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November 2, 2026 Dear Pershing Square Shareholder: Our third quarter financial results, which were primarily driven by the underlying business performance of our portfolio companies, highlight the value of our unique business model. We are the only publicly traded alternative asset manager with permanent capital comprising nearly all of our Fee-Paying Assets Under Management (FPAUM), which enables us to focus on investing in the world’s greatest businesses at attractive prices over the long term. In this letter, we provide an update on the key business and financial developments during the quarter, an update on our portfolio companies, insights on AI and the hyperscalers, and our perspective on recent developments in the capital markets. We will be hosting a conference call at 9:30 AM ET tomorrow to answer questions from research analysts, institutional investors and retail investors. Immediately after the call, we will also host a Q&A event on X and on our website at 10:30 AM ET. During the Q&A event, we will take questions from a broader group of shareholders which will give us an opportunity to provide further detail on our portfolio companies. The details for the call and subsequent Q&A event are on the Pershing Square website here. We intend to begin each quarterly letter with a brief primer on our business model and long-term growth prospects, which we believe provides a useful framework for evaluating our quarterly results in the context of the long-term drivers of our business value. Readers who are familiar with this section from our prior letter may wish to proceed directly to our third quarter results in the section which follows. A Guide to Understanding Our Business and Long-Term Goals Pershing Square is an alternative asset manager which manages funds that have a unique capital structure. Ninety-eight percent of the capital we manage is in publicly traded investment vehicles, including a public operating company, Howard Hughes Holdings (HHH), of which Pershing Square, employees, and affiliates are the largest shareholders.1 In comparison, the vast majority of public equity, private equity, and hedge fund managers’ capital is in the form of private open-ended funds and/or multi-year drawdown funds in which affiliates of the manager are small percentage owners. We believe the permanency of our capital gives us important long-term sustainable competitive advantages as it enables us to invest for the long term without the requirement to return capital to our investors. Our investors benefit from daily liquidity due to our investment vehicles’ listings on global 1 All quantitative data or figures in this letter are as of September 30, 2026 unless otherwise specifically indicated or context suggests otherwise.

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2 exchanges. Having the ability to take a long-term view, particularly as markets have become ever more short-term, has enabled us to generate substantially above market rates of return over the long term, and to a greater extent since 2018, when nearly all of our capital became effectively permanent. The permanent nature of the funds we manage is also an important competitive advantage for our business as our FPAUM compound with our investment returns as substantially all of our investment gains are retained and continually reinvested by our funds. We do not need to run a continual fundraising operation to replace redeemed capital, so we can focus on identifying, investing in, monitoring, and assisting our portfolio companies in maximizing shareholder value. While our business is simple, the GAAP accounting for it is somewhat complicated, particularly in light of certain transactions we entered into prior to and in connection with our initial public offering. As part of our investment process, we regularly translate a company’s GAAP earnings into economic earnings to better estimate and predict a company’s economic progress and intrinsic value, and we encourage you to do the same with Pershing Square. We have summarized the differences between GAAP and economic accounting in our 10-Q so you can understand the appropriate adjustments one would make to better understand our business progress. The alternative asset management industry has also adopted certain metrics to judge its business progress, which we believe are useful. These include Fee- Related Earnings (FRE) and Distributable Earnings (DE), which we discuss further below.2 One back-of-the-envelope way to think about the economics of our business is to calculate our revenues by summing the following: (1) the management fees we receive from FPAUM, (2) the Preferred Performance Fees (PPFs) we receive from Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. (PSH) and Pershing Square International, Ltd., and (3) the service fees paid by HHH, and then subtracting our expenses including interest and taxes, which should enable you to approximate our net cash flow available for distribution and/or reinvestment in our business. Our PPFs are only earned and payable in years with returns in excess of 5% per annum, a rate of return we expect to substantially exceed in most years and over the long term, but not every year. In the event that the PPF is not earned in any one year, it accrues into the next year, and no performance fees are paid to management until all accrued PPFs have been earned and paid to Pershing Square. In valuing Pershing Square, one should also include our on-balance sheet assets which include nine million shares of HHH, and $50 million of preferred stock and four million common shares of Pershing Square USA, Ltd. (PSUS). These investments ensure that we have significant ‘skin in the game’ alongside our investors and give us important influence as well as the opportunity to participate in the long-term value creation of the investment vehicles we manage. Because the NAV of our publicly traded funds is published on a weekly basis and HHH’s stock is publicly traded, an investor can estimate our management and service fee revenues with a relatively high degree of accuracy as of the last day of the calendar quarter. In addition, our industry-leading FRE margins mean that future increases in FRE should closely track the growth in our management fees. In order to project 2 FRE and DE are Non-GAAP financial measures. Please see the Appendix to this letter for our definitions of FRE and DE and a reconciliation of FRE and DE to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated in accordance with GAAP .

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3 future economic earnings for Pershing Square, you will also need to make assumptions about our future investment performance, HHH’s longer-term stock price performance, and potential future fund launches. The biggest challenge in estimating our business’s progress and intrinsic value is predicting the returns we will generate in the future and HHH’s stock price over time. Our goal for the funds and companies we own is to generate gross returns of 20% or more per annum over the long term. For the prior 22 calendar years, we have achieved this goal. That said, our concentrated investment strategy is inherently volatile, so predicting any one year’s results is impossible. Rather than using a fixed projected rate of return in calculating Pershing Square’s intrinsic value, you should consider a number of different return scenarios in order to model the long-term growth of Pershing Square. Q3 Financial Results Fee-Related Earnings and Distributable Earnings: (1) Reflects management fees gross of contra-revenue associated with the amortization of certain intangible assets. (2) Following the Corporate Conversion effected in connection with our initial public offering, PS Inc. is subject to U.S. federal, state and local corporate income taxes. We did not incur corporate income tax in periods prior to Q3 2026. For Q3 2026, taxes reflected in Distributable Earnings represent the estimated current income tax provision for the period, including related adjustments to income taxes payable and the effect of certain known tax adjustments expected to arise during the tax year. Note: See Appendix for the definition of FRE and DE, which are Non-GAAP financial measures, and their reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

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4 Fee-Paying AUM Roll Forward: Note: For the nine and twelve months ended September 30, 2026, FPAUM outflows include $273 million of investor withdrawals and redemptions from PSLP and PSINTL in order to participate in the Combined IPO and Combined Private Placement. Fee-Related Earnings (FRE) We believe FRE best reflects the core operating profitability of Pershing Square as it represents our earnings derived from management, service, and Preferred Performance Fees (PPFs). In the third quarter, our FRE revenue totaled $75.6 million, up 10% year-over-year, primarily due to the impact of recognizing the first full quarter of management fees from PSUS. Our FRE expenses totaled $12.0 million, down 1% year-over-year. Employee compensation was stable year-over-year, as the increase from public- company-related headcount additions was offset by the lapping of severance costs and signing bonuses in the prior year’s quarter. General and administrative expenses declined modestly as the increase in costs associated with becoming a public company was largely offset by the lapping of other costs that we incurred in preparation for our IPO. FRE totaled $63.7 million for the third quarter, up 13% year-over-year. Our industry-leading FRE margin expanded to 84.2% from 82.3% in the prior year’s quarter, as revenues grew at a double-digit rate while expenses were down slightly. Year-to-date, FRE totaled $167.4 million, up 16% year-over-year. Distributable Earnings (DE) represents the portion of our earnings that are available to be distributed to shareholders and primarily reflects FRE reduced by net interest expense and taxes. Pre-tax DE grew 8% year-over-year to $61.0 million in the third quarter, below the rate of FRE growth due to increased interest expense. Net interest expense was $2.7 million in the third quarter, up from a negligible amount in the prior year’s quarter, as a result of interest expense from debt incurred to fund our anchor investment in PSUS. During the quarter, we increased our borrowings by approximately $62 million, which together with cash on hand funded $80 million of investments for Pershing Square Ventures, Ltd. (PSV), which we discuss further below. After the end of the quarter, PSV made an additional $30 million of investments, bringing the total capital deployed by PSV to $110 million. As we have previously explained, we intend to finance our anchor investments in new funds like PSV with debt, and we view the associated interest expense as part of a new fund’s startup cost. We expect the returns on these anchor commitments to substantially exceed our cost of debt, enabling us to earn

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5 attractive leveraged returns on these commitments in addition to the incremental FRE generated by the new funds that we launch. Opportunistically, we intend to replace our existing credit facilities with fixed- rate, long-term, investment-grade bonds. Absent the launch of additional permanent capital vehicles, we expect our interest expense to remain relatively fixed while FRE continues to grow due to underlying investment performance. As a result, over the intermediate to long term, DE growth should substantially exceed FRE growth. The third quarter was the first period in which DE was reduced by corporate income taxes following our conversion to a corporation in connection with our IPO. Taxes and related payables totaled $11.5 million, representing an effective tax rate of approximately 19%, a rate which benefited from certain one-time items. We expect our effective tax rate to normalize in the low 20s% range over time. After-tax DE was $49.5 million, or $0.12 per share, down 12% year-over-year, with the decline entirely due to the inception of corporate income taxes. Year-to-date, DE was $151.5 million, or $0.38 per share, down 4% from the prior year period. Fee-Paying Assets Under Management (FPAUM) FPAUM totaled approximately $23.0 billion as of September 30, 2026, up 3% sequentially and 4% year- over-year with permanent capital representing 98% of our FPAUM as of September 30, 2026. In the third quarter, FPAUM grew 3% compared with the second quarter, driven by a 4% increase in market value, reflecting positive fund performance and an increase in HHH’s market capitalization, partially offset by 0.5% of outflows related to share repurchases at PSH. Year-over-year growth in FPAUM principally reflects the $5 billion raised in the PSUS IPO, partially offset by negative fund performance in the first quarter of this year, outflows of 4% related to redemptions from our legacy hedge funds in connection with the PSUS IPO, and modest share repurchases at PSH. The legacy fund redemptions were a one-time consequence of offering our private fund investors the opportunity to redeem to invest in the PSUS IPO, which converted open-end fund capital to permanent capital. We do not expect share repurchases to be a meaningful source of fund outflows in the future. We list the top five portfolio company contributors to and detractors from the change in market value of our FPAUM, on an aggregate basis, in the table below:

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6 Note: The table above presents only those positions that individually represent greater than 3% of our total AUM during the respective periods. Each figure in the table is calculated as the applicable numerator described below, divided by our total FPAUM at the beginning of the respective period. For each portfolio company (other than HHH Change in Market Capitalization), the numerator is the aggregate investment gain or loss attributable to that company’s FPAUM across all of our funds. Management fees and other fees are calculated on the same basis. For HHH Change in Market Capitalization, the numerator is the change in HHH's market capitalization during the period. We believe presenting information for our core funds and HHH on an aggregate basis is most meaningful to our shareholders because our revenues are principally comprised of management and service fees, which are driven by changes in the AUM of our funds, and fees earned under our arrangements with HHH, which are driven by changes in HHH's market capitalization. Accordingly, we believe the aggregate performance of our funds and HHH is a more meaningful indicator of the trajectory of our revenues than either measure viewed in isolation. EPS Growth of Our Portfolio Companies Will Be an Important Driver of Long-Term Growth Our primary goal is to grow Pershing Square’s FRE by increasing FPAUM with strong investment fund performance and with additional growth from the periodic launch of new funds. Historically, we have generated a ~20% compound annual gross return for the last 22 calendar years. Our goal is to achieve a similar or greater level of returns over time. In light of our permanent capital business model, if we are successful in achieving our long-term investment objectives, we believe that Pershing Square will likely be one of, if not the fastest-growing, publicly traded alternative investment managers before considering any growth from new fund launches. Our investment portfolios are comprised of high-quality, durable growth companies that we expect will generate about 20% annual EPS growth over the next three-to-five years. We believe our investment returns from these companies will be principally driven by their earnings growth with the potential for additional returns as investors assign higher multiples to their earnings. We believe that P/E multiple increases for these companies are justified based on their business quality, growth, and other attributes. For the substantial majority of our investment portfolio – excluding Howard Hughes Holdings and Fannie and Freddie, which we consider special situations and discuss separately below – we view economic EPS growth as the best metric by which to evaluate the growth in intrinsic value of our companies. Despite our portfolio companies’ relatively low business volatility and high business quality, their stock market values remain highly volatile due to short-term macro, geopolitical, and company-specific developments. We believe this volatility is a function of continuing changes in stock market dynamics due to the reduction in float from indexation and the increased amount of capital controlled by leveraged short-term investors. The market’s reduced float increases the impact these short-term investors have on stock prices as they trade around short-term, company-specific, and macro factors. We believe that current market dynamics are favorable for long-term fundamental investors as these factors increase the probability that even the highest quality businesses will occasionally trade at prices substantially below their intrinsic values, creating buying opportunities. One can think of our funds as akin to tax-advantaged investment holding companies with 12 to 15 subsidiaries that operate across a range of industries, have distinct growth drivers, and are run by superb management teams who pursue separate capital allocation policies. The overall earnings growth of our ‘holding companies’ will therefore reflect the aggregate earnings growth of their subsidiaries. Given that we estimate the annual EPS growth potential of our portfolio companies to be between 15% and 25% over the intermediate term, we would expect their earnings to grow at about 3+% to 6+% per

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7 quarter, subject to periodic business and macroeconomic developments that may cause them to grow faster or slower than their longer-term potential. We would expect our ‘holding company’ to reflect the aggregate growth of its subsidiaries and thereby grow its earnings per share about 20% per annum on average over the intermediate term, or by approximately 4% to 5% in a typical quarter before considering management or incentive fees or the benefit of investment grade leverage at Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. that we also intend to utilize at Pershing Square USA, Ltd. For the third quarter, the aggregate EPS growth of our portfolio companies (excluding Howard Hughes Holdings and Fannie and Freddie which we consider special situations and discuss separately) averaged approximately 5%3, a rate similar to what we would expect in a typical quarter, i.e., one-fourth of our average 20% annual earnings growth estimate. In addition, the range of quarterly EPS growth rates across our portfolio companies was 3% to 6%, which is also consistent with what we would expect in a typical quarter. Collectively and individually, earnings growth for our portfolio companies was strong this quarter, and in line with our expectations for their longer-term growth potential. The overall investment return from our core portfolio companies (excluding HHH and Fannie and Freddie) was just over 8%, which reflects their quarterly EPS growth and a modest 3% aggregate increase in their P/E multiples. While the overall increase in their weighted average P/E multiples was a positive contributor to our investment returns this quarter, there was significant fluctuation, both positively and negatively, in the P/E multiples of each of our portfolio companies. For example, Microsoft’s and Meta's P/E multiples increased by more than 30% and 20%, respectively, from the prior quarter, while Uber’s and Brookfield's P/E multiples contracted by nearly 10% and 20%, respectively, despite our view that both companies’ valuations were already well below what we believe to be appropriate levels for businesses of their quality and growth. During the quarter, most of our portfolio companies experienced a change in their P/E multiples, either positively or negatively, that was greater than their growth in EPS, causing their security prices to be more volatile than their underlying earnings progress. Overall, the increase in P/E multiples at certain portfolio companies outweighed the impact of reduced P/E multiples at other companies in the portfolio. Over the long term, we expect the investment returns from our portfolio companies to closely track their long-term earnings growth, with changes in the multiple that investors assign to these earnings providing incremental returns in some years and reduced returns in other years. Howard Hughes Holdings (HHH) We made substantial progress during the quarter toward our goal of transforming HHH into a high- returning, diversified holding company. Shortly after the completion of HHH’s acquisition of Vantage Holdings this June, we recruited Marc Grandisson as Vantage’s Executive Chairman and David Gansberg as its future CEO once his garden leave is completed. Over the last few months, Marc has made significant progress recruiting a world-class leadership team. 3 As measured by Pershing Square’s estimate of the quarterly change in the next twelve-months’ economic earnings per share, including dividends.

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8 In September, at the Howard Hughes annual meeting, HHH announced that it intends to accelerate the company’s transformation by substantially reducing the capital intensity of the Howard Hughes Communities (HHC) real estate subsidiary, which will free up capital to be invested in Vantage. HHC has begun the process of monetizing assets through sales and joint ventures in which it will retain operational control, transforming HHC into a fee-generating real estate asset management platform. We believe that the monetization of HHC’s real estate will benefit both Vantage and HHC. Vantage will obtain substantial additional capital it can deploy in its business while HHC’s more capital-light, fee- generating business model will enable it to earn substantially higher returns on capital. HHC has the potential to become a best-in-class real estate alternative investment manager due to its superb management team, massive commercial land holdings with decades of high-return investment opportunities in some of the best large-scale, master-planned communities (MPCs) in the country, and a long-term track record of successful on-budget and on-time development. We estimate the current after-tax value of HHH’s real estate assets to be about $5 billion. By selling assets and entering into joint ventures, HHH can redirect significantly more capital to Vantage’s insurance business in the short term than would be achieved from the organic cash generation of the company’s real estate assets. Moreover, by transitioning HHC into a real estate asset manager that earns fees on third-party capital, HHC can materially increase its returns on equity while reducing its overall cost of capital, which should enable it to pursue more high-return development opportunities over time. With the addition of capital from the monetization of HHC’s real estate assets, Vantage will represent a growing percentage of HHH’s equity value and earnings potential. If Vantage is successful in achieving our long-term investment and insurance profitability goals, we believe Vantage’s book value per share should grow at a compound annual rate of 20% or more. Over time, we believe that HHH’s annual growth in book value per share – which we believe to be the most appropriate metric for judging the growth in business value of an insurance company – will compare favorably with the long-term growth in EPS and intrinsic value of our other portfolio companies. Our Investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Has the Potential for Asymmetric Returns While the investment portfolios we manage largely consist of high-quality, durable growth companies, we also invest a small part of our capital in investments that offer substantially greater upside potential with a corresponding greater risk of a permanent loss of capital. While most of these investments are in the form of options, credit default swaps or similar instruments, occasionally certain common stocks offer similar asymmetric potential, notably, our investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F2). We view our investment in F2 as long-term, mispriced, probabilistic options that have the potential to increase in value by more than 10-fold from current share prices. Importantly, F2 also meet our standards for business quality, durability, and growth, and benefit from their duopolistic, government- sponsored market position. Now with 18 years under government conservatorship – what was supposed to be a temporary resting place until recapitalization – F2 have more than $200 billion of shareholder equity, more than 2.5% of the nearly $8 trillion of mortgage-backed securities they guarantee before considering F2’s additional claims paying resources from the $40 billion of annually recurring guarantee fees they receive.

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9 F2 have had average annual credit losses of only 0.05% over the last decade, so their current levels of capital amount to approximately 50 times their average annual credit losses, a massive margin of safety even in a housing recession or depression. We estimate F2’s combined capital will grow to more than $375 billion over the next five years, more than 4% of the total mortgage-backed securities they guarantee. Despite their high-quality, low-risk business model which is best considered a royalty on first mortgages secured by the growing value of America’s housing stock, Fannie and Freddie currently trade at about 1.5 times earnings. Their current valuations are the lowest that we have ever seen for a high-quality, capital- light business, as investors do not value the companies based upon their current earnings, but rather based upon a probabilistic assessment of their potential future political outcomes. Since the election and through the end of last year, F2 share prices have increased by about eight times as President Trump and other senior members of his administration repeatedly and vociferously reiterated their commitment to take the companies public and ultimately end the conservatorships. This year, however, the President and his team have remained silent and have taken no public steps toward listing the companies on the NYSE or ending the companies’ conservatorships. As a result, their share prices have declined more than 60% this year, as investors have lowered the probability they ascribe to F2 exiting conservatorship in the near term, and ignored the companies’ strong operating performance, which has enabled them to rebuild capital. We strongly believe that President Trump, his administration, and the Republicans in Congress do not want to risk handing control of Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship to a new administration in 2029 as it would give a potential Democratic Party administration enormous influence over housing policy and the resulting political power that comes from control of F2. As one member of President Trump’s administration succinctly stated, “We can’t take the risk of the Communists taking control of Fannie and Freddie.” In our view, the President’s remaining term is more than sufficient to facilitate a relisting of F2 and their orderly exit from conservatorship in a manner that maintains and enhances mortgage affordability while maximizing the long-term value of American taxpayers’ 79.9% ownership of the two companies. Importantly, a relisting and release from conservatorship can be accomplished by the President using his executive authority without any involvement of Congress. If the polls and betting markets are correct and control of the House and/or Senate goes to the Democratic Party, the relisting and release of F2 will be one of the few major pieces of economic policy the President can still achieve after the midterms. We believe that there is no credible alternative to F2 exiting conservatorship and relisting on the NYSE as private-sector-owned operating companies. F2 provide a mission-critical service to the American public, have a safe and inherently low-risk core business, and have built up more than sufficient capital to withstand even the most draconian potential future credit losses. The only way to protect them from future political influence is to release them from conservatorship to facilitate long-term private sector, institutional and retail ownership.

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10 Treasury Secretary Bessent has recently stated that the administration will focus on F2 and their future ownership in 2027 and 2028. For all of the above reasons, we believe it is only a matter of time before F2 exit conservatorship and are valued as traditional operating businesses, which should result in share prices that are many multiples of current levels. And yes, our 13-year holding period has been a long time to wait. The Current Stock Market Environment Continues to Create Long-Term Opportunities The Market’s Return Continues to Be Driven by a Relatively Small Number of Companies In the third quarter, the S&P 500 index gained just over 2%, while the median stock in the S&P 500 was down 4%. In addition, more than 60% of the constituent stocks in the S&P 500 experienced negative share price performance. This market backdrop is consistent with the overall trend this year, in which the average stock in the S&P 500 has meaningfully underperformed the overall index. Year-to-date, the S&P 500 is up 13% through September 30, while the average stock in the index is up only 1% while just under half of all stocks in the S&P 500 are down. While the stock price performance of the median stock in the index was negative this quarter and was marginally positive through the first nine months of the year, earnings per share, the most important metric for measuring growth in business value, did substantially better. In the third quarter, consensus EPS estimates4 for the median company grew by 4%, and nearly 85% of the companies in the S&P 500 exhibited growth in consensus EPS estimates. In addition, consensus EPS estimates for the median company increased nearly 10% through the first nine months of this year. Historically, the average S&P 500 stock generates nearly 10% EPS growth for the entire year, so most companies in the S&P 500 in 2026 are outperforming their typical levels of earnings growth. For the substantial majority of the companies in the S&P 500, their business values have continued to grow while their share prices have remained largely unchanged or have declined. As a result, nearly 70% of the stocks in the S&P 500 are trading at P/E multiples that are below the level at which they started the quarter and began the ye a r. We believe that investor enthusiasm for the relatively small number of companies supplying ’picks and shovels’ for the massive AI infrastructure buildout has caused investors to overlook the relatively large number of businesses that are also generating strong performance, including the high-quality, durable growth companies in which we seek to invest. As a result, the current market backdrop has provided us with a rich opportunity set that has allowed us to make seven new investments so far this year, a rate of new investment identification about three times our typical average. 4 As measured by Bloomberg, consensus estimates of the quarterly and year-to-date change in next twelve- months’ earnings per share.

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11 Many of the great businesses we have long admired are trading at attractive prices. Subsequent to quarter-end, we began building a position in an eighth new investment, which we will discuss in more detail once we have completed our purchase. Suppliers of the AI Buildout Have Outperformed the Hyperscalers That are Funding It The buildout of AI infrastructure has been one of the principal drivers of stock market performance this year with the ‘picks and shovels’ companies having been the largest beneficiaries. The S&P 500 Semiconductor Index and S&P 500 Technology Hardware Index, which we view as rough proxies for the ‘picks and shovels’ companies, have increased by 44% and 36% year-to-date, respectively. In contrast, the share prices of the hyperscalers (Microsoft, Meta, Amazon and Google), which are the ‘picks and shovels’ companies’ primary customers, have increased by 8% on average, despite 27% growth in their EPS this year. The decline in the hyperscalers’ P/E multiples has largely been driven by investor concerns regarding the potential returns they will earn on their elevated capex spending. The total capital expenditures of the four hyperscalers are nearly five-fold the level of three years ago, from approximately $140 billion in 2023 to approximately $740 billion in 2026 based on company guidance. Consensus estimates forecast an additional 35% increase in capex next year to over $1 trillion. While the hyperscalers’ revenues have grown rapidly over this period, capex has risen much faster with near-term capital intensity increasing from nearly 12% of revenues in 2023 to an estimated 38% in 2026 for the group. Given this large increase, investors have understandably questioned whether this spending is defensive in nature, representing a structural increase in their maintenance capital intensity, or alternatively, an offensive growth investment that will generate high returns in the future. The Hyperscalers' Growth and Return Opportunity Is Underappreciated We believe that the hyperscalers’ capital spending is offensive rather than defensive. Rather than merely protecting existing franchises, we believe the hyperscalers are investing to accelerate growth and are deploying capital behind a transformative technology that plays directly to their competitive advantages. These include unmatched distribution, long-standing customer relationships, proprietary data and context, security and reliability at global scale, and the balance sheet strength to invest at a level few competitors can match. Amazon CEO Andy Jassy recently described the economics of the buildout at Amazon Web Services (AWS) in a manner that helps to explain the attractive and lower-risk nature of this investment. In summary, he explained that the capex buildout has two components: the data center shells (not including land), and the servers and network equipment that fill them. The shells require capital roughly two years before they can be put to use, but once operational, they can be utilized for 30 years or more with only minimal ongoing maintenance capex. Servers and network equipment, by contrast, are purchased only a few months before they are placed into service, enabling this commitment to be closely aligned with customer demand. Servers achieve payback in a little under three years, have a useful life of at least five to six years, and generate substantial free cash flow in the years following payback.

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12 The near-term consequence of bringing a large amount of data center capacity online is elevated capital spending and a headwind to free cash flow. That said, Amazon’s data centers are estimated to house five to six generations of servers, with each generation requiring less capital and achieving better returns than the previous because the data center shell investment is not repeated. Once Amazon’s revenue growth outpaces its incremental capex growth – in part due to the fact that the next generation servers and network investment do not include the data center shell capex – the resulting free cash flow and returns on invested capital should be highly attractive. While Jassy’s comments are particular to AWS, we believe the same dynamics apply to our other hyperscalers. Each of these companies has a differentiated and substantial opportunity to monetize its compute, whether on a first-party basis through its own applications or through the sale of cloud services, and each is uniquely positioned to benefit from the technology it is building. Amazon: AI Is Accelerating AWS and Extending Amazon’s Lead Across the Stack Amazon's compute investment directly leverages AWS's dominant position as the largest cloud provider. Even at its $170 billion annualized revenue scale, AI has helped AWS accelerate its revenue growth to 39% in the third quarter, its fastest growth in nearly five years, despite nearly doubling in size over this period. In our view, Amazon is extremely well positioned across the AI stack. Bedrock, its inference service, offers customers access to the broadest selection of leading models in a world where no single model is likely to dominate, and where the race to the frontier is won and lost periodically by the leading frontier model companies. Trainium, Amazon's custom AI chip, offers leading price performance and has secured multiyear, multi-gigawatt commitments from Anthropic and OpenAI along with a growing roster of start- ups and large enterprises. Importantly, growth in AI is also accelerating growth in AWS's core business as the post-training and agentic workloads that accompany AI deployments run largely on AWS's conventional compute, and as enterprises accelerate migration to the cloud in order to realize the full benefits of AI. Management has noted that the margins and returns of its AI business are tracking ahead of the core cloud business. It believes that AWS can ultimately become a $1 trillion revenue business, roughly double what it previously thought possible. AI is also strengthening Amazon's retail business where agentic shopping is emerging as a new channel for both commerce and advertising. More than 350 million customers have used Alexa for Shopping, Amazon's agentic shopping assistant, over the past 12 months, and these customers spend more per order and convert more often. Across both of its major businesses, we believe AI is strengthening Amazon's competitive position while adding to its already substantial growth runway. Meta: Monetizing AI in its Core Business While Launching Consumer and Business Agents For Meta, AI and the associated investment in compute are transforming its business in two important ways. First, Meta's core digital advertising business has effectively used AI for better ad targeting, generative ad copy, and more effective content recommendation. These benefits are already visible in the company's revenues, with growth accelerating from 22% in 2025 to an estimated 27% in 2026.

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13 Second, AI is unlocking entirely new products, namely consumer and business agents, which Meta can launch at a scale, that we believe few companies can match. Entering the year, the magnitude of Meta's compute investment exceeded what many investors believed its core business alone would support. It was also unclear what new products could justify the incremental investment. In recent months, the company has addressed that question directly with a series of launches, including its Muse Spark and Wonder Full family of models, which are now at the frontier, the Muse personal agent, and Meta Enterprise Platform. Muse appears to be a resounding success, now surpassing ten million downloads within weeks of its launch. Muse benefits from Meta's extensive knowledge of each user's interests and social connections, deep integration with partners (Shopify, Walmart, Gmail, etc.), and distribution to the nearly four billion people who already use Meta's apps. The range of early use cases, from negotiating cable bills to booking travel, managing appointments, and customer service interactions, suggests broad consumer appeal. By frontloading its compute investment, Meta has given itself the optionality to scale Muse to a billion or more users, offering it free of charge to most, while retaining the ability to monetize it over time through transaction fees on the commerce it enables. Likewise, Meta Enterprise Platform applies a similar logic to businesses. Meta already helps hundreds of millions of businesses reach customers through advertising. The platform allows these same businesses to use Meta's models and agents to grow and operate more efficiently. Prior to Meta’s recent product launches, investors had limited visibility into how Meta's consumer and business agent efforts would take shape, but now the narrative on the stock has quickly shifted as investors increasingly recognize the multiple paths to monetizing Meta's compute assets beyond its core business. Meta's earnings multiple has increased from 18 times to 22 times. We continue to view Meta as undervalued given the momentum in its core business and the large new addressable markets that Muse and Meta Enterprise Platform provide to the company. Microsoft: Copilot and Azure Provide First-Party and Third-Party Paths to Monetize AI Microsoft occupies an enviable position among the hyperscalers in having two large channels by which to monetize its compute. Like Meta, it has a first-party channel in Microsoft 365, its productivity suite embedded in daily workflows of over 450 million users. Like Amazon, Microsoft’s Azure, the second- largest cloud provider after AWS, offers a third-party channel, which surpassed $100 billion in revenue last fiscal year while growing 41%. Microsoft understood earlier than most that enterprise adoption of AI would be won by serving customers' practical needs to choose the appropriate model for a particular task, to evaluate and control token costs, and to maintain control of their data, and it presciently oriented its business around these principles. AI also presents Microsoft with a massive market expansion opportunity. Just as Muse is driving AI adoption among consumers, Copilot offers Microsoft the same opportunity among enterprise workers.

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14 The company's intense focus on Copilot product innovation is visible in its adoption, with paid Microsoft 365 Copilot seats doubling over the past six months to more than 30 million. Microsoft has evolved its business model thoughtfully, while retaining per-seat pricing, which gives customers a leading AI agent within a predictable, low-cost bundle, while introducing consumption- based pricing for power users who wish to scale their agent usage. This approach aligns Microsoft's revenue with token consumption as usage intensifies, while administrative controls and spending caps protect customers from unexpected costs. AI is also spotlighting franchises within Microsoft's platform that were previously less visible to investors. For example, the rise of agentic coding has materially accelerated GitHub's growth, with GitHub Copilot revenue accelerating more than 60% quarter-over-quarter. We believe security represents another substantial opportunity given the expanded threat landscape of an agentic world, and Microsoft's broad visibility into enterprise customers' data and context. As with Meta, investors have started to reassess how beneficial AI could be to Microsoft’s growth as its AI strategy is now starting to show in its recent business results. Microsoft's P/E multiple has increased from 19 to 25 times over the past three months as the narrative on the stock has shifted from the company being an AI laggard to an AI leader. We believe Microsoft’s current valuation understates the degree to which AI will accelerate Microsoft's growth and deepen its entrenchment with customers. Consensus Estimates for the Hyperscalers Embed the Cost of the Buildout but Discount Its Upside Consensus analyst estimates for the hyperscalers reflect a notable disconnect: they expect the current level of capital intensity to persist for years into the future, yet they assume minimal acceleration in revenue growth beyond this year and next. Consensus estimates treat the capex buildout as a structural increase in maintenance capital intensity rather than as an investment capable of producing outsized future revenue growth and attractive returns on capital. For example, consensus estimates show Meta’s capital expenditures increasing from 50% to 65% of revenue from 2026 through 2029, roughly double the 20% to 35% capital intensity of 2023 through 2025. Over the same period, consensus estimates assume revenue growth decelerates from 27% in 2026 to 20% in 2027, and 15% by 2029, below the company’s 22% growth in 2024 and 2025, despite the acceleration AI has already delivered. The dynamic is similar at Microsoft and AWS, where consensus estimates suggest that capital intensity will remain significantly in excess of levels in 2023 and 2024 for several years while revenue growth is expected to hold steady or decelerate.

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15 Note: Consensus Bloomberg estimates as of September 30, 2026. In our view, analyst estimates penalize the hyperscalers for the cost of the buildout today while ascribing limited potential to the significant future growth in revenue and earnings that are likely to result from these investments. Most of the revenue acceleration visible in 2026 reflects capital deployed in 2024 and 2025, while we believe the larger levels of investment now will yield an additional increase in growth in the future. As a result, we believe it is highly probable that the hyperscalers’ revenue growth will exceed analyst estimates over the next several years. To the extent that does not occur, we believe the hyperscalers will reduce their capital expenditures from current levels. In either scenario, we believe the hyperscalers’ capital intensity will be lower and their free cash flow will be meaningfully higher over the next several years than what is implied by current consensus estimates. A simple illustration suggests how material the underestimates for growth could be. We estimate that one gigawatt of AI data center capacity currently costs approximately $40 billion to $50 billion to build using the latest generation of chips. We believe a hyperscaler can generate $15 billion to $20 billion in annual revenue per gigawatt of compute capacity, which, at a 50% incremental operating margin, would generate $7.5 billion to $10 billion of incremental operating income, implying a pre-tax return on invested capital of 15% to 25%. Consensus Bloomberg Estimates ($ in billions): Microsoft FY 2023 FY 2024 FY 2025 FY 2026 FY 2027E FY 2028E FY 2029E Revenue $212 $245 $282 $332 $393 $466 $566 Gr owth 16% 15% 18% 18% 19% 21% Capital Expenditure $32 $56 $88 $145 $219 $251 $283 Growth 75% 58% 65% 51% 15% 13% % of Revenue 15% 23% 31% 44% 56% 54% 50% Meta 2023 2024 2025 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E Revenue $135 $165 $201 $254 $306 $363 $419 Growth 22% 22% 27% 20% 19% 16% Capital Expenditure $27 $37 $70 $139 $199 $216 $210 Growth 38% 87% 100% 42% 9% (3%) % of Revenue 20% 23% 35% 55% 65% 60% 50% Amazon Web Services 2023 2024 2025 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E AWS Revenue $91 $108 $129 $171 $234 $304 $361 Growth 19% 20% 33% 37% 30% 19% AWS Net Additions to PP&E $25 $53 $96 $177 $244 $288 $339 Growth 114% 81% 83% 38% 18% 18% % of Revenue 27% 50% 75% 103% 105% 95% 94%

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16 We regard these assumptions as conservative and believe the ultimate returns could be substantially higher given the hyperscalers’ ability to monetize capacity through higher-value inference services and first-party applications rather than just wholesale compute rental. To gauge what potential returns could suggest for future growth, one can divide the hyperscalers’ current capital expenditures into two components: maintenance and growth capital. The 2023 to 2024 level of capital can be considered the maintenance capex required to sustain baseline growth, and the spending in excess of maintenance capex to be growth capex. If the consensus estimates for growth capex generate a return consistent with the assumptions of our one-gigawatt example, we estimate the potential for five to ten percentage points of upside to consensus annual revenue growth through 2029. Compounded over the next three years, that would suggest future revenues could be 15+% to 35% above current consensus estimates. The operating leverage that would accompany the higher-than-expected revenue growth would result in an even larger impact on EPS. Amazon, on its third quarter earnings call, provided long-term guidance on AWS revenue growth exceeding 40% in both 2027 and 2028. This outlook is the first specific multi-year growth guidance any of the hyperscalers have offered, which is consistent with the range of outcomes our framework suggests relative to consensus estimates. The Hyperscalers Are Uniquely Positioned to Fund the Buildout The availability and cost of financing required to fund a buildout of this magnitude has been another area of increasing investor concern. The four hyperscalers discussed above are collectively expected to spend a little over $1 trillion on capital expenditures in 2027 based on consensus estimates. Including Oracle and SpaceX and neoclouds such as CoreWeave and Nebius, total data center capital expenditures are expected to reach approximately $1.5 trillion next year based on consensus estimates. Investors have grown concerned about how this will be funded, as reflected in the widening of credit spreads on neocloud debt and certain hyperscaler asset-level financings as well as in the recent sharp declines in neocloud share prices. In our view, the scrutiny of the neoclouds and the funding needs of companies such as SpaceX and Oracle should not be conflated with the hyperscalers’ ability to fund their own capital expenditures. The hyperscalers are in a vastly stronger financial position. They have virtually no net debt and can finance the substantial majority of their capital expenditures from the prodigious cash flows of their core businesses. Their multi-trillion-dollar market capitalizations also mean that even large equity issuances, in the hundreds of billions of dollars, would amount to a low- to mid-single-digit percentage of their shares outstanding. For example, we estimate that Meta’s free cash flow before capital expenditures (consider that Meta is the smallest of the four by market capitalization) will approach $150 billion next year. Meta has more than $80 billion of cash and no net leverage, which with its operating cash flow would allow it to fund more than $200 billion of capital expenditures before accessing the capital markets. If Meta were to increase its net leverage to just one times 2026E EBITDA, it could raise an additional $125 billion of capital. The $98 billion equity raise that Meta announced two weeks ago amounts to only 6% of its

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17 shares outstanding. Microsoft, Amazon, and Alphabet are each considerably larger than Meta and even better positioned to self-fund capital expenditures of this scale with minimal financial risk. Importantly, the hyperscalers’ financial strength compounds their other competitive advantages in the buildout. In addition to capital, standing up new data center capacity requires permitting, power, chip supply, and the navigation of political considerations. The neoclouds and other secondary participants face meaningful challenges with each of these requirements. To the extent those challenges slow the pace at which others can bring capacity online, the current shortage of compute will persist for longer, and the benefit will accrue to those who already have capacity in place and the means to add more. The hyperscalers already operate large installed bases, have ready access to capital, and are developing custom silicon that reduces their dependence on external chip supply. They also have been planning land, power, and cooling infrastructure on multi-year lead times. The more difficult the buildout proves for others, the more valuable the hyperscalers’ capacity becomes, and the more durable their competitive position. The Performance of Our Portfolio Companies The table below highlights the Q3 and year-to-date share price performance of our portfolio companies. In addition, we provide an estimate of their EPS multiples based upon their share prices at the end of the third quarter and our estimates of longer-term EPS growth. We also provide estimated three- to five-year annual EPS growth rates as an illustrative analysis to highlight the longer-term growth potential of our portfolio companies. We periodically revise our estimates of the near- and longer-term growth rates of our portfolio companies based upon new information and business developments that occur over time. There is no guarantee we will be correct in our assessments of their future growth potential, and our estimates are inherently imprecise. We seek to purchase our target companies at share prices that incorporate a margin of safety so that even if our estimates for the longer-term growth of a company are ultimately proven incorrect, we can still achieve an attractive investment return.

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18 (1) New position initiated during the year. (2) Reflects total shareholder return, including dividends, as of September 30, 2026. For positions initiated in the applicable period, reflects performance from average cost. (3) Reflects the next-twelve-month price-to-earnings (NTM P/E) multiple based on Pershing Square estimates as of September 30, 2026. Multiples for Howard Hughes, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac are not presented, as they are not meaningful (N.M.). (4) Reflects estimated EPS compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over the next three to five years from calendar year 2026, inclusive of dividend yield. (5) Weighted by delta market value as of September 30, 2026, of each investment across the Pershing Square Affiliated Funds (PSH, PSUS, PSLP and PS Intl.). Excludes Howard Hughes, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We estimate that the companies in our investment portfolios will have average annual EPS growth of about 20% over the next three to five years, and trade at 20 times our estimate of current earnings per share5, compared to the S&P 500 index components, which are expected to grow EPS at 13% over the same period, and trade at an average P/E multiple of 20 times. Our portfolio companies’ relatively higher EPS growth rate combined with a similar current valuation relative to the S&P 500 should increase the likelihood that our investment performance exceeds that of the S&P 500 index over the long term. Our companies also have higher profit margins, better returns on capital, more favorable competitive positioning, and, in our view, more capable management teams than the average company in the S&P 500. 5 As measured by Pershing Square’s estimate of the next twelve-months’ economic earnings per share. Company Q3 2026 Year-to-Date NTM P/E(3) Microsoft(1) 38% 27% 25x 19% Uber (5%) (16%) 16x 25% Me ta Platforms 29% 10% 22x 22% Amazon 5% 8% 26x 24% Brookfield (14%) (20%) 11x 20% Restaurant Brands (1%) 7% 17x 15% Howard Hughes Holdings 3% (8%) N.M. N.M. Netflix(1) (3%) (11%) 19x 19% Mastercard(1) 8% 13% 24x 18% Visa(1) 5% 12% 24x 16% Intercontinental Exchange(1) 2% 2% 17x 15% S&P Global(1) 3% (1%) 20x 15% Alcon(1) (5%) (5%) 17x 16% Fannie Mae (35%) (61%) N .M. N.M. Freddie Mac (35%) (61%) N.M. N.M. Weighted Average(5) 20x 20% S&P 500 2% 13% 20x 13% Estimated 3 - 5 YR(4) EPS CAGR Share Price Performance(2)

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19 Below we provide more detail on each of our investments, other than HHH and F2, since we discussed them above:6 Microsoft Corporation (MSFT) Microsoft’s share price increased 38% during the third quarter and 27% year-to-date from our average cost. The company is delivering accelerating performance across its core productivity and cloud franchises, with M365 growth accelerating to 18% and Azure growth accelerating to 48% in the most recent quarter. Azure’s commercial backlog has also grown substantially, with the recent growth driven entirely by enterprise customers rather than frontier model companies, which provides strong visibility into durable demand. This business momentum has been accompanied by a rapid pace of product innovation. Milestone launches over the last few months include the consolidation of Copilot’s chat, Cowork, Autopilot, and Code experiences into a single application, the release of more than a dozen new proprietary MAI models, the scaling of the company’s custom silicon Maia program across its datacenter fleet, and the introduction of Project Perception, an agentic cybersecurity offering. Investor perception of Microsoft’s AI positioning has shifted markedly in recent months, and its P/E multiple has increased from 19 times to 25 times forward earnings. We continue to expect high-teens earnings growth over the long term and believe the stock remains undervalued. Uber Technologies (UBER) Uber’s share price declined 5% in the third quarter and 16% year-to-date. Investor concerns regarding the potential long-term impact of autonomous vehicles (AVs) continue to negatively weigh on Uber’s share price, which is increasingly disconnected from its strong business performance. During the quarter, Uber continued to make progress with its multi-partner AV strategy by launching and/or expanding commercial AV operations in London, Dubai and Croatia. The company is targeting AV operations in 15 cities by year-end, with further geographic expansion and scaling in 2027 and beyond. With respect to Uber’s Delivery operations, the arrival of Muse catalyzed a debate regarding agentic commerce’s impact on the delivery business. We expect Uber to incorporate agentic capabilities into its platform, while preserving optionality to partner amidst a rapidly evolving ecosystem. We believe Uber’s business model is inherently insulated from agentic disintermediation given (1) the high-frequency nature of the purchase combined with a low average ticket, (2) consumers’ expectation for a low-latency, “on demand” interaction, (3) enormously diverse supply-side aggregation, (4) dynamic “inventory”, which changes in real time, and (5) complex real-world fulfillment obligations, including local regulation. In contrast to the negative investor sentiment, Uber continues to demonstrate exceptionally strong financial performance, with earnings on pace to grow approximately 35% this year. Uber now trades at 16 times earnings, its lowest valuation ever. DoorDash – Uber’s direct delivery competitor – currently trades at 30 times earnings per share, or 38 times based upon a normalized 23% tax rate. Applying DoorDash’s relative multiple to Uber’s delivery business implies the market is ascribing minimal value to 6 Only includes portfolio positions that individually represent greater than 3% of our total AUM during the respective period consolidated across all of our funds.

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20 Uber’s core mobility business. Uber’s current valuation implicitly assigns a high probability of disintermediation, a view we believe is mistaken. We believe Uber’s long-term earnings per share will continue to compound at 25% or more for the foreseeable future and the risk due to AVs is minimal. Meta Platforms (META) Meta’s share price increased 29% during the third quarter and 10% year-to-date. Its core advertising business continues to accelerate with third quarter revenue growth of 26%, as AI-driven improvements in content recommendation and ad targeting lift both engagement and monetization across Meta’s family of apps. The launch of its Muse personal agent and Meta Enterprise Platform during the quarter gave investors a clearer view of how Meta intends to monetize its substantial compute investment beyond the core business. The company’s valuation has increased from 18 times to 22 times forward EPS since the end of the second quarter. We expect Meta to grow earnings at a 20%-plus rate over the next several years and believe the shares remain undervalued given the strength of the core business and the scale of the new market and monetization opportunities enabled by Muse and Meta Enterprise Platform. Amazon (AMZN) Amazon’s share price increased 5% during the third quarter and 8% year-to-date. Business momentum remains strong across the company. AWS revenue growth accelerated to 39% in the third quarter, its fastest rate in nearly five years. The segment’s backlog reached nearly $600 billion, growing at a triple- digit rate, while operating margins remained near their highest levels in history despite the ongoing buildout. The company’s retail business continues to take share, with paid units growing 12%, aided by the secular tailwind of rising e-commerce penetration and the early adoption of agentic shopping. Despite these results, Amazon remains undervalued in our view, as investors are focused on the magnitude of capital spending, with 2026 capital expenditures of approximately $220 billion and management indicating it expects to spend meaningfully more in 2027. Notably, the demand supporting this investment has become increasingly visible as management now expects AWS to grow more than 40% in each of 2027 and 2028, with a stated goal of reaching $1 trillion of annual revenue within the next five to ten years. We find the company’s framework for the returns on this investment compelling, particularly as management has indicated that its payback period on AWS capital continues to shorten, and we believe the resulting growth in free cash flow is underappreciated. We believe Amazon can compound earnings at a 20%-plus rate over the long term. Brookfield Corporation (BN) After significantly outperforming peers earlier in the year, BN’s share price declined 14% in the third quarter and 20% year-to-date. Sector-wide concerns continue to weigh on valuations, further exacerbated by the sharp rise in interest rates this quarter, which has caused investors to temper expectations for asset monetizations and carried interest realization. Notably, Brookfield has only modest carried interest in its earnings base (8% over the trailing twelve-month period) with carried interest representing more of an upside to earnings than a risk to current profits. We believe Brookfield will be less impacted than peers given its focus on real assets. In addition, higher near-term interest rates position Brookfield to lock in higher spread earnings at Brookfield Wealth Solutions, which acquired a low-cost $40 billion long-duration liability book through the acquisition of Just Group earlier this year.

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21 We believe Brookfield remains on track for mid-teens-or-greater distributable EPS growth over the next twelve months, and the company recently issued a five-year target of 24% compounded earnings-per- share growth. BN is inexpensive both on an absolute and a relative basis at only 11 times earnings estimates, or ~20% below direct peers, KKR and Apollo, despite consensus expectations for higher growth at BN. We believe the shares offer highly attractive returns from current levels. Restaurant Brands International (QSR) QSR's share price declined 1% during the third quarter but remains up 7% year-to-date, as we believe investors are beginning to better appreciate the durability of its growth. While peers have declined due to slowing sales, QSR’s consistent growth stands out: the company has now delivered five consecutive quarters of global same-store sales growth above 3%, and the company is returning to its capital-light model by selling down company-owned stores. Burger King delivered third quarter same-store sales growth of 8%, consistent with its first-half performance and well above peers, reflecting the brand’s foundational improvements and recent elevation campaign. The International business grew same-store sales by 4%, also ahead of peers and against a tougher prior-year comparison. Tim Hortons grew same-store sales by 2%, performing in line with the Canadian QSR industry despite a pressured consumer. With momentum in each of its franchises, the company remains on track to deliver 8% operating profit growth this year, consistent with its longer-term targets. We believe sustained high-single-digit operating profit growth combined with appropriate financial leverage and an ongoing share repurchase program should allow for a mid-teens total return before considering any potential for an increase in its P/E multiple. Despite these favorable attributes, QSR trades at 17 times earnings, a material discount to our view of intrinsic value. We expect the stock price to increase as the company delivers strong earnings growth over time. Netflix (NFLX) Netflix’s share price declined 3% during the third quarter and 11% year-to-date from our average cost. The decline has been driven principally by investor concerns that engagement growth may be plateauing, particularly in the company’s US & Canada segment. We continue to believe that the market’s focus on engagement, as measured narrowly by watch time, overshadows the quality of that engagement, which is what ultimately drives the value proposition for Netflix subscribers. As the company expands into live programming and experiments with other new and innovative content formats, watch time alone will become a less relevant measure of the service’s value. More importantly, we believe these concerns overlook the company’s dominant competitive position and continued strong business performance. Revenue grew 12% this quarter, and we believe the company can sustain close to double-digit growth over the next few years. Advertising revenue continues to scale rapidly, and the lower-priced ad-supported tier is meaningfully expanding Netflix’s addressable market. AI should further enhance the business by improving content recommendation and ad targeting algorithms, driving efficiencies and enabling new forms of interactive and personalized content.

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22 Netflix’s model of growing content spend more slowly than revenue should continue to drive meaningful margin expansion. The company converts nearly all of its earnings into free cash flow, which is principally redeployed into share repurchases. Taken together, we estimate that earnings should compound at nearly 20% annually. We believe the current forward multiple of 19 times vastly undervalues the company’s growth profile and business quality. Visa and Mastercard (V and MA, and collectively the Card Networks) Visa and Mastercard shares increased by 5% and 8% during the third quarter and 12% and 13%, respectively, year-to-date from our average acquisition prices. Both companies reported strong third quarter results, with organic revenue growth of 12% at Visa and 14% at Mastercard, driven by high- single-digit growth in payment volumes and double-digit growth in cross-border volumes. Value-added services grew by approximately 27% at Visa and 19% at Mastercard, significantly ahead of the growth rate of the core payments business. EPS grew 17% at Visa and 21% at Mastercard. Both companies cited healthy October volumes, and Visa introduced its full-year guidance for next year, guiding to low-double- digit revenue growth and low-double-digit to low-teens EPS growth. The quarter also provided further evidence that stablecoins and agentic commerce are opportunities for the card networks rather than threats. Open USD, the stablecoin issued by the Open Standard consortium, went live with Visa and Mastercard among its founding partners. Visa launched a platform for banks and fintechs to issue and manage stablecoins, and Mastercard completed its acquisition of BVNK, a stablecoin infrastructure provider. In agentic commerce, both companies expanded tools to allow AI agents to transact securely on their networks, including partnerships with large technology companies. Subsequent to quarter-end, Visa received approval from the People’s Bank of China to begin preparations for a domestic operation, a milestone in its years-long effort to enter China’s domestic payments market, following Mastercard’s entry several years ago. Visa and Mastercard trade at 24 times forward earnings, an attractive valuation for businesses of their quality. In light of their multi-year runway of double-digit revenue growth, low-to-mid-teens operating income growth, and mid-to-high- teens EPS growth, we expect both companies to generate attractive returns for years to come. Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) ICE’s share price rose 2% from our average cost in the third quarter as record volumes on ICE’s futures and options exchanges and accelerating growth in its data businesses have been somewhat offset by concerns around the sustainability of recent Exchanges volumes, the perceived threat of perpetual futures, and the impact of higher rates on Mortgage Technology. We remain confident in the long-term growth prospects of ICE’s futures and options business, which is driven by increased participation in the global hedging marketplace, the rewiring of global energy supply chains spurred by geopolitical conflict, and continued European interest rate volatility. We continue to believe that perpetual futures are ill-suited to institutional hedgers and are primarily a vehicle for leveraged retail speculation. During the quarter, ICE announced the acquisition of MarketAxess, a leading electronic credit trading platform, for $5.7 billion in cash. We view this acquisition as highly opportunistic, with the per-share

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23 acquisition price representing a 72% discount to MarketAxess’s all-time high share price, reflecting the company’s tepid mid-single-digit revenue growth and declining margins in recent years. We expect the acquisition to be highly synergistic with ICE’s existing fixed income offerings and view ICE management as uniquely capable of reinvigorating MarketAxess’s long-term growth and profitability. Following the quarter, ICE announced a partnership with Trade[XYZ] to bring perpetual markets onshore. We believe the partnership is complementary to ICE’s existing institutionally driven business and will allow ICE to help foster the development of a more transparent, well-regulated, and efficient market for perpetual futures. ICE trades at 17 times earnings, a highly discounted valuation for a high-quality franchise that we believe should compound earnings at a mid-teens rate over the long term. S&P Global (SPGI) SPGI’s share price increased 3% during the third quarter and is down 1% year-to-date from our average cost as strong performance in S&P Global’s high-quality benchmark businesses has been overshadowed by concerns around the impact of AI on Market Intelligence and higher interest rates on Ratings growth. We continue to believe that AI risk is confined to a small percentage of the company’s overall earnings and may be offset by growing demand for high-quality curated and proprietary data, as evidenced by preliminary data points from the company’s AI initiatives. Following the quarter, the company announced a strategic review, including the potential separation of its CapIQ and related data businesses. We are supportive of a separation as it will allow for greater focus on and investment in S&P’s high-quality data assets while alleviating concerns of AI disruption risk for the remaining company. Despite higher interest rates, we expect Ratings to deliver healthy growth and solid margin expansion through the cycle, supported by AI-related capex, robust M&A pipelines, and substantial maturity walls, particularly in high-yield debt. We expect SPGI to compound earnings at a mid-teens rate over the long term, driven by high-single-digit revenue growth, operating leverage due to its largely fixed cost structure, and its robust capital return program, which should reduce shares outstanding by 4% per annum. SPGI trades at 20 times earnings, a low multiple for a company which owns a portfolio of the world’s best benchmark businesses. Alcon Inc. (ALC) Alcon’s share price declined 5% from our average cost in the third quarter despite reporting strong second-quarter results, with robust margin expansion in the quarter against modest expectations driving earnings upside. The company raised full-year guidance, now targeting 12% to 15% constant-currency earnings-per-share growth, with foreign exchange a further tailwind to earnings. Alcon is currently trading at 17 times earnings, its lowest-ever multiple and a significant discount to its average high-20s multiple of earnings since becoming a public company. The company’s valuation is being pressured by sector-specific factors, with European MedTech valuations nearing decade lows (Alcon is a US company with its operational headquarters in Texas but it is dual listed in Switzerland given its Novartis legacy).

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24 We anticipate Alcon can generate meaningful compounded returns from current levels as it grows earnings at a mid-teens rate and its valuation multiple expands to a level more reflective of its underlying business quality and longer-term growth prospects. An Update on Pershing Square Ventures We continue to make substantial progress toward the launch of Pershing Square Ventures, Ltd. (PSV), our new permanent capital vehicle which will invest in early-stage and growth-stage private companies. PSV will provide investors with differentiated access to high-growth, private, pre-IPO companies. Since announcing our plan to pursue this strategy last quarter, we have received substantial inbound interest from founders who view Pershing Square as a strategic investor who offers differentiated perspectives, relationships, and value-added advice. We expect PSV will benefit from the relationships and corresponding deal flow generated via Pershing Square’s brand and investor profile. We offer founders substantial public markets expertise, an ability to facilitate introductions throughout our deep relationship network, and the permanent nature of our capital, which allows us to remain a shareholder long after a company goes public. To date, we have reviewed more than 100 opportunities and met with more than 40 founders. We have invested in seven companies, deploying $110 million of cash from Pershing Square’s balance sheet, principally financed through our credit facility. These investments, together with select private investments contributed from Bill’s family office, will form PSV’s initial seed portfolio and represent our anchor investment in PSV. We look forward to sharing further details in the near term on PSV. ----------------------------------- In summary, 2026 has been a volatile year in the capital markets which has created the opportunity for us to optimize our portfolios of some of the greatest businesses in the world that trade at prices that offer high rates of return over the intermediate to long term. Pershing Square is well positioned to manage through such a volatile environment with our permanent capital structure, our zero-to-minimal- leverage investment strategy, and a team highly focused on driving shareholder value. Sincerely, William A. Ackman Ryan Israel Chief Executive Officer Chief Investment Officer

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25 Appendix Forward-Looking Statements This letter contains forward -looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements other than statements of historical fact, including, without limitation, statements regarding our investment strategi es; our expectations regarding our future earnings or earnings of our funds or any investment position in our funds, or future financial performance or results or market capitalization of HHH (including as a result of the Vantage acquisition and the transformation of HHH); our expectations regarding the timing and outcome of any exit of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from conservatorship and any relisting of their shares; our expectations regarding the returns on, and future earnings growth from, capital expenditures by the hyperscalers in our investment portfolios; our estimates of EPS growth or P/E multiples of companies in our investment portfolios; our outlook on the long-term performances of companies in our investment portfolios; our expectations regarding our financing arrangements and the contributions of financed investment in our business to our future earnings growth; and our plans and expectations relating to Pershing Square Ventures made in this letter are forward-looking statements. In some cases, you can identify these forward-looking statements by the use of words such as “outlook,” “believes,” “expects,” “potential,” “continues,” “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” “seeks,” “approximately,” “predicts,” “intends,” “trends,” “plans,” “estimates,” “anticipates” or the negative version of these words or other comparable words. Forward -looking statements reflect management's current expectations and are inherently uncertain. We caution investors that such statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, many of which are difficult to predict and generally beyond our control, that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed in, or implied or projected by, the forward -looking statements. Some of the factors that could cause actual results to differ include, but are not limited to, the following: • difficult global market, economic or geopolitical conditions affecting our investment performance and business; • operating performance challenges for certain investments held by our funds or HHH arising from a period of economic slowdown, which may occur across one or more industries, sectors or geographies; • loss of services of our Founder, Chief Investment Officer and other key personnel; • our substantial dependence upon our investment management agreements (each, an “IMA”) with PSH and PSUS and the Services Agreement, dated May 5, 2025, with HHH, each of which may be terminated under certain circumstances; • an investment in our common stock is not an investment in our funds or HHH, and their returns should not be considered as indicative of returns expected on our common stock; • intense competition in all aspects of our business, including attracting and retaining talented professionals; • financial harm due to employee misconduct and damage to our reputation;

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26 • extensive regulation of our business which affects our activities and creates the potential for significant liabilities and penalties and the possibility of increased regulatory focus resulting in additional burdens on our business; • changing regulations regarding derivatives and commodity interest transactions; • scrutiny from regulators, elected officials, investors and other stakeholders with respect to environmental, social and governance matters, which may constrain investment opportunities for our funds and harm our brand and reputation; • climate change, and climate change and sustainability-related legislation and regulation, business trends and physical impacts, which could adversely affect our business and the operations of our funds, and any actions we take or fail to take in response t o such matters, which could damage our reputation; • cybersecurity and data protection risks, including failure or alleged failure to comply with applicable data and privacy laws and regulations, which could subject us to regulatory actions, increased costs and financial losses; • use of artificial intelligence technology by us or third parties which could lead to the exposure of our data or other adverse effects and more effective threat actors; • substantial risks of litigation and regulatory proceedings which may result in significant liabilities and damage to our professional reputation as well as negative publicity; • our ability to maintain sufficient insurance to cover us for potential litigation or other risks; • risk that if Pershing Square Inc. were deemed an "investment company" under the 1940 Act (as defined below), applicable restrictions could make it impractical for us to continue our business as contemplated and could have a material adverse effect on our business; • poor performance of our funds and other investment vehicles which would cause a decline in our revenues, results of operations and cash flows; • decreases in the market capitalization of HHH or our failure to realize the anticipated benefits of the transactions contemplated by the Share Purchase Agreement, dated May 5, 2025, by and between HHH and Pershing Square Holdco, L.P., and related agreements; • the risk that HHH may be unsuccessful in executing its strategy, including the transformation of HHH into a capital-light, fee -generating real estate asset management platform and the deployment of capital into Vantage’s insurance business, that such transformation may not occur on the anticipated timeline or at all, and that HHH and Vantage may not realize the expected benefits, returns or growth; • the risk that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may not exit conservatorship or relist their shares on the timeline we anticipate or at all, which depends on government and political actions beyond our control, and that the value of our investment in F2 may not increase as we expect; • the risk that capital expenditures by the hyperscalers and other portfolio companies may not generate the revenue growth, returns or free cash flow we expect on the anticipated timeline or at all, and that our estimates, which are based in part on manageme nt guidance and third-party consensus estimates, may prove inaccurate;

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27 • concentration of investments in our funds and our other vehicles, which can exacerbate volatility and investment risk; • risks associated with the launch of new funds, including Pershing Square Ventures, which may not be launched on the anticipated timeline or at all, and our use of borrowings to fund anchor investments in such funds, including the risk that returns on such investments may not exceed our cost of debt and that we may be unable to refinance our credit facilities on favorable terms; • risk that our investment strategies, including with respect to any future funds we may launch, may not be successful and our failure to identify suitable investment opportunities, including the risk that our due diligence may not reveal all relevant facts in connection with such investment; • our funds and investment vehicles’ investments in companies that we do not control, which expose us to the risk of decisions made by others with whom we may not agree; • our risk management activities may not be successful and, in some cases, may negatively impact our business; • our foreign investments may be subject to various risks; • our trading orders may not be executed in a timely fashion; • our reliance on third-party service providers for certain aspects of our business; • changes in relevant tax laws, regulations or treaties or an adverse interpretation of these items by tax authorities; • Pershing Square Management, LLC (“ManagementCo”) controls us and its interests may conflict with ours or yours in the future; • our share structure involving a special voting share held by ManagementCo; and • sufficiency of funds to pay dividends or other distributions on our common stock. These risks and uncertainties, as well as other risks and uncertainties that could cause our actual results or outcomes to differ significantly from management's expectations, are described in greater detail in the section entitled “Risk Factors” of our prospectus (the “IPO Prospectus”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on April 30, 2026 pursuant to Rule 424(b)(4) under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), relating to our Registration Statement on Form S-1 (File No. 333-294165), as updated by our periodic filings with the SEC. The forward-looking statements included in this letter speak only as of the date hereof or as of the date they are made, as applicable. We undertake no obligation to update any "forward-looking statement" made in this letter, whether as a result of new information, changed assumptions, the occurrence of unanticipated events, changes to future operating results or otherwise, except as required by law. Certain Definitions For defined terms used but not defined herein, please see the meanings assigned to such terms in Pershing Square's Third Quarter 2026 Earnings Presentation. Use of Non-GAAP Measures

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28 This shareholder letter includes references to certain financial measures that are not required by, or presented in accordance with, GAAP (“Non-GAAP financial measures”). Management uses these Non- GAAP financial measures to assess the performance of our business across reporting periods and believes this information is useful to investors for the same reasons. Fee-Related Earnings (“FRE”) FRE is a Non-GAAP financial measure used by us to evaluate our business by highlighting earnings from recurring management fees and Preferred Performance Fees. We believe FRE is useful to investors because it provides additional insights into the fee-driven operating profitability of our business that is not directly based on the net income of the funds we manage. FRE represents management fees and Preferred Performance Fees less the compensation directly related to the management fees and performance fees, which includes salaries, benefits, payroll taxes and discretionary cash bonuses and other operating expenses, and after deducting “Subordinated Performance Fees,” which consist of amounts in excess of Preferred Performance Fees which are payable to PS CompCo, LLC (“CompCo”) pursuant to the arrangements described in our quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2026. Distributable Earnings (“DE”) DE is a Non-GAAP financial measure used to assess performance and amounts available for distribution or dividends, including to our personnel and owners of Pershing Square Partner Group, LLC (“PSPG”) and holders of our common stock. DE represents FRE (i) plus interest income or less interest expense and (ii) less taxes and related payables, as applicable. These Non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered a substitute for, superior to or an alternative to net income attributable to Pershing Square, which is the most directly comparable GAAP measure. Further, these Non-GAAP financial measures have limitations as analytical tools, and when assessing our operating performance, you should not consider Non-GAAP financial measures in isolation or as a substitute for GAAP measures including revenues, net income (loss) and net income attributable to Pershing Square. We may calculate or present these Non-GAAP financial measures differently than other companies that report measures with the same or similar names, and as a result, the Non-GAAP financial measures we report may not be comparable. The table below shows a reconciliation of FRE and DE to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated in accordance with GAAP for the periods presented:

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29 FRE Revenue consists of Non-GAAP Management fees and Non-GAAP Performance fees. FRE Expenses consist of Non-GAAP Employee compensation and benefits, Non-GAAP General and administrative expenses and GAAP Depreciation and amortization expense. The table below shows a reconciliation of each of these Non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated in accordance with GAAP for the periods presented:

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30 (1) Pershing Square recognizes contra-revenue from the non-cash amortization of its two intangible assets: (i) the Deferred Asset - PS Inc. IPO Shares, which represents the relative fair value of the shares of the Company’s common stock delivered, for no additional consideration, to each initial investor in the PSUS IPO and each private placement investor in connection with the Combined Transaction and (ii) the Deferred HHH Service Agreement Premium, which is deemed for accounting purposes to represent the amount paid to obtain the HHH Services Agreement. These intangible assets are being amortized over periods of 10 and 20 years, respectively. (2) Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P . (“PSCM”) pays the Subordinated Performance Fee to CompCo, an entity that compensates our investment professionals and certain other employees. As such, the Subordinated Performance Fee is not available for distribution through dividends. (3) The operations of PSGP , the general partner of Pershing Square, L.P . (“PSLP”), are consolidated with our results under GAAP rules. PS Inc. has no equity interest in PSGP and, as a result, any performance allocation earned by PSGP and the unrealized gain/loss recognized on PSGP’s investment in PSLP are fully attributable to non-controlling interest. (4) Includes the unrealized gain/loss recognized on both the PSUS common and preferred shares. (5) Includes (i) non-cash amortization expense related to employee equity grants and (ii) one-time severance benefits paid to former employees. (6) Includes (i) non-recurring expenses primarily related to the Combined Transaction that do not represent the ongoing cost of running our business and (ii) non-cash amortization expense related to RSUs granted to non-employees. (7) We have historically rebated management and performance fees attributable to shares of PSH held by our employees and their affiliates. This rebate mechanism was terminated following the Combined IPO. In order to facilitate period-to-period comparability, we have presented FRE and DE for comparative periods on a basis that excludes the affiliates fee rebate expense. (8) In connection with the Combined IPO, shares of our common stock and certain redeemable interests of PSPG were granted to the partners in PSPG in exchange for their existing profit-sharing interests. As a result, all cash-based profit-sharing distributions, which had previously been treated as a compensation expense prior to the completion of the Combined IPO, will be in the form of dividends and therefore treated as equity distributions. In order to facilitate period-to-period comparability, we have presented DE for historical periods on a basis that excludes such profit-sharing partner compensation. (9) In Q2 2026, this balance was primarily comprised of a non-cash gain recognized on the deconsolidation of PSUS following the Combined Transaction. Important Legal Information Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. All investments involve risk including the loss of principal. It should not be assumed that any of the investments discussed herein were or will prove to be proﬁtable, or that the investment decisions we make in the future will be proﬁtable or will equal the investment performance of the investments discussed herein. This letter does not constitute a recommendation, an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or investment product. Pershing Square or its funds may currently or in the future buy, sell, cover or otherwise change the form of its investment in the companies discussed in this letter for any reason. Pershing Square hereby disclaims any duty to provide any updates or changes to the information contained here including, without limitation, the manner or type of any Pershing Square investment. The statements in this letter do not constitute a guarantee or promise with respect to any outcome and there can be no assurance that these expectations will be achieved. They should not be taken to reflect the views or opinions of the management or the board of directors of any portfolio company or that of any individual director. The analyses and conclusions of Pershing Square contained in this letter reﬂect Pershing Square’s views and opinions as of the date of this letter, unless expressly indicated otherwise, and are based on Pershing Square’s internal analyses, estimates and assumptions based on, or derived from, publicly available information. Unless expressly attributed to a portfolio company or another third-party source, estimates and projections regarding a portfolio company’s future operating performance are Pershing Square’s own estimates and should not be understood as guidance issued or endorsed by that portfolio company or analyst consensus estimates. Pershing Square recognizes that there may be conﬁdential or otherwise non-public information in the possession of the companies discussed in the letter and others that could lead these companies to disagree with Pershing Square’s conclusions. The analyses provided

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31 include certain statements, assumptions, estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, the historical and anticipated operating performance of the companies. Such statements, assumptions, estimates, and projections reﬂect various assumptions by Pershing Square concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to signiﬁcant economic, competitive, legal, regulatory, and other uncertainties and contingencies. Pershing Square’s estimates and projections may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the portfolio company’s own estimates or other third party estimates. No representations, express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of such statements, assumptions, estimates or projections or with respect to any other materials herein. Furthermore, the information presented in the table under the section “Performance of Our Portfolio Companies” concerning our estimates of longer-term earnings per share growth has been included solely for illustrative purposes and is not, and should not be considered to be, a forecast, prediction or expectation of future outcomes with respect to the applicable portfolio companies. We understand that actual results of a given portfolio company, which are each subject to a number of risks and uncertainties and many of which are diﬃcult to predict and generally beyond our control, may likely diﬀer materially from the estimates presented in the table.

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