All right. Good afternoon, everyone. We are going to move along. I know there's been a great deal of demand. People want to watch a conversation between two actuaries, so this is your chance. I do want to welcome Jonny Strickle, who's Group Managing Director at Pelagos Capital. Let me start with any opening comments that you want to make in terms of how you're seeing the world nowadays. Yeah. Thanks, Meyer. I think we've had a really exciting year trying to build out our story as a capital allocator, executing on the model that we've set out over that period. There's probably a couple of areas I'd want to touch on before we kick off. The first one of the things we've really been thinking about a lot is optionality and access to risk. I think as a capital allocator, it's one thing working out where and how you want to allocate capital, but if you don't have access to that underlying source of risk, then you can't execute on that strategy. For us, our cornerstone partner, our first partner was The Fidelis Partnership. They write over 100 lines of business. That gives us a great base to work from. We're continually trying to innovate with them. I think one of the more recent examples would be around data center risk, where we look to engage on the construction side there, building up different sources of capacity with them, so we can go with a meaningful line size, benefit from the leverage you get by having a meaningful line size while not over-allocating ourselves in terms of net line ourselves. There's one example with them. Obviously, we've had a real focus on building out to new underwriting partners as well, and some of the examples there, Euclid Mortgage. We previously had great success with the European mortgage book with The Fidelis Partnership. Euclid accessed the U.S. mortgage market, which historically has been really difficult to get into, especially from a reinsurance point of view. So again, that's given us more options to access through. I think the more different ways we can access market, the more different lines of business we have or access to different elements of a line of business that we're already in gives us more optionality to be more resilient as the market changes. So it's been a real focus for us. I just arrived here from Monte Carlo yesterday, and I have to say, working through with potential partners, existing partners there, the pipeline we've got over the next couple of years is really, really exciting. Lots of innovative teams there. We've said before we turn down over 90% of the risk we see, but even with that stat, I think the amount of opportunity we see is really exciting for us. The other thing I'd touch on, which I think is key to being a capital allocator, is agility. Our model is purpose-built for agility. Got options, different top-tier underwriting teams, people accessing different bits of the market at different times. And us being able to move between them as the market moves gives you real flexibility. Again, if you've got an idea of how you want to allocate your capital, you've got the access to market, but you don't change with the market, then I think that puts you at a big disadvantage. A couple of examples of us being agile over the last year that's been really exciting for us. One is we pulled out of the aviation market 50%. As soon as we determined that that wasn't hitting the hurdles we need, we took action to correct that. On the opposite side to that, there was opportunity post the start of the conflict in the Middle East to go in and write a niche bespoke book, picking certain risks that hit the hurdle, staying away from others, going in the market where we saw opportunity, pausing where we saw uncertainty, and going back in with a different risk appetite where appropriate. That business has run at a sub 20% loss ratio and been really great for us, given us a real boost into the year. So being agile all the time is something that's really important to us. Our whole thought process over the recent period has been about those two things, expanding optionality, being agile to move through where we see the best opportunity at a particular time, and I think that's what gives our business the resilience to move through market cycles. Okay. No, that's fantastic. What I've been saying for a long time is that the indicators of the market cycle for a Monte Carlo suggest some level of softening, and I think that offers a great context for what we should be expecting from Pelagos going forward. One of the main themes of this conference that I've been trying to get is to have companies explain in as concrete terms as possible their AI related priorities and how we on the outside are going to see them in the financials and maybe when. Can you talk about a little bit about where Pelagos is on the AI journey? Yeah. We're a reasonably new company, so we don't have legacy data. We don't have legacy operation systems. We're also structured in a way where some of that burden's taken over by our underwriting partners rather than us. So I think what you won't see is big efficiency changes and reductions in expense ratio because we never had bloat in those areas to begin with. That's not something you're going to get from Pelagos. The way we look at what AI is doing for us is it's giving us more time, and it's giving us more time to spend on making high-value strategic decisions and executing on them. Some examples of that, we use AI to process data, we use AI to come up with the first view of analytics and analysis out of that data, and then we use AI to iterate on that. That buys the management team, for one, gets better, higher quality information to base their decision and strategic thinking on. But it's more than that. It cascades down the business, and more junior members of our business now are also getting time to think strategically. One of the things at Pelagos is I think diversity of experience in our leadership team has been one of our greatest strengths. I think my background's actuarial, as you say. I've come up through that. Dan's background, so our CEO, is as opposite as you can get to that, I think. He's come up through the broking market, senior positions in Aon. Just to get just our two perspectives together, that's really diverse. You can add up our years of experience, but it's more that those years are in completely different areas. Add on our CFO, our CRO, and other people, and that diversity of experience really shines through when we think about underwriting opportunity. To take some of the more junior members of the team throughout the organization and add their experiences in, particularly since they started their careers, their whole life experience is in a different world to ours, has been really useful. Bringing that back to AI, that extra time that we've got through the entire organization has let more people contribute to the strategic thinking. Now you wanted concrete examples. I did. No surprise that I don't know what the others have given you, but unless it's on expenses, it's very hard to do. What I see it doing for us is improving decision making and strategic thought throughout the business, so that materializes with a better combined ratio, a better return than we would have had. It gives us more time to add optionality, as I said earlier, build a more robust business, think about how we're going to navigate market cycles. I think it improves the business and will improve the results as a consequence of that. But it's really difficult to split out of our result how much was because of that extra time, how much would you have had anyway? You're right. No, that's perfectly fair. I think just having the context and talking about, I'll say it in my own terms, improving underwriting decision making and what that means. So that could be faster growth, that could be lower loss ratios, but isolating that event is obviously going to be close to impossible. But broadly speaking, we should see that as a trend. Yeah. Lots of people in our industry talk about how it's specialist, it requires expertise, it's very difficult to disrupt the underwriting process in specialty with AI directly. I do think that's true, at least with AI in its current form, but it can enhance the existing underwriting process, and I think people that embrace that earlier are going to make better decisions than those that don't. Okay. That is very helpful. I had a related question on AI, and I'm thinking obviously there is the bifurcation of Fidelis into Pelagos and The Fidelis Partnership. There's a great proliferation of MGAs. There's this thesis in Monte Carlo, or not the thesis, this observation of additional capital coming in for casualty sidecars. It seems like the insurance industry is becoming more modular. In other words, you've got expertise in underwriting. There's expert capital over there. There's expert claims handling over there. How does AI fit into all of that? Yeah, in terms of becoming more modular, when we thought about bifurcating the business, the idea, as we've articulated before, was about having people spend more of their time doing what they're good at. So the underwriting team focus on executing the underwriting strategy on a risk by risk basis. They have more time to risk by risk push pricing, push terms and conditions, innovate, think of new product lines, meet the brokers, and concentrate on that. We sit back and manage at a portfolio level, so we have more time to think about the macro strategy, what lines of business, where are we getting the best risk return profile for our capital allocations, how should we think about things like buybacks versus deploying to underwriting. That's been a great benefit. We think we've generated more alpha thinking about macro topics. They've generated more alpha executing on the day to day, and the sum's been a more robust business that performs better. I think if you extrapolate that, some other carriers, it may not be as direct, the modulation, but they take investment off, hand that over to someone else, let them concentrate on that while you concentrate on underwriting. I can see that becoming a trend. Maybe other companies looking to take the underwriting and the investment out. It's more challenging then because the person sitting in the middle of trying to balance those two macro risk allocations, investment and underwriting, and the more detailed bit at the same time. But I can definitely see that happening. I think where AI could disrupt in there is some other of the more vanilla aspects of a business. So maybe the operations, the claims handling, the reserving. You could see AI really interrupting in that space. Now people could build out their own solutions, and people are definitely trying to do that. But to me it makes sense that you would have a company come along that specializes in that, really build up a niche business there, and then interrupt that space in a big way. Right. People would not just break that out for the efficiency gains. They'd break that out so they could concentrate more on what matters to the business, the risk selection, the underwriting, and less on the operational aspects. So I definitely suspect that AI will lead to an increase in how modular businesses become with a breakout of some of those more operational related services. Great. Thank you. I do want to look around the room. If you have questions, I want to make sure that everyone's getting the information that they want. If you do, please just raise your hand. We'll get you the microphone, and you can ask. I often find myself in the situation where I'm interviewing executives, and I basically invite them to explain what the sell side is doing wrong. I'm going to do that now also. How well do you think that U.S. investors, because you're trading on New York, understand the volatility inherent in your book of business? Yeah. I think the understanding there has really increased in recent periods, partly because we've had some volatility that we've had to explain, right? The theme that we've tried to get over to investors is that our business, if you judge it on a quarter-to-quarter basis, will have volatility within it. You see that this year. Q1 we had a great result down in the low 80s. Q2 we had a result that had a high combined ratio with it. What we want to get across to people is we care deeply about volatility, but we think about it a bit differently. We think about it on minimum a 12 month period. I think if you take just the six months this year, Meyer, we had one large loss in Q1, great result. We had five in Q2. My expectation for the year would've been six to eight for the half year. Right. It's like we've had some quarter-to-quarter volatility, but on the half year actually we're bang in line with where we'd expect to be. I think in addition to that, one of the great tools we have to help control volatility is outward reinsurance. But you really can't judge that on a quarterly basis if you think about an aggregate contract that operates on an annual term. So you have your difficult first half of the year and an aggregate protection in place. You expect less volatility in the second half of the year. That doesn't come across in your half year results. Right. I think it's our job to, one, communicate clearer how we think about volatility, and two, to look at areas where we do think it's appropriate to reduce. And where we want to reduce volatility, we'd look at a couple of things. Diversification, I think, is a great way to reduce volatility. We look volatile sometimes because we don't have a big casualty book sitting on the side. We're just writing short-term business. So if you have a property loss, our loss is bigger relative to our overall [X book] because we have no casualty book than many of our peers, right? Again, it's thinking about things like that, thinking how do we add diversification to reduce the effect of that. It's outwards reinsurance use as well. As the market becomes softer, you may expect a lower mean return, but there's more tools to reduce the volatility associated with that. We bought aggregate protection in our property cat book last year. That hadn't been available at all in the hard market. We bought an aggregate stop loss to protect more risk losses in terms of large loss frequency coming through. Again, no chance we could have got that a year before. If the market did continue to soften, those options to protect volatility become wider and wider on the outwards reinsurance front. I think that the investors are starting to understand that, but we'll do more in communicating that and giving as many examples as we can on the things that we do to reduce it. Okay, fantastic. I want to shift gears a little bit. One of the points that Dan emphasizes a lot is that Pelagos is the lead, or The Fidelis Partnership is lead on 90% of the accounts that you write. Sometimes it's hard for us to understand. If I would put it differently, that's a Lloyd's term, and I'm not sure that it's as familiar in the U.S. Can you flesh out what the concrete advantages are to having that lead position? Yeah. I'll start with the easier positions. One of the metrics we track is our differential to the market price. How much more we get paid for the same risk than anyone else. We don't disclose that publicly, but there's a significant margin there. I think the easiest way to outperform before you get to risk selection outwards any of it, is to just get paid more for the same thing than anyone else. Now why would someone pay a lead more? A lead's coming with input into how you price the risk, structure the cover. A lead's putting a significant line down to kick off the process of getting syndication behind that risk. That's why we aim to lead in most of the lines of business that we write, The Fidelis Partnership leading over 90% of the business they write, and it gives you that leverage to drive pricing. It also gives you leverage to drive terms and conditions, which to us are just as important as pricing. Playing in the parts of the program that you want to play, getting a different set of coverage restrictions to some others, excluding things that we're particularly worried about in the tail with loss ratio caps, with exclusions for particular types of exposure. Those are just as important to us. I think as the market's changed, the difference between lead and follow has become more pronounced because it's changed access to risk. What we've seen in the last year is some follow lines, if you just had a small line, particularly in the property market, you now don't see all of the business because you're not needed. They can feed it with lead and larger line capacity. If you're seeing less of the business and you still want to maintain the same size, you're having to access in a different way. We see in property, people come back and write the risks that we write as facultative reinsurance of us. That means, and this is why you get variation in how the press report rate change, I think. We might see, for example, 10% off on the slip. We then FAC some of that out at a greater rate reduction to what we just received, and our 10% becomes 8% off, and someone else has got 20% off now on exactly the same risk. That dynamic doesn't exist at all when the market's hard because there's plenty to go around for everyone. But it's really started to come out in the last year, and if the market didn't change in property, I'd expect more of that into the next year. Again, it's going back to my first point. Even if you know the best portfolio to write, if you don't have access to it, you can't execute it. Being a lead gives you that access, and it gives you preferential pricing and terms on top of that. Okay. That's fantastic, and that clarifies things, I think, greatly. Are there any trends that you can communicate in terms of how it's hard to get much better than 90, but how that's developing or maybe trends in the gap of pricing? I'd always expect that to be high for us. I'll perhaps take it a slightly different way and tell you why it's not 100. There's some lines of business where you take a lower premium and write higher volume of risk that just doesn't work to be a lead market. It's much more about industrializing the process of binding those slips. Again, that is actually an area of the overall business that can be disrupted by AI at some point in the future because it's so mechanical. So those are the lines that we wouldn't lead. Those are the type of lines where we don't see the same advantages to leading because it's small premium, you can't change the terms and conditions. You can't get a differential pricing, and effectively, it just becomes more admin heavy to lead. Right. Okay. No, that's very thorough. Again, if there are questions, please raise your hand. Sorry, go ahead. [inaudible] It's coming, yes. Your thoughts on the data centers, is that an opportunity or not? If you do think data centers are an opportunity, how large do you think it is for the industry overall and for yourselves specifically? Yeah, that's a great question. In terms of data centers, we're very boring people, so we ensure the construction risk. I think data centers being an opportunity for us is because data centers are the thing that most of the construction budget's going on at the moment. It's not the fact they're data centers, it's the fact that people are building a lot of them at the same time, if that makes sense. That's a big opportunity. These are absolutely enormous projects. So what we found with that is if someone wants to buy $5 billion a limit, even if we have a reasonably large line size, say $100 million, you're not really relevant to that slip. It's difficult to even get a seat at the table when you're doing such a small percent of the overall. For that, we worked with The Fidelis Partnership for them to stack other capital sources up along with ours, so that we could go with a much more meaningful line size, get a seat at the table, negotiate terms and conditions, and protect our line by keeping to the level that we are comfortable with. That is how we got on the construction risk and how we have built that portfolio, and it has been a driver of growth in the last couple of years. There is lots of other risk associated with this in terms of getting the chips in, ensuring business interruption if they shut down, insuring the chips themselves, insuring the energy assets coming in. For us right now, we do not feel that we have got the expertise in valuing some of those assets, understanding how their values change if there is a disruption in the supply chain to underwrite that appropriately. I think that is certainly an opportunity for the market. It is not a space that we would want to play in at the moment because there is just not enough data to evaluate the risk properly. Do you have any sense of how large an overall market opportunity it is? Aside from Fidelis, just the entire market. I will not give you a number on that. I think it is an enormous opportunity if you factor in the chips and the business interruption and the energy source supplying it, I think. But how much of that they can get anyone comfortable with to provide an insurance solution for is a really big uncertainty for me. Also, if you think about the type of entities building data centers, some of these are enormous companies that do not require insurance. They can either retain the risk themselves, insure through a captive or find a different approach to it. I would say in terms of economical development, it must be the biggest opportunity that we see right now. How much of that translates into insurable risk I think is difficult to say, and how much of it translates to insurable risk that we would want to take on as Pelagos is even more difficult. Thank you. Thank you. I am going to move to another sort of hot topic, if you will- Sure. ...besides data centers. The Middle East, where the agility of, and 20% loss ratio are things that you've highlighted before. Can you update us on the current? I know that things change all the time, but what are the current risks and opportunities based on today's political environment? Yeah. Again, it's an area that we try to be as boring as we can in. We saw an opportunity there to help get commerce going again post the start of the conflict. We knew that there would be a really differentiated risk profile, and it would require looking at each risk, each ship, each site, risk by risk from the start. To give some examples, we thought, you say a Chinese flagged vessel not going through the strait was probably an insurable risk because it was only going to get hit by accident. It wasn't going to be the target of a strike. Whereas being frank, we thought a U.S. friendly asset sailing through the strait, for us was an uninsurable risk and probably remains so. The same on the PV side. If it was an SME company nowhere near a U.S. air base, it's probably only going to get hit by accident. If it's a big high-rise tower in the middle of a city, much more at risk and probably uninsurable for us. So picking through what we think is a good risk, what we think isn't, what we think is priced very well and what we think less so is how we've approached it. And I think unless you're willing to do the work of underwriting at that level, it's really difficult to deploy into a live conflict situation. We amended that. We set that appetite within 24 hours of the conflict beginning because I think if you're first, you get a pricing advantage. You also get a data advantage and a relationship advantage. You're there to solve problems at the start. The brokers appreciate that. They remember you as more people join the table later. You build up more information about the risky and less risky areas, and again, build up your information to set your underwriting appetite. Then we updated it originally, or pretty much every day as we learnt more information. As things quietened down, that probably changed to a weekly process. At periods during the conflict, we've completely stopped underwriting and then gone back in in select areas. We react as the situation changes, and I think that will continue. Right now, it's the same thought process we had at the start, right? We want to write risks that we think aren't going to be active targets, are going to more be incidental damage from trying to target something else. It's just exactly what that pool of risks is changes over time. Okay. On a related note, how does the current global political violence, terror marketplace look? Is this a year where you can expect above average profitability, below average? I know there's volatility. I know there's uncertainty, but your overall appetite for that risk in the current market. Yeah, that's a great question. I'll give you a Pelagos specific answer first and then think about the market. I think for us, we've got two competing things, right? A significant portion of our book relative to the overall comes from war premium. We have like 5%-10% share of the war market. We don't have 5%-10% of the insurance market's capital. Right. Clearly, we have an outsized play in that versus something else. I think that's been a great decision for us. We've written $1 billion of war premium since 2023, sub 20% loss ratio, and that includes losses that we've picked up for the Middle East. But if you have a year with a major conflict and you're skewed to war business, then you are going to have more loss experience coming through. You look at our half year combined ratio, it's 93%, somewhere around there. We'd hope to typically between mid to high 80s. So we've had a higher combined than we want. The main thing to point out for that is the fact we've had a major conflict and we're overweight there. But if you think about the opportunity that we discussed that's come through, that's offsetting that to some extent because we've gone in and written a decent sized book of post-conflict business at very elevated rates. When I say elevated rates, I mean we're being paid 20 times what we would've been paid pre-conflict. As I say, we're trying to pick up pretty vanilla risk within that. So the profitability on that, as you sub 20% loss ratio we've seen on that so far, is help offsetting to some extent. I would say on balance, by the end of the year, it's going to be even for us, a higher combined ratio year in that class than a typical year just because of the fact we've had a major conflict. I think if you look at the market overall, we've had a lower share of the market loss than our market share suggests by quite a bit. The market as a whole, I think, will have a pretty poor combined ratio in those lines. People are talking about a $3 billion- $4 billion event, $4 billion+ now. So that'll be a really significant loss on those lines of business. How people approach post-conflict isn't evenly spread either. So there'll be some people that picked up a big loss and not written any post-conflict business because they're not equipped to do it sort of on a risk-by-risk basis. So we think for us, it'll be a difficult year, but perfectly manageable. I think 93% versus 89%, when one of our biggest exposures has had a live conflict, I think is a really good result. How we've done versus the market, I think is a really good result. But it's certainly going to be challenging for the classes as a whole. Okay. In some ways, I don't mean to gloss over what that means, but that implies a longer duration opportunity, at least in theory. Yeah, in theory. The reason I hesitate there is what you see at the moment is an abundance of capital in the industry, I think, eager to find wherever they think the next opportunity's going to be. I think war's quite a nuanced line of business where you need real expertise to deploy effectively. So there's a bit of a higher barrier to entry to come into that. But if rates go up, I would expect more people to try and move into that line. So I remain hopeful that rates adjust for the longer term. But if you look at the rating environment posts and big losses we've seen recently, we're just not seeing that come through at the moment, and I think that's because of the abundance of capital. Take aviation, for example. A whole series of losses, large war losses from Russia, Ukraine, and then war rates were going down. Right. You look at the marine market, had Baltimore Bridge, things like that, and marine rates really not coming up from that. We are hopeful that rates will adjust appropriately given the risk profile, but we are not going to hold our breath. No, that is fair. I guess I should caveat that in theory with this theory really does not work that well. I will take it from there. If we take a step back, in the context of geopolitical uncertainty, I am trying to understand how the various asset-backed finance lines perform, both in terms of demand and in terms of loss experience. Yeah. I am a negative actuary, so I will start with the risk one first. Okay. We've written those lines of business pre-bifurcation since about 2015. That means we were writing financial cat exposed business over COVID, for example. Right. The really big shocks over the interest rate rises we've seen over the last few years. When we write that type of scenario is the kind of one we would use as a stress, right? We've been through two different periods of that over the period we've written it and picked up pretty much no loss as a result of that. The first thing I'd say is we really feel like that portfolio is quite deeply stress-tested and ready to be resilient through any economic changes. In terms of demand, I don't see it as much in those lines as a driver of demand movement. We tend to see steady demand increase in there year- by- year, more because we're expanding the clients that are accessing those products. If you're writing a capital relief product for a financial institution, more institutions, more geographies are starting to utilize that product to get the efficiency. If you're writing the other side to asset-backed finance, we really see that as providing insurance to facilitate a transaction. You need a loan to buy a plane. You can't get the loan without us insuring it, therefore the transaction doesn't happen without the insurer. Again, there's been a steady uptick as people use insurance more and more in those spaces to enable more transactions to take place. That, for me, has been the real steady driver of demand increase rather than fluctuations in the economic environment. Okay. Should we worry that there is some other stress, then, to which these lines are vulnerable if it is not COVID, if it is not spiking interest rates, maybe there is some other black swan? Yeah. These lines came about, at least for us, after the financial crisis. Right. What that means is that gives you a great set of results to regenerate and say, "I do not want to have a loss in that set of scenarios again." I think it is a tail type event that exposes this type of exposure. But you find with something like COVID that if you are too far in the tail, then there is no loss at all because there is government bailouts and something changes. Right. There is risk there. The risk is certainly pretty far in the tail because we have had no losses in extreme scenarios recently. What we do to gain comfort with it is, one, I think diversification is key. Spread your risk geographically. Spread your risk by client base, so who you're offering the insurance products to. Spread your risk by product, so doing some SRT, some mortgage, lots of different things in there. And spread it by where you're attaching the curve. Some stuff right in the tail, some a bit in the tail, some a little bit more in the money, so you get a bit of a spread between the different buckets there. I think that's a great way to build resilience in the portfolio to face anything. Okay. Excellent. I want to move on to property because property's a significant line of business. The cycle has been softer or more abrupt than a lot of insurance executives anticipated. I guess I would quote Pat Ryan here, who said he's been surprised by this, and Pat Ryan has seen a fair number of cycles and has insight into that. What is your view? What is the Pelagos view about what that faster than historical softening means for the duration and maybe the amplitude of the cycle from here? Yeah. One thing I'd say on that is I think we probably hit a higher peak maybe than in some previous cycles. Right. We saw compound rate increases from 2019 all the way up to 2024, something like that. And by that point, when we think about pricing and rate adequacy, that was our most profitable line of business, property direct. Yeah. Which is really incredible when you think about some of the other risks that we take where you are getting paid more than just the risk transfer premium, say, in asset-backed finance. I think it got to a place where it was very well-priced. Then lots of extra supply came in and the rates fell off. I suspect people view it pretty similar to us, which is through the lens of rate adequacy, not rate change. I am not surprised that it came off as much as we saw it come off, which is not as much as you see reported, but still a reasonable rate of decline. Because even as we look at the market now, we see plenty of pricing adequacy within it. I think it is probably that effect of getting up higher maybe than in some previous cycles and then having more room, if you like, as the market changed. The other impact is sort of the leveraged impact I described earlier, where I think if you pick the biggest rate increases and then you find the biggest rate decreases, you get the biggest rate of change. Sure. I think. Someone said to me that someone had mentioned during the Monte Carlo conference that rates were back to where they were in 2017, which I thought the only way you could conclude that is by picking the high point and the low point and taking the difference and trying to make that argument, I think. For me, I thought that is quite easy to disprove. Look at the loss ratios in 2017. Look at everyone's loss ratios now. It is short tail. It comes through in six months. You have gone from something that is probably over 100% in 2017 to something running for us well sub 40% right now. That is not the same rating environment. That just does not make sense as we look at it. Yeah, I think there is that effect of exaggeration in terms of how much the movement has actually been. To the point I made earlier, if the rate is off 10% and we FAC it to someone, that means the rate is off 8% for us and 20% for someone else. Right. If you then put 20% in the press and then you do it next year and the year after, all of a sudden you get very far away from the rate change we see. Okay. No, that clarifies things tremendously. I would argue 2017 had a little bit more adverse weather. Mother Nature was in a bit of a worse mood then, but I take your point. I assume you are adjusting for that. Yeah. Even if you take the cat out of it and look at the risk losses over the risk premium, I think that might not be at 110 then, but you look at the difference between those two periods. Right. You see that same effect. Okay. No, that clarifies things tremendously. Second quarter reinsurance actually had very strong growth. The response to this will probably involve some of the difference between rate declines and rate adequacy. I was hoping you could talk about what business you wrote in the second quarter of 2026 that you didn't in the second quarter of 2025. What improved there to warrant the growth that you put up? This is in reinsurance. Yeah. There's probably two themes to that, I would say. One is we wrote more quota share business. Historically, we've written almost all excess of loss business in that line of business. We thought that's where you got the best value, the best contribution to our risk reward profile. If you write quota share, you can access the underlying direct writer's rate change. What we'd seen is the people getting direct rate increases and then getting decreases on their outwards reinsurance excess of loss program. We wanted to participate in some of those rate increases with the direct writers, which you can do through doing quota share. We saw more opportunity to do some of that in the quarter, so there was a little bit of that in there. The other factor was there was a couple of geographical areas, I won't say exactly which ones, where we wanted to see how changes played out, so legislative changes, other changes, and whether they had the impact that people thought they were going to. Those were areas that we were underway on last year as part of our portfolio. As we got comfortable this year with those changes, we brought them up to equal weight. Right. It's not that we've gone out and found a particularly attractive area of risk that we've gone overweight in, it's more getting the comfort to bring some other bits up to equal weight. Okay. No, that's very clear. Looking forward, and I know this is a little bit tricky, I was hoping you'd talk about your expectations for maybe the second half of 2026, or I think the name change of the company was intended to signify some sort of evolution. I was hoping you could share your thoughts on what that means for growth going forward. Yeah. In terms of expectations, most of our growth last year and the majority this year have come from our new underwriting partnerships. Right. Going back to what I said at the start, I do not think that should be a surprise to people because those are places where we can add diversifying different risk, a new point of access to the market. Euclid in the U.S. market, Bamboo doing homeowners, where that is not something that we have been in typically, and there are lots of other examples of that. Looking forward, I also think new underwriting partners will be the source of our growth, at least in the near term, just because it is easier there to add new things we do not have access to at the moment. New underwriting partners tend to be on a portfolio level basis, and most portfolio level deals will incept at 1:1 or the first half of the year. I think our growth, that book will be more a Q1 book than the rest of it, so you get some temporary distortions in growth, but quarter- by- quarter. That being said, we are on for mid-single digits this year. We are up somewhere in 6%, 7% for the half year, so well on track for that. With the pipeline that we saw at Monte Carlo, very confident in delivering on that. I think into 2027, I think it is too early for us to give a firm guide on there, but I would expect us to continue to grow. With the pipeline that we see, and unless the market comes off significantly, there is plenty of rate adequate business opportunity to diversify and make the portfolio more robust that we will execute on in that period. In terms of the rebrand and the name change, I think that has been great for us. We IPO'd. We then got two or three years to really work out who we wanted to be, what we wanted the story to be, and by the time we rebranded, we knew what we were doing, where we were going, and who we were, so we could put the whole brand around that. We always say all the taglines of the partnerships that matter make the connections. They all associated with what we are trying to build out as lots of different touchpoints to risk allocating amongst them depending on where the market is. For me, the brand has let us get across what we are trying to do much clearer. It is giving us a great point to reconnect to brokers and investors and explain the story again and exactly what we are about. That has translated into an uptick in pipeline business that we have seen. No doubt about it. We have had more meetings. The meetings with brokers have got to the point of our risk appetite much quicker. It has been a real success story for our business. Okay. Fantastic. Can we get a little color on, not necessarily numbers, but how the most recent partnerships have been working out relative to your expectations? Yeah. We said when we moved away from The Fidelis Partnership to look at new partnerships alongside them, that they set a very high bar in terms of performance. The team there have got a four-year track record, fantastic combined ratios over the whole period and delivered great results for us. We wanted our new underwriting partners to meet or beat that hurdle, otherwise there was no point in doing them. We may as well allocate more capital to The Fidelis Partnership. Right. So we set a very, very high bar. Really pleased that as the performance has earned through for those, it's been beating those expectations that we built up in terms of profitability. Also with our partners, we said from the start, we want scalable opportunities. Over the long term, we only want 20- 30 partners because a core advantage in our business is the entire executive team is involved in every partnership, every opportunity, every new avenue we go down comes back to the executive team to review. I think where we've seen things go wrong with any level of delegation in our business is when you stop having that level of involvement at the level of seniority that is necessary. So 20- 30 partners is the right number for us to go to on that, I think. Okay. Is there a timeline that you've disclosed or that you've got in mind? All I can say on that, I think, is that it's been the key area of growth for us over the last couple of quarters, and I think it will continue to be in the near term. We're about 10% from new underwriting partners now, 90% from The Fidelis Partnership, and I certainly see that split swinging more towards new underwriting partners over the next couple of years. The reason we won't set a firm target is we want to be agnostic to The Fidelis Partnership or other partners, and we want to only care about where the best opportunity is. The Middle East is a great example. The Fidelis Partnership were the best partner to execute that opportunity for us, and we wouldn't want to artificially choose between partners because we've set a pre-goal. It'll definitely be more, it's definitely the core area of our growth, but we haven't put firm numbers around it. Okay. Then this, I think, will be the final question, and this wouldn't happen between Euclid and Bamboo, for example, but how do you monitor the risk of good partners not competing with one another at the expense of your balance sheet? That's a really great question. Obviously one we thought about from when we embarked on the mission to try and find new partners. I think going back again to my first point of one of the key things we want is options to access risk in a different way. So one of the criteria for a new partner is they have to do something different to what we can already get to, so that kind of removes them directly clashing with each other almost automatically. Right. Again, think about Euclid. They're in the U.S., TFP is in Europe. Bamboo, they're in homeowners, TFP is in E&S. That's true across almost all of our partners. There is in our industry, if you underwrite at a portfolio level, an inevitable level of clash at some level. A bit of someone's book's going to overlap with a bit of someone's book somewhere else, and I think that's unavoidable, but it's certainly the minority of the partnerships we do. Where we do have a clash, we deal with it through a few different ways, explicitly excluding it from the new underwriting partnership, i.e., you can't do it if this other person does it on a risk-by-risk basis, or we tackle it with outwards reinsurance, or we tackle it with reduced line sizes when we come into that situation. So we've got the tools to manage the exposure. But I would say because at a strategic level, writing business that directly clashes with what we've already got doesn't make sense to us, then it comes up as less of an issue as we go through. Okay, phenomenal. With that, we have come to the end of our session, so please join me in thanking Jonny for a tremendously informative session. Great. Thanks, Meyer. Thank you very much. We really appreciate it.