Good morning, everyone. This financial year has been one of investing in our ecosystem for the future growth of delivering integrated healthcare, as well as delivering strong results from our core retail business. You will see that in the presentation we have shown the group results for the financial year end, as well as the performance of core retail. Important to note is the once-off property gain of ZAR 103 million in the prior period in the wholesale segment with regards to the IFRS 16 release from the acquisition of Midrand Warehouse. The main aspects from a statement of comprehensive income perspective are revenue growth of 9.3% and total income growth of 8.7%, 9.5% excluding the property gain in the prior period. After excluding the property gain and investment in the ecosystem and non-recurring expenses in the current period, which we will unpack in the subsequent slides, expenditure increased by 8.5% and operating profit by 14.8%. four other points to note in the statement of comprehensive income is finance costs, profit from associates and joint ventures, tax, and non-controlling interest. Net finance costs increased by 3.3% from the prior comparable period. Excluding finance costs from IFRS 16, net financing costs increased by 7.1%. This increase is mainly due to the additional overdraft facility being used in the current period. The increase in the profit from associates and joint ventures is due to the performance of Kaelo, Genop, and Kena that has offset the loss in Dis-Chem Life of ZAR 50 million. The effective tax rate has remained fairly consistent from the prior comparable period. Non-controlling interest increased due to the strong performance of minority interest stores and oncology. In the statement of financial position, there is an increase in property, plant, and equipment due to the net 31 new retail stores opened during the period and investment in computer hardware. Intangible assets increased due to additional software build, including the enhancements on the app and broader e-commerce offerings. The inventory holding remained consistent from the prior period, despite the opening of a net 31 new stores to achieve the medium-term target in day stock cover. Trade and other receivables have increased with the growth in the wholesale debtors book on the back of external sales growth of 11.3%, as well as additional service income earned. Other assets have increased due to the preference shares acquired in Dis-Chem Life of ZAR 189 million. Bank loans have reduced to the quarterly capital repayments that have been made. Other liabilities have reduced due to the redemption of Benefit Points with the launch of Better Rewards and reduction in the foreign supply chain financing. At year-end, the Benefit Point liability was only ZAR 3 million. Revenue has been broken down between the wholesale and retail segments. Retail revenue has grown by 9% to ZAR 36.6 billion, with like-for-like revenue pleasingly growing by 5.3%. This growth was influenced by the opening of a net 31 new retail pharmacy stores, strong growth in both the pharmacy and health categories, as well as the launch of Better Rewards. For the 17 weeks under the Better Rewards program, which launched on the October 21st, retail revenue increased by 9.6%, with participating Better Rewards brands increasing by 12% compared to the corresponding period and volume growth of 18.7%. External wholesale revenue growth has been well supported by the growing TLC franchise model at 16.4% and the continuing support of independents at 7.2%. The TLC franchises have grown from 240 stores at February 2025 to 280 stores. Total income for the group has increased by 9.6%, excluding the property gain in the prior period, with total income margin moving from 30.7%- 30.8%. Retail total income grew by 12.2%, with total income margin increasing from 50.3%- 51.1%. The increase in margin is attributable to the increase in trade terms of 18.4% against purchases growth of 7.4%, as well as transactional gross margin growth ahead of sales growth in healthcare and medical category. Wholesale margin declined from 8.2%- 7.2% due to the mix of products sold, promotions into the external customers, as well as the impact of certain procurement costs and rebate impact of lower inventory levels in the current period. Moving on to retail operating expenditure. Retail expenditure has increased by 15.7% from the prior period. Excluding the investment in the ecosystem and eliminating non-recurring expenses, retail expenditure increased by 9.8%. There has been a 14.9% increase in depreciation, mainly as a result of the IFRS 16 depreciation, additions to computer software and hardware, as well as fixtures and fittings for the new stores and renovations. Occupancy costs have increased by 9.9%, predominantly due to the increase in electricity charges. Employee costs, still the largest expense within the retail segment, increased by 11.5% and when excluding the investment in X, bigly by 10.3%. Like-for-like employment costs continue to be well maintained at 3.5%, which is lower than like-for-like revenue of 5.3%. Other operating costs increased by 26.2% and 9.8% when excluding the investment in X, bigly and non-recurring expenditure. This increase is mainly due to the increase in IT related costs, courier costs and advertising. Rui will elaborate further on the investment and non-recurring expenditure that has been incurred in the period versus the expenditure in the core retail business. Wholesale has done well in the current period, with the increased warehouse space to keep expenditure growth at 2.6%. Depreciation has decreased by 24.3% due to the reassessment of the residual values of buildings in the current period. Employment cost growth is predominantly due to the additional staff in the Longmeadow warehouse, as well as the annual increases. Operating profit for the group declined by 11.9% from the prior period due to the investment in the ecosystem and non-recurring expenses. Excluding these costs, the operating margin improved to 5.4%. EPS and HEPS for the period is ZAR 1.042 and ZAR 1.037 per share, which is a decrease of 17.1% and 17.3% respectively for the period. When excluding the investment and non-recurring items, EPS and HEPS increased by 18% and 17.7% respectively. We now move to working capital in the statement of financial position. Debtors days is being well managed and has increased by two days due to the increase in the wholesale debtors book and additional income earned in the period. Inventory days have reduced from February 2025, with the sell-through of the SCP buy-in in the prior period and the strategic plan to reduce inventory days. That has been partly offset by the additional inventory held for Better Rewards products. Overall, net working capital days improved by one day when compared to February 2025. When looking over the 12-month period, the rolling stock days have improved from 79 days- 77 days. The store inventory has increased by one day due to the additional stock held for Better Rewards products. The waterfall graph depicts our cash movement in the current period, with a decrease of ZAR 429 million since February 2025. Cash inflows have come from normal trading and working capital movements. Cash payments have been made for taxation, finance costs, dividends declared, as well as for lease payments, CapEx, and loan repayments. Included in investing activities is also the ZAR 189 million relating to preference shares acquired in Dis-Chem Life. Expansion CapEx is mainly driven through the opening of our new stores and investment in information technology enhancements across both retail and wholesale. Maintenance CapEx has increased with additional warehouse space and renovations of existing stores and head office premises. I now hand over to Rui to take you through the retail trading performance. Thank you, Julia. If we describe our retail trading performance, we start with core category market shares. Across our core categories, we've gained market shares, predominantly a function of the introduction of the Better Rewards program that launched on the March 21st. The design of the program, which I reference to later on in the presentation, talks to call to actions that encourage the consumer's integration of the ecosystem. As a function of that, when we think about the penetration of the basket across our core categories in terms of what belongs in the Better Rewards space, and the way that we use elements like the Pharmacy Boost to drive dispensary traffic, we have gained market shares across dispensary, personal care and beauty, healthcare, and medical, and baby care. Of specific relevance is the market share gains in dispensary and healthcare and medical. The way that we've positioned ourselves as a group and what we chase down is security of foot traffic around healthcare services and certainly a destination healthcare retailer. If we look at core category performance off the back of those market share gains, you would have seen revenue increase strongly across dispensary, personal care, healthcare and medical, and other. Baby care down at 5.3%. That really is a story of two halves. Significantly down considering a decline in the market in the first half of the year or prior to the Better Rewards launch. Subsequent to the Better Rewards launch, we started to see value gains and volume gains in baby care for the first time in the last 36 months. It really talks to the commoditized nature of the baby basket and how price sensitive consumers are on the majority of baby. A big contributor to baby is obviously paper, so nappies and wipes, as well as food, areas where Better Rewards are very prominent. We have started to see a shift in baby care. Again, pleasingly strong revenue growth in dispensary and healthcare and medical. Point to note, the dispensary revenue growth has been influenced by the introduction of GLP-1s. We see and continue to see high penetration of GLP-1s. That will come off a bit as a function of that GLP-1 revenue in the base, but we continue to see growth in the GLP-1s driving dispensary revenue growth. A change in total income margin, and again, across the entirety of the year, there has been an improvement across all categories. Important to note, considering that we launched Better Rewards on the October 21st. We specifically talk about the margin profiles of the period prior to Better Rewards and a period post Better Rewards. I think considering the disruptive nature of Better Rewards, very, very positive results, strong change in revenue growths, indicative of market share gains, and then certainly increased and protection of total income margin, which talks to the manner and sustainability of the funding of the program. If we move on to the slide where we break down the ecosystem, again, I think it is important, just as a function of how the investment in the ecosystem through X, bigly labs and the investment on Dis-Chem Life has been made, it is important to break them down into the contributing factors. When you look at our group, and Julia described it in the way that she presented the financials, and I will talk to the numbers and reiterate the principle when you look at our group, core retail, that includes our health-funded products, which are growing ahead of core retail. I think when you look at core retail, you also have to exclude the non-recurring expenses, which I touch on more in the next slide. Then we have got the investment in the ecosystem. If you think about how X, bigly has come to life, obviously you have to upfront that investment, and by investment, typically because it is resource-focused, it is through the income statement. We also use consultants to build out work parcels or parcels of work that became important in our ambitions to move from retail pharmacy to integrated healthcare provider. It is important to split those two to demonstrate the performance of the core retail machine, which is ultimately how the stores are trading. Then we have our wholesale segment, which we report on traditionally. If we look at the trading performance of core retail and we break down those numbers, what you start to see is when you combine all of the elements that I described previously, our operating profit down 6.9% as a function of the investment that we have made in the ecosystem. If you had to split the investment in the ecosystem and the non-recurring expenses, they are really two buckets. ZAR 330 million has been invested across the ecosystem and to fund the continued improvement of Dis-Chem Life, ZAR 27 million of the ZAR 330 million has gone into Dis-Chem Life. Just over ZAR 300 million has been invested in X, bigly labs. As I said previously, that investment was made over the full financial year. Importantly, the realization of the efforts that have come from the investment are starting to play into the back end or played into the back end of fiscal year 2026. Some of the initiatives that landed that were in the control of X, bigly labs, Better Rewards, the design and the implementation of Better Rewards as a reimagined reward program, and certainly the mechanism that we see as a group to reduce the cost of care and open up value in the South African consumer wallet. Store of the Future. Store of the Future, very much a project that was run out of X, bigly labs. The conceptualization of a physical space that did justice to the purpose of the brand and coordination of that to not only deliver a reimagined space, but to change the ways of working, to disrupt how we think about clinic and pharmacy, which I will talk to separately, and the establishment of every other vertical of X, bigly labs, which I will talk to you in the next slides. The way that we think about that investment into fiscal year 2027 is that it will return a net positive return just purely as a function of X, bigly labs having the opportunity over the 12 months to generate a return, which was quite different to how we thought about it in this year, where some of the initiatives that were worked on were only launched in the last quarter. Also, you have to strip out the non-recurring expenses, so the property gain that influenced the base, but more importantly, the retiring of the Benefit Card program. What that essentially was the Benefit Point that we used as tender that lay in the system, that we encouraged utilization of up until April. At year-end, ZAR 3 million of that still existed, but a significant portion of the ZAR 105 million, which are non-recurring, was the retirement of the program. In conjunction, we were already discounting the Better Reward brands. In addition, there was overspend in marketing on the Better Rewards launch. Obviously, that Better Rewards marketing material now goes into a maintenance period, and there is a reduction in the expense. In total, the non-recurring expenses make up a significant part of the core retail machine. If you take all of that out, core retail traded really well, profit before tax up 27.2%. That shows or driven predominantly by two metrics, our like-for-like number which was north of 5% from a revenue perspective, and our retail payroll number, which is our biggest contributor to the cost line, just north of 3.5%. The establishment of operating leverage driven by the continued deployment of Framework 2 and obviously the benefits of the implementation of Framework 1 and the relationship between retail revenue growth and total income, as we have described previously, has generated positive operating leverage in the core retail trading performance. If we move to X, bigly labs, maybe just a reminder of the innovation unit and what it controls. Bringing to life X, bigly labs was really a manifestation of areas of the business that were underinvested in, and an acknowledgment that not only to change the business from a pharmacy retailer to integrated healthcare provider, but also to change the ways of working that would be suited to the market that we operate in. The market that we operate in remains highly competitive, and servicing what becomes more and more of a value-conscious consumer. I think the tribes do justice to how we think about the investment in X, bigly labs and the return associated with the investment we're making along each of those tribes or verticals or areas of control. The first one is integrated digital engagement. Integrated digital engagement basically is the investment that we're making on controlling how we shape up as a brand in the world of e-commerce. We are close to launching our reimagined application. The way that we think about that reimagined application, already the infrastructure that sits behind it has found its way from an omnichannel perspective into Store of the Future. It's modernized, it's integrated. It's a big lift on what existed previously, and certainly, we believe it will be as competitive as any retailer app in the market. Integrated health enablement. This is really the investment that we make on the extension of our health funding solutions to build out and to control benefit design of health funding solutions. Customer lifecycle value. Customer lifecycle value holds and controls not only the way that we communicate in a personalized way with customers, but also the way that we shape up and evolve the Better Rewards, as I said, important and certainly the tool that integrates into how we think about unlocking value for customers and reducing the cost of care. Commercial decision intelligence, which is basically aligned with how we think and how we use data to inform the way that we retail. Commercial decision intelligence has been very active in the way that we've reimagined our promotions, the way we've integrated the Better Rewards into our promotional mechanisms. Wholesale innovation, which Chris will talk to separately. The TLC brand and the way the TLC brand ultimately plays out into the network. Basically, Dis-Chem and TLC brand servicing ultimately what would be the solution of our health-funded products. Enterprise acceleration, which really creates efficiencies across the organization, both internally and externally. The biggest piece of work being chased down by that tribe, really reducing the cost of dispense, and that has been brought to life, and I'll touch on it a bit later, in the way that we've designed and implemented Store of the Future. If we move on to X, bigly labs from an update perspective. From an integrated digital engagement, as I said, we relaunch our app. We're also making significant progress into other e-commerce channels. Our app will mirror, certainly from a digital perspective, the presence that we have in our physical space. Simply the foundation and the way that we think about our digital space is anything that is enabled in the physical space, we enable digitally, and we ensure the consistency of any omnichannel experience that we have in our physical space consistent with that of the digital space. Integrated health enablement. This continues to be focused on using our customer base for lead generation purposes and driving the return improvement in both our health and life businesses. Customer lifecycle value. As I said, we continue to personalize consumers' experiences, certainly linked to Better Rewards, really focused at the evolution of Better Rewards. We are adding to the Better Rewards basket, I'll talk to a little bit about when we look at the metrics of Better Rewards, the basket of Better Rewards continues to evolve. Certainly, the way that we think about boosts, encouraging interconnectedness of our ecosystem and driving ecosystem utilization, you will see play out into the fourth quarter of this calendar year. Commercial decision intelligence continues to track the way that we unlock promotional effectiveness. In addition, it controls and improves the way that we think about ranging for working capital and margin purposes. Was very active in the ranging exercise that went into Store of the Future. Wholesale innovation is really around supporting the TLC proposition and strengthening this as we chase more and more independent penetration with the TLC brand. Enterprise acceleration. As I said, really focused at reducing the cost of dispense and also extensions of how we've reimagined the way that we offer our clinic solutions. Moving on to Better Rewards. I think it's important just to remind everyone of the mechanics of the program. The mechanics of the program were built off the learnings of Extra Rewards, which was an instant discount program at point of sale that was centered at our policyholder base, obviously the consequences from a retailing perspective that we saw in that program. A base reward program that is collectively funded by participating vendors, as well as the use of what is inefficient Benefit Points, partnership funding from ourselves. Just repurposing some of the funding that was assigned to Benefit Points and paid out to partner associations directly into the Better Rewards basket to arrive at a base 10%. It's stackable in principle as a program, it allows the principles of an additional 5% in the way that we stacked up the Pharmacy Boost and the Capitec boost. That encourages simple call to actions from consumers to increase their average level of discount, those boosts open up other areas of funding in our ecosystem that drive specific commercial objectives. The Better Rewards program is designed to generate value immediately at point of sale, not delayed gratification. It's also built and centered around what is the most relevant healthcare basket in South Africa. The brands that were selected to be part of the Better Rewards program were selected as a function of their commoditized nature, the value of the brand participating, the importance of that brand and that product in the health basket of a South African consumer. If we look at the Better Rewards metrics, this to me is probably the most interesting slide. If I try and do justice to explaining it, on the left-hand side, we have total sales growth in value, total sales growth in volume, total income margin. We divide the pre-Better Rewards period, the March 1st, which is the beginning of our financial year, to the October 20th, 2025. That would have been an environment where we would have traded with the old Benefit Point program. We show the October 21st- May 19th, which is the period we reported to post year-end, across our financial year-end, effectively six months worth of Better Rewards data. We show the periods in comparison to one another. I think the important thing firstly is from a total sales growth perspective, 8.3% in the prior Better Rewards period, compared to 9.2% in the period post Better Rewards. Of course, the 9.2% is highly discounted. If you think about the contribution of Better Rewards brands to total front shop trade, it's significant. In real terms, that number is much higher and in actual fact, better reflected in volume. Pharmacy at 11.9% moving up to 12.9%, driven not only by GLP-1 mix, but also by the call to action, which is the Pharmacy Boost and the Better Rewards program attracting pharmacy volume and value, which isn't discounted because of the way that the program is stacked up, but improving the pharmacy revenue growth and in turn, driving share gains for ourselves. We break the front shop, the front shop going from 6.4%- 7.2%. Importantly, Better Rewards brands going from 6.1% in value growth to 11.8% in value growth. Obviously, the 11.8% is highly discounted, and if you look at that same line in volume, you see Better Rewards brands going from 5.7% in volume to 18.7% in volume under the program. Those are significant share gains for participating brands, which anchors their investment in the Better Rewards program. Non-Better Rewards brands dropped from 3.9% in volume to 0.1%. Interesting, that is a relatively good performance and really driven by the frequency gains in shopping traffic that we're seeing, which I'll talk to in subsequent slides. Most importantly is the total income margin. 30.8% from the March 1st- October 20th, shifting up to 31.6% from the October 21st- May 19th. Again, this talks to the sustainability of the mechanism of funding. If you think about what I described in how the Better Rewards program is stacked up in the overview, what you have in this environment is you have what is effectively a fully funded program as a function of vendor participation in the way that we've reimagined the use of what was being paid out under the Benefit Point program and to participating partners. We look at the next slide that shows market share gains across Better Rewards. What this slide shows, as read by Nielsen, is our market share gains, in the months of June, July, August, September, and October, compared to the prior months, the same prior months. You would typically see a trend of 0.3%, 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.1%, 0.2%. That is what we traditionally see in market share gains as a function of us just growing slightly ahead of the market from a new space perspective. This is across the total market. This is across all front shop core categories. We then launch Better Rewards, you see the incremental percentage point gains go from 0.2 percentage points on average to 0.8 percentage points, 1 percentage points, 0.9 percentage points, 1.1 percentage points, and 1.5 percentage points. Effectively what we are seeing is we are getting more shoppers coming to our environment, we are taking more share of the markets that we play in. When you think about the three most important metrics of a disruptive launch such as Better Rewards, strong value growth, sales value growth, market share gains in value and volume, and total income margin protected. That talks to the sustainability of the design principles of the program and super encouraging considering the evolution of the program that's held within X, bigly and what it potentially does to the retail machine across fiscal year 2027 and onwards. We move on to the next slide. The next slide really demonstrates the relationship between frequency and average discount. As I've said previously, the most important metric I track is the average level of discount on the program that consumers are experiencing. The average level of discount does a few things for me. One is it talks around the penetration of boosts that we build and the relevance of the boost to every single South African that engages with our program. As you can see when we started, month one as denoted by the legend, when we started, the average level of discount was 11.1%. It makes sense as a function of the base reward being 10% and low penetration into things like the Pharmacy Boost, the Capitec boost, and the cover boost. If you track that average level of discount across the months of the program, up until the end of May, you see it gradually tick up from 11.1%- 11.4%, 11.6%, 12.2%, and 12.3%. By implication, what that is meaning, considering the basket has stayed relatively static, is that you are seeing higher penetrations of the boosts and you're seeing higher average level of discounts. That means people are more engaging and they're certainly understanding the principles of stackability of the program. If you look at the two lines below, this really describes the halo effect of the Better Rewards program. What that talks about is the trips per shopper in a cumulative way across each of the months. If you had to take the comparative base, which is the lighter green line, month one, two, three, four, five, and six, you would have seen the cumulative number of trips of an identified shopper. In month one, starting at 2.76, and by the end of month six, almost eight shops over the six months on average. What you're seeing on the Better Rewards program is that 7.94 shops moving up to 9.63 shops. Effectively, almost a 1.7 additional shops for everyone on our program. We continue to see the jaws open between historically how people shopped and the number of trips that people shopped versus what we're seeing now. If you had to multiply that delta, extended, extrapolated over a full 12 months, then multiply it by the number of benefit cardholders that we have or Better Rewards cardholders that we have, we are potentially looking at anything north of ZAR 20 million additional trips from shoppers as a function of the Better Rewards program. The reason for that, relatively clear in the next slide, when we look at the value passed back to customers by boost type. This is effectively up until the 19th of May from the inception of the program. It is broken down by boost, but I think what is relevant is the total, so ZAR 761 million being passed back. To give context to that, off the Benefit Point program that was previously in existence, over a 12-month period, passed back ZAR 350 million. We anticipate, certainly from a modeling perspective, we anticipated that number to be ZAR 1.45 billion. It looks like it is going to be slightly higher than that as a function of higher penetration of Better Rewards brands in the basket. One of the other elements that we have landed collectively through the retail machine and Bigly was the exciting launch of the Store of the Future concept. If you look at the Store of the Future concept and overview, initially what we wanted to do was we wanted to reimagine a store format to do justice to the purpose of the brand. I think we had changed the purpose of the brand. We felt the brand could extend from retail pharmacy into integrated healthcare provider, but certainly our biggest asset, which was space, was not reflective of that change. It was a fundamental shift, and it is a fundamental shift in how healthcare is delivered across all dimensions of retail, from store design to product assortment to tech and process flow. It did influence the ways of working. I think underneath or behind the format change really lies a difference in operating and the ways of working. I think when you think about the process that we ran, we essentially described to a multifunctional team that existed, in terms of consultants, designers, internal SMEs, and we created a space that did justice to the purpose of the brand, centered in healthcare service delivery. The way that we think about the brand, and certainly what we believe our defensive mode to be, is around healthcare services traffic, and we needed an integrated and seamless way to manage and create efficiencies in healthcare services traffic, knowing that the rest of our retail front shop would be sold to the traffic that engaged in how we delivered healthcare. So the design principles, if we talk about this concept of a T, the design principles are very clear. The T really demonstrates the focus of the Store of the Future design. Across the top bar of the T lie our integrated healthcare services, and that will consistently remain across all of our store spaces, dispensary, clinic, and cover. I think importantly, we talk a little bit about the metrics, but as we thought about integrated healthcare services, we actually reimagined the way that we did clinic cover and our dispensary. I think each of those elements would have been done in silos traditionally very different across the industry and across the market. When integrated, lifting and giving opportunities for interdependencies and driving script traffic from clinic to dispensary, and driving kind of data points from dispensary into a financial advisor space to allow cover to be sold, becomes an interesting concept to try and unpack. That's exactly how we thought about the top crossbar of the T and the way that we've reimagined the ability to do clinic, to do dispensary, and to do cover. Down the draw bar or the centerpiece of the T, we imagine the hub. I think it's important to explain the principles of the hub. What the hub is intended to do is it's intended to, using intelligent queue management system, it's intended to reduce the time of care delivery of anyone who engages in healthcare services and allow the practitioners, be it clinic sisters, phlebotomists, pharmacists, post basic qualified resources, or financial advisors, to operate at the top of their scope. Simply take the administrative burden, which comes at a significant cost, away from the clinicians and the expensive resources in store. The hub does that. It takes the admin away. It manages the routing using intelligent queue management into the healthcare services part of the business, and it integrates Better Rewards into the workflow of each of the customers and the patients. Front shop retail gets slightly lifted, and the categories get premiumized. The categories that we want to champion or play strongly in potentially get experience-led retailing. The concepts of hubs that allow consultants to use experiences to retail on the floor, depending on store sizes, they get dropped into retail spaces to increase the average revenue per square meter. Interestingly enough, because of the focus on the healthcare element of the Store of the Future design, metrically, we've been measuring the Melrose Arch Health Hub closely. One of the things that has always been important is effectively the time to dispense. As a baseline and the time motion of study that was done by Bigly, on average, it takes 17 minutes to service a pharmacy customer from when they enter the back of the queue to when their dispensing process is concluded. What this slide demonstrates is this slide demonstrates that across each of the elements of engagement, using the health hub and using a differentiated operating model in pharmacy, that 17-minute time has been reduced to just over five minutes. If you think about the cost of dispense in our business, we spend just over ZAR 2 billion servicing pharmacy. That cost is directionally or in a very linear way, linked to time. If you think about the principle of eliminating the admin, allowing the pharmacist to practice at the top of their scope, what you're seeing metrically is the achievement of that. Moving the 17 minutes down to five minutes. The same is true if you think about the workflow in clinic. If we look at the clinic metrics, the average consultation time is at 16 minutes. Generally, across the store environment, our average consultation time is at 27 minutes. Not only do we have a lifted, more dignified clinic experience with better health outcomes, we're also doing it in a shorter amount of time. That indirectly increases the capacity of the clinic, which is delivered using slotted-based bookings. If we think about how that rolls into property strategy and our expansion from the August 1st, from a beneficial occupation date from the August 1st, all stores get the Store of the Future design format. As we've said previously, this isn't a flagship store, this isn't a concept store, this is a reimagined way of delivering healthcare services, and because of that, it rolls out into any store with a BO date, post the August 1st. If you think about the property expansion strategy as a function of how that bleeds into it, this is how we've delivered property across the fiscal year 2026 year. 33 stores added with just over 34,000 sq m of space. I think more importantly is the trajectory of that into fiscal year 2027, fiscal year 2028, and then the pipeline. I do talk about the operating model post the property expansion strategy, but I think what's important is the interdependencies between Store of the Future formats and the property expansion strategy. What the Store of the Future format does as we track the incremental economics of that format against a base case of store, I think it potentially opens up the opportunity to fast-forward how we revamp the estate to bring to life the Store of the Future format, especially with the opportunities in pharmacy and clinic. That needs to be resourced in a specific way under real estate to achieve that over a shorter period than the normal revamp cycle. In addition to the stores that we are to open, there's going to be a significant amount of stores that need to be revamped as we think about Store of the Future format. Be it as it may, if we look at fiscal year 2027, we have eight stores already trading, we have 19 stores committed to and that are planned to open, and we have a further seven under negotiation. In total, 34 stores that are effectively certain for fiscal year 2027 with many more in the pipeline. fiscal year 2028, we've already got 16 stores committed, then ultimately 80 in the pipeline as a function of us assessing markets in South Africa which we are underrepresented in or under-invested in, now unlocking opportunities in that pipeline to convert to under negotiation and then ultimately committed and eventually trading. In total, committed stores in pipeline we're at 163,000 sq m, which ties to the strategic importance of property in the way that we think about being as close to the consumer as we can be. If we move into the operating model change, and I spoke about it briefly, the operating model change is something that I feel is very important to deliver on our ambitions that we've described. It really is a redefinition of the operating model of the business. I think what was inherited was a founder-led, cross-functional leadership structure. Obviously, from a succession perspective, that doesn't allow clear lines of accountability. What the OpCo model does is it ensures appropriate and sustainable structure to realize our strategy, but more importantly, to drive those clear lines of accountability. It also adapts and establishes new ways of working with X, bigly labs. One of the most interesting things that we've seen lifting or certainly allowing X, bigly labs to control the elements that are described previously is the pace at which an innovation unit like that moves, and how it forces the rest of the business to adapt. Part of the reorganization specifically is the way that we think about the traditional IT or CIO structure. That is a best example of ways of working needed to change because ultimately, IT needs to empower how we think about the tech developments in X, bigly labs. As a function of this reorganization, it's classified as a large-scale restructuring, and as such, it is a deemed a Section 189A process. After initial engagements, we anticipate that it will be concluded by the first half of fiscal year 2027. Currently, 545 employees affected across the verticals, which I will show shortly. They really are reorganized central verticals to ensure clear lines of accountability. Importantly, an additional 200 jobs will be created in areas of under-investment, specifically in marketing and in IT. If we look at the diagram to illustrate this change best, it narrows the span of control. The current span of control that is reporting into me is far too wide for it to be effective. It narrows the span of control. It creates clear lines of accountability, specifically in areas that lacked it. In commercial, and how that stacks up with the commercial intelligence abilities in Bigly. Also in the CMO space, in marketing, and how we think about positioning the brand and evolving the brand into a brand that allows us to do justice to our purpose and build out a healthcare ecosystem. Certainly investing in real estate under a real estate director and building out two verticals, which is new and revamps, considering we've landed on Store of the Future. As I said, the importance of the CRO and the way that we shape up that RT vertical to enable and empower and move at the pace of X, bigly labs as a function of how that was restructured. I'm now going over to Chris to talk about our wholesale trading performance. Thanks, Rui. Good morning, everyone. Thanks for the opportunity to present. Firstly, I want to thank God for his grace and his hand of blessing on our business. Without him, none of this would be possible. I want to thank and congratulate my whole team on their dedication and continued focus on driving sales, exceeding customer expectations on service, and controlling costs. Results like these are only possible through a team that is passionate about excellence, consistency, and continual improvement. Our customer-centric approach forms the basis of everything we do, and we see these efforts being reflected in the numbers that will be shared. This morning, I will take you through some of the details surrounding the top-line revenue numbers achieved by CJ Distribution during the 12 months of the 2026 financial year. I will be focusing on the main business customer channels driving the revenue growth that we are seeing. As mentioned by Julia earlier, wholesale revenue has increased by 13.1% to ZAR 34.04 billion. Our total income has declined from 8.2%- 7.2%. This is due to a few factors, of which the biggest one is a 15% decline in stock holding with obviously the accompanying loss in terms. If we turn to slide 37, the wholesale revenue slide, the table illustrates wholesale customer growth by channel with corresponding revenue growth. If we turn our focus to the left-hand side of the table, we can see Dis-Chem Pharmacies store growth from 285 stores- 316 stores. Revenue growth from ZAR 23.9 billion- ZAR 27.8 billion, which equates to a 16% growth in revenue from Dis-Chem Pharmacies. Support from Dis-Chem stores grew from 86.9%- 89.1%. Growth in support can be attributed to additional vendors, our warehouse in the new Longmeadow facility, and the increase in Better Rewards products. We look at the middle, TLC. Franchisee growth from 240 stores- 280 stores, which equates to a 16.7% growth in franchisee numbers. Revenue from TLC franchisees grew from ZAR 2.5 billion- ZAR 2.9 billion, which equates to a 16.4% growth in revenue. Support from TLC franchisees declined slightly from 81%- 80% due to the new franchisees that take time to mature to improve purchase compliance. We look at the right. Independent stores grew from 1,264 to 1,325 stores, which equates to a 4.8% growth in independent customers. Revenue growth from independent customers grew from ZAR 3.1 billion- ZAR 3.3 billion, which equates to a 7.2% growth in revenue from independent customers. Support from independent customers grew from 30%- 31.1%. We are pleased with the 11.3% growth in revenue from our external customers. Our independent customers grew by 4.8%. However, our revenue growth in this customer group increased by 7.2%. This gives evidence to our sales initiatives and high service delivery levels are bearing fruit as existing customers continue to move more of their spend to CJD. We are also incredibly proud to see the support from TLC customers maintaining around the 80%. Support numbers this high are comparable to the Dis-Chem support numbers, despite the fact that the TLC stores are independently owned franchise stores. We turn to slide 38, shows The Local Choice retail performance. As can be seen, the group's retail revenue has increased to ZAR 5.03 billion for the 12 months of the 2026 financial year. This is a 16.7% growth in the group's retail revenue. The TLC customer revenue growth is partly driven by front shop support and ranging that we as a supply chain offers them. We currently have 284 TLC franchise stores. We turn to slide 39, the X, bigly labs involvement. X, bigly labs has established a wholesale division or tribe, as they refer to it, which supports us in driving a new set of capabilities with specific focus on The Local Choice pharmacy franchise group. Outcomes we were working on together includes increasing the loyalty base of customers and improving their reward value. Improved profitability of the franchisees and consistent growth of a strong TLC network through deep and consistent support levels, resulting in an ever-increasing defendable and scalable network. We intend doing this collectively with X, bigly labs by building a life cycle engine using analytics-driven offers to reward loyal customer behavior, equipping the owners with operating playbooks and leveraging our corporate scale to support purchasing and data-led ranging, pricing, and promotions. Catalyzing the network growth with data-led site selections and co-created roadmaps. This supports the franchisees in executing their entrepreneurial spirit by being able to open up and own more stores. We now turn to slide 40, X, bigly labs. This is enabling the team with the capabilities to create analytics-driven offers, increased clinic use and script capture functionality through virtual doctor's consultations, and thereby offering a holistic health management system and retaining the patient within the ecosystem, providing bespoke growth insights to improve specific areas in the business and create the ability to manage more stores, enhance the loyalty integration with the goal of improving access to better health outcomes. They also facilitate network scale procurement. They provide an operating toolkit for HR, finance, and operations to create efficiencies and optimize manual processes to free up time for the owner or pharmacist to spend more time with the patient and thereby becoming the trusted neighborhood pharmacy. They also assist with digital and point-of-sale infrastructure to optimize the current digital and marketing infrastructure to improve sales growth. The benefits from these enablers will drive higher margin per script and basket, provide better access to care, reduce the cost to serve, and improve store economics. Other benefits will include creating a trusted local health partner for Dis-Chem in the market, a sense of belonging with the freedom of being an independent pharmacy owner, improving confidence in The Local Choice brand, and rewarding better health behavior, not only spend. Thank you very much for your time, and I will now hand back to Rui for the outlook. Thank you, Chris. If we just look at the outlook, I think the important thing is the trading post year end from the March 1st- May 19th. Strong group revenue performance of 19%, retail revenue growth of 8.8%, a slightly softer pharmacy number as a function of the GLP-1 mix normalizing, continued performance of front shop brands, and the continued relationship between Better Rewards and non-Better Reward brands. Eight new stores opened as I described in the property slide post year end, and wholesale revenue to external customers up 10.4%. Most importantly, the group's total income margin increased to 32.0%. That's north of what we disclosed across the Better Rewards period over six months in the Better Reward metrics, just showing the improvement of the total income margin as we have more and more Better Reward traction. Really, that's the relationship of a fully funded Better Rewards program, considering the increased penetration of Better Rewards brands. The revenue growth market share gains and improved total income margin really do highlight the sustainability of the Better Rewards programs and really the importance of this program in driving positive operating leverage and strong future earnings growth that we anticipate for fiscal year 2027. We do expect the consumer to remain constrained due to the current economic environment, the increase in fuel prices, and we do anticipate high competition from competitors. Following the establishment of X, bigly labs, there is a shift and continues to be a shift to data-led commercial decision-making that places the customer at the center of our ecosystem experience. Linked to our strategic areas of focus, the following will be prioritized into fiscal year 2027. The launch of the Store of the Future design, which integrates our healthcare services into a single cohesive customer and patient experience will be expanded. The new format already proving to reduce the cost to serve, maximize floor efficiency, and generate a higher return per sq m, and shifting integrated healthcare delivery from secondary service to the very core of our store, intrinsic with the legacy of the brand. Continued acceleration and identification of space with new store openings. We've been very purposeful about how we think about the real estate structure and vertical and the importance of revamps, Store of the Future, and space in our strategy. 34 retail pharmacy stores are planned for the year, and as I said, eight already trading. All stores that carry beneficial occupation from the August 1st will be executed under the new Store of the Future design principles. We have a restructured operating model focused on realigning the business' operating model to a more modern operational structure that really allows for a more cohesive working relationship between what is the traditional business and X, bigly labs, a tighter span of control for myself, and an important shift from a founder-less cross-functional leadership to a structure that creates very clear lines of accountability. We continue to focus on Staffing Framework 2.0 into the retail business. The relationship between like-for-like retail payroll cost growth and like-for-like revenue growth with improving total income really is what drives the enhanced return profile and strong profitability for fiscal year 2027. We continue to reimagine online retailing and healthcare access, starting with a revamp of our digital channels and the launch of our new app in the month of June. Then always a continued focus on people and culture. Employees will remain and are our priority customer, and we have a commitment to improve their health, enabling them to access differentiated rewards, really creating north of 20,000 purpose-aligned ambassadors to assist in educating the consumers on the stackability of the reward program. Before I hand over to questions, I would like to thank the team. I would like to thank every green-hearted employee who works in the organization. This has been what we denote as a very successful year, not only because we've launched market-disrupting initiatives, but we have also implemented a significant amount of change. We do realize and acknowledge that that is difficult, but we appreciate how the group has received this, how everyone has embraced the change and the renewed energy, the improved culture, and the focus on delivering the ambitions of the group and the purpose of the brand. I'll now take questions in relation to the presentation. Good morning to everyone online, and thank you for all your questions. We have grouped them under different topics, and we'll start with Better Rewards. Our first question: can you comment on the regulatory risks associated with the Pharmacy Boost? Are you considering any changes to the program as a result? In the design of Better Rewards, the regulatory risk associated with the Pharmacy Boost was considered. Fundamentally, and there's lots of literature on it, but fundamentally what the regulation precludes you from doing is discounting medicine as a function of it being SEP-driven. What the program does is it encourages the participation on front shop Better Rewards basket as a function of engaging in the pharmacy. It achieves two things. One, it improves the health outcomes as a function of driving primary care foot traffic. Two, it opens up value in the consumer wallet ultimately for them to invest in the cost of care. The way that we have designed the Better Rewards program it is entrenched in stackability. We believe that the program does not contravene any regulations. It does only one thing, which is to increase value in the South African consumer wallet. We studied it intensely as prior to launching the program. I think importantly, principally, the program has got also a lot of flexibility in the way that it's been designed because of the stackability elements. What the ecosystem has is it's got many funding pockets to facilitate the stackability and the nature of the Better Rewards program. As I said in the presentation, the important thing for me is the average level of discount being passed back to consumers and the way that we think about many different boosts and increasing that to drive market share gains for participating vendors, and foot traffic from a customer, policyholder, and patient perspective. How sustainable is the Better Rewards level of discounting? We believe it's sustainable. Fundamentally, we are a big funder of that in the way that we've opened up pockets of funding from ecosystem opportunities. If you think about cover penetrating into the average level of discount, if you think about pharmacy penetrating into the average level of discount, those are all in our control. Part of the big funding piece of the base reward is actually just looking and repurposing what was our old Benefit Point spend and some of the rebates that we paid to partners that have been centered in a Better Rewards basket. From a funding perspective, we think it's sustainable. Importantly, the vendors that are participating are also seeing differentiated shares. One of the principles that is important to acknowledge is that a small level of the 12% or just over 12% that currently is being experienced by consumers is being funded by vendors. They are seeing the value upside. Again, I spoke about an 18% increase in volume for vendors. They are seeing the upside associated with an always-on variable promotional deal that is Better Rewards, that ties into that 12.5% discount level. From a vendor perspective, it is very sustainable, and we believe in the way that it's designed and the principles of stackability and the funding options and pockets of funding that we have in the ecosystem. It's sustainable and will continue to evolve, and that average level of discount will continue to tick up. Can you explain the margin dynamics of Better Rewards? I can. We discussed it extensively in the presentation. Ultimately, if you think about the recoveries, what you have is maybe I'll do it in an example. Under our old program, if you sold something at ZAR 100, that thing today would've been sold at, let's call it ZAR 88, representing the 12% level of discount. If you think about what happens at a total income level, that ZAR 100 would've generated ZAR 30. In our world, that ZAR 100 is generating ZAR 29, and that ZAR 1 being the Pharmacy Boost that we are funding. From a Capitec perspective, it's being recovered. The base reward is either being funded from how we reprioritize spend that would've gone to the Benefit Reward Program or the recovery that we have from vendors. Effectively what you have is a relationship from a total income margin perspective of ZAR 30 on ZAR 100, and in the scenario post Better Rewards, one that is a ZAR 29 on ZAR 88. That's why you see the improvement in total income margin. Fundamentally, what you're also starting to see is very strong volume share gains and market share wins. Also as a function of the additional foot traffic, you're starting to see strong revenue value as well. How many items are there in Better Rewards now from when you started? How many more items are planned or expected for the next 12 months? That to some degree is commercially sensitive. I can tell you what we started on. We started on 140 brands. We had 180 brands. The store in its entirety will not be on Better Rewards. There is an appropriate tension that is required to ensure that vendors get share gains in our space. We will add to the basket where it makes sense in nuanced categories, and you will see that play out during the course of this financial year or certainly during the course of the calendar year, in addition to some of the boosts that we bring to market. The basket is in a good place. Currently, there are just north of 180 brands in the basket from the 140 brands that we started. Where does the supplier funding benefit come through? Is it other income, or reflected in a lower cost of sales figure? It would be a recovery on cost of sales, but ultimately it affects the total income margin. Does your data show that Capitec users are more likely to use Dis-Chem now due to the partnership? Capitec have a bigger market share in our space than they did previously. Simply speaking, more people are taking out Capitec's cards when they are paying at our point of sale. Likewise, we have a bigger market share base of the Capitec pharmacy spend, than we used to previously. The partnership is working well for both partners. The last question on Better Rewards. How sustainable is the program? Apparently, the competitors are asking vendors for similar terms which they can't afford. Do you see a risk of vendors exiting the program once the contractual term ends? As I described, we think it's very sustainable. I think one of the important things, and I say this again, is that the vendor funding that we are requesting is co-funded with many of the items on our side. If the average level of discount increases, which is the intention of the program, specifically as we think about the additional boosts, vendors are getting volume growth associated with an average level of discount of north of 12%, and that will continue to grow, with an investment into the program of something that is far, far lower. That sustainability or that delta between what a vendor is funding, versus what the program is unlocking for discounts for consumers in a very value-conscious environment, means that I think the sustainability of the program is intact. Many of the vendors have already, specifically some of the bigger vendors, have already renewed, for another 15 months from today. We do believe it's sustainable. We also have many vendors asking to join the program, which we will consider selectively depending on the composition of the basket. Moving over to some number questions. What was the selling price inflation? The selling price inflation, it's an interesting question because obviously it changes significantly on the back of the launch of Better Rewards. Considering that we have Better Rewards entrenched in our numbers into fiscal year 2027, I think it's important to distinguish the selling price inflation number in Better Rewards from pre-Better Rewards. Selling price inflation in relation to front shop items was just shy of 1%. What you see there is a significant contribution on Better Reward brands with negative price inflation as a function of the level of discount in relation to volume. Almost 40% of total front shop sales are now going through Better Rewards. You see the non-Better Rewards price inflation at around five. That gives you the blended front shop sell price inflation of one. You have much higher price inflation in pharmacy, and that's really a function of the GLP-1 mix, which is growing strongly, but obviously maturing as a function of the GLP-1 numbers being in our base. That price inflation is around 8%. What will drive further expansion in the total income margin? One will be scale. I think one of the other elements that we've spoken about that has been successfully deployed in the last quarter of the year is the promotional efficiency out of commercial excellence that is coming from X, bigly. We've become a lot better at executing promotions, in terms of how we think about return. Loss leading promotions, understanding buying forward patterns, a lot of the data-led type of retailing that is coming out of commercial intelligence in X, bigly. If you think about the three key areas, scale, promotional effectiveness in terms of return on funding. The last is really tied to Store of the Future and the way that we think about categorization. As we start to use data to categorize stock better in stores, we generate higher margins and better working capital metrics. Why did gross profit margin and other income margin within wholesale reduce during the year? I think both Julia and Chris described that it's a very competitive market. We also had the dynamic of high sales growth and lower stock holding in wholesale. That will naturally correct. We had appropriate stock levels in wholesale. Again, that dynamic was a facilitation of the Better Rewards program. When you launch a program as disruptive as that, the last thing you can afford to do is be out of stock. There was a huge buy forward in for the Better Rewards program that unlocked towards the back end of the year, and then you get that relationship between sales and stock purchases. Obviously, a big part of the total income margin in wholesale is linked to rebates associated with purchases, and as that normalizes and as you settle that, there's going to be an impact on margin with the benefit being cash flow I anticipate that that incrementally increases into fiscal year 2027. Given the non-recurring framing throughout the presentation, is the correct earnings base for fiscal year2027 ZAR 1.516 per share? Meaning, does management intend to grow off that base? To me, the better way to explain it is to break down the two buckets. The ZAR 115 million that we speak about as non-recurring, is legitimately non-recurring. A big portion of that was Benefit Point being used as we retired the Benefit Point program. If you think about that would've compromised margin directly. We also had the launch marketing costs of Better Rewards, which obviously from a budgeting perspective, no longer exist. That element plus the property gain, which was north of ZAR 105 million, ZAR 103 million. ZAR 218 million or ZAR 220 million are legitimately non-recurring expenses. Then you've got the ZAR 330 million, which is an investment in ecosystem. The way we think about that is that that investment would generate positive returns into fiscal year 2027. Of course, we've called it investment in ecosystem in this financial year because that investment happened across the entirety of the year with the benefits only really unlocking in the last quarter. What I will say principally, is that it's very difficult to track internal disruption. What Bigly is effectively internal disruption. I guess we find ourselves in a very, very competitive retail market. You either stay safe, and you become irrelevant, or you disrupt internally to stay relevant. I think what the year represents is exactly that as a function of what we've invested in Bigly. Moving to ex-Bigly Labs questions. Why do you say the ZAR 330 million and the ZAR 115 million investment in Bigly or Better Rewards is non-recurring? As without Better Rewards, retail volumes are unlikely to have been achieved. I just explained that. The ZAR 115 million was effectively Benefit Point that were part of the old program cycling through our income statement, so they legitimately don't recur because they don't exist to recur. That program has been retired. They are legitimately non-recurring expenses. The way that we frame Bigly, as I said, is we expect net positive incremental returns off that base. That invested base of ZAR 330 million did not have the opportunity to generate returns as a function of those returns only coming towards the final quarter of the financial year. Could you provide more detail on the key areas of investment and how we should think about the split between operating expenditure and capitalized development costs? The way that the innovation unit works, the majority of that expenditure is in people. We have ingested resources and capabilities across the tribes that I described to bring to life some of the return-enhancing work parcels that sit across those five tribes. The majority of that, probably 70% of the total investment will be through the income statement, which is indicative of what happened this year. Will the e-commerce launch come with additional costs, i.e., last mile costs? e-commerce doesn't come with additional costs. When you look at the last mile costs, obviously last mile costs are variable. There's a recovery from customer on last mile. I think the ambitions that we have around e-commerce, over a five-year period, need to be significant. I think in South African retail today, if you don't believe that the penetration of digital into your total sales number is not anything north of 30% over a five-year period, you would be wrong. The investment that needs to be made to establish yourself, as someone who can cater to that level of penetration in a way that doesn't compromise the economics that you see from your physical space is essentially what we are going through at the moment. We have one question on baby. Can you explain the softness in the baby market? I think it's quite evident, considering what is happening in the baby market, across all of retail, that there is extensive softness in the baby market. I put it down to a few things. I think if you look at the average birth rate in South Africa, there has been a consistent decline over the last four years. In addition, the higher margin, call it subcategories of baby, have effectively been disrupted in physical retail. Many of those items are bought in the digital space today. You end up with a very commoditized baby market in physical retail. When you dedicate a space to commoditize items in South African retail, it's unlikely to work. That's the pressure that you're seeing in the baby market. I think that is supported by some of the volume growths we're seeing in baby off the back of Better Rewards. We're seeing 30% volume growth in baby off the back of Better Rewards, which is indicative of how commoditized that category really is when you think about paper and food. A working capital and CapEx question. Are you able to provide guidance on the CapEx required to revamp the stores to the Store of the Future, and the amount needed for the expansion? With this expansion, does CJ have enough capacity to service this? There are probably 11 questions in that one. Let me try and describe it this way. I think one of the pieces of work that we are intimately involved in is understanding the incremental return profile of the Store of the Future format. We obviously have an expectation of what that is. Once that is tested, that gives us an opportunity to ensure that we deploy capital appropriately. The way that we think about that capital deployment is really around how do we bring forward what would typically be a revamp cycle? When you think about a revamp cycle, it's not to say that you wouldn't have revamped in any event. It's the cost of bringing forward that revamp. Those two metrics need to align, and they need to be, in theory, greater than your weighted average cost of capital for it to make sense to shareholders. That is the piece of work that we are doing today. When we are comfortable with that, we will come to market with our view on how quickly we intend revamping the state. A big portion of that is also the way that we stack up the real estate vertical in the OpCo model change that I spoke about. The consideration of what would be a shortened revamp cycle requires a huge amount of resources focused on revamps. In terms of CJ having the capacity, I think they definitely have the capacity. We've invested for longer term growth in the way that we think about our facilities and the geographical spread of our facilities, I feel quite comfortable with that. A couple of questions on the change in the operating model. What are the expected costs to be incurred as a result of the change in the operating model? Not incrementally huge. I think we do talk about an additional 200 roles. Obviously, those 200 roles won't be fulfilled at once. That will come in time as those teams get established. We were looking at future state. That will be well controlled, well managed. I think the group has proven the discipline of cost management in the way that we think about our retail segment and the way we've implemented Staffing Framework 1.0 and now Framework 2.0. I think the same disciplines will be handled in the way that we think about the operating model change. What is the strategy to empower and repurpose employees affected by the Section 189 to retain the intellectual property they may be holding? The way that I think about the Section 189, unfortunately, the Section 189 is quite a blunt instrument to facilitate what is very much a growth story. The IP that we have in the organization is actually, in the way that the organization is structured, is actually relatively inefficient. The organizational structures don't allow that IP to come to market. What the reorganization intends to do is ensure that the verticals that exist and the way that people are moved between the verticals allow those people to be the best versions of themselves, the best version of the skill set that they have, and ultimately, deliver the best value for the company. If you think about what the outcome of the reorganization is, and as I said, we are looking to add an additional 200, and I think it's 203 roles to the 545 affected, so there's 700 roles. If you think about the nature of what we intend to do, it would be to relocate those 545 individuals into the verticals that make sense. That, in theory, and practically, will solve any sort of risk around IP leakage. Our final question, how do you see X, bigly in the next three to five years? Conceptually, I described it. If you have to ask yourself the honest question around what is happening in South African retail, and you look at the grocers and specifically, the largest grocer, you have to ask yourself whether you stay safe. If we had stayed safe, we would have delivered excellent earnings growth. Our core retail business would have been north of 20%, but we would have under-invested in the risk associated with the future. As I said, you either stay safe and you become irrelevant over time, and there's lots of examples of South African retail that's happened, or you go through a process of internal disruption to stay relevant and to ultimately benefit from that. Why I say that is because the lift and shift on X, bigly labs was exactly that. It's forced an internal disruption. X, bigly, as a function of the things that it controls and the way that I've described it, has controlled things that have, over time, been under-invested in, but it's forced us as an organization to change the ways of working, and it's effectively led internal disruption. Which is tough, as I said, but importantly for the sustainability of the business, and the relevance of the business in the way that retail stacks up over the next three to five years. Thank you for dialing in. This brings us to the end of the results presentation.