Okay. Hopefully you all can hear me. I just need to read this brief statement. This event does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any interest or security in Pershing Square, Inc., or any Pershing Square fund or securities of any other person, or investment advice, or an invitation or inducement to deal in securities. I guess we're just going to have a conversation. We welcome your questions. We'll take them in the order in which they're received. Let's see if I can do this. Okay. James Kiernan, please unmute your line, and we'd be delighted to take your question. Okay, James, you have to unmute. Okay, we're going to take the next person. Let's try Lumi Casanova. You have to unmute your mic. Hello? Hi, we can hear you now. Oh, hi, Bill. I've got a quick question, and thank you again for taking questions on X Spaces. That's unprecedented. I think it's leading the way. It should be how every business does their disclosures, in my opinion. Onto my question. Indirectly, Pershing Square owns quite a large stake in U.S. Fintech, which currently has $16 trillion under management. Do you think that will ever materially affect the balance sheet of Pershing Square? How would you unlock that potential? I'm not sure I understand your question, to be honest. Could you be a little more explicit? Yeah. Through F2, Fannie and Freddie, you own two 10% stakes in the Commons, which owns 50% in U.S. Fintech. U.S. Fintech is one of the most unknown companies, but it is huge. It manages $16 trillion. I believe there is a lot of potential unlocked value for Pershing Square shareholders, which I am a shareholder, potentially, and I was wondering if you were thinking about that. Yeah, never know. Yeah. I am not sure exactly what you are referring to. I know Fannie and Freddie have some joint securitization and other sort of assets. We have not assigned any incremental value to them beyond the core value of the two franchise companies. They are obviously very uniquely positioned businesses. They have been effectively stewards of the government for the last 15 or more years. One of the benefits, of course, for them to become public companies again and go back to private enterprise, the ability to recruit talent. They have among the greatest data sets of any company in the world. There is a ton of unmonetized, I am sure, assets, and I think Director Pulte has been trying to take some steps in that direction in making the enterprises more efficient. We think they are amazing companies, incredibly strong market position, and it is time for them not to be wards of the state. Certainly with you there, but thanks so much for your question. Let us go to the Mars Centurion. Feel free to ask your question. You have to turn off your mic and turn on your mic. Go ahead, Mars Centurion. We are going to go with— Okay. Oh, there we go. Can you hear me? Yes, we can now. Great. Sorry. Just a question on PSUS and a follow-up on Howard Hughes, if you've got the time. Related to two investment theses from Fannie and Freddie, there will probably be a few questions on that today. You started off the year mentioning it was one of your, or maybe your best idea for 2026. How should we think about it, kind of looking at the PSUS sizing, how should we think about maybe your current conviction on Fannie and Freddie, and any progress you have on that? Also, if you could give us an update on Hertz and your previous thesis on that. Sure. I'll take F2, and Ryan, why don't you handle Hertz? Our views on Fannie and Freddie really have not changed. From an investment perspective, what's interesting about these companies is they're sort of perpetual options on an outcome that we think is a likely outcome. We think, and we believe the president and Republicans generally believe it's critically important that these entities leave conservatorship before the end of the Trump administration. The reason for that is, in the event that someday Democrats control the executive branch, in an AOC presidency, the concern would be you wouldn't want Fannie and Freddie and the cash they generate to be expropriated in the way that that cash was expropriated during the Obama administration and used for purposes without congressional oversight. I think that's one, I would say, important strategic reason for this to be resolved, and be resolved in the administration. The president himself has been very forward-leaning in saying that he wants to "take these companies public again," that there's a trillion dollars of value to be unlocked for the American people. I can't imagine the president not wanting to unlock a trillion dollars of value for the American people. So it's definitely something that I believe will remain a high priority. We've had multiple meetings with the administration, from the president on down, all the relevant participants, and we remain optimistic that this gets resolved. Now, obviously, a lot of things on the president's plate. There's a war in Iran, midterms coming up, and various other things. What's interesting is whatever way the country tips on midterms, what's interesting about a resolution of Fannie and Freddie is the entire resolution can be resolved by the president without going to the Congress. Whether you think of it as a $500 billion deal or a $1 trillion deal, it's an important thing the president can do with or without the Congress, before or after midterms. We like it. We own it. We are very constructive on the outcome here. In regards to the Hertz question, we fully exited our position in Hertz, which was relatively small to begin with, after they announced an equity offering that we did not think was necessary, we found pretty surprising, and frankly, was a very bungled equity offering. It's unlike anything we had really seen a company do before. It was very surprising to us that they decided to issue equity for the amount and in the manner that they did, because they had previously just reported results that were quite good for the first quarter. They had a very strong level of liquidity. When they actually released their results last week for the second quarter, they again showed pretty good results, strong levels of liquidity. So it was never really clear to us why they needed to issue equity. We effectively lost confidence in management, so we decided to exit our position. Now, to go back to your question about the initial thesis and how we think about it, which I think is instructive. Ultimately, Hertz was very different from the typical investment. Normally, we are a relatively concentrated investor focusing on simple, predictable, free cash flow generative businesses. Every now and then, we will make an investment that we believe has the characteristics economically of an asymmetric, not a hedge per se, but asymmetric outcome. We will allocate a very small percentage of our capital. In the Hertz's case, it was generally something, before we sold around 2% in the 2%-3% range, depending upon the day. We will do that when we believe there is the opportunity to make 5x or 10 x our money in a business that otherwise would not meet our quality standards. Hertz was something that was a very levered business, had gone through bankruptcy, gone through multiple management teams, and was at, what we believed, a very depressed price when we bought it. We knew that there was some risk inherent in it. Whenever a business is highly leveraged, even relatively small negative surprises can have a very big impact on the share price. Recognizing that, but also the potential for significant share price appreciation of 5x-10x, we decided that we would invest a very small amount of our capital with the potential to make a huge investment return if the facts played out in a way that we thought was very reasonable. While Hertz was on a very good track initially, this equity offering caused us to reassess our views. With asymmetric investments like Hertz, even though they're relatively small, once they go off track in the thesis, we lose some confidence in management. We ultimately reduce the likelihood of the potential outcomes that we think got us into the investment in the first place, and we just decide to sell and move on. We had, effectively for the funds that we manage, a very small, almost immaterial loss on the position overall for the funds, although it was, I think, roughly a 30%-ish type loss on the position itself. Fortunately, we sold the investment very quickly, and we actually avoided a lot of the significant decline. I think the shares ultimately went down 60% or so to the bottom, but we had exited before that came, in large part. We think sized this one appropriately given the relative range of outcomes that could happen, but we have exited position. Yeah, just to give you a little more granular on that. One of our thoughts here is if we could be helpful to the company in helping manage the balance sheet risk. To that end, we helped the company execute a convert on very attractive terms, with minimal dilution to the company, that our understanding with management is that was going to fulfill their equity needs, and their capital needs going forward. We were frankly shocked when they did this literally overnight equity offering on terrible terms. Just the way it was executed was about the worst execution of an equity raise we've seen in history. It just made no sense to us. We actually like the CEO. I think the operating team is good. I just don't understand the sponsor here and how they're managing, or if the CFO, I don't know who's the ultimately responsible party here. It makes no sense. It could still work from here. But when you own a highly levered enterprise, you want to have a lot of confidence in the capital allocation skills and financing skills of the team running the company. So there you go. Thanks for your question. Makes— Yeah. Makes sense. If I may— I want— A follow-up. Quick, because I want to give other people a chance. Go ahead. Of course. I understand on your previous call, please just correct my understanding, but do I understand correctly, you're intending to monetize some of the real estate exposure in Howard Hughes via third-party capital and then redeploy that, primarily into the insurance side of things. I'm just curious if you could give us a little color on how you see allocating that capital. Are you still considering other acquisitions of private companies, or is it primarily going to be going? How would it be allocated exactly? Sure. In the insurance space? Yeah, thanks. Right now, we've advanced $1 billion of, we purchased a $1 billion Howard Hughes preferred to facilitate Howard Hughes's acquisition of Vantage. The result is that today Howard Hughes only owns 50% of the economics of the Vantage business. The first priority is for Howard Hughes to own 100% of Vantage. The first $1 billion or so we raise will go to buy out Pershing Square's economic interest in Vantage, and then incremental capital will go to write additional business. Imagine a world in which we found a way to create $1.5 billion of monetization, and the real estate's subsidiary figure $1 billion of that would go to repay the preferred, which would give Howard Hughes 100% of the insurance operation, and then $500 billion would go into the capital of the insurer, which would give it the flexibility to write more business. That's, I think, the easiest way to think about it. Then over time, as we generate more cash, we think the highest ROE in the short to intermediate term at Howard Hughes is when you have a very talented team, the best thing to do is put more assets under them, and that's really what we're trying to accomplish. Vantage and the liability side is really managed by the team that's there, and the asset side is managed by Pershing Square, and we think we can earn some very attractive returns on the asset side of the balance sheet. Most insurance companies are driven entirely by the liability side, and the asset side is a bit of an afterthought, a bit the way that Vantage was run, where the entire assets were outsourced to BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, to manage a 10,000 CUSIP fixed income portfolio. That's not really a differentiated asset strategy. We have the ability to offer, I believe, differentiated long-term returns to Vantage. Now, if Vantage can't use capital, that's when we have, if we've generated enough capital that Vantage can't use it, which I don't envision that world for quite some time, that starts to free us up the flexibility to make other investments at Howard Hughes. But the focus right now is going to be building out the asset side of Vantage's balance sheet and where the team is focused on writing good business for the insurer. But thank you for your question. Okay, let's go to Phil Barrere, if I pronounced your name correctly, sir. Yes, perfectly. Hi, Bill. How are you? Thank you for your time. Regarding F2, my question is, what is the incentive of the government to maintain the conservatorship if they are not taking any money from Fannie and Freddie as Obama did? The second one is, what do you expect? Why do you think Trump isn't doing anything? Because when I hear Pulte and many others, they said, "We are ready to go. We are loaded and ready. Everything is okay for releasing both companies." I don't understand which is the incentive for not doing anything. Thank you so much. Sure. It's a very good question, and you make a very good point. I think the incentive is for Fannie and Freddie to be released from conservatorship, but in a manner that minimizes risk to the mortgage markets, right? The last thing the Treasury secretary wants to do is see a Fannie and Freddie release from conservatorship and mortgage spreads widen 25 basis points, right? So it's critically important that it's done correctly, which is why we've suggested you take first a baby step, right? Baby step number one is account for the payments that have been made on the senior preferred stock, exercise the government warrants, list them on the stock exchange. Perhaps, put in some private sector people on the boards of directors of the company, maybe recruit. That transaction alone will enable the recruitment of a very talented team, but the entities still are in conservatorship at that point in time. So there literally is no risk to mortgage rates from the taxpayer. The next step is the one that is more critical for the long-term future of the mortgage markets, just making sure that Fannie and Freddie are adequately capitalized and hold enough capital on their balance sheets, and that the government, we believe there should be a government backstop. What form that takes, we think the senior preferred, once it is Okay, apologies. We had some technical difficulties. Why don't we go to the next question from Michael Chutney. Please unmute. How's it going, Bill? Big fan. How are you? Very well. I have a question about the fees and also about the PS Ventures. Can we start with the PS Venture portion? Of course. Go ahead. What's the question? All right. Regarding PS Ventures, are you going for like a Coatue style, like a crossover fund? Is it? Because I was trying to listen to the phone call on quarter, and I kind of missed some of it earlier. Sure. So— Was that [airplane] Basically, these will be private investments at the inception of the entity, pre-IPO companies at various stages, high-growth, probably tech-forward portfolio. What we did say on the call is we are not going to immediately sell them when they go public. One of the value-added things that we think we can offer a private company is, unlike venture funds, many of them that are required to sell or distribute stock over time, we can be a long-term owner. We can help them navigate the public markets. So over time, this becomes a mix of early-stage, later stage, growth stage, and then eventually public companies. But thank you for your question. Let's go to Bradley Martyn. Please unmute. Okay. Horseman Country. Why don't you go ahead. Yes, sir. Good morning. It's an honor, and just thank you for your advocacy. You are a blessing beyond measure to shareholders. My question is, and we had technical difficulties a minute ago when you were discussing F2, but any thoughts on why the delay in up-listing, because as you have said, that is such a simple step, and it would not do anything to disrupt mortgage spreads. Are you at liberty to disclose the quantities of Fannie and Freddie that you picked up after the cash raise in your IPO? So today, they are approximately 3%. Okay, we will just give people a chance to come back. Hopefully, the app will be more stable. Okay. Let's go to Uncle Truth. Feel free to unmute, and then we will go to Tequila next. Go ahead, Uncle Truth. Thanks for taking my question, Bill. My question for you is, I understand the mechanics of what you are saying about Fannie Mae, but what is the probability that you think that no action, I do not want to say no action, but that Fannie Mae does not make it to the major stock exchange, or has the resolution of the senior preferred shares by the end of the Trump administration? I just assign a very low probability to that. We've had the benefit of the president being out there very publicly. He has a track record of keeping his promises. It's in the interest of the country. It's in the interest of Republicans generally to resolve this within the Trump administration. When, God forbid, AOC gets control of these entity world, that's not something that the president would want to stomach as part of his legacy. So I do think, again, we're sort of long-suffering shareholders. We've been here a long time. We weren't selling at $17 a share when Howard Lutnick was on CNBC saying it could happen before the end of the year. So we have experienced real volatility here. But at the end of the day, we believe in the facts, the fundamentals, and what's in the best interest of the country, and also have a pretty good understanding of the president and how he thinks. This will be one of the greatest deals of all time, and he will deservedly get credit for it. So we think it happens. Does it happen by midterms? My guess is probably not. Does it become an important focus afterwards? Absolutely. Thank you for your question. Let's go to Kavish. Please go ahead. Go ahead. We can hear you. Thanks for— Yeah. Taking my question. What's the biggest challenge you think you'd encounter while building Howard Hughes into a modern-day Berkshire? I ask this given the recent short-term nature of the markets, where people want to hop onto the next big thing for quick profits, and instruments like levered ETFs and prediction markets only add to the short-term trading. I ask this because Howard Hughes, PSUS, and all of your other related funds are meant to be held long-term. Yeah, I think it's a great question. I don't think the current state of the markets will have any negative effect on our ability to execute at Howard Hughes. We're able to recruit a phenomenal team to run Howard Hughes insurance operations. I would argue that Mark and David are two of the top, by far the top executives in the country. They understand the potential. They're going to execute. How quickly the world comes around to understanding what we're doing, this is a market environment where people are distracted, to your point, by other more, I would say, short-term exciting things. There is an enormous short-term orientation, not just to many retail investors, but there's a lot of capital that's managed in a very short-term fashion with a lot of short-term incentives. We think that's a very helpful fact. The reason why we were able to deploy $5 billion of capital in businesses, we gave six examples of companies we've really wanted to own for years, but that were too expensive and became cheap. I just think the passage of time will reward us. We're not trying to figure out which stock is going to go up the most in the next 90 days. I would say a very big percentage of the people investing in markets today is focused on which stock's going to go up in the next, not just 90 days. You look at the rise of one-day options, which stock's going to go up the most in the next few hours? That's a very good environment for someone who wants to compound their assets for their retirement, right? Because it's going to lead to very significant mispricing of securities and mispricing of very high-quality long-term compounders. The assets of Vantage today are invested, the float's invested in short-term treasuries, and the surplus of the insurer or the chunk of the surplus of the insurer is invested in long-term compounders. That's going to work out very well over the next three, four, five, 10 years. It will also work out very well from a tax perspective. The people who are whipping it around are incurring ordinary income every time they sell something or a high rate of tax. We like our approach. It's consistent with the way we like to live our lives. It's something we can do over a very long-term period of time. One thing I would just add is very similar to how Mr. Buffett was able to build Berkshire because he had a very large economic interest in the company. Our ability to own a significant portion of Howard Hughes, as well as have our services agreement with him, is very critical to making sure that in an increasingly short-term world, we can maintain a long-term orientation because we are such significant owners of the company and can help direct its longer-term actions. To Bill's point, now that we have what we think is the best team in the industry in place on the insurance side, our long-term orientation, combined with our economic ownership to help control the destiny and make that happen, is very valuable. Thank you for your question, Kavish. If I could go to Enrique. Thank you. I was just wondering if you could speak a little about the investments in Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon. I saw in the report you published yesterday afternoon that your expectation is for Amazon to grow their earnings per share on a yearly basis, the highest of probably all of your investments. Just curious about that. Thank you. Sure. Those are all three businesses we like. I would actually look at Meta as being a slightly different business and the reasons we like it than Microsoft and Amazon. But all three share the common characteristic that we believe, and I like that you were able to point out how we think about the future growth potential of Amazon. But all three really when you look at them, are very high growth businesses that we think are some of the best businesses in the world, that are run by incredibly capable management teams, and that are actually getting better over time, which is not something that you typically see when companies are growing beyond a $1 trillion or $3 trillion market cap in some of those cases. We like the fact that these are businesses we've long admired but did not previously have the opportunity to own because the valuations really reflected how great the businesses were and the large amounts of future growth potential. One thing I think is interesting about Meta in particular is that this company is growing at the fastest rate it's grown at in over a decade, despite being at a significantly larger scale, and yet it is at one of the cheaper earnings multiples that it has been in a long time because people are concerned about their spending in order to create a lot of compute capacity. We happen to think that the core business is phenomenal and is growing very, very rapidly. Therefore, we are getting the opportunity to buy the core business at a very discounted price because people are concerned about a lot of spending that is somewhat adjacent to a large degree from the core business that we actually think is going to be worth a lot of money in the future if Mark and the team can execute, which we think they are very likely to do. We feel like we are getting a free option on a very valuable amount of compute and a business that Meta is building while at the same time getting a very discounted valuation on an incredible core business. That is really the reason we like Meta. Do you want to add something? No, thank you for that one. For Microsoft and Amazon, the way I would think about that is those are two very simple and similar business models in the sense that they effectively are the world's, along with Google, three leading cloud businesses. We are very excited about the long-term growth potential of those businesses, and we actually think that people are underestimating how quickly they will grow. Because Amazon has so much of its business geared towards the cloud business and has a rapidly growing retail business as well, we think that the opportunity for them to grow a little bit faster perhaps than Microsoft is there. I would not be surprised if Microsoft's numbers in terms of growth are actually a little bit higher and more similar to Amazon's over time to the extent that they continue to also execute really well on the cloud strategy. Long term, we think the capital spending they are doing has depressed their share prices because people are not giving them credit for what we think are going to be excellent longer-term economic returns. When that story starts to bear out, you would expect to see a very significant acceleration in the rate of revenue growth and earnings per share growth of these businesses as they again become less capital intensive because now you have spent the money, but you are finally getting the revenue and the associated earnings attached to that, and we think that they are going to be very attractive shareholdings from here. Thank you for your question. Let's go to the commander. Go ahead, Ron Luhrman. Can you hear me? Yes, we can. Okay. I was curious that when you presented your plan to the government, your three-step plan to announce for getting the loan, to uplist and then execute the warrants, what was the government's Were they receptive to agreeing that the loan has been repaid in full and well over the top? Or did they just say okay? Was there any pushback from them, or did they agree that, "Yeah, we've more than repaid the loan? My goal in keeping a good relationship with the government is to not disclose conversations I've had with the government. But I think that the summary I gave before is accurate. We maintain our investment in the companies. We are confident that the right thing is going to happen here, and I really think that's the best way to summarize it. Let's go to Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. We will go to Massad. We have Massad on our call. Go ahead, Massad. Please unmute. Okay, we are going to go to Daniel Nouri, if you want to unmute your line. Got to unmute in order to ask a question. There we go. Can you hear me? Now we can. Yes. Hi, Bill. How are you doing? I am actually here with my brother. We are joint investors in Fannie and Freddie, so he actually has a question for you. Bill, I just want to let you know that we are— How about a question— Huge fans. I actually— I was just going to say, how about no more Fannie and Freddie questions? We got too many of them. Go ahead. If it's not Fannie and Freddie, I am happy to talk about it. It actually is Fannie and Freddie. Is that going to be an issue? I just feel like we have killed that one already. Why don't you come back with another one? We are going to go to David. Okay. David Scadron, please. Hey, Mr. Ackman. I read recently about your investment in Uber, and I have recently been driving in, or haven't been driving in self-driving Waymos and Teslas, and I was just kind of blown away by the experience because it was cheaper, and you just have a personal lounge. I was curious kind of your long-term vision of ride sharing and how Uber stays valuable if these other cars are much cheaper and a better experience. Yeah. I would say very high level, I think we're bullish on autonomous vehicles, and that makes us more bullish on Uber as opposed to less bullish. Ryan, why don't you go ahead and take that one? Yeah, I think you picked up on an important point, which is ultimately, the cheaper that these rides become, the more likely it is that more people will take them in increasing amounts, and therefore, it really expands the addressable market, as Bill mentioned. I think the important thing is just because there are other alternatives without a driver, which is important to lower the ultimate cost of the vehicle through autonomous, that doesn't mean that Uber won't still serve an increasingly valuable place in the market. For example, what does Uber bring? Well, Uber, on the one hand, it aggregates demand and supply, but it does that across really everywhere in the U.S. and in many markets into an alternative where you have an autonomous vehicle company that owns its entire supply. That might work in certain select markets, but the number of vehicles that you need everywhere across the U.S., we believe is too enormous in order to meet the demand of people. Therefore, we think that while AVs can be very great experiences, we've ridden in them ourselves and also like the experience, we ultimately think that there will need to be both. There'll need to be AVs that can exist to meet certain demands at certain times, but there's going to need to be a very large base of human drivers for the long term in order to meet the overall demands, particularly as people continue to take more trips. We think that joint solution means you can't just have AVs, and there won't be enough of them to meet the ups and downs that you need. You'll need some swing capacity for sure, and we think that Uber services are still very valuable because as a consumer, what we want is to be able to order a car very quickly and for the lowest cost. Having the most amount of vehicles, driver or driverless, is very important to that. You need to be able to do, ultimately, the upkeep of the vehicles, the maintenance of the vehicles, the storing of the vehicles, the charging of them. We think that Uber provides all of these services in a way where they really understand each local market that they operate in. They know how to route which driver to which consumer, and they have a brand, and we think that people really like the ability to go to one app that they trust, to be able to route them to all the different ride options. I would say in general, that makes us very bullish on AV. I would also point out lastly, though, the important thing to remember about Uber's business is that Uber is half a rideshare company and half a delivery company. We think that both aspects of the business are great. It's also half U.S. and half international. A lot of the focus on the business overall is about this potential risk that we think is an opportunity for really only the U.S. rideshare business. Because outside of the U.S., it is much less developed, and we think it'll be even harder for that to take off, although it's been really slower to develop everywhere around the world. Then half of the business is related to delivery, which we think has very distinct characteristics. We think ultimately there are a lot of aspects outside of this kind of core U.S. AV market perception of a risk, where Uber is really thriving and will continue to thrive. Do you think that it's possible that the existing fleet of Uber vehicles could become autonomous, like retrofitted with, I don't know, say NVIDIA makes a solution that makes it so the current fleet, do you think that Remember, Uber is not really a fleet operator. Uber is a platform where you order a ride. People who drive for Uber today could make the decision, in theory, to retrofit. My guess is what will happen is that for the extent there are vehicles in the future where NVIDIA or there is a dozen other people who are working on very good technology that would ultimately go to OEM manufacturers like Ford or GM or others to make AV cars. People in the future might decide to purchase those cars, put them on the Uber platform, and then ultimately, much like the driver makes a certain amount of money from Uber on each ride, the person who finances that AV vehicle that they have purchased would also be making that equivalent amount of money. We think that is an alternative. For people who decide to go that route, there really is no alternative other to Uber as well. We think that is an additional lever of growth in the AV world. Okay. We are going to give someone else a chance, okay? Thank you so much. No problem. Thank you. Okay, let's go to Perry Pasub. Why don't you go ahead and ask your question. Please unmute your line. Okay. Massad, were you able to unmute? Okay. Let's go to Achilles. Achilles, go ahead and unmute your line if you'd like. Good morning. Thank you for having me. Quick question. I saw the recent announcement about Netflix position, and I am extremely bullish on that position, but I wanted your opinion specifically when it comes to IP. First of all, are you going to be basically trying to be more active in advising management, or is it just a position that you are going into? Second question is, what do you believe the value of the IP in Netflix is? Thank you. We have a lot of confidence in management. They have done an incredible job navigating a big transition in their business. This is one where if we have a great idea for the company, we are happy to share, but we view this largely as a passive investment behind a great team. Yeah, and I think to your question, one of the things that we like about what they have done, because when we owned Netflix a little over four years ago, there were a lot of developing questions about competition. There were developing questions about the business model, particularly would you need to introduce advertising? Would Netflix be able to do that? I think what we have seen consistently over time, going back much longer than four years prior when we owned the business, is at really every step of the way, the company has been able to surprise to the upside, if you will, in how well they have navigated an increasingly changing market. Now the way we look at the business is a lot of the questions that existed four years ago or 10 years ago have been answered. Netflix is by far the leader. A lot of the up-and-coming companies that were throwing increasing amounts of content, which to your question ultimately creates IP, have really pulled back on that because they have not been able to build a model that is as profitable and lucrative as Netflix. Now Netflix, in our view, has really won the streaming competition wars, if you will. The benefit of having the largest platform by far, which Netflix has, is that allows you to spend more money on content or IP than anybody else, which means that your cost per subscriber is lower than anybody else. That cost advantage is great for the company in terms of its improving profit margins, but also means that you can charge more for that, which is great for revenues. It is a really interesting business model where it keeps getting better over time because of its scale advantage. Every new Netflix subscriber gets the benefit not just of what they spend this year, but for all prior years that they have spent. We think the business uniquely becomes more valuable to each incremental customer every single year. Okay. Let's go. Thank you so much. You are welcome. Let's go to Eli Dashef, or Eli Dashef. Hey, Bill. How are you? Very well. Last week you mentioned World Book as a cautionary tale for information businesses. In the letter, you argue AI accelerates demand for S&P's proprietary data. That assumes that the value stays to the data owner, not the model layer. What keeps the pricing power with S&P and not whoever controls an agent? Sure. No, it's a great question. The way we think about S&P is roughly 80% of its business relates to ultimately what we call these franchise industry benchmarks. For example, their largest business is a ratings business, the S&P ratings, which rates the debt of a lot of companies. The reason that's so valuable is, in theory, one could say, "Well, AI could rate this. Why do you need a human?" The reason why is it's an accepted standard by which insurance companies, capital market participants on the debt side, really everybody has accepted for decades. That is the gold standard in terms of getting a rating. What that does is it provides a huge cost of capital advantage to the person buying that rating. That advantage in the lower cost of interest is many multiples of the cost of getting that rating. That self-reinforcing mechanism where it is the standard by which people are used to agreeing on is incredibly powerful, and that really doesn't change in an AI world because there is no reason why having an AI agent rate you for your debt for less money creates the same value because people wouldn't accept that in the way they've accepted S&P's ratings for decades. For example, another part of their business that is a benchmark, is they actually own the S&P Dow Jones franchise. So whenever people use that product to trade and they put that name on it, they pay a royalty for doing so to S&P Global. That is an accepted benchmark that we don't really think is going to be disrupted because people rely on it. Very similarly, they have a Platts Energy franchise, which is the standard for assessing a huge number of physical delivery oil and other commodities around the world. Everybody agrees that is the benchmark. It is written into contracts on which people trade. Even if there is more AI solutions, that network effect where everybody relies on it because they think it is valuable doesn't really go away because there is no way to get started with an alternative. That is 80% of the business. There are some other parts that are much smaller where we think maybe 3%-5% of the business could be somewhat subject to potential AI risk, but that has cast a pall over the entirety of the 97%+ of the business that we think isn't at risk. We think the management team is very smart in handling a very small risk for a small percentage of the business. We thought this was a unique opportunity to buy an incredible franchise at a really discounted valuation because the market was misperceiving how AI could apply to the vast majority of its really indestructible business. Okay. Let's go to the, I think this will have to be the last question, James DiCenzo. Please go ahead. Good morning, gentlemen. Congratulations on the IPO, and hats off on your transparency. Question, you added some new holdings, not on Fannie, of course, but we're going to talk about the Intercontinental Exchange. There's a lot of useful things in that company, particularly in the mortgage side, but in many other respects. Do you have anything to share beyond the commentary you provided in the news release on the Intercontinental Exchange that you like going forward? Maybe just the one thing I would say at a very high level, I do think that we obviously try to write the things that we like about it the most, but there are very few businesses that we have come across where they have a 20-year operating record where they're able to grow their earnings every single year. While some people can say, well, that must mean that there are some sort of accounting games or others, I don't think that's at all the case here. What it reflects is how unique this business model is, where it produces this steadily growing stream of profits because over 70% of its business, which does not include the mortgage business that you referenced that we really like, which is a good chunk of the remainder of the business, is really about exchanges. It reflects the fact that when markets are good, people want to trade more. It reflects the fact that as the economies grow, people need to trade more. For example, ICE's primary franchise is really this energy business where they own the contract on Brent Crude or they're increasingly in some natural gas in Europe. Those are contracts where as the world grows, people need to use more of it. Producers need to hedge their production. People who want to protect themselves from incremental risk if they're buying oil or natural gas need to hedge. So there's kind of this ever-growing upward lift. In periods of volatility where stocks might be down, that's a very small part of their business. So what it means is more people need to trade to protect themselves from the wide range of things that can happen. Volatility is the friend of this business. So it's a very durable franchise, and it's one of the few businesses that I can think of off the top of my head where you've seen that reflected in 20 years of positive growth. Partially reflecting the great business that it is, but also the really talented owner/operator mentality that Jeff Sprecher, who leads the business and has really been the driving force of the business over time, has created. So I would just highlight that I think it's one of the best businesses that we've followed. It's got an incredible management team that has a very great kind of founder orientation, that has done some wonderful things and has really, at times where people in the stock market have doubted him, generally been entirely right about the things that he'd done. We think it's a wonderful business, a great management team, and the fact that it's had such consistent earnings growth due to both of those factors, I think is something that is very underappreciated by the markets. Thank you, you and Bill. You've made me a better investor. Okay. Very kind of you. And we just want to thank everyone for joining us, and we look forward to seeing you guys next quarter. Have a great day.