All right. Good afternoon, everyone. We are thrilled to have our next conversation with Dara from Uber. Before we get started, Dara, I have to read the important disclosures including all the personal holdings disclosures and Morgan Stanley disclosures. It's all up here on the Morgan Stanley public website at www.morganstanley.com/resource-disclosures. They're also available at the registration desk. Some of the statements made today by Uber may be considered forward-looking. These statements involve a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. Any forward-looking statements made today by the company are based on assumptions as of today and Uber undertakes no obligation to update them. Please refer to Uber's Form 10-K for a discussion of the risk factors that may impact actual results. Welcome back. Good to be here. It's great to see you as always. So maybe let's talk about prioritization and how it's changed. You know, I think it's a fascinating case study and journey of what's happened at Uber. So maybe talk to us about your priorities the first four to five years with the company and now that we've sort of gone through two analyst days and sort of really set up what seems to be a great growth and cash flow profile. How are you spending your time in prioritization now versus three years ago? Yeah, absolutely. So you know if you look at the life stage journeys of Uber, obviously I came in at a very difficult time, as it related to Uber leadership. And my priorities in those early days were to make sure we set the Uber culture kind of in the right way where our success was shared and we had to grow in a way that was responsible for all stakeholders. So that was a big one. Second for us was the governance of the company. The board of directors. Bringing in a chairman who's an independent chairman, Ron Sugar. And then, third was to set the company up for an IPO. Right? It was we were a company we knew we needed the capital. We knew we wanted to be a public company. We were very far from having the capabilities set or the controls to being a public company. So we got a bunch of that stuff done. I'm glad it's behind us 'cause it's not my favorite activity in the world but it certainly was necessary. Post-IPO obviously COVID came which was an entirely unexpected circumstance. Really COVID forced us to reexamine the portfolio of the company and really reshape the portfolio to the core of our building innovating on this managed global marketplace in terms of managed supply and managed demand and really focusing on mobility and delivery and then adjacencies therein. Getting out of some of the other businesses that you know are autonomous business bikes and scooters et cetera that were more call it balance sheet heavy. So it was reformulating the business. Yep. And then really thinking about the driver as first priority for the company. And then focusing on the core economics of the business. You know, coming out of COVID, we were very disciplined in terms of costs. And really driving the P&L, et cetera. So there was a lot of focus on looking at our portfolio of products. Looking at our geographic portfolio in terms of both mobility and delivery. Determining what are the products that are going to have significant margins going forward. What are the countries where we know we can win, where we can eventually get to be the number one player. And again getting out of products and/or countries that weren't gonna be long-term accretive. Now I think the focus is much more for me in terms of product innovation and growth. Mm-hmm. Right? We built out a portfolio of mobility bets that are now it's about $11 billion in size. It's reservations, Uber for Business, high-capacity vehicles, shared vehicles, taxi, et cetera. It's a big portfolio of products that really didn't exist four years ago within the Uber portfolio. Growing at 80% on a year-on-year basis. And then on the delivery side we've got grocery. We've got advertising. We've got direct. $7 billion run rate growing 40+%. So for me now the focus is much more on making sure that those growth bets. Mm-hmm. Get to scale. You know the grocery business TAM is bigger than the online food delivery TAM. Right. So these are huge huge markets out there. And spending much more time with our technical teams our product teams. We now have, you know, very strong economics in the business. I have a new CFO who's terrific. At one point hopefully he'll be at one of these events. So I think that the business you know the governance is in a good place. The culture's in a good place. The how we look at financials and kind of getting a fair return on equity on the products that we invest in. That's all become muscle. And now I can focus more on driving innovation driving top line and spending more time with our technical and product teams. Oh great. That's a good, It's a lot more fun. Yeah. It's a good table setting to sort of set us up for these discussions. So I think it's also interesting to think about over the course of the years you know we proved it's a quite cash flow generative business. Mm-hmm. We've shown a lot of growth. You talked about, you know, the new mobility versus the core. When you have your investor discussions now with investors that don't yet own the stock or, you know, don't own enough of the stock as they should. What do you think is sort of the most consistent misunderstood or consistent hesitation from those investors at this point? I think the most significant one is just the power of the platform for us. You know, we always say we wanna have best-in-breed verticals. And if the Uber mobility business was a standalone, right, it would be a dynamite. It is clearly the mobility leader in the world. Highest growth, highest margin, highest category position. And on delivery, you know, I think DoorDash did $17.6 billion in bookings. We did $17 billion in the last quarter. So one of the leaders by far, the most geographically diverse with a proven ability to grow anywhere and everywhere in the world. So standalones, these are relatively easy to understand. Mm-hmm. Because for investors there's another player that they can look at. And And they can compare our metrics to their metrics. And it's math and, you know, some opinion and then some predictions of what the future is. We are the only player that is a multi-product company. Yep. As a result, there's no model for platform. Everything that we're building is new. It's actually harder for us 'cause, you know, sometimes copying is easy. Right. Right? Right. But with platform everything that we're building essentially we have to—it's an idea that someone has. You test it out. You see if it has promise and then you start working on it. And the other difficult factor in terms of platform is anything that you're doing to optimize a platform can take away from the standalone. Right? It's—these are our phones are pretty small. There are only so many surfaces that we can surface to the user. And every pixel, for example, on the Uber mobility app that is promoting delivery is taking away from mobility. Right. It may take away advertising dollars. It may take away a safety message that we think is important. It may take away an upsell into reserve for example. So there's one no one's doing it. And two there's no such thing as a free lunch. So you have to go out and find what's the right time for me to upsell you reserve. What's the right time for me you know let's say you're going home to upsell you into why don't you order dinner on Uber Eats. Mm-hmm. Maybe on a weekend on a Saturday morning we'll promote grocery to you. All of these targeting mechanisms are models that kind of we're creating from scratch and are very sophisticated models that no one else really has built. The results that we see on the platform are, we think, pretty spectacular. Right? About 30% of delivery new customers come from mobility. Yep. At 50% of the cost. If we wanted to get to kind of the same cost as third parties, we could actually drive that up. But we're taking incremental growth and we're taking profits. 20% of mobility's first trips are coming from delivery. When you get customers to use more than one product within the platform, multi-product users are now about a third of our users. Mm-hmm. It's up from 20%, a couple of years ago. So we've been driving consistently those multi-platform that multi-platform percentage up. And they spent 3.4 times more. Then we upselled on our members. Members spend 3.4 times more. So just mathematically what the asset that we built in terms of the platform is it can attract more customers more cheaply than competitors. It has more shots on goals in order to drive someone to be multi-platform. Yep. And then you've got membership, which is a superior membership offering than anyone else because most of the membership, other players they offer delivery benefits. We offer delivery benefits and mobility benefits. It's kind of the Netflix model. The more content you have. Yep. The better your subscription. Our subscription has more content than anyone else's. So you've got a customer acquisition cost advantage, numerical advantage. And then you've got an LTV advantage as well. And so there's no model around that. We're the only company that does it. And you know, like, the little example that I'll give you is of a monoline player versus a multi-line player. About 14% of our first trip of our delivery users use grocery. Right? So we're trying to upsell them to grocery. When they use grocery, they tend to spend three times more than just the online food player. So that's, you know, that is a no regrets move. DoorDash, who's a great competitor in the U.S.—for DoorDash that number is 20%. Mm-hmm. Right? So they are ahead of us as it relates to that metric. But when you compare that to the 33% we have for multi-product we just have more shots on goal. Right. We have more opportunities to offer to you. Yep. That structurally allows us to succeed more of the time and get a higher percentage of your dollars coming out of your pockets. So those advantages accrue over a period of time. They compound on top of each other. And I think you're seeing that compounding now in terms of our growth rate, our margins, versus competitors as well. And then the last thing that I'll tell you is that this is, it's a technical platform. Mm-hmm. That is quite broad. It's very capable. You know we have single sign-on. We have a single fraud stack. We have a single payment stack. You know all of a single customer service stack et cetera. So not only are we the biggest in terms of multiple geographies but being able to build, you know, a single mapping platform that powers both mobility and delivery that allows us to either track I think stronger engineering talent. Yep. Or it allows us to build more sophisticated capability at either the same or lower cost than our competitors. And you know these capabilities for example in our payment stack we've built the capability to be able to move payments around quite flexibly from one provider to another provider. You know these are big platforms. It takes a huge amount of effort. That ability to move volumes around has saved us $hundreds of millions in terms of going to lower cost, payment methodologies or being able to negotiate with providers and say, you know, we're one of the fastest growing large transactional companies in the world. If you want my volume then you know I want them priced there. So these are that's a platform benefit that I think again it's a little bit invisible to the external customer. But I think the technical capabilities that we're able to build to scale are second to none. Got it. Okay. Well, maybe we, let's hone in a little bit on the core rides business. One of the investor discussions and debates that we still have is about the durability of multi-year rides growth. Specifically, whether or not you can drive broader adoption across more people. Mm-hmm. You know, I mean, I use Uber once a day. I'm sure there's a lot of power users in this demographic that use Uber a lot. But yet at the Analyst Day you talked about how 50% of the MAUs are using it once or twice a month. So walk us through sort of the strategic pipeline to drive more frequency and engagement with those users who are only using it once a month. And maybe they do have lower income demographics et cetera. Yeah. So I think, a couple of factors there. One is that, the way to increase frequency for every single user out there whether you use it once or twice a month or thank you for using us, every single day is to keep improving the core product. Right? Which is make sure that, ETAs come down. Make sure that surge is coming down. Make sure that cancellations are coming down driver-led cancellations. All of those metrics for us are generally moving in the right direction. So the you know you can never lose sight of just build a better product over a long period of time. And you kind of knock on that drum and good things come to you whether it's a single product user or a multi-product user. The second area that we look at is, driving more occasions. For example, what we're seeing with a Reserve product. Mm-hmm. Reserve is originally it was built really for the airport use case. 15% of our gross bookings come from travel use cases. And now about 20% of our airport pickups are from Reserve, which is it's going great. We're very happy with the product. Turns out now 40% of Reserve use cases have nothing to do with travel. Okay? They're people going out to dinner. I talked to a few people at this conference. They, you know, you may reserve an Uber to take you to places to make sure that reliability is up. And of that 40% Reserve use case a majority of that in the U.S. is actually in the suburbs. So that's an example where in the suburbs where we don't have the liquidity to be reliable either in terms of time or in price people are now kind of hacking the Reserve product which was supposed to be for travel to drive reliability and price certainty and create liquidity in a market. And you know if we create more liquidity in a suburb that can actually accrue to the whole business as well. So the new use cases in terms of Reserve lower price points in terms of high-capacity in terms of share for example. Users who use UberX Share have 2.5 times the frequency of users who use UberX. So it does become that everyday use case, you know many of these people need because it's cheaper. Mm-hmm. So, new occasions, price, and then last and certainly not least for us, membership. You know, trying to get these—if we push these people into me+ membership or upsell membership, the frequency both on mobility and delivery increases pretty fundamentally. Let's talk membership then. You know, 30% of total bookings come from Uber One members. We think that skews more so toward delivery. You've talked about 45% of delIvery gross bookings coming from members. I guess two questions on Uber One from here. One, sort of talk to us about the U.S.er growth drivers you're focused on to drive that penetration. Yeah. Absolute number up higher. And then, too, what do you have to do to sort of increase the utility that Uber One members get from rides? Yeah, absolutely. So, generally what we see as the driver in terms of number of members is just upselling to membership from our own services. Right? So if you're not a member and you order food we'll remind you that you could have saved $7 on this order. You know, pay $9.99 a month and one more order will kind of get you to be profitable. So we have significant every single time you buy something on Uber that's an opportunity for us to upsell you into membership in a very compelling way. That's one. Second for us is free trials. So free trials for us to some extent is advertising for membership. We can the percentage of our users that we offer free trials for, the targeting of those free trials, whether it's a one month, two month, three month free trial. All of that essentially can drive or accelerate new member count or not depending on what we want to do. Then the third for us is partnerships with third parties. So we have a terrific partnership, for example, with an Amex that provides very broad benefits to our product. But there are other players, a Disney et cetera, that we have essentially created additional membership benefits or Uber One benefits for. And that brings a very highly incremental kind of new member, so to speak. Because ultimately the value of membership is about the incrementality of the U.S.e. How much of that 3.4 times. Right. It is incremental. So, and we're able to tune those three. Mm-hmm. Surface upsells, free trials and then of course the relationships that we have with third parties in a pretty programmatic way for us. And then there's also geographic expansion. We're now in 19 countries. We'll continue; we don't quite have the full footprint. We're in over 70 countries as a company. So we'll continue to increase the footprint of membership as well. In terms of driving kind of membership utility, you're absolutely right, which is we wanna drive more utilization on our mobility side. You know we are about 45% of gross bookings delivery gross bookings come from members. That'll go over 50%. We're quite confident of the path there. Right. On the mobility side, there are a couple of programs that there are a bunch of programs, but a couple that I highlight is, you know, the base benefit is 6% cashback. Right? We're seeing cashback versus discounts tends to drive more incrementality on mobility. We started with a discount. We saw the incrementality wasn't that high. Cashback has a higher incrementality. Then we're driving programs like, for example, with Uber for Business. Mm-hmm. We will for Uber for Business. Anyone who uses a member who uses Uber for Business, you can actually apply that 6% cashback for your personal use. And about a quarter of that cashback is actually used for delivery. So not only does it drive more volume, but it actually drives more volume to the platform as a whole. This is an age-old product that the Marriott's of the world, the airlines of the world have used. There's no reason why it's not gonna work for Uber as well. We're using accelerators. So for example, instead of 6% cashback, you may get 10% cashback to try Reserve product. That drives higher Reserve usage. And it's another benefit that we're bringing into mobility for a high margin product. We'll use Quests. Do the trips this week and you'll get again an accelerator in membership as well. So all of those are about targeting specific products targeting specific use cases. And then on top of that we are going to look to build out more experiential membership benefits for mobility. You know, jump the line in an airport. Get upgraded to a Comfort for free. Get upgraded to a Green for free, et cetera. Those are features that are in path, so to speak. And hopefully they are gonna be launched sometime this year. I can't wait. I I can't wait for those to launch. Yeah. For a lot of reasons. You can jump the line. Exactly. My Comfort. Let's talk about the new mobility versus the quote-unquote core. Mm-hmm. You talked about it earlier a little bit. But new mobility, you know, growing 80%+. We think it's sort of a mid-teens-ish percent of overall mobility bookings but at a lower margin. So maybe talk to us just about sort of the philosophy of how you're managing the profitability of the total rides business as you have sort of these two pools. Yeah. With the core business versus new mobility and the growth versus profitability trade-off. Well, I think listen, that's what we're paid to do. Like any company is always managing growth versus profitability. For folks who don't have the background, our new mobility products now it's about an $11 billion portfolio growing at 80% on a year-on-year basis. So we're thrilled about the progress there. And within new mobility there are products with different margins. Right? Reserve actually has a higher margin than our, call it the core. Uber for Business has a higher margin because we have a much higher mix of premium products. Mm-hmm. About 40% premium products than the baseline business. That's offset by taxi or hailables two-wheelers or three-wheelers or UberX Share. So there's actually a portfolio within the portfolio. Right. But on average, you're absolutely right, which is the new mobility products have a lower margin than the baseline business. The two activity sets that we're focused on is we want the new mobility margins on a standalone basis to improve over a period of time. So there's you know you lean into a product. You find product market fit. You drive liquidity. And sometimes you have to invest to drive liquidity in a product. Once you get that liquidity and product market fit, you actually want the margins of that product to to increase. And we're quite confident, for example, that our taxi product is going to be a very profitable product at maturity. We've seen it with some of our competition. Mm-hmm. We see that you know we have a roadmap to increase margins as well. Then for us it's a capital allocation framework. Honestly it's a capital allocation framework between mobility and delivery. Mobility business is a bit more profitable than delivery. There's a capital allocation framework in terms of geographies. Mm-hmm. There are certain geographies where we may be pushing for greater category position or we want higher penetration of our target audience that may have lower margins. And then there's product. And you know we lean into our new mobility and our delivery kind of grocery product pretty aggressively. Mm-hmm. As long as margins in those products can continue to improve. Got it. You know, it's a bit of an art and a science in terms of how much you lean into new products. But we wanna lean into new products kind of as much as we can afford to, so to speak. That said, we know that investors expect of us. Right. You know a predictable framework that delivers you know mid-teens to high-teens growth on the top line and then you know growth in from the 30s to 40% on the bottom line. We've got enough tools so to speak to be able to push growth aggressively but then deliver the bottom line that we expect and investors expect of us. Great. At the recent analyst day there were a couple slides that sort of broke the business down by country or by region. Mm-hmm. There was one that sort of had it. It showed three of your top ten countries across both mobility and delivery are still not profitable. So maybe talk to us about what's holding back profitability in those large markets and how do you think about hurdles to make those profitable over your your guidance arrival. I've heard that was the investor's favorite slide. So It's up there. go figure. It's up there. So it's a combination of, I'd say, the maturity of a market, competitive position in a market, and then especially product mix. So there are a couple of markets on delivery where the grocery business is actually quite large compared to the online food delivery business. Right. We're still in investing mode on the grocery business. On average, margins are negative in grocery. So in the markets where grocery has very high penetration, the overall market can be negative. But again, as long as grocery margins move in the right direction, we think we'll move into positive for those markets as well. Then there are a couple of markets where, from a competitive standpoint, we're not the number one player yet, let's say, in delivery. Yep. You know, there are three players who are vying for the number one position. The fortunate position that we're in is because we're number one in a bunch of markets, we have some excess margins. Right. That we can reinvest in these markets to grow at outsized rates and hopefully get to the top category position. So that typically is either product mix or it's competitive position that we're aiming for that account for the margins. But we're quite, you know, this is—it's a pretty mature model at this point. Mm-hmm. Based on various take rates and based on product mix, we're quite confident that we can get every single country that we operate in into EBITDA solid EBITDA positive margins. Okay. One of the costs in the U.S. I know that I keep getting wrong. We, I think we've gotten it wrong. I I know at least twice. I guess four times if we count your competitor's insurance costs. Mm-hmm. I guess so, maybe a couple parts in this insurance cost. The first one is sort of as we think about 2024-2025 costs of insurance in the rides business. Philosophically, how are you thinking about passing through versus absorbing? And then maybe if we just kind of analyze the rest of the OpEx and other potential sources of leverage that could offset some of those potentially higher insurance costs. I know this is hard to predict. Yeah. That absolutely. So, for background for folks, insurance costs like the CPI print on car insurance costs was up 20% on a year-on-year basis. Our insurance costs have been up not quite as much. So we through a multiplicity of activities whether it's our maps avoiding unprotected left turns is just one example, we're able to optimize our insurance costs to rate increases that we think all else being equal are gonna be better than industry. Because there's a lot of tech that we can bring to our marketplace in a way that other players can't. You know, so we might incentivize actively safer drivers to get on the platform. So if we can incentivize, there are two drivers that are equal in every way. One drives a bit more slowly. As a safer driver, we will send incentives to that driver. Younger drivers tend to be less safe than older drivers, et cetera. Yep. So there's also mix that we're shifting actively within our marketplace in order to put a premium on safety. And it's a no-regrets move on the P&L but more importantly it's a very important move in terms of, our customers. We have been passing on to users to riders the increase in insurance costs that we've seen. So essentially it's a 100% pass-through. We don't like it but it's it's fair. We provide commercial insurance for our drivers so that they don't have to, pay for themselves. And we think the road forward for us is one where on a relative basis we're hoping that you know the insurance inflation comes down. The price of used cars is coming down. The price of of repairs generally is is coming down. So we're definitely moving in the right direction. We have been able to offset it through other costs. Right? Our margins. Mm-hmm. For mobility and delivery. Delivery insurance is not as much of an issue for delivery. Insurance outside the U.S. is really not an issue for mobility. Right. So we benefit from a geographic from the diversity that we have geographically. And then essentially every other cost line. Variable costs and fixed costs. You know if you look at payments if you look at customer service if you look at fraud background checks et cetera. We have teams that are looking to optimize those variable costs. They are responsible. They have targets. They've been able to drive to those targets for years now. Mm-hmm. And then, on the fixed cost side, you know, since Q4 of 2019, we've doubled the gross bookings of the company, and we've probably added about 10% to headcount. So we've shown that we have real discipline on the fixed cost side. So I think that we're hoping insurance becomes less of an issue. And we have programs against every other cost item. And hopefully by now we've proven to our investor base that we're a very disciplined company. And and I think you see it you see it in the culture of the business, which is, you know, innovations that save money are celebrated at a company now. Like it's it it is we have a very nice balance between driving innovation around newer product around driving growth and driving innovation around saving costs. Both of them are heroic endeavors, so to speak, for our engineers, which is great. Yep. It's great. Maybe let's talk about the U.S. delivery and specifically the U.S. underlying restaurant delivery business. A couple years ago you talked about really investing more in the suburbs. Mm-hmm. improved supply in those areas. The business has actually responded. You know, we think we get some, you know, periodic numbers from you guys on. So it looks like the U.S. business is doing quite well. Yes. As we now look into 2024, what are sort of the key drivers to continue the U.S. core restaurant business, you know, taking share or driving the market? However you think about driving that growth. Absolutely. Just stepping back for a second. Generally for us we are a supply-led company. Mm-hmm. Right? It's on the mobility side it's about adding more drivers to the platform. On the delivery side it's more adding more restaurants to the platform. And if you look for us on a global basis we have we think about 20% of the total addressable markets of restaurants in our platform. So there's a ton of growth in terms of adding restaurants. We're adding restaurants at about 10% per year. Our transaction growth is higher than that. So we wanna have higher penetration into our partners. So we become. Yep. A more important partner. In the U.S., our restaurant penetration, we think, is about 30%. So ton of headroom in terms of U.S. And if you add grocery to that, you know, the headroom is even greater. It is true that our restaurant penetration in urban destinations is on average better than a restaurant penetration in terms of suburbs. But I think we're making real headway in suburbs. Both in small kinda enterprises, the neighborhood favorites. But then also in enterprise. You know, Domino's, for example, is a very big partner. We've onboarded all of the Domino's stores. And we're working on driving now more penetration of those Domino's stores and more performance from those stores. So we think now in suburbs, the restaurant supply that we have. Mm-hmm. is at a good place for us to get the magic of, you know, more supply, more demand, and kinda this dynamic marketplace that we have. We still think our relative category position in urban destinations is much higher than it is in suburbs. We think suburbs are a huge opportunity for us. We feel like our restaurant supply is finally at the point where we can push in the suburbs but not buy our way into glory but kinda earn our way into glory. More to come. Mm-hmm. But we're reasonably confident of our position here. Is the cross-platform strategy so how you're thinking about now driving that now that you have the supply? Is it trying to get more of the riders and the eaters et cetera? So there's more of a cross-dispatch in suburbs between couriers and drivers. Because suburbs tends to be a car. Mm-hmm. So from a supply standpoint we can get couriers pretty easily in suburbs. Our mobility business isn't as strong in suburbs. Right. The platform benefit that we have in the center of cities is actually greater on the consumer side. In cities the platform benefit that we get on driver supply is greater in the suburbs but it's helping the mobility business more. In the suburbs the Eats business kind of is a little more on its own so to speak. Right. I think the supply position is there. The Uber brand is incredibly strong. Mm-hmm. The technical platform that we have built is just a bigger scale technical platform than anyone else. So I think their capabilities are best of breed there. So again it's a long game. Compounding is a. Mm-hmm. Powerful force. We think compounding's on our side so to speak. Okay. One of the businesses that I think we feel comfortable from a top line perspective of compound is grocery. Mm-hmm. But online grocery is a hard business. You know, this is a. Yeah. Low margin offline business that are adding more costs too. So as you sort of think about profitability and ROIC of the grocery investments are there any KPIs or metrics that you analyze that you say oh these are going in the right direction in online grocery to see a path to it being profitable? Yeah absolutely. That now I would tell you that the most important KPIs for us on grocery right now are still customer-led KPIs. Mm-hmm. What's, you know, what percentage of our audience are we upselling into grocery? What's a repeat rate of that customer? What's an average fill rate of a particular order? So in terms of importance, customer-facing KPIs are more important than P&L KPIs. Now all of it is important. In terms of P&L, it it really the biggest two items that we look at are basket size and then cost per order. Right? And obviously a delivery costs a certain amount. So the larger your basket size the greater opportunity you have for profits. And then the cost per transaction, you know, the more to the extent you can batch. Double batch, triple batch, quadruple batch, et cetera. That helps the CPT as well. On top of that we have the advertising revenue. Mm-hmm. advertising and the advertising revenue for us in grocery is relatively nascent. Yep. Which is, we have just built a sponsored items product very much along the same product that Instacart has built. Instacart has built a very strong advertising product. And you know we're building something quite similar. And we're quite confident that advertising in grocery is gonna be actually significantly higher as a percentage of GMVs than our food business. When we put it all together, you know, one big advantage we have on grocery is our cost of customer acquisition is next to nothing. Right. We can upsell this audience. So that puts us in a position where we're quite confident that over the next, you know, two-five years we can grow grocery top line, but every year we can improve on grocery margins at the same time and get to a profitable business. Most of the profits are gonna come from advertising. Mm-hmm. But the platform advantages that we have and the technical advantages that we have in terms of payment and fraud and CPT put us in a very strong position. Great. Talk GenAI. You know, a year ago it was a touch newer discussion to say the least. Yeah. Yeah. Now here we are. So maybe a two-parter on GenAI. Number one is you sort of now versus a year ago what are areas where you're already seeing GenAI impact your business internally or externally? And then as you sort of think about 2024-2025 what are the next low-hanging fruit areas for GenAI to help the business? Yeah, absolutely. If I were to make a very general characterization, these GenAI models are getting better. They're getting faster. They're getting cheaper. So we're not at maturity by a long shot. Right. That said, the latency of these GenAI products is higher than the latency we look for other services that we build. That kinda creates a circumstance where that latency is okay if you're replacing or augmenting human activity. Humans are slow. Yeah. Right? Systems are fast. Humans are slow. So the first kinds of products that we see getting to scale within our own portfolio are, you know, higher productivity, for example, of engineers. Right? Engineers using Copilot. We see incredible promise there. They're coding at higher quality faster. Perfect. On customer service for GenAI to give our agents summarize a situation, give our agents recommendations so our agents can get to the outcome faster. Mm-hmm. That is happening right now. Now once the GenAI starts making recommendations that are highly accurate, you can imagine actually replacing the agent with a GenAI agent. Right. So I think those are the kind of sets of activities you know my instead of a bunch of people making SQL queries to you know in the business now plain English queries et cetera. So I'd say we're more focused on the productivity side of the pie. There's some cool experimentation we're doing in terms of like Uber Eats and what's the best burrito in town or where can I go in San Francisco for authentic Chinese food et cetera. That holds promise but I think it'll be less material to the P&L. I think the productivity stuff is gonna be quite material to the P&L in the next kinda three to five year time range. Great. All right, Dara. We're against the clock. Awesome. Thank you so much as always. Thank you very much. Thank you.