeper relationships with PBMs. That seems to have done as you expected and quite well. I think at the investor day, you noted ISP would be around 5% of your marketplace revenue this year, and it would grow at a 60%-90% CAGR through 2026, which is obviously a great growth rate. Any changes to those targets and how you're thinking about the program in 2025 and 2026? We want to take that one, Karsten? Yeah. So I think on ISP number one, it has performed pretty much exactly in line with our expectations for this year. So we were not surprised by how it did, and we're grateful that it's expanded in the way it has. And as we said at investor day, going from nothing to 5% of revenue is a pretty steep climb, granted off a small base. I think looking into the future for ISP, what we have going forward is not only the existing ISP program, which operates on the basis of driving scripts to GoodRx when GoodRx is cheaper than the copay on covered PBM or benefit plan formulary. We incrementally announced deals with several PBMs around ISP wrap, as we're calling it, because it wraps around the benefit to provide GoodRx pricing for off-formulary medications. So deals are signed. We'll be launching that as we look into the coming year, and so I think the challenge right now is absent a trajectory. It's hard to predict exactly how wrap's going to contribute, but given that we're dealing with medications that are inherently off the patient's formulary, our ability to provide a lower price is something we're highly confident in many instances. I think the wildcard is if they're off-formulary medications, even if the consumer can save a lot, is the price still too high, so do they still walk away, for example, if it's a brand drug that may cost tens or hundreds instead of single-digit dollars, so that's the wildcard that we're evaluating. But within that context, we absolutely expect to see healthy double-digit ISP growth into next year as well between the combination of the base ISP and this new ISP wrap that we've signed deals with several PBMs. Got it. Let's stick with the base ISP, but I do have some questions on the wrap product as well. So I think you've said that there are five main levers to drive growth in ISP: adding PBMs, adding employers' plans, adding pharmacies, adding drugs covered, and increasing the win rate. Can you kind of force rank those levers on kind of what do you have the most control, what's most impactful for you, and what you're focused on? Sure. So I think the most impactful levers from our perspective at this point, given we have the big PBMs, the majority of them in the program, it's all about more plans and plan sponsors coming on board. So I think as this has been in market longer, plan sponsors get more comfortable, PBM sales forces get more comfortable. We anticipate that we'll continue to see that. This year was the first year we've done this. We're also now directly reaching out to employers/sponsors to also catalyze demand directly at that level to pull the demand through the PBM channel as well. And this year has been pretty nascent, but it's something that we plan to continue to focus on going forward. As you do more of that direct outreach, do you think you'll have to spend to invest in more sales folks? We love being high gross margin and high EBITDA margin too, and we also love variable cost, Ramin and I. So from that perspective, it's more about educating brokers and leveraging those channels versus fielding some kind of huge sales force that knocks on every employer's door, just to be super clear. Yeah. And just as a reminder, the go-to-market is on the PBMs' end to communicate and drive that messaging to their plans to kind of do the uptake of this program. So it's really not on us. It's on them, but we definitely help them with the messaging and marketing as well. Yeah. Yeah. And full disclosure, Citi uses Caremark, who has the ISP program. And I have no idea if I'm using it because we don't know as consumers what price I'm getting. But I guess it seems like a no-brainer to me on the employer side. When you do get pushback, if you do get pushback on this program, where is it from? And as an employer, why wouldn't an employer want to adopt this? Sure. I think the nature of the pushback generally, and this holds true at the employer level, and I also surmise at the PBM level to some degree too, is that I think when a new PBM starts to offer ISP, like this year was the first year Caremark was in, for example, I have a feeling that the folks who are interfacing with the PBM customers, so Citi in your case, some of those folks are maybe more cautious about how aggressively they sell until they've seen how well it works, seen it work seamlessly for a year, and then they go, "Okay, this is something I can put my customers on without my customers being mad at me." Back in the days when I used to work at Microsoft, every time we had a new product, the sales force wouldn't touch it because they'd say, "Hey, I don't want to sell the 1.0 version because it might mess up my sales of Windows and Office," right? It took a year or so before they really ramped up. I think this could be a maybe not perfectly analogous situation, but correlated situation at least. Got it. Got it. Okay. Now let's shift over to the wrap product because I do think that is a very interesting extension of ISP. Can you remind me which PBMs are on the wrap product? And for the ones that aren't currently, what's the kind of fear there? Sure. So far we've announced that MedImpact, SilverScript, SmithRx. Navitus. Navitus is signed up on that one. We've seen some of those PBMs be sort of more innovative in terms of things they're willing to try quickly in the past. So we're eager to have them all enrolled now. I think with respect to the others, we are certainly continuing to work with them, and in that context, our hope and expectation is that those conversations prove fruitful, and then we'll add more of them in too because it's just such an incrementally logical extension of the base ISP. Got it. And as both these products grow, ISP base, ISP wrap, how do you think that changes your business model? Because presumably, if we do see more volume come through the ISP versus the core product, you would have to spend less on direct-to-consumer marketing. So you become more efficient from a marketing perspective. So just talk to us about how your model may change as volume increases through the ISP. Yeah. So from our marketing standpoint, we're still paying a marketing fee to the PBM for ISP. So it's very similar at scale to our existing business. So in other words, on a per-transaction basis, the amount that we pay to the PBM approximates the CAC in our D2C business. So in the D2C business, we pay an upfront acquisition cost, and that's amortized over the life of that customer. But whereas in the ISP side, we're just paying it on a per-client basis. So you shouldn't see any non-linearity in marketing as a percentage of revenue as that business scales. Got it. Okay. Okay. I do want to touch on Medicare because there have been some changes in Part D plan design. In 2024, there's a $3,500 out-of-pocket maximum cap on beneficiary spending. It's going to drop to $2,000 next year. Presumably, this may make GoodRx a little less impactful for Medicare beneficiaries. But can you just remind us, one, what% of your users are Medicare beneficiaries? And have you seen any drop this year as that kind of benefit change is phased in? And what are your expectations for next year? Sure. Just to hit the summary first, our expectations are that it's not very impactful. And the basis for that is couple-fold and essentially mathematical. So under 30% of our users are Medicare users, about 28% or so. And of the Medicare users, if you look at historically how many of them would have exceeded the $2,000, that information is available, and it's generally around to sub 2%. So sort of 2% of 28% theoretically impacted. I think that's sort of the ceiling as a way to think about it, though, because you don't necessarily know if you're going to get impacted at the start of the year. So at the start of the year, if you think you're maybe not going to hit it, you're still incented to try and save money. And then if something happens to you acutely and you hit the limit, you may stop. But that's why I do sort of define that as a ceiling because everyone who hits the limit doesn't know ad hoc. Some of them only know post hoc that they're going to get there. But that gives you the rough scope, which is pretty darn small. Got it. And I presume no change that you know, no meaningful change in what you've seen this year out of Medicare. If we were to look at Medicare beneficiary utilization 2023, 2022, it would be around that 28%-30% or so Correct. Yeah. I think even if you went all the way back to our IPO-related disclosures, Medicare has always been in that roughly 30% range, ± a few%. Got it. Okay. That's good to hear. Let's switch over to Pharma Manufacturer Solutions, which has been a nice growth driver for you guys recently. I think this year, if you exclude the Medicaid business, you're going to grow kind of in the mid-20s% next year. You said you expect that business to grow 20%, which is faster than the rate of the overall kind of market for pharma advertising budget. So can you kind of parse out that growth for us? How much of that growth is due to just overall market growing? How much of it is from you taking share? And from that bucket of taking share, where is that coming from? Who do you compete against and who are you winning from? Sure. I'll take that. Thanks for the question, Daniel. I think we're growing significantly faster than the market, just as a top-line point. A key driver of that are our access solutions. We've talked about our embedded copay cards and our point-of-sale discounts being highly measurable and driving high-value outcomes, things like incremental claims and increased medication adherence. And these are particularly compelling for pharma because they're strong attribution and there's high ROIs typically associated with them. And for that reason, they're very sticky programs. Once they start, they tend to stick and compound in value over time. Now, in terms of growth dynamics overall, what we're seeing is that there's pretty great momentum in the digital brand and media side of the business where we're noticing that we're taking share. We're also seeing that in trade and market access budgets where typically there aren't digital budgets allocated to those types of solutions that we have. We're noticing that there's new budget dollars being assigned there. And part of that's driven by the fact that our point-of-sale discounts are kind of a new way to go to market for pharma and thus represent new budget dollars, which we think is indicative of a lot of the innovation we'll bring into the market there. So I think overall, a combination of market growth, taking share in digital, and new dollars from new budgets. Yeah. Yeah. Makes sense, and I want to stick on that point-of-sale discount point because that is a really innovative approach that you guys are taking, and I should mention before we get into that question, you guys recently put up on your website a whole hub dedicated to Pharma Manufacturer Solutions. So I encourage everyone listening in to visit your website and the investor relations site and look at that because there is some great data there, but now you do have 72 point-of-sale discounts, whereas before, I think at the beginning of the year, what was it? Like a handful of users. 27. So it's been a very fast-growing area for you. Can you just describe what that is and why a pharma company would want to use that and how the price they get from going through you and a point-of-sale discount may differ from the net price it receives if going through an insured benefit? Yeah, sure. Effectively, what these point-of-sale discounts are is us working with pharma to create a cash price for the consumer that's lower than the list price. And the way that is affected is the manufacturer will fund that buy-down, and we will, as an intermediary, pass that through to the consumer at the point of sale. We're specifically situated in a great way that we have relationships with the pharmacies, relationships with pharma, and the relationship with the consumer to do that. And so far, we've seen great uptake, as we just talked about. 72 programs in place now. They're quite sticky. Once they're in place, they continue to compound. And great momentum, and we plan to continue kind of leaning into this area. We've also seen that it creates wins across various stakeholders. Consumers have better prices. They also get to sidestep oftentimes the friction that's associated with their funded benefit, things like step therapy and prior authorizations. They no longer have to deal with that. So they get a big win there. Pharma obviously gets incremental claims. There are 80 million rejected brand claims per year. So we're able to kind of lower that number and help them kind of get incremental claims on top of that. And in addition, pharmacies, and this is not quite often known, is that they get much better reimbursements through us. Oftentimes, I think they'll have reimbursements in the 2%-5% range, sometimes for high-demand drugs, even negative, like for GLP-1s. So our reimbursements are more in the 5%-10% range. So this is quite attractive for them as well. So overall, it creates a lot of wins across the environment, and that's part of the reason why we've seen such great uptake. Got it. Got it. Helpful. Okay. Let's turn to GLP-1s because you mentioned that hot button issue. It does seem like supply constraints are easing a bit, that more competition is coming into the market. Pharmacies are still struggling and oftentimes are underwater on their GLP-1 products. So talk to us about what you're doing with the GLP-1 manufacturers. How can you help your partners with this product? And as we think ahead to 2025 and 2026, as we see supply constraints ease, as we see more competition come into the market, how is that going to change for you? Sure. These are obviously extremely high-demand drugs, and they represent an enormous opportunity. We're currently deeply engaged in the space as it is. We get over 2 million unique searches for GLP-1s. We got last quarter 2 million unique searches on GLP-1s on our platform. I think that represents the level of consumer intent that we have and the scale of the opportunity itself. Looking forward, we already work with the manufacturers to help them embed their copay cards and drive awareness to their brands. There are significant potential opportunities on things like point-of-sale discounts that we just talked about to create a lower cash price for consumers to convert some of these high-intent folks into loyal users for brand pharma. I think that's a significant opportunity. As the FDA, as you just talked about, signals some of the shortages perhaps coming to an end or supply constraints easing, we anticipate that GLP-1 manufacturers may use that as an avenue to now unleash their marketing engines and their access engines. I think we're a natural and strategic partner for them to work with in that regard to help kind of drive these users to become loyal brand users of their medications on a go-forward basis, help them get on these medications and stay on them. Presumably, as compounding comes to an end, your solutions become a little bit more impactful. Yeah, absolutely. Okay. Okay. Last question here. I think we're just about out of time, but I do want to talk about your capital deployment priorities. Given your free cash flow, you throw off a lot of free cash flow, and you don't have debt coming due until 2029. How are you balancing investing in the business organically, M&A, perhaps share repurchases, given where the stock has traded recently? Sure. Yeah. No, quite accurate. Our EBITDA margins have been accreting up for the last several quarters up to levels that you've seen in the lower 30s now. I think we grew margin like 520 basis points YOY 3Q to 3Q last year. So EBITDA is growing, and our EBITDA is actually supported by cash, like you said. So we had a great cash flow quarter again too. So from those perspectives, we spend a lot of time thinking about this. M&A tends not to be a priority. We're focused on running our business as it is. So you may see us do smaller sort of tuck-in type things. Like a couple of years ago, we bought an entity called RxNXT that became the technology foundation for ISP, for example. But that was like a $10 million-$19 million deal, if I remember correctly, and Ramin's confirming that. We do smaller deals, I think, could still be in our future, but that obviously leaves a lot of FCF since we don't have to invest that much into the business beyond the current levels of product development and tech expansion. To your question, when we see opportunities, we have taken advantage historically of buying back stock on the open market. And also, to a degree, we can get it at an appropriate price and discount off some of our sponsors as well, the private equity sponsors who still own stakes in us. We have a repurchase authorization that's pretty healthy, well over $200 million. We've got some room to run with that. Yep. Yep. All right. We are officially out of time. Karsten, Ramin, thank you so much for joining us at our conference this morning. And thank you, everyone, for listening in. Appreciate it. Thanks so much for having us. It's been a pleasure. Thanks, Daniel.