Morning, and thank you for joining the Lument Finance Trust Second Quarter 2026 Earnings Call. Today's call is being recorded and will be made available via webcast on the company's website. I would now like to turn the call over to Andrew Tsang with investor relations at Lument Investment Management. Please go ahead. Morning, everyone. Thank you for joining our call to discuss Lument Finance Trust second quarter 2026 financial results. With me on the call today are Jim Flynn, our CEO, Jim Briggs, our CFO, Greg Calvert, our President, and Zach Halpern, our Portfolio Manager. Last evening, we filed our 10-Q with the SEC and issued a press release to provide details on our recent financial results. We also provided a supplemental earnings presentation, which can be found on our website. Before handing the call over to Jim Flynn, I'd like to remind everyone that certain statements made during the course of this call are not based on historical information and may constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Such forward-looking statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. These results and uncertainties are discussed in the company's reports filed with the SEC, in particular the Risk Factors section of our Form 10-K and Form 10-Qs. It is not possible to predict or identify all such risks, and listeners are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The company undertakes no obligation to update any of these forward-looking statements. Further, certain non-GAAP financial measures will be discussed on this conference call. Our presentation of this information is not intended to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the financial information presented in accordance with GAAP. Reconciliations of these non-GAAP financial measures to the most comparable measures prepared in accordance with GAAP can be accessed through our filings with the SEC. For the second quarter of 2026, we reported a GAAP net loss of $0.18 and distributable loss of $0.10 per share of common stock. In June, we had declared a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per share with respect to the second quarter, in line with the prior quarterly dividend. I will now turn the call over to Jim Flynn. Please go ahead. Thank you, Andrew. Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Lument Finance Trust earnings call for the second quarter of 2026. We appreciate you joining us today. We also wanted to express our appreciation to our investors for their patience, support, and continued engagement as we work through issues in the legacy portfolio. We recognize the challenges that the company has faced, and we remain focused every day on improving outcomes for our shareholders. Looking at the economic and market conditions in the country today, conditions remain generally stable. There is continued uncertainty around monetary policy weighing on investment activity. Recent economic data has increased uncertainty regarding the path of the Fed, including whether short-term rates may remain elevated for longer than previously expected. Long-term rates also remain elevated, continuing to pressure transaction activity and real estate valuations. Within multifamily, fundamentals continue to improve as the sector moves beyond peak supply levels. While rent growth remains modest, long-term demand drivers, including housing affordability challenges, continue to support the multifamily rental sector. Capital markets remain active, with liquidity available across warehouse securitization and institutional lending channels strong through the first half of this year. The CRE CLO market continues to be an important source of financing for multifamily mortgage assets, and investor demand for floating rate credit remains relatively strong, particularly for repeat issuers with proven track records. Active asset management remains our highest priority. We continue to work closely with borrowers and operating partners to maximize outcomes across both performing and non-performing investments. We continue to proactively evaluate resolution strategies for legacy assets while maintaining a disciplined approach to credit. While the market for certain legacy assets remains soft, we are beginning to see an acceleration in resolution activity, including both negotiated sales and other paths to monetize or stabilize challenged positions. We continue to work tirelessly to resolve these assets in a manner that protects value, improves liquidity, and positions the company to reinvest capital efficiently. On the portfolio side, during the quarter, we were intentional about managing liquidity on our balance sheet to support ongoing portfolio management efforts while selectively redeploying CLO capital when available. We generally held on to cash from non-securitized asset loan payoffs. Our financing profile remains well-positioned following the refinancing initiatives completed earlier this year. We believe our current liquidity position remains appropriate to support asset resolution activities, portfolio management, and selective capital deployment opportunities. As capital becomes available through resolutions and repayments, our objective is to redeploy it efficiently into investments that meet our credit standards and are expected to be accretive to earnings. We are being disciplined on timing and asset selection, but we are also focused on ensuring that the company's capital is put back to work as efficiently and quickly as possible. Our Board of Directors recently approved a 10-for-1 Reverse Stock Split of our common stock after having determined that such actions were in the best interest of the company and its stockholders, providing flexibility to maintain compliance with the applicable New York Stock Exchange listing requirements and support an efficient public market for the company's common stock. The Reverse Stock Split is expected to become effective at the close of business on Wednesday, September 9, and the company's common stock is expected to begin trading on a split-adjusted basis on the New York Stock Exchange at the opening of trading on Thursday, September 10, under the existing ticker symbol, LFT. The Reverse Stock Split will affect all stockholders uniformly and will not alter any stockholder's percentage ownership interest in the company, except with respect to treatment of fractional shares, which will be paid out in cash. We have also posted for our investors a Reverse Stock Split FAQ document on our website. We believe the Reverse Stock Split is an important step toward reducing technical pressure on the public stock price and supporting a more orderly market for our shares. While this action does not change the underlying economics of the company, we believe it helps address one of the external pressures on the stock and allows investors to focus more clearly on the value of the portfolio, our asset resolution progress, and our earnings trajectory. Our priorities remain unchanged. We are committed to resolving legacy assets, protecting book value, and thoughtfully redeploying capital into high-quality multifamily investments. We appreciate the continued patience and support of our investors and capital partners as we execute on this plan. While we recognize the resolution of our non-performing and REO assets remains challenging, we are seeing improving momentum in deal resolutions and sales activity. As those resolutions occur, we intend to reinvest capital efficiently and on a disciplined basis. We remain committed to fully deploying our capital in 2027, which we believe will be an important driver of improved earnings and, over time, enhanced shareholder value. We recognize there is still work to do, and the timing of certain NPL and REO resolutions remains subject to submarket conditions. That said, we believe the company has the support of its capital partners, a clear path to redeployment, and the platform capabilities necessary to move forward constructively. With that, I'd like to turn the call over to Jim Briggs, who will provide details regarding our financial results. Jim? Thanks, Jim. Good morning. Last night, we filed our quarterly report on Form 10-Q and provided a supplemental investor presentation on our website, which we'll be referring to during our remarks. Supplemental investor presentation has been uploaded to the webcast as well for your reference. On pages four through seven of the presentation, you'll find key updates and an earnings summary for the quarter. For the second quarter of 2026, we reported net loss to common stockholders of $9.2 million, or $0.18 per share. We reported a distributable loss of $5.3 million, or $0.10 per share. There are a few Q2 P&L items I'd like to highlight. For Q2, net interest income was $4.5 million, a sequential decline from $5.7 million recorded in Q1. This was primarily driven by a lower average-performing loan portfolio balance quarter-over-quarter, as we chose to build liquidity during the quarter rather than reinvest principal repayments from loans held outside of CLO. The ending outstanding UPB of the total portfolio was approximately $1 billion, compared to $1.13 billion as of March 31st. The weighted average coupon of our loan portfolio declined to 704 basis points compared to 709 basis points in the prior quarter due to payoffs of higher spread loans relative to newly acquired assets, as well as a slight decline in the average SOFR rate during the period. Although we had greater payoffs compared to Q1, our exit fee income was relatively flat to prior quarter, and recognition of extension fee income was down by about $300,000 quarter-over-quarter. Our total operating expenses, including fees to our manager, were higher quarter-on-quarter at $3.9 million versus $3.7 million. The primary driver was higher reimbursable expenses compared to Q1, driven primarily by resource allocation. The difference between reported GAAP net loss and distributable loss during the quarter was primarily attributable to an $8.6 million net provision for credit losses recorded in the period, $5.1 million of realized losses on mortgage loans and REO included in distributable, and $390,000 of depreciation on REO. The $8.6 million in net provision for credit losses recorded during the quarter, which is excluded from distributable earnings, was driven primarily by specific reserves on our risk-rated five loans. As of June 30th, we had six loans risk rated five, all collateralized by multifamily assets. Greg will provide a bit more detail in his remarks. We evaluated our risk-rated five loans individually to determine whether asset-specific reserves were necessary. During the quarter, we recorded specific provisions related to two loans downgraded to a five risk rating in the quarter and three loans that were already risk rated five at March 31st, including one property that was foreclosed upon and transferred to REO during the period. Specific reserves totaled $7.4 million at quarter end, representing approximately 18% of the associated UPB of specifically evaluated assets. The $5.1 million in realized losses included in distributable earnings related to three assets that were fully resolved in the quarter. These included discounted payoffs on two previous five risk-rated loans, one in Philadelphia and one in Des Moines, with proceeds generally consistent with their March 31st net carrying values. In addition, we sold one REO property in San Antonio for $12.1 million and recognized a small GAAP gain on that sale. The realized losses reflected in distributable earnings this period were primarily attributable to prior period reserves and impairments recorded on those assets. At quarter end, our CLO's capital was substantially fully deployed at an 88% advance rate and a cost of funds of SOFR plus 191. As of June 30, a portion of our loan and REO portfolio were pledged to warehouse facilities that provided financing and an effective advance rate of 68% and a weighted average cost of funds of SOFR plus 209. We ended Q2 with an unrestricted cash balance of $29 million, and LMNT 2025-FL3 was substantially fully deployed. The company's total book equity at the end of the quarter was approximately $205 million. The total book value of common stock was approximately $145 million or $2.76 per share, decreasing sequentially from $2.97 a share March 31st. I will now turn the call over to Greg Calvert to provide details on the company's investment activity and portfolio performance during the quarter. Greg? Thank you, Jim. During the second quarter, LFT acquired or funded four loans with an aggregate UPB of $91 million and experienced $184 million of loan payoffs. As of June 30th, our total loan portfolio consisted of 51 floating rate loans with an aggregate unpaid principal balance of approximately $1 billion, a weighted average floating rate of 330 basis points over SOFR, and an unamortized aggregate purchase discount of approximately $800,000. The weighted average remaining term of our book as of quarter end was approximately 18 months, assuming all available extensions are exercised by our borrowers. 100% of the portfolio was indexed to one-month SOFR, and 91.7% of the portfolio was collateralized by multifamily properties. As of June 30th, approximately 81% of the loans in our portfolio were risk rated a three or better, compared to 77% as of March 31st. Our weighted average risk rating quarter-over-quarter remains stable at 3.1. During the quarter, we had several positive asset resolutions, including the resolutions of the two loan assets Jim mentioned in his remarks, which had been risk rated five as of March 31st, and for which we received payoff proceeds consistent with March 31st net carrying values. As of June 30th, we had six risk-rated five loans with an aggregate principal amount of $98 million, or approximately 10% of the unpaid principal balance of our quarter-end investment portfolio. Four of these loans with an aggregate UPB of $62 million were also risk rated five as of the prior quarter due to either maturity or monetary default. Two of these loans with an aggregate UPB of $36 million were downgraded to a five risk rating for the first time due to monetary default. As of quarter end, the REO portfolio in total consisted of four multifamily properties with an aggregate carrying value of approximately $61.6 million and a weighted average occupancy rate of approximately 67%. During the period, we completed a sale of one San Antonio REO asset with a carrying value of $12.2 million. We also foreclosed on a multifamily property in Arlington, Texas. The $15.7 million loan associated with that property had been risk rated a five as of March 31st. Subsequent to quarter end, we foreclosed on a multifamily property in Dallas, Texas. This property had a $21.9 million mortgage loan associated with it and was risk rated five as of 6/30. We have been very active in seeking positive asset resolutions and maximizing recovery values and are pleased with the significant progress we have made so far. Yet we understand that there is still more work to be done on behalf of our shareholders. With that, I'll pass it back to Jim Flynn for his closing remarks and questions. Thanks, Greg. I'd like to thank everyone for joining us today and for your continued partnership and support. We recognize and appreciate the patience of our investors as we work through our legacy assets and reposition the company for improved earnings. We remain focused on resolving those challenged assets, redeploying capital efficiently, and moving the company toward a fully invested, higher earning portfolio in 2027. Importantly, we continue to have the support of our capital partners as we move forward, and we believe the actions we are taking today position LFT to create value for our shareholders over time. With that, I'll ask the operator to open the call for questions. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. We will now begin the question and answer session. Should you have a question, please press the star followed by the one on your touchtone phone. Should you wish to cancel your request, please press the star followed by the two. If you are using a speakerphone, please lift the handset before pressing any keys. Once again, that is star one should you wish to ask a question. Your first question is from Steven Sapp. Your line is open. Yes. Hello? Morning. Yeah. I've been a shareholder for many, many years. I see the book value declining considerably along with the stock price, which is what I'm concerned about. Your dividend, which I bought many years ago, has declined also significantly. I see what you're paying now, and my question is, I don't know how you're going to continue to pay that. A very simple question I have, it's just a size of scale. I don't think there's any company that's smaller than your company, as far as assets and market cap in this particular space. There's another company I own, Cherry Hill, which recently made a merger with MITT. My question is, I see your expenses going up. I don't blame you. Inflation is there. People got to earn money. Everything costs money these days. Do you see an opportunity to merge with another company because of the scale just doesn't make sense? Or just sell the assets, since you said the book value is $2.70? Thank you. Thank you for the question. Thank you for your time as a shareholder. We appreciate that support. I think that you've certainly identified a challenge which we've discussed in the past, which is our size, and compared to many of the larger competitors in the space, that is accurate. It's also one of the reasons our portfolio, probably on average, has distressed assets in the same relative percentages as the peer set. Our challenge is our size, and so we've held liquidity on our books and not redeployed that capital. So that's further suppressed earnings in addition to losses that have been taken on underperforming loans. So that's one of the drivers, as you point out. As we move through these assets and redeploy capital, we should be able to improve earnings as we move forward. In terms of evaluating potential M&A opportunities or other strategic alternatives, that is something that we continue to do with our bankers, with anyone that has discussions with us, with our Board. All of those options are evaluated as they come up. Unfortunately, over the past couple of years, we've been unable to execute on any of those that were discussed. To the extent something came forward, we certainly would discuss that with the Board, and take any alternatives that could create shareholder value seriously. We'll continue to do so as we move forward. The other question is, how about just wrapping up and selling the assets at $2.75 before they get any lower? That is a fair question. Certainly a consideration of our Board and the management and discussions with the Board. The one caveat I would say is if you take a look at the market for selling portfolios of assets of this type, particularly some of the older vintage multifamily assets, if we were to attempt to sell that into the market, it might be difficult to sell the entire portfolio at those recoverable values. But as you point out, I think, to the extent there is a strategic investor or someone that we were able to find, it would be something we would have to consider as a management team and a Board. The concern I have is the book value, not just of you, but of many of these companies in the space, that they are overinflated. The book value should be what you should be able to receive, in my opinion. Well, we believe that our book value does represent what we will receive on these assets. Okay. I do appreciate- Listen, I have taken enough of your time. I appreciate you answering my questions. As I said, I have been a shareholder prior to when you raised money through a REITs offering. So you can see how long I go back, and this has been the most disappointing REIT that I have. I have significant portfolio of REITs, and this is the most significant. Hopefully, you could turn this around. I remember when I bought this, everybody said you were conservative, and that this would be a very good management company. That is why I bought the stock. Hopefully, you guys can turn it around or make a decision to look out for the shareholders instead of having the increase in expenses. That is sort of like an insult to me as a shareholder. Everybody has to suffer. The stock is down, but I think the management should take some responsibility, and the best responsibility is one word, money. That is all the questions I have. I appreciate the time that I had here, and I appreciate your answers. Again, I hope you look out for the shareholders. That is my concern. Thank you very much. Thank you. We appreciate both your questions and your time as an investor. Thank you. Your next question is from Lee Zulch from OVERCAP. Your line is now open. Good morning. Is the 12/15/2025 stock repurchase program still in effect? Is the $10 million there to buy common shares? I'll defer to Jim Briggs on the timing of that agreement. But in general, the question around repurchasing shares and other strategic alternatives are all on the table in discussions with our Board. To answer, I think the underlying question is the technical question on whether that agreement is- That is still open. Yes. Thanks, Jim. Thank you. Thank you. Your next question is from John Power from Redwood Fund. Your line is now open. Good morning. Thank you for your time. If the stock buyback plan is still open and your stock is trading for 25% of NAV, why hasn't the Board and management actually made any stock repurchases in the open market? Any discussion around stock repurchases or other alternatives also has to reflect a full view of liquidity and maintain liquidity to make sure that we can resolve underperforming assets. But certainly, our current stock price does not reflect what we believe is the fair value of our assets, and it is something that we will continue to discuss with the Board around whether we take any action in that regard. Any thoughts on how to close that gap? There are several, right? Certainly, you mentioned stock repurchase would certainly help. The primary way for us to improve book value is to work through assets and get them resolved off our books and redeployed efficiently. Today, we have roughly $1 billion of assets outstanding, including non-performing loans. We should be closer to $1.4 billion. That is a significant drag on earnings. Not to mention that a portion of those assets are some $300 million, including REO, are inefficiently financed or not financed at all. That is the biggest drag on our earnings. And so working through these assets, I should point out, having three resolutions last quarter, we expect to have several more here over the next quarter or two, and really move through that legacy portfolio, which will allow us to move forward with redeploying that capital efficiently. That is the biggest drag, but along the way, we are going to continue to see if there are certain other potential opportunities to enhance the book value or the trading price of our shares relative to book value. Okay, thank you. We appreciate you holding these calls and talking to shareholders and investors. Thank you. Thank you for your support. Thank you. Your next question is from Greg Bennett. Your line is now open. Hey, good morning. On your supplemental data, when you have a closing date for a loan and then you have a maturity date, you look at some of these loans that were done in 2021, let's say. I take it this is the problem portfolio. Am I correct that most of these problem loans are the ones that were done in 2021 and 2022? Would that be correct? That would generally be correct, maybe into early 2023, but that is generally across the industry and our portfolio, the time of the most challenged assets, typically valuation issues, meaning they were overvalued to begin with. When we are looking at these and the maturity date, there are some that I will see that the closing date was 2021, but they will have an. How many of these have an extension, I guess, what I am trying to get at. If you take a loan that was done in 2021 and you see that the maturity date is 2027 now, that would have been a six-year loan. That maturity date, shouldn't there be an asterisk next to that that tells us that you actually did a loan extension that we could identify maybe these were the weaker loans? Yeah. Does the maturity date include a loan extension, or is that what the original term was? It would be what the current maturity date is in the supplemental, and I will ask the team to step in if I say anything wrong. But most of our bridge loans have a total maturity of five years, usually three years initial term with two one-year extensions. Occasionally, it is two with three one-year extensions. And the outside maturity date is listed as that five-year period. But for any loan that has gone through a modification with an extended maturity date, the maturity date in the supplemental would be listed as a. That is the current maturity date. So we can provide that data in future supplementals to be clear, but for loans that were done in 2021 that have a maturity date of 2027, that would be an extension, because we do not have any loans that have an initial maturity beyond six years, I mean, beyond five years. Okay. I do not know if anyone back or. Go ahead. Sorry. No, go ahead and finish. Well, I was just going to say, I suspect that someone does not have the data right at their fingertips, but we can certainly provide that in the future. But if anyone else on the team has that, meaning the number of extensions. Some loans have extended to four too. Right at the end of the three years, and then they get an initial period because of some agreement that they have reached with us on an extension, typically a pay down. Yeah. So the problem loans have to do with just the management of a property that has finished its remodeling or its construction, or that they are just not managed well? Or is it because they are still using a loan to put capital renovation into the property? Any troubled loan, we are generally no longer advancing on in terms of the last question. In terms of management, it is a bit of a mixed bag. Certainly, in some cases, it is due to management. Most often, it is because sponsors have themselves run out of capital, that these are not their only properties or only loans, and they just no longer have the capital to commit to the assets that they have, whether in our portfolio or others. What happens when sponsors no longer invest capital, even minor things, is properties deteriorate, which make it harder to rent new units. I think the answer to your question is, in many cases, it is bad management. It is not necessarily that sponsors do not know how to do it or what to do, it is that they no longer have the resources as they have held onto these assets for an extended period, waiting for the market to turn better, the sub-market that they are in, thinking places like Houston or San Antonio and those types of markets that have struggled. They just run out of money and resources. In many cases, it does not mean that they do not know what they are doing, it just means that they no longer have capital. That is a challenging environment where you have had cap rates expand, you have had increases in interest rates, and so that sponsor does not have capital to put into the asset. We are trying to work with them to exit the asset, hopefully at our loan proceeds, but at this point, in many cases, as we have seen below loan proceeds. That process is, frankly, a challenging one, with some sponsors who are unwilling to cut their losses, so to speak, and move on. That is something that has accelerated a bit here in 2026, moving toward a resolution. That is the biggest problem, that sponsors acquired assets at valuation levels that have since declined meaningfully. Their expenses have gone up, and their resources have been drained. Going forward, when you do commit to loans, obviously there is a lack of confidence based on the stock price. I am wondering from a management point of view or from ORIX, your sponsor, if there is some way of, well, first of all, the commitment going forward that maybe you only invest in two-rated loans, to try to improve, I guess, what the quality of the portfolio is. I do not know if that would matter or not. Then the other thing is Go ahead. Well, I was going to say, we've certainly evaluated investment criteria and have considered sponsor strength as one of the key components here in terms of common themes among struggling assets. Again, I think the portfolio for multifamily assets across the entire industry, not just LFT's portfolio, has seen significant struggles in assets that were acquired during that period as identified in the 2021 to 2023 period. They were acquired at a time of lower interest rates, lower expenses, and lower cap rates. All three of those things have moved meaningfully against those owners. We've taken a particularly closer look and identified stronger sponsors on newer assets. Those with deeper pockets, more capital, more experience, and those that have not necessarily grown as significantly as many sponsors did during that period. That is certainly something that we have done, and if you look at our portfolio that's been invested since that period, it's performed quite well. One thought I have, and I don't know if this is available or not, but part of the reason for investing in your company had to have been the relationship with Lument and then the parent company, ORIX. I don't know, this would be self-serving, but since the insiders own roughly, if you think about it, the insiders own roughly 45% of this company, the publicly-traded company with ORIX, I guess, the largest shareholder. If there's some way to build investor confidence back in the price of ORIX or the sponsor, basically, I don't know how you would do it, but taking back these assets for a preferred stock in the company, and allow the parent company to work this out. They're the ones who put these loans on. You didn't buy these from a broker. Part of the appeal of investing in this is that you weren't relying on third parties to bring you these deals. These were all underwritten and done in-house by the parent company, which would pay a management fee. That might be a crazy idea, but the idea of closing the discount is not going to happen until we see the tide turning, and the way to turn the tide faster would be to, I think, to eliminate the lack of confidence that investors. We're a small group now, and with the Reverse Stock Split, we're going to be even smaller. Is that possible to do that? Well, is it possible? I am sure it is possible. But in terms of looking at the portfolio and finding ways for, whether through our parent or other investors to find ways to basically, what I would say is to box that risk or move that risk of those, what is now a shrinking part of the portfolio, but still having a meaningful impact on earnings, both, again, as I said, in losses and from effectively and efficiently deploying capital. What you describe, minus the, I will not say, oh, the parent is committing to doing anything like that, but the idea of trying to box that risk into a portfolio of loans that could be set aside and worked through is something that we certainly have been and are evaluating. To the extent we could configure something out that is accretive to the shareholders, we certainly would like to do so, and we will explore that opportunity as we move forward here. I think your question and your thought is a good one. There are opportunities we are looking at with investors about ways that we could possibly do that. Or something like that, I should say. Yeah. In your comments, you frame that the outlook is starting to look more positive for some of these problem loans. But I see the San Antonio property paid off $11 million, whatever, but you have that, so now you are down to what, $50 million of REO or I do not have a sense necessarily that REO or problem assets is necessarily getting better. Is that- I think, yeah. Do you indicate- What's happening, what's starting to turn, again, we're looking at markets that have not seen good news for several years, that we're seeing occupancy increasing, vacancy declining, absorption increasing, limited supply contracting, or being limited, right? Those dynamics are starting to happen in markets that haven't seen that for years. To clarify maybe my remarks, what we're starting to see is some positive momentum in markets that have struggled for years, in rental growth, occupancy, vacancy, and deal momentum, right? We're starting to see a few deals get done. What we've seen for a couple of years now is assets go under contract or at least initial LOIs for sale. These are performing and non-performing. And those sales fall through for whatever reason. Usually, something in diligence comes up or the market just moves against and the buyer walks away. What we've seen in a couple of instances, including this quarter, is that we got to a resolution. It's not positive relative to the original loan amount, but it's positive to move the asset off our books to recapture that liquidity and to be able to redeploy it into performing assets. To be clear, it's more about resolving, right? Having these assets continue to remain on the books and linger is a drag at any value. Right. Optimistic is the wrong word, but there are signs in these markets that we could see some deal momentum. Now, I would also offer that we're not the only lender that are trying to sell or dispose of assets in these markets. That has put some pressure on going back quarters now. But even as we go forward, we'll continue to see other lenders kind of having the same experience, which means we might see some struggling or distressed assets coming to market from several lenders in the same places. That would be the only caveat. But to be clear, I'm not suggesting that these are complete turnaround stories. It's just relative to where we are. We're starting to see some aspects change. Okay. Hey, one other comment for trying to build the investor confidence. Is there any way of these loans that are underwritten by the parent, is there any provision in there going forward? These aren't bought from brokers. You guys are underwriting it, where the trust has a put provision that if, A, we don't like the way this is turning out, we do have the ability to put some of these loans back to the parent. I mean, that would be something that would The loans are underwritten by Lument. It was owned by ORIX, and we underwrite the loans, obviously. I don't think that that is a market provision. Having a put right back to the manager when a loan goes bad would be a challenge to get our parent, or probably any parent to agree to. But certainly evaluating when assets have gone bad, how we can revise underwriting standards or look at assets differently, we'll continue to do. As I said earlier, we will continue to explore all opportunities and options to speedily move these resolutions off the balance sheet with the help of existing and/or new investors. But we have not found an opportunity to date that has been something that we feel would be accretive to shareholder value. Hopefully, we can do so here in the coming quarters. But we haven't been able to as of yet. Okay. One other question. Distributable loss. I'm not familiar with that term. What does that mean to a shareholder in a company? The terminology distributable loss. It sounds like free cash flow, but that's something when you get your year-end taxes, 1099, that that's considered a loss. Do you know that for individual investors, what that might mean? The distributable loss and I'm not a tax expert, but distributable loss is a GAAP concept, and it's not a tax concept. Okay, that's fine. All right. That's good. Are you done? Thank you for having. Thank you for having the call. I guess I'm getting off this call, and I'm not sensing that necessarily the tide is necessarily turning, but I guess we'll see in the next couple of quarters. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, and certainly appreciate your support. Thank you. Your next question is from Martin Brody. Your line is now open. Yeah. Hi, good morning. On the last call, I asked many questions that I was going to ask. I'm a long-suffering shareholder, too. I go back to the several name changes. Four Oaks, I think it was originally. In the middle of June 15th, the quarter was almost over, and you declared a second quarter dividend of $0.04, which thrilled me at the time, but it sort of misled me a little bit because I was assuming if you're paying $0.04, then at least you had some positive income or earnings available for distribution. Can you tell me why you did that? As I said, the quarter was almost over, so you clearly knew the state of the income expenses at that point. Whenever we discuss the dividend, we share with our Board and discuss with the Board, the current projections for the quarter and for the year, and for, frankly, the future. Based on the projections at the time, we felt the $0.04 dividend was appropriate for the quarter based on where we expected things to be. A few of the resolutions resulted in bigger losses upon ultimate sale or payoff than we were expecting. As we go through the dividend discussion in our next quarter with the Board, we'll evaluate the current projections for this quarter and for the next several quarters, and go through the same discussion we do each quarter. It's a quarterly discussion based on, not just that quarter, but the year's anticipated and expected returns. Okay. Next question is, this is probably impossible, but you have an outside manager of which you pay a considerable fee to, and I understand that, but that is taking a larger and larger percentage of income. Is it possible to internalize management? I am sorry, is it possible for...... Can you— I missed the last part. Internalize management. To lower the fee? No. Internalize. Both, actually. Thanks for bringing that up. Lower the fee and internalize management. Both ways would save money, of course. Yeah. I don't think that is likely, but what I would point out, I think internalizing management would actually increase fees. There's a cap on reimbursable fees and expenses that a standalone public company of this size would likely go beyond. There's currently no plans to internalize the manager. Okay. I'm not quite sure. It would It seems like a fairly simple business, but maybe I'm wrong. One last question has to do with stock rates. So at the end of June, I think it was the day before they went ex-dividend, there was a 5 million share print at the end of the day, which is, as you know, massive. In fact, a year ago, approximate time, approximately the same time, there was also a 5 million share print. I was surprised that there was no reporting of this. Can you shed any light on that? I'm sure you're aware of it at the time. Yeah. I can answer that, Jim. Yeah, go ahead. LFT, a year ago, a little over a year ago at this point, as you point out, there was a big print at the end of June. LFT had been added to the FTSE Russell 3000. So what you saw a year ago and change and what you saw this past June was the effects of any activity from that rebalancing and index funds that were indexing to that FTSE Russell 3000 that we were in. So, yeah, that explains that big print, June of 2025, when LFT was added. When LFT was pulled out, that became effective at the close of business on that day that you saw the big print. So there was a lot of activity that day as well. Okay, great. That answers that question. I had no idea they were loose. Okay. Thanks so much. Good luck with the future. Thank you. Thank you. There are no further questions at this time. Please proceed with the closing remarks. I want to thank our investors for joining today. Again, for your patience. Appreciate the questions and feedback and support, and we will continue to work to improve the earnings profile and with intent to increase our trading price relative to book value. Thank you all, and we will speak next quarter. Ladies and gentlemen, the conference has now ended. Thank you all for joining. You may now disconnect your lines.