Hi, welcome to the Pershing Square IPO Presentation. I'm here with Ryan Israel, our CIO. I'm Bill Ackman, the CEO of Pershing Square. Today we're going to talk about actually two public listings. The IPO of a company called Pershing Square USA, and the listing of a company called Pershing Square Inc. Pershing Square Inc. is the general partner of the management company of Pershing Square. It's the company that I work for. Pershing Square USA is a new fund that we're launching, our first fund to be launched in the U.S., listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The launch of a new fund makes the management company more valuable, so we want to share some of that value with investors who are participating in the offering. The way we're doing that is that for every five shares of PSU you buy, you receive one share of PSI. For $250, you own five shares of Pershing Square USA, and you get one free share. The market will determine the value of that share. The plan is an offering with a minimum size of $5 billion and a maximum size of $10 billion. The way we're going to get there is in advance of this public offering, we went to what I would describe as real money investors. These are large institutions, family offices, pension funds, insurance companies, sort of ultra-high net worth investors making investments in the tens of millions. Our goal was to raise $2 billion of capital. We were fortunate at having a ton of interest. We raised $2.8 billion of committed capital from these investors. I'm told this is the largest amount of committed capital for an IPO in history. The only condition to that capital is that the IPO is a minimum of $5 billion, and we're going to cap the size at $10 billion plus a greenshoe of approximately $1 billion more. Pershing Square Inc. is the management company, or as some people call it, the GP of Pershing Square. That was founded 22 years ago. We manage $31 billion of assets. $21 billion of our assets are fee- paying. What's unusual about Pershing Square in our industry is 96% of the capital is permanent capital. What that means is the capital, it's in public companies where we're an important shareholder, and we receive significant fees from managing these assets. $6 billion of the $21 billion is employee capital, which is a lot of skin in the game, if you will, for the people making the investment decisions at the firm. We have 48 employees. Most people assume Pershing Square has to be a much larger firm for our kind of presence in the market. We can operate in a very lean organization because of the nature of our strategy. We are a concentrated investor. We own typically 12 or slightly more companies. We tend to own them for the long term. We get deeply involved in these businesses. The other reason we can operate with such a small team is the capital base is permanent. This means we don't have to constantly fundraise, which is typical for hedge funds and other asset managers. Over the 22-year period since we started, we've generated a 16.2% return net of all fees. 5.5% per annum above the S&P over the same period. The history of our firm, I describe it as success is not a straight line up. We started out in the hedge fund business with an onshore and offshore fund, limited and just high net worth investors investing with us. The plan, however, was to get to a permanent capital model, and the reason for this is the strategy involves taking pretty large stakes in public companies. We typically are one of the largest shareholders of the companies in which we invest. We get deeply involved in these businesses. We get to work with management teams. We join Boards of Directors. We sometimes recruit new management teams. We make commitments to teams we hire. We're a long-term investor. We never wanted to be in a position where investors could redeem their capital at a time where it was critical for our business, and that's why permanent capital was important for our model. We took an important step in that direction in October 2014. We launched a company called Pershing Square Holdings, and it was listed offshore. The reason we launched it offshore is that you could not charge incentive fees to a U.S.-listed investment company, and our business model required incentive fees to recruit talent in that we compete with other hedge funds in the industry. Unfortunately, within a year of that investment, we made one of the worst investments in the history of the firm, a company called Valeant Pharmaceuticals. The stock declined 90%. We got a lot of very negative press. We were short at the time a company called Herbalife, and investors in our industry viewed this as an opportunity. They thought the vulnerability created by the bad press might lead to investor redemptions. People bought stock in Herbalife, which caused the price to rise, and started shorting the companies that we owned, which contributed to our losses increasing to more than 30%. That really led to our decision to get out of the business of managing open-ended funds like hedge funds. Our investors who we offered them the opportunity, of course, to stay if they wanted, but if they wanted to leave, they could take their money, and most did. That put us in a position beginning around January 2018, where our capital base became almost entirely permanent. As you can tell from the chart and on the next page, our performance improved significantly. We've had the best period of outperformance over the last eight years, and we attribute it to the permanent capital nature of our business model. We're not exposed to investors who constantly gave us money in the first decade-plus of our business. We're not exposed to the risk of money leaving. Money coming in can be as dilutive to returns as money rushing out the door. The beauty of permanent capital is it's a closed system, and we don't have to worry about the money flows of our investors. That enables us to be a long-term investor. It also means we can be more focused. The typical hedge fund manager spends a fair amount of time meeting with investors because in order to keep the capital stable, you have to constantly raise money. The beauty of our model is we haven't had to raise money for almost a decade, and that's enabled us to be focused on investing. We've generated 8.3 percentage points of outperformance versus the S&P 500 net of all fees. Over the last eight-year period. Now we've done this. Herbalife was our last short, so today we only own stocks. We're so to speak, long only. We own some of what we believe to be the best businesses in the world. We try to buy these companies on a very opportunistic basis at a time when perhaps there's either an overreaction in markets because of geopolitical or macro events that causes all stocks, even some of the best companies, to decline significantly in value. Sometimes it's a great business that sort of lost its way. Management's made a strategic mistake, a bad acquisition. Perhaps they've let costs get out of control. We get deeply involved in our companies, and we work with them, sometimes with a Board seat, sometimes just as an influential outside shareholder, helping them succeed. That's the core engine of the profitability of the firm. What you see on this page are examples of hedging. One of the things we spend a portion of every day thinking about, I spend a lot of time thinking about geopolitics, politics, macro. Maybe Ryan, speak to a typical day. What are we doing on the asymmetric hedging side? How are you spending your time? Sure. Nearly every day, I and several other members of the team spend two to three hours of our day really going through and thinking about all of the large macro risks that could be out there. Some of that is as simple as making sure we read all of the papers. We follow all of the government releases where the government talks about the various ways in which the economy is developing. We also pay very close attention to a lot of macro research. We actually have a unique strategy where we follow hundreds of companies every single year in a lot of detail. By looking very carefully at what those companies are saying, which are often leading indicators that will later show up in the overall economy, we're able to develop a thesis about what might be happening in the world, what might be happening in the U.S. economy. We can start to think about the things that we're worried about. When we develop something where we think there could be a risk, we know that there are at least two dozen different instruments that we could potentially purchase at the right prices that would allow us to be a significant beneficiary if the things that we're worried about were to occur. Now, in order to have what we call asymmetric hedging, which means we put down a small amount of money on one of these instruments and have it be a very large return or multiple of capital, we need several things. One is we need to be worried about a risk that the market's not worried about. We then need to select the correct instrument, where the pricing is very attractive to us because people are not worried, the risk we're worried about. And that risk needs to come to fruition. On this page, we've shown that that's several times at each of the black swan events over the last 20 years, where we've done that successfully. Just sort of taking that a bit further. Beginning around 2005, we started to be concerned about AAA-rated companies taking on subprime credit risk. We had a concern this could lead to a cataclysm, if you will, in the credit markets. We bought an instrument called a credit default swap. A credit default swap is sort of like an insurance policy on a company defaulting on its debt. It trades in the marketplace. We bought insurance on AAA-rated companies. The insurance was very cheap because people believed with AAA rating that the probability of default was very small. We had a different view because we saw companies taking on a lot of risk. When the financial crisis happened, these instruments became much more valuable. We made $1 billion and $1, and we took that money. We had about $4 billion under management at the time, and we bought stocks. We did very little in terms of hedging black swan risk because we didn't see any sort of storms on the horizon until early 2020 when we became concerned, at least personally, I became concerned initially about COVID from a health perspective. I became concerned about the economic effects of COVID, and then ultimately came to the conclusion that we were going to have to have a global economic shutdown in order to address the spreading virus. The capital markets at the time, the stock market, the bond market, no one seemed to care. The result was we could buy for a very small amount of capital, in effect, an insurance policy on credit spreads generally, so-called index CDS. This instrument went from being worth nothing to being worth $2.6 billion over basically a 10-business-day period. We took the money, and we used it to buy stocks in March of 2020 when the market was down about 30%. About nine months later, our concern was inflation. President Trump had spent trillions of dollars bailing out the economy during COVID, supporting the economy. We had 0% policy from the Federal Reserve. We had a vaccine, and people were going to get excited about spending money again and living again. Those forces, in our view, were going to create a demand shock at a time when supply chains, the ability of companies to deliver goods to their consumers, had been disrupted as a result of COVID. Increased demand or dramatically increased demand and limited supply, we thought would lead to massive inflation. The way we hedged that risk was we bought an instrument called an interest rate swaption, which is really almost like a call option on interest rates. At the time, two-year rates were at 0.12% or 12 basis points, and our call option was struck around 94 basis points. A bit like buying an option on a stock 7x or 8x above the current market price. What happened was inflation came to be as we expected, and that instrument became a lot more valuable. We made $2.6 billion on these interest rate swaptions, and we bought stocks. When you think about Pershing Square as an investment firm and think about the funds we manage, today we focus exclusively on owning some of the best, great, durable companies in the world. Think of that as the long-term engine of profitability of the firm. We also episodically identify a risk that we're concerned about. We look for an instrument. It could be an interest rate swaption. It could be a credit default swap. It could be some other kind of currency or, for example, oil-related commodity price-driven instrument, where we spend a small amount of capital, typically 1% or less than 2% of our assets, on an instrument that could have a very large payoff if the unexpected, significant risk were to occur. When you look at the firm, many firms in our industry have the real competitive advantage are the people that they hire and their ability to retain those people, and that's obviously very important for our firm and really every firm in our industry. We think we have some other attributes that give us kind of long-term sustainable competitive advantages. It starts with permanent capital. We're the only firm in our industry with a substantial majority. Nearly all of our capital is permanent, which means we don't suffer from the risk of investor redemptions. We've built a track record over time of being a very influential shareholder, and that's given us what we call the ability to effectuate change without paying the control premium. Private equity firms generally have to write a big check, and have to pay a big premium to the market price to buy control of a business. We get a very high degree of influence, something pretty close to control, an ability to make changes to management, to Boards, to strategy, by being a large shareholder and having the backing of other large shareholders. We've become a preferred partner to management teams over time. We recruited a lot of the most talented CEOs to some of our companies. That's led to periods of outperformance. We've built relationships with these CEOs. It's a very small community. Result is it enables us to recruit other very talented teams when we need them. We've built a unique hedging program, and we operate in a strategy that benefits from scale. It's better for us to own a greater percentage of a company because it gives us more influence. We're investing in the largest and most liquid companies in the world. Liquidity is not a concern for this strategy, and the capital base is permanent, so we're never forced to sell as a result of investor redemptions. The incremental capital that we raise from this public offering will give us, we think, important long-term benefits. We've also built a brand. It's kind of, I would say, historically best known in sort of the institutional space as we've been an active investor and run proxy contests. We've gotten to know many institutions that have supported us over the years. We've also built a big retail brand. I've got 2 million Twitter followers. We're a firm that's very closely followed by the media, and that's very valuable when you launch an investment vehicle, in this case, Pershing Square USA, that can be owned by retail investors. This will be the first New York Stock Exchange-listed, first U.S. publicly traded hedge fund, and the first opportunity for many retail investors to invest in a hedge fund, and one that will be liquid in that it is traded on one of the most liquid markets in the world. The goal is to own basically the same portfolio in the same proportions, with a couple of exceptions of companies that are of a scale that we can't replicate today. One's called Howard Hughes, which I'll talk about later in the deck. It will be the lowest- cost hedge fund in the world. You're not permitted to charge a performance fee or a promote to a U.S.-listed vehicle that owns securities. We will charge just a 2% flat fee, which compares with a 1.5% management fee and a 16% or 20% annual fee that we charge our other funds and our other investors. This entity will be a closed-end fund in terms of its corporate and tax structure. We're going to run it like a real company. What I mean by that is the company has a real Board of Directors. Our Board Chair is the former head of Division of Investment Management at the SEC. We have the former CIO of Fidelity Investments. We have the former Head of Risk Management at Morgan Stanley. We have a former executive from a very well-regarded private equity firm called Providence Capital. We have an executive from a hedge fund firm called Tremblant. It's a Board that's going to run the company and oversee the business like a real business. We're going to have active investor communications. That's actually not that usual for a closed-end fund. We're going to have quarterly calls where shareholders can ask questions. We're going to have an annual meeting. I call it Berkshire Hathaway style, where we encourage people to show up, and Ryan and I, and other members of the team will be available to answer questions about the business. We also intend to seek credit ratings. We have a London-listed vehicle called Pershing Square Holdings. We believe it's the only A- rated hedge fund in the world. That A- rating allows us to issue long-term fixed- rate laddered maturity debt. We invest in long-term assets. It's appropriate to finance those assets with long-term fixed-rate obligations. The debt has no mark-to-market or other maintenance or other covenants. As long as we pay interest and principal on time, it's a very conservative way to finance our business, and we keep leverage at a very low level. Leverage is capped between 15% debt to total assets and low 20% debt to total assets. Pershing Square Inc, the GP, the entity that's principally owned by management, will be making $100 million investment in Pershing Square USA. We have significant skin in the game. If you look at the Pershing Square track record over the last 22 years, and you adjust for the lower fees of Pershing Square USA, our 16% return would have been a 90% compounded return, 8.3 percentage points per annum above the S&P 500 over the same period. Since we've had permanent capital, that margin has expanded almost 11% per annum better than the S&P over the same period. We've talked about some of the competitive advantages of permanent capital, and I think you can see those in our results. When you compare our results, and here we do the comparison since we've had permanent capital over the last eight years, the median equity closed-end fund generated a 7.3% return compounded over the last eight years versus 24.9% for Pershing Square. For equity closed-end funds of $1 billion or more, the return was approximately 10%. The best performing, which would become the second-best performing fund based on historic track record, had a 14.7% compounded return over the last eight-year period. This is by far, by historical track record, the best performing closed-end fund. The power of compounding is something I talk about often. You can see that in our 27.4x return to investors. Every dollar became $27 if you invest at the beginning and you kept your investment over time. Had we charged the lower fees of Pershing Square USA, it would've been a 46-fold return over the same period. Lower fees and the power of compounding generate big results over time. We have, as I mentioned, a London-listed vehicle, which is a great entity, but it suffers from a number of important limitations. We're not allowed to market PSH in the U.S. In fact, when we took it public, we were not allowed to sell it to investors in the U.S. It's restricted. Most U.S. retail brokerage firms will not let their clients invest in Pershing Square Holdings, and there's a large deferred tax liability. What this means, if you are a U.S. taxpayer and you buy Pershing Square Holdings, and we sell any of our existing holdings, you'll pay a lot of tax, even though you haven't experienced the run-up in the share price of that underlying holding. That entity has grown to become the second-largest closed-end fund in the world. It's listed on the London Stock Exchange, but we are very limited in our ability to market it, talk about it in the U.S., and it's really something that cannot be owned by U.S. investors. We also charge a 16% performance fee with Pershing Square Holdings. PSUS will have an unlimited ability to market to its investors. This, of course, will be an SEC-registered entity. We're taking it public. We're selling stock, I would say principally to U.S. investors, although there are many investors around the world that have committed to invest, and we expect many more to do so as well. It'll be listed in one of the most liquid equity markets in the world on the New York Stock Exchange. It will have very favorable tax treatment, a pass-through tax regime, the so-called regulated investment company, which is to the benefit of U.S. investors. For foreign investors, it will be treated as a typical C corp like NVIDIA or Microsoft or Tesla. Importantly, there'll be no performance fees, as I mentioned before. Pershing Square Inc. is what we call the GP or the management company of Pershing Square. It's the entity that receives fees for managing its various funds. I'm the CEO of Pershing Square. Ryan is the CIO. Ryan has been CIO now for almost four years. The day after the IPO, we will have three revenue streams at Pershing Square Inc: management fees and incentive fees at Pershing Square Holdings, management fees at Pershing Square USA, and management and variable management fees at Howard Hughes. We are not the first alternative asset management company to go public. I'm sure you've heard of Blackstone or Apollo or KKR. Many of the largest firms in our industry have gone public. As part of their public offerings, they have contributed into the company all of the management fees they collect, and then a portion of their performance fees or their promote income. Typically, they put in 50% or 60% of their promote income, and they keep 40%-50% or so to pay the team. The problem with that model over time, and these firms went public years before we did, is that they now have to compensate their team in addition with equity compensation. Equity compensation is, as you know, dilutive, the issuance of stock options and restricted stock, to compensate the team because they've taken away sort of too much of that promote income from the team. The other problem with a performance fee income in a public company, particularly if your underlying assets are private equity or real estate, is you have to sell an asset in order for those fees to be earned. The fees do not have the same recurring quality as management fees. The result of that is that public market investors and analysts don't assign a high multiple to those earnings streams. To address both of those problems, we've done something different from the other alternative asset management firms. We've actually set up, sort of split performance fees into two components, a senior preferred component and a subordinate component. The subordinate component is held by management, and the senior component is held by the public company. Basically, the incentive fees, the performance fees, and the first five percentage points of returns stay in the company. We've kept 100% of the incentive fees on returns each year above 5% to pay the team. We have plenty of incentive fee compensation available because this is a high-return strategy. Importantly, we've created a very stable stream of income that stays in the company, really addressing both of those concerns. PSUS, as I mentioned, a flat 2% management fee, and now Howard Hughes. Howard Hughes is a public company. It's a public company that we created. We purchased 25% of a company called General Growth in November 2008, starting at around $0.34 a share. The company was headed toward bankruptcy. The company had $27 billion of debt, and well more than half of that was coming due in a relatively short period of time. As you may remember, during the financial crisis when it was difficult, if not impossible, to refinance obligations. We viewed it as an opportunity because the stock was trading, in our view, at a discount to the value of the assets. We believed if we could join the Board and lead a restructuring which benefited not just the creditors but the shareholders, we could create a lot of value. I joined the Board a few months after the company filed for Chapter 11, and then I worked with the Board to lead a restructuring of the company, where the company emerged from Chapter 11, where the shareholders got to keep their investment in the company, subject to raising some new capital and some dilution. We spun off a new company called Howard Hughes. Howard Hughes was all of the assets of General Growth that were not Class A malls. We wanted to set General Growth up to compete with Simon, which was a pure-play Class A mall company. The assets we took out of the company were principally land, and a small amount of development assets, and some 60 acres on the beach where we had recently gotten approval to build condominiums. Fast forward a little more than a decade, we've worked through a lot of those assets. The company's developed a large amount of income- producing property and still retains many tens of thousands of acres of land that it sells a portion of every year. It's a very unusual company as a real estate company. Most real estate companies are REITs. This is a C corp. Most real estate companies are in one property type. This is in many. Most public real estate companies pay dividends, and this does not. The stock market has never really given Howard Hughes kind of the, in our view, the value it deserves. The stock's consistently trading at a very significant discount, 40%-50% discount to the value of its underlying real estate assets. Last year in May, we, Pershing Square Inc., the GP, invested $900 million in Howard Hughes, purchased an additional 15% interest in the company. That gives us 47% of the company, including 32% that's held by the Pershing Square funds. I became executive chair of the business. Ryan became the CIO of the business. The full Pershing Square team we've made available to the company, and the business plan is to convert Howard Hughes into a diversified insurance holding company, akin to what we call a modern-day Berkshire Hathaway. In lieu of compensation, conventional compensation like salaries and bonuses and stock options, effectively, we've made Howard Hughes into another permanent capital vehicle, and we receive a base management fee, which is about 0.35% of the market cap of the company. Then we receive a variable management fee, which is about 1.5% of the company. Before I go further on the fees, it might be interesting for you to hear from Ryan. Ryan, why don't you speak to the business plan? We've entered into a definitive agreement to acquire a company called Vantage. How does that fit into this Howard Hughes strategy? Sure. Our goal with Howard Hughes is really to transform the business to be our version of a much smaller Berkshire Hathaway. The key first element in that is taking what is a very fundamentally sound real estate business that will produce significant cash flows over time and really harvesting those cash flows to help reinvest in an insurance platform. The Vantage acquisition, which we announced last December and will be closing in the coming months, is really exciting for us because we bought what we believe is a wonderful, diversified insurance company that we think is run by a very strong team and that has the ability to grow over time. As importantly, inside of the insurance company, we believe that Pershing Square can add a lot of value by better optimizing their invested assets, which are a key portion of the insurance business that we can add a lot of value to. By taking the investment portfolio and allocating a portion of that towards common stocks, we believe that we can really help improve the returns on equity, which will ultimately lead to a much higher growing business. We think that the advantage for Howard Hughes in that is it will be able to have a higher return insurance company relative to the returns on the real estate business, and that will allow the company to grow while also diversifying its asset base in a way that will make the business less prone to the economic cycles, while also improving shareholder returns. The nature of Howard Hughes is if you go back to Mr. Buffett, he purchased Berkshire Hathaway, which was a textile company. It was a textile company competing against Asian textile manufacturers that had lower cost structure. Over time, he liquidated that business because it wasn't competitive, and he put the assets initially in insurance and banking. Over time, he's bought obviously many different businesses. We're starting with a much better business than Berkshire Hathaway's textile operation. It's a company that in some sense self-liquidates over time. The company's most important asset is land, representing more than half the value of the company, and we sell lots to home builders over time. That generates cash. The company has about $4 billion of condominiums with $800 million of 20% deposits from buyers. Those condominium transactions will close over the next several years as we complete those projects. All that cash comes into the business. We reinvest some of that cash in building income- producing properties in the small cities that the company owns. The business will generate way more cash than it can use, that can be invested in the communities that it operates. We intend to take that cash and buy businesses like Vantage and other operating companies over time. We expect that to cause the stock price over time to rise. As we grow the intrinsic value of Howard Hughes, we expect the stock price will grow commensurately over time. As I mentioned, that contract is a bit different from our other contracts, which just pay us a flat 1.5% or 2% management fee. In this case, we get a base fee of $15 million. That's the dark blue line. That grows only with inflation. You see very little growth in the $15 million piece. We get a variable fee that's based on the growth in the stock price. If the stock price compounds at 15% over the next decade, if you look at the top, the fee stream compounds at 25% per annum. If we can achieve our ambitions of growing the stock price at 20% or more, the fees grow at 31% compounded. While this is not an important or material percentage of the revenues of Pershing Square Inc. Today, we expect as we drive value at Howard Hughes, as people understand the story and the stock gets revalued to something more appropriate to its business, we expect the stock price to rise over time and the fees to Pershing Square Inc. to grow over time. Why is Pershing Square Inc, the GP of our firm, such a valuable company? The reason, in our view, is really the power of compounding. We will have approximately, assuming a $10 billion IPO, which is the upper end of our range, $30 billion of assets, fee-paying assets after this offering. If we don't raise another dollar of capital and we just compound at rates similar to the rates we've compounded historically, in a little over 20 years, we'll have over $1 trillion of assets under management. We won't have to hire any more people. Our kind of base costs will probably likely grow with inflation. It costs about, we expect, $50 million per year to run our business, excluding the incentive compensation that's paid to the team, that's kind of contractually allocated to the team. Our firm with 1 trillion of AUM with a similar fixed cost structure becomes an enormously profitable firm. In fact, the firm has about an 87% economic operating margin that goes to over 90% after the offering. As the AUM grows, it sort of asymptotically approaches almost a 99.9% margin. Pretty much every other asset manager is dependent on raising money, raising new funds to grow. In our case, as long as we generate good returns over time, the business grows enormously in value. That assumes we don't raise another dollar of capital. We intend to launch some new funds. Our goal is not to become Fidelity Investments with a fund for every American. Our goal, though, is to grow sensibly in a manner which enables us to maintain our existing business model. These are four examples of funds that we can launch without hiring an additional person. We already have the systems, the sort of intellectual property, the deal flow necessary in order to execute these. These are some examples of funds that we intend to launch over time. Pershing Square Asymmetric will be a fund. We raise capital. We invest the money in short-term U.S. Treasuries, and the interest income becomes the budget for these asymmetric bets. If all the asymmetric bets go to zero, your principal is protected by the Treasuries. If any of the bets pay off, you have an asymmetric kind of upside. Pershing Square Opportunistic will be an entity we use to take advantage of deal flow that we see in the private world. These are companies that will go public in two, three, five years, where they'd like to have Pershing Square as an anchor investor in advance of their public offering. We create a vehicle. We'll charge probably a 2% fee based on deployed capital, and we'll build a portfolio of pre-IPO companies that will become yet another permanent capital vehicle. Pershing Square Crossover will be an entity where we take 2/3 of the capital to invest in the core equity strategy of Pershing Square and 1/3 will be in this opportunistic, illiquid private strategy. Absolute Return will be 60% the core equity strategy and the same kind of macro investments that we're making with options and asymmetric instruments. Here, we'll make them outright. We'll buy a bond instead of buying a derivative. We'll go long a commodity instead of a derivative instrument based on the performance of that asset. Each of these could be a fund of $10 billion. If we launch one, because our base of assets is so small post-IPO compared to our competitors, it's incredibly material to us. One new fund overnight could increase our assets under management by 30%+. We believe we'll be the fastest-growing alternative asset manager just with the compounding of our assets because we retain substantially all of our gains and reinvest them. We'll grow faster because each new fund we launch will be highly material relative to the assets that we currently have under management. Our business model is different than the other alternative asset managers. The largest such company has 5,300 employees, and we have less than 50. They have 2,560 investment professionals. We have nine. If you're one of the top young investment people in the world, would you rather be the 2,561st employee or would you rather be number 10 at Pershing Square? The answer consistently we hear is people would rather come to Pershing Square, which is why when we go to recruit a new team member, we get resumes from every eligible person at our competitors because by virtue of our small scale, but the very large amount of capital per investment professional. We have 10 or more times the amount of capital managed by the team here. We have a kind of team approach as opposed to individual P&Ls. It makes for a very attractive culture and a very attractive environment. This page represents the investment team. I'll let you know the backgrounds include Goldman Sachs, Blackstone, Apollo, KKR, Hellman & Friedman, and Silver Lake. Notably, most of the backgrounds are private equity. Our strategy is a private equity approach to the public market, so that background is ideal. Each of these candidates was someone that was literally the best in their class. We started with a couple hundred resumes, and we chose one or two people to join Pershing Square. When they join, they stay. The right column represents their tenure at the firm. You'll note all but the two most recent additions have been with the firm for almost 10 years or more. That's unusual in an industry with a lot of turnover where people leave to form their own funds. Part of that is the culture. A lot of that is the team approach, and a lot relates to the unique assets. Once you manage permanent capital, you don't want to do so anywhere else. This is the org chart. As I like to say about Pershing Square, our firm is not effective unless everyone is contributing to the organization. If you look at the senior leadership, Brian's been here 17 years. Elise, our Head of Legal, 18 years. Tony, 16 years. 19 years. 21 years. 14 years. Fran McGill, only 11 years because he's in his middle 30s. Joe is our new CTO, an area where I felt we needed an upgrade. A lot of team tenure throughout the organization, which is one of the reasons we can operate so effectively. Pershing Square is really built to last. We think that the combination of our highly tenured team, we've institutionalized the investment process, and the advantage of our permanent capital base substantially minimize the key man risk. We think we have an enormous structural advantage in our permanent capital for many reasons. One of them is it eliminates the risk of investor redemptions, which greatly reduces the risk of team departures in a key man event. The reason that most hedge funds in a key man event ultimately go out of business is investors understandably decide to redeem in a key man event a portion or all of their capital while they wait on the sidelines to watch and see how the team would perform without the key man. Unfortunately, the reduction in assets that results from those redemptions reduces the prospective economics of the business. The team starts looking for other opportunities that may be more valuable to them. As the capital leaves, the team leaves. In our model with permanent capital, in an event of a key man risk, the capital doesn't leave and the team doesn't leave, which is an enormous structural advantage. In addition to that, we have a highly experienced and aligned team. Our team stability and our tenure that Bill talked about really differentiate Pershing Square from the industry. Our median investment team member tenure is 11 years. For example, I, as Chief Investment Officer, have been here for 17 years. We have a really long-term culture that's built on mentorship, training, talent development, and retention. Our permanent capital base provides us with the unique ability to attract the best and the brightest on Wall Street versus the other opportunities that they have available for themselves. We have truly institutionalized the investment process. We have a one team, one portfolio approach that makes sure that every single team member is fully aligned with our repeatable process, and that our investment results and our process and success can outlast any single individual on the team. We closely monitor a library that we've created over the last two decades that consists of hundreds of companies that we think are consistent with our core investment criteria. For every holding that we monitor or that we diligence for a new opportunity, we make sure that we have a two-person team that is responsible for becoming the leading experts across those companies and knowing everything about them. To the extent that Bill or I are not one of those two people, we would provide additional oversight for that team. When the team does work together as two, they are side by side. We have two sets of eyes on everything, two sets of ears for every expert call that they do. When they look through all of the filings, they look through all the competitor filings, they look at the industry research. Everything that we do is team-based. During that investment process, the team in totality, the two people who are working and the rest of us are talking every single day about the ideas. We're sharing the relative merits, the relative drawbacks, the risks, the rewards of that investment. We have lunch together every day where we talk about everything that we own in the portfolio. We talk about everything new that we're looking at. We talk about risks that we see in the world, and we're constantly communicating with each other and being able to learn and also help develop each other with that approach. When it comes to looking for the diligence in our portfolios, when we finally find a new investment that we think could be exciting, we have a formal investment team meeting that's attended by every single person on the team, including Bill and myself, where the team of two who are responsible for doing the diligence work present to the rest of the team. The team is tasked with asking them their best and hardest questions, and ultimately, every single team member is responsible for giving their perspective on the investment. Do we think that this investment is good enough to be one of the 12 or 15 investments that we hold in our portfolio? Do we think that we should be selling another investment in order to fund this investment? Do we think that we need to do more work on that investment? That's a very robust process, a very robust meeting. At the end of the meeting, every single team member goes around the table and gives their view as to whether we should be making the investment before we ultimately decide to proceed or not. We think that we have a core set of investment principles that Bill talked about earlier that we've honed over the last 20 years, and those core investment principles are time-tested, and we believe very critical to our success. All of this happens in a team-based environment where we're all completely bought into a one team, one portfolio approach. I think all of the above is reinforced by the fact that we have an equity-oriented culture. Which means seven of the investment team members are major owners of the firm, and we have about 18 partners throughout the firm that are major owners of the business. When you think about the value of Pershing Square's business, we think that the value of our fee streams really sit in four different component buckets. First is the value of the PSH fee stream. Second is the capital that we're raising in this IPO, the PSUS fee stream. Third is the Howard Hughes fee stream, and fourth will be the new capital, permanent capital vehicles that we launch over time. In addition to the fee streams, we also have some very valuable balance sheet assets, including today the 9 million shares of Howard Hughes that we own, as well as some balance sheet cash. When you add up the value of the fee streams that we'll be producing over time, in addition to what we have today, with the growth of investment performance and our balance sheet assets, that allows you to determine the value of our business, Pershing Square Inc. When you start thinking about the value of that fee stream, ultimately, the value of the fee stream will be our starting base of fee-related earnings, which would be, for example, our base last year in 2025, combined with the long-term growth of the business, which will happen through our investment performance and ultimately the launch of new funds over time. To start, for 2025, we had fee revenue of about $343 million. As Bill talked about, we have a business model that produces very high operating margins, is very capital light, so that fee revenue was able to produce $298 million of fee-related earnings at an 87% profit margin. That's our initial base of earnings from last year. You add to that the PSUS launch between $5 billion-$10 billion, would produce an incremental $100 million-$200 million. Now we've decided to give a fee reduction to Pershing Square Holdings for $20 million-$40 million of that, and thus our fees would increase from PSUS to the manager from $80 million-$160 million. In addition, when you annualize the fee revenue from Howard Hughes, as we've not received all of the management fees over the course of the year as we struck that deal in the middle of last year, and then as Howard Hughes' share price increases, we'll be receiving a rapidly growing fee stream increase from Howard Hughes over time. In addition, our assets under management will grow, and as a result, our fees will grow as we retain our investment performance from our permanent capital over time. We'll have new permanent capital vehicles which produce additional fee streams. Over the long term, the totality of all these drivers will be what allows us to continue to grow our fee-related earnings at what we believe will be a very attractive rate over time. When you look at the last five years, we have grown our fee revenue at a 16% annual rate. We have grown our fee-related earnings at an 18% annual rate and our distributable earnings at a 19% rate, which has been primarily driven by the retained investment performance. Importantly, I would note that this does not include the benefit of capital allocation that we will be able to do afterwards in terms of distributing dividends to shareholders or share buybacks if appropriate, which would be additive to these historical figures. We believe that Pershing Square Inc has all of the characteristics that investors look for in alternative asset managers when they are deciding to place a premium valuation on some of the best companies in the space. Our earnings are principally derived from fee-related earnings, which are a much more stable base of recurring fees versus the volatile performance fees or investment income that some others in the industry have. Our preferred performance fee structure allows 100% of our earnings to be very predictable. We manage a high proportion of permanent capital, which will be 98% of our total capital, will be permanent after the PSUS offering. We have a very high growth profile due to our high investment returns, which can be completely retained, as well as the new capital vehicles we plan to launch over time. We're a very capital- light and high -margin business with a fixed cost base, so as we grow our earnings, we do not need to grow our costs at nearly the same rate. We have a very simple corporate structure, investment-class governance led by an independent Board of Directors, a simple C corporation structure, and no tax receivable agreements, which are often present in other alternative asset management firms. You'll see on this page that last summer, many of the alternative asset management peer firms were trading between 35x and 40x earnings, as investors were very excited about the capital-light and high-margin nature characteristics that we discussed on the prior page, as well as the opportunity for growth that investors believed that the private credit industry was going to provide to these firms. However, that changed last fall, starting with the bankruptcy of First Brands Group. As a result, since that time, the multiples that investors have ascribed to these alternative asset management firms has dramatically declined as investors have become increasingly concerned about potential problems with the private credit industry. Starting in this year, investors have also been concerned in questioning the duration and permanency of the capital base, as many business development companies have had significant investor redemptions throughout the year, and people are now questioning whether private credit is going to be a benefit to growth or could be a headwind. They're starting to question whether the alternative asset management firms actually have a longer duration capital base or whether investor redemptions can continue to reduce the amount of capital that manages the future. We believe our business model has all the positive attributes and more when investors last summer were excited about the multiples that these companies were trading at between 35x and 40x earnings. Our model has none of the drawbacks of things that investors are currently concerned about. We have no exposure to private credit, and the capital that we manage is truly permanent, so there will not be investor redemptions that are able on a quarterly basis or for any other type. We believe that those are enormous advantages to our business model going forward. I would add, we will be the smallest of the publicly traded alternative asset managers. The base from which we're going to grow is much smaller, which enables us to grow much more quickly. Each new fund we launch is a much larger percentage increase in our assets under management. We sold a 10% interest in Pershing Square two years ago to a group of family offices, in many cases the general partners of hedge funds and private equity firms, people in our industry that I guess we have mutual respect. We did so at a pre-money valuation of $9.5 billion, a post-money valuation of $10.5 billion, which was one of the largest prices paid on a percentage of fee-paying assets. What investors saw back then was, one, the very high margin nature of our business and the potential for growth. We hadn't raised capital. We built this big brand, track record, the infrastructure to be a much larger firm, but we really had been out of the fundraising business over the previous decade. With this offering will increase our AUM by approximately 50% overnight. Then with the growth that has taken place since the transaction we did two years ago, we will have likely more than doubled our AUM. At the $10 billion IPO size, we'll be in the 115%-120% increase in our assets under management. Meanwhile, our expenses have not increased materially. We think the Pershing Square story is an interesting one. We've structured a transaction, which I think gives people a very good starting place. We think Pershing Square USA will be an interesting, very attractive long-term investment as the first opportunity for a U.S. investor to invest in a hedge fund, and one with an excellent long-term track record and own a listed security with the lowest fees of any hedge fund in the world, because we don't charge incentive fees. Whether you think of it as a hedge fund or an investment holding company, and we think of this vehicle as an opportunity to partner with hopefully millions of shareholders who can enjoy the benefits of compounding with us over many decades. I thank you for your attention.