Good morning everyone. Thank you for taking time to join us today. Welcome to the African Rainbow Minerals Investor Conference Call. The purpose of this call is to discuss the outcomes of the definitive feasibility studies for the Bokoni 180 kilotonnes per month development project and the recommencement of the Nkomati open-pit mine. Please note this call is being recorded. Before we begin, I would like to remind participants that ARM is currently in a closed period. Accordingly, questions and discussions should be limited to the Bokoni and Nkomati projects and the associated DFS outcomes. Today's presentation has been published on the ARM website and is available for reference. All participants will remain in listen-only mode during the presentations. Following the completion of both presentations, we will open the call for questions and answers. Participants will have the opportunity to ask questions verbally. Questions may also be submitted through the session via the Teams chat function. Let me take a moment to introduce ARM's management team joining us on the call today. We've got Phillip Tobias, our Chief Executive Officer. We've got Jacques van der Bijl, our Chief Operating Officer, and we also have Tsundzukani Mhlanga, Financial Director, and myself, Thabang, who is the Executive for Investor Relations and New Business Development. I will now hand over to Phillip to deliver the opening remarks. Good morning. Thank you for joining us. Bokoni and Nkomati are two of ARM's 100% owned flagship projects, which are world-class assets that unlock significant long-term value for ARM and its shareholders. Bokoni establishes a material, high-grade growth platform for ARM, positioning us as a globally competitive, low-cost PGM producer, whilst the recommencement of operations in Nkomati reestablishes South Africa's only primary nickel producer through a low capital intensity and a value-enhancing restart. What gives us confidence is not only the quality of these assets, but the strength, the depth, the expertise, and the experience of the management team responsible for delivering them. ARM currently manages most of its joint venture operations. That proven hands-on operating experience is exactly what underpins our confidence in delivering these projects. These are disciplined, well-defined plans built on proven infrastructure and rigorous, independently peer-reviewed studies. Also led by a team with an operational track record and execution capability and capacity to bring them to successful realization. Having carefully evaluated these investment opportunities, we are now taking a decisive action to position ARM for long-term resilience through the commodity cycle. At the same time, these investments will create lasting value for our host communities through job creation, economic opportunities, and sustainable development. On that note, I will now hand over to Jacques to take you through the presentation. Thank you very much, Phillip, and good morning, everybody, and thank you for joining us. Today, I will take you through the ARM approved development plan for Bokoni, and later the proposed restart for Nkomati. The purpose is to explain why management believes these projects are strategically important, technically executable, and financially attractive. I will focus on the investment rationale, the operating model, the key risks, and the value creation opportunity. I will structure the Bokoni discussion around six themes. First, why Bokoni is an attractive investment proposition for ARM and its shareholders. Second, why the approved development plan is different from the earlier operating approach. Third, how the technical design and execution pathway have been structured. I will then cover financial returns, delivery risk, and controls before closing with why management believes Bokoni can succeed. A good mining project starts with a good ore body, but that alone is not enough. For Bokoni, the board approval was supported by a completed definitive feasibility study across mining, processing, infrastructure, capital cost, and execution work streams. The technical basis was independently reviewed, and the financial model was also subject to third-party review. Importantly, the board approval was based on a completed definitive feasibility study with strict stage gate compliance criteria. Importantly, Bokoni is not starting from a greenfields position. Existing mine workings, the concentrator plant, chrome recovery plant, and surface infrastructure provides a practical platform for development. That combination of study work, independent review, and brownfield infrastructure gives management confidence in the execution basis. This slide answers the key strategic question: why does Bokoni matter to ARM? Bokoni materially changes the scale of ARM Platinum by adding approximately 350,000 ounces to 400,000 ounces annually at steady state. It also improves the quality and resilience of the portfolio by adding a large, high-grade asset with a competitive cost position. What is particularly important is that the current 19-year plan only depletes 13% of the measured and indicated UG2 resource. We therefore see Bokoni not simply as another operation, but as a cornerstone asset that materially strengthens ARM's platinum for decades. This slide summarizes the core ingredients of the Bokoni investment case. The project combines a high-grade UG2 ore body, meaningful scale, and existing infrastructure. Bokoni has a measured resource of 31 million 6E ounces, with a long-term melt grade of 6.1 grams per ton. The approved 180,000 tonnes per month system is designed to improve fixed cost absorption and support margin resilience. Grade, scale, and existing infrastructure are rarely available together, and that is what makes Bokoni strategically compelling. A natural investor question is why ARM should invest in Bokoni rather than return additional cash to shareholders. Our answer is that ARM is managed for long-term value creation. Mining companies need to reinvest in quality assets if they want to sustain future production, earnings, and cash generation. Bokoni provides attractive returns, strengthens ARM's platinum portfolio, and preserves significant long-term optionality. Shareholder distributions remain extremely important, but disciplined capital allocation also means investing where the risk-adjusted value opportunity is compelling. Grade is one of the most powerful value drivers in underground mining. A higher grade generally means more metal per tonne mined and processed. We support margin resilience and lower capital intensity per ounce. Bokoni's planned average weighted grade compares favorably with ARM's existing platinum operations. What matters is not simply having a higher grade, but what that grade does to margins, capital efficiency, and resilience through the cycle. That grade advantage is one of the reasons why management believes Bokoni can generate attractive long-term returns through the cycle. This is one of the most important slides in the presentation. The approved project is not simply a continuation of the early ounces model. In many respects, it's a completely different business proposition. The scale is different, the mining method is different, and the infrastructure approach is different. The earlier approach was subscale and relied heavily on low-profile on-reef development. Whilst the approved plan is reserve-led, phased, and designed around an integrated 180,000 tonne per month operating system. In simple terms, production growth can now follow infrastructure readiness or reserve readiness and operational discipline. The earlier mechanized plan provided valuable operating lessons. Mechanized mining could be implemented, but the ore body characteristics changed the economics. Sorry. The key issue is dilution. With the steeper dip, mechanized on-reef development would lower the delivered grade and require substantially more tonnes to produce the same ounces. The approved model therefore combines conventional stoping with mechanized off-reef development. Management selected the model that provides the best balance between grade delivery, capital intensity, operating cost, and execution risk. Investors should think of Bokoni as one integrated production system. Middelpunt Hill anchors the initial 120,000 tonne per month mining profile, with Winterveld providing the additional 60,000 tonnes per month. Processing follows the same staged logic using the existing 60,000 tonne per month concentrator first, followed by the new 120,000 tonne per month concentrator. Tailings capacity is also sequenced using existing facilities initially before transitioning to the longer-term solution. The design is deliberately phased, integrated, and aligned to mine readiness. One of the lessons from the large mining projects is that risk increases when production is scheduled ahead of infrastructure readiness. The project has been deliberately sequenced so that plant productivity only comes online when the mine is ready to support it. The schedule links underground development, plant upgrades, and new plant construction and production ramp-up in a staged manner. First production is planned from the existing plant, with the new 120,000 tonne per month concentrator only commissioned later. The philosophy is straightforward. Build capacity first, then grow sustainably. This slide helps investors visualize the physical integration of the project. Middelpunt Hill, Winterveld, the existing plant, the new plant, and supporting infrastructure all sit within a focused development footprint. The shorter distances between mining areas, plant, and supporting infrastructures simplify execution and operational integration. We are not creating an entirely new mining district from scratch. We are building on existing mine access, plant infrastructure, and surface infrastructure which improves capital efficiency and execution practicality. It may be natural to assume that conventional mining means less technology, but that's not how we see the design. The objective was never to maximize mechanization. The objective was maximum economic value. Conventional stoping is the primary ore production method because it is better suited to the dip conditions and grade objectives of Bokoni. Mechanized development remains important because it establishes access and improved mining flexibility. The objective is not maximum mechanization. The objective is maximum value and a practical executable mining system. This slide shows a 3D illustration of the conventional mining layout planned for Bokoni. It uses a breast mining layout with raise lines spaced at 200-meter intervals. A conveyor belt system in the footwall drive provides an efficient and cost-effective means of transporting ore from the stope horizon to the main decline conveyor system, from where it is conveyed to surface. This is a well-established mining layout that has been extensively tried and tested. It minimizes grade dilution and thereby maximize the revenue generated per tonne mined. The credibility of a mining plan depends heavily on whether production assumptions are realistic. For Bokoni, the production schedule has been built using conservative stoping rate assumptions. The average planned stoping rate of 267 square meters per crew per month over the life of mine remained well below the industry benchmark of 300 square meters shown on the slide. Similarly, the production per half level has been limited to 10,000 tonnes per month to account for the logistical constraints associated with conventional mining. This means the project does not rely on exceptional productivity to achieve its plan. The approximate 17% stoping headroom relative to the benchmark and realistic half level production rates are important points because it supports confidence in the production schedule. This slide highlights the value of historical capital invested already at Bokoni. One of the three decline barrels at Klipgat portal has been completed and connected to the existing underground workings. That materially improves access to Middelpunt Hill and supports a more controlled ramp-up. A high capacity conveyor system is also planned for one of the decline barrels. In simple terms, the completed decline work reduces future development requirements and strengthens the execution pathway. This is a tangible example of how historical capital already invested is reducing future project execution requirements. At Winterveld, the plan is to reuse and refurbish existing infrastructure wherever possible. We plan to reuse the existing offices, change house, workshop, and surface infrastructure at the existing Brakfontein Merensky shaft and thereby minimize cost as well as schedule impact. New build is limited to essential production-enabling infrastructure. That reduces duplication, lowers upfront capital, and shortens the development timeline. This demonstrate the discipline applied in minimizing capital wherever existing infrastructure can safely fulfill the same purpose. Winterveld is not intended to carry the project in the early years. Middelpunt Hill remains the anchor during the initial ramp-up. Winterveld will produce an additional 60,000 tonnes per month to complete the 180,000 tonne per month production system. The slide shows Winterveld ramping up to steady state by approximately financial year 2030 with an average wasted grade of 5.6 grams per tonne over the life of mine. The processing strategy follows the same principle as the mining strategy. We start with existing capability, then add new capacity when the mine ramp-up is ready to support it. The existing 60,000 tonne per month plant is upgraded and recommissioned first. The new 120,000 tonne per month concentrator plant is then constructed and integrated with the existing processing system. One of the attractive features of Bokoni is the significant processing infrastructure already in existence. The 60,000 tonne per month concentrator plant provides a pathway for first PGM and chromite concentrate production in financial year 2028. The new completed chrome recovery plant also enhances revenue during the ramp-up period. The early processing capacity helps establish operating knowledge before the larger plant is commissioned. Equally important, it shortens the pathway between capital investment and first revenue. The chrome recovery plant creates an additional revenue stream from the existing 60,000 tonne per month concentrator. The additional earlier revenue generation is particularly valuable while the mine is still ramping up and the new concentrator plant is being constructed. The combination of high-grade PGM feed obtained from the conventional stoping and increased chromite recovery supports stronger revenue generation during the ramp-up phase. This strengthens the early-stage economics of the project. The new plant is what ultimately unlocks the full Bokoni scale opportunity. It expands total processing capacity to 180,000 tonnes per month when combined with the updated existing plant. The design uses proven processing technologies, including new Derrick screens, as well as Jameson Cell. We have deliberately selected technologies with established operating histories rather than relying on unproven innovation. The plant ramp-up has been planned conservatively and is aligned with the mine ramp-up. The key message is that processing capacity is added when ore supply and the operating system are ready to support it. Tailings facilities can become a critical path in a mining project. Bokoni benefits from existing facilities, which will be used alongside the 60,000 tonne per month concentrator plant for the first five years of milling operations. This reduces upfront capital intensity and supports project value through capital deferral. This approach is practical, using existing infrastructure where it's safe and appropriate, and then sequencing new infrastructure around the project readiness. This slide brings the mining and the processing strategy together. The ramp-up begins with the existing 60,000 tonne per month plant and then transitions to the combined 180,000 tonnes per month processing system from financial year 2030 onwards. The model allows for a progressive build-up in tonnes milled, with additional stockpile capacity built into the system that provides additional flexibility. Overall, this is a realistic representation of how large projects mature, and it supports a more credible operating plan. On this slide, we show how the technical plan translates into a compelling financial outcome. Bokoni has a nominal capital estimate of ZAR 15.2 billion, including a 15% contingency. The project delivers a post-tax net present value of ZAR 5.9 billion at an 18.47% discount rate and an internal rate of return of 28%. These returns are generated using a discount rate that makes full provision for the project's risk profile. We believe the combination of grade, scale, and existing infrastructure supports the strength of the financial case. The key message on this slide is the transition from an investment phase to cash generation. The early years are focused on development, capital deployment, and building production capability. Once steady-state operations are established, the project becomes a meaningful cash generator, with annual free cash flows of approximately ZAR 4 billion before financing activities. The real value of Bokoni becomes visible once the development phase is complete and the operation transitions into sustained cash generation. No mining project is immune to commodity price volatility. What matters is whether the business can remain robust across reasonable downside and upside scenarios. This slide shows the impact of price and cost changes on net present value. Commodity prices are outside of management controls, but capital discipline, operating performance, and grade control are all within our control. Commodity prices remain the principal financial sensitivity for Bokoni. The approval case uses a lower long-term basket price relative to broker consensus prices to build further project resilience. This is important because it demonstrates a disciplined approval basis that was followed in evaluating the Bokoni project. The higher price scenarios show upside potential. They are not required to justify the approval case. We have, therefore, approached the price environment with caution while preserving exposure to upside if market conditions improve. The approved nominal capital estimate is ZAR 15.2 billion, including a 15% contingency. The capital is allocated across mining, underground infrastructure, surface infrastructure, and plant. The funding approach includes three potential sources: ARM cash reserves, Bokoni operating cash generated during mining ramp-up, and debt funding if required. This flexibility of funding structure allows ARM to optimize the funding mix as market conditions evolve. This slide shows not only how much capital is required but when it is required. Capital spend peaks during the period in financial year 2029, when mining, underground infrastructure, and plant build overlap. Thereafter, capital requirements decline as the project moves through development into steady-state operations. This phasing in capital helps ARM to manage liquidity, funding requirements, and project risk. It also reinforces the point that the capital program is linked to the stage execution plan rather than being committed all at once. Every mining project carries risk. The question is not whether risk exists, but whether it is understood and actively managed. The principal risk for Bokoni include schedule uncertainty, production mining ramp-up, capital overruns, mining rates achieved, grade delivery, plant recovery, and infrastructure readiness. Each of these risks have defined controls and mitigation measures. These include development buffers, tracking of leading indicators, suitable contingency, change control, grade control, monthly reconciliations, and staged commissioning. Management view is that the risks are real. They are understood, owned, and actively controlled. The key point is that none of these risks were discovered after approval. They were identified during the study phase and incorporated into the project plan. Bokoni will also benefit from ARM's broader project delivery and operating experience. ARM has acted as managing partner across multiple major projects, including Modikwa, Nkomati, Two Rivers, and Black Rock. The Bokoni plan draws on this experience through an experienced owner's team, an EPCM delivery model, and deep platinum operating capability. The project governance structure is designed around clear accountability and appropriate oversight. Projects are ultimately executed by people. ARM has successfully developed, operated, and expanded mining assets of comparable complexity for more than two decades. Procurement is an often underestimated risk in major projects. Bokoni's procurement strategy balances three objectives: delivery certainty, local value creation, and access to specialist capability. Incumbent suppliers provide continuity and known performance. The use of local community suppliers promotes local value creation and contributes to increased employment opportunities. International suppliers are used where specialist technology, quality, capacity, or commercial value is required. All of this sits under an owner-controlled framework covering pre-qualification, technical specifications, quality assurance, and management of long lead items. Let me summarize the Bokoni case in five points. First, we understand the ore body. It is supported by a large grade UG2 resource. Second, we have selected a practical operating model that combines conventional stoping, selective mechanization at a stage scale. Third, the execution plan is phased and aligned to mine readiness. Fourth, key risks are understood and have defined controls. Fifth, delivery accountability is clear, with appropriate governance and assurance. Taken together, these factors provide the foundation for a project that we believe can deliver safely, responsibly, and with attractive long-term returns for shareholders. Let me now turn to Nkomati. Bokoni and Nkomati are different opportunities. Bokoni is a long-term growth project, whilst Nkomati is a restart opportunity. The Nkomati investment case is based on leveraging existing infrastructure, existing operating knowledge, and a defined commercial route to market. The result is a comparatively low capital intensity opportunity with attractive economics. This section is deliberately shorter and more focused. I will cover project overview, restart timeline, operating plan, capital expenditure, financial returns, and conclusion. The key question is straightforward: does restarting Nkomati create more value than remaining on care and maintenance? Management believe the answer is yes, and the following slides will explain the basis for that conclusion. The restart is positioned as a disciplined value-accretive investment. This slide reminds us that Nkomati is not a new asset. It has a long operating history across underground mining, open pit mining, and processing. Mining and processing were placed on care and maintenance in 2021 following a decline in the nickel prices. The restart proposal benefits from extensive operating knowledge and existing infrastructure. That is a major advantage because we are not starting from a blank page. We are reactivating and optimizing an existing operation. The significance of this history is that we're restarting a known operation rather than developing an entirely new one. One of the attractive features of Nkomati is the relatively short timeframe to production. The restart and plant refurbishment are expected to be completed within one year, with first production planned in the second half of FY 2027. This shorter execution timeline is possible because the restart leverages existing infrastructure and established operating knowledge. Compared with a greenfield project, the development complexity and time to value creation are materially reduced. Nkomati has a well-understood ore body supported by more than 30 years of operating history. The open pit resource include distinct geological zones with different nickel and chromite characteristics. The PCMZ contains higher chromite and moderate nickel, whilst the MMZ contains very low chromite with higher nickel. Understanding these ore types is essential for mining sequence, plant feed strategy, and product optimization. The ore body knowledge is one of the key advantage of restarting Nkomati operation. This slide demonstrate how Nkomati monetizes multiple products. The operation is not purely a nickel story. In fact, almost half of the revenue is expected to come from commodities other than nickel. The refurbished PCMZ plant will process both PCMZ and MMZ ore from the open pit mining. Nickel concentrate and coarse chromite production both contribute to the value proposition. The mine plan commences with high chromite PCMZ ore before moving to MMZ ore. The sequence follows the geological formation and mine planning logic dictated by the ore body. The proposed plan provides a mine life of 13 years with mining operations and an average of 250,000 tons per month. The plan also notes potential to bring the higher grade MMZ ore forward, which gives management additional flexibility. The processing strategy mirrors the mining strategy and is structured to optimize recovery and product value over time. Processing starts with the PCMZ ore, with MMZ ore introduced later in the plan. Over the processing life, the plan is expected to produce nickel concentrate and coarse chromite concentrate. This multiple product profile help to diversify the revenue stream and improve the resilience of the restart case. It also provides optionality as commodity market conditions continue to evolve. The production profile reflects the planned transition from PCMZ feed to MMZ feed. Importantly, the slide also identifies future processing optimization opportunities, including improved grinding and new flotation technology currently under evaluation. These opportunities are not presented as requirements for the base case. They present potential upside if further technical work supports its implementation. A major attraction of the Nkomati restart is the relatively modest capital requirement. The total capital expenditure, including 15% contingency, is ZAR 753 million. This is primarily associated with restarting the mining operations, refurbishing of the PCMZ plant, and the tailing storage facility. Because this is a restart rather than a greenfields development, the relationship between capital invested and value generated is favorable. Nkomati benefits from a diversified revenue stream, with nickel contributing approximately 49% of revenue. platinum group metals contribute a further 29%, whilst other base metal contribute 15%, which provides a meaningful revenue diversification. This diversified commodity exposure enhances the resilience of the operation, thereby reducing dependency on any single metal and mitigating the impact of commodity-specific market downturns. The project capital is ZAR 753 million, including the 15% contingency, with post-tax net present value of ZAR 764 million. The internal rate of return is 28.4%, and the payback period is 5.3 years. The recently concluded Boliden offtake agreement strengthens our confidence in the commercial pathway. This slide shows the transition from restart investment to cash generation. The initial funding requirement is followed by positive annual cash flows over the operating period. It reinforces the point that Nkomati is capital efficient value unlock rather than a large-scale new development. Let me summarize the Nkomati case. Nkomati provides a practical way to unlock value from an existing asset base. The capital requirement is modest, the execution timeline is relatively short, and the economics are attractive. The Boliden offtake agreement supports the commercial pathway. Management therefore believes the restart is a disciplined and value accretive use of capital compared to leaving the asset on care and maintenance. I would like to conclude with a broader message. Bokoni and Nkomati are very different opportunities. Both are aligned with ARM's long-term value creation strategy. Bokoni is a long-term growth platform to build long-term scale and earnings resilience. Nkomati is a capital-efficient restart that unlocks value from existing infrastructure. Both projects are grounded in detailed technical work, financial review, and realistic execution planning. Perhaps the simplest way to think about today's presentation is that Bokoni grows ARM's future, while Nkomati unlocks value from ARM's existing assets. Together, they demonstrate our commitment to disciplined long-term shareholder value creation. Thank you. Thank you very much, Jacques, for the detailed and insightful presentations. Ladies and gentlemen, we will now move to the question and answer session. Before we begin, I would like to reiterate that ARM is in a closed period, and as such, discussions today should be confined to the DFS outcomes and project approvals relating to Bokoni and Nkomati. In addition, ARM will not be participating in further investor discussions and media inquiries until the release of our results on the 4th of September 2026. We therefore encourage participants to make full use of this opportunity to raise any questions relating to the information presented today. Participants are welcome to raise their virtual hands or submit their questions via the Teams chat function. Before you ask your question, can we kindly ask you to state your name and your company. With that, we will open the floor for questions. Tim Clark. Tim Clark, the floor is yours. There we go. Can you hear me? Yes, we can hear you clearly, sir. Thank you. Thank you. Good morning. Thank you very much for the presentation. Very useful and very helpful. I'm not sure if you can share it with us, but many mining companies do actually share the full DFS. If at all possible, we would really appreciate that to work through the details of our models, because certainly some of the detail you've given us today in the slides will take quite a lot to run through and digest in full. When speaking to investors, the primary concern that's been raised is reaching that full capacity. I appreciate the commentary you've made about below benchmark stoping rates, et cetera. Just geologically, I'm not a geological technical person, but geologically, the commentary has always been that there's faulting, there's various issues with the ore body, and that reaching steady state and maintaining steady state production is the difficulty. Obviously that massively would influence your returns. I suppose my first question is, can you just try and give us a little bit more color on some of those risks around the ore body? How well you know the ore body, how detailed and how far out your drilling goes. Secondly, just on CapEx. I suppose one of the things we've seen in the industry over time is that we get told when projects blow out a little bit or CapEx increases, that the detailed engineering hadn't been completed and that we needed to be at a totally detailed engineering level of at least 60% to get assurances. We have had detailed engineering uncertainties that have then led to, especially with retrofits of plants, have led to significant CapEx increases over time. Perhaps you could give us some sense of how far you are with the detailed engineering and therefore how much risk there is on that side. I'll leave it at those two. I think there are others with questions. Thank you. Thank you, Tim. Thank you, Tim. Those are very good, insightful questions. Thank you. I think goes to the heart of risk of any underground mining project. What gives us a lot of confidence is the fact that we have operated with the early ounces model, that mine, and we did multiple different mining techniques. We did on-reef development, waste development, both of those mechanized, as well as conventional development of the raise lines and conventional stoping. It gave us a very good insight of the ore body itself and the particular risk, and all of that has been accounted for or taken into account in the detailed definitive feasibility study. I think firstly, relating to the operating history, in particular the UG2 that was mined at Bokoni, all at Middelpunt Hill, is all where Middelpunt Hill, the ore body is basically outcropping against the hill and hence the name. It's all very shallow. The earlier mining, especially on the conventional side, where they've had challenges with hanging wall collapse, is just because of the very shallow nature of the ore body in that aspect, and you don't have sufficient horizontal stresses to maintain clamping forces of your hanging wall. Where we are planning to commence mining with is deeper within the ore body. We're only starting at level 2 going down, and from the stoping as well as development that we've already done there, we've already seen that there are sufficient clamping forces that you don't have those sort of challenges with hanging wall collapse. That gives us a lot more confidence that what we've had, the operation experience in the past will not continue going forward. We've also, with regards to the ramp-up, quite well advanced with the development. We have already accessed 4 levels. We've got access to 3 out of the 6 levels required to ramp up the mine to a steady state 120,000 tonnes. That's level 2, 3, and 4. What's remaining still is 5, 6, and 7. As we are speaking, those decline developments are progressing and continuing. That also de-risks as well as increases the rate at which we can ramp up the mine compared to, let's say, a greenfield conventional mining ramp-up. On the adjust in terms also with regards to faulting and other geological disturbances, what we have seen at Bokoni is very little faulting. The ore body is extremely homogeneous. If we compare it, for instance, to Modikwa or Two Rivers, a lot less undulating. The ore body horizon on the UG2 is extremely stable. Very low pothole intensity of only 9%. The only challenge that we did have in the upper area, is the hanging wall collapse that I spoke about. That's not really due to the geology. It's more just the nature of the shallow nature of where that mining was happening at. With regards to the capital cost estimate and the risk associated with the engineering, we benefit from the fact that a lot of the brownfield refurbishment work has already been done during the early ounces, where probably most of your uncertainty and risk lies. We've already fixed up the 60,000-tonne plant. We've fixed up the underground conveyor infrastructure at Middelpunt Hill. A lot of that work is fortunately behind us. With regards to the new plant design and new infrastructure design, we have designed it up to a 40% design completion, which is in line with our stage gate policy for a Definitive Feasibility Study, which gives you a 10% accuracy. Notwithstanding that, we have increased our contingency to 15% to provide us with a little bit more additional headroom. We are quite well advanced with the mining, as well as the plant infrastructure design that we believe that we would certainly be able to execute within that capital estimate. Just an example of that, one of the key things and lessons learned from our Two Rivers, Merensky project implementation was geotechnical uncertainty in the plant design. Because of that, we have done extensive geotechnical investigations already at Bokoni. All of that has been incorporated into the design of the plant. Thank you. Thanks, Jacques. Just a follow-up. Just on contractors. Another one of those things that comes through is that South African construction skills have largely depleted or have weakened somewhat. Perhaps you can give us some indication of what you've got in terms of a contractor kind of security to ensure that everyone talks of getting the A team, the B team, and the C team, and there's certainly quite a few projects going on in PGMs at the moment. How can you convince or how can you make us comfortable that there's an A team on this project? Yeah. I think first and foremost, it starts with a very strong owners' team. Our owners' team have got a Project Manager, Morrison Maseko, who's got more than 25 years experience, also supported with very strong operational people that have got a long track record on project execution as well as operations such as J.J. Joubert, Johan Jansen. They are all integral part of the project team. Secondly, we believe in appointing a very strong EPCM model, your engineering, procurement, construction, management model. That's the model that we've used successfully over the last 20 years in executing many big projects. We're probably one of the last mining companies to successfully execute and build a PGM concentrator plant, which was the 200,000-tonne plant at Two Rivers, Merensky. There were certainly a lot of lessons learned during that implementation. There's all of those lessons we have built into our project plan for Bokoni. Your point is valid about contractor maturity and availability in South Africa. However, in our execution in Two Rivers, Merensky, we found that the skill set and the contractor capabilities that we found there was well up to standard. We are confident that we would be able to secure the right mix of skills and capability to be able to successfully execute on Bokoni. Thank you very much. Thank you, Tim. The next question will come from Betty. Andrew Snowden, you may proceed. Hi, can you hear me? We can hear you, Andrew. Right. Sorry, I put my message on chat, so I'm a bit surprised you called me. Anyway, my understanding, tunnel boring technology as well as narrow reef technology has been implemented at Bokoni. Maybe you could just speak to what you're seeing in terms of results from that so far. In your assumptions that you presented today, because I didn't pick up that you mentioned either of those. Are you assuming any benefits from what is new technology, you could argue, into account, or should we consider any gains that you achieve from better efficiencies, et cetera, from this as additional upside to what you've presented today? That's the first question. The second question is also just on the CapEx of ZAR 15.2 billion at Bokoni. How much of that is US dollar denominated versus ZAR? And maybe you could just share the ZAR/USD exchange rate that you're assuming in that, because obviously the ZAR/USD has been incredibly volatile of late, and that could be a driver for potential overruns. Thank you. Thank you for those questions, Andrew. I'll answer the first question, then the second question, we'll just get feedback from our financial colleagues to be able to give you accurate numbers on those. With regards to new mining technology employed at Bokoni, you're quite right. During the early ounces, our strategy was to try and implement mechanization as much as possible. That included both the development as well as the ore body stoping. For narrow reef equipment to be able to get access to the ore body, you have to provide trackless access to the stope horizon to be able to implement NRE. We used low-profile machinery similar to what we use at our Two Rivers bord and pillar operations. That low-profile ore development produces quite a lot of dilution, specifically on our ore body dip at Bokoni, where in excess of 20 degrees. With the significant contribution of those tons making up 50% of your overall volumes, that reduces your overall head grade milled. In the 100% mechanized case, we were looking at stoping grades coming in at 6 grams a ton. However, your development grade's coming at 2.5 grams a ton, which then reduces your overall blended grade into the milled at 4 grams per ton. For that reason, we specifically in this, having the knowledge and the insights gathered from the early ounces implementation, decided to go back to more a lower dilution, higher stoping contribution towards the total ore mix. In the current mine plan that we're using, it uses conventional stoping supported by mechanized off-reef development. We've relocated all our access tunnels from the ore horizon into the waste norite, which is a lot more stable and a lot more favorable, and we're seeing that benefit now already for the last two years since we've done that development. We're achieving very good efficiencies and productivity rates with our current development crews on-site at Bokoni. The current mine plan doesn't make use of any NRE, narrow reef equipment. I just want to say that the NRE itself delivered on all our plans. When we implemented during the early ounces, it delivered the required stoping production efficiencies, et cetera. The reason why we elected not to go forward with it is just purely the economics, specifically linked to the Bokoni ore body, which we have, with the benefit of all that insight of implementing at early ounces, chosen a more optimized mining method, which is the conventional supported by off-reef development. Coming to your second question on the tunnel boring machine. It is correct, we are currently deployed, or a tunnel boring machine is operating at Bokoni, opening up the Winterveld project. Tunnel boring is part of our plan for the Winterveld project. However, it's not dependent on it. The advance rates that we've assumed for the tunnel boring is very conservative, and it's based on what our current performance is at Bokoni with the current TBM, where we're currently doing 100 meters per month face advance on a two-shift operation, that's only working weekdays. We are planning to go onto a full co-cycle soon, which will increase that rate to 140, 150 meters per month. That's the rate that we've assumed in the feasibility study. However, in the unlikely event that TBM is not successful, you can achieve the same development targets with trackless mining when attacking from both ends, so essentially doing 75 meters per end, which is well within the reaches of trackless single-end development. The question is why did we go for TBM? It's because of the potential upside. These TBMs, in particular the type of TBMs that we're going to secure from international suppliers, can operate up to 400 meters per month, which creates significant headroom for further improvement, and that's all additional benefits that's not currently built into the feasibility study. We went with deliberately conservative numbers, that in the event that it doesn't work, we always have a fallback plan without compromising the overall plan. However, the TBM does provide significant upside if we are successful in achieving those at higher advance rates, which means that we can open up the ore body significantly quicker, have a faster ramp-up, and also overall improve the economics of the business case. Thank you. Maybe I can answer- Yeah. The CapEx one. Okay, Andrew, just on your question on the CapEx, about how much of the $15.2 billion is U.S. dollar denominated. That percentage is about 20%. 20% of that 15.2 is U.S. dollar denominated, and it is for some fleet equipment as well as processing equipment. On the exchange rate that we modeled to purchase that U.S. dollar-denominated equipment, we used ZAR 17 to the U.S. dollar. A bit of a upside from our current levels. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Andrew, do you have any follow-up questions before I move on to the next participant? No, there's plenty of questions. I'll give others a chance. Thank you. Thank you very much. Next, we will go to Brendan Ryan. Can you hear me? We can hear you, Brendan. Hi. When the original capital estimate for this project made by your former CEO, Mike Schmidt, four years ago was ZAR 5.3 billion. Now you're over ZAR 15 billion. Can you please explain the difference? Yes, certainly. You're absolutely correct. The estimate was ZAR 5.3 billion. That estimate was also based on 180,000 tonne production plan. It was based on the assumption that we would refurbish the existing Merensky plant. At Bokoni, we've got two plants, a 60,000 tonne UG2 plant, which we have already refurbished and fixed up as part of the early ounces, and 110,000, 120,000 tonne Merensky plant. The plan was to basically repurpose and change that from an Mill-Float1 to an Mill-Float2 plant, essentially that would make up the 180,000 tons. However, upon after acquiring the asset and doing a lot more detailed investigation into it, we realized that the condition of that Merensky plant requires much more extensive work to repair, as well as the requirements to convert it from an Mill-Float1 to an Mill-Float2 is a bit more onerous than initially our estimates allowed for. That was one, for that reason, we've decided to rather go for a new plant, 120,000-ton plant that is built and designed specifically around Bokoni's mineralogy. It also affords us the opportunity to include some of the more latest technologies such as Jameson Cells as well as Derrick Screens on the combination. That's one part of the additional cost increase. The second cost increase was generally what we have seen also over the last five years. That ZAR 5.3 billion was a real terms price in 2021, is that there has been quite a high double-digit capital cost escalation, we witnessed that at our Two Rivers Merensky concentrator build as well, especially during the years 2022 and 2023 following COVID, due to the impact of logistical supply chain, et cetera. The combination of that basically led to the increase. There's both a plant as well as above inflation capital cost increases. Lastly, the contingency provision that we've made in this latest capital estimate is also higher than what we've put in before. Thank you. One more question, please. Your proposed new mining system, this optimized mining system, which is going to be conventional plus mechanized. Doesn't going for conventional mining expose you to the same kind of risks that the previous owners of this property battled with and were unable to overcome? Thank you very much for that question. We have considered a number of options, as Jacques mentioned earlier, there was a mechanized option of employing the narrow reef equipment. Following that period of that early ounces, we went back to the drawing board. If you look at the nature of the ore body, is generally a steeply dipping ore body, at 25 degrees. Hence, going back to that, based on the ore body characterization, we had to really go back to a conventional stoping layout. Yes, risks. It expose us to the same risks, we have to come up with mitigation measures to make sure that we certainly address those risks. One of the things that Jacques mentioned earlier on, mining at shallower level with basically key blocks, now we're going to mine at depth with the support regime that we're going to be employing. It will be more prone to withstand whatever geotechnical challenges and issues we're going to face. The risk assessment has been done, we do believe that we can mine safely and optimally still using the conventional mining method. Thank you. Thank you very much, Brendan. Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to please remind you when you ask your question, to please state your name and your company. Or if we already have your name, your company. Next, we have Ntebogang Segone from Investec. Ntebogang, you can go ahead. Thank you. Hi, team. Can you hear me? Yes, we can. Perfect. Thank you for the presentation. I think my first question is just around understanding of operating costs. Can you please quantify and unpack how operating costs on a ZAR per ton basis are expected to evolve from the ramp-up to 60,000 tonnes and also finally to the 180,000 tonnes level, and how much at steady state the fixed costs will contribute to that total, an estimated cost of around ZAR 2,061 per tonne. What is the 6E post split on Bokoni? Then the other question is around CapEx, where given the fact that 55% of the Bokoni CapEx requirement is concentrated between FY 2027 and FY 2029, and this is during the ramp-up phase, can you break down how the three funding methods will be funding that project during that period? The final question is around what is the normalized SIB CapEx of Bokoni at steady state in FY 2032? Thanks. Ntebogang. Jacques, will you address the operating cost evolution over the ramp-up and the post-split? Then Tsu can discuss the CapEx concentration over the financial years FY 2027 to FY 2029. Jacques, you can address the last question. Yes, certainly. Could I maybe ask Tsu to start first? I'm just pulling up that full split quickly. No problem. I can give a- Okay. All right. No problem. Hi. Ntebogang, as you would have seen, I think, in the presentation, we disclosed peak funding of about ZAR 10.4 billion. That will be funded through a mix of cash reserves, cash generated by Bokoni from the 60KTP plant when it starts producing in September 2027, as well as a little bit of debt funding. How we are looking at it and just to a proviso, we're still at initial discussions with our lenders as to what that would actually look like in terms of concrete percentages, how much would be funded from each bucket. I think there was a slide, I can't remember which slide, which did show. Is it just me or are they frozen? Sure that we maintain our balance sheet flexibility as well as still being able to declare and pay a dividend to our shareholders in line with our dividend guiding principles. I hope that answered your question, Ntebogang. Sorry, Tsu. I was just asking. If I then might move to the question on the pool split. I've got it here. On the pool split on Bokoni, the platinum contributes 37%, palladium 40.7%, rhodium 7.6%, gold 1.3%, ruthenium 10.6%, and iridium 2.6%. You've also got minor metals, nickel, copper, and chrome. We have modeled as part of the chrome recovery, a roughly 7% yield of plant feed, which is in line with what we're achieving at Modikwa and Two Rivers to make chrome concentrate, 40% saleable chrome concentrate. With regards to the operating cost, the steady state long-term cost for Bokoni is ZAR 2,061 per tonne milled. If you compare that to Two Rivers, which is currently running at about ZAR 1,500 per tonne milled, and Modikwa are probably about ZAR 2,300 per tonne milled. We think, given the scale and complexity of Bokoni, our internal benchmarks, it benchmarks well. On the evolution of the cost, obviously, to be able to get those long-term real operating costs of just over ZAR 2,000 per tonne, you need certain economies of scale. When we start off with the initial processing at 60,000 tonne, your operating costs would be higher because of the high fixed cost nature of PGM mining, that will be roughly about ZAR 3,000 per tonne. It will progressively come down to ZAR 2,000 per tonne as the amount of milling production volumes increase up to steady state at 180,000 tonnes. All of these costs that I've given you are in real 2026 terms. When we do see those costs coming through in 2029, 2030, you'll obviously just have to escalate it for appropriate escalation figures. I think your last question was with regards to SIB capital cost. SIB capital cost long-term that we're looking at is ranging between ZAR 800 million and ZAR 1 billion per annum. That's also in line with what we're seeing, combination between Modikwa and Two Rivers. Two Rivers is running slightly higher because of the higher volumes processed. At Two Rivers, we're doing 300,000 tons per month. Also being a 100% mechanized mine, you've got a much higher mechanization in terms of trackless mining fleet that you've got to replace. We do think that both from an operating cost as well as, say, SIB capital cost, we've done intensive benchmarking with our other operations within ARM Platinum, and that it compares well, and that it is achievable. As part of our third-party review done as part of our stage gate approval for the DFS, that work was also extensively tested by the third party to compare against other operations. Thank you. Frozen and that we had lost connection. Ntebogang, I'm going to use you to please help me. Can I check if you heard all of Jacques' answers? I heard all of Jacques' answers. It's Tsu's answers. Actually, Jacques, I only started hearing from when you said palladium was, I think, at 40.7%. If you could repeat the pearl split. The rest I heard. Tsu, in the middle, I did not hear. Tsu, my question was essentially asking, when do you expect essentially the early revenue from Bokoni to start funding that CapEx? Okay. Thank you very much, Ntebogang. I think what we will do is just ask Jacques to repeat the pearl split. When Jacques is done, Tsu, I think you need to answer all the questions from scratch. I apologize. Thank you, Ntebogang. The pearl split for the Bokoni UG2 ore body is platinum is 37.2%, palladium is 40.7%, rhodium is 7.6%, gold 1.3%, ruthenium 10.6%, and iridium 2.6%. Thank you. Thanks, Jacques. Okay. Can I come in then? Ye s. Thank you. Okay. Thank you, Ntebogang. In terms of the ZAR 15.2 billion, the total capital bill to be spent over the seven years, what we are seeing in terms of the model is that we're expecting to spend about ZAR 2.3 billion of that ZAR 15 billion before our first revenue. As Jacques shared in the presentation, first revenue is expected in September 2027. From then on, we're then expecting the ounces that are produced will then start partly funding that capital bill such that then our peak funding, instead of the ZAR 15.2, drops down to ZAR 10.4 billion. Okay. Ntebogang, do you have any follow-up questions? Just one last question, team. I think, look, it's around capital allocation. ARM has already deployed ZAR 6.5 billion, including acquisition, early development in Bokoni, right? Now is committing a further ZAR 15.2 billion. Why is the Bokoni project the best use of capital given the size of investment relative to the implied value that it will create, or even versus allocating capital to other projects or M&A opportunities? No, it's a very good question. It's something that we obviously evaluate very carefully. As part of ARM, in our criteria to when we evaluate projects, we've got a very strict capital allocation guidance system looking at it. We always, when we're evaluating a big project such as this, compare against other opportunities available at that time, and then using a ranking system to see strategically what is the best interest for ARM and its shareholders, and which, how to allocate those capital. When we compare Bokoni's attractiveness and returns relative to other projects, what really attracts us about Bokoni is the long-term scale and possibility with Bokoni. More so the cost competitive position that we foresee it will occupy on the industry cost curve. Due to its high grade, and in that slide that we've shown there, relative to Two Rivers, it's more than double the grade, and that Modikwa, I think it's a 30% improvement compared to Modikwa. The grade that we'll get out of Bokoni, that directly translates into much more competitive unit cash cost position. We think that gives Bokoni significant resilience once the enabling infrastructure and the platform has been created by, which requires the capital investment, to sustainably be able to produce 180,000 tons per month. That combination of its position from a competitive point of view, its cash-generating ability through the cycle that we've seen, as well as its long life, means that it scores quite high on our capital allocation matrix. We regularly every time test our assumptions as well as our strategic objectives in reviewing these projects and before making a capital allocation decision. Thank you very much, Jacques. Next we will move to Brian Morgan from RMB Morgan Stanley. There we go. Hi guys. Thanks very much for the presentation. Jacques, why don't you chat to us about the decision to fix up the 60,000 tonne plant? I'm a bit worried that it's small and old, sub-economic. Chat to us maybe about the decision to refurb that and build a 120 versus building a whole new 180. Yeah. I think, Brian, it's a very good question because when you look at 120 to 180, it's not a 50% increase in cost space. You're probably scaling it. It would be probably a 30%, 40%. I haven't done the numbers rightly. You do get that economies of scale by implementing one larger plant. Also long-term operating two plants is slightly more expensive than operating one larger plant. I think that the reason why we deliberately went for the 60+, 120 option as opposed to a new 180 build is that does leave us still the flexibility in future to also double up the current plant to 240, which we'll always see as the long-term if we want to extract full value of Bokoni. The 60,000 ton plant in operating that in terms of the operating efficiencies that we have seen was quite good. We believe that with limited capital spend, which we have built into this plan, that we can get that to a sort of efficiency level approaching that we will get with a new plant. When we've upgrade and fix the plant, it will be to comparable new plant status, that we'll be able to suitable for the next 20 years of operation. Okay, cool. To get from 120 to 240, what does that involve? Is it a whole new concentrate? Obviously not, just maybe just flesh it out a bit. It would be the new current 120 plant we've deliberately designed on its footprint. It's just a modular expansion. You'll obviously have to expand your milling and your flotation section. The layout and so on has been done, that you can double up quite efficiently. There is fixed cost synergies with regards to lab, stores, concentrate load out facilities, et cetera, that you'll get with a combined plant. When we do make such an investment in future, it will be at a lower cost point compared to the current 120 build. Okay, cool. The decline is expandable. What's the sort of maximum capacity of the decline? The current decline is comprised out of two sections, Middelpunt Hill West and East. We are planning only to do the Middelpunt Hill West, which is 120,000 tonnes. The main artery, when it comes out at Klipgat Decline, we are equipping for 240,000 tonnes. That does leave us the option in future to expand and implement the Middelpunt Hill East decline to increase to 240,000 tonnes. In addition, if we do look at the Winterveld area, that area can easily expand from 60,000 tonnes to 120,000 tonnes as well. We've got quite a lot of flexibility in terms of which area to ramp up between the two shafts. That's cool. Can I just confirm, your contract with Valterra, you do get paid for ruthenium and iridium? Yes, we do. Cool. Can I just ask a question on Nkomati? Payabilities was always the issue that I could see looking at my model around Nkomati. Has that problem been fixed with Paladin? Just because of, I think the nickel market has evolved quite a lot since 2021, when the mine was placed on care and maintenance. With the significant increase in nickel capacity in Indonesia, the ferro-nickel as well as the pig iron nickel that's coming out of there. A lot of the other traditional sulfide mines around the world has come under strain, and there was quite a lot of headline news around, I think a year or two ago, about those mines closing down. Which has left the nickel sulfide concentrate market in a bit of a deficit because of those mines closing down. We have been able to, in this current market context, to be able to secure significantly better terms compared to what we had in the past. I think that's probably one of the biggest value unlocks that gives us confidence about the future economic resilience of the Nkomati operation. Okay. Last question. It's not related to Nkomati or to Bokoni, but it indirectly is. The Merensky project at Two Rivers, we haven't heard much about that. It does require some capital. Where are we with that one? Thanks, Brian. We will answer those questions when we report results on the 4th of September. The guidance that we've been given is today to stick only to Bokoni and Nkomati. Apologies. Okay. That's fine. Thank you. Thanks, Brian. Next we've got Thobela Bixa from Nedbank. Thobela, you can go ahead. Yeah. Morning, everyone, and thanks for the time. A few questions. Yeah, I think similar to other investors, bit shell-shocked around the ZAR 15 billion CapEx announcement. Especially given that you have already spent quite a bit of money, can you just give us some comfort on some of these numbers? Then perhaps related to that is, just on the returns that you state in terms of what you think you can achieve, do those include the money or the capital that's already been spent? I calculate on my numbers, I think it's roughly ZAR 4.2 billion from FY 2023 to FY 2026. That's the first question. Just in terms of the targeted grade of over 6 grams a tonne, I think given the history of the mine, it does seem like a best-case scenario, given that the mine has in the past more or less struggled to achieve around about the 4.5 grams per tonne. Just talk to us as to how do you believe you achieve that on a more sustainable basis, then I'll come back with my last question on Nkomati. Thank you. Thank you very much, Thobela. Just going back to the slide on the capital spend, you'll see the breakdown there, in terms of what elements build up to ZAR 15.2 billion. I think Jacques, during the presentation, did also mention that we have already spent some capital in things like your Klipgat Decline. Because one of the three decline is already hauled, that is actually not included here. We've already spent ZAR 77 million on the 60-kilotonne chrome recovery plant, therefore that is not included here. Initially with that 60- kilotonne, we did really spend some money to refurbish that. The only delta that will be spent now will be to upgrade and bring it to the latest state in terms of that. With the benefit of that 60- kilotonne giving us an early start, compared to when we had to maybe delay and build a new construction. In terms of the capital breakdown, those are basically your breakdown. You can see that mostly goes into mining. Jacques mentioned that we're already now hitting level 4 of the 8-level build mine, almost halfway. Establishing that infrastructure, making sure that we create that enabling environment, that will really make operating conditions conducive for our crews so that they can really deliver optimally. Also, it has been mentioned that even in terms of the rates that we have scheduled, like your 267 sq m per crew, it's more on the lower side. It's realistic, achievable. Should there be an upside, obviously that will have an uplift in terms of the returns. Our scheduling of this ZAR 5.9 billion is basically limited to the 19-year life of purchase of concentrates. At the end of that 19 years, we'd have only basically extracted approximately 13% of the UG2 ore body capacity. There's still going to be value to be unlocked beyond 2046, which means when we get there, we'll have to go back obviously into the renegotiation of the purchase of concentrates. There is a potential upside if you look at the ZAR 5.9 billion NPV that we have modeled at this point in time. I'm not sure whether I've covered all the questions that were asked. Just a question, if I may, Phillip, on the grade. Okay. Our confidence in that. Thobela, you're quite right. In the past, we only achieved a grade of 4 grams per tonne into the plant mill. However, that was premised on the mechanised mine approach that we had. There were two sources of feed into that that made up that grade. The one is your on-reef development, which, because of the mechanised mine approach, your development access needs to be on-reef to give access for the NRE fleet into the stope horizon. Because of the ore body dip, specifically at Middelpunt Hill, you're carrying quite a lot of waste dilution with that on-reef development. Our average grade achieved there was around about 2.5 to 2.7 grams per tonne. Then the stoping from the NRE, there we did achieve 6 grams a tonne, sometimes approaching up to 7 grams a tonne in those areas. However, the development tonnes as your early contributor dominated the feed into the plant, that brought that average down from your 7 grams from a stoping down to around about 4 grams a tonne. What's different going forward now is that we are committed to a conventional mine design, which minimizes your dilution incurred during stoping. More importantly, we've gone to an off-reef layout. All of those on-reef low-grade tonnes, we are now capitalizing, that those access tunnels are going into the footwall, into the norite, which means that the amount of tonnes that we mine and deliver is only the stoping tonnes with a little bit of conventional development for your raise lines. That means that your average delivered grade into the mill is 6 grams per tonne. We're quite confident about the ability to be able to achieve those grades. It's consistent with the results that we have received for the stoping during the early ounces. Thank you. Yeah. Maybe just some comment before I ask my next question is, I guess, the reason I asked my first question around the CapEx number is really if one thinks about the ZAR 15.2 billion, it's roughly just over 40% of market cap. There is still money to be spent on Merensky, even though perhaps it's almost done, and then there's Surge Copper. I guess, we will have to have some thinking and some discussions during results around capital allocation, especially given that the ferrites division, which has been sort of your the cash cow within the business is perhaps entering into some downturn. My final question is on the free cash flow that is projected from Nkomati over ZAR 600 million. I guess, the business has in the past struggled to have a positive EBITDA number or put it this way, that it has been sporadic in terms of positive profitability in the business. What has changed now and what are perhaps some of your price assumption to achieve this or how are you planning to do things differently to achieve that over ZAR 600 million free cash flow? Yeah. Thank you. If you look at Nkomati, the principle difference that we do see, apart from the fact that we're putting the mine on care and maintenance, we've got the opportunity now to scale the mine to the optimal production profile, as well as the right fixed cost structure to support that mine. Secondly, also the primary reason why the economics this time around is substantially better improved, is because of the improved offtake terms that we have secured. That probably account for about 90% of the variance, compared to what we had in the past. That just flows through straight into the economics. We are quite fortunate that the capital spent, as well as the time to production, essentially as it is a brownfield existing restart, is quite modest and it's relatively quick, which means that we get into a cash-generating position from a very early stage. Okay. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much, Thobela. Ladies and gentlemen, once more, I'd like to remind you that we are in a closed period and that discussions will be limited to the DFS outcomes of Bokoni and Nkomati. I also just want to highlight that we are prioritizing the virtual hands over the chat. As we go along, we see that a lot of the questions in the chat are answered as we go through the Q and A via virtual hands. Next, I will move to Mandi Dungua from Camissa. Morning, Phillip and team. Thanks for the opportunity to ask questions. It's Mandi from Camissa Asset Management. I think my first question is the operating unit cost on Bokoni. Why is that lower than Modikwa, given it's the same mining method and my sense is Modikwa is larger. Shouldn't it be higher? The next one is, PGM markets are notoriously volatile. This is a relatively long-dated project, and in that period, if I look at your sensitivity, a 10% reduction in your basket price assumptions results in a ZAR 3 billion investment case. We've seen ZAR 3 billion valuation. If we've seen significant reduction in the basket price earlier this year, it was significantly lower at the start of 2025, what happens in the event that you've got a long-dated, say like the basket price is at a lower level than what you assume for a significantly prolonged period? What then happens to your funding options for the project? Maybe I could take the first question and then Tsu the second one. Mandi, on your question, it's a good observation, between Modikwa and Bokoni because they are essentially the mining method that we are proposing is very similar. There's a lot of similarities between the two operations. However, also the projected unit cost from a rand per ton operations, we do foresee that they're very similar between the two, being operated in the same area. It primarily comes down to the grade difference between the two operations. The in-situ grade at Bokoni from a resource point of view to start off with is higher, and that's because of the average reef width at Bokoni is about 70 centimeters, whilst at Modikwa is only 60 centimeters. For the same mining cut, being 1.1 to 1.2 meters wide, you do recover more chromite content and higher grade, Bokoni benefits from that. The second one is that Modikwa is currently operating only at about 120,000 to 130,000 tons per month underground from UG2, which is the higher grade stoping content, and the balance is made up with lower grade Merensky as well as open pit mining. Whilst Bokoni, we're planning at 180,000 tonnes pure underground UG2. That also contributes to the better grade performance. In that comparison in the presentation, we've shown that Bokoni has roughly about 40% higher grades, 6.1 grams a tonne versus circa 4.5 grams a tonne currently that we're achieving at Modikwa. That difference, having a similar rand per ton operating cost, however, having that 40% better grade and more metal content feeding into the mill for the same tons milled directly translates into a better unit cash cost on a rand per ounce basis. Thank you. Mandi, just on your question on our funding options. If the prices were to fall off, so to speak. Yes, obviously the cash generated then from Bokoni would then be placed under pressure. Yes. We still have a number of options that are available to us. Again, we still have the own cash reserves. Also, we're also just not looking at the balance that we're sitting on, but just to also remind that we do have other businesses that are generating cash. Without going into details in terms of the funding that has been offered to us or in terms of initial discussions. In addition to the vanilla debt funding, which takes the form of revolving credit facilities and term loans, we are also looking at invoice prepayment or invoice discounting as an option. Also, we have the Harmony collar that we do have in place, that we can tap into. There are quite a number of options, Mandi, in terms of funding Bokoni if its own cash proves insufficient to sufficiently offset the ZAR 15.2 capital bill. Thanks for that. Maybe a final question on recoveries and grade to Thobela's question. If I look at Modikwa over the last while, that 87% recovery rate isn't achieved for that operation in particular. Again, a similar operation mining method and plant, why would you be able to achieve it at Bokoni sustainably over time? Because I'm assuming that's very important for your unit cost outcomes. Yes, Mandi. A very good observation. I think the answer there lies in the detail. If you look at the current makeup of the tonnes milled at Modikwa, roughly about half of it is coming from underground UG2, which is very comparable to what we're planning at Bokoni. In that instance, the plant there is getting the average of 87%. There's about probably 25% of the volume is coming from Merensky, which is a lower grade running at about 2.6, 2.7 grams per tonne. There, the plant is achieving about an 80% recovery. Lastly, about a quarter of the production, also about 30,000, 40,000 tonnes is coming from open pit volume. Open pit being because the material is oxidized, we're only achieving about a 60%-65% recovery on the open pit material. Combined, that reduces the overall recoveries at Modikwa to about 80%. At Bokoni, we are only planning to process the high-grade stoping UG2 from underground, which gives us the 87% recovery, and that is comparable to what Modikwa is achieving on similar material. In addition, what also gives us confidence is that it is in line when we were only milling stoping tons during early ounces, the high-grade feed. We were also seeing those recoveries even through the existing 60,000-tonne plant. We are quite confident that we would be able to achieve the 80% recovery at that type of grade feed into the mill at Bokoni. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mandi. I will now move to the chat. Bruce Williamson, your question on the 6 April split has already been covered. Jacques, I just want to make sure when Thobela asked questions around the pricing assumptions that we used at Nkomati, did we answer that? It is one of the questions from Garth Berry on the chat. Maybe I can answer. Thanks, Tsu. Just to answer on Nkomati. For nickel, we used a long-term price of $17,890 per tonne. For copper, $10,400 per tonne. Thank you very much, Tsu. Okay. Next, I will move to the other question on the chat. Tsu, it's also for you. It's coming from Andrew Snowden from 921. He says: "Not related to the upcoming reported results. Given the added CapEx spend and timing of peak CapEx, can you perhaps comment on the group dividend policy over the next few years? Net cash will likely be more stressed than it's been over the last few years. Are you comfortable to fund the dividend with debt? Should investors expect a fall in dividend with a view that they can expect a higher dividend later as and when there's positive free cash flows from the project? Okay. All right. No problem. Thank you, Snow. Yeah. Yes, Bokoni is a significant capital project, and has been mentioned on the call. The funding plan has been deliberately phased, and includes cash generation during the ramp-up, debt funding and cash reserves. We did that to preserve balance sheet flexibility and also to make sure that we still stick with our dividend guiding principles, wherein we've communicated that we aim to pay dividends of between 40% and 70% of the dividends from our underlying operations. That would remain unchanged. In terms of whether our net cash would be stressed, it wouldn't be stressed. We'd still be in a net cash position. As the project moves from ramp-up into steady state, with those free cash flows coming through, obviously then the shareholders would then be expecting additional dividends that come through, basically as a function of our dividend guiding principle, because we say 40%-70% of the dividends coming from our underlying operations. I think the last part of the question was around whether we would consider utilizing debt to pay dividends. Firstly, we don't need to. Secondly, it is not our policy to do so. When we take out debt, it is for a specific purpose and it's for actually funding a project and not to pay dividends. We believe if you take out debt or loans to pay out dividends, then you're kind of initiating an unsustainable dividend-paying practice, as you will. Andrew, we're not planning on taking out any debt to pay dividends. I think our cash remains robust, not stressed, with the expectation that the dividends will improve from current levels once the project goes into steady state. Thank you very much, Tsu. The next question is from Bruce Williamson, again from Integral Asset Management. Will you be selling the chrome concentrate to a local trader at the mine gate or exporting it yourself? The second part of his question is, what is the average UG2 reef width and the planned stope width? As Jacques mentioned earlier on, for Bokoni, the average reef width is 70 centimeters, and the stope width will be anything between 1.1 and 1.2. In terms of the chrome, obviously we do have an agreement with Valterra in terms of the smelting and processing. Those things are part of that purchase of concentrate agreement. If I may just add, the chromite itself, currently the concentrate that we'll be producing in addition to the PGM concentrate that Phillip alluded to, would be exported. And we in the past, at our Two Rivers operations, we have sold to traders, basically at the mine gate where they would then pick up and take responsibility to deliver to the port. We are evaluating also alternative mechanisms, if there is more cost effective, if we do export it ourselves. That decision hasn't been made yet. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Phillip. Thank you, Jacques. Next, I will take a question from Wang Dong Hui. I hope I said it correctly. I know that your hand was up. Would you still like to ask a question verbally? If so, could you please state your full name and the company that you come from? Okay. All right. It looks like we've lost him. He had also left a question on the chat. He was asking, what is the planned tendering period in terms of the EPCM contract? Thank you for that, Wang. We have already gone out. We're quite far advanced with the process. We've already gone out on inquiry to obtain proposals from the EPCM contractor. Those tenders have already closed, so we are currently in the adjudication phase, and we hope to make a decision on that soon. Thank you very much, Jacques. We have a question from Dikeledi Nhlapho, who's asking, what is the business model? Will this be contractor-based or owner-miner-based, and why is the choice chosen in terms of cost control? This is particularly at Nkomati mine. At Nkomati mine, it will be a contractor base. Also, as Jacques already mentioned, in terms of your tender processes, those processes are currently underway and well advanced. The reason being, we didn't have to really incur the upfront massive capital in terms of equipment procurement and all that. We looked at the low capital model, and basically that we'll be able to sort of get into positive cash flows within a short space of time. Thank you very much, Phillip. I think you should take the next and what seems to be the last question on the chat. There's an individual called Bongo. They're asking, "Is the surrounding infrastructure of the Nkomati mine ready for transport, or will this create a potential bottleneck? Look, initial assessment has been done. Jacques mentioned the issue of risks, which is a process that we go through in terms of assessing, quantifying the risk and coming up with mitigation measures and allocating that risk to someone accountable to make sure that those issues are addressed. That is one of the things that has really been taken into account, and there are measures to really address that, to make sure that there are no unexpected consequences as a result of that. When we do a project review, we look at the holistic picture. Thank you very much, Phillip. Ladies and gentlemen, before we close off, I would just like to ask if there's any further questions or any further clarifications that are required. Okay. All right. That concludes the conference call for today. A recording will be made available on the ARM website as soon as possible. On behalf of the ARM management team, we would like to thank you for your time, your engagement, and your insightful questions, and we appreciate your continued interest in ARM and its projects. We wish you a pleasant day ahead. Goodbye.