Good morning, everyone. I'm George Jenerikis, one of Canaccord Genuity's sustainability analysts, and I have to tell you we're incredibly blessed and grateful to have the SunPower management team with us today, particularly CEO T.J. Rodgers, I don't think needs an introduction from most. With that, sir, please go ahead. Thank you. I have 24 minutes and 24 s who econds and 53 slides. I am going to talk fast, and I am going to try to, the purpose of this, I was told, is to tell you who we are and what we do. I am going to try to do that and tell you what our strategy is. This airplane is called the Helios. Those are SunPower cells on it. It set a record of 92,800 feet in 2001, which is unbroken for any airplane taking off under its own power and landing under its own power. That includes the F-15 Eagle and the SR-71 Blackbird, neither one of which can get anywhere near that altitude. It is as big as a 747. It carries 700 pounds. The solar cells are bifacial. You get light from both sides because they have clear plastic on the bottom. It has 14 two-horsepower motors, six-foot diameter paddles, because when you get up there, and I will show you in a minute, there is nothing left. You need windmills really to carry the air. It will do 170 mi an hour. This is a real airplane. This one was early, and it was under remote control. You will see, they now have people. This is a picture from a wing camera. It shows you that indeed the Earth is round. It shows you the Sun well above the atmosphere. You are above 99% of the atmosphere here. To me, this signifies the power of solar. This is a solar wing. The solar cells are so thin that they can bend over the wing. This is what the future is about, not the goddamn ITC credit. This is what the future is about. I decided to use our logo to illustrate that point. When we got rid of the government, we got rid of the ITC. This is a quarterly report. That is our logo. Quarterly report. My quote was from Martin Luther King, "Free at last, thank God almighty we're free at last." The government has been screwing up solar since it was started. Now they are going away. When I tried to say why subsidies are bad for an industry, I talked, I was the CEO of Cypress Semiconductor for 30 years. I talked about Semitech and the horrible subsidies to the solar and to the semiconductor industry. I wrote so much, I could not write my report. I turned it into a Wall Street Journal editorial and published that. That is just last month. A couple of years ago, I published how the tariffs really were hurting the industry. Here's where the Chinese panels come in, and we have 500,000 people designing systems and installing them, and they made them more expensive by protecting Americans from jobs they don't have and never had. When I think solar, oh, by the way, up there, there's only 0.2 pounds per square inch of atmosphere. Therefore, your blood would boil at body temperature. Therefore, you got to wear a spacesuit. This is what I see when I see solar, not a tariff or an ITC or which side of the bed the president got up that morning. When I saw that, this is an old slide. I presented it back in 2024. Complete Solaria assets were available to be purchased, and I wanted to buy them. By the way, I was seven years retired. I retired at 69. I was 76. I saw SunPower coming back on the market. I saw a chance. I was on the board of a small solar company. We were having a war with private equity at that time. I saw a chance to 10x our revenue by acquiring the assets of SunPower. We raised $80 million. I've raised about $1 billion in my lifetime. I'll show you that in a minute. I was coming off the bench, and I had to re-explain who I was. I showed the most important slide I have, which is that I played football in Oshkosh High School, and we were state champions. That caused the coach of Dartmouth College to come to the cafeteria in Oshkosh High School. I went to Dartmouth and did well in physics and chemistry, and I became a trustee for eight years at Dartmouth. I went to Stanford, got a PhD in electronics. It was called Moore's Law. I worked for Jerry Sanders at Advanced Micro Devices, where I learned how to run a product line. I started Cypress Semiconductor, which I ran until I retired in 2016. If I could highlight just one thing, we did our IPO in May of 1986, 37 months after I got first money. Built a fab, turned it on, made revenue, made profit. Even in the semiconductor industry, we were fast. I'm an investor's person, always have been, because I've always been a big investor in whatever I run. I've raised $4.38 billion in my lifetime, mostly convertible debentures, by far my favorite form of funding. My company paid out $4.91 billion in earnings lifetime, including a spin-out of SunPower for $2.6 billion. After After I left, two years after I left, we were acquired for $9.4 billion. We were cash flow positive. The point is to investors, invest in me because I'm an investor's guy. What do you do now? I'm a venture capitalist. We actually took, as a company, SunPower public for $6 billion. I'll show you that story. We turned around Enphase, $4.3 billion. Current market cap was as high as $30 billion and way undervalued right now. I'm working now on a battery company called Enovix. I'm on the board. And that's got a, its market cap is up to $2.1 billion, and I'm expecting that to double or triple in the future. Why I'm here is the current market cap of the new SunPower is $0.1 billion. What I'm offering, if you believe, is a chance to move the decimal point one place to the right. This is an article ran in 2012. SunPower had a great idea and strategy, but cash was running short until it received a $750,000 person who saw the light. That's the light seer there. That's Dick Swanson, the CEO of SunPower. I met him at Stanford. We're in the same PhD program. He's one of the five smartest guys I've ever met. His company had technical superiority. This is a half panel, a small panel in those days. There's a SunPower version, 95 watts out of a smaller footprint. They made all black high-energy panels. That green company I showed you before did the same thing because we saw SunPower getting sloppy and figured we could take some market share. In the case of SunPower, we built them a plant in the Philippines. This machine's 100 feet long, goes through a clean room all there. It made solar cells automated. I am one of the patent holders for this machine. It made one solar cell every two and a half seconds. SunPower was an unbeatable company from that time, which is early 1990s, all the way up till they went bankrupt. I'll tell you why they went bankrupt in a minute. This is a slide from Cypress, which I ran and owned SunPower. When we acquired them, they were small. We built them the machine. That machine turned on a lot of revenue. We took them public, and I taught Tom Werner, the new CEO. Dick Swanson became CTO. I convinced him he didn't like being a CEO, and he agreed with me, and I brought in a real CEO, another guy that worked for me at Cypress. We grew the company 18x. When I think of SunPower, this is what I think of revenue should be. In 2008, my shareholders said, you know, you got this little bullshit semiconductor company. We really want the solar company. We want you to spin it out to us. I argued with them for a quarter, and then I spun it out, and the value of 40% of the company was $2.6 billion. We owned 40%, but we had 95% of the vote. This looks like 2010 total. What it is, is 2010 total, and I would call it a total disaster. They took a $1.5 billion, highly profitable company, and they had a greenwashing program going for French oil. They ran it to be a $1.4 billion company that was $500 million in debt and defaulted on its debt and went bankrupt. I bought their assets for $46 million. Swanson's older. He's still smart. I brought him back. He's a technology consultant to us. What does SunPower mean? The other thing, we had to go to court to get the SunPower brand. It means higher prices. What you got here is what panel does a group of companies use? What inverter do they use? What's the price? The answer zero is the lowest price in the market. You see who prices more. You see here different kinds of panels bouncing around. You see batteries, or this is inverters, Tesla, which is part of their battery, et cetera. You see SunPower with a 20-point bulge over the 30-point bulge number two has. That's because SunPower is SunPower. They were the name for a long time because they're the biggest and best in technology. I'd like to point out they were doing it with substandard panels and their own inverter, which turned out to be a technology disaster for them. It doesn't work. We have signed a deal with REC to work with them on all black high-quality panels. We've replaced the homebrew inverter with Enphas e. I'm on the board of c With this combination, we will go back to having the best panels in the world. I'll show you the picture of the best inverter in the world that comes from Enphase. There's that picture. I'm a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, and this picture right here is important. I read it like a book. Now I'll explain it to you, what it reads like in brief terms. DC from the panel, 10 amperes at 40 volts. That's a 400-w, 4x 10 panel. Comes in, goes to these transistors here. It's a four-way bridge, four transistors, and it chops it from being DC to being AC, square wave. Energy stored on these capacitors goes into a high-tech, very low-loss transformer. Ten amps at 40 volts comes out in those two wires as one amp at 400 volts and goes to these four transistors right here. They go through capacitors and inductors, and this is the grid. This thing is attached directly to the telephone pole outside your house, directly with copper. Take a panel, it's called an inverter, microinverter, one per device, and this does that job. It sells for $100. You can buy a Chinese inverter that works for $50. They have no market share. SolarEdge used to compete against us. We had 15%. They had 85% market share. It's now inverted. I'll explain why. This is not a printed circuit board. This is a system, a system in a box, and it's really a sophisticated one. My best power consultant came in. I was ready to leave. I didn't like, I was interviewing Enphase to see if I wanted to work with them. Didn't like their glass building, their expense. Ross came in and said, "Don't you want to hear what I have to say?" Yeah. "Their microinverter is designed the way I've always wanted to do it, but no company would let me anywhere for me." That was okay. He's being honest. Why does that? Right here, this chip is 4.1 million gates. It has two computers on it, an ARM M0 to control it and an M4 to do calculations. It predicts the future of the next wave. It doesn't react to a mistake. The whole thing is in an 80-pin package that costs $1.25. The way this thing works is you turn on and off these four transistors to put stuff in the output. You turn on and off these four transistors to take power from the input. That's it. If you're an electrical engineer, you know something. If you watch, one more thing. It's not another box that enables the digital grid. This is total digital control. There's no analog in it. There's no printed circuit board from China, nothing like that. This is a computer. If you watch down here, I just switched. Now I've got AC in, not out, and DC out. This means you put the grid in here, power comes in here, and DC out comes there. What does that mean? That means this is a battery charger. That means this thing runs forward and backwards. We change the program, and it can switch from running forward to backwards. You can hook a solar panel and a battery there, and you can charge a battery, or you can take power from the solar panel and you can switch it. What that means is everything in an Enphase system is attached to the same computer that speaks the same language. You can tell that computer, "I would like to have my solar system during noontime charge my car only with solar electrons, please." You tell them on your cell phone, and it'll do it for you. It'll do it with AI control. That's why the Chinese can't sell cheap printed circuit boards and call them inverters and get away with it. What are we trying to do? We're trying to hump our ass because we have nine minutes left. We're going to try to grow $280 million of revenue, our current size, to $945 million in three years. That's less than where SunPower has been. Therefore, I consider this to be an achievable goal. We'll use organic and inorganic growth, and we're going to remain consistently profitable. I'll talk about profit. That's a problem, of course, in solar. That's dumbish. Let me give you some data. Revenue is $70 million. This is estimates for the quarter I'm in. $70 million, $3 million in profit. I'll talk more about price-to-sales ratio. There's revenue, market cap on revenue. Stock price is currently, as of last Friday, $1.40. If I follow the mission, and by the way, this is not in the mission statement. This is to explain where it came from. We'll grow our quarters to $236 million. We will not be a billion-dollar company again. We'll grow our revenue, our market cap on revenue to 2 from 0.41. If we do that, and if 80 million shares go to $1.40 due to acquisition, then we're looking at $13.45. There's the decimal point that I talked about that we've got in there for numbers that are achievable. Vision comes from Collins & Poore. It's built to last. It's a statement of what things will be like when you've made your mission statement. SunPower is again recognized as number one in solar. SunPower has regained its traditional technology superiority by creating software-controlled intelligence solar system problems that dominate in an industry that is degraded to commodity sales and government handouts. We're planning on being a real company. We have our core values, and that's 77-year-old T.J., and our average age is 29. We're working on the core values. They're sticking. They like the discipline. They like doing things right. This, of course, is Lee Ermey, who was a Marine Corps consultant in Full Metal Jacket, the movie. When Stanley Kubrick saw him, he fired the actor and hired Lee, and that began his acting career. Customer quality and customer success. What was I going to tell you there? Because I have pre-arranged my bailout points. I got a good quality guy, Intel. We have a quality Hall of Fame. We're teaching about quality. I'll show you that one. This is a slide we showed in the last company meeting. Oh, you thought I needed help? No. I'll go like this when I need help. I showed this at the company. Actually, our quality guy showed it at the company meeting. He got the surgeon. You can see here, Control A. He's in the meet. The surgeon says, "Don't worry, Mr. Jones. I have 85% first-pass yield." That's the point. 85% yield and 85% quality is good enough. 100% quality, zero defects is what's required. That's what we train our people with. They like it. They like a high standard of quality. In Japan, they pull the andon cord and shut down a line that makes $100 million a day in cars, and the lowest worker can shut off the line. In our case, we took Lightreach, our company that funds us. We had that 85% first-pass yield. The first thing we did was pull the andon cord, shut it down. We went in and contained the problem. That's a quality term. We went and did risk-cause corrective action, another quality term. Now we have 100% first-pass yield. Second quarter. This is the last reported quarter. This is the quarter when the ITC news hit. $82 million dropped to $67 million. I likened it to the Ice Bowl at Lambeau. We lost $3.7 million in gross profit. Our gross margins are fine, but our gross profit is down due to revenue fall through. We cut $3.2 million in cost, and that let us make about the same amount of profit. Everybody had a tough quarter in solar. Our BRAG, this is the second quarter report, Complete Solaria Q2 2025, $67 million in revenue, $2.4 million in operating profit. I don't talk about EBITDA. I don't believe EBITDA is a good measure of companies. I showed an Ice Bowl picture. I won't show it to you. I was alive then. That was Lambeau. It was - 18. This is what it looks like when they breathe, and it freezes immediately after it freezes. It's not fog. It's frost. It comes out of your mouth, and you have a haze over the field all day long. This is me in Oshkosh in 2000. It is true, your eyes can freeze shut on a really bad day like that. Here's our profit result. This is the merger, Q1, Q2, and Q3. The sum of losses of the companies that we merged, there were three of them, was -$40 million the quarter before. We cut to - $5.9 million. Then we made our first profit. This is 180 days after we got together. We made a second profit and third profit. This quarter, we're planning to be better than our prior profits, and we're planning on the profit going up from here. How do we cut costs and get away with it? Normally, in any company, you get pushback. I did it with the ARC theory. I said, "We're on an ARC. We can only keep so many people. We're going to get the best people, and we're going to move forward." Our ARC can afford to have 1,225 people on it. That was the pitch, and they bought into it. This is a graph of headcount over the first, second, and third quarters, and this is now. It shows that the reason they lost so much money, they had three times more people than they needed by the time we got going. The 1,225 was we were almost there. We made that. We came in and said, "The new number is 980." They said, "Okay." They beat it. Actually, beat it by a lot. We came in and said, "The new number is 820." That's real close to where we got to be to be really very profitable every quarter. That's how we cut it. We do a system called the REC auction. This is an old memo. This actually did the President of Enovix, the President of Enphase. It's a method for controlling headcount. I won't go over it, but I talk about Elon cutting two-thirds of the employees at Twitter and IBM having $214,000- $214,000 per employee, the minimum number you can have and make money. With these targets and a process, we have a weekly meeting. In this particular, this is August 5, so it's not that long ago. We started with 849. We lost seven. They chose not to hire back seven people. None of them were essential. They chose instead to hire the five most important people they had identified. That's what happens. You lose some people. Typically, half of them, you don't care. You should have already done that, but companies don't work that way. You argue about the most important people to backfill with. Savings to quarter. Savings to quarter to date is $1.6 million. This is a graph we use to control it. The company has $334,000 per employee compared to IBM, $214,000. This is a five-week running. We look at this actually twice a week. There's our target, and so everybody knows there's a next target. There is our solar business putting on other people's houses. There is our solar business doing new homes. You notice the legal guys, I'm sorry, the administrative guys are already on target. This comes from our consultants that tell you how many administrative people, IT people, lawyers you can afford to have per billion-dollar business and as a% of revenue. We got the overhead out right away. We're running two divisions that have a little bit of leaning to do yet. There's my VP of HR. The average age in the company is 29. He brings that average down. He's a real smart guy, and he's now a VP in Salt Lake. He's doing fine. Growing revenue. I have Dan McCraney here. Dan going from new, young to old. Dan's on the old side. He's been a director of important companies, and he is going to, so now I need the two-minute warning. Who's got a two-minute warning for me? Nobody. They cut, oh, I have four. They cut me off at 25. I get my free four in return for questions that I would rather not answer anyway. Dan's a big guy. He comes in. We have a 1,000-person sales organization, 1099, that we don't count as headcount. They're all independent, and managing it is really different. Called him loosely managed. He talked about lack of responsibility. He talked about slow to react to changes, not given complete performance targets. You really have to look at the entire funnel and not effectively engaged in other corporate departments. He started working on it. Here's our organization. This is existing homes, new homes. For the first half, they're about equally divided. If you look at where we have to acquire, we'll acquire a dealer, somebody who is hopefully double the size of our company in one acquisition. We're going to acquire a new homes company to help build new homes. This is our jobs in progress. You see, this is forecast, but we're building it. This is existing homes, and that we acquired, and it's fine. This is new homes. They got wiped out by the SunPower bankruptcy. We built it back last quarter, and this quarter, we're rebuilding the whole thing. We do have $443 million in the funnel. Stock price. This is one year. This is our whole life. That's three bucks. After we went public as a combined company and made our, we hadn't even made profit yet. We go to three bucks. The standard story for us is it decays. We have mostly retail investors. That little glitch right there is the loss of the ITC. If you look at our price-to-sales ratio, we're at 0.5, plank's constant. This in gray is SunRun. The solar industry has been beat down on price-to-sales or market cap on revenue. We should be double that. This is a selection of high-tech companies. We didn't pick high-value companies. This is a typical high-tech company value. This is our near-term target. This is our long-term target. We got hit by our risk factors that were too aggressive. Our lawyers wrote, "We may not achieve profitability in page 200 of a 10-Q." In page two of the 10-Q, it said, "First profitable quarter in years." We had risk factors coming out of boilerplate, and that was unfortunate. The other problem we have is the ITC announcement. The risk factors hit us once, and the ITC hit us again. We're swimming upstream. Our performance is a lot better than that. Here I'm complaining about the fact that we're SunPower but another green energy bust, Complete Solaria, Wall Street Journal, Complete Solaria files for bankruptcy, Complete Solaria stock falls. These articles are all half a year old. I say to the people in the stock services, and we're hassling them right now, "Gentlemen, why do you have your boss keep digging up dinosaur bones and beating us over the head with them?" I show the scene from 2001: A Space Odyssey. We're okay on cash. I don't have to talk about it. This is our plan. These are our axles, our dots, and we just turned on. We started collecting the builders as a group. We're holding back. This is more from the builders. Right now, our cash is fine. I wouldn't want to raise a lot of cash right now. I wouldn't want to raise a lot of cash right now. Any questions from the audience? That was a fantastic presentation, sir. Thank you so much for your time. Thank you for coming to our conference.