All right. Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to Jumia's Investor Day. My name is Francis Dufay. I'm the CEO of Jumia. I joined the company 12 years ago now as the country manager of Jumia in Ivory Coast. I stepped up as CEO three years back as we were starting a broad restructuring plan that you're certainly aware of now. I often get the question from journalists, investors, anyone outside the company, "Is Africa ready for e-commerce?" Fair question. Obviously, the answer is yes, but it's also the wrong way of asking the question. Of course, Africa is ready for e-commerce. There's plenty of demand, poorly served demand, latent demand that can be actually served at scale and in a profitable way. The right question is, when will e-commerce be ready for Africa? It's all about building a business model that's not a copycat of what worked somewhere else, but that's truly adapted to the unique challenges that we face in our markets. We'll come to that later. We believe this is what we're building, and this is why it's working. Let me start now by diving into the fundamentals of our markets and explaining to you what's changing today and what's supporting the rise of e-commerce across the continent. Thank you. All right. Looking at the fundamentals, we're looking at a market of 1.5 billion people across Africa and population still growing. We're looking at an e-commerce market, addressable market, of $40 billion in 2029, only in the nine markets that are recovering. Most importantly, penetration remains extremely low. There's massive headroom for increased e-commerce penetration in our markets, even compared to other emerging markets like LATAM, not to mention Southeast Asia. More in details, we see a lot of things happening on the continent that's quite favorable for the growth of our e-commerce addressable market. We see macro factors like demographics, but we also see clear progress in business enablers that will change the way we can do e-commerce and will make it easier to drive customer adoption. If we look at the macro factors, starting with demographics, obviously, population in Africa is going to grow significantly to 2.5 billion people in 2050. That's a 60% growth versus today, while all the other regions in the world will be flat or declining. As well, we're currently operating with very low GDP per capita across Africa, around $2,000 on average in the markets where we operate. Even modest improvements, which is reasonable to expect, compounded with population growth, will have a massive impact on our addressable markets. Last but not least, and that's happening, internet penetration is clearly improving. We do remain far behind what's happening in India, China, or LATAM, of course. You see that we're going from 14%- 38% in about 10 years only. There's a real trend. Internet is becoming cheaper and more accessible for local populations. That's going to help drive e-commerce adoption, obviously. When we look at slightly more conjunctural business enablers in our ecosystem, a lot of things are happening. We picked a few examples here that are making our work way easier as an e-commerce platform. To start with, SMEs and vendors are increasingly going online for their own needs, for their own marketing, to sell on social networks. It's really improving their digital fluency, if I may say it this way, and making it a lot easier for platforms like Jumia to take them online at scale to sell on the marketplace. Core infrastructure is slowly improving. I say slowly. I do not want everyone to get too excited. We see progress in the road network across all countries. Electrification is progressing, and that is unlocking new markets for us. When the roads get better, we can serve new regions, new cities. That is increasing the addressable market. When electricity access improves, people get access to the internet, and people can start purchasing appliances and electronics from Jumia. Overall, that is fundamental trends that keep on improving our addressable market. Last but not least here, we see clear progress in the fintech and payment ecosystem across the continent, across our markets. Payments are becoming increasingly digitized with very different payment methods across countries. There is no one size fits all, very different ecosystems. Overall, this is creating—I mean, people are really changing the way they transact using less cash and more digital payment methods, creating trust in digital services and ultimately in e-commerce, making it easier for us to convert customers. Those fundamental trends and more conjunctural business enablers are really helping us to get the e-commerce flywheel, or marketplace flywheel, started across the continent. I expect everyone is quite familiar with the marketplace flywheel in which more demand will create—I mean, more sales will generate a more favorable business model, and it will attract more vendors, supply, and brands on the platform. On the other hand, more supply will generate more sales, starting the positive marketplace flywheel. What's happening outside of Jumia on the background is actually helping us to get this flywheel started. On the demand side, demographic trends that we just discussed are really—I mean, this is really playing in favor and building up demand. Also on the supply side, more conjunctural factors that we see—so FX Stability, probably a new cycle opening for Africa with much more monetary stability—is really helping to build up the supply of the marketplace. In this very specific case, we had three, four very tough years across Africa with massive volatility on the currency side. The main consequence was that the supply side of the marketplace was particularly dry. What happens in our countries when FX is a little tricky, importers will stop importing. They will keep their dollars somewhere outside of the country, and they will not risk to commit that to get inventory and sell in Naira or Cedi or Kenyan shilling. Now that we have more stability and more visibility on currencies, which has been the case for about a year and a half now, we see that the supply side of the marketplace is getting a lot stronger on top of all the work that we've done, of course, to build trust with our suppliers. Then something that happened more recently, we're also greatly helped by the recent pivot of Chinese manufacturers towards new markets. It puts Africa back on the map and makes it a lot easier to secure inventory, supplies, more goods at a better price for African consumers. All this is really helping us and enabling a favorable background for the growth of Jumia. I do believe that now is finally the time for African e-commerce and more specifically for Jumia. The stars are finally aligning for us. I'll start with what is under our control. For the first time ever, after 13 years of operations at Jumia, we have rebuilt a business model that makes sense and that creates value for customers, for vendors and local partners, and for Jumia-needed shareholders. We're able to grow again while improving the economics at the same time because we're able to solve people's problems, to put it in a very simple way. I'll come back to this business model, but it's now very visible in the numbers that something is happening and what we have rebuilt makes sense. There's product-market fit finally. At the same time, we're entering, we believe, a much more favorable cycle for Africa with positive tailwinds on the macroeconomic side. Currency stability is the most obvious sign of this new cycle that will greatly help to boost consumer confidence, of course, working on the demand side, but as I was explaining, also improving the supply side of the marketplace, which is probably the most critical ingredient for the success of Jumia. All that is happening in the context of markets with massive structural runway. Our markets are massively underpenetrated when it comes to the share of e-commerce over the total retail. We're looking at huge runway for growth. We'll come to that a bit later in the presentation. It's happening while Jumia has finally rebuilt the right value proposition. We have extremely strong brands and barriers to entry in those countries. We see that it's very difficult for both smaller local players or large international players to come and compete with us now that we've adapted to those markets. We believe that we are finally on the right continent, in the right place, at the right time, and with the right product. Briefly on this one, just quickly, Jumia is the only Pan-African e-commerce player operating at scale across the continent. We're covering nine markets. We are leveraging unique know-how and unique knowledge of the market that we've accumulated over the past 15 years. We're delivering the same playbook, the same operating model across markets, which makes it relatively simple to implement and scalable. Obviously, we're one of the only publicly listed companies able to tap the growth of African consumers at scale across the continent. All that is great, but there has to be a reason why there's only one Pan-African e-commerce player. It's a tough market. The African e-commerce market comes with a set of very unique challenges. We could draft a very, very long list. We chose to pick like only seven bullet points here. I mean, the challenges of the African e-commerce market are absolutely unique. It's the lowest disposable income on Earth when we look at the region. Africa is one big continent, but it's 50 plus small fragmented markets, which makes it very difficult to operate a business like e-commerce where you need fixed costs and logistics and so on. The logistics ecosystems, sorry, are not mature enough. Payments are not yet fully digitized. Shopping behaviors differ across cities, across countries. There are very different customer profiles. The informal market is prevalent, and we have to cooperate with informal players and the private and local private initiative to be successful. Of course, there are huge trust issues from large parts of the population whenever it comes to doing anything online and any online transaction. The challenge is to solve that, right? How do we solve those problems? The bright side is that we've been able to operate on the ground, very close to our customers, very close to our partners for the past 15 years. We've learned. We've tried. We've failed in some cases. We've experimented, but we've been able to build a business model that exactly addresses those problems. We perfected our operations to solve everything that's in this list. To give you a few examples here, the issue of low disposable income, the way we solve it is that we've massively focused our sourcing operations, our commercial teams, towards bringing an amazing value for money. We're looking for affordability above anything. We've designed our logistics as well to be very cheap, very affordable, so we don't have to charge a lot of shipping fees. Affordability at all costs. The way we deal with the size of the markets is that we've made sure that we have very small, very lean, and agile teams in each country, so we don't have much overhead to cover, and we're actually able to generate some cash at country level and then break even at group level. The way we deal with, from a clear leader in Africa in cash on delivery. Nobody likes cash on delivery in this room, I guess. Me neither, but our customers need it, and they love it. We had to do it. It was not really an option. We have built our operations. We have trained our partners. We have built our tech to make sure that we could operate cash on delivery at scale in Africa with no leakage, no issue, and very efficient operations. Today, it is working, and that is a great asset for us to bring more offline customers to e-commerce. It is not just about acknowledging the problems. It is about seeing these as challenges that can be solved. Because we have been blessed with very strong teams on the ground, we have been able to embed the solutions into our business models. We have been able to fully adapt the e-commerce playbook to solve the real issues that our customers and vendors are facing. This is our moat today. This is not just about being first. This is not just about spending money. It's about being willing to take the e-commerce playbook and change everything that needs to be changed. Today, we have a playbook that I believe is very hard, very expensive to replicate, either by local competitors or large international players who would come with a copycat of what has worked somewhere else. All right. I'd like to spend some time now on Jumia's journey. We could write a book about it, probably. Those of you who've been following the story know that it's been quite a rollercoaster to put it nicely. It is very important for me to explain to you what happened, in particular what went wrong, so we can also clarify what we're doing right now and why we believe it's going to work at scale. All right. On this page here, you see a very simple timeline showing, I mean, in a simplified way, the IV phases Jumia has been through. First one has been the building phase, foundations, so from 2012- 2019. We've been building the basics of the marketplace. We've been expanding to a peak of 16 countries, I believe, quite a lot. Many different verticals. A lot of time and money was spent on building the brands with, at the time, pretty strong focus on volumes, growth, and expansion driven by the first shareholders. That led to the IPO in New York in 2019. Starting from there, unfortunately, the company was able to raise a lot of money and burn it very fast, quite helped at the time by the COVID bubble. I mean, what Jumia started at the time was a phase of growth at all costs, like a lot of other tech companies. We fell into the same traps, I believe. It came with pretty negative consequences on the quality of operations, our unit economics, our focus, and so on. I'll get to that right afterwards. Late 2022, the situation had become totally unsustainable. Huge cash burn that was not justified by the scale that has been reached. We were burning more than $200 million a year, and there was pretty much the same amount left on the bank account. Something had to change. It was not possible to raise our way out of it anymore because the music had stopped on the stock market. That is where everything changes. That is when I was appointed to CEO of the company. That's when we changed the whole management team, and we started three years of pretty tough restructuring across the whole business and with a clear focus not only on cost management, but also on rebuilding the right business, the right value proposition that does make sense for African consumers so we could grow again and deliver a viable business. I'll come to that later, but basically, this phase takes us to where we are today, entering the fourth phase in this chart here, a phase of sustainable growth where we're able to scale again on healthy foundations with better unit economics, a refocused business on the one big opportunity, which is e-commerce at scale for the lower middle class of Africa, and with now a clear path towards profitability and fully our breakeven in 2027. Let's start with the second phase, the most painful one. I don't like going through this slide again, but I think it's worth explaining so everyone can understand what we've been through and why we're not making the same mistakes again. It's been expensive learning, but still learning. When we started that phase of growth at all costs from 2019- 2022, it came with some pretty negative consequences that I guess a lot of companies have been facing in the tech ecosystem pretty much at the same time. First of all, focus was completely diluted. Too many different verticals, too many countries, some with very little hope of breaking even. While I do believe that in our countries, across Africa, I mean, we're not short of opportunities. There are thousands of ideas that make sense. It's just about executing one at scale the right way across many countries and doing it well. We're not able to execute well with so many topics to deal with. We've changed that radically. We're now clearly refocused on one big opportunity, which is e-commerce only in nine countries that do make sense. Growth as the absolute focus came at the expense of attention to details, clean operations, and ultimately unit economics. We ended up in a situation in many countries, for example, where the cost of fulfillment was higher than the gross profit. The bigger they would get, the more money they would lose. That doesn't make sense, but that's the kind of stuff that can happen when you don't pay attention to quality of operations. This has changed radically. Obviously, the whole new team that's been promoted is coming from the ground, coming from operations. We are maniacal about unit economics and details of our operations on the ground, on commercial operations, fulfillment, call centers, and so on. I myself started at Jumia focusing on logistics. So quality of operations is a topic that's very close to my heart. Of course, in the process, when raising too much money, what you usually do is that you build huge overheads because you assume that it's going to solve a lot of problems. Turns out it didn't. In our case, we built big overheads, particularly in central teams that were based very far away from Africa, either in Europe or in the Middle East, which didn't lead to the best decision-making and led to quite some misunderstanding with local teams who were actually working on the ground in pretty tough conditions. This has completely changed as well. We have now very lean overheads. I mean, the staffing at Jumia has been massively reduced. We had 4,500 people on the payroll late 2022. We have 2,000 today. Quite a change. Last but not least, because most of the leadership was outside of the continent and never really lived in Africa, most of the decision-making that happened in Paris or Dubai could not really understand the specificities and the needs of our customers and vendors, which led to two things: broad disconnect between the teams on the ground and the leadership and quite some disorganization, and most importantly, building a value proposition that did not make sense at all. We will come to that later. Of course, with that, you have little opportunities to grow in a healthy way over the medium term. The most important part here is that we've learned a lot from that, and we've made the right changes. What have we changed? Late 2022, we started a phase of deep restructuring across the whole business with three main building blocks. One, refocusing on the one big opportunity. We had had the chance, I mean, in the previous years, we had the chance to understand that the one vertical that made sense was e-commerce, what we call physical goods. In a few countries, specifically Ivory Coast and Senegal, we had been able to scale with much better unit economics, with specific categories that made sense. We knew we had an opportunity. We knew that there was a playbook to make it happen. It was not a shot in the dark. To do that, we had to refocus. We could not keep all those businesses in countries and dilute our focus. We went for very tough cost management across the whole P&L. We worked on gross profit, obviously. We went really hard on fulfillment costs, marketing costs, and the fixed cost base to make sure that not only that we save the company by protecting our cash in the short term, but also that we build the right unit economics on which we can scale and bring more volumes in a profitable way. Which takes me to the third part. I mean, probably the most important part. We've been finally rebuilding over the past few years the right value proposition for African customers and for our vendors and partners so we could grow again on healthy fundamentals. It happened mostly by focusing on supply to bring amazing value for money, great assortment, right prices, and right accessibility to our customers. We expanded our coverage in the countries by building the logistics network to cover several millions of more people. We changed our marketing playbook to be able to address the diversity of our customers. Let me get into the details, starting with the refocus. That is probably the most simple part to explain, right? I mean, we had one big opportunity, which is e-commerce at scale in Africa. We chose to exit a few verticals that did not make sense. For example, our classifieds business that was extremely small, almost profitable, but with low opportunities to scale and complex to handle. We left something bigger with Jumia Food, our food delivery platform, operating in eight countries. That was a lot more emotional at the time, but we were unable to scale with the right economics. The barriers to entry in that business were way too low compared to what we had been able to build in the e-commerce field, and we chose to leave. Operations were quite complicated as well. It was a big relief when we were finally able to focus only on e-commerce. We also deprioritized and shrunk some categories within e-commerce, such as groceries. Groceries had been all the hype in e-commerce in the U.S. and in Europe for many years. It turned out that in our countries, the economics after logistics did not make sense. We dropped it. That was for verticals and businesses. We then looked at the country's portfolio. We chose to exit two countries, Tunisia and South Africa, for different reasons. Tunisia was a fairly small addressable market, and the business environment was deteriorating quite fast. It was just not worth the effort, not worth the investment. We had better places to invest our time and money. South Africa was quite a unique case, very mature, a much bigger market, obviously, but also very mature in logistics and e-commerce and retail. We had a very small business there operating under different systems, different brands, very low synergies. It did not make sense for us to fight to death in this market, and we chose to quietly exit, which helped us refocus on the right markets where we could scale and get to profitability. Last but not least, there had been lots of talks in the past of spinning out our payments activities to build a new PayPal of Africa, the new Mercado Pago of Africa, or spinning out our delivery activities to build the FedEx of Africa. All that was shelved. It did not make sense anymore. We need to scale the core e-commerce business before we discuss options like this. We have made clear with the teams that the mission of logistics and payments activities at Jumia were clearly to enable the growth of e-commerce in the most efficient way possible. That has massively clarified and made the job of the teams and made everyone's life a lot easier. Yeah, one last thing. Of course, this was a bit emotional. You can imagine, right? I mean, exiting countries with hundreds of employees, shutting down big vertical like Jumia Food across eight countries was quite a shock to most of the teams. But very quickly, sorry, everyone understood why we were doing this. And very quickly, also, everyone saw that it enabled us to deliver in a much more effective way on the core e-commerce business. And we had to do this not only for focus, but also for cost saving. It enabled us to deliver a much less complex organization and save on overhead and tech at group level. So let's now take a look at what we've done on the cost side. I'll start with Fulfillment. So I've told you Fulfillment is very close to my heart. It was probably the most important part to start with because, well, it was quite chaotic back in 2022. If you want to deliver a business that can scale in a profitable way, Fulfillment costs have to be low. No way around. If your Fulfillment costs are very close to your gross profit, there is just no way to deliver profitability. What we found late 2022 was the following: a slightly chaotic situation with scattered and inefficient warehouse footprints, low productivity, hundreds and hundreds of inefficient, loss-making logistics partners, a lot of them delivering pretty bad service, way too much focus at the time on convenient, speed, and door delivery that came at the expense of simplicity, reliability, and efficiency, and some level, I mean, great levels of disconnect between the central teams and the local teams. We had to change pretty much everything. I think the results are quite spectacular. We started by doing something very interesting. We redefined, redesigned the service level agreement kind of. The most important example here is that we shifted most of our deliveries from door delivery, which was expected or assumed to be the best option for customers, to pickup station delivery. Customers have to walk for 20 minutes and pick up their order at a Jumia Pick-Up point. It made a lot of sense because finally, we could deliver a service that customers were willing to pay for. Door delivery is complex to handle for our partners and also a lot more expensive. The unit costs are way higher. You need to pay for fuel, time, some CapEx with the vehicles, and so on. This shift enabled us to massively simplify the work of Jumia, the work of our partners, reducing its costs, while our customers were actually very happy to save $0.50 on a dollar and have to walk for 30 minutes to the pickup station. We adjust the service level to what people are willing to pay for while making sure that we deliver on the absolute basics, reliability, and affordability. As I like to put it, on our continent, reliability is luxury, and we're happy to deliver it. The results, I mean, very strong results. You see it in the slide here. The Fulfillment cost per order reduced by half in three years. From $3.4 that was total and unsustainable to deliver profit to $1.9 last quarter. I mean, dividing by half Fulfillment cost per order is quite a performance in my personal experience. You see right below how the mix evolved, right? I mean, back in 2022, 62% of deliveries were happening in door delivery, and now it is 72% happening through pickup stations, massively simplifying the experience. Most importantly, that cost reduction happened while we massively scaled the network to reach hundreds of new cities that were quite remote, where you should expect higher costs, but we have been able to do it while reducing the costs. It happened while improving reliability, and it happened while improving customer satisfaction. It is actually possible to operate with much better economics and much better customer satisfaction. Looking at what we did in marketing now. Back in 2022, marketing was almost the biggest expense budget, very close to logistics, which did not really make sense. Quite a lot of money was wasted on that topic for many years during that phase. What we found late 2022 was the following. We were spending very heavy budgets to promote an assortment that was insufficient and poorly priced. You can imagine that the return on investment was not great. At the same time, we were completely deliberately ignoring the diversity of our customer base by focusing only on online channels and ignoring all those people who are not fully online and who need to be convinced because they do not trust the internet and they do not trust what is happening online. All that, mostly on online channels, was unfortunately happening with pretty low quality of execution, further deteriorating the efficiency of these budgets. First, we had to protect our cash back in late 2022. We started by the obvious, slashing the budgets. We massively reduced marketing budget, divided by four in 2024 versus 2022. Today, we're still spending three times less than in 2022 in marketing budgets in Q3. We have maintained very, very high efficiency and a relatively low level of marketing budgets, although we're gradually starting to reinvest. We went to rebuild the right channels. Marcelle will talk about it later in the presentation. We made sure that our channels mix was also accommodating for the needs of people who are fully offline or do not trust whatever is happening offline because we have huge trust issues in our markets. Sorry. More recently, we started to rebuild the online channels with a priority for free channels like customer relationship management and SEO. Even more recently, we're starting to see very good traction from paid channels that we had fully deprioritized in the past, but now with much better assortment and better execution, we see traction and profitability spending money on Google Ads, TikTok, and Meta. Here again, very clear impact. I mentioned the evolution of total budget. You see the evolution of the mix. We're much less dependent on price cuts and discounts. The ratios of marketing spend remain extremely reasonable at 2.6% over GMV last quarter, which I believe is a fairly low ratio for any e-commerce player on Earth. Fixed costs, which cover G&A and technology. Fixed costs also needed fixing. What we found late 2022 was the following: oversized G&A, mostly invested in remote teams, central teams living, I mean, operating far away from Africa, overstaffed teams in technology as well with very low seniority and very low productivity and shifting priorities all the time, which did not help. A lot of the contracts for software infrastructure, sorry, had been negotiated for the wrong volumes and with a business that had much higher complexities. The costs and the capacity that had been negotiated did not make sense anymore. We started there with pretty tough restructuring. I mean, when you look at G&A, we divided the headcount by half from 1,500 people to around 800 today. We did that mostly by starting with the central teams, starting with our Dubai headquarters that we mostly shut down. Back in the days, we had 70 of the top salaries of the company based in Dubai having a relatively better life than the rest of our employees and not helping in the quality of the decision-making. We started by shutting down most of it, also sending a clear message to the rest of the organization, positive message, I mean. Same in Technology. We managed to get a lot of attrition and restructure. We have half of the staffing we used to have at the time with much better productivity, leveraging AI and much better tools, and also simplifying their priorities. When it comes to vendor terms for infrastructure and software, we've been able to renegotiate successfully a lot of contracts and reduce the costs. What you see here is massively reduced cost base on the fixed costs. Minus $11 million per quarter on G&A, minus $4 million per quarter on tech versus 2022, which is greatly helping for us to deliver breakeven in 2027. What I want to insist on here is that it did not come at the expense of our ability to grow. We do believe, we're convinced that our tech platforms, as well as our core central teams and G&A basis, can take two to three times the volumes we're running today. Last quarter, for example, we see that tech costs are decreasing 10% year- over- year, but volumes are up 25%. We can do it. We can actually scale with stable or diminishing fixed costs. The most important thing here to contribute to our profitability equation, we've built a fixed cost base that is very lean and can scale, and we're proving it. Now the most important part, rebuilding the value proposition. I mean, some people told us, "You guys cannot cut cost-cut your way out of it." We also have to be able to make sure we can grow again without hurting the economics, without compromising on economics like it happened in the past. When it comes to rebuilding the right value proposition, we start with the customers. Very simple question: who should be our customers? The answer for us is very simple. Our customers are the lower middle class of Africa. What does that mean? That means anyone in our countries making somewhere between $150-$400, $500 a month. That is our middle class in our countries. All right? The fantasized middle class of Africa making $2,000 a month and driving their car to work does not exist. If you look at the income distribution data on the slides here, 99% of the population in Nigeria makes less than $420 a month. Even in Egypt, it's 86%, whatever we may think of Egypt. Egypt is in the same income brackets as Kenya, Uganda, or Ghana. In that income bracket, we see the biggest potential for consumer demand, for purchasing power, and we go all in for those customers. A lot of people asked us, "Why do you make your life so much harder? Why don't you focus on richer customers?" They do not exist. Or it's such a small pool that there's no point. You cannot build an e-commerce business with all the fixed costs and the tech and everything to serve only that niche segment. It means that we have to sell very affordable products at scale to millions and millions of people. We are very proud of doing this. We have embraced a challenge. That is the market we have, not the market we dream of, but the market we have. We are very proud to serve the lower middle class of Africa with the right service. How did we do it? Let me start with what we found at the time. Sorry. Back in 2022, the value proposition that we were delivering to customers was not the right one. The price points, sorry, were too high due to too much focus on fancy brands. Usually, commercial teams, I mean, people love to focus on Apple and L'Oréal rather than focusing on cheap white label brands from China. That is just the way it is. We had to change that, and teams really got it when this wholesale is moving upwards. The choice was insufficient due to low vendor engagement driven by low vendor satisfaction and bad operations as well. There was way too much focus on big cities at the expense of millions of potential customers living in secondary cities. We have changed a lot of things. I will not go into details because it will be covered in the next section here. I would just like to take you through a few KPIs that show what we have done. I was mentioning secondary cities. Back in 2022, 44% of our orders were shipped outside of the capital cities. Today, it is 60%. Slow, but gradual and consistent change, and we are seeing very strong growth outside of the main cities, where we are solving very big problems for our consumers. We made a big push on assortment. One simple KPI here. We've been pushing very hard to restore trust and deliver better operations and profitability to our Chinese vendors. Hisham, we'll talk about it later. We see the impact. From 2023- 2025, the volume sold by our international vendors, mostly Chinese, has been multiplied by two. This is having clear impact on the way our customers behave, how they shop, and on their satisfaction levels. The repurchase rate, to start with, 90-day repurchase rate of new customers has significantly increased from 39%- 43% in the past three years, while we were massively cutting marketing budgets, virtuous budgets, incentive budgets, and so on. Quite an achievement here, purely driven by better value proposition and affordability. Satisfaction of our customers has massively increased from 46 of net promoter score in 2023 to an all-time high of 64 today. This happened while cutting costs, shrinking the teams, and saving everywhere we could. Massive chance that brought value to Jumia, but also to our customers. That is pretty much the result of delivering on the basics of affordability, reliability, availability, and trust. I will not go into details into everything we did on the value proposition because that will be covered right afterwards. There is just one point I would like to elaborate on with you right now, which is what we did to cover more cities, what we call the upcountry expansion. You probably have heard of it a million times if you are following our quarterly calls, but I would like to provide more color here. The context for that is that in our countries, and I've heard it a thousand times in Abidjan, business leaders have a clear tendency to heavily discount or fully write off purchasing power and demand outside of the big cities. There's some kind of urban elite syndrome that had played in our countries, even within our teams, that makes so that those markets are completely underestimated. We had the same at Jumia. In the previous phase, it was clearly acknowledged that we were not going for smaller cities. All the focus was on big cities because, out there, there's nothing. I even got a few years back when we started pushing again, I got a question from a Nigerian journalist who asked me, "But why do you go to those cities? The people there have no money and they can't read. Why do you do this?" That was slightly exaggerated, but he meant it. Actually, people there have money because, I mean, these are mostly agricultural economies, so they have some money. They can read, actually, yes. Most importantly, they are totally underserved. In those cities, we are solving massive problems for our customers. They have access to very limited choice, and the price points are absolutely crazy. Delivering the value proposition of Jumia in those cities makes a lot of sense. We just have to adapt the way we do the logistics. Luckily, we have been able to probe into those markets and experiment in one country that was Ivory Coast starting in 2016. It helped a lot. There was a lot of returns from teams as well at the time, but it helped a lot the growth of the country, made Ivory Coast at some point, I mean, still to this day, bigger than Nigeria or the other big countries, and was a clear contributor to the success of the country. Late 2022, when you took over, we started replicating exactly the same success across all countries. A few things you see on this slide here. You see the kind of dense network that we have built in Ivory Coast, fully based on pickup stations, nothing fancy. People come to the pickup station and that's it. Very efficient logistics. We've just started to build the same network, I mean, a year and a half ago in Nigeria, and there are still hundreds of cities that we are yet to cover in this country. We're just halfway through, and we'll see some more details later. We're doing it in a very efficient way. You see here some pictures of our pickup stations. As I like to put it to my teams, we're not building Apple stores. Nobody can pay for it, certainly not our customers. These are super basic. It's raw concrete. There's no AC, basic. There's no security. Some people are surprised when they visit, and there's no security because it would kill the economics of the partner running it. Basic, efficient, reliable. Our customers actually love it. I think it's a great example of how we learn from the ground. We experiment. We sometimes make mistakes, but we fully adapt our business model to solving the challenges that our customers are facing across Africa. With that, I'll leave the floor to Antoine, who will walk you through the results of this transformation phase. Thank you, Francis. Good afternoon. My name is Antoine. I'm the CFO of Jumia, and I've been working with Jumia since 2016. You can see on this slide the impact on our financials of the plan that Francis just detailed. That led to much better unit economics and much lower cash burn. Starting with take rate, you'll see a peak in 2023 and 2024, which were mainly driven by corporate sales, which was an opportunistic B2B business we did in Egypt and that stopped being material in Q4 2024. If now we compare with 2022, I'd like to remind you that we've exited some business in 2023, late 2023, which had higher margin but awful logistics unit economics. The highlight of the plan, as Francis mentioned, is the evolution of full expense per order. We've decreased it by almost half, $3.5 in 2022, down to $2.1 in 2025. This has massively contributed to improve our contribution margin per order. We were at $1.9 in 2022. We are now at $2.3. I will not comment further on sales and advertising expense, which we have drastically shrunk by $15 million. Regarding G&A and tech and content, which we consider as fixed cost, we've been also drastically reducing our costs. We did that mainly through reduction of staff costs. Also, as Francis stated, we've renegotiated all contracts. As a result of those improvements, our operating loss has drastically reduced from $200 million down to $70 million. Accordingly, cash burn went from almost $300 million in 2022 down to $82 million. At the same time, we've been working on the fundamental of the business. We are seeing now growth, sorry, on all unit economics across the board. You'll note in Egypt a negative GMV evolution, which is related to the corporate sales that I've just mentioned. You can see, looking at orders, the real health of the business with Egypt growing 27% in Q3 2025. In summary, these results clearly demonstrate that our plan is effective and that we are able to deliver sustainable performance. We believe that we are now ready for the next phase of growth of Jumia. Francis. With hindsight, cutting cost is probably the easiest side, the easiest part of it. What was probably the biggest challenge was keeping the team together. A lot of people ask me, "How did you manage to keep your best talent in the team?" Right? You will see later that we have kept our best talent in the team. No worries about that. It has been three very challenging years with several waves of restructuring seeming like it never ended for some of the teams in specific countries where it lasted a bit longer. We have made sure that we could keep our best talent in the team and we could give clear mission, a clear sense of purpose to everyone in the company, and particularly top management. A few things we did to make sure it happened. First of all, we heavily focused on internal promotions. The whole management team and the people, the managers you'll see right after me have been promoted from the ground. These were great operators running commercial logistics or something in one of the countries, and they've been able to step up. This phase, painful as it was, created very strong personal opportunities for our best performers, and this has really been recognized. There's been amazing upward mobility in the company. Also, we've been able to empower local teams a lot more, creating more accountability as well, but also by shrinking and massively reducing the amount of work they were being told to do by people sitting very far away from the market. We've been able to give them more freedom, more responsibility, more empowerment. We've also clearly aligned the incentives for all those people who were crazy enough to follow us in this phase. We've made sure that they would get a real upside with stock options. I believe we've been distributing the pool of stock options in a very fair way over the past couple of years. You can ask the rest of the team if they confirm on that so that everyone would get a clear upside when we make it. Last one, we've made sure that, I mean, our actions clearly align with what we said and with the mission. We walk the talk. The most obvious example here was us exiting the Dubai office, where we had the top salaries, sent a very clear message. When we told the teams we need better operations and less cost, the teams in Uganda or in Ghana, they got it. They got it that it was time for them to deliver. It was their responsibility and their accountability. We are now blessed with, I believe, a very strong team of very strong operators who clearly understand their customers, their partners, their markets, and this is really the right team to deliver the next phase of growth and take us to profitability. Thank you very much. With that, I leave the floor to Hisham, our CCO, to start explaining our whole new business model. Thank you, Francis. Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for being with us today. I'm Hisham El Gabry. I'm the Group Chief Commercial Officer. I joined Jumia initially four years ago as the CCO for Egypt, which is my home country, and then I managed the country as Head of Operations or CEO in the interim period during the early period of the restructuring before moving on to lead the commercial function over the last two years. Before we start discussing what my team actually does, and it's mostly about the supply side of things, managing our relationship with the sellers, the local sourcing, the global sourcing, pricing structure. Before we go deeper into this, I would like to take one step back and look at what builds for a successful marketplace. If you look at this, it's pretty standard. A marketplace is about somewhere where sellers would list the products. You need a component for customers to pay for those products, a payment mechanism, and you need a logistics mechanism for you to deliver those products. Very standard, but if you pull the hood, it looks very different in an African context because we have to heavily and heavily customize it. You will see that as a running theme as we talk today, this customization thing. It looks normal at face value, but then it needs to be heavily reworked. With that, we were able to build a resilient marketplace that is talking to a potential 600 million customers across our nine geographies, our nine markets. Let's give a few examples on this customization. On the supply, the name of the game is that we have to be looking over our shoulders all the time. Things are changing. There is not very strong or not very well-developed local manufacturing ability. Global supply chain is challenging. Regulations are very fluid, so difficult. We have to customize for all of this. We will explain that in detail through the course of my presentation. Marketing as well. Marketing needs to be personable, needs to be on the ground, needs to help bridge the chasm between the offline and the online. Again, a recurring theme that we will discuss a lot today. How do I take people through this first step from moving to an offline world into an online world? Logistics, I think Francis covered this in detail, and Vinod will do as well. It needs to be heavily customized without a lot of door delivery and more efficient pickup station operations. Finally, for the payments. We'd love to have everyone on credit cards, but the adoption is on single digits in most of our countries, so it makes it a bit difficult, and then we have to be innovative. At the same time, localized. It's not going to be the exact same solution for each and every country. We localize as well within our African customization. Let's jump into what constitutes a supply. I said we have patchy local manufacturing. Global supply chain is not great. That means we need to diversify. We need to be hedging all the time. We built the strategy of quad sourcing across four pillars with two main wings that we fly on, or you could say this is the resilient base of the pyramid, which is our vast network of local sellers and international sellers, 70,000 of them. This is the resilient base. On top of that, we are having specific bets and selective bets with some top local players and international players. Together with all of this, we're creating a diverse supply. We're hedged against anything that goes wrong, and we can do a system of balances and checks on what we want to grow and how we build our categories. To give one example that I always love to use, if you think about something like beauty, the first thing that comes to mind when you're talking about a beauty category is like skincare stuff, face care stuff, and it's more chemically driven products. Now, for example, in such a category, we don't take half measures. We play with the top-tier players, Nivea, L'Oréal, etc. There are other stuff that you should be sourcing from local players, some curlers, some simple accessories, and so on. There are stuff that you should be getting from China because it's very efficient in terms of supply chain and it's cheap and there's a huge diversity, like wigs. We sell a lot of wigs. It's not the thing that would naturally come to people as this is a big thing in the beauty category. In our case, it is, and we sell a lot of them. Collectively, this is one live example of how we play our different pillars to have a comprehensive offer end to end. The most important thing, it's hedged. It's balanced because if something goes wrong, you can always rely on one of the other arms. We're going to talk a lot about these two components, the local and the Chinese sellers. Let me give a few examples on the selective bets I'm referring to. Locally, let's play a game. How many brands do you know from that? It would be the bottom left box. Can you raise your hand if you know more than one brand? You should be making money from this. Cool. All right. Expect it. You don't know any of this because despite these being our Zaras, our Apples, our Volkswagens in Africa, you know none of them. These are established brands locally. Some of them were either big and then we partnered with them, and some of them we grew together. The part I like a lot is in many cases of those, we help them go abroad. We help them build a Pan-African presence. If you take Dice, for example, that's an Egyptian homeware brand, now active in Morocco. If you take Smart Technology, that's an Ivorian consumer electronics brand, now active in Senegal, and so on and so forth. Tornado as well, another Egyptian brand. The suit I'm wearing is Egyptian, 100%. We walk the talk. We help those sellers grow. Even in our offices, by the way, all the screens and the dashboards that we monitor are coming from people like Vitron or Smart Technology or NASPO. These are top players, products that we use. We're not talking about stuff that doesn't work. It's all functional. It's nice, but it's built for our markets. If we talk about the international players, and you'll see here familiar names, but even for those, you don't take it for granted that they will be familiar products. If you take Samsung, for example, we're not selling a lot of S series. We're not selling a lot of Notes. It's more in the A-Series. It's more in the mass market, but it still enables us to sell millions upon millions of dollars of Samsung phones that are just built for us. You take Starlink, one of our most important partnerships. We started in one country, in Nigeria, two years ago, and today we're operating in almost four countries. The fourth one is coming very soon. Together with Starlink, we're building in the upcountry connectivity. There is a mission that we're also driving in our very own use case. It's not about speed. It's more about connectivity in rural areas. Even for Adidas, we have our own production lines. There are specific product lines that are working in Africa that you might not be very familiar with. Let's take a deeper dive on China. Here I want to bust a few misconceptions or a few myths. You go to China because it's cheap. Not totally false, but it's not the whole story. They're less profitable working with Chinese sellers. Absolutely false. It's unreliable supply. Again, absolutely false. Now let's break this down. Are products from China competitive? Yes, of course, they are competitive. The main thing for us is the entrepreneurial mindset that we can scale fast, try things very efficiently and very fast together. I'll give you one example. In Nigeria, a couple of years ago, there was this massive devaluation, and there was a fuel crisis. The prices tripled overnight in a few weeks. We were thinking generators is a big deal in Nigeria because, unfortunately, in many cities, they're off the grid, off the electricity grid for many hours a day. The generators are a very big business for us. They were mostly diesel and fuel-operated generators. We said, there is an opportunity here. I mean, it's becoming very expensive for people. We can have a green impact, and we can substitute all of this with solar-powered generators. They operate with the sun for those who are not familiar with the sun here. Yeah, that was nasty. Yeah, we shifted to the solar generators, and you had to try fast, multiple variants and multiple iterations with many of our partners to get to the right balance. What is the size? What's the price? What is the capacity? And so on. We couldn't have done this without having someone sitting on an established manufacturing capability and willing to try with you a lot. We do that by working with the dolphins and not the waves. If you're working with very big Chinese players, probably you're not going to be at the top of their attention at this moment of time. We play with more like the level below, which are agile enough, fast enough, and they test these things with us. When you do a couple of iterations, within three, four months, we've established the new category. For example, in this case, the 1 kW solar generator, and off you go, one of our top sellers today. We continue to do this all the time. Don't get me wrong. We're not fortune tellers. We don't get it right from the first time. We iterate. We had a case also with some tablets that we were doing for the education sector. It was not working fine initially, and then we had to continue trying. This gives us assurance also that we have the right control measures to know which products are coming in, and if they are not good enough, to push them back. Entrepreneurial mindset is number one. Second thing is on the profitability. Actually, from our seller base, the sellers coming from China are the most profitable for a simple reason. Efficient sourcing, that is number one. Number two, they are technically adept. They are more likely to use value-add services, advertising, monetization, etc. It makes them significantly more profitable for us. However, I cannot go all in and say, I will put all my business there because it is more profitable. That does not make sense, of course. Number three on reliability of supply, because we have built such a significant team in China, a 60-plus team that controls the end-to-end chain. We are not just having some sales officers sitting in China. We have a 60-plus team that is self-reliant, that is big enough to tackle the commercial side of things, negotiate with the freighters, have the vendor support. We have all of this as a self-reliant team in China. Because of that, we can keep our supply coming in. It is a very clean supply chain in millions and millions of units today. At the warehouse, we have 2.2 million units sitting in our warehouse today from Chinese sellers. The growth is 55% year- over- year and accelerating. This is not even uncovering all the opportunity. One example I like to use is we're mostly operating in the region south of China today, Shenzhen. There is a region called Huadong, east of China, which is the big manufacturing hub, a large semicircle to the west of Shanghai. There we've started making some inroads maybe 18 months ago. The penetration of the sellers from this region is in the single digits for us now, whereas this region is doing 35% of the consumer products output of China. It's just one tiny hint of opportunity of things that we're still going into. Even with this rate of growth, early stages, still a lot to unlock. We come to our local sellers, or as I call them, the backbone. We have 45,000 sellers plus in our markets that are very unique in nature, very engaged, passionate, but they need help on entering the digital world. I was talking to some of you, and I was saying, you might build very nice seller tools. I mean, today you can code with three prompts and build a very nice-looking seller tool that allows people to sell online. Looks very nice theoretically, has nothing to do with reality. You need to help sellers first cross the first barrier into getting from the offline world into the online world. This is what we're really good at. We have that recipe. For example, we have something called the acquisition agency. By the way, one of the management people here started as an acquisition agent on Jumia a few years ago. You start with acquisition agents. They actually go to the sellers, knock the doors, sit with them, show them how to use digital tools, how to take photos for an e-commerce website, how to create your content. They take them through this journey until they are live on Jumia. One week later, they forget everything. You need to have a team that is following up, and we call it the incubation teams. They are calling the sellers, telling them, okay, you should do this, you should do that. By the way, you received your first order. This is how you handle it, and so on. You take them to the next stage where they reach the self-serve stage and they are fully self-reliant. For that, we are improving our tools every day. Every day we are adding new features. I mean every day as in every day. We are adding new features to our self-service tools. Our vendor center, for example, which we are improving every day so that when the sellers come to that level of their journey, they are good. You cannot ignore the first part, the Omni part, that you need to help them cross that step. You will see the result in front of you. The glide path is very clear. The graph is for sellers who are actually doing a sale. It's not just the sellers we have in the base. They're the sellers who are actually doing a gross sale. We're adding 120 of them every week. The trend is accelerating. This is the result of all the hard work that has been put in the past years. I'm not going to tell a story on this one. I will let you listen to a video yourselves from one of our sellers, Owolabi in Nigeria. I love it for two reasons. First, you cannot not get inspired by this guy. Energetic, passionate, you will see for yourself. The second thing is he mentions a very important and radical mindset change. We were just saying that a few years ago, people would not touch e-commerce with a stick. It's too difficult. We don't understand it. We don't trust it. You will see what Owo labi will say is that now he's actually drawing his legitimacy, his credibility from Jumia. I'll let you with the video. My name is Owol abi Alex. I'm the store owner of Crystal Gold on Jumia platform. We've been selling for the past two years on this platform. We sell phone gadgets and accessories. We sell power banks, chargers, and the likes. Selling on Jumia has actually given the business more credibility because anytime a new customer reaches out to us, trust at first getting products from us is always at zero. Anytime we tell them that we sell on Jumia, we send our link to them, the credibility actually increases from 0- 100. You just see the occupying. I'll actually purchase from you. That's you getting the product offline. Sometimes customers actually go further ahead to actually place the order on Jumia and actually give our business that sense of trust and credibility that, yes, whatever I'm getting from this vendor is actually 100% legit. That has actually helped us to scale our business both offline and online. Okay. I mean, for me, this is a rewarding moment. This is what we've been building towards. Obviously, Owo labi is based in Lagos, which is an area that we're heavily penetrated. The moment that we have sellers from every corner and nook in our African countries that are saying the same is the moment we have made it. This is what we're all driving to. As a recap, building supply is about diversity. It's about being prepared for unwanted events all the time. You are building that resilience in your platform. At the end, it culminates in one thing at the end. How many products do we have for your customers at a good price? Here we have some very telling examples. Yes, they are all products that work. Yes, there are TVs at $60 and fans at $12. You can see those as products, or we can see them as telling real stories. You could see the TVs as a family buying their own first TV, or you could see it as a young person opening a sports bar for less than $1,000 in equipment. You could look at the fans for making people sleep better. It is as simple and as factual as that, rather than just a product. This is the impact that we are trying to drive every day. You could argue that in the globalized world we live in today, you can get access to those products from somewhere else. You can open a website in China and order a shoe for $5. True, true. If you look at it from a customer journey, the first question is, am I going to get this product? We do not know. Am I going to pay the same price tag that I saw eventually, or are there duties and hidden costs? We do not know. Is it going to be the same product exactly as I ordered? I do not know. Can I return it if something goes wrong? Definitely not. If you look at the same four points, the answer will be exactly the opposite for Jumia. You know the price you are going to pay. You know you are going to get it. There is someone to talk to to return it. Even if that same product is available somewhere, getting it from Jumia is a different story. It is about the end-to-end customer experience. Thank you so much for your time. With that, I hand over to Marcelle, my colleague. Hello everyone. Thank you for being here today. I am Marcelle Siayojie. My journey at Jumia started 11 years ago as an acquisition agent. Yes, I'm the one Hisham was talking about. I started 11 years ago back in Cameroon as an acquisition agent. Basically, we used to go in 2014 where internet penetration was really, really low. We had to go to the market, convince the merchant to come online. Convincing them was not the only thing we did. We needed to do education. We needed to show to them to build trust and show to them that e-commerce can actually be a great boost to their business. I later on moved to Senegal as the Chief Commercial Officer and then to Kenya, where I held the same position working with Vinod. I am honored today to be leading Jumia Senegal as the CEO. It has been a great journey filled with a lot of learnings, growth, and transformation. Speaking of transformation, now we have built the right assortment. That is what Hisham just showed. We need to find a way to market it, to reach our consumers in a way that they really understand. Most importantly, do it in a cost-effective way. In our markets, we have very diverse consumer's behavior. Some are fully online or partially. These are mainly the ones living in main cities that are comfortable with digital. Then we have orders that are still very okay buying offline. That is most of the people living in secondary cities. In addition to these shopping behaviors, the truth being said, trust in e-commerce is still to be built in most of our markets. We still meet people that need to be reassured that if they order a product on Jumia, they'll actually receive it. It may sound surprising to people in more developed markets, but this is our reality. That is why we could not just copy-paste a global playbook. We had to build our own, one that is truly made for Africa. Of course, we use all the normal online channels that every e-commerce business needs to master. We use our own channel, CRM, Customer Relationship Management tool, where we recently invested in a powerful tool that enables us to reach consumers directly with personalized messages through push notification and emailing. This helps us drive repeat purchases at almost zero additional cost. We also leverage social media, working mostly with local influencers that are really known on socials like TikTok and all the like. We do organic and paid channels also. We are seeing a recent upside on paid marketing with good return on investment. I think Francis mentioned that because we have improved our execution. On the other side, we are a little bit lucky because in most of our market, online competition is still very, very limited. Most importantly, our product offering is now more competitive and relevant. As Francis mentioned earlier, we have moved from a premium product mix, so all the premium products, to more affordable products that truly meet our consumers' needs. We now sell, and I love to say that when I go to our warehouse in Senegal, hundreds of kettles, thousands of kettles. We sell a lot of fashion items. We sell affordable phones at the like of Samsung, A-Series, Tecno, Itel, like the brands that are really built for Africa. This means we have moved from spending to be seen everywhere like we did before to invest to convert. Now, I think this is my favorite part. Beyond the online performance, we had to customize our offline. We had to focus our marketing; we had to focus our marketing budget on what really matters in our context. That is offline customized channel. We use radio to reach consumers that are partially online. It really works when we do that in local languages. For the past three years, and even a little bit more, we have been communicating our ads. Our ads radio has mainly been in local languages. That is in Dakar or in Senegal, where I live, Wolof. 80% of people, sorry, speak Wolof. In Kenya, where I lived for like two years, people speak Swahili. In Morocco, Berber. Our ads are well received, and people really understand the message we are communicating. For the offline customized channel, I think this is one of—this is my favorite, actually, offline channel—is our print catalogs. They may look very, very simple, but they are very powerful, especially in secondary city where sometimes connection can be really patchy. They make Jumia real. They build trust. They drive sales. Most importantly, they help us to connect with customers that have never been online. Three months ago, during Jumia anniversary, I went to Mbour, a small city in Senegal, where I met a lady. You must know that these catalogs, we do not just dump them somewhere, drop them on the table for clients to pick them. We actually go meet them in the markets with our JForce agent. I'll explain that later, where we meet the customers. We talk with them face to face. We show them the product. We explain to them how it works. This actually brings all the human interaction that makes e-commerce real for them. I met this lady, and she confessed to me that she has been hearing a lot about buying online, the trend of online. For her, it has always been as a scam. Seeing us with those catalogs wearing our branded Jumia, explaining to them that this really works, made her trust in e-commerce, and she actually placed her first order. That was her first ever smartphone because the price point was interesting. This is someone that has never had a smartphone. She has been hearing around about online, but she has never really been there. She was not the only one to give us those feedback. Seeing how people are reacting on these catalogs and the field activation made us believe that we are reaching the consumers in the right way, in a way that they really, really understand. We printed 2 million catalogs for our Black Friday. You have some of them on the table. You can actually look at them. What you see there is that the discount is really visible. The product speaks to our customers, and the price makes all the difference in a market where most households have very, very limited income. Another very successful offline is our JForce. It is our underground sales network called JForce. I say JForce because I am French-speaking. So it is JForce. I had mentioned then earlier, these are independent sales agents. They help consumers come online. Those are the people that bridge the gap between offline and online. They are very important. These are independent sales agents. They are not on payroll, but they gain commission on every sale that they make. What makes JForce truly special is that anyone can join, let it be women or single mothers that are using JForce in a way to empower themselves, gain financial independency, and build a better future for their family. It can be students that are trying to get extra income or workers wanting just a side job. Anyone can be. To show you how it really works, we have a short video of Samson that is a JForce agent in Nigeria. Please, let's have a look. My name is Popoola Adebayo Samson. I'm a project writer. Additionally, I'm also a part-time JForce agent here in Ile-Ife. I joined the JForce program so that I can get some additional income. JForce has been very, very successful in improving my customer relations. I've been able to convince people to buy things on Jumia by using some strategies, like introducing them to pay on delivery, letting them know about the pickup station that we have very close to them, and also clearing their doubts about what I ordered versus what I got, which gives them peace of mind in buying things from us too. We see that this is really interesting because Samson is a worker already, and then he uses JForce as a side business, a side job to get additional income. At the same time, he makes his community discover the benefit of shopping online. With the JForce program, we are creating a framework where people make business in a smart way, a true community of entrepreneurs learning digital skills, earning money, and growing together with Jumia while driving job inclusion and impact across Africa. To conclude, we have adapted our marketing strategy in a way that really speaks to diverse consumers and unique consumers that we have in Africa. Our growth trajectory, you will see that later, and I think some Francis already showed. Our growth trajectory in 2025 indicates that we are building a very relevant playbook that is unique to Africa. I will now hand over to my colleague Vinod, who will take us through how we are also customizing logistics across Africa. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Marcelle. I think a lot of people are probably waiting for the break. We are only 10-12 minutes away from the break. Just bear with me. I am also covering a very important topic, going into details of logistics. Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Vinod Goel. I am the CEO of Jumia East Africa, basically covering Uganda and Kenya. I also started my journey in Jumia around five years back when I joined as Head of Fulfillment Operations. I stayed in that role for around a year and a half, moved to Uganda as CEO of Uganda, almost about to settle there for a year and a half, moved back to Nairobi to manage both Uganda and Kenya. Yes, it is true that in Jumia, if you do good, you move around fast. Sometimes it is problematic because you move way too fast. On the logistics side, Jumia's logistics is arguably the biggest enabler and probably also our biggest entry barrier to entry. Jumia operates currently one of the largest parcel delivery networks in all the markets we operate, bigger than any other private third-party logistics company. 349 pickup stations in Kenya means we are catering to not only the tier one, tier two, but also the tier three and tier four towns where the population is as low as 30,000-40,000 people. This is not natural. Just a couple of years back, we were stopping ourselves at 100,000-200,000, and we thought it is not worth going to the smaller towns. However, we were wrong, and we learned that actually these tier four towns are highly underserved, both in terms of assortment and enterprises. Hence, this is why Jumia clicks there, and we are entering smaller and smaller towns and growing our network faster. Dipping dive into this, how actually we are able to do that. Francis told us about that we reduced our fulfillment cost by half, going from $3.5- $1.9. How did we do it? We are able to do cash on delivery, how we are able to do it, et cetera. I am going to go a little bit deeper into this. The first thing is that Jumia has enabled and harnessed around 246 local logistics companies. If we divide it by roughly nine markets, we are talking about around 25 companies in each country. Not too much and not too little. We do not want to be dependent on very big third-party logistics companies. We also do not want to work with very small hundreds of companies. What do they do not bring, our third-party companies? They do not bring tech. It's counterintuitive, but our companies actually do not bring any tech because we have it. We have to be very prudent that we do not want to have the tech cost double. They also do not bring high G&A cost, overhead cost, because if you are tech-driven, you will have the people who understand that tech, who can manage it, who can run it, who can license it, who can integrate it. All these costs we have already paid. We are not going to go to those kinds of companies. What our third-party companies bring, what are they? These are the small logistics companies who started with a fleet of two small trucks, three tuk-tuks, and probably two vans. Sometimes actually ex-Jumia employees who started these companies. What do they bring? They actually bring very cost-effective vehicles, low overhead costs, and deep local know-how. Let me talk a little bit about the vehicles. Around 50% of the small items, when we talk about small items, it can be a T-shirt, a face cream, a smartphone. They are delivered in Uganda, for example, through motorbikes. We can easily switch to, could continue on the vans and the five-tonner trucks, but they are way more expensive. They cannot enter all the streets. We deliver them through bikes. Similarly, the medium-sized items, for example, your microwave, a laptop, a pair of shoes are delivered on tuk-tuk. And tuk-tuk, actually, it's a makeshift on a local motorbike where they put a box which can carry around, let's say, seven microwaves. This is designed on a local motorbike. It's around 35% cheaper than any one-tonner, two-tonner, or a van available in the market. These third-party partners also do a very important thing for us. We have been talking about pickup stations, right? We are going not only door delivery only in big cities, but we are doing pickup stations. Who are actually opening these pickup stations? Who is running these pickup stations? It is very difficult for Jumia as a company to do all that. We rely on our third-party companies, and they have kind of a roadmap for the one year that we have to go on this route. On this route today, you have 15 pickup stations, but we see a continuous growth, and hence you have to open five more. They are ready with that plan, and they are ready with the small investment they have to do, and they know that they can grow business. Lastly, they rely 100% on Jumia's technology. It is a very important piece because they do not have their own tech. They rely on our technology. It brings us 100% visibility and almost 100% control on all the operations. This setup works very well. We get almost exclusive, super loyal third-party companies working for us, while we have these small entrepreneurs who are able to grow, scale a very profitable, simplified business without investing too much into vehicles and technology. This is a very important piece for us to understand, is that this is also one of the biggest reasons why we are able to crack cash on delivery in Africa. We will come to that later when we go to the payments part, and I will explain it again. Coming to the balance, reducing the cost has not always been a sweet topic. Like any other customer, our customers also demand speed, convenience, and affordability. In busy routes and big cities, let's take an example of Kenya, Nairobi plus four other big cities. Yes, we offer door delivery, and we offer next-day delivery, right? We are able to hit all three: speed, convenience, and affordability. You can get a smartphone delivered in Nairobi anywhere for $0.85, and you can get a microwave delivered for 250 km for less than $2. Doable. However, the moment we step out of the urban centers and we go to the smaller towns, we are not able to deliver all three. We can't be faster. We can't be affordable and convenient. We do not do a lot of door deliveries in smaller towns, and we also have to choose between the speed and the cost. You can take a particular route, and either we are able to fill a one-tonner truck daily, or we can fill a four-tonner truck in three days. If we go for a four-tonner truck, the cost is lower. We can pass this as a lower shipping fee, and the customers love it. Sometimes we have to be slow, but be able to give the affordable service to our customers. Talking about our pickup stations, as Francis was mentioning, they are not fancy establishments, very, very basic, but they are well located. They are very well branded. Actually, they can be sometimes the landmark in the town. They are always in the middle of the town, in the most popular city. They are not fancy, but they are functional. A content creator 300 km from Nairobi can easily choose from 300 types of ring lights on Jumia, get it delivered 250 km in a town which has only 30,000 population, can pick it up in any day of the next six days, try it for the seven days, press a button, return it if they do not like, and get the money refunded in the mobile wallet. This happens only on Jumia in Africa. Lastly, coming to our warehouses, so-called fulfillment centers. Again, we have to operate in a very frugal manner. All our warehouses are tech-enabled, non-fancy, very efficient, 100% on standardized SOPs. All our warehouses are located in the capital cities. They are located closer to the sellers, closer to the buyers, closer to the airports, closer to the ports. Led by fast growth, we have moved in many countries from smaller, scattered warehouses to consolidated fulfillment centers, which is giving us operational efficiency and higher productivity. We also moved, actually, some of our corporate offices in five countries to the fulfillment center. Again, saves us cost and brings us operational efficiency. It will be interesting to see one of the warehouses in the video, and it will give us a glimpse of what is happening there. Before we move to the video, I would also like to say that even in the warehouses, we have to make frugal trade-offs, right? For example, recently, we had to reduce our packaging material on our products. If you are trying to buy a 43-inch TV from Jumia, you will not find another layer of the bubble wrap, and there is another branded Jumia plastic on it because it is not required. The customers might fancy about it, but no customer is ready to pay for the fancy packaging. Lastly, it is not good for the environment, and hence we decided to cut it out. Yeah, let's go for the video for the warehouse, and then we'll move to the next topic. Xiaomi has a long cooperation with Jumia already. After Jumia has a bigger warehouse in Egypt, we can have a bigger cooperation in the future, and we can sell more Xiaomi products on the Jumia platform. That's amazing. أنا شايف إحنا كقنوات وجوميا هيبقى في تعاون استراتيجي يعني في الحتة سبيشال في الحتة بتاعة الـ H.A. الور هاوس كبير يسمح [Foreign Language] إن إحنا نتعاون في الهيفي والأجهزة لكبيرة والاوبريشن هيبقى أسهل طبعا. إحنا يكون عندنا مساحة تخزينية كبيرة عن طريق المخزن الجديد دوت دي حاجة هتساعدنا خلال الفترة اللي جاية نكبر البزنس بتاعنا وإن إحنا نكبر معاهم بشكل كويس. إحنا كعربي بنهدف دايما إن إحنا نوصل للاند يوزر في كل مكان في مصر. إن كان الوسيلة دي هي هتبقى جوميا فده شيء هيضيف لمنتجاتنا وإحنا بنعتبر جوميا من الشركاء النجاح المهمين جدا عندنا. مساحة الور هاوس حوالي 27,000 متر ده بيدي كباستي كبيرة قوي للمكان وبيزود الطاقة الاستيعابية ليه وهيساعدنا بشكل كبير قوي في الفترة اللي جاية إن إحنا نقدر نضخ كميات كبيرة من المنتجات بتاعتنا مع جوميا. Actually, we just showed you our fanciest warehouse, so not all of them are like that, but one day. Moving on to the next topic, logistics is not only about cost. Logistics is a key driver for Jumia's growth, unlocking new markets for the seller and new merchandise for our customers. In logistics also, we have a flywheel. It's very easy to understand, but let me still go through it. We expand to newer and newer cities, newer and newer towns, which means our sellers are able to sell to the wider network. They actually started with, before Jumia, they're actually selling in a 2, 3, 4, 5 km radius. Now with Jumia, they're able to sell to 200 towns and next year to 300 towns, and hence their business on Jumia is growing. When they have a larger business, they are able to source at a lower cost, passing that cost to Jumia's customers. This effect also comes on logistics. We are able to fill our one-tonner trucks going to 200 km route on the east faster. We are able to move to a bigger truck, and hence our logistics cost per order goes down. Both these benefits of having the lower cost of the product and the lower cost of the delivery fees and probably way more assortment are passed to the customers who, in turn, will return faster to us, will actually tell the neighbor that this is the best place to shop, and hence we have the flywheel turning up. It is not just a theory. It is happening in real life. I want to share an example where recently, around a year back, I was on a field trip on the east side of Nairobi. It's a small town called Awasi, and I was at a pickup station, and I had two gentlemen picking up the items. One of them picking up a mobile cover, and the other one is a pair of shoes. Natural question, why do you shop in Jumia? Here is the interesting list. They said that we have only two, three shops in our town where we can find these products. Very important. The lack of assortment. They say the prices are very high, around 40% higher, and then we do not know if this product will work or not. It is good quality or not. There is absolutely no way for them to return. Once the money has been given, forget about it, right? When we see actually in the background, this is exactly the problems we are solving, right? You have the assortment, you have the right prices, and you can return if you do not like. The only problem they continued was that they actually came to this pickup station from 7 km in road from Awasi, another town called Ahero. They complained that, why do you not have the pickup station there? We studied the town. It was way too small for us at that time. However, just two months back, we opened the pickup station there. It is thriving. We are doing around 60-70 packages a week there, and hence able to access a new town. Probably in the next visit, they will not complain about that. Looking at the other side, just before Black Friday, we met our vendors. We do a vendor meeting like this, and we discuss things with them. I met a lady who actually started selling mobile phone covers on Jumia a year back, and she said that she started with Jumia, not with a store, because she has very little money and she could start only with 20 pieces of mobile phone covers. The only place she could do is either social media or Jumia, but Jumia gives us a whole variety. It takes care of your marketing, sales, logistics, and cash. Today, she runs a business with around 500 SKUs. She sells on Jumia. She sells on three social media platforms. She does her own content creation for all these social media. She has a website. When we talked to her, she did not think of this kind of a future. She never studied digital marketing, and she never knew what e-commerce was one year back. That is the flywheel effect. Moving to payments. After moving the physical goods, there is one important piece we have to move, which is the money. In the Western markets, this topic is quite easy. A lot of people have the bank accounts. They are integrated, aggregated by players like Visa and MasterCard, and hence the topic is sorted. In Africa, we have the challenges. Around 50% of the transactions still happen with hard cash. Hard cash means the note or the coins. Very complex, full of leakages, and hence the most expensive despite any transactional cost. Second, digital money, which is around 28%. It is growing. And digital money in Africa largely means mobile money, which means you have the account with a telco, and you're able to pay to any companies or to any PS. And last but not the least is the prepayment, which is around 17%, growing very fast. This number looks very small as a%. However, I do not think there is any consumer company, any online consumer company in the whole continent where 17% consumers trust them by prepaying. Coming back to cash. Cash is complex, and hence it's a great moat for us. All organizations fear it. Many have failed to crack it. How do we do it? Coming back to our partnership with our third-party companies. The biggest issue is actually the delivery agent who is delivering your item has to collect the hard cash. Now, sometimes this cash is way too much for this person's choices to be different. If this person is delivering a phone, which is worth $200, this person can actually decide to just run away, and $200 can be easily four or five months of salary. That is a plug we need to crack. This is where we have spent almost a decade to understand how we could do it. There are multiple hooks between the delivery agents and the third-party logistics company and Jumia. That is why we say that exclusivity, a complete dependence on each other, is the role which we play, and hence we are able to do cash on delivery in almost a no-leakage manner. Digital on delivery is a very interesting one. It is growing fast. It is available in almost all of our markets. The way it works is that we have different digital money players in each country. For example, in Kenya, you have Safaricom and M-Pesa, which is around 99% of the transactions. When we go to Morocco, it is still almost cash. When you go to Nigeria, around 80% of the payments happen on delivery, but through the bank transfer. What we have to do is then in each market, we have to identify the most relevant payment partners, and we integrate with them through JumiaPay. Hence, every single country, we have almost 100% options available for the customers to pay for the goods. Last but not the least, the upside going forward is that our prepayment ratio is increasing, our digital on delivery is increasing, and both these things go in our favor because it is going to help us increase the success rate of the deliveries. Lastly, we are accelerating on buy now, pay later. It is an option where customers will be on the checkout of Jumia. We'll be able to select the product for which they do not have the money. They can pay a small deposit for it, get the instant loan from the fintechs or the banks behind it, and get the items which they are aspiring for. It is going to unlock a lot of new market and also going to drive our average order value. Thank you very much for listening patiently to me. I'll invite Antoine. He's the last man standing between the break and us. We have discussed several aspects of the business of Jumia. We have discussed about commercial logistics. We even touched about cash reconciliation, which is close to my heart as a CFO. You know, CEO, we operate in such a large footprint across Africa. To make this work smoothly, we have at the core of our operation our unified tech platform. The core has been built in-house and is being maintained in-house. It is built around three different tool sets: vendor center, customer center, and finance and operations. It provides us with a single entry point for all users, integrated building blocks, as well as a layer of data for real-time analytics. This tech stack is built for Africa. For instance, if you think of mobile app, we need mobile app which are adapted to low data availability, low bandwidth availability, and high data cost. When you think of our sellers, we also need to have very user-friendly applications to onboard them and keep them engaged with the platform. Finally, and we not talk about that, we are enabling our 3PL vendors with our tech, but we need to control each and every step of the logistics process. Lastly, we are facing a very fragmented payment environment in which there's a lot of cash. To mitigate this, we are using JumiaPay and the gateway we have built. Data is at the heart of everything we do. With all those systems, we are, I would say, very data-rich, but we are working hard to be data-driven. Our unified data warehouse draws information from all systems and powers real-time analytics that create a lot of value. We are able to better serve our customers. Our vendors can look at and manage their price on a real-time basis. They can monitor their inventory. Very importantly, all Jumia team have access to the same data metrics, which helps us take decisions real-time with a coordinated view: finance, marketing, and commercial. I will let the floor either to the pause or to Temidayo. I do not know if we pause now. Oh, it is the break. All right, welcome back, everyone. We get to the fun part, right? My name is Temidayo Ojo. I am the CEO for Jumia Nigeria. My journey started with Jumia about five and a half years ago. It is a classic case of what Francis was talking about, about merit-based growth and opportunities for local operators in the business. I joined the Ghana business five and a half years ago as the Head of Planning and Performance, driving growth and efficiency initiatives in the business. I did that for a year and a half and subsequently moved on to become the Chief Commercial Officer for Ghana. Two years after, I became the CEO for Ghana. Five months ago, I transitioned to the Nigeria business, to head the Nigeria business as the CEO for Jumia Nigeria. Tonight, I'll be taking you through how we win versus competition in our markets and why we are confident that we have the right competitive advantages to continue winning in our markets going forward. Let's have a look at how our competitive landscape is. Today, the competitive landscape for us at Jumia is quite diverse. As you can see, we have a mix of local operators that are either specific to the country or category specific. We also have non-resident players like Temu and Shein that are also making market entries into the continent. Then we have countries like Egypt, which is quite peculiar, where you have a mix of everything of local competitors, category specific players, as well as Noon and Amazon. However, we believe and we are confident that we have the right competitive strategy to win in that market. Our focus on low—sorry, our focus on low-cost consumers or the lower middle-class consumers allows us to differentiate ourselves and still take a sizable share of the market. I'm sure you've noticed two countries on the chart. That's Senegal and Ivory Coast that generally don't have any large competitive player in the market. They just have a couple of smaller local players as well as probably social commerce. If you look at this, one thing that is clear is that we have an unmatched footprint on the continent. With that comes clear advantages of learnings as well as operational execution and the ability to adapt to the local context in the markets in which we operate. These are very, very strong—these are very strong things to have. Let's move on to the next slide. Our local players. We win versus local players, and I'm not going to flash flood this anymore. It has been touched on by different parts of the presentation already today. Some of the key competitive advantages or strong pillars that we have that we compete against local players today is our tech stack. We're able to build a very robust tech stack because we're able to invest for nine markets across all our nine markets. We have a very superior supply and commercial infrastructure, which HM has delved extensively into. This allows us to negotiate at scale with our international brands and suppliers, and as well, allows us to source very strongly locally. We also have our matched infrastructure in terms of our logistics network, which is built on the back of our 3PL partners that are exclusive to us and have deep knowledge of the locations in which they operate. Of course, there's a big one which we've invested a lot on on the Jumia side over the years, which is trust. We've done this by building local presence in our markets over the last 10- 15 years. We are talking of our 3PL partners who are local, our pickup stations that are local, as well as customer support and vendor support operations that are physically present and available to consumers for issue resolution and all forms of support with the e-commerce journey. Let's look at the non-resident players, right? There's been a lot of buzz around players like Temu and Shein, and these guys are basically disrupting—they're disrupting the e-commerce playbook globally, not just in Africa, but we get news about what's happening in Canada, in the U.S., and all. We are quite confident that we have—we have not competed with them for about a year and a half. Temu came into Nigeria last year and Morocco as well. They also launched in Ghana this year. We have been competing with Temu for at least a year and a half now, and I have not done that. We have learned a lot, but we are also more confident. We are also quite confident that we have the right—that we have the right competitive advantage to actually win against them. Let us look at it. Assortment, right? Number one, in terms of assortment, under 60% of our GMV drivers, for example, this is a category like appliances, TVs, and the likes. Temu is not able to compete because of the size of the items. Things like high-value phones and things like large and medium items, they are not able to do dropshipping directly from China in a cost-effective way. Meanwhile, we are able to manage this because we build a local supply and we're able to ship to customers in good time. For the rest of the traditional e-commerce or cross-border categories like the home, like the electronic accessories, as well as fashion, we've also spent a lot of time building very, very reliable and competitive supply through our relationship to the China hub and actually bringing that supply into the country such that we are able to match Temu on prices and supply and even do better than what they do in terms of the fact that we can actually deliver faster in 24 hours because many of those items are sitting in our fulfillment center warehouses in the countries that we operate. Now we look at the reach, and we've talked a lot about our logistics infrastructure, but this is one of our strongest pillars. We are able to reach the entire country and the most significant breadth of the country in a cost-effective way, something that Temu is unable to do today because of the fact that they're operating from outside the country and they don't have that network that we have. To talk about payments, cash on delivery is super important. We've talked about the trust topic. We've been able to provide payment solutions, both offline and online, that address the frictions that consumers today face, particularly with regards to payments. There's a big—let me speak about Nigeria. There's a big thing about people being scammed online, right? I'm in the U.K. today. I placed an order on Amazon a day like two days ago, and I didn't even think twice before using my card details. The same me in Nigeria would think twice about providing my card details on the platform. That's the kind of trust issues that we have to deal with on the continent. There's a lot of skepticism and a lot of paranoia about e-commerce online platforms. Today, Jumia has been able to kind of bridge that gap with the physical presence that we have in those countries. We are present on radio. We are not hiding. We're present on TV. We have hubs scattered all over the country. We have JForce agents that are local people, local agents that are local to the communities in which they work that can act as ambassadors for Jumia and say, "This is a legit business. This is a business that you can work with. These are some of the assets that we have that allow us to break that barrier and still something that non-resident players and international players are still struggling with today. As you see, this is just not a theoretical thing. We are seeing that even one and a half years after Temu has been in Nigeria, we are still seeing that Jumia is maintaining its leadership in the market and still remaining relevant in the market. What we tried to do is to also check this. We did a test with Ipsos. Sorry, and then we'll move to the next slide. We did a test with Ipsos, surveying about 15 cities of our major cities and about 2,000 consumers, kind of understand where we stand 15 months or 18 months after the entrance of Temu. You see that in terms of top-of-the-mind awareness as well as brand awareness, Jumia still maintains market leadership. In terms of the key metrics of usage and stickiness, we are still the preferred brand. If you ask me what we think about competition, I think competition is good for us because it keeps us on our toes, it keeps us sharp. We are confident that we have the right tools, we have the right infrastructure, we have the right competitive advantage to fight and to win against competition. If we look at the entire industry, if we look at the entire ecosystem, we can see as Jumia that we win both locally and we win both internationally because we built a service that truly adapts to the needs and requirements of users in our market. If we look at the entire e-commerce funnel from awareness up until repurchase, we have built strategies and we have deployed strategies that enable us to continue to effectively capture that market. I would like to finish by saying we are confident that we can compete and deliver in the market and deliver on our plan without killing our unit economics. As you can see, we are not competing by burning cash. As my colleague will show you in subsequent slides, competition is not taking away the momentum of the growth that we are seeing in the markets that we are operating today. In actual fact, we are seeing the opposite. We are seeing growing momentum in all our key markets, and even in some markets, we are seeing acceleration, including in markets where we have Temu and non-resident players operating. I believe that we can compete by burning cash, and we can build the—but we compete by building the right value proposition, and that's what we have today. With that, I'm going to hand over to Renaud. He's going to take you through the country-level lens and show you the performance overview at the different countries. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for joining us today. I'm Renaud Glenisson. I've been working with Jumia for 10 years. I started as the CFO for Ivory Coast, then CFO for West Africa, CFO for JumiaPay all countries. Three years and a half ago, I was appointed CEO for Ivory Coast, and I am now Regional CEO covering for Ivory Coast, Ghana, Senegal, Algeria, and Morocco. I'm based in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. In this section, we are going to cover country information. We've been asked quite a few times in the past to provide more information at country level. In the last two quarters, we have started disclosing information on usage. What we are going to do today is give you a little bit more information and more color market by market. All right. One of the key important things that we want in the next few quarters is to be profitable. For that, countries have to generate enough cash by increasing their scale and penetration across markets and by having very strong unit economics in order to cover for their lean fixed costs and those of the central cost as well. The fixed cost part was already taken care of by Francis in the previous section. What we are going to focus on today in this section, sorry, is scale and penetration and unit economics. Let's start with scale and penetration. This slide is very important for you to understand what is the addressable market and what market we currently address. Let's start with the first chart, which is the logistic network coverage. In this chart, you see a very different situation across countries, with Ivory Coast and Egypt being the best-in-class markets in terms of population covered and other countries below. This chart represents the percentage of population of the country living in cities where at least one pickup station is operating. I will talk about the Ivory Coast situation because I live there and I know it pretty well. Ivory Coast is where we started what we call the playbook with Jumia. We started expanding upcountry back in 2016, with the first country being San Pedro and then subsequently opening dozens of cities every year. Even this year, in 2025, we opened 20 new cities. One of them is Biankouma, which is a city close to the border of Liberia, 70,000 people roughly. We were asked by JForce agents to actually open a pickup station there because they thought that there was a market there. And they were actually right. Within a couple of weeks, we had hundreds of orders in this city, and it has been a very successful launch this year. Looking at Nigeria, we saw earlier in the presentation that the coverage is—well, there is less coverage in the country. Currently, the team is working on the ground trying to open the northern parts of the country. We will soon have an increased coverage in this country. I will not detail every single country here. My point here is that we still have a lot of room for growth in terms of coverage of population. Moving on to the two other charts, which measure the penetration as the number of orders in the last 12 months per 1,000 people and the economic relevance as the GMV over GDP, those two charts show that Ivory Coast is the leading country here. This is, again, because we started the playbook way earlier than in the other countries. The two countries that are following are Ghana and Kenya, which were actually the two countries that started the turnaround of the business three years ago very quickly, while the restructuring took a little bit more time in Nigeria and Egypt. In this slide, you can therefore see that we have a lot of opportunities to get to a higher level of penetration and economic relevance across the countries. That being said, this is not just—this is not just what we think we could do. It is actually happening. Growth is already happening, as you saw earlier in the presentation. I'm going to show you in the next slide and give you some more color about how we have growth in all countries. Let's start with Ivory Coast. Ivory Coast is the most penetrated country. We saw that in the slide before, but we still have 20% growth, and we still have room for growth. We are currently having very high growth in some categories like babies, kids and babies, fashion, beauty. We still are opening pickup stations, so there's room for growth in the country. Looking at Nigeria, Nigeria has 30% roughly growth in quarterly active customers, the same for orders, a little bit higher in GMV because the country is switching to higher AOV, average order value. The country is massively underpenetrated, and we still have a long work ahead of us. When you think about it, there are more than 230 million in Nigeria, while we have only 30 million people in Ivory Coast. So the country is seven times bigger than Ivory Coast. There is definitely room for growth in the country, and the team is on the ground working on both the assortment and the pickup station network. Moving on to Kenya, Kenya has a very good and strong trajectory in terms of growth across the three KPIs, with a very strong usage as well in orders. Kenya has a strong assortment and is currently diversifying things to local sellers, but as well as Chinese sellers. The pickup station network is still expanding as well. Egypt, the situation looks a bit more complicated when you first have a look at it. Let me explain on this country the situation. Egypt has a growth on orders in quarterly active customers, but in GMV, we are degrowing. That being said, this is because of corporate sales. As mentioned earlier by Antoine, corporate sales represented a high amount last year at the same period. When you remove this impact, there is definitely a growth on GMV, 40% growth. This shows acceleration in Egypt despite the competition that is quite important with Amazon and Noon. We believe that we have some space there. Definitely, we have space for three factors, and Jumia has room by focusing on low and middle class. Moving on to Ghana, Ghana's growth rates are very good, I must say, with active customers growing by 60%, orders close to 100%, and GMV even higher. Ghana has the same playbook as other countries, but significantly invested in the pickup station expansion very recently. The local seller and Chinese sellers are working very well. All in all, we can see a strong reacceleration across markets. This is done with good unit economics. This is not just like we keep on growing, but at a high cost like we used to do before 2022. Let's move on to the financial KPIs here. Same here, I'm going to give you some more color market by market. Ivory Coast first. Ivory Coast has a good take rate, a bit higher than the rest of the group. We actually increased the monetization earlier this year with a bit of higher shipping fees, higher commissions. We do not have that much competition there, so we can even continue increasing the monetization. Fulfillment expense for order is quite high, higher than the rest of the group. This is because the mix of products is quite oriented towards large items. When you walk into the warehouse in Abidjan, you would see a lot of fridges, like thousands of televisions, big TVs, air conditioning systems everywhere. A lot of large items, which costs a bit more in terms of fulfillment. There is also a mix that is more towards the upcountry. Ivory Coast is one of the highest of the countries where the mix between capital city and upcountry is more favorable towards the upcountry. Marketing expense in Ivory Coast is quite good below the rest of the group. Low competition online and very strong execution offline. Quite a good marketing expense per order and quite a profitable growth in Ivory Coast. Nigeria. Nigeria is the best-in-class country in terms of take rate and fulfillment expense per order. Take rate is higher because of the category mix that is more favorable towards higher commissions. Fulfillment expense per order is quite low. When you look at it, it seems really low, and it is. This is because the mix of categories is more into small and medium items first, and then staff cost is way lower than in Ivory Coast, for instance. Nigeria still has potential to grow upcountry, so the mix is a bit less towards the upcountry for now. Marketing expense is very similar to Ivory Coast. Despite online competition, it remains very lower than the rest of the group. Kenya has strong unit economics across the three KPIs. High take rates, low fulfillment expense per order. Same here, less large items than in Ivory Coast and strong marketing expense per order with roughly the same level as Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Egypt. Egypt's take rate is lower than the rest of the group and fulfillment expense per order higher than the rest of the group, while marketing expense as well. Here, the situation is a bit different. We are lacking scale in Egypt. As you saw earlier, the penetration is lower, but the reacceleration of growth will help us definitely increase monetization in the next couple of months. Scale will also help us decrease the cost in this country. Now, Ghana. Ghana's unit economics are a bit hard to read, if I must say. This is because of the hyperinflationary adjustments that we have in the country, so accounting entries. If you look at local currency take rate, you would not see this kind of low take rate. You would see roughly the same level as Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Kenya. Fulfillment cost per order and marketing cost per order is very good in Ghana, but the same here. They were impacted, like in Nigeria, by inflation and a difficult macroeconomic situation. The costs went shrinking for a couple of months in a row. This is kind of favorable for us. In Ghana, we definitely have a profitable growth, and it is a very strong acceleration as we speak. All right. All in all, all countries have good unit economics, whilst Egypt's situation is a bit different, but we are working on it with scale and acceleration of the growth. What I want you to remember from this section is that we have room for deeper penetration of the market. There is definitely room for growth working on the assortment, on the logistic network, and we have good unit economics making it profitable growth. I hope this couple of slides helps you get more color about the situation by market. I will now hand over to Francis and Antoine for the next phase of growth and financial outreach. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Renaud. As we look into Jumia's next phase of growth, we see several key strengths that we have been discussing extensively. First, we operate in massively underpenetrated markets. Second, our value proposition is tailored for Africa, and we have a proven playbook. Third, we have developed, after 10 years, a unique local expertise. We have an asset-light model in logistics, which is powered by our own tech, ensuring scalability and unit economics control. Finally, Jumia is a recognizable brand. We are famous. We are appreciated, and this drives customer loyalty and repeat purchase. We believe the turnaround is done. There is still a lot of work, but we've made huge improvements on the top line and the efficiency and then the cost management. Going forward, we have a very clear objective. First, by 2030, we aim at $2.5 billion-$3 billion GMV. In parallel to this growth, we expect take rate to grow by 2.5%. The operational leverage resulting from the growth will result in an EBITDA margin over 20%. Most importantly, this plan is a self-funded plan. We have a clear path to reach profitability in 2027 and to be free cash flow positive going forward. We are committed to driving 20% CAGR GMV growth per year. This will come mainly from value proposition announcements, enhanced coverage, reacceleration on sales and marketing, and improved conversion. Beyond this, we have some long-term optionality, which we will trigger in due time when specific internal KPIs will be met. We have extensively discussed the potential in our countries. Briefly, when we compare the population covered by our pickup station and the active consumer, we see that we have a huge room to grow around 40% in Ivory Coast. How are we going to increase our monetization? It will come mainly from increased monetization, which comes with scale because monetization is a byproduct of scale. We'll increase as well the contribution from advertising. We are about 1% of our GMV, while our peers are around 2%. We will optimize our retail pricing as well as the mix with international vendors. As we scale and as we discussed, in line with what was achieved from 2022- 2025, we expect unit economics to drastically go down, both on fulfillment and marketing cost per order. Talking about fixed cost, we believe that the current structure, both G&A and tech, can operate between 2.5-3x the current volumes. We intend to maintain this structure where it is through continuous renegotiation of our suppliers' contracts and a very strict and cautious HR policy. When relevant, we will use AI to boost productivity. As an example, I can tell you that after a first period of ramp-up, about 15%-20% of our code is today generated by AI. As a recap, the profitability will come from a combination of GMV growth, increased monetization, and keeping the fixed cost stable. Beyond this, we see some optionalities. We believe that Jumia's platform is the best one with our systems, our expertise to address logistics in Africa. If we open our networks to third parties, we are tapping into a $50 billion opportunity by 2030. We have also identified other countries with significant potential, and we might, when ready, go there. We will need to meet some criteria, which will be for sure ethics, stability, strong potential in terms of GDP and population. We need to have the proper network available and sellers ready to accompany us. We will trigger those two optionality if and when we reach our internal criteria. Thank you. I will now let the floor to Francis for closing in. I have amazing news for everyone in the last slide. Thanks all for your attention and patience. I will be very short. I believe we're finally in the right place. The backdrop is that macro trends are obviously favorable for the African consumer market. More specific macroeconomic evolutions and more conjunctural elements are finally slightly playing in our favor, which is a big improvement versus the past few years we've been through in Africa. We operate in markets that are extremely hard to adapt to, even if you're willing to learn, which is not the case for everyone, but very hard to adapt to and enter for foreign large players. We discussed non-resident, but it applies to everyone coming with deep pockets, a standard, rigid business model that has been tested on other bigger continents in terms of demand. Most importantly, at the heart of everything, the team at Jumia has done an amazing job rebuilding the right business. I mean, we talked a lot about the past today, but it's really behind us. What matters now is that we have something that makes sense for African consumers and partners. We can generate profits serving this market at scale, and it's showing in the numbers. We have built some credibility in the past around cost cutting. That's pretty clear, I think. We're showing the recent quarters that there's a clear acceleration in usage across our markets. It's not driven by one country. It's not driven by one category or something exceptionally happening across the board. This business model that we've rebuilt is working, is relevant, and is generating value. All that in the context of markets that are massively underpenetrated, where we have created barriers to entry, strong reputation, trust, and an amazing brand across Africa. I do believe, and we all believe, Jumia is the one e-commerce platform that will play the next phase of growth in consumer demand in Africa. Thank you all for your attention. We will be taking questions in just a minute. We just need to rearrange the stage, right? Thank you. All right. Thank you. We are ready to start Q&A. Whoever wants to go first. Yes, please. Hi. There just seems to be lots of opportunities in lots of countries. How do you decide which countries go first, how you allocate capital to increasing that coverage? Yeah. First of all, I would say there's not much about capital allocation in this case, right? I mean, expansion at country level is happening without much CapEx. When you expand the network within the country, it's funded by three players. We may make some choices in working capital allocation, but it's very minimal. It's more allocation of time and focus, I would say, from the teams. Over the past few years, we started from a very large footprint, which ranked to fewer countries, that makes sense. Today, we're definitely allocating more time, attention, and more working cap, a bit more freedom to the countries where there's obviously the biggest potential. In the list, we'd have Nigeria first, obviously given the scale of the untapped potential, Kenya, Egypt, Ivory Coast, and somehow Ghana that can actually catch up with Ivory Coast because on paper, it's pretty much the same markets. We have a bunch of smaller markets that are either a bit smaller or with slower traction. That would be Senegal, which is structurally smaller, Uganda, which is a bit smaller as well, Algeria, and Morocco, where we had lower, I mean, slower traction in the past years. Ballpark, that's the idea, but there's very, I mean, there's not much around capital allocation in our case. So you're not constrained in any way in terms of your ambitions, in terms of how quickly you can do things? The only way in which we are constrained by capital would be allocation of working cap at group level, right? We cannot afford to have big swings in working capital. We know that the most important part for us to, I mean, the easiest part for us to accelerate fast would be building up inventories, which right now would not be the right thing to do for our business and for our cash flows. That is somehow a constraint. Marketing levels, we can manage with the cash we have. We could do a bit more, maybe, but that is the only limitations we have. To your point, what I like to say usually, given the type of business we are in and given the profiles of customers we are serving, it is actually good to be under some amount of pressure on the cash side. We do not get crazy and remain very, very frugal for some time. We are okay with the current situation. Just a question on those global brands. Where is the relationship with the global brand managed? Is that managed centrally, or is that managed at the country level? How important are you to those brands in terms of exclusivity, that type of thing? Yeah. I'll take this one, Russ. First, to come back to the working cap part, if you recall, we showed these four buckets of sellers that we work with. The only one where we would need working cap is the part of the global brands. For all the rest, we operate on consignment models. We operate on marketplace models, so it's not cash-intensive at all. We are not limited in accelerating all the other three buckets. Come the global brands, we are customized on this level. We are mapping what we see from the brands. Take, for example, someone like Starlink. It's a centralized relationship because Starlink is centralized. You take something like Transsion, so Itel, Infinix, Xiaomi, they are decentralized on their end, and we map that as well. We're always mirroring the opportunity so that we have the best flexibility. Typically, with most of those brands, it's a one-piece relationship. It's a retail relationship. In terms of exclusivity, not as much. We have first entrant opportunity across most of those brands, be it Adidas, be it Starlink, et cetera. I cannot call it an exclusive partnership. It's just a dominant market position. Thank you. Hey, thank you. A couple of questions. First, maybe explain to everybody the tariff war that's kind of going on globally. How does that impact the business? We've heard that you mentioned it's actually a tailwind to the business in the past. If you could explain it to everybody, I think that would be great. Yeah. I'll let Hisham answer again. I mean, high level is favorable for us. Definitely for Chinese manufacturers, it's putting Africa back on the map. I mean, not at the top of the list, but at least we're back on their radar. It's overall favorable. It's a net positive for our supply. I'll let you elaborate. Yeah. So I mean, as Francis put it, simply put, less products going to America, more products are being funneled to Africa, if you put it in very simple terms. Psychologically, also, our partners internationally, they feel that, okay, there is a market that is being risked, so let me de-risk and diversify my options somewhere else. Again, the nature of the products are different, but the numbers are big. With some sellers we have, they are shipping 60,000-80,000 units per container, and this is coming every couple of weeks. Significant volumes for many of those sellers that they see as, okay, if we shuffle this to Africa, then this is the upcoming opportunity, and I am hedging against whatever goes wrong in the states. The supply is there. Got it. And then one. Just adding to that. In practice, I mean, on the ground, what we see is that our supply pipelines from China are better than ever. I mean, we're literally counting the number of consignment orders that are raised by Chinese vendors to our warehouses. This is looking better than ever. We see way too many sellers attending our meetings and our onboarding sessions in Shenzhen. We have more sellers than chairs available sometimes, quite recently, actually. We really see some kind of enthusiasm or sellers having to pilot somehow. I can add on top that there is a very strong interest even from the authorities and the governments there. So many programs that are sponsored by them, they are putting us on events and so on. They see also holistically the opportunity in Africa, and they are sponsoring that on the ground. Got it. Another interesting thing that we saw in the quarter was previously, a lot of the growth had been led by Nigeria, Ivory Coast, but there was a huge acceleration in Ghana, for example. Maybe talk about how some of these smaller countries start to contribute to the overall growth acceleration now going forward. I think high level, of course, in the past few years, each country had a different pace of restructuring. Very early, actually, in 2022, I mean, 2023, already Ivory Coast was contributing to most of the growth or maintaining somehow the pace for the whole company. I mean, we saw that restructuring was pretty fast in countries like Uganda, credits to Vinod, Ghana, credits to Temi here, and a few other countries that were able to catch up some pace, but were unfortunately unable to make up for the whole loss in bigger countries like Egypt or Nigeria. Now we are at a stage where all the countries pretty much have done the restructuring. It took longer, a bit longer in Nigeria, much longer in Egypt, but we're seeing now very positive trends. It took more time. The pace was different, but now we have everyone contributing. The case of Ghana is very interesting. It's no longer a small country, actually. It's the same scale as Egypt for us now, with a much better pace, so going to be much bigger very soon. Ghana is an interesting case, and I will let maybe Temi or Renaud elaborate on that, because we've been able to deliver very strong growth over the past two years, actually, in Ghana already, on the back of a horrible macroeconomic environment. Ghana had the highest inflation across all of Africa in 2024, 50%. And still, we delivered 80-plus% in GMV growth in dollars. Very strong case that by adapting our value proposition to customers with very low income, we can grow in any kind of environment. If you want to add to that, maybe, Temi? I'll just add that Ghana is an example of a case where everything that we've put out on the playbook is finally working and coming together. On the supply side, on the logistics side, as well as on the operations side, this is a typical example of what can happen when everything in the business is working. Also, it's a testament to the adaptability that we talk about, because we have people that are in the markets, and we are used to volatility. We understand the kind of volatility that will cause. In fact, although 2024 was really a bad year for us, we also had 2022 to learn from, which was also a very, very bad year for Ghana in terms of currency volatility. A lot of changes in the way we source and the kind of coverage we take, in the way we operate, and the way we manage risk came from the learning of 2022, such that we're in a much better position to manage the volatility that came again in 2024. This is just basically the local teams on the ground adapting and learning from the diversity and the changes in the markets that they operate in. Hi. Do you have a breakdown, a GMV country breakdown? What we're providing is the GMV breakdown for the top five countries and then a bucket of the remaining four. You can find it on page 10 or 11 of the quarterly release issued yesterday. Thank you. In terms of delivery times from the Chinese merchants, how does that work? An order is placed, Chinese brand, delivery times are the poodos you have. Do they have stock on site? Do you have fulfillment in your warehouses, or do they do it themselves? How long does it take? Most of the business with our Chinese suppliers is done with fulfillment on site. Basically, our thousands of Chinese vendors will ship container loads to our warehouses in Africa under a consignment model. They will manage transit, customs, everything, and then we sell and we remit the money. The most simple option for us, which means that it can be delivered the next day in the big cities, it can be paid on delivery. It frees us up from a lot of constraints that you would have with cross-border otherwise. On the other hand, it kind of limits the breadth of the assortment, but we're very focused on winning at the top sellers and the 80-20. Thank you. Cash flow projections, you have $80 million cash balance and $80 million cash burn. How do you see that evolving next year in 2027? Sounds like a CFO question. Yeah. Can you hear me? Yes. We believe we have enough cash, as I said, to reach profitability and free cash flow in 2027. It is going to be a combination, as we said, of scale and savings with a bit of increase of monetization. That is our plan, profitable in 2027 and free cash flow onwards. Okay. Okay, cash burn is going to decline significantly. Cash burn is going to decline, and you have also to think in terms of seasonality of the different quarters. Great. Thank you. Hi. This question from online, Brad Erickson with RBC. When we think about your ability to achieve the long-term targets, can you give us any guardrails around how sensitive the business is to current currency volatility before the targets become less achievable? Yes. The way we're sensitive to currency volatility is mostly, I mean, it's directly tied to the level of disruption caused by currency volatility. We had very extreme cases over the past few years, like in Nigeria or Egypt, when there is massive volatility with very strong devaluation in the market. The biggest impact is that the supply kind of freezes for like a whole quarter, and we lose a lot of time building up the marketplace. That's the big impact. Of course, it impacts reported currency numbers, makes the figures a bit harder to read, but that's almost secondary here. It's just that large volatility is impacting our ability to source because suppliers will keep their dollars outside of the country. They will not import. They will not risk it to get a lot of Naira in Nigeria, for example. Chinese vendors will lose confidence and stop shipping. That's what we had in 2022, 2023, 2024 in Nigeria. However, a slow decline in currency rates, I mean, some money slowly losing against the dollar, slowly gaining against the dollar, is totally fine. As long as the moves are controlled and slow, it's fine because suppliers can still plan, international sellers can still plan ahead, ship without losing confidence. It's all about the magnitude of the volatility. I think, and then we have a question in the back. You've obviously done an excellent job in the Ivory Coast with creating a very profitable business with pickup centers and moving upcountry. Is there anything structural in Nigeria, which is clearly the biggest prize in Africa, that would prevent that same model working, or is this just a simple execution playbook that you need to follow? I deeply believe it's all about, it's 90%, 99% about execution. There's no structural barrier. Temi, you contradict me if needed, but there's no structural barrier that prevents us from delivering the same plan, the same quality of execution in Nigeria. There are some subtleties at country level. The road network is not as great in Nigeria as in Ivory Coast. Okay, we can deal with that. Some regions in Nigeria have security issues, but our 3PLs, our partners can deal with it. They can deliver in the north. Supply is a bit more scattered, but we're managing. On the other hand, we have great teams, great seniority, very high level of excitement and motivation in Nigeria. There is really no reason for Nigeria not to be able to achieve the same levels we see in Ivory Coast. I completely agree with you. It's the same. The playbook works as well in Nigeria. As you mentioned, there are unique quirks in each country, but the fundamentals of the playbook still apply. You just need to adapt, make minor tweaks to adapt to the specific market that you're in. Still, the fundamentals of what we are doing in Ivory Coast and Ghana as well work in Nigeria. Bottom line, it's on us. The one difference between those two countries is that Ivory Coast has been executing a decent business plan for the past 8- 10 years, and Nigeria only had one year and a half of clean execution. That's the big difference. Just one more question. I think one thing that is really great for investors is the profitability target. You've talked about Q4 2026 and full year 2027. Maybe you could just give everybody your overall confidence level on hitting that profitability. That's not that far away for the company to really turn profitable, and I think it really changes the game. We're confident. I don't want to go to jail. We're very confident with that. That's why we disclose the numbers. It's because it's perfectly achievable. Yes. Next question in the back, I think. Hello. Thank you. You mentioned a significant part of your code is now being written by AI. I was wondering if you guys are looking at or seizing on any other opportunities for automation, whether it's on the backend office side or in your logistics operation, like the physical warehouse space and easing in levels of automation and planning that can go a long way. Anyone wants to take four sentences? We have no robots, and we do not plan to have robots in the warehouse, for sure, for many reasons, a matter of price and moisture and some other topics. On AI, I have mentioned the code example because it is the most obvious, but we have developed use cases everywhere. I have my auditors in the room. We are working in gathering information for SOX control with agents, for instance. They will have to edit the code, but we have opportunities to reduce cost and automate really everywhere. The list is very long. As far as the warehouse is concerned, I will let Francis answer. In operations, we have very different use cases. In call centers, it's obvious. Like everywhere on earth, we're replacing human beings with agents, and customers are interacting with AI-enabled chatbots. We have fewer and fewer people in our call centers each year, although the volumes are growing. That's an obvious one. In warehouses, a few things here. On the one hand, staff cost is extremely low, extremely low in most of our countries, especially the biggest ones like Nigeria, after massive devaluations. The business case to add robots or any kind of really strong automation just doesn't fly, doesn't work in our countries. On the other hand, the ecosystem to provide robots, automations, and maintain them in those countries hardly exists. Yeah, the highest level of automation, we've just recently reached in Nigeria. We've set up a conveyor belt, gravitational, no engine. That's as far as it gets. It's definitely not an Amazon warehouse issue, if that's what you had in mind. The economics work. The ecosystem would not work to support something much more sophisticated anyway. Very helpful. Thank you. Additionally, the relationship with Axiom, they're now a significant shareholder, and you've added Hassounim to the board. Maybe if you can touch on the synergies that they see or you see together and how that relationship benefits going forward. Yeah, of course. We're working with them on synergies. Of course, there are some obvious overlaps in the footprint, so we can work on a few things. Maybe Marcelle, you want to comment on what you're doing in Senegal? Yeah, of course. Senegal is actually the one country where we have both groups, that is Axiom and Jumia, and we're doing a lot with them. We have a lot of synergies, starting by selling just your products on Jumia. That's the basic part of it. We're also doing a lot of things. We're working on BNPL, buy now, pay later, phone financing. They already have a solution, so it's working for us. We're also working on overdraft with them, like financing a little bit the SMEs that are on Jumia. There are a couple of things. Adding to that, we have all the connectivity, the internet in our warehouse and offices. We're working on a lot of things right now. The main opportunity would be around the fintech arm, where they know how to do consumer finance, vendor finance. I mean, we're not ready to disclose anything tangible here, but that's probably the main opportunity. Thank you. And lastly, could you touch on why you stopped accepting cash in Kenya and maybe why that's unique to some of your other markets? Because we could. You want to elaborate? Sorry, what was the question? Why did we stop accepting cash in Kenya? Oh, yes. I think the answer is short, is that we could. There is a very high penetration of digital money, mobile money in Kenya. And just a small nudge to the customer that, sorry, we do not accept cash. Actually, we went from probably accepting 15% of cash to zero cash, and there is no damage. It's actually faster, better for everybody. It's a great example of what's coming with digitization of payments, right? I mean, in Nigeria, one, two years back, it was 90+% banknotes, cash. A few things happened. They withdrew all the banknotes, which helped us. It was a bit rushed. I mean, the system of local bank transfers really works. We've integrated it to our JumiaPay platform, and now it's over 80% of deliveries that are paid through JumiaPay, through, sorry, on bank transfers upon delivery in Nigeria. We're moving a lot of cash and a lot of complication for partners and for Jumia. Really depends on the local ecosystems, and some countries are way more advanced than others. Thank you. One more. Sorry, I'm hogging. If you could expand into other product categories or service offerings today, is there anything that you're targeting or looking at bringing into the fold, or maybe it's market specific, but just on how you enhance the offering profile? Nothing crazy. We really stick to the basics, right? We have a few core categories. We believe there's still a lot of potential demand to serve in those categories. We are still trying to expand. Maybe Renaud, you want to explain the fine-tuning in Ivory Coast, which is almost penetrating markets? Yes. In Ivory Coast, we started developing the kids and babies category a couple of years back, predominantly because we were having customers asking for it, right? Many people and many, especially mothers, asking for diapers in the countryside while there were no delivery available there with the retail market. We are covering this category. We are also expanding on, unlike in the Northern African markets where beauty and fashion is very elaborate in Western countries, we still have a lot of opportunities to grow with local sellers, but also with international brands through China, through Turkey. We are working on several projects as we speak. We definitely have a lot of growth in these categories. One more question from me. I remember in the past there was a big gap between gross GMV and net GMV. With the new delivery strategy, how has that changed? We haven't disclosed that for a while. I think it's either 20F, correct me if I'm wrong. Fairly stable on that KPI. On the one hand, we're making our deliveries a lot more reliable. On the other hand, we're pushing to more remote cities, targeting customers who have less experience of e-commerce and who, well, we're finding more surprises with them. Many different factors at play here. The ratio is overall stable on the e-commerce business. I mean, what I can say most precisely, though, is that this is probably our biggest battle in operations. We know that there's a gap because we're doing payments and delivery, whether it's cash or digital. There's a gap, a significant gap between gross and net, more than just the returns because customers are not committed. The money may dig on between the moment you order and three days later when you get your product, right? We are working really hard on that. A few different topics here. We are working to deliver a bit faster as long as it makes sense for unit costs. We are working to make our partners more professional, to provide them incentives or penalties if they can reach certain targets on that. We are working also really hard on kind of communications we are sending to customers through text messages, through WhatsApp, through push notifications. It is a very broad range of topics we are trying to cover to gradually improve that metric. That will always be kind of under pressure because payment and delivery is going to stay and is going to be a very important part of the playbook for a long time. Question from Francis, I think now. Thank you. Can I maybe ask the same question that was asked around the playbook working in Nigeria, but for Egypt? I mean, it seems a tougher market all around. I appreciate you're maybe further behind in terms of aligning the business model to the changes that you've done elsewhere. I guess as you think of that market five, ten years out, is there any reason to think it could just be more structurally difficult there because of competition or anything else? Maybe Hisham, you want to explain the specificities of the Egyptian market? Yes. At face value, it is a more difficult market, okay? You have big players like Amazon or Noon. You have a lot of homegrown players, I mean, 60 of them, and you have sometimes per category seven or eight players. It is a market that is more competitive, and that means maybe your marketing cost per order will be higher there. Is there a structural reason for it to fail versus the other markets? No. Simply put, what we mentioned at the start of the presentation, people are coming with a global playbook. It is more focused on the tier one cities. It is more focused on the higher AOV, which is usually what you come with, the non-customized version, as we call it. In Egypt, we have a huge opportunity in the upcountry, which is still not unlocked in the north, in the delta, or in the south. This is, it's the same playbook. We're expanding one by one. We're opening pickup stations, and we're delivering to those underserved customers with products in that price range. Yes, there is more competition. We're not going to deny that, but the playbook is going to work. It's just not going to be in the tier one cities. It's going to be in the upcountry, which is our strength. I'm absolutely convinced that the gap in penetration that you see today in Egypt versus other markets is purely, I mean, it's not due to competition. Competition has been a convenient excuse for a long time. It's, of course, a bit more competitive, but most of the gap is driven by legacy and by quality of execution over a whole decade. That's why we had three full years of restructuring in Egypt. Now, after rebuilding the teams, changing the logistics, rebuilding the supply base, and delivering the same quality of execution that we're delivering in, I don't know, Uganda, Ghana, or Nigeria, we're able to grow again quite significantly, as you could see last quarter. We deeply believe in this market. It's starting from a more challenging point. It's always harder when you're small in the big ponds when you're in a marketplace. We believe that scale will help. There is clearly a market for the lower middle class of Egypt that is not the focus of other big players where we know how to serve. We have learned a lot for this segment of customers, and it definitely applies to Egypt. Thank you. Thank you very much for the detailed presentation. Just if we look at the GMV or order mix now in terms of countries, do you largely expect that to remain the same if we think about that $2.5 billion, I think $2.5 billion-$3 billion GMV figure? Where would the majority of that growth come from, or will it be quite broad-based? For sure, the mix will change, right? You saw the penetration levels across countries. We do expect much faster growth from the most under-penetrated countries where we already see momentum, right? Nigeria is growing faster than the average. Ghana is growing faster than the average. Kenya as well. We do expect those countries to take a larger share of the mix. That would be surprising if Ivory Coast remained the biggest country at Jumia in one or two years. That would not make sense. Yeah. I guess the, I mean, the experience from Africa is that all the countries don't operate the same way all of the time, such that some of those, one of the countries might be susceptible to increased risks, whether it be competition in Egypt or otherwise. Do you see an element of offset that you'd see better growth in a more advanced market like Ivory Coast because there's affordable, people can afford to transact on the marketplace and maybe the business environment is a bit more stable? I mean, our forecasts are kind of all things being equal, right? We cannot foresee political events and macroeconomic events and so on. Based on what we see on the ground, we expect those countries with low penetration to catch up very clearly. And then, no, I mean, of course, it's harder to operate in some countries for some specific reasons like Nigeria, but we also have lower competition. So there's no specific reason for a country not to be able to reach penetration ratios that we're seeing in other better countries. Okay, thanks. Final question is just on take rates. I think you said 200-250 basis point improvement over the five years. You went into some detail about how that would take place. Could you just re-explain that, like how much would come from advertising, increasing contribution to GMV, and how much would be from terms with your merchants, like putting through price to merchants? Yeah. Yeah, the range is around 2.5 points in the next five years. The way we see it happening, on advertising revenue, we're generating about 1% of our GMV in revenue from advertising. When we look around, we believe the right benchmark should be around 2%. It will take a few years to get there. I mean, we're working, we'll have better tools, better execution. Scale will help. More competition on the marketplace will definitely help. It will take time, but we assume up to one percentage point can come from advertising. The rest, which should be one and a half up to two percentage points, will come from better take rates from the marketplace and from one-piece vendors, one-piece suppliers, which we're fairly confident with, right? I mean, on a yearly basis, we're reviewing the terms. We're reviewing, most importantly, the commission rates. We're doing this in all the countries where we have scaled. We deeply believe that the take rate is a function of scale in those countries. The more you sell for your vendors, the more you can get from them. That's the balance of power in any marketplace on earth, right? We did that in January 2025 in all the countries where we had been scaling over the previous years. That was Kenya, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Uganda. Ghana not so much. Nigeria, not so much. We had spared Egypt at the time because they were in a more challenging situation. In January 2026, we will be reviewing the terms again with a view to winning a few, I mean, a few decimal points of take rates as part of the greater plan to get this 1.5. You mentioned one-piece. I thought that one-piece would sort of normally translate into just the whole thing into revenue, but you said there's an element of one-piece involved in there as well. One-piece is about scaling and getting better terms when we purchase. It's much harder to decide upfront, but we also see it as a function of scale for the future. Thank you. Wanted to add to that, Hisham? No, I think you covered all the key points. Thanks, Francis. Thank you. This question is from Tracy Kivunyu with Standard Bank. How many JForce agents do you have at the moment and any data on how much GMV they provide? I don't think we've disclosed recent numbers. Dozens of thousands of active JForce vendors, but we've not provided the latest figures, and we have not provided the share of the mix. I mean, what we usually say, it's above 10% of the GMV. Depends on the countries. It can be between 10-15% across countries with some specificities. It just shows us how significant it is and how important it is to have sales channels that can deal with customers who are fully offline. It is a significant share of the sales. One more question. This is from Brad Erickson, RBC. You mentioned some sensitivity to working capital intensity on inventory, but ultimately, what are the gating factors to building supply, and would that carry a relatively one-to-one relationship in translating order and GMV growth? I'm not sure I get it. Can you? Yeah, sure. Just basically asking what is the working capital intensity on inventory, and what are the issues that will stop the building and supply? Any question? Let me reiterate on what I said a few minutes ago. It's only one angle of building our supply out of four, and it's not the major one. As I clearly said, the majority lies with our local sellers who are all on marketplace, many of them on consignment, and our international sellers who are also on consignment. The cash-heavy part is we're not at liberty to disclose numbers, but it's not the majority at all of what we do. It's selected bets. We don't. Are there opportunities that we can do more? Obviously, yes. Is that going to be straining? Is that where we're going to put the majority of our focus? No, it's not. We're scaling with non-cash-intensive avenues. If you look at the balance sheet, you'll see the inventory numbers, which are not significant. It's around $8 million-$9 million. All right. With that, I think we're done with the Q&A. We have a small cocktail upstairs. Is that right? Yes? You are all welcome upstairs for a few drinks. For all of you, if you have a bit of time, we'll be very happy to have a chat. I'll be very happy if you can spend some time talking with the team. I've been doing a lot of talking over the past few months with investors. I'm happy to leave the floor and let you double-check everything I've said. Thank you.